The Hopeful, the Fearful and the Furious - Polarization and the 2019 European Parliamentary Elections - Bertelsmann Stiftung
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The Hopeful, the Fearful
and the Furious
Polarization and the 2019 European
Parliamentary ElectionsThe Hopeful, the Fearful
and the Furious
Polarization and the 2019 European
Parliamentary Elections
Catherine E. de Vries & Isabell Hoffmann
#2019 / 1Catherine E. de Vries Professor of European Politics Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam c.e.devries@vu.nl Isabell Hoffmann Senior Expert Bertelsmann Stiftung isabell.hoffmann@bertelsmann-stiftung.de www.eupinions.eu Description The Eurozone crisis has pushed reform of the European Union (EU) to the f orefront of political debate. How can a Union of 28 states with a population of over half a billion be reformed to weather future economic crises and political challenges? Finding an answer to this question is extremely difficult not only because current reform proposals are so varied, but even more so because we lack insights into the preferences for reform amongst national elites and p ublics. Although EU support has interested scholars for over three decades now, we v irtually know nothing about public support for EU reform. Current r esearch f ocuses a lmost exclusively on the causes of support for the current project and fails to provide a sufficient basis for effective reform decisions. Surely, the f easibility and sustainability of EU reform crucially hinges on the support amongst n ational publics. eupinions examines public support for EU reform by developing a theoretical model and employing cutting-edge data collection techniques. Our findings will aid policy makers to craft EU reform proposals that can secure widespread public support.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Executive Summary
ver the course of the last decade, we have witnessed a surge in support
O for euroskeptic parties across European capitals, as well as in Brussels.
While the eurozone crisis, followed by increased migration flows from
Syria and other parts of the world, are generally seen to have acted as
catalysts of euroskeptic party support, the question is whether these parties will
be able to do as well in 2019 as in previous elections, or even better. Although
it is highly unlikely that euroskeptic parties like Lega in Italy, the Alternative für
Deutschland in Germany or the Rassemblement National (formerly known as Front
National) in France will gain the upper hand in the election, increased fragmen-
tation and polarization seem to be in the cards for Europe. While polarization
is often viewed in ideological terms, that is to say between the political left and
right, it can more broadly be seen as indicating major divides in society. The
division we highlight in this report is one between those who are hopeful about
the state of their society and their own economic position, and those who are
fearful about society and their own economic standing. The dividing line between
the hopeful and the fearful is important in light of the 2019 European Parliament
(EP) election, because – as we will show – it coincides with very different views
and preferences regarding European politics and political parties.
Our empirical evidence is based on a survey conducted in December 2018, in
which more than 11,000 EU citizens participated. We highlight four main findings:
• First, our evidence suggests that European citizens are deeply divided with
regard to how they view society and their own economic position within it.
We find a divide between those who are hopeful about society and their eco
nomic situation within it, and those who are fearful about these topics.
Our findings suggest that within the European Union as a whole, 51 percent
of the population is worried about the state of society while 49 percent is
not. Similarly, 35 percent of people are economically anxious, while 65 per-
cent are not (see page 13 f for further detail).
• Second, our evidence indicates that this polarization between the hopeful
and the fearful has political implications. The degree to which people are
worried about the state of society and are economically anxious is associ
ated with dissatisfaction with the quality of democracy and the direction
of p
olicy at the EU level, as well as with the feeling that EU politics are too
complicated and fail to take the concerns of ordinary citizens into account.
While those who are not worried about society and are not economically
anxious tend to be much more satisfied with EU-level democracy and the
direction of EU policy, they are also less likely to think that EU politics are
too complicated or insufficiently responsive to the concerns of ordinary
citizens. Note that we are indicating associations here, not necessarily causal
relationships (see page 14 ff for further detail).
3EU PINIO NS THE HOPEFUL , THE FEARFUL AND THE FURIOUS
• Third, our evidence suggests that in addition to differences in how the
hopeful and the fearful view politics at the EU level, there is also consid-
erable overlap between the two groups. A majority of individuals in both
groups – roughly 65 percent – intend to vote in the upcoming EP elections,
and demonstrate a basic level of knowledge about the European Union (see
page 14 ff for further detail).
• Fourth and finally, our evidence shows that those who are fearful are more
likely to say that they feel close to populist-right or far-right parties. How
ever, a large share of those who are fearful also say they have no close affin-
ity with any political party. Those in the hopeful group are more likely to
say that they feel close to centrist and pro-EU parties. Furthermore, those
who are fearful are most likely to think that managing migration, fighting
terrorism and securing citizen rights should be the EU ’s main policy prior
ities in the coming years. Interestingly, those who are comparatively more
hopeful view some of the same policy areas – specifically fighting terrorism
and securing citizen rights – as being important points of focus for the EU
in the coming years. However, they also think that fighting climate change
should be a top EU priority (see page 22 ff for further detail).
4INTRODUCTION
Introduction
he year 2019 will be an important one for the European Union (EU), not
T only because of Brexit or the possibility of an economic downturn, but
also because of the upcoming European Parliament (EP ) elections in
May. For one, the outcome of the EP elections will be important for the
composition of the next European Commission. Since the 2014 EP election, the
Spitzenkandidaten process creates a direct relationship between the outcome of
the election and the composition of the Commission as the leader of the largest
party group will most likely be selected as the new Commission president. The
EP must also approve of the new Commission team through an investiture vote.
Along with these important institutional factors, the outcome of the election will
also be important because it will most likely be judged by commentators and
pundits as an important bellwether for future EU political developments. How
will La République en Marche, the party led by pro-European French President
Emmanuel Macron, do? How much of the vote will the Lega, the Italian party led
by euroskeptic Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini, attract? What will all this
mean for political cooperation at the EU level, and for the formation of govern-
ments at the national level?
Over the last decade, we have witnessed a surge in support for euroskeptic
parties both in Brussels and across European capitals. The eurozone crisis and
increased migration flows from Syria and other parts of the world are generally
seen as catalysts for euroskeptic party support. The question in 2019 is whether
these parties will be able to do as well as in previous elections, or even better.
Although it is highly unlikely that euroskeptic parties like the Lega, the Alternative
für Deutschland in Germany or the Rassemblement National (formerly known as
the Front National) in France will be able to gain the upper hand in the election,
increased fragmentation and polarization seem to be in the cards for Europe.
Many experts are framing the 2019 EP elections as a struggle between pro- and
anti-European forces.
What is important to remember, however, is that while various parties might
agree on a generally pro- or anti-EU stance, this does not mean they neces-
sarily agree on other issues. Indeed, many issues divide parties even within the
euroskeptic and pro-EU camps. Euroskeptic parties are a particularly diverse
group. Some are “hard sceptics” that strongly oppose the EU . These parties
reject the idea of European integration, and campaign for the renationalization
of competencies (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004, Treib 2014, De Vries 2018). Ex-
amples of hard euroskeptic parties include the Rassemblement National in France
led by Marine Le Pen, and Geert Wilders’ Partij voor de Vrijheid in the Nether-
lands. Le Pen has worked to bring her party into the mainstream since taking
over from her father in 2011. She is running on an anti-EU , anti-immigration
and anti-Islam platform.1 Like Le Pen, Wilders combines an anti-immigration
and anti-EU platform. With slogans such as “taking our country back”, he is
actively campaigning for a renationalization of powers ceded to the European
5EU PINIO NS THE HOPEFUL , THE FEARFUL AND THE FURIOUS
Union.2 Other parties are “soft euroskeptics” that accept the idea of European
integration, but demand reform of specific policies or institutions (Taggart
and Szczerbiak 2004, Treib 2014, De Vries 2018). Examples of soft euroskeptic
parties include Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece. Both of these parties rose
to electoral power during the eurozone crisis. Podemos mobilized the grievanc-
es held by segments of the Spanish population that were suffering under the
effects of the economic crisis and the associated austerity measures imposed
from Brussels. To an even greater degree, Syriza vocally opposed the austerity
policies demanded and enforced by the European Council and Commission.
The party’s message resonated strongly with Greek voters, and helped lead the
party into government. This great diversity between euroskeptic parties is one
of the reasons why cooperation between them within the European Parliament
has turned out to be so difficult.
Interestingly, recent academic work suggests that euroskeptic parties have
tempered their EU stances in the wake of the crises, especially given the polit-
ical and economic uncertainty following the Brexit vote (Pirro, Taggart and Van
Kessel 2018). Hard euroskeptic parties in particular have become much less likely
to advocate for a complete exit from the European Union or the eurozone. The
same pattern can be found at the level of individual citizens; since June 2016,
survey respondents have increasingly said they support their own home country’s
membership in the EU (De Vries and Hoffmann 2016, De Vries 2017, 2018). This
might suggest that euroskeptic parties will be unable to garner large-scale elec-
toral support in the upcoming EP election, while indicating that pro-EU parties
could do well. However, two points are important to remember here. First, even
if people increasingly believe that their countries should remain in the European
Union, this does not necessarily mean they are satisfied with the direction being
taken by the EU. Not wanting to leave should not be mistaken for wholehearted
support for the EU’s current policy direction (De Vries and Hoffmann 2015). Second,
EP elections are not only about Europe. Indeed, a large body of scholarly work has
demonstrated that EP elections are also used to express discontent with national
governments, or used to cast more general protest votes (Van der Brug and Van
der Eijk 2007). Many euroskeptic parties harbor and mobilize anti-government
and anti-elite sentiment, and will very likely seek to exploit these currents in
the upcoming election campaign (Polk and Rovny 2017).
Purpose of this Report
In this report, we are not attempting to predict the outcome of the 2019 EP elections.
Electoral forecasting is in itself extremely difficult, but is especially so for EP elec-
tions, in which turnout rates are notoriously low and national campaigns hinge
on very different issues. What we instead aim to do here is provide a tool to help
analyze the possible outcomes of the 2019 EP elections – specifically using the lens
of polarization. While polarization is often viewed in ideological terms, that is to say
between the political left and right, it can more broadly be seen as an indication of
1 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/05/marine-le-pen-promises-liberation-from-the-eu-with-
france-first-policies (accessed 29th of January 2019).
2 https://www.pvv.nl/36-fj-related/geert-wilders/9601-heteuropadatwijwillen.html
(accessed 29th of January 2019).
6INTRODUCTION
major divides within society. The division we highlight here is one between people
who are hopeful about the state of their society and their own economic position,
and those who are anxious about society and their own economic standing. The
dividing line between the hopeful and the anxious is important in light of the
2019 EP election, because – as we will show – it coincides with very different views
and preferences with regard to European politics and political parties.
Our empirical evidence is based on a survey conducted in December 2018, in
which more than 11,000 EU citizens participated. We highlight four main findings:
• First, our evidence suggests that European citizens are deeply divided with
regard to how they view society and their own economic position within it.
We find a divide between those who are hopeful about society and their eco
nomic situation within it, and those who are fearful about these topics. Our
findings suggest that within the European Union as a whole, 51 percent of
the population is worried about the state of society, while 49 percent is not.
Similarly, 35 percent of people are economically anxious, while 65 percent
are not.
• Second, our evidence shows that this polarization between the hopeful and
the fearful has political implications. The degree to which people are worried
about the state of society and are economically anxious is associated with
dissatisfaction with the quality of EU-level democracy and the direction of
EU policy, well as with the feeling that EU politics are too complicated and
fail to take the concerns of ordinary citizens into account. While those who
are not worried about society and are not economically anxious tend to be
much more satisfied with EU-level democracy and the direction of EU policy,
they are also less likely to think that EU politics is too complicated or insuffi-
ciently responsive to the concerns of ordinary citizens. Note that we are indi-
cating associations here, not necessarily causal relationships.
• Third, our evidence suggests that next to differences in how the more
hopeful and fearful view politics at the EU level, also considerable over-
lap between the two groups exists. A majority of individuals in both
groups – roughly 65 percent – intend to vote in the upcoming EP elections,
and are quite knowledgeable about the EU. A majority of European citizens,
whether falling into the hopeful or fearful camp, know that Jean-Claude
Juncker is president of the European Commission, and knows which coun-
tries are members of the EU.
• Fourth and finally, our evidence shows that those who are anxious are most
likely to say that they feel close to populist-right or far-right parties. How
ever, a large share of those who are fearful also say that they do not feel close
to any political party. Those in the hopeful group are more likely to say that
they feel close to centrist and pro-EU parties. Furthermore, those who are fear-
ful are most likely to think that managing migration, fighting terrorism and
securing citizen rights should be the EU’s main policy priorities in the coming
years. Interestingly, those who are more hopeful view some of the same poli-
cy areas – specifically fighting terrorism and securing citizen rights – as being
important points of focus for the EU in the coming years. However, they also
think that fighting climate change should be a top EU priority.
7EU PINIO NS THE HOPEFUL , THE FEARFUL AND THE FURIOUS
Taken together, these findings provide an important lens through which to view
the upcoming EP elections. They suggest that one important dividing line in
society stems from the degree to which people are hopeful or fearful about the
state of society and about their own economic position within it. This resonates
with the idea popular among pundits and media commentators that the upcoming
election will be a clash between a positive vision for Europe’s future, articulated
by French President Emmanuel Macron and others, and a more skeptical vision
expressed by Italian Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini and other such figures.
Our evidence suggests that European citizens are polarized when it comes to their
levels of hope or fear about their own situations and larger societal trends. Nev-
ertheless, in terms of individual willingness to participate in and to stay informed
about the EU, there seems to be considerable overlap. Our findings indicate that
a majority of people intend to vote in the upcoming election, and have a degree
of basic knowledge about the EU. Many citizens seem willing to participate, and
seem to have at least a basic level of knowledge enabling them to do so. Our results
also suggest that with the exception of climate change, European citizens agree
on what the EU’s core policy priorities should be in the years to come: fighting
terrorism and securing citizen rights. These findings indicate that a candidate
or political movement able to bridge both sections of society, the hopeful and
the fearful, could garner high levels of public support. This conclusion adds new
weight to the results of our 2018 eupinions study, Globalization and the EU: Threat or
Opportunity?, in which we found that the hopeful were remarkably homogeneous
in holding a positive attitude toward European integration, while the fearful were
not. Specifically, the latter group was split between those who wanted the EU to
provide more protection, and those who rejected the EU altogether.
Are European Parliamentary Elections Actually About Europe?
Although most commentators seem to view the upcoming 2019 election as a cam-
paign between pro- and anti-EU forces, the European issue was long seen as being
comparatively unimportant in EP elections. Indeed, scholars have previously con-
ceived of EP elections as second-order national elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980,
Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996, Van der Brug and Van der Eijk 2007). Given that
EP powers are fairly limited compared to those held by national parliaments, this
perspective regarded EP elections as being less important than national elections in
the eyes of voters, who used the former largely as a way to express their approval
of or disappointment with national governments. However, against the backdrop
of rising public concern about the EU project and the extension of EP powers, re-
cent evidence suggests that EU concerns do in fact affect vote choices (Clark and
Rohrschneider 2009, Hobolt et al. 2009, De Vries et al. 2011, Hobolt and De Vries
2016b). For example, research has found that one key reason why voters may de-
fect from governing parties in EP elections is because these parties hold positions
that are more strongly pro-EU than are their voters (Hobolt et al. 2009). Voters
possessing high levels of political information in particular use attitudes toward
the EU to guide their vote choices in EP elections (De Vries et al. 2011); however,
knowing more about the EU does not necessarily mean that they back strongly
pro-EU parties (Marquant et al. 2018).
8INTRODUCTION
The growing involvement of EU institutions in national policymaking, especially
during the eurozone crisis, is perceived as one of the main reasons why EP elections
are increasingly turning on people’s views about Europe (Hobolt and De Vries 2016a).
For example, citizens today are less likely than previously to think that their own
government is solely responsible for national economic outcomes, and have instead
shifted a portion of blame to the EU (Hobolt and Tilley 2014). Indeed, given that the
2014 EP elections were held against the backdrop of the eurozone crisis, with the EU
itself becoming an object of blame in the popular discourse, many citizens expressed
their discontent by casting a ballot for a euroskeptic party (Hobolt and De Vries
2016b). This short review of the scholarly work on voting behavior in EP elections
suggests that European matters have increasingly become an influential factor within
European elections, but that they are clearly not the only such factor. Disagreement
with the EU’s policy direction, disapproval of a national government’s overall stance
on Europe and disappointment with a national government’s record more generally
can all be major forces driving voter decision-making in EP elections. EP elections
have increasingly become an arena where voters can express their discontent with
European and national politics alike.
9EU PINIO NS THE HOPEFUL , THE FEARFUL AND THE FURIOUS 10
POLARIZATION AND THE 2019 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
In Focus
Polarization as a Prism
for Understanding
the 2019 EP Elections
s stated earlier, we are making no attempt here to predict the outcome
A of the 2019 EP elections. This is in part because electoral forecasting
is increasingly difficult as party loyalties weaken (Wattenberg and
Dalton 2000), especially in relation to the EP. Given that EP elections
are perceived by voters as being less important than national elections, and less
consequential for the composition of the executive branch (Reif and Schmitt 1980,
Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996, Van der Brug and Van der Eijk 2007), turnout is a
key issue. However, turnout rates are also hard to predict. This additionally makes
it very difficult to evaluate which parties are more or less likely to be affected
by changes in these rates. Yet while we do not seek to predict the outcome, we
do want to provide deeper insights into key developments that might shape this
election outcome. As we have demonstrated in previous reports, including Fear
Not Values (2016), Globalization and the EU and The Power of the Past (2018), the
European public is deeply divided in how they view the world around them. Here
we aim to delve deeper into these divides by focusing on two sources of polari-
zation: people’s worries about the state of society, and their anxieties regarding
their own position within society. We understand polarization as being a sharp
division between elements of the population that produces opposing factions
(Lipset 1960, Schnattschneider 1960). While this is often viewed in ideological
terms, that is to say between the political left and right, it can more broadly be
seen as an indication of major divides in society. Sources of societal division can
be especially important, as the terms “left” and “right” have lost some of their
prescriptive power in recent years, with many debates on the state of society
focused on issues such as immigration, cultural values or LGTB rights (De Vries,
Hakhverdian, Lancee 2013, Norris and Inglehart 2018, Abou-Chadi and Finnegan
2019). In this research, we focus on polarization based on people’s assessment of
the state of their society and their own position within it. These two aspects of
polarization capture what political scientists refer to as sociotropic and pocket-
book evaluations. Sociotropic evaluations relate to assessments about the state
of world, while pocketbook evaluations relate instead to assessments of the way
an individual (or household) is situated within that world (Kramer 1971). While
scholars have traditionally argued that personal circumstances have less influence
on voting decisions and turnout rates than do sociotropic economic evaluations
11EU PINIO NS THE HOPEFUL , THE FEARFUL AND THE FURIOUS
(Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, Fiorina, 1978), there has recently been something of
a revival of pocketbook approaches to electoral behavior. A series of studies has
suggested that personal economic circumstances in fact have a significant effect
on electoral behavior and political preferences. Voters respond to specific policies
that have direct consequences for their own welfare, such as disaster relief or cuts
in social expenditure, by adjusting their political preferences and voting choices
(Bechtel and Hainmueller 2011, Healy and Malhotra 2010, Margalit 2013). Likewise,
economic self-interest is found to be a key determinant of welfare preferences,
with income, employment risk and degree of dependence on social protection
being strong predictors of attitudes redistribution (Rehm 2011, Hacker et al. 2013).
Against this backdrop, we are interested in the degree to which differences in
how people view the state of society – that is, whether they are worried about it
or not – and in how they evaluate their own economic position – again, whether
they are anxious or not – matter for political preferences. What we label here as
polarization refers to the degree to which people diverge in their views of the
state of society and their own economic position. While there are of course many
different roots of societal division, for example based on rural or city residence,
cultural values, or class (Cramer 2016, Norris and Inglehart 2018, Evans and
Tilley 2017), we contend that these two aspects – people’s views about the state
of society and their assessment of their position in it – are also important. They
feature heavily in current political discourse, for instance in the populist narratives
of societal and personal decline, and in high-profile societal protests, as in the
Yellow Vest movement in France. Specifically, we distinguish between those who
are fearful about the state of society and their own economic position in it, and
those who are hopeful about these topics. We suggest that this distinction might
play a role in shaping people’s preferences about European politics, the party
they feel most close to, and the priorities they think the EU should be pursuing
in the years to come.
However, it can be difficult to provide empirical insight into the ways in which
Europe’s citizens are divided in terms of their societal worries and economic
anxieties. Measuring these concepts in a survey is a far from straightforward task,
and many different authors have taken different approaches. No convention has
yet been established with regard to measuring people’s anxieties about the state
of society or their own positions within in. We thus aim to be entirely transparent
regarding the choices we have made. Specifically, we have relied on the following
questions to capture people’s worries about the state of society and their level
of personal economic anxiety.
The measure of worry about the state of society combines answers to two questions:
• To what extent do you agree with the following statement: The world used
to be a better place.
• Think of today’s children. Compared to their parents, do you think they will
be better off, worse off, or the same?
The measure of personal economic anxiety also combines answers to two ques-
tions where 1 is coded negative and 0 is coded positive:
• How has your personal economic situation changed in the last two years?
• In general what is your personal outlook on the future?
12POLARIZATION AND THE 2019 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
Those who think that society used to be better and / or that today’s children are
worse off are regarded as being worried about the state of society. Those who
think that their personal economic situation has become worse over the last two
years and / or are pessimistic about their personal outlook are categorized as
being economically anxious. For ease of interpretation, all measures used in the
analysis are coded between 0 and 1 so the numbers in the tables and graphs can
be interpreted as proportions through percentages.
Figure 1 and figure 2 provide an overview of the shares of people who can be
classified as societally worried and economically anxious – that is, the fearful – ver-
sus those who are hopeful about soci-
ety and their own economic position.
FIGURE 1 Are You Worried about
It indicates these shares for the EU27, State of Society?
that is to say the current EU member
Yes No
states without the United Kingdom,
along with six individual member states EU27
including France, Germany, Italy, the 51% 49%
Netherlands, Poland and Spain. France
Figure 1 indicates that citizens 51% 49%
across the EU27 are tremendously di- Germany
vided with regard to their views about 38% 62%
the state of society, with 51 percent Italy
expressing worry on this topic, and 65% 35%
49 percent feeling more sanguine. We Netherlands
find a similar distribution in France, 47% 53%
where 51 percent are worried about Poland
society, and 49 are not. In Italy and 56% 44%
Poland, respective majorities of 65 per- Spain
cent and 56 percent are worried about 45% 55%
the state of society, while 35 percent of
Italians and 44 percent of Poles are not
worried. In Germany, the Netherlands
and Spain, a minority of respondents FIGURE 2 Are You Economically Anxious?
are worried about the state of society.
Yes No
Only 38 percent of Germans are worried,
while 62 percent are not. A respective EU27
total of 47 percent and 45 percent of 35% 65%
Dutch and Spanish respondents are France
worried about the state of society, while 62% 38%
53 percent and 55 percent of Dutch and Germany
Spanish respondents are not. 27% 73%
Figure 2 provides an overview of Italy
the share of respondents who are or are 40% 60%
not economically anxious. The level of Netherlands
polarization is also considerable when 27% 73%
it comes to personal economic anxiety, Poland
but is less pronounced overall than is 24% 76%
true of people’s views about society at Spain
large. A total of 35 percent of respond- 33% 67%
ents in the EU 27 can be classified as
economically anxious, while 65 percent
13EU PINIO NS THE HOPEFUL , THE FEARFUL AND THE FURIOUS
are not. The figure shows interesting differences across countries. France in
particular stands out with a majority of 62 percent of respondents classified as
economically anxious, and 38 percent as more confident. Italian respondents are
also slightly more economically anxious than the EU27 average. A total of 40 per-
cent of Italian respondents are economically anxious, while 60 percent are not. A
third of Spanish respondents classify as economically anxious, while 67 percent
do not. Finally, the lowest levels of economic anxiety can be found in Germany,
the Netherlands and Poland, where only 27 percent (for the first two countries)
and 24 percent of respondents (in Poland) are respectively economically anxious.
Overall, these figures suggest that there is a considerable share of people – as
much as one-third to one-half of the population – who are anxious about the state
of society and their position within it. Yet at least one-half, and perhaps even a
majority of European citizens are hopeful about society and their own position
in it. Next, we examine how these different groups in society, the hopeful and
the fearful, each view EU politics.
People’s Views About EU Politics
In this section, we explore different aspects of people’s views about European
politics. Specifically, we will examine seven aspects:
• People’s intention to vote in the 2019 EP election
• Familiarity with the concept of Spitzenkandidat
• People’s knowledge about the EU
• People’s views as to whether EU politics are too complicated
• People’s views as to whether the EU takes ordinary citizens’ concerns into
consideration
• People’s views as to whether the EU is moving in the right direction
• People’s satisfaction with democracy at the EU level
These various aspects reflect what political scientists have traditionally called
political efficacy (Almond and Verba 1963, Easton and Dennis 1967). Political effi-
cacy captures the extent to which people think their political participation will be
effective – that is, the belief among citizens that the political system serves their
interests in the best possible way, and that politicians are doing the most they can
to ensure this. Political efficacy may present itself in either an internal or external
form. While internal efficacy relates to the belief that the individual understands the
political system and has the ability to affect it, external efficacy is associated with
the feeling that politicians pay attention to citizen demands and respond accordingly
(Converse 1972, Craig 1979). Political efficacy is clearly important, as individuals
might not bother participating politically if they believe such action will make no
difference. Having a sense of political efficacy is connected with people’s emotion-
al links to the political system and their experiences with it (Easton and Dennis
1967). While a sense of political efficacy captures the extent to which people think
they can affect political outcomes through engagement in the political process, for
instance in the context of an election, feelings of powerlessness might in contrast
14POLARIZATION AND THE 2019 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
lead citizens to feel politically alienated, prompting them to withdraw altogether
from political participation. These processes are complex and most likely reciprocal,
with higher levels of political efficacy being associated with more participation, and
participation in turn helping to increase feelings of political efficacy (Finkel 1985).
We aim here to establish relationships and associations, not determine causality.
Table 1 compares views about European politics between those who are worried
about society and those who are not. The table shows some interesting differences
and similarities between the two groups. As a start, the groups differ very little
with regard to the intention to vote in the 2019 EP elections, with 65 percent of
those who are worried about society intending to cast a ballot in the 2019 EP elec-
tions, along with 68 percent of those who are not worried. Similarly, we find only
small differences with regard to familiarity with the lead-candidate concept or
more general knowledge about the European Union. While 28 percent of those
who are not worried about the state of society have heard of a Spitzenkandidat,
22 percent of those who are worried have done so. A total of 54 percent of those
who are not worried about society demonstrate a basic knowledge about the Eu-
ropean Union, while 47 percent of those who are worried do so. We measure this
knowledge based on two items, the first of which asked people who the current
Commission president was, the second of which asked whether certain countries
were members of the EU or not. The largest differences between the two groups
emerged with regard to people’s perceptions that EU politics are too complicated,
and the question of whether the EU takes the concerns of ordinary citizens into
account. A majority of 74 percent of those who are worried about society think
that EU politics are too complicated, while 55 percent of this group thinks that the
EU does not take the concerns of ordinary citizens into account. These shares are
much lower among those who are not worried about the state of society, with a
respective 54 percent and 47 percent thinking that EU politics are too complicated
and that the EU fails to take the concerns of citizens into account. Those who are
worried about society are also much less satisfied with EU-level democracy and
the direction of EU policy than those who are not worried.
TABLE 1 EU27: Views about European Politics by Societal Worry
Worried about Not Worried about
State of Society State of Society
65% INTENDING TO VOTE IN EP ELECTIONS 68%
22% HEARD OF SPITZENKANDIDAT 28%
47% KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EU 54%
74% EU POLITICS TOO COMPLICATED 54%
55% EU FAILS TO TAKE CONCERNS OF CITIZENS INTO ACCOUNT 47%
23% EU MOVING IN RIGHT DIRECTION 36%
42% SATISFIED WITH DEMOCRACY AT EU LEVEL 60%
Table 2 compares the views about European politics between those who are and
are not economically anxious. Here too, we find some interesting differences and
similarities between those who are economically anxious and those who are not. As
15EU PINIO NS THE HOPEFUL , THE FEARFUL AND THE FURIOUS
TABLE 2 EU27: Views about European Politics by Economic Anxiety
Economically Economically
Anxious Not Anxious
64% INTENDING TO VOTE IN EP ELECTIONS 68%
18% HEARD OF SPITZENKANDIDAT 28%
50% KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EU 51%
68% EU POLITICS TOO COMPLICATED 63%
64% EU FAILS TO TAKE CONCERNS OF CITIZENS INTO ACCOUNT 44%
13% EU MOVING IN RIGHT DIRECTION 38%
32% SATISFIED WITH DEMOCRACY AT EU LEVEL 61%
in the case of people’s societal-worry categorizations, the two groups differ very
little when it comes to the intention to vote in the 2019 EP elections; 64 percent of
those who are economically anxious intend to cast a ballot in the 2019 EP elections,
while 68 percent of those who are not anxious say they will turn out to vote. When
it comes to being knowledgeable about the EU, we also find only small differences:
50 percent of those who are economically anxious express a basic level of accurate
knowledge about the EU, compared to 51 percent of those who are more confident.
People’s views about the complicated nature of EU politics also show smaller differ-
ences than were evident in Table 1. Here, 68 percent of those who are economically
anxious believe EU politics are too complicated, while 63 percent of those who are
not economically anxious hold this opinion. The different economic-anxiety groups
show greater variation regarding familiarity with the Spitzenkandidat concept than
do the societal-worry groups. While 28 percent of those who are not economically
anxious have heard of a lead candidate, only 18 percent of those who are anxious
have. The biggest differences between the two groups appear with regard to peo-
ple’s perceptions of the degree to which ordinary citizens’ concerns are taken into
account in EU politics, the extent to which people are satisfied with the direction
the EU is taking, and their feelings about the state of EU democracy. A majority of
64 percent of those who are economically anxious thinks that the EU does not take
the concerns of ordinary citizens into account. This share is much lower among
those who are not economically anxious, with only 44 percent thinking that the EU
fails to take citizens’ concerns into account. Those who are economically anxious
are also much less satisfied with EU-level democracy and the direction of EU pol-
icy than those who are not anxious. Only 13 percent of the economically anxious
agree that the EU is moving in the right direction, while 32 percent of this group
is satisfied with democracy at the EU level.
Tables 3 through 8 provide the same type of information, this time split up
among the six individual countries. By and large, they reflect the same patterns
evident within the EU27 as a whole. Those who are anxious about the state of society
or their own economic position differ little from those who are hopeful with regard
to voting intentions or their degree of basic knowledge about the EU. Yet the two
groups – the fearful and hopeful – differ greatly with regard to perceptions of how
complicated EU politics are and how little the EU takes ordinary citizens’ concerns
16POLARIZATION AND THE 2019 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
into account, as well as with respect to their degree of satisfaction with EU-level
democracy and the EU’s overall policy direction. Interestingly, yet not surprisingly,
what clearly stands out for Germany in Table 4 compared to the rest of the countries
is the degree to which German respondents are familiar with the Spitzenkandidat
concept. Roughly three-quarters of German respondents, no matter what their
degree of anxiety or hope about the state of society or their own standing in it,
were familiar with the concept. In all other countries, this share was much lower.
TABLE 3 France: Views about European Politics by Societal Worry
and Economic Anxiety
Worried about Not Worried about
State of Society State of Society
64% INTENDING TO VOTE IN EP ELECTIONS 61%
6% HEARD OF SPITZENKANDIDAT 8%
47% KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EU 52%
76% EU POLITICS TOO COMPLICATED 64%
79% EU FAILS TO TAKE CONCERNS OF CITIZENS INTO ACCOUNT 67%
9% EU MOVING IN RIGHT DIRECTION 29%
25% SATISFIED WITH DEMOCRACY AT EU LEVEL 46%
Economically Economically
Anxious Not Anxious
62% INTENDING TO VOTE IN EP ELECTIONS 64%
5% HEARD OF SPITZENKANDIDAT 10%
49% KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EU 50%
73% EU POLITICS TOO COMPLICATED 66%
83% EU FAILS TO TAKE CONCERNS OF CITIZENS INTO ACCOUNT 57%
8% EU MOVING IN RIGHT DIRECTION 37%
22% SATISFIED WITH DEMOCRACY AT EU LEVEL 57%
17EU PINIO NS THE HOPEFUL , THE FEARFUL AND THE FURIOUS
TABLE 4 Germany: Views about European Politics by Societal Worry
and Economic Anxiety
Worried about Not Worried about
State of Society State of Society
63% INTENDING TO VOTE IN EP ELECTIONS 71%
75% HEARD OF SPITZENKANDIDAT 71%
55% KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EU 65%
72% EU POLITICS TOO COMPLICATED 56%
54% EU FAILS TO TAKE CONCERNS OF CITIZENS INTO ACCOUNT 40%
20% EU MOVING IN RIGHT DIRECTION 36%
40% SATISFIED WITH DEMOCRACY AT EU LEVEL 65%
Economically Economically
Anxious Not Anxious
67% INTENDING TO VOTE IN EP ELECTIONS 69%
74% HEARD OF SPITZENKANDIDAT 72%
63% KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EU 60%
64% EU POLITICS TOO COMPLICATED 61%
53% EU FAILS TO TAKE CONCERNS OF CITIZENS INTO ACCOUNT 42%
15% EU MOVING IN RIGHT DIRECTION 35%
33% SATISFIED WITH DEMOCRACY AT EU LEVEL 63%
18POLARIZATION AND THE 2019 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
TABLE 5 Italy: Views about European Politics by Societal Worry
and Economic Anxiety
Worried about Not Worried about
State of Society State of Society
78% INTENDING TO VOTE IN EP ELECTIONS 82%
12% HEARD OF SPITZENKANDIDAT 15%
54% KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EU 64%
76% EU POLITICS TOO COMPLICATED 49%
71% EU FAILS TO TAKE CONCERNS OF CITIZENS INTO ACCOUNT 60%
18% EU MOVING IN RIGHT DIRECTION 25%
29% SATISFIED WITH DEMOCRACY AT EU LEVEL 39%
Economically Economically
Anxious Not Anxious
75% INTENDING TO VOTE IN EP ELECTIONS 83%
11% HEARD OF SPITZENKANDIDAT 15%
58% KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EU 57%
68% EU POLITICS TOO COMPLICATED 66%
74% EU FAILS TO TAKE CONCERNS OF CITIZENS INTO ACCOUNT 62%
11% EU MOVING IN RIGHT DIRECTION 27%
21% SATISFIED WITH DEMOCRACY AT EU LEVEL 40%
19EU PINIO NS THE HOPEFUL , THE FEARFUL AND THE FURIOUS
TABLE 6 Netherlands: Views about European Politics by Societal Worry
and Economic Anxiety
Worried about Not Worried about
State of Society State of Society
53% INTENDING TO VOTE IN EP ELECTIONS 63%
17% HEARD OF SPITZENKANDIDAT 23%
42% KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EU 48%
81% EU POLITICS TOO COMPLICATED 62%
56% EU FAILS TO TAKE CONCERNS OF CITIZENS INTO ACCOUNT 45%
25% EU MOVING IN RIGHT DIRECTION 42%
47% SATISFIED WITH DEMOCRACY AT EU LEVEL 62%
Economically Economically
Anxious Not Anxious
47% INTENDING TO VOTE IN EP ELECTIONS 63%
11% HEARD OF SPITZENKANDIDAT 24%
40% KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EU 47%
75% EU POLITICS TOO COMPLICATED 69%
71% EU FAILS TO TAKE CONCERNS OF CITIZENS INTO ACCOUNT 43%
8% EU MOVING IN RIGHT DIRECTION 43%
28% SATISFIED WITH DEMOCRACY AT EU LEVEL 65%
20POLARIZATION AND THE 2019 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
TABLE 7 Poland: Views about European Politics by Societal Worry
and Economic Anxiety
Worried about Not Worried about
State of Society State of Society
77% INTENDING TO VOTE IN EP ELECTIONS 77%
19% HEARD OF SPITZENKANDIDAT 19%
29% KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EU 33%
76% EU POLITICS TOO COMPLICATED 54%
32% EU FAILS TO TAKE CONCERNS OF CITIZENS INTO ACCOUNT 29%
32% EU MOVING IN RIGHT DIRECTION 46%
61% SATISFIED WITH DEMOCRACY AT EU LEVEL 73%
Economically Economically
Anxious Not Anxious
72% INTENDING TO VOTE IN EP ELECTIONS 79%
12% HEARD OF SPITZENKANDIDAT 21%
26% KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EU 32%
69% EU POLITICS TOO COMPLICATED 66%
29% EU FAILS TO TAKE CONCERNS OF CITIZENS INTO ACCOUNT 31%
30% EU MOVING IN RIGHT DIRECTION 41%
62% SATISFIED WITH DEMOCRACY AT EU LEVEL 68%
21EU PINIO NS THE HOPEFUL , THE FEARFUL AND THE FURIOUS
TABLE 8 Spain: Views about European Politics by Societal Worry
and Economic Anxiety
Worried about Not Worried about
State of Society State of Society
62% INTENDING TO VOTE IN EP ELECTIONS 67%
9% HEARD OF SPITZENKANDIDAT 7%
42% KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EU 46%
60% EU POLITICS TOO COMPLICATED 39%
68% EU FAILS TO TAKE CONCERNS OF CITIZENS INTO ACCOUNT 68%
21% EU MOVING IN RIGHT DIRECTION 28%
47% SATISFIED WITH DEMOCRACY AT EU LEVEL 56%
Economically Economically
Anxious Not Anxious
60% INTENDING TO VOTE IN EP ELECTIONS 67%
5% HEARD OF SPITZENKANDIDAT 10%
42% KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EU 45%
56% EU POLITICS TOO COMPLICATED 44%
80% EU FAILS TO TAKE CONCERNS OF CITIZENS INTO ACCOUNT 62%
11% EU MOVING IN RIGHT DIRECTION 32%
32% SATISFIED WITH DEMOCRACY AT EU LEVEL 62%
Taken together, this evidence suggests that by-and-large those respond-
ents who are fearful about the state of society or their own economic position
feel less politically efficacious in EU politics compared to those who feel more
hopeful. However, there are far fewer differences with regard to the intention to
vote within the EP elections or respondents’ level of basic EU knowledge. This
suggests that the polarization we have identified here may indeed play a role in
the 2019 EP elections, as most citizens intend to vote whether they feel anxious
or hopeful. In the next section, we turn to the question of respondents’ politi-
cal-party affinities.
Political-Party Affinities
Which political parties do people feel close to? This is the question we turn to
next. We first provide an overview of respondents’ party affinities in general,
and then in a subsequent step, take a closer look at party affinities among those
falling respectively into the anxious and hopeful groups. Figure 3 provides an
overview of party affinities in the six countries we examine on an individual
basis, including France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain.
Several interesting findings stand out here. First, in France, the largest share of
22POLARIZATION AND THE 2019 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
respondents – 49 percent, to be specific – do not feel close to any party. Among
respondents that do feel some degree of party affinity, 14 percent feel close to
Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National, while a bit more than half that amount,
or 8 percent, feel close to President Emmanuel Macron’s La République En Marche.
In Germany, while 23 percent of people feel close to no party at all, affinities
for the parties currently represented in the German Bundestag are quite evenly
distributed. A total of 10 percent feel close to the Alternative für Deutschland,
14 percent feel close to the Greens, and 16 percent feel close to Chancellor Angela
Merkel’s Christian Democrat party. In Italy, we find that most respondents
feel close to one of the two parties currently in government, either the Lega,
at 26 percent, or the Movimento Cinque Stelle, at 28 percent. In the Netherlands,
14 percent of respondents feel close to Geert Wilders’ Partij voor de Vrijheid, closely
followed by 13 percent for Prime Min-
ister Mark Rutte’s Liberal Party and FIGURE 3.2 Germany: Feel Close to
11 percent for the Greens. Here too, a Political Party?
a considerable share of 19 percent of
AfD
people feels close to other, unlisted
10%
parties. In Poland, the largest shares
FDP
of respondents feel close either to
6%
the ruling Law and Justice party (PiS,
CDU/CSU
with 29 percent), or to no party at all 16%
(30 percent). In Spain too, the largest
SPD
share of respondents feel close to no 13%
party (30 percent), followed by oth- B90/Grüne
er unlisted parties (20 percent), and 14%
the Social Democratic party current- Die Linke
ly headed by Prime Minister Pedro 11%
Sanchez (15 percent). Other Party
7%
No Party
FIGURE 3.1 France: Feel Close to 23%
a Political Party?
RN
14%
FIGURE 3.3 Italy: Feel Close to
LR
a Political Party?
6%
MoDem LN
2% 26%
LaREM FI
8% 7%
PS PD
9% 12%
LFI MVCS
5% 28%
Other Party Other Party
7% 7%
No Party No Party
49% 20%
23EU PINIO NS THE HOPEFUL , THE FEARFUL AND THE FURIOUS
FIGURE 3.4 Netherlands: Feel Close to FIGURE 3.5 Poland: Feel Close to
a Political Party? a Political Party?
PVV K'15
14% 10%
FvD PiS
4% 29%
VVD .Nowo
13% 4%
CDA PO
5% 17%
D66 Other Party
7% 10%
CU No Party
3% 30%
PvdA
8%
DENK
2% In the following, we explore peo-
GL
ple’s responses in greater detail, ex-
11% amining differences between those who
SP feel anxious and those who feel hopeful
8% about the state of society and their own
Other Party economic positions. This information
19% is contained in figures 4 and 5. Again,
No Party several interesting findings stand out.
6% In virtually all of the countries under
investigation, we find that those who
feel an affinity for right-wing parties,
especially parties on the populist right,
FIGURE 3.6 Spain: Feel Close to display higher levels of societal worry.
a Political Party?
Such parties include the Rassemblement
PP National (RN) in France, the Alternative
9% für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, the
C's Lega in Italy, the Partij voor de Vrijheid
13% (PV ) in the Netherlands, the Prawo i
PSOE Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice Party;
15% PiS) in Poland, and the Partido Popular
Podemos (PP) in Spain. We find a clearer pattern
13% for societal worries in this respect than
Other Party economic anxiety. Levels of economic
20% anxiety are also pronounced among
No Party those who feel close to populist-left
30% parties, which include the Socialist Par-
ty (SP) in the Netherlands, Die Linke in
Germany, Podemos in Spain, and Jean-
Luc Melenchon’s La France Insoumise
(LFI) movement in France. This evidence underscores conclusions made in our
previous report, Fear Not Values, in which we found that economic anxiety and
globalization fears in 2016 coincided with greater support for populist parties on
both the left and the right of the political spectrum. Figures 4 and 5 also suggest
24POLARIZATION AND THE 2019 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
that those who feel close to centrist parties, such as La République En Marche
in France or the Christian Democratic parties in Germany and the Netherlands
(respectively the CDU and CDA), display less societal worry and economic anxiety.
FIGURE 4.2 Germany: Closeness to Political
Party by Societal Worry
Worried about State of Society
No Yes
AfD
37% 63%
FDP
73% 27%
CDU/CSU
65% 35%
SPD
65% 35%
B90/Grüne
80% 20%
Die Linke
65% 35%
Other Party
54% 46%
No Party
FIGURE 4.1 France: Closeness to Political
58% 42%
Party by Societal Worry
Worried about State of Society
No Yes
FIGURE 4.3 Italy: Closeness to Political
Party by Societal Worry
RN
28% 72% Worried about State of Society
LR
No Yes
48% 52%
MoDem LN
69% 31% 28% 72%
LaREM FI
63% 37% 27% 73%
PS PD
53% 47% 55% 45%
LFI MVCS
41% 59% 32% 68%
Other Party Other Party
50% 50% 51% 49%
No Party No Party
60% 40% 33% 67%
25EU PINIO NS THE HOPEFUL , THE FEARFUL AND THE FURIOUS
FIGURE 4.4 Netherlands: Closeness to FIGURE 4.5 Poland: Closeness to Political
Political Party by Societal Worry Party by Societal Worry
Worried about State of Society Worried about State of Society
No Yes No Yes
PVV K'15
27% 73% 41% 59%
FvD PiS
68% 32% 36% 64%
VVD .Nowo
62% 38% 37% 63%
CDA PO
62% 38% 56% 44%
D66 Other Party
64% 36% 53% 47%
CU No Party
45% 55% 42% 58%
PvdA
49% 51%
DENK
72% 28% FIGURE 5.1 France: Closeness to Political
Party by Economic Anxiety
GL
76% 24% Economically Anxious
SP
No Yes
49% 51%
Other Party RN
45% 55% 20% 80%
No Party LR
54% 46% 54% 46%
MoDem
46% 54%
LaREM
FIGURE 4.6 Spain: Closeness to Political 74% 26%
Party by Societal Worry
PS
Worried about State of Society 40% 60%
LFI
No Yes
31% 69%
PP Other Party
49% 51% 34% 66%
C's No Party
58% 42% 41% 59%
PSOE
65% 35%
Podemos
61% 39%
Other Party
44% 56%
No Party
56% 44%
26POLARIZATION AND THE 2019 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
FIGURE 5.2 Germany: Closeness to Political FIGURE 5.3 Italy: Closeness to Political
Party by Economic Anxiety Party by Economic Anxiety
Economically Anxious Economically Anxious
No Yes No Yes
AfD LN
54% 46% 61% 39%
FDP FI
77% 23% 72% 28%
CDU/CSU PD
88% 12% 66% 34%
SPD MVCS
73% 27% 65% 35%
B90/Grüne Other Party
78% 22% 55% 45%
Die Linke No Party
63% 37% 45% 55%
Other Party
73% 27%
No Party
71% 29% FIGURE 5.4 Netherlands: Closeness to
Political Party by Economic Anxiety
Economically Anxious
No Yes
PVV
56% 44%
FvD
81% 19%
VVD
94% 6%
CDA
94% 6%
D66
87% 13%
CU
85% 15%
PvdA
83% 17%
DENK
74% 26%
GL
80% 20%
SP
56% 44%
Other Party
58% 42%
No Party
66% 34%
27EU PINIO NS THE HOPEFUL , THE FEARFUL AND THE FURIOUS
FIGURE 5.5 Poland: Closeness to Political FIGURE 5.6 Spain: Closeness to Political
Party by Economic Anxiety Party by Economic Anxiety
Economically Anxious Economically Anxious
No Yes No Yes
K'15 PP
82% 18% 75% 25%
PiS C's
92% 8% 71% 29%
.Nowo PSOE
76% 24% 78% 22%
PO Podemos
71% 29% 69% 31%
Other Party Other Party
64% 36% 60% 40%
No Party No Party
67% 33% 61% 39%
Respondents’ Policy Priorities for the EU
In a final step, we review respondents’ responses to a question in which they were
asked which policy priorities should be most important for the EU in the coming
years. Figure 6 provides an overview of responses within the EU27. It indicates
that respondents overall feel that protecting citizens’ rights (17 percent), fight-
ing terrorism (16 percent) and stopping climate change (15 percent) should be
the EU’s key priorities. Figure 6 also provides the same type of information for
the six countries examined in greater depth. These results suggest that fighting
terrorism is perceived to be the top-priority issue among French respondents
(18 percent), followed by protecting citizen rights (15 percent). In Germany, stop-
ping climate change (21 percent) is perceived as being the EU’s top priority. In
Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain, protecting citizen rights is perceived as
being the EU’s top priority, supported by 20 percent to 25 percent of respondents.
28POLARIZATION AND THE 2019 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
FIGURE 6 Top Priority for the EU in Years to Come
What tasks should the EU focus on in the coming years? Most important in percent.
Protect Citizen Rights Stop Climate Change Secure Peace Fight Inequality
Fight Terrorism Manage Migration Create Growth
Fix Eurozone Tame Globalization
EU27
17 16 15 14 12 10 8 5 3
France
15 18 13 13 6 11 14 6 4
Germany
12 17 21 13 17 4 9 3 4
Italy
20 14 13 16 9 18 5 23
Netherlands
18 17 17 12 12 5 8 7 4
Poland
21 18 11 14 17 6 6 5 2
Spain
25 12 10 12 9 12 12 6 2
In Figure 7 we show the distribution of policy priorities based on the previ-
ously distinguished categories of societal worry and personal economic anxiety.
The main differences between those who are fearful and those who are hopeful
relate to the importance attributed to managing migration and stopping climate
change. While those who are worried about the state of society or their own
economic position within it view managing migration as a top priority for the
EU (with a respective 16 percent and 15 percent choosing this option) along with
protecting citizens’ rights and fighting terrorism, those who are more hopeful
place a similar or even stronger priority (19 percent for those who are hopeful
about society, and 15 percent for those hopeful about their own position) on the
need for the EU to fight climate change. That said, the fearful and hopeful agree
on the importance of protecting citizen rights.
29EU PINIO NS THE HOPEFUL , THE FEARFUL AND THE FURIOUS
FIGURE 7 EU27: Top Priority for the EU in Years to Come
What tasks should the EU focus on in the coming years?
Most important by societal worry and economic anxiety. In percent.
Protect Citizen Rights Stop Climate Change Secure Peace Fight Inequality
Fight Terrorism Manage Migration Create Growth
Fix Eurozone Tame Globalization
Worried about State of Society
19 18 16 12 11 10 7 4 3
Not Worried about State of Society
14 16 12 19 12 10 9 5 3
Economically Anxious
15 18 15 15 10 10 9 5 3
Economically Not Anxious
17 17 13 15 13 10 8 4 3
In a final step, we ask what are the policy priorities for those who feel close
to particular political parties? These results are shown in figures 8–13. Interest-
ingly, in France we see that supporters of both the populist-right and centrist
parties think that fighting terrorism should be a key priority for the EU in the
years to come. However, for those who feel close to the centrist La République En
Marche, climate change is equally important, while this is clearly not the case for
those who feel close to the Rassemblement National. In addition, those who feel
close to La France Insoumise think that climate change is a key priority, but do
not identify terrorism or migration as such. In Germany, those who feel close to
the Alternative für Deutschland view managing migration as the core issue for the
EU in the coming years, with fully 40 percent viewing this issue as a top priority.
Among those who feel close to Die Linke, stopping climate change is identified
as the highest priority (receiving a 25 percent share), while those who feel close
to Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrat party by contrast lean toward
securing peace (23 percent). In Italy, those who feel close to the Lega, Forza Italia
or the Movimento Cinque Stelle all think that protecting citizen rights should be the
EU’s key priority, while those close to the Lega and Forza Italia also view managing
migration as a top policy issue. Protecting citizen rights is also viewed as a key
priority among Dutch respondents, especially for those who support Geert Wilders’
Partij voor de Vrijheid (PV), the Liberal Democrats (D66) or the Christian Union
(CU). For those close to Wilders’ party or the Christian Union, fighting terrorism
is also perceived to be a key EU policy priority. Climate change is seen as a key
priority for those close to D66, the CU and the Greens (GL). For those close to
the Polish governing party, Law and Order (PiS), fighting terrorism and manag-
ing migration are seen as the key policy priorities. Among Spanish respondents,
regardless of what party they feel close to, protecting citizen rights is viewed as
the top priority for the EU in the coming years.
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