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Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe-1989.doc
Josef Schmid, The Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe (1989) 1
Josef Schmid, The Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe - New Social and Psychological As-
pects. In: R. L. Cliquet/G. Dooghe/J. de Jong-Gierveld/ F. van Poppel (Eds.), Population and Family in
the Low Countries VI. (Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (N.I.D.I.) and The Popula-
tion and Family Study Centre (C.B.G.S.), Vol. 18, The Hague/Brüssel, S. 1-16.
The Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe
1
- New Social and Psychological Aspects
The European fertility decline is commonly characterized as "unprecedented". The
moments of surprise date back to the early 1970s, when the German population
dropped to below-replacement level and other European populations hesitatingly fol-
lowed this course and continue to do so. We became accustomed to this and to
some extent we enjoy the demographic notoriety we did not have in the "demog-
raphically unproblematic" 1950s and 1960s, when growing populations were ab-
sorbed by growing economies.
Statistical analysis confirms the tendency toward fertility decline: crude birth rates,
synthetic period measures, cohort or completed fertility fell in line and the differences
concerning rates of the downward slope and its speed reflect only each country's
own path to modernization (Council of Europe, 1976; 1987).
Judgements of the consequences of the fertility decline vary as well. This is revealed
by the different ways in which the decline is treated, attitudinally and politically. Fertil-
ity decline designated as "scarcity of births" or "shortage of births" implies embar-
rassment and regret, the French "la chute de la natalité" connotes catastrophy and
the German "Geburtenrückgang" (birth regress) sounds neutral and appeasing.
Regardless of a country's demographic situation and future prospects, there is the
common conviction that we must come closer to the complex of causes, i. a. by
means of an interdisciplinary framework.
1
This paper was originally presented at a seminar CBGS organized on 7/12/87 in Brussels at the occasion of
the meeting of the CBGS Fertility Working Group.Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe-1989.doc Josef Schmid, The Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe (1989) 2 I. Obsolescence of former instruments for fertility analysis The first empirical knowledge on fertility trends crystallized from the investigation of the first birth decline in Europe on the road to industrialization. This downward trend could be divided into progressive stages showing a particular constellation of demo- graphic variables. The demographic transition, particularly the fertility transition, took shape as a sequence of more or less discernible stages along social and economic progress. It was possible to find a congruence with general developmental stages in the socio-economic congruence with general developmental stages in the socio- economic field and many demographers were successful in combining demographic movements toward lower fertility with modernization trends (Caldwell, 1982; Coale & Watkins, 1986). This procedure provided the bulk of our knowledge about the first fertility decline: fer- tility levels were juxtaposed with variables in the wider social setting and correlations between even crude rates and socio-economic macro data yielded high levels of sig- nificance. The so-called threshold theory profited from the rather stable relationships between demographic and socio-economic variables such as income levels and income distri- bution, educational level of women, access to health care, urbanization symbolizing market chances (Srikantan, 1982). These vary impressively with demographic struc- tures, high income and educational levels will make couples more interested in family planning; high-standard health care brings infant mortality down and reinforces the desire for a small family size and so on. The mutual relation of demographic transition stages and development stages ap- plies to the threshold concept of demo-economic progress and embraces our basic knowledge on fertility trends. The reasons why the major variables of modernization can reduce fertility (not reversible, according to all experiences) and how they suc- ceed in doing so constitutes the first body of common knowledge. In their lucid research on Europe's fertility transition, Knodel and van de Walle (1980) delineated the course of fertility decline in Europe. They demonstrated that especially the last stage on the transitory process shows a fertility decline at an accelerated pace, as health care, better living conditions and birth control practice cumulate. It is
Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe-1989.doc
Josef Schmid, The Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe (1989) 3
an explanation of the early finding by Donald Bogue (1969) that crude birth rates be-
tween 20 and 30 cannot persist.
Summarizing, we can say that the bulk of our knowledge stems from the European
fertility transition. We must admit that we have been captured by it to this day, as we
still think in methods and categories that are familiar to us but that make sense only
in transitional times.
The low fertility level is due to a historical constellation including:
(1) a shift from an agrarian to an industrial economy, i.e. a decline of rural life;
(2) a shift in the economic status of children from producer to consumer;
(3) the spread of university education;
(4) the replacement of traditional values by rationality of ethos;
(5) the declining impact of the traditional family with the changing status of
women;
(6) the development and distribution of modern contraception.
None of these tendencies are expected to change. On the contrary, a higher degree
of equality between men and women will doubtlessly weaken the institution of mar-
riage even more. The effect of progress in contraceptive practices and abortion on
fertility can no longer be questioned (Westoff, 1986).
Most fertility survey questionnaires still use conventional variables of the structural
analysis of society which found first application in the Growth of American Family
Studies (GAF). It entailed correlations of concepts borrowed from structural analysis
such as income, occupational structure, social stratification, family, religion, educa-
tion with social-demographic data or, the other way round, demographic variables are
related to elements of the social structure. This raises the question whether the em-
bedding of demographic events into rather crude categories of social structure is any
longer satisfactory as an explanation of demographic resp. reproductive behaviour.
This brings us back to the initial stages of fertility research and we wonder how far
we have managed to advance since the first pioneer fertility studies (Indianapolis,
Princeton) and what degree of sophistication we have reached since the early
framework for fertility analysis was established by Ronald Freeman (1975).Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe-1989.doc
Josef Schmid, The Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe (1989) 4
A tentative answer might be that in conceptualization terms we have done quite well
(Robinson & Harbison, 1980), but that in the application of this conceptualization in
fertility research our results have always been below our possibilities. Apart from the
already mentioned adherence to the traditional and familiar framework there are fur-
ther biases to cope with:
(1) fertility surveys (which go beyond the usual university research) are funded by
national or international authorities and are widely conducted for administrative
purposes. Fertility research based purely on the conventional categories of so-
cial organization best meets the needs of administrations, and tends to argue
and act, for convenience' sake, with quantitative macro data;
(2) an explanatory framework built up with crude structural categories (income, oc-
cupation, religion, education) became unjustified powerful because it is easily
filled with data which are available in all modern countries. So fertility research
contents often itself with conventional work and is, therefore, less innovating
and less concentrated on new unresolved issues.
2. Fertility research and the behavioural aspect of reproduction
As to reproductive behaviour and fertility research in general methods have divided
into analysis of social structures (pre-modern, modern, post-modern settings) and
decisionistic approaches (concerning marriage and reproduction).
The highly sophisticated economics of fertility can not find an equivalent follow-up in
fertility research – in spite of Easterlin's efforts in explaining fertility swings in the
United States. The ideas of focussing the research on the desire for children during
the phases of economic "squeezes" is worth adapting to the European setting. How-
ever, empirical research on the economic variables of fertility is confronted with in-
surmountable difficulties when determining a household's "relative income", which is
according to Easterlin the crucial resource for reproduction. Consequently, it should
make more use of modern economic theory, in which the economic outlook and
prospects are considered to be more relevant for shaping behaviour than income (in
general). An "economic squeeze" can lead to a threefold result regarding family con-
stitution:Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe-1989.doc
Josef Schmid, The Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe (1989) 5
(1) preventing marriage as such;
(2) remaining childless, and
(3) restraining from reproduction at a particular point.
In all cases, fertility behaviour is considered a sequential process, representing a life
cycle application in economic research into fertility behaviour.
As far as fertility psychology is concerned, the "Value of Children School" (Fawcett,
Bulatao) offers the best known and most widely accepted approach, but there is a
growing need for a more in-depth approach which retains the cost-benefit-analysis of
having a (another) child, but which does not ignore the psychology of choice-making
nor the normative influences behind the decision-making process (Beckman, 1978).
A fertility psychology must allow for a continuum in procreation matters from subjec-
tive favourability to a couple's choice with respect to norms. A couple's choice can be
divided into:
(1) a process of rational decision-making,
(2) a series of minor choices leading to a slow drift into parent-hood, i.g. via
cohabitation, and
(3) a tacit consent on omitting contraception.
An important part of knowledge is contributed by action analysis, whereupon acting is
carried out with regard to a comparison level: The value a person attaches to the
outcome of a choice is not determined by the possible gains and losses, but by the
expected gains and losses relative to a comparison level. The gains drawn from a
parent-child relationship must be balanced against.
(1) the parents' past experience in this relationship:
(2) their past experience in comparable relationships (with their former children
or other children);
(3) their perception of what others (of their social stratum, or the reference
group) are obviously and allegedly receiving, and
(4) their perception of the gains available from alternative choices.
This model is highly convenient for the study of a low-fertility society in a mature in-
dustrial setting, where Weberian goal-orientated action is pandemic. Pre-industrial
fertility behaviour meant reproduction (up to a varying point). It constituted both aBackground of Fertility Behaviour in Europe-1989.doc
Josef Schmid, The Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe (1989) 6
moral act and an end in itself. It was regarded as immoral and as raising the parents'
life risks to weigh childbirth against alternatives. "A normative or moral act (for in-
stance having at least two children) may be chosen automatically, whatever de dis-
utility of opportunity costs involved; it is not determined by rational considerations"
(Beckman, 1978). This historical retrospect clarifies the case once more. A society
with little social change and with a social stratification similar to a caste system, of-
fers no hope of reaching a higher level and, therefore, no alternative to the normal life
course. Comparative levels take shape in people's minds as the spectrum of goods
and opportunities widens. This model seems very promising when applied to the
most recent fertility levels, which reflect the extent to which procreation is refrained
from today.
2
3. (Post)modern structures and fertility behaviour
In the introductory remarks, the obsolescence of variables and categories stemming
from the demographic transition analysis was asserted. They fall short of explaining
the present situation. During the demographic transition fertility underwent a dramatic
transformation as the quality of life rose. This transformation involved the family only
marginally and it was able to counteract by diminishing its size and by promoting the
quality (i.e. formation level) of the child. Nowadays, there is growing evidence that
the most recent trends in industrialization are about to affect the family in a funda-
mental way as far as its capacity for reproduction and childbearing is undermined by
influences weakening and disrupting its continuation. According to our present ex-
perience, ideas of equilibrium and of existing balancing forces for restoring previous
social and demographic regimes will have to give way to ideas of systems maintain-
ing individual welfare optima as the central goal. This is going on, obviously, even at
the price of destroying the logic of a self-sufficient subsystem what population was
meant to be.
How postmodern structures affect fertility can be demonstrated in tow points:
2
In the author's view, "postmodern" is synonymous with "postindustrial". The term "postmodern" puts a
greater emphasis on the recent impact of postindustrialism on the cultural sphere.Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe-1989.doc
Josef Schmid, The Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe (1989) 7
(1) the situation of the family and
(2) cultural traits and reproduction in contemporary Europe.
3.1 The state of the family
Dealing with this topic, one should keep in mind the large body of literature about the
"family in crisis". One can also refer to the statistically well-documented dissolution
phenomena that have been haunting the nuclear conjugal family since the late
1960s. The recent Council of Europe national reports confirm the relatively new com-
bination of lifestyles other than marriage, and decreasing fertility. The problem is
summed up in the following question:
"A modern paradox is that despite time-saving household devices, an unprece-
dented degree of affluence and the benefits of university education, the family's
ability to care for children seems to be diminishing. How can it be that more time,
money, and knowledge co-incide with less capacity for childbearing?" (Gilbert,
1987)
The family crisis as the amount of dissolution phenomena, can be measured in terms
of changes in four variables that are crucial for reproduction:
(1) the first-marriage rate: a declining propensity to marry is found among all
younger age groups;
(2) the remarriage rate: it is declining for several reasons;
(3) the fertility rate: a feedback loop between low fertility and divorce and new
lifestyles can be assumed;
(4) the divorce rate itself: it remains constantly high, but with persisting differ-
ences between Northern and Southern Europe.
The dissolution phenomena are increasingly complemented by new kinds of life-
styles, such as cohabitation, that may be related to a written marriage contract, the
two-earner family, one-parent families and various single person households gener-
ated by celibacy, separation, widowhood and divorce; not forgetting the living ar-
rangements of children after their parents' divorce. All these phenomena can serve
as descriptive quantifiable categories – indicating a departure from the "normal" post-
war family (Roussel, 1986; Schwarz, 1983).
This convergence of trends in Europe does not mean conformity. It is worth remem-
bering that a Brussels meeting organized by the King Baudouin Foundation in 1986,Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe-1989.doc
Josef Schmid, The Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe (1989) 8
degrees of familial decomposition and fertility differentials by country along with the
phenomena of living alone, living together, divorces, and illegitimacy, were reported.
The following chart contains the differences which the European countries show
when the degree of familial dissolution and fertility levels are juxtaposed.
Chart 1: Degree of familial dissolution and fertility in Europe
fertility level
elevated/ extremely low
unchanged
degree of familial high France, U.K. Denmark, Sweden
dissolution
low Ireland, West-Germany;
Southern Europe Switzerland, Austria,
Italy, The Netherlands,
Belgium
When renewing a discussion of "family crisis" causes, a brief summary of the main
arguments should be given (Kaufmann, in print).
The following propositions may explain the decline of the family through ongoing loss
of its functions and the growing independence of the individual from former family
ties:
(1) Most people earn their living not from familial property (land) but from
wages paid for particular tasks (jobs, positions).
(2) Work positions offer the possibility of gaining a living as an individual and
earning much more by individual effort than by pooling labour with mem-
bers of the family.
(3) Work positions and upward mobility are based mainly on individual compe-
tence and no longer on traditional compliance within a family. That is why
formation and qualification are oriented toward individual achievement –
away from the family.
(4) Family is indispensable in early childhood when the young individual lives
by parental transfers. When the children are grown up, they do not contrib-Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe-1989.doc
Josef Schmid, The Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe (1989) 9
ute substantially, if at all, to the care of their parents. This means a radicali-
zation of the Caldwell-hypothesis of transfer reversal; there is no longer
any reciprocity (Caldwell, 1982). In economic terms, children are a bad
bargain. It requires the mobilization of non-material, emotional and psychic
gains to restore at least a fragile balance.
(5) In retrospect the assumption that the conjugal family best fits in industrial
processes proves to be a myth that ended in the mid 60s. The prophecy of
William Ogburn that there is no predetermined harmony between family
and industry becomes more and more a reality. The crucial points buttress-
ing this reasoning are the following:
- industrial work and management obey their own rules and rely upon a
functioning individual, regardless of family strains and family-eroding im-
pacts;
- industry increasingly employs women. Their rising level gives them larger
burdens, rewards and responsibilities. Traditional female roles such as
motherhood, are widely ignored;
industrial economy separates the generations, and even spouses. The high
divorce rate (industrial working structures contribute to this rate) turns the
family into a fragile unit and suppresses the motivation for parenthood.
(6) What we have learned so far leads us to the conclusion that individualism
is the outcome of a liberalistic education that is required by new tendencies
of industrialism. The assumption of a growing "egocentric attitude" or he-
donism is not a sufficient explanation. The individual cannot help witness-
ing the erosion of traditional ties and commitments vis-à-vis the community,
which is, in turn, increasingly able to provide support for the individual.
(7) To the extent that grown-up children do not need to resort to family re-
sources (fully under the parents' control), parents cease to guarantee suc-
cessful status-seeking of their children. Parents are bound to lose authority.
(8) Cot-benefit-analyses concerning marriage and offspring are about to be
governed by long-range prospects. If young women perceive that their
long-run advantage, lies in education, in job holding and climbing up a ca-
reer ladder, they will not give way to a family orientation offering only short-Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe-1989.doc
Josef Schmid, The Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe (1989) 10
term gains in view of the uncertain prospects of married women nowadays.
They will use contraception and adopt the ego-centered long-term view in
their life plan.
(9) A decrease in fertility (as well as persistently low fertility) is concomitant
with
- decreasing interaction between parents and children;
- decreasing amounts of emotional investment (i.e. the interest in and re-
sponsibility for the other family member's life course);
- the development of independent and individual life courses of spouses
and children. This will reinforce the emotional estrangement between family
members.
(10) The instability of marriage and family is fuelled by the high expectations of
sharing with a partner, whereas the payoffs seem modest after altering ro-
mantic objectives. The partner ceases to be adequate. Sexual freedom
constantly nourishes illusions about new partners by facilitating the search
for them. Another point is that the fact that women hold on to jobs despite
marriage and motherhood, is partly caused by the experience that a
women, after divorce, is worse off of she is not or has never been part of
the labour force.
In low-fertility populations, nuptiality becomes a main force for reproductive outcome.
Moreover, in societies with moderate illegitimacy rates, "Nuptiality functions like a
beam in which fertility is suspended" (Schmid, 1984). Dissolution phenomena dimin-
ishing the capacity of a population for childbearing will, at the same time, narrow the
sense and willingness to engage in the long-term obligations of parenthood and the
raising of children.Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe-1989.doc
Josef Schmid, The Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe (1989) 11
3
3.2 Cultural traits and reproduction in contemporary Europe
When capitalism had reached its first stage of success around 1900 and marital fertil-
ity declined at the same time, Malthusianism was refuted because of its insistence on
the direct link between wealth and the number of offspring. Now the direction of the
causal chain was viewed in reverse terms: the spread of higher money income was
considered to be at the root of the matter. The explanation for this new situation was
the following: capitalist economy and mass production offer a growing number of al-
ternatives to family life. Man is confronted with competing options. A family reduction
was a means, the easiest at hand, to increase resources for a better life.
During the first half of the century, "low fertility" meant a level comparable to that of
the 4th demographic transition stage i.e. fertility being slightly higher than mortality.
There were times after World War I, after the Great Depression and after World War
II, when fertility increased as the economy showed signs of recovery. That is why the
hypothesis that as welfare decreases fertility does too, but only to the point of equilib-
rium with mortality, was accepted for decades. In this view, demographic setbacks
would soon fin their remedy through increasing marriage rates and/or a baby boom
following the upward trend of a business cycle.
The 1970s and 1980s have discredited the welfare hypothesis. Fertility decreased
during the prosperous 1960s, dropping below the replacement level for the first time
in history. No birth rate recovery has been registered, although the 1970s brought no
losses for most segments of society. Now, in the last decade we have been facing a
"welfare paradox". Even economic stability does not lead to a rebound if fertility is
extremely low. On the contrary, with signs of hope people become aware of the in-
creased societal wealth and they hope people become aware of the increased socie-
tal wealth and they try to maximize their share of these resources by promoting their
personal career. A fear of possible loss of status and opportunities is connected with
this new outlook. This "new sensibility" – as elaborated by Schmid in 1984 – means
3
This rather brief character attempts to clarify special ideas of the author on a more adequate frame for low
fertility research. It cannot refer to all the basic work already done on contemporary reproductive behaviour.
The author has the intention to rely only upon bodies of knowledge that provide a greater insight into West-
ern fertility and that take contemporary research into account. (Davis et al., 1987; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975;
de Jong-Gierveld et al., 1988; Opitz, 1982; Rosenstiel et al., 1986; Deven, 1984).Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe-1989.doc
Josef Schmid, The Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe (1989) 12
an orientation toward a self-centered welfare optimum, inevitably diverting the
4
younger generation from family-bound life goals, including reproduction.
Chart 2: Behavioural orientations in view of long-lasting commitments
risk avoidance
New
Relative sensibility rising
deprivation expectations
Welfare
optimum
fate control
The new sensibility with regard to a personal welfare optimum comprises several
modes of behaviour and orientation. The tentative matrix in chart 2 indicates the pos-
sible parameters for this behaviour. On one level, behaviour is determined by fear of
relative deprivation, i.e. when persons compare themselves unfavourably with others.
Because even in a society saturated with material goods and ever rising consumption
standards people will yearn for more goods or services.
On the other hand, rising expectations change behaviour in that they diminish the
feeling of satisfaction once success has been achieved. This phenomenon is well-
known in the modern economic theory of behaviour and could also be fruitfully inte-
grated in a theory of demographic behaviour.
4
This welfare optimum can be seen in terms of the protestant ethic but also in terms of new forms of altered
value-orientation such as loose ties to partners, and other social institutions. Welfare optimum is subjected
to the societal tendency toward the creation of one's own lifestyle.Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe-1989.doc Josef Schmid, The Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe (1989) 13 The second axis of behaviour orientation is formed by the two poles of risk avoidance and fate control. They are two sides of the same coin and they indicate an increased need for security in all spheres of life. In addition to the traditional areas of security (such as employment and health), there is a desire to extend the feeling of security to all aspects of life and stages in the life cycle. Willingness or/and necessity to take risks in one area leads to an increased attempt to reduce risks in all other spheres. Today, people are no longer willing and/or able to simultaneously take the risks of childbirth an childrearing and the risks connected with personal relationships and the labour market. Fate control means control or reduction of forces that could prevent the achievement of the desired goal. Change in sociological or systemic terms is seen as a differentiation of attitudes, growing independence, or even detachment of attitudes from each other. For in- stance, religion, law, and family were tied to the unquestioned idea of marriage as a lifelong obligation ending only with the death of one partner. This convergence of atti- tudes has dissolved and society lacks new forces of orientation. Religious participa- tion has dropped, religion is on the retreat (mending barriers only at the abortion is- sue); amendments have converted family law into divorce law, and the working place ignores family life and reproduction because they are seen as fully private affairs. Nowadays, it is up to the individual to bring separate attitudes together for his own goals. Above we mentioned the coercive character of choice and the liberty in this stage of our (post)modern society. Today the individual alone must come to term with the growing incongruities experienced through syndromes of being overburdened. He faces an overload of unsolved problems (shortage of time), fears of failure and con- cern over the need to find the best or most convenient solution. The difficult integra- tion of manifold experiences into a comprehensive body of knowledge and orienta- tion, that was provided for by society in the past, must now be carried out by the indi- vidual. Consequently, man must develop problem-solving patterns. However, the problems are of a new kind! They imply a growing role distance and the awareness of living up to a number of ambiguities and double standards. An ever growing- number of problems are solved by a changing commitments (cf. serial monogamy).
Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe-1989.doc
Josef Schmid, The Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe (1989) 14
Furthermore, rapid social change is an impediment on the way to personalized iden-
tity. Life decisions are postponed, particularly those entailing obligations. Decisions
concerning occupational status are made rather case, those concerning marriage,
however, will be made "in due time". Nowadays, the latter decisions often remain un-
taken.
Under such circumstances, human action must undergo an essential reorientation
because of the following features emerging in today's society: (Kaufmann, in print).
(1) the shifting levels of adventures and risks on the way to reaching personal
goals;
(2) the ever-shrinking ability to foresee the consequences of previous deci-
sions;
(3) the greater success of flexible behaviour strategies in comparison with en-
gaging in long-lasting obligations;
(4) the increasing importance, for security purposes, of keeping a certain
amount of resources in reserve for goals the individual is not yet fully aware
of.
This self-centered type of modern man's action pattern counteracts the guiding prin-
ciples that were valid for the "normal" nuclear family and brings about the erosive
phenomena already discussed, such as the weakened bonds between married part-
ners and between parents and children who are, for that purpose seen as adults
much earlier; divorce ceases to be a tragedy.
All this, however, did not lessen the parents' responsibility for funding the formation
and the education of their children. On that point, social control continues to work in
the long run. The costs of having children are more obvious and easier to grasp than
the gains from and the desire for children, which are minimized by man's overall pat-
terns of risk-avoidance.
Parenthood involves a risk because its advantages are by no means assured and it
can only develop within the narrow limits of emotion and pleasure. The continuous
postponement of this risk-taking will ultimately lead to the complete avoidance of
parenthood.Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe-1989.doc Josef Schmid, The Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe (1989) 15 Abstract European fertility is characterized as "unprecedented" and the judgments of its con- sequences vary in the way in which the decline is treated, attitudinally and politically. Former instruments for the analysis of current fertility trends are obsolent because the bulk of the knowledge stems from the European fertility transition. Many still think in methods and categories they are familiar with but which make sense only in transi- tional times. The analysis of fertility behaviour follows two different ways: the one is engaged in an analysis of the social structure or defined settings, the other uses decisionistic ap- proaches (concerning marriage and reproduction). The complex present requires to reconcile these two ways of theorizing and research. Nowadays there is growing evi- dence that the most recent trends in industrialization (post-industrialism) are about to affect the family in a fundamental way as far as its reproductive capacity for offspring is concerned and that they will do so by undermining the basis for its continuation. The author attempts to clarify his own ideas on a more adequate frame to low fertility research. In the last decade a "welfare paradox" is being experienced, because even economic stability does not lead to a rebound if fertility is extremely low. People try to maximize their share of the societal wealth by promoting their personal career. A fear of possible loss of status and opportunities is connected with this new outlook. This "new sensibility" means an orientation towards a self-centered welfare optimum which is determined on the one hand by risk avoidance/fate control parameters and on the other hand by feeling of relative deprivation/rising expectation parameters. Under the circumstances of the rapid social change human action must undergo steady reorientations toward work and life style. This makes increasingly parenthood a burden and diminishes, on a societal level, the motivation for it.
Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe-1989.doc
Josef Schmid, The Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe (1989) 16
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