The Aspin-Brown Intelligence Inquiry: Behind the Closed Doors of a Blue Ribbon Commission
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Assessing an Earlier Panel on Intelligence
The Aspin-Brown Intelligence Inquiry:
Behind the Closed Doors of a
Blue Ribbon Commission
Loch K. Johnson
During 1995–96, the United of cooperation (or resistance) it
States conducted a major inquiry received from outside institu-
into the status of the nation’s tions and individuals. It will also
intelligence agencies. Carried out offer conclusions about the com-
by a high-level commission, mission’s influence on
chaired in succession by former intelligence.
secretaries of defense Les Aspin
and Harold Brown, the inquiry’s METHODOLOGY
The inquiry’s avowed avowed purpose was to deter-
This article is the result of
purpose was to mine how best to adapt the archival research, interviews, and
determine how best to Intelligence Community to the the personal observations and
adapt the Intelligence challenging new world that had notes of the author, who served
emerged following the end of the on the commission staff. The
Community to the archival research included
Cold War. The inquiry served
challenging new world other purposes as well, some hav-
examination of public docu-
ments on intelligence; the
that had emerged ing more to do with domestic interviews with commission
following the end of politics than national security. members and staff took place
the Cold War. The experience of the Aspin- during the inquiry and in the
months after the commission
Brown commission sheds light on
issued its report. The author, the
the state of intelligence in the only academic on the staff,
United States in the years imme- attended every formal com-
diately following the end of the mission meeting and most of its
Cold War and provides insights informal staff sessions and spent
many hours privately with
into why this nation was taken
Chairman Aspin in the planning
by surprise in the attacks of 9/11. and startup of the inquiry. It is, in
Its history also offers lessons effect, an eyewitness account of a
about the policy value of indepen- significant political event.1
dent panels.
Despite the frequency of such
commissions of inquiry, the schol-
arly literature on them is thin,
especially in the realm of
national security, where commis-
1The author expresses his
sion doors have generally been appreciation to the members and
Loch K. Johnson is Regents locked tight against scholars and staff of the Aspin-Brown commission
for discussing with him their views on
Professor of Public and reporters. What follows is a the panel’s work. He thanks the CIA
International Affairs in the detailed, behind-the-scenes look Publication Review Board for its
prompt and helpful reading of the
School of Public and into the Aspin-Brown inquiry. It manuscript; he is grateful to Leena
International Affairs of the will describe the commission’s Johnson for her perceptive editorial
suggestions and encouragement.
University of Georgia. internal dynamics and the kind
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 1Earlier Panel on Intelligence
The idea of an Aspin-
led intelligence
Creation of the Commission
commission did not sit Besides, conservative lawmakers
well in some corners of had a different intelligence
The incident that initially drove Capitol Hill. agenda. When it came to the CIA,
the establishment of the Aspin- what most concerned them was
Brown commission in 1994 was not so much the quality of intelli-
the military encounter in Mogad- gence. That was a cerebral
ishu, Somalia, in October 1993 in debate tailor-made for the brainy
which the soldiers of a Somali Les Aspin, “The Secretary of
bureaucratic reform” and with
warlord killed 18 US Special Analysis,” with a summa cum
“only a passing interest” in the
Forces soldiers in an intense fire- laude degree in history from Yale
nation’s intelligence agencies—
fight. With US troops surprised University, a Ph.D. in economics
gained permission from Clinton
by the sophisticated firepower from the Massachusetts Insti-
to pursue a major probe into the
and determination of ragtag tute of Technology (MIT), and a
intelligence deficiencies that had
Somali forces and Americans tendency “to look at all five sides
contributed to the Somali trag-
shocked by the humiliating, tele- of a triangle.” 3 Rather, they wor-
edy. 2 In June, the media reported
vised display of killed soldiers in ried about the hemorrhaging of
the prospect of a presidential
the city, the tragedy suggested America’s secrets to the Rus-
commission on intelligence, led
yet another intelligence failure, sians. In 1994, CIA investigators
by Aspin in his capacity as
coming on top of the surprising discovered that one of their own
PFIAB chairman. officers, Aldridge H. Ames, had
terrorist detonation of explosives
at the base of the World Trade spied first for the Soviet Union
Center in February that year. The idea of an Aspin-led intelli- and then for Russia for more
gence commission did not sit well than a decade, revealing to the
Vice President Al Gore, national in some corners of Capitol Hill, Kremlin details of hundreds of
security adviser Anthony Lake, where Aspin had served in the CIA operations and the names of
and Secretary of Defense Les House of Representatives for 22 US agents in Moscow. If the CIA
Aspin sought an explanation for years (D-WI) and developed a were to be a subject of an investi-
the debacle in Somalia. So did reputation as a sharp-tongued gation, this counterintelligence
members of Congress, who were critic of the CIA. Aspin had been failure (conservatives reasoned)
quick to blame the Clinton a member of a controversial should be the focus.
administration for the defeat. As House committee that briefly
criticism of the administration investigated the CIA in 1975, The leader of the effort to block
mounted on Capitol Hill and in and, subsequently, he became an the Aspin initiative was the for-
the media, President Clinton unabashed critic of the Agency as midable Republican senator from
fired Aspin in December, less a member of the House Perma- Virginia, John W. Warner, the
than a year into his job, forcing nent Select Committee on ranking minority member and
the secretary of defense to take Intelligence (HPSCI, created in vice chairman of the Senate
the hit for the administration. To 1977). Already distrusted by con- Select Committee on Intelligence
soften Aspin’s fall, Clinton in servatives, Aspin had become (SSCI). In February 1994, he had
April 1994 appointed him chair- doubly suspect because of the written a letter to President Clin-
man of the President’s Foreign losses in Somalia. ton asking him to establish a
Intelligence Advisory Board task force to investigate the
(PFIAB), a group of civilian
advisers to the White House on
2James Bennet, “Thinking About the Day
After Tomorrow,” New York Times (24 De- 3 Bob Woodward, “The Secretary of Analy-
intelligence matters. In this cember 2000): A14; Donna Cassata, “Con- sis,” Washington Post, 21 February 1993:
capacity, Aspin—backed by Gore gress Jumps to ClA’s Aid in Its Quest for W8 and R. W. Apple Jr., “Vietnam’s Stu-
and Lake, with the president Identity,” CQ Weekly Report (7 January dent,” New York Times Magazine, 31 De-
himself “largely indifferent to 1995): 41. cember 1995: 9.
2 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3Earlier Panel on Intelligence
In frustration,
Aspin proposed in
Ames case and, at the same time, September a combined Indeed, Woolsey’s cocksure per-
reassure the public that the CIA presidential- sonality, interpreted by some as
remained a vital organization in congressional arrogance, had managed to alien-
the nation’s security. Clinton ate key lawmakers—notably
replied that he saw no need for a
commission. . . DeConcini, who accused him of
special investigation. Unhappy “total obstructionism” with
with Aspin’s role in the Somalia respect to the Congress. 7 The
incident to begin with, the Vir- DCI had been widely admon-
ginia senator pushed Congress to Senator Daniel Patrick Moyni- ished on the Hill, too, for merely
create its own panel to serve as a han (D-NY) for the outright reprimanding 11 CIA officers in
counterweight to what might abolition of the Agency, on supervisory capacities over Ames
become an overly negative report grounds that it had demon- rather than dispensing harsher
by Aspin. Hearing about strated its uselessness by failing penalties. As for PFIAB’s inquiry,
Warner’s plans, Aspin went to to forecast the fall of the Soviet some lawmakers were of the
the senator’s office in an attempt Union in 1991. Reflecting mind that since this panel was
to dissuade him. He greeted the Warner’s orientation, the SSCI part of a White House already
senator with a big grin and his staff director told the press that tarred by intelligence mistakes in
standard Wisconsin salutation, an alternative commission was Somalia, Congress could provide
“Hey, whadda ya know?” This needed to “rebuild the political a better perspective. So ran the
stab at charm often worked, but consensus” in support of the arguments for a second intelli-
seemed to have no effect on CIA. 5 gence inquiry. Try as he might
Warner, so Aspin went straight to with several more visits to
the point: two investigations Warner and his colleagues, Aspin
would be redundant and waste- Lawmakers also questioned could not get this horse back into
ful. PFIAB could do the job. As a whether the CIA had adequately the barn.
bargaining chip, he offered seats pondered its post–Cold War mis-
on the PFIAB commission to sion. Director of Central
In frustration, Aspin proposed in
individuals of Warner’s choos- Intelligence (DCI) R. James
September 1994 a combined pres-
ing—including the senator Woolsey had been unable to com-
idential-congressional
himself. 4 municate a vision of the role
commission, with the president
intelligence should play in the
choosing nine members “from pri-
new era—at least, to the satisfac-
Warner rejected the offer and vate life” and the leaders of
tion of SSCI members. “Warner’s
moved ahead with plans for a Congress selecting eight mem-
commission proposal is the only
separate inquiry. He had an bers (four “from private life” and
way to get [the CIA] back on
agenda in mind rather different four from Congress). It was a
track, because Woolsey hasn’t put
from Aspin’s. The senator viewed take-it-or-leave-it proposal: either
it there,” declared SSCI Chair-
a congressional inquiry as an this hybrid or two separate
man Dennis DeConcini, (D-AZ). 6
opportunity to buoy up the CIA inquiries. Satisfied that he would
(based in Langley, Virginia, a have enough clout on the pro-
part of his constituency), whose 5 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, “Do We Still posed commission (including his
morale had dipped dramatically Need the C.I.A? The State Dept. Can Do own membership) to rein in the
with the revelation of the Ames the Job,” New York Times, 19 May 1991: Aspin faction, Warner agreed to
E17; John J. Fialka, “Congress Is Set to the deal, sweetened further when
treachery. Warner was also con- Approve Big Review of Costly U.S. Intelli-
cerned about the public calls of gence Community,” Wall Street Journal, 26
Aspin agreed to name the SSCI’s
September 1994: A6. general counsel, L. Britt Snider—
6 Steven Komarow, “In Turnabout, the CIA
4Author telephone conversation with Les Finds Itself under a Microscope,” USA To-
Aspin, 21 February 1995. day, 15 July 1994: 5A. 7 Ibid.
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 3Earlier Panel on Intelligence
MEMBERS OF THE ASPIN-
a Warner protégé—as staff direc- citizens. The presidential side of
tor of the joint inquiry. the new commission got off to a BROWN COMMISSION
slower start. After more than two (presidential appointees in
On 30 September, Congress months of jockeying over who italics)
approved the creation of the would be among the chosen few,
Les Aspin, first chairman
bipartisan “Commission on the the Clinton administration man-
Roles and Capabilities of the aged in December to present the Harold Brown, second chairman
United States Intelligence Com- names of its eight appointees to
munity” and the president signed join the already announced com- Warren B. Rudman, vice
the bill on 14 October, setting a mission chairman, Les Aspin. chairman
1 March 1996 deadline for the The administration’s slowness Lew Allen Jr.
panel’s report. “I have warned for prompted the New York Times to
the last several years that if the warn in an editorial in January Zöe Baird
Intelligence Community did not 1995 that unless the panel got
move boldly and publicly to moving it would soon be “road- Ann Z. Caracristi
change, that change would be kill,” run over by HPSCI, which Tony Coelho
forced upon it. That has now hap- was gearing up under Combest’s
pened,” observed Woolsey’s leadership to conduct a House David H. Dewhurst
predecessor, DCI Robert M. probe into the state of intelli-
Gates. 8 DeConcini predicted the gence. 11 The House committee Norman D. Dicks
panel could be of tremendous planned a set of hearings labeled J. James Exon
help—“if it doesn’t get co-opted “IC21,” short for the “Intelli-
by the Intelligence Community.” 9 gence Community in the 21st Wyche Fowler Jr.
His counterpart in the House, Century.”
HPSCI Chairman Larry Comb- Stephen Friedman
est (R-TX), had a different In addition to a few individuals Porter J. Goss
concern: that “partisans” might who were already members of
“hijack” the commission “to vali- PFIAB, the presidential side of Anthony S. Harrington
date their efforts to dismantle the commission’s roster included
the Intelligence Community.” 10 Robert J. Hermann
two former managers from a sin-
gle intelligence agency (out of the Robert E. Pursley
then 13 in the Intelligence Com-
Starting Up the Commission John W. Warner
munity): the National Security
Membership. The Congress was Agency (NSA). Aspin’s original
Paul D. Wolfowitz
quick to name its eight commis- plan of an exclusively White
sion members: two incumbent House inquiry had been
swamped by “outsiders,” with to assemble a staff. In the final
senators, two incumbent repre-
only five PFIAB people making it compilation, nine of the 17 staff
sentatives, and four private
onto the 17-member panel. members had served in the intel-
ligence agencies (six retired); six
8 Tim Weiner, “Commission Begins Its As the White House sauntered had worked on intelligence issues
Task to Redefine Role of C.I.A.,” New York toward the selection of its quota as Capitol Hill aides; one came
Times, 18 March 1995: Al.
of commissioners, Aspin sifted from the Office of Management
9 Elizabeth A. Palmer, “Congress Creates
through piles of curriculum vitae and Budget; and one from
Commission to Study ClA’s Performance,”
academe.
CQ Weekly Report, 1 October 1994: 2824.
10 Walter Pincus, “Politics Marks Intelli-
gence Study Panel,” Washington Post, 11“Mr. Aspin: Pick up the Pace,” New York Planning. During January
1 November 1994: A5. Times, 16 January 1995: A16. 1995, as the FBI established
4 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3Earlier Panel on Intelligence
As always with
commissions, this one
security clearances, the staff
was constantly As the commissioners discussed
began to trickle into the commis- buffeted by external the panel’s objectives and likely
sion’s quarters in the New events. witnesses, national security
Executive Office Building, across adviser Anthony Lake arrived at
Pennsylvania Avenue from the the meeting by invitation of the
White House. As PFIAB chair- chairman. He offered a list of top-
man, Aspin already had a ics he thought important to
spacious suite of offices in the study. At the top: Do we have the
the president. Deteriorating rela-
Old Executive Office Building, right structure for the Intelli-
tions with Congress doubtless
adjacent to the White House. In gence Community? Are we
added to the DCI’s frustration in
these early weeks, the staff lead- keeping up with technological
ers shuttled between the two his job. So, as the commission
began its work, the Intelligence change? He observed that the
buildings for planning sessions
Community was without a direc- administration would soon name
with Aspin. Between meetings,
tor. After the administration a new DCI, as well as issue a
the chairman placed calls around
finally picked an Air Force gen- presidential decision directive
Washington, DC, and the coun-
try, consulting on intelligence eral to replace Woolsey, the (PDD) on intelligence that would
topics with his wide network of candidate was forced to with- lay out the president’s priorities.
government and academic spe- draw amid innuendos that he Most likely, the new DCI would
cialists. The questions poured had suffered ethical lapses. The come up with his own plan for
out: “What topics should we focus next prospect, John M. Deutch, a reform, Lake said, rather than be
on?” “In what sequence?” “Whom former MIT chemistry professor “brain dead” until the commis-
should we call as witnesses?” and provost, and at the time dep- sion completed its work.
“Should we hold public uty secretary of defense, publicly
hearings?” balked at leaving his job at the Aspin’s main concern in these
Department of Defense (DOD). start-up weeks was to think
The chairman maintained a through how to organize the com-
steady flow of press releases on mission’s work. For help, he
On 3 February 1995, more than
commission activities. He also turned to his associates at
three months after its creation,
made himself available for media RAND, the government-funded
the commission held its first
interviews and lectures to organi-
meeting in the staff conference think tank that carries out
zations interested in intelligence
room. Two members were absent, research primarily on defense
issues, beginning with an Ameri-
but the others visited amiably issues. It was a perfect symbiotic
can Bar Association breakfast in
and with an air of excitement relationship: RAND saw the com-
January. There he told the attor-
neys that the number one about the challenge before them. mission as a source of funding,
question facing the commission Aspin, looking rumpled as and Aspin respected the exper-
was “What is the Intelligence always, called the meeting to tise inside RAND that could help
Community for?” He vowed to order and gave a brief history of him structure the commission’s
examine closely America’s intelli- the commission’s origins, skating work. He asked RAND to set up a
gence “targets, organizations, over his early run-ins with Sena- series of strategy sessions; the
costs.” tor Warner. Staking out a search was on for an analytic
position in favor of the status framework to guide the commis-
As always with commissions, this quo, Warner expressed his con- sion. “What should the Intelli-
one was constantly buffeted by cern that some lawmakers were gence Community be doing now
external events. In December out to cut the intelligence bud- that the Cold War is over?” Here
1994, DCI Woolsey resigned, get. This would be unwise, he was the central question Aspin
grumbling about lack of access to cautioned. posed to the RAND experts.
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 5Earlier Panel on Intelligence
‘We’ve got to establish
intelligence targeting
“There’s good news and bad
priorities,’ Aspin New Executive Office Building in
news,” Aspin told the RAND staff insisted. search of government contracts,
in February. The good news was armed with fancy, four-color
that reform was likely to happen briefing books on how they would
since so many people had an organize the panel’s work. Many
interest in it, as demonstrated by of their ideas were good, but none
HPSCI’s “IC21” project and a of these policy entrepreneurs had
lively interest in the subject the close ties to Aspin enjoyed by
would have to define more pre-
inside the White House—if not in RAND, which ended up supply-
cisely the universe of subjects for
the Oval Office, at least with ing the commission its chief set of
which the Intelligence Commu-
Gore and Lake. The bad news outside consultants.
nity would be responsible,
was that all of these different
instead of the vague targeting
parties might go off in sundry Prestigious study groups inter-
list currently used.
directions, bringing chaos to the ested in intelligence reform
reform efforts. Taking on the col- sprang up, too, including forums
oration of an advanced graduate Of concern, too, was another at Georgetown University in
seminar on intelligence (punctu- first-order issue: how to organize Washington, DC, and at the
ated with quintessential RAND the intelligence agencies—and, Council of Foreign Relations in
jargon like “tilting the matrix” especially, how to overcome the New York City. 12 In March, the
and “force multiplier”), Aspin and problem of “gorillas in the stove- Georgetown group offered an
his senior staff entered into an pipes.” Here was more jargon, impressive checklist of recom-
all-morning exchange of views referring to the individual intelli- mended reforms, high among
with RAND specialists on how gence agencies acting separately them the consolidation of the
to proceed. For RAND, it was (as if in isolated stovepipes) nation’s military intelligence
imperative that the commission under the leadership of their own agencies.
establish a “baseline”—a firm strong program managers (the
understanding of how the gorillas, such as the NSA direc- By the end of February, the com-
intelligence agencies currently do tor) and beyond the control of the mission staff had drafted a “scope
their work. Then commissioners DCI. The RAND “seminar” ended paper” meant to plot out the
could consider what changes with clear marching orders from boundaries of the inquiry and,
were necessary and then Aspin: build a baseline for the working in harness with RAND,
appraise a wide range of reform commissioners. had set down the “baseline” that
proposals against the baseline. Aspin sought. The framework
RAND was not the only source of consisted of four guiding
“We’ve got to establish intelli- advice pouring into the commis- questions:
gence targeting priorities,” Aspin sion. In January and February,
insisted. Here was a “first order” the panel averaged 600 tele- 1. What are the intelligence
issue. The RAND experts pushed phone calls a day from needs of the United States in
the idea that the CIA had to be individuals (frequently job seek- the post–Cold War world?
able to mobilize information in a ers) offering guidance on how the
hurry, having access to the tele- commission should proceed. A 2. What are the intelligence
phone numbers of the nation’s similar deluge of letters fell on capabilities required to col-
top experts: agile resources able the commission, some from
to respond to “flavors of the retired generals and admirals, 12 For a report on the Georgetown colloqi-
month,” like the unexpected cri- others from citizens concerned um, see “The Intelligence Community: Is it
sis in Rwanda that had suddenly about civil liberties, a few from Broken? How to Fix It?” Studies in Intelli-
popped up when Aspin was secre- cranks. Think tanks and “belt- gence 39, no. 5 (Annual Unclassified Edi-
tary of defense. The commission way bandits” descended on the tion, 1996): 11–18.
6 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3Earlier Panel on Intelligence
lect, analyze, and disseminate Truman had sought when he cre- staff meetings were often free-
such information? ated a Central Intelligence wheeling debates about impor-
Agency. tant intelligence issues, no holds
3. To what extent do the exist- barred. “NSA is like a huge vac-
ing capabilities compare with uum cleaner,” opined one staffer
those needed to satisfy future Interviews and Task Forces at a meeting, “it collects way too
requirements for intelligence? much information.” “Which is to
On 1 March 1995, the staff held say ‘NSA sucks,’” chimed in
4. To the extent that existing its first formal meeting, with another before the former NSA
capabilities fall short, what Chairman Aspin presiding (and officers on the staff came to their
changes—organizational, the only commissioner present). agency’s defense. During a ses-
managerial, programmatic, After reviewing the origins of the sion early into the inquiry, the
or budgetary—should be hybrid panel, he reprised the staff director evoked Warner’s
made? good news/bad news remarks he chief objective for the commis-
had made to RAND. His grey- sion: Moynihan’s call for the
Finding answers to these ques- flecked eyes sparkling with intel- abolition of the CIA had to be
tions became the staff ’s abiding ligence, Aspin ended what had rebuffed. “Our goal is to sell
interest, which, in turn, led them become a pep talk with the pre- intelligence,” Snider declared.
to prepare long lists of special- diction that “we are going to “We have to establish a political
ists inside and outside the learn a great deal as individuals consensus in the country favor-
government who could help. The and do some good things.” ing intelligence.”
staff also initiated requests to
each of the intelligence agencies The staff director, L. Britt Snider, By the end of April, the staff had
asking them to provide docu- announced that questions of conducted 66 interviews, mostly
ments that explained their oversight—keeping the secret with intelligence officers, but also
“baseline” activities and budgets. agencies accountable—were off with a wide range of policymak-
And RAND forwarded the first of the table. That challenge would ers, academics, Hill staffers, and
many “project memoranda” be left to others (presumably businesspeople (given the inter-
designed to help the commission SSCI and HPSCI) to work out; est in economic intelligence that
in its planning. This opening instead, the commission was had become a fashionable topic in
memo suggested that the key going to concentrate on how to Washington). The staff recom-
question the commission should improve intelligence gathering, mended to Aspin, and he agreed,
keep coming back to as it worked analysis, and dissemination. that—instead of all the staff and
through its agenda was “how to Turning to the anticipated sched- commissioners working on every-
make intelligence both more use- ule, he said that for the rest of thing—the commission’s tasks be
ful to customers, and more used the year the commission would distributed to 11 task forces:
by them.” RAND also came go through a “discovery phase”
quickly to the crux of the organi- that would include a series of • Collection Priorities
zational dilemma facing the DCI. interviews, briefings, and formal
“The current intelligence system hearings with experts. • Macro-Organizational Issues
is organized and dominated by
the owners of collection sys- Thus began a series of staff meet- • Military Intelligence
tems,” noted the memorandum— ings, usually once a week, Restructuring
“that is, by the suppliers.” Here occasionally with Aspin presid-
were the gorillas in the stove- ing, but more often with Snider • Analysis and Production
pipes undermining the more in charge. Now and then, RAND
centralized coordination of intel- experts would sit in. In the • Programmatic Changes in
ligence that President Harry S. absence of commissioners, the Imagery
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 7Earlier Panel on Intelligence
‘Major heart attack at
the DOD!’ Aspin
• Programmatic Changes in Sig-
answered for business,” he said. “Our cus-
nals Intelligence Studeman. tomer relations are terrible.”
• New Methods of Management
Terrorism at Home
• Budget Process
In March, the president man-
• International Issues aged to persuade John Deutch to
of information, deep and wide. accept the DCI nomination after
• Personnel Policies We receive thousands of intelli- all, with the hint that he might
gence reports every day.” After be favorably considered as a can-
• Cats and Dogs (a catchall the admiral had outlined the var- didate for secretary of defense
including covert action and ious threats facing the United down the road. During his Sen-
counterintelligence) States, Aspin opened the floor for ate confirmation hearings,
questions. Deutch said that he would “move
immediately to consolidate the
The Briefings Begin
“What if we placed the entire management of all imagery col-
intelligence budget under the lection, analysis, and
On 16 March, the commissioners
control of the DCI?” former Dem- distribution.” He intended to
convened for a series of briefings
ocratic House majority whip Tony streamline the way in which the
by a panel of intelligence officers
Coelho (CA) asked. United States used satellites to
on the nuts-and-bolts of the spy
photograph intelligence targets,
trade. After greeting the group,
interpreted the pictures
Aspin—a listener and a thinker “Major heart attack at the DOD!” (“images”), and disseminated the
more than a talker—turned the Aspin answered for Studeman. information to policymakers. He
meeting over to Rudman, the vice The biggest of all the gorillas— vowed as well to rid the CIA of
chairman. A barrel-chested man the secretary of defense—would its old, cold warriors and change
with an air of confident com- not passively accept a DCI’s the Agency “all the way down to
mand honed as a battlefield encroachment on military intelli- the bare bones.”
soldier in the Korean War, Rud- gence spending. The admiral
man had gained some national smiled in recognition of the ten- If the commission and the public
notice since retiring from the sion between the DCI and the needed any reminding of the
Senate for his cochairmanship of secretary of defense. The DCI importance of intelligence, they
the Concord Coalition, a group of had, in fact, only clear authority got it—tragically—on 19 April,
private citizens interested in over the CIA and had to rely on when a truck filled with explo-
trimming the federal budget. He the soft power of persuasion to sives blew up the federal building
told the commission forcefully
convince other agencies to follow in Oklahoma City. “I think we are
that they needed first to estab-
his lead. going to see more of this,” Stude-
lish the “threshold questions.”
man warned. 13 Security
Aspin nodded, “There are six to
tightened around the White
ten really critical questions. We The briefings spilled over into the
House and the Executive Office
need to talk those out.” next day when the commission
Buildings, with the Secret Ser-
convened again to hear from
vice now inspecting each vehicle
The commission welcomed its more intelligence managers, one
entering underground parking
first briefer. Adm. William Stude- of whom observed that the ties
man, the deputy director of between intelligence officers and
central intelligence and (for the policymakers were strained and 13 Craig Gilbert, "Expect More Terrorism,"
moment) acting DCI. He sometimes nonexistent. “If we Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 21 April
described intelligence as a “river were a business, we’d be out of 1995: A12.
8 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3Earlier Panel on Intelligence
‘Our mission is to
explain to the
and prohibiting any trucks or
American people that stop that—and it has succeeded.
vans from idling in front of the intelligence is Our mission is to explain to the
buildings. Aspin asked a commis- important,’ said John American people that intelli-
sion staffer to prepare a study on Warner. gence is important.”
the US counterterrorism capabil-
ity. “‘Aerial terrorism’ seems
likely at some point,” a CIA coun- Deutch as DCI
terterrorism specialist informed
the aide—“filling an airplane DCI Gates. He reiterated the The following week, Aspin had
with explosives and dive-bomb- theme that CIA was over- dinner with Deutch on the eve of
ing a target.” American was still whelmed by all the intelligence his confirmation hearings, and
six years away from comprehend- targets that had emerged since the DCI nominee, an old friend of
ing the full implications of this the end of the Cold War. He rec- Aspin’s, asked for changes in the
warning, and how the right kind ommended that the commission commission’s “scope paper” (now
of passenger airplane—loaded establish a pared down list of in its third iteration). Deutch
with highly volatile aviation intelligence priorities and pro- wanted the commission to focus
fuel—would serve well enough as pose a method by which more on technical improvements
a bomb. in intelligence gathering. Clearly,
policymakers could communicate
their needs to intelligence man- he intended to take an active role
agers with greater clarity. He in intelligence reform and, draw-
At the Farm ing on his cordial ties with Aspin,
urged, too, enhanced authority
was not going to be shy about try-
for the DCI over communitywide
To attempt some bonding of the ing to shape the commission’s
budgets and personnel, in order
diverse commissioners, Aspin recommendations. In private
to overcome the centrifugal forces
decided to have the panel escape asides during breaks in the com-
in the Intelligence Community.
the hectic pace of Washington for mission’s meetings over the next
On his checklist were these addi-
a couple of days. The retreat took month, some commissioners
tional proposals: reduced
place in early May at the CIA began to question what they
redundancy among the eight mil-
facility in Virginia known famil- feared was too close a relation-
itary intelligence agencies; the
iarly as “the Farm” and used ship between the DCI and Aspin.
construction of better connec-
chiefly as a training site. The The commission, they whis-
tions among the “stovepipes” that
atmosphere had the desired pered, had to ensure a proper
the 13 agencies had become; con-
effect. Open collars replaced balance between independence
solidation of counterintelligence
starched white shirts and ties, and cooperation in its dealings
operations (Ames was the ghost
and commissioners joked easily with the new intelligence
in the room at many commission
with one another. Almost all director.
stayed for the full two days of meetings); and greater attention
briefings and discussions. to reform within the Directorate
On May 9, a couple of days after
of Operations (DO).
the Deutch dinner, Aspin showed
The sessions began with a panel up late for a staff meeting. “I’m
of “case officers,” the foot soldiers During Q and A, Warner took the not feeling well,” he mentioned to
of the CIA who lived abroad and opportunity to underscore his an aide, a worrisome comment
recruited indigenous spies. They philosophy about the commis- since Aspin had a long history of
had a primary message: the CIA sion’s charge. “A few of us were heart problems (surgeons had
was being asked to do too many desperately concerned that some- implanted a pacemaker in 1993).
things. “Just say no!” seemed to one was going to go in and cut up But he was able to rally enough
be the theme. The featured the intelligence budget,” he said. to listen attentively to the day’s
speaker at the retreat was former “This commission was meant to witnesses. After their departure,
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 9Earlier Panel on Intelligence
he summarized for the staff his around the country, and was con- Rudman at the Rudder
dinner conversation with Deutch tinuously on the telephone,
and asked them to strengthen asking experts for their thoughts Despite the loss, the commission
the technical side of the commis- on intelligence reform. He said had to move on. Rudman dropped
sion’s scope paper, which would nothing more about feeling his other obligations for a while
soon be distributed for comment and met with the staff leaders to
unwell. Then, on the morning of
to the White House, the intelli- keep the work on track. The
19 May he tried to rise from bed
gence agencies, and congressional briefings were now turning
officials. only to slump to the floor, the left toward the testimony of policy-
side of his body paralyzed. Aspin makers—those on the receiving
That same day, without dissent, had suffered a major stroke. Liv- end of intelligence. What were
the Senate confirmed Deutch’s ing alone, he somehow managed their information needs? How
appointment as DCI and he left to telephone for help and was well were they being served?
the Pentagon to take up his post rushed by ambulance to the Rudman assumed the position of
at CIA Headquarters, soon Georgetown University Medical acting chairman officially on
dubbed “Deutchland” by insid- Center. He could still speak 1 June, beginning a commission
ers. After a four-month quietus, lucidly when carried on a meeting with a moment of silence
the Intelligence Community at for Aspin. “There can be no bet-
stretcher into the hospital, and
last had a director again ter monument to Les than to
initially there was hope he would
(although Adm. Studeman had move this work forward,”
survive; but, later in the day, his remarked Commissioner Coelho.
filled in effectively). Deutch
brain began to swell and he fell
immediately called a “Town
Meeting,” and the CIA’s top brass into a coma. The next evening, The star witnesses for the day
assembled in the 600-seat audito- death claimed the chairman at were Secretary of Defense Will-
rium known as “the Bubble.” age 56. iam J. Perry and former national
Reflecting his concentration on security adviser Lt. Gen. Brent
technical issues at DOD, Deutch A cloud of despondency settled Scowcroft. Perry said that halt-
spoke of “a new system for the over the commission staff. Aspin ing the proliferation of nuclear
management of both our mili- and other weapons of mass
had been the primary source of
tary and intelligence satellite destruction had become the fore-
energy and direction for the
acquisition systems.” He pre- most intelligence and defense
dicted that “there would be no inquiry, and, while his haphaz- priority for the United States. He
seam, in my view, between our ard administrative style could be dwelled on the need for better
efforts and the efforts of the vexing at times, he had a HUMINT (“We focused too much
[Aspin] commission...I don’t warmth, intellect, and knowl- on the Soviet Union, at the
regard them as a problem; I edge about national security expense of places like Iraq, Iran,
regard them as an opportunity— affairs that had won over the and North Korea”), and for bet-
as a help.” staff ’s respect and devotion. ter all-source coordination of
There was a feeling of great loss. intelligence gathering and analy-
Senator Rudman took over as sis (“Nothing exists to bring it all
The Loss of a Chairman together”). Many a witness
interim chairman while the
lamented the woeful state of
White House considered Aspin’s
Between commission meetings, HUMINT, especially the lack of
Aspin attended plays at the replacement. Rudman met with precise tasking (that is, carefully
Kennedy Center and profes- the staff on 22 May and assured focused requests for information)
sional basketball games, played them the commission would “con- from policymakers and the
tennis once or twice a week, tinue on the same path that absence of good foreign language
spoke at forums in DC and Chairman Aspin laid out.” skills among case officers and
10 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3Earlier Panel on Intelligence
Joe Nye . . . informed
the commission that,
analysts. “We only have 26 Farsi
despite his interest in would continue to meet with
speakers in the Intelligence Com- intelligence, he rarely experts periodically, but most of
munity right now,” a retired had more than 40 its attention was now concen-
military intelligence manager minutes to read each trated on report writing and
informed the commission, “and day and only five interactions with commissioners
only three are able to under- minutes or so for to make sure their views were
stand excited Muslims talking to well reflected in the drafts.
each other.”
intelligence reports.
Rudman played an important
Scowcroft criticized the imbal- role during June in “working the
ance in intelligence spending Hill,” meeting with key legisla-
that favored the military. “Now tors (particularly on SSCI and
political intelligence is more all around the world, and spy sat- HPSCI) to keep them informed of
important,” he argued. “What ellites crisscrossing the heavens the commission’s progress. His
makes North Korea tick? What to provide information to Nye (an busy law practice prevented him
about the leaders of Iran?” Com- avid reader) and policymakers from giving the commission the
missioner Zoe Baird asked like him, he had only a few min- steady attention that Aspin had
Scowcroft how it was that some utes to look at the intelligence invested, however, and it was
commissions succeeded and some product each day! It was sober- clear a more fully engaged chair-
failed. “It depends on the subject ing testimony. Nye also man was desperately needed. Yet
and the circumstances,” he complained that he got “a lot of the White House had failed to
replied. “President Reagan and information, but not a lot of come up with a replacement for
the Congress were at logger- insight” from the intelligence Aspin. For a month, from mid-
heads over the Commission on reports he received. June to mid-July, the commis-
Strategic Forces in 1983. It went sion had little direction from the
nowhere. There was another com- By mid-June, the commission top.
mission on defense management had brought its discovery phase
during the Reagan years that to an end and had entered a During a brief burst of interest in
attracted little public interest, phase of analysis—trying to fig- the subject of intelligence, on 13
because the subject didn’t seem ure out what all the information July the White House picked a
that urgent. Your commission it had gathered meant in terms replacement for Aspin: Harold
suffers from that same lack of of possible reforms. This Brown, secretary of defense dur-
interest.” Still, Scowcroft viewed endeavor would last through the ing the Carter administration.
the Aspin inquiry as an “unusual summer. The centerpiece for The next day Clinton made a
opportunity” to sit down with the moving the work forward was the rare presidential visit to CIA
DCI and focus on his problems. task force. More motivated com- Headquarters. Under a sizzling
missioners attended task force noon-day sun, he stood between
Joseph S. Nye Jr., the thoughtful meetings of interest to them and Deutch and the First Lady on a
assistant secretary of defense, some asked for the creation of platform set up in the courtyard
followed Scowcroft on the agenda additional task forces, including in front of the Original Head-
and informed the commission one on intelligence and law quarters Building and addressed
that, despite his interest in intel- enforcement (of special interest the Agency’s VIPs. As if written
ligence, he rarely had more than to Baird). The staff decided to by Senator Warner, the speech
40 minutes to read each day prepare special “options papers” was a rallying cry to boost morale
(between meetings) and only five as well, so the commissioners among intelligence officers, still
minutes or so for intelligence could select which of several pos- reeling from the Ames spy case.
reports. With a reported annual sible reform directions they The president reminded the audi-
budget near $30 billion, agents would like to pursue. The staff ence that Ames’s deceit was a
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 11Earlier Panel on Intelligence
ics. Brown needed only to
preside, give authoritative
backup for staff decisions, and,
above all, pull the report together
by March and sell it to Congress.
Yet, clearly he intended to pre-
side with a strong hand—at least
when he was around. It soon
became clear that Brown would
not match Aspin’s steady pres-
ence. Aspin had thrived on the
work of the commission; here was
the joy of high policy—and a
chance to win back his good repu-
tation, sullied by Somalia and his
forced resignation. In contrast,
the Washington rumor mill sug-
Commission at work under Chairman Brown. (Photo: Studies in Intelligence) gested that DCI Deutch had
twisted Brown’s arm to take the
“terrible exception to a proud tra- and the panel soon found itself job. The commission had inher-
dition of service” at the CIA. under quite a different style of ited a forceful, yet reluctant,
“Every morning I start my day leadership than Aspin’s. chairman, whose hectic consult-
with an intelligence report,” he ing schedule would keep him
said, adding a further reassur- Brown wasted no time in estab- away from the nation’s capital
ance: “I believe that making deep lishing a commanding presence. most of the time, including the
cuts in intelligence in peacetime While Aspin had been informal entire month of November.
is comparable to canceling your and casual, with his tie askew
health insurance when you’re and his body hunched over the A Second Retreat. Before
feeling fine.” table, Brown sported cufflinks Brown arrived, Rudman and the
and a tie pin, and sat erect. staff had already decided to hold
Aspin was soft-spoken and con- another retreat to corral the com-
Brown Takes Over tent to let others talk; Brown had missioners for an intensive
a persuasive, even intimidating, workshop on the composition of
In addition to his service as sec- way of expressing himself and the final report, especially
retary of defense, Harold Brown soon began to dominate commis- regarding the recommendations
had been director of defense sion meetings (see Figure 1). the commissioners wanted to
research and engineering in the Aspin was exceptionally smart, make. “This retreat will proba-
Pentagon during 1961–65 and but Brown had a reputation for bly be our most important
president of the California Insti- brilliance—perhaps the bright- meeting,” Rudman told the staff.
tute of Technology during 1969– est of all the secretaries of Then, near the end of the com-
77. Like Deutch (who had recom- defense—with a flypaper mem- mission’s inquiry, would come one
mended him to the White House), ory for facts and figures. day of public hearings. “Les
he was a bona fide “techie” with a wanted the public to have a
strong interest in intelligence For the most part, though, it was chance to be heard and I agree,”
“hardware,” from surveillance business as usual on the commis- Rudman said to the staff before
satellites to reconnaissance air- sion. Most of its schedule had Brown took over. “Besides,” he
craft. He held the commission already been worked out under noted, “this will be a self-protec-
gavel for the first time on 14 July, Aspin, as had the task force top- tive exercise.” That is, the
12 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3Earlier Panel on Intelligence
commission would be able to
claim a certain degree of open- Commission Member Participation (U)
ness to outside views—an
opportunity to offer symbolic Number of comments and questions
reassurance to the public (a com- 350
mon role of commissions) that
the intelligence agencies were Aspin
300
back on track. Brown
Rudman
250
Commission Average
Ironically, in August just before
the retreat and long into its life, 200
the commission finally addressed
one of the major drivers of its cre- 150
ation: the Ames affair. A CIA
officer who had helped crack the 100
case warned commissioners that
“we’re never going to stop people 50
from ‘volunteering’ [i.e., spying
for the enemy]. We just have to 0 Feb
learn how to catch them earlier, Apr Jun Aug Oct Dec Feb
1995 1996
and to encourage people to report
Mar May Jul Sep Nov Jan
on those engaged in suspicious
activities.” DI/MPG Design Center 395657AI 7-04
In September, the commission
convened for the retreat at a con- putting up something that is techie commissioner who balked
ference center in Leesburg, going to go nowhere.” at lumping together photo-
Virginia, near Dulles Airport. graphic intelligence with tele-
The staff realized they were The commissioners went in a phone intercepts. One thing was
unlikely to gain a consensus dozen different directions, spend- certain: with three commission-
around every issue, but the ses- ing most of the first morning on a ers on the panel and two senior
sions would provide them with a topic that was not even on the staffers on the commission, the
valuable sense of where the com- main agenda: economic intelli- NSA was unlikely to lose its con-
missioners stood. For two days, gence, weighing whether the CIA trol over signals intelligence.
the staff presented options to the should spy on behalf of US busi- Discussion of the intelligence
commissioners (sans Warner and ness (with widespread opposition budget also produced sparks,
Senator James J. Exon [D-NE]) to the idea). Covert action—from with different factions in favor of
and received a good reading on propaganda to paramilitary oper- downsizing, increasing, or hold-
what topics and recommenda- ations—caused the most ing spending exactly where it
tions they wanted to include in fireworks, with little consensus was. Brown grew fidgety during
the final report. No votes were for or against. “It’s a dirty diaper these clashes, his right fist dou-
taken; the idea was to identify pail,” a commissioner concluded. bled and pumping up and down
worthy recommendations Disputatious, too, was an idea on the arm of his chair.
through discussion. “We should floated to consolidate all techni-
say the honest thing,” Rudman cal intelligence under one “We are in danger of becoming a
said, “not pull any punches. But command. “Wait, IMINT is differ- status quo commission,” Coelho
let’s also be realistic. No sense ent from SIGINT!” objected a warned.
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 13Earlier Panel on Intelligence
[Moynihan] singled
out ‘analysis’ for
“We will have some changes.”
special criticism, funding, misleading the Con-
Brown replied, with an edge to complaining that gress on how its money was being
his voice. the process had ‘too spent. 14
much bureaucratic
“According to whom? The DCI? layering.’ Also in October, Brown and Rud-
The SecDef?” man visited Congress to bring
key legislators up-to-date—an
The chairman’s jaw hardened. unsubtle form of lobbying—and
“Let’s put this discussion off to to solicit their opinions. Brown
later.” defense how to run his shop; so told the lawmakers that the com-
as a member of the club, I’m of mission would make four or five
On the last day of the retreat, two minds about that.... I would significant recommendations,
Brown reviewed the topics the not want to write this into legis- related to the DCI’s authority,
commission had decided were lation, but,” he added lamely, law enforcement, satellites, per-
most important. The list “rather urge the secretary of sonnel, and military intelligence.
included: economic intelligence; defense to make those changes.” “By significant, I refer to the
the relationship between law number of persons who will be
enforcement and national secu- “I think we’ve made a very upset,” he joked: “the more out-
rity; covert action; whether the important start,” Rudman con- cry, the more significant the
office of DCI should be strength- cluded at the end of the fourth recommendation.” The lawmak-
ened; whether to consolidate the day, “but there is a lot more to be ers kept their cards close to their
military intelligence agencies; done.” vests, although HPSCI Chair-
personnel issues; improving the man Combest said he would not
management of space surveil- Preparing the Final Report. release his “IC21” report until
lance (Deutch’s pet project); The glamorous activities were April 1996 (a month after the
whether to declassify the aggre- now over; no more government planned publication of the com-
gate annual intelligence budget celebrities visiting the premises, mission’s report). Senator
figure; whether to trim the bud- no more retreats, no more for- Moynihan was as feisty as ever
get; whether policy departments eign trips (commissioners and and, while he backed away from
and agencies that wanted intelli- staff had traveled to consult his earlier public statement that
gence should be charged a fee by intelligence services in Europe, the CIA should be dismantled, he
the DCI; oversight (revived as a Israel, Canada, Australia, and offered a spate of reform propos-
commission subject, at the insis- the Far East). Now it was time als. He singled out “analysis” for
tence of Representative Porter for the staff to prepare the final special criticism, complaining
Goss [R-FL]); counterintelligence report, in continual dialogue with that the process had “too much
(the Ames problem); and the those commissioners who had bureaucratic layering.”
state of HUMINT. Commissioner shown an interest in specific top-
Paul Wolfowitz saw these last ics. In October, the staff huddled
To satisfy the staff ’s ongoing
two issues as “the most spectacu- with clusters of commissioners in
quest for directions on how com-
lar failures going into this the conference room, trying to
missioners wanted the report
inquiry.” hammer out exactly what lan-
written, the commission assem-
guage and recommendations the
bled once a month during the
Brown was leery of trying to pass members desired. Goss’s concern
winter to hear staff briefings on
a new law to increase the DCI’s about oversight received added
authority at the expense of the attention when newspaper
800-pound gorilla in the Penta- reports revealed that the 14 Robert Pear, “Disclosure of Spy Agency’s
gon: the secretary of defense. “It National Reconnaissance Office $1.5 Billion Fund,” New York Times,
is really telling the secretary of had played shell games with its 25 September1995: A12.
14 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3Earlier Panel on Intelligence
specific topics. Only the techies— clear that the Dicks-Goss faction was prepared, though—however
plus Democratic fundraiser and had the votes on the commission reluctantly—to allow disclosure
now commissioner Stephen if it came to a formal division, of the aggregate intelligence-
Friedman, who had begun to dis- including most importantly spending figure, but without fur-
play a voracious interest in all Chairman Brown’s. Gen. Allen ther budget details. Several of
topics before the commission— eventually threw in the towel: “If the commissioners thought the
showed up for the technical brief- I can’t convince you to save staff language in the report was
ings, like one on the possible money, then, okay, I’ll go along.” too critical of the intelligence
consolidation of imagery opera- agencies. “Remember the under-
tions. More understandable and These meetings made it clear lying reason for the commission,”
sexier subjects, such as covert that on a good many issues the Warner stressed: “to restore con-
action, drew larger crowds of staff would face challenges try- fidence in intelligence.” Goss
commissioners. At one session, in ing to find common ground agreed: “We shouldn’t paint such
an uncommon conservative-lib- among commissioners for the a black picture. I’m not trying to
eral alliance, Goss emphasized, final report. Moreover, when the whitewash, but let’s tone this
seconded by former Senator report was finished, the commis- down.”
Wyche Fowler (D-GA), that “We sioners would need to build a
need strong language on over- consensus outside the panel. “We
The commissioners often got
sight.” “We haven’t spent enough have to sell this report to the
sidetracked, at one point spend-
time on counterintelligence,” public and the media,” Rudman
Friedman complained, as around ing 20 minutes on how to define
reminded his colleagues in
and around the table flew a bevy intelligence. A senior staffer
December. “And to the DCI,”
of policy pleas, caveats, and whispered to a colleague: “This
Dicks added.
declarations. will be like drafting a National
Intelligence Estimate: we’ll get
In the midst of partisan wars
the lowest common denomina-
At another session the prickly that had broken out in the
tor.” The wide range of views on
issue of budget cuts came up nation’s capital—this was the
the commission and the hope for
again. Representative Norman D. autumn in which the president
consensus did seem to have the
Dicks (D-WA) and Goss opposed closed down federal agencies and
effect of blurring important
the 15 percent spending reduc- departments in a budget feud
issues—a common criticism of
tion over 10 years recommended with House Speaker Newt Ging-
commissions. 15 “This will be
by a commission subcommittee rich (R-GA)—the commission
viewed as an extraordinary apo-
led by former NSA director Gen. staff continued to polish drafts of
logia for the Intelligence
Lew Allen. “We ought to stabilize the final report. Then, on 18 Jan-
Community,” Fowler cautioned,
intelligence, not cut it,” argued uary 1996, the panel convened to
Dicks, who represented a district prepare for its public hearing the drawing grimaces from Goss and
in the state of Washington where next day. The commissioners Warner. “We don’t say enough
spy satellites were built. “That went through the report chapter about counterintelligence,”
kind of cut wouldn’t muster 100 by chapter. Warner opposed per- Fowler continued. “What about
votes on the Hill.” Coelho and sonnel downsizing, since the covert action? What about envi-
Fowler countered that the com- CIA’s “morale is very low,” he ronmental intelligence? And the
mission should do what is right, warned. He also advised the com- stuff on economic intelligence
not what might be politically pal- mission to drop most of the strains credulity.”
atable; cuts were the right thing language about enhancing the
to do, since (in Fowler’s words) intelligence role of the United 15 Joseph A. Pika, John A. Maltese, Nor-
“appetites [for more money] are Nations, a “hot button” issue man C. Thomas, The Politics of the Presi-
insatiable...the public expects that, in his opinion, would dis- dency, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press,
savings.” The debate made it credit the report on the Hill. He 2002).
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 15You can also read
