THE OEI TIONG HAM CONCERN AND THE CHANGE OF REGIMES IN INDONESIA, 1931-1950 - Brill
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE OEI TIONG HAM CONCERN AND THE CHANGE OF
REGIMES IN INDONESIA, 1931–1950
Peter Post
Introduction
The central decades of the twentieth century posed tremendous chal-
lenges for ethnic Chinese family firms in Indonesia. During this period
the late colonial Dutch regime was forcefully replaced by a short-lived
but highly significant Japanese military administration and followed
by the independent Republic of Indonesia. Each of the regime transi-
tions was accompanied by widespread anti-Chinese violence resulting
in many deaths and great material damage to Chinese shops, trading
firms, manufacturing industries, and agricultural enterprises. Since each
of the regimes professed different economic policies and created highly
different sets of economic institutions (partly because of the changes in
the global economic environment, partly because of different ideolo-
gies), ethnic Chinese firms were forced to adapt and adjust themselves
constantly in order to sustain their businesses. Some were successful,
others failed. The mechanisms underlying the various Chinese busi-
ness responses towards the enforced institutional changes during these
crucial decades in Indonesian history have so far hardly been studied,
let alone understood. The major reason seems to be that most writ-
ings on the ethnic Chinese experience during the Japanese military
administration and the Sukarno regime have used political frameworks,
rather than business perspectives. The powerful nation-state paradigm
fitted the indigenous bourgeoisies and U.S. hegemonizing efforts in the
region. In the post-war debates on modernization, development and
nation-state building simplified dichotomic frameworks ruled the dice,
and within these frameworks no need was felt to delve deeper into
the experiences of the ethnic Chinese business elites, since they were
simply seen as collaborators and profiteers of an unjust colonial order
and exploiters of the indigenous populations, actually preventing their
emancipation rather than supporting it. This collaboration-resistance
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dichotomy has dominated the post-war research agenda for decades,
although it was termed differently in different regions.
Regarding motivations and business strategies of Chinese capital-
ists in wartime China, North American scholars have recently started
to question the usefulness of the collaboration-resistance framework,
pointing out that matters were far more complex and fluid (Coble
2003; Brook 2004; Cochran 2006). Similarly, in regard to Chinese
business responses in Yogyakarta under the Japanese military regime,
Kwartanada (2002, 257) has argued, that they were confronted with
“three major issues: competition against the emerging Indonesian
entrepreneurs and Japanese business expatriates; patriotism towards
their ancestral land China in fighting against Japanese aggression; and
collaboration with the new regime run by their former enemy, the Japa-
nese.” Except for Twang (1998) and Kwartanada (2002), little research
has been done into the way Chinese family businesses in the Nether-
lands East Indies coped with the period of intense and often extremely
violent regime changes when Western colonial rule was swept aside by
Japan’s military power and subsequently by nationalist forces result-
ing in the decolonization of the region. This essay aims to fill this gap
by looking at the fates and fortunes of the Oei Tiong Ham Concern
(OTHC), the largest ethnic Chinese conglomerate in pre-war Asia,
during the reign of Oei Tjong Hauw.1 Unlike many other ethnic Chi-
nese businesses in pre-war Indonesia, OTHC was able to survive the
regime changes fairly well, and by the mid-1950s was once again rated
as the largest ethnic Chinese business conglomerate in Asia. This essay
1
The Kian Gwan trading firm, predecessor of the Oei Tiong Ham concern, was
established in Semarang by Oei Tjie Sien in 1863. Under the directorship of the leg-
endary Oei Tiong Ham (1866–1924), son of Oei Tjie Sien, the company grew into
a multinational corporation. After Oei Tiong Ham’s death, the company was first
directed by Oei Tjong Swan (1899–1944), son of Oei Tiong Ham’s third wife, from
1925 until 1930, and subsequently by Oei Tjong Hauw (1904–1950), eldest son of
Oei Tiong Ham’s fifth wife. The latter steered the corporation through the depression
years and the Japanese period. There are several articles and books on the develop-
ment of the Oei Tiong Ham Concern and more specifically on the achievements and
entrepreneurial cunning of Oei Tiong Ham. See for example, Liem (1979), Koo (1943
and 1975); Tjoa (1963); Panglaykim and Palmer (1970). Yoshihara (1989) brings sec-
tions of these books and articles together. In addition, Yoshihara added contributions
by Onghokham (on Chinese capitalism in Java) and Charles Coppel (on Liem Thian
Joe’s unpublished History of Kian Gwan) and included two extensive interviews with
Oei Tjong Tjay and Oei Tjong Ie. But as Coppel noticed in his contribution to the
Yoshihara volume, little is known about the Oei Tiong Ham Concern during the
central decades of the twentieth century.
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studies these business responses of OTHC during the 1930s–1950s
from the perspective of its main protagonists and will argue that the
strategies employed during the Japanese period were part and parcel
of a long-term strategy that was aimed to keep family control intact,
spread business risks, and lessen the dependence on Indonesia for the
survival of the conglomerate. The essay is arranged chronologically,
focusing respectively on the late Dutch colonial period, the Japanese
interregnum, and the Sukarno period.
The First Decade of Oei Tjong Hauw’s Rule, 1931–19422
When Oei Tjong Hauw (1904–50) took full control of OTHC he was
only twenty-six years old. It is difficult to imagine what he must have
felt like taking over a multinational conglomerate with some 25,000
people in the Netherlands East Indies on its payroll, a bank, a steam-
ship company, sugar factories, an enormous wholesale business, and
a well-known international trading firm, as well as branch-offices in
Singapore and London, and over ten branches in the Indies. There
is little information about his early life, and although he entered the
HBS there is no evidence that he completed this higher education.
According to most written and oral sources, he received only little
training from his father. Until the age of seventeen he most probably
2
In writing this essay I greatly benefited from a large number of interviews con-
ducted with members and close associates of the extensive Oei Family. Unfortunately,
some of them have recently passed away. I am most grateful to Oei Tjong Ie ( Jack,
1918–2007), Oei Tjong Tjay (Benny, 1924), both sons of Oei Tiong Ham, and to Tan
Swan Bing (1908–2004) for sharing their thoughts and detailing their life-histories with
me. Also to Oei Ing Swie (Billy, 1924–2005), eldest son of Oei Tjong Hauw, who in
his e-mails was kind enough to share his views. Moreover, I would like to thank Ms Dr
Yve Boen San Tjiang and Ms Lieke Oei Tiang Han (daughters of Tan Tek Peng),
Oei Hwaij Liem and Oei Tiang Han, for kindly providing me with a rare 1959
manuscript on the History of Kian Gwan written by Tan Tek Peng, and for detailing
their personal experiences during the Japanese occupation and the Sukarno period.
In addition I have talked to many peranakan Chinese living in The Netherlands and
Singapore, who had married into the Oei family or who were otherwise connected to
them. I gained much insight into the complicated Oei family structure through a close
analysis of a number of private photo albums. I would like to thank Kwee Kiem Han,
Oei Tiang Han, and Khoe Liong Hoey for allowing me to use their family photo-
albums. I am moreover grateful to Ms Twie Marinkelle-Tan for introducing me to
the Oei Family and the late Mr Tan Swan Bing. I would like to emphasize that the
ideas expressed in this essay are mine only and do not necessarily reflect the thoughts
of the people interviewed.
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led a life of leisure and pleasure befitting his status as one of the heirs
of OTHC. Most of his early education he apparently received from
his mother Ong Mie Hoa Nio. In 1921 his father took him into the
business and made him chief of the loan and mortgage department,
mockingly called the “Bank Oei Tiong Ham” (Tan 1959). At the age
of twenty he married Be Hien Nio, youngest daughter of the famous
major-titular of Solo, Be Kwat Koen.
Through this marriage Oei Tjong Hauw became member of a
highly influential and respectable peranakan family that had close ties
and intimate relations with the Central Javanese royalties and the
Thai royal family.3 Being at the helmet of OTHC at this young age,
he relied most heavily on the knowledge and business experience of
some of the concern’s most talented professional managers.
First among these was Tan Tek Peng (1896–1969), who had joined
Kian Gwan in 1917 and served as its executive director from 1924 to
1952. Tan was born in Bandung and was a brilliant student in book-
keeping. He finished the Dutch high school (HBS-B, which until the
early 1970s was the major higher education for a business career in
The Netherlands) and became chief bookkeeper in 1920. After Oei
Tiong Ham moved to Singapore in 1924 he promoted Tan to execu-
tive director of the trading department of the conglomerate. Although
he himself was not directly related to the Oei family, a niece of Tan
Tek Peng was married to Oei Tjong Liam, half-brother of Tjong
Hauw.4 Under Tan’s leadership the trading interests of the company
greatly expanded. During the 1920s, when Oei Tjong Swan’s directed
the conglomerate, Tan opened branches in Calcutta (1925), Bombay
(1926), and Karachi (1928) to buy jute sacks for the packing of sugar,
and in the early thirties set up offices in Bangkok, Canton, Tsien-
tsin, and Amsterdam. The Bangkok office was mainly engaged in the
export of rice to Java, whereas the China branches dealt in a wide
range of goods. Tan Tek Peng became a well-known figure in Java-
nese business circles. He was small (1.60m.), good humored, and was
known as the Little Napoleon of OTHC. In the mid-thirties he was
3
Be Kwat Koen was a nephew of Be Biauw Tjoan and heir to the Be fortunes.
4
Interview Yve Boen, November 2004. Dutch archive sources mention that Tan
Tek Peng was an illegitimate son of Oei Tiong Ham, which according to these sources
was one of the reasons that Oei Tiong Ham favored the young boy so much. A close
associate of Tan Tek Peng, Mr Tan Swan Bing (1905–2004) saw no reason to deny
this “rumor.”
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vice-chairman of the Semarang Chamber of Commerce as well as the
head of Chinese Chamber of Commerce. He was active in the Chung
Hwa Hui (CHH), the peranakan political party that favored a closer
integration of the Indies with The Netherlands; he wrote extensively
in the Semarang newspaper De Locomotief regarding matters pertaining
to the Indies economy in general and Chinese business in particular.
At the eve of the Japanese occupation he, together with Oei Tjong
Hauw, was the undisputed leader of Kian Gwan. Although his com-
mand of the Chinese language was good, he was mainly responsible
for communication with the Dutch and other Western business rela-
tions of OTHC and as such was indispensable for Oei Tjong Hauw.
Relations and communications with the Chinese business commu-
nity, the native labor force, and the native ruling elites were generally
in the hands of two other confidants of Tjong Hauw, e.g. Tjoa Soe
Tjong and Lie Hoo Soen.
Tjoa Soe Tjong was formally director of the N.V. Bankvereeniging
Oei Tiong Ham and he had good relations within East Asia and the
singkeh Chinese business circles in Java and Sumatra. Between 1932
and 1937 he traveled with Oei Tiong Hauw to Hong Kong, Shanghai,
Kobe and Tokyo looking for investment and trading opportunities.
When in 1934 OTHC opened an alcohol factory in Shanghai, in col-
laboration with the Chinese government, Tjoa became its sales man-
ager. Later he became the manager of Kian Gwan’s Shanghai branch
and during the Japanese occupation he would head the main office
in Semarang. In 1952, after Tan Tek Peng’s retirement, he became
executive director of Kian Gwan.
Lie Hoo Soen was in charge of what might be called the “native
department” of the conglomerate. Oei Tjong Hauw and Lie Hoo
Soen probably knew each other from a very young age, as—according
to all informants—throughout his life Tjong Hauw’s closest and most
trustworthy friend was Lie Hoo Soen. He entered the concern in 1925
and stayed until 1961. First he started in the agricultural department
and later was appointed as manager of the real estate division. Lie was
the mata-mata (“spy”) of OTHC and he was the only one that could
enter Tjong Hauw’s office without making an appointment. Although
he held an official position as manager, his main task was to infiltrate
in labor unions, bribe native—and later Indonesian—officials, put the
screws on bad debtors, and deal with labor union leaders. People in
and outside OTHC were afraid of him, since nobody knew exactly
what his position was, whether he could be trusted or not, and how
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close he was with the son of Raja Gula (Sugar King) Oei Tiong Ham.
Managing-directors like Tjoa and Tan Tek Peng hardly had any idea
what kind of deals Lie Hoo Soen actually made for the company. And
in a way they didn’t care. When there was labor unrest or a large
debtor needed to come forward, they knew that Lie Hoo Soen would
successfully take care of it, but how he handled these cases, nobody—
except for Oei Tjong Hauw—knew.5
When in the 1930s the Depression hit the Indies hard and the
sugar industry in particular was affected, Tjong Hauw and his execu-
tive directors started to look for new investment possibilities and new
markets for Indies produce. In this they showed great creativity and
innovativeness.
In 1933 they moved into the rubber remilling industry in South
Sumatra by renting a rubber mill in Palembang owned by the Dutch
Rubber Union. Together with the Singapore based, Lee Rubber Com-
pany, which rented the rubber mill of Internatio, Kian Gwan came to
play a pioneering role in transforming South Sumatran rubber exports
from slabs to blankets, and by 1936 half of Palembang’s rubber exports
were blankets. At this stage Kian Gwan decided to rubber sheet pro-
duction and set up collecting agencies in the interior. Since hand man-
gles were essential to the production of small holder sheet rubber, the
company also encouraged their import and distribution selling them
mainly to warung holders. Lee Rubber and also Nomura East Indies
(the largest pre-war Japanese investor in the Indies) did the same, and
in 1941 a total of 31,000 tons of sheet rubber (thirty-six percent of
exports) went out from Palembang. To create new markets for its rub-
ber Tan Tek Peng traveled to New York and would soon find important
clients. He negotiated a special arrangement with the Dutch shipping
line KPM whereupon Kian Gwan started to export blankets (and later
sheets) directly to the United States, thereby breaking the monopoly of
5
Benny Oei Tjong Tjay, who took over OTHC Indonesia in 1950, confided to
the author that Lie generally scared him and that he did not know how to deal with
him. He too avoided Lie as much as possible and just handed money whenever Lie
requested it; knowing too, that whatever Lie did, it was always in the interest of the
firm. Authors interview Benny Oei Tjong Tjay, November 4, 2004. Little is known
about Lie Hoo Soen. But he is most probably related to Lie Siong Hwie who headed
the Kian Gwan Surabaya branch after 1907 and had been involved in the company
for more than twenty years. Lie Siong Hwie was president of the Surabaya Chinese
Chamber of Commerce at the time. Wright (1909, 547–8).
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Singapore as the entrepot center for South Sumatran rubber. Kian
Gwan’s remilling factory sold 2,000 to 3,000 blankets per month, mak-
ing this venture a big success. In the next decades rubber, rather than
sugar, would be the mainstay of Kian Gwan’s business.
Tan Tek Peng’s trip to New York had another effect on the com-
pany’s business diversification. Noticing that the tapioca market in the
U.S. offered good possibilities for expansion, the company founded
its own tapioca factory in Krebet and started shipping tapioca flour
directly to that country. In doing so, it became a fierce competitor
of the Dutch-owned Handelsvereeniging Amsterdam (HVA), which
until that time had monopolized this trade. The U.S. became also an
important market for other products Kian Gwan handled.
Figure 1. Tan Tek Peng.
Courtesy: Mrs Lieke Oei Tiang Han.
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Opening Up China and Japan
Whereas Tan Tek Peng took the responsibility to open up markets
in the Western hemisphere (Europe and the United States), Tjong
Hauw and Tjoa Soe Tjong looked for new opportunities in East Asia,
especially China and Japan. As has been said above, between 1932
and 1937, Oei Tjong Hauw—together with Tjoa Soe Tjong—traveled
extensively to Hong Kong, Shanghai, Kobe, and Tokyo looking for
investment possibilities and new trading opportunities. China and in
particular Shanghai had Tjong Hauw’s great attention. This roaring
city had a big appeal to young, handsome, and powerful ethnic Chi-
nese tycoons from Southeast Asia like Tjong Hauw. Its cosmopolitism
was highly attractive when one wanted to escape the rumor and gos-
sip and the strict social norms of peranakan Chinese society in Java.
And Oei Tjong Hauw had every reason to escape gossip-rich Java. He
was still married to Be Hien Nio, who had given him three children,
and the couple lived together. But he had fallen in love with a beauti-
ful young Eurasian woman, who had become his mistress, and both
of them wanted to spend time together. She was getting bored and
increasingly frustrated with their life in Java, especially since she felt
that the two of them were always being watched, gossiped about, and
could hardly spend time together. She therefore urged Tjong Hauw to
buy an apartment in Shanghai so that the two of them could go out
unhindered and “dance the night away” without being watched and
criticized by the colonial elite. So when in Shanghai Tjong Hauw was
invited by Chen Kung Po, mayor of Shanghai and later to become
minister in the Japanese puppet regime of Wang Ching Wei, to jointly
set up an alcohol factory near Shanghai in 1934, he was eager to
respond positively to this request. The company took care of the
management of the factory and the sale of alcohol. In due course the
alcohol factory became the largest of its kind in Southeast Asia with
a production capacity of 4,000 gallons of industrial alcohol per day.
Tjoa became the factory’s first sales manager. Oei Tjong Hauw had
managed to combine successfully private and business motives, and
was able to offer his mistress the kind of life she was looking for.6
6
In a personal interview Tjong Hauw’s half-brother, Oei Tjong Ie, insisted that
Tjong Hauw’s main motivation, however, was to bring his mistress to Shanghai and
that business motivations were only secondary. Post (2004, 14).
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Tjong Hauw’s association with Chen Kung Po coincided with a
general shift in peranakan Chinese attitudes towards Dutch colonial
(economic) policies of the time and Republican China. In September
1933 the Dutch colonial office had instituted the Crisis Import Ordi-
nance to ward off the Japanese penetration of the Indies economy and
to protect the Dutch textile industry from severe Japanese competition
in the Indies market.7 The regulations implemented were designed to
protect the interests of not only Dutch textile industry but also the
large Dutch trading companies and Dutch shipping in the foreign
trade of the Indies. Since the colonial export economy was in a ter-
rible state, getting actively involved in the Japan-Java trade was about
the only way for large trading firms like Kian Gwan to make profits.
However, the Crisis Import Ordinance was designed in such a way
that major ethnic Chinese trading firms like Kian Gwan, Kwik Hoo
Tong Trading Co., and Liem Bwan Seng Co. were unable to reap the
benefits of the increasing demand for Japanese textiles in the Indies
markets. The Dutch banks in the Indies, and especially the Java Bank
which financed much of Kian Gwan’s and also Kwik Hoo Tong’s
trade, working in tandem with the colonial government, forced the
major ethnic Chinese trading firms not to step into the lucrative Japan
trade, but rather to stick to their traditional export trade of Indies
produce.8 This type of “Dutch-first” economic policies caused much
resentment on the part of Oei Tjong Hauw, his managing-directors,
and the Semarang Chinese business community at large. There was
a general feeling that if they were not allowed to engage actively in
Japan’s export trade towards the Indies, they would look to Republi-
can China and to develop the Indies market for Chinese products.
To achieve this, a closer cooperation between the singkeh economic
elite and the Chung Hwa Hui (CHH), the major peranakan political party
in Central Java, was sought for. The CHH was mainly financed by the
7
See Alex Claver’s contribution to this volume.
8
Since increasing sugar exports to Japan were part of the bilateral deal made
between the Japanese government and the Dutch colonial office in 1933–34 and
Dutch trading firms were not particularly equipped to handle huge amounts of sugar,
the pressure on the large Chinese trading firms to focus only on their traditional
export trade, rather than to step into the import trade from Japan, might have been
good policy from the Dutch colonial authorities point of view. But the powerful ethnic
Chinese business class thought otherwise. According to them they could have easily
developed both trades successfully. This, however, would have had an even more
negative impact on the role of Dutch trading firms and hence on the carefully struc-
tured social economy the Dutch colonial government wanted to protect.
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OTHC and membership of the CCH mostly consisted of employees
and agencies of the concern. It was said that of one hundred CHH
members in Semarang, ninety were related to the vast business empire
of the Oei Family (Lohanda 2002, 155). Following Oei Tjong Hauw’s
travels to Shanghai, in 1933 Kan Hok Hoei (HH Kan), chairman of
the CHH and member of the People’s Council (Volksraad ), went to
China to negotiate closer cooperation with the Republican govern-
ment. Subsequently, in 1934 Oei Tjong Hauw invited Chen Kung Po
to visit the Netherlands East Indies and to initiate, together with the
Chinese Consul General in Batavia, the establishment of a Federa-
tion of Chinese Chambers of Commerce in Batavia. The office of this
federation was in the same building as the CHH office and the office
of the main division of the KMT. HH Kan became the first president
of this Federation (Lohanda 2002, 115). In the meantime, Tjoa Soe
Tjong organized a large China Fair in Semarang, which drew much
attention and attracted large crowds.
Although the Dutch colonial office was wary of the increasing col-
laboration between the Semarang Chinese business community (CHH
and OTHC) with Republican China, Oei Tjong Hauw received much
support from Mangkunegoro VII, one of the four rulers of the Native
Principalities in Central Java.9
Mangkunegoro VII, who was very close with Be Kwat Koen (major-
titular of Solo), the father-in-law of Oei Tjong Hauw, had a great
interest in Tjong Hauw’s China ventures.10 As ruler of the Mangkune-
gara he was particularly keen in developing native agriculture and
modernizing the local economy and traditional Javanese society. In
introducing modern technologies and new agricultural techniques he
looked to both the West (The Netherlands) and the East.11 During his
years in Shanghai Tjong Hauw regularly wrote letters to Mangkune-
goro VII informing him about the political and economic situation in
9
The following is drawn from the private correspondence of Mangkunegoro VII
with Chinese from Central Java covering the period 1916–44. I am grateful to Madelon
Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis for making these sources available for the project.
10
The special relation between the Be Kwat Koen and Mangkunegoro VII is dealt
with in Post (2009).
11
In her recently published Vorst tussen twee werelden [Monarch between two worlds]
(Schoorl: Uitgeverij Conserve, 2006) Madelon Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis looks spe-
cifically at the relations between Mangkunegoro VII and Dutch intellectuals. In this
illuminating study, which has been written in the form of a novel, Ms Djajadiningrat
makes extensive use of private letters and memoirs of MN VII and his intimate Dutch
intellectual friends.
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China and sending him Chinese goods to be introduced in his domain.
With the support of Mangkunegoro VII, Oei Tjong Hauw was able to
create new markets in Central Java for Chinese manufacturers, which
at the same time benefited Kian Gwan Trading Co.
By calling on a variety of different ethnic networks, Tjong Hauw and
his senior-directors skillfully managed to expand into different global
regions, the U.S. and China. Their motives to do so were purely com-
mercial and in the interest of the family business. These motivations
also lay at the background of their expansion towards Japan.
OTHC and Japan’s Pre-War Expansion into East and Southeast Asia
In the pre-war period Japan’s rise as an industrial and military power
in Asia greatly affected the region’s economic and political balance
of power. After the First World War the country extended its ship-
ping, trading, and financial networks towards colonial Southeast Asia
and its export industries began to conquer colonial markets. Japa-
nese zaibatsu and large trading firms invested heavily in the region’s
resources, especially rubber, sugar, and in the late 1930s bauxite, tin,
forestry, and fisheries. In this economic expansion Japanese shipping,
trading firms and banks cooperated closely with Chinese business net-
works in Makasar, Semarang, Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, and
Taiwan.
Oei Tiong Ham was one of the most powerful ethnic Chinese entre-
preneurs in Southeast Asia who worked intensively with Japanese busi-
nesses. He assisted Japanese merchants with capital and connections in
the pre-World War One period and during that War provided secret
funds to set up the Japanese-controlled China & Southern Bank in
Taiwan together with another famous pre-war Chinese capitalist,
Kwik Djoeng Eng (Post 2002). Whereas many Southeast Asian Chi-
nese firms resorted to occasional anti-Japanese boycotts due to Japan’s
acts of aggression in China, Oei Tiong Ham never took part in this.
And due to his power and influence in Semarang and Central Java,
the Semarang Chinese community almost never joined such a boy-
cott movement. Oei Tjong Hauw shared this attitude of his father.
Although the company did not engage in direct imports from Japan, it
did, however, distribute Japanese goods in the Indies and had a large
export trade with the country, mainly rubber and sugar.
Kian Gwan was a major exporter of sugar (since 1926) and rubber
to the Land of the Rising Sun, but in the 1930s—when other ethnic
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Chinese firms in Southeast Asia became increasingly involved in anti-
Japanese boycotts—the company saw new possibilities. From the early
thirties onward it started to export maize from East Java to Japan and
in due time it would almost monopolize this trade.
In 1939, after Germany’s invasion of Poland, Kian Gwan opened
a branch office in Tokyo. This office was headed by a certain Hayashi
who was the manager of Senda & Co. Ltd., a large Japanese trading
firm in Surabaya.12 Hayashi’s main task was to find clients for the
export products Kian Gwan handled at the time and he did so quite
successfully. In Surabaya he also came to head the maize department
of Kian Gwan.
That the conglomerate was not willing to support the anti-Japanese
boycott movements and only meagerly financed the National Salva-
tion Movement after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937
aroused bitter feelings among Singaporean and Malaysian Chinese as
well as among pro-China groups in the Indies. Given the fact that
under Japan’s military rule the OTHC apparently cooperated heartily
with the new masters, this “Japan issue” continues to be hotly debated.
But to Oei Tiong Ham, Oei Tjong Hauw, and the company’s man-
aging directors, it has always been a policy that business rationality
should not be hindered by politics and or “emotions.” That they, how-
ever, were anxious about Japan’s expansionist policies is clear from
the following.
In the early 1930s OTHC started its own and successful newspaper,
Matahari, in Semarang.13 To keep track of political and economic devel-
opments and expansionist ideas in Japan it send out its correspondent,
Ahmad Subarjo, to Tokyo. Subarjo, who later became Indonesia’s first
foreign minister, stayed in Japan for about two years and afterwards
regularly went there in the same capacity. His main task was to inform
the board of OTHC about Japan’s southward intentions and military
build-up. Subarjo had no connections in Japanese business circles and
did not become involved in OTHC business activities in the country.14
After 1933 OTHC was quite anxious about Japan’s political course
and possible military advance and to what extent this could affect its
business interest in Japan and China.
12
Interview Tan Swan Bing, January 2003.
13
The Matahari was to become the most profitable newspaper in the Netherlands
East Indies.
14
Authors interview with Tan Swan Bing, December 2004.
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This anxiety and cautiousness became also apparent in their nego-
tiations with the large Japanese banks. The company’s main bank
was the Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank (NIHB). The people
here were considered knowledgeable and businesslike, unlike the NI
Escomptobank, which was considered highly incapable with incompe-
tent staff. OTHC had for many decades build up a trustworthy and
profitable relation with the NIHB. But in the 1930s other banks, par-
ticularly American and Japanese, started to offer services that were
more lucrative and seemingly more profitable. In the case of the Japa-
nese Yokohama Speciebank (YSB), OTHC generally declined their
offers, since it was afraid that it might end up in YSB’s financial web,
which when war broke out would be quite difficult (and maybe impos-
sible) to untangle.15
Also in the private sphere, the members of the Oei family and its
management expressed their anxiety and antipathy for Japan’s fascism
and military aggression. There was a general feeling that Japanese
militarism and expansionist ambitions were bad news and this message
was also brought to their children, especially after the Nanking atroci-
ties became known.16 In general, the OTHC management made a
clear distinction between business interests, private feelings, and politi-
cal viewpoints with regard to Japan. It was felt that economic decisions
should not be based on political ideas or “emotions,” but should be
calculated and rational in the interest of the firm and family. To the
group as a whole it was clear that an anti-Japanese boycott would have
no effect whatsoever on Japan’s industrial development and economic
(and possible military) expansion, and to try so would be pure non-
sense and a waste of money.17
15
Interview Tan Swan Bing and Benny Oei Tjong Tjay. December 2004. How-
ever, recently Ms. Yuko Kudo, a PhD graduate of Tokyo University, discovered that
at least in the second half of the 1920s, OTHC did make use of the financial services
of the YSB. To what extent this relation continued in the 1930s needs to be scruti-
nized further.
16
Tan Tek Peng, for example, forbade his daughters to go to school and learn
Japanese culture and language during the Japanese period in Indonesia. They were
forced to stay inside and keep out of sight. Interview Yve Boen and Lieke Oei, daugh-
ters of Tan Tek Peng, May 2007.
17
Interview Tan Swan Bing. The late Mr. Tan, voicing the opinions of others
in the company, was very clear and outspoken about this. He considered the anti-
Japanese actions by Tan Kah Keh and other prominent leaders of the wide-spread
National Salvation Movement as highly irrational and ineffective.
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Corporate Structure
The expansion since the late 1920s demanded an adaptation of the
company’s structure and a modernization of its administrative appa-
ratus. To that effect Tan Tek Peng in 1933 brought in a young and
talented assistant-accountant, Tan Swan Bing (1906–2004). He gradu-
ally transformed the administrative department into a sound, mecha-
nized, and modern accounting section, which also became an advisory
department in matters of finance, economy, and taxes. Tan Swan
Bing, among other innovations, introduced the modern punch-card
system into the company, the first of its kind to be used in the Indies.18
The extension of the trading business also led to the formation of dif-
ferent departments and divisions within Kian Gwan Trading Co.19 In
1930 a new department was established, the Primex (Product Import
and Export), which concentrated on the import of rice from Thai-
land, cloves from Zanzibar, and tea from Formosa,20 while it exported
sugar, rubber, coffee, kapok, and maize. The Primex department gave
special attention to sugar sales for local consumption and succeeded in
obtaining more than sixty percent of these sales which for the whole
archipelago meant a yearly turnover of more than 200,000 tons. In
addition, Primex came to supervise two important branches, e.g.
Palembang (rubber) and Makasar (maize and copra).
In 1931 Kian Gwan started a separate import business for con-
sumer and luxury goods, the Kian Gwan Import Department, and in
1932–35 two other departments were created, e.g. the Hide & Skin
Department and the Insurance Department. This last department was
strictly speaking an insurance pool where the Kian Gwan’s interests
were insured with a fixed share of participation by large British, Aus-
tralian, and American insurance companies. In establishing these dif-
ferent departments within Kian Gwan Trading Co., Oei Tjong Hauw
and Tan Tek Peng wanted to spread their risks, and especially the
risks involved in the speculative sugar trade. The establishment of a
separate Import Department turned out to be a blessing in the 1930s
when the export trade collapsed and in the 1950s when the Indies
market needed huge amounts of foreign articles.
18
Interview Tan Swan Bing, December 2003.
19
Details in these sections come from Tan (1958).
20
As might be recalled this was the tea business Oei Tiong Ham Concern had
taken over in 1926 from the Kwik Hoo Tong Trading Society.
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The wide-spread interests and the vast staff and diverse labor force
demanded further attention to the personnel front to ensure commit-
ment, loyalty, and harmonious working relations throughout the con-
glomerate. To achieve this, the staff members, in consultation with the
directors, formed in 1939 the Sarpoci (Sarikat Pegawai Oei Tiong Ham
Concern Indonesia). The head-committee of the Sarpoci was located in
Semarang, whereas in the main branch-offices side-committees were
formed. In these committees directors and staff members regularly
got together to explain business decisions, to discuss salary scales and
old-age provisions, leave regulations, and staff housing problems.
The creation of Sarpoci contributed to feelings of “belonging” to
the concern, and it tended to alleviate feelings of competition and
antagonism between staff members of the industrial and commercial
departments.
Table 1. Corporate Diagram
In 1932 the Oei Tiong Ham Concern consisted of the following legal entities:21
1. Kian Gwan Trading Company (capital 3 million guilders)
Directors: Oei Tjong Hauw and Tan Tek Peng
Main Indies offices: Semarang (manager Oei Tjoen Hui)
Surabaya (manager Li Siong Hui)
Batavia (manager Tan Kim Say)
Foreign offices: Kian Gwan Western Agency Ltd. (London, est. 1910)
Kian Gwan Malaya Ltd. (Singapore, est. 1914)
Kian Gwan India Ltd. (Calcutta, est. 1925)
Kian Gwan Bombay Office (est. 1926)
Kian Gwan Karachi Office (est. 1928)
Kian Gwan Shanghai Branch (1929)
2. Algemene Maatschappij tot de Exploitatie der Oei Tiong Ham Suiker-
fabrieken (capital 40 million guilders)
Director: Oei Tjong Hauw; Vice-director: Dr Djie Ting Ham
Overseas office: Oei Tiong Ham Concern Bangkok Office (est. 1932)
3. Sugar factory Redjo Agoeng (capital 600 thousand guilders)
Director: Oei Tjong Hauw
4. Sugar factory Tanggoel Angin (capital 600 thousand guilders)
Director: Holding Company OTHC Sugar Factories
21
The details in this section come mainly from the Handboek voor Cultuur- en Handel-
sondernemingen (Batavia: De Busy, 1930 and 1933). I would like to thank Drs. Herman
Kwak for thoroughly scrutinizing these materials.
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5. Sugar factory Pakkies (capital 600 thousand guilders)
Director: Holding Company OTHC Sugar Factories, Oei Tjong
Hauw
6. Sugar factory Ponen (capital 600 thousand guilders)
Director: Holding Company OTHC Sugar Factories
7. Sugar factory Krebet (capital 1 million guilders)
Directors: Oei Tjong Hauw and Dr Djie Ting Ham
8. Tapioca factory Krebet (capital 600 thousand guilders)
Director: Holding Company OTHC Sugar Factories
9. Bank Association Oei Tiong Ham (capital 15 million guilders)
Directors: Oei Tjong Hauw and Dr Djie Ting Ham
10. Heap Eng Moh Steamship Company (registered in Singapore)
General manager: Lee Hoon Keong (grandfather of Lee Kuan Yew)
11. NV Midden Java Veem (wharehousing)
12. NV Bouwmaatschappij Randoesari (real estate)
Director: Bank Association Oei Tiong Ham
13. Grond & Huizenbedrijf Oei Tiong Ham (family real estate)
14. Matahari (newspaper)
On the organizational level we see that by the end of the 1930s the
OTHC operated a highly modern and well-structured multinational
business enterprise with tasks and responsibilities of the different depart-
ments and divisions clearly defined. Mainly due to this rationalization
the conglomerate had been able to overcome the pitfalls of the world
depression and successfully entered new lines of business in the Neth-
erlands East Indies and other parts of the world. Overall control in
the company rested firmly with Oei Tjong Hauw, who was respected
by everyone and had shown himself to be a capable successor to his
father. Since the OTHC was the only ethnic Chinese conglomerate
in pre-war Indonesia that operated on such a grand scale and was so
influential worldwide, the company was envied by many in the Chi-
nese business circles in Southeast Asia and in Java specifically.
The Japanese Occupation
The 3.5 years of Japanese military rule had a large impact on the Chi-
nese business communities in Indonesia. Many well-established large
peranakan firms that were closely integrated in the Dutch colonial
economy found themselves in disarray, and not being able to cope
with the changing business environment, lost much ground to singkeh
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Chinese firms.22 Soon after the Japanese troops landed popular unrest
loomed quickly and Chinese firms and shops were its main targets.
Within a couple of days many firms, shops, and factories all over Java
were plundered, its owners and personnel beaten and sometimes mur-
dered, leading to sizable damage to Chinese assets in the Indies. Once
the Japanese forces had established their military administration, it
took a firm stand towards plunderers and offered protection and shel-
ter for the Chinese population groups.
Damage to Chinese property was also caused by Dutch demolition
troops. As part of the scorched earth policies, Dutch military forces
destroyed strategic harbor facilities and the big oil refineries, along
with many Chinese-owned factories (Touwen-Bouwsma 2002, 57;
Twang 1998, 70). One of the sugar factories destroyed was the Ponen
factory in Semarang of the OTHC. In a similar way the Oei family
lost the Palembang rubber remilling factory. The Chinese losses in
Indonesia during the first weeks of the occupation, by both popular
violence and Dutch demolition forces, have been estimated at 100
million guilders (Twang 1998, 71).
Despite the fact that the premises of the Oei family and managing
personnel of the company were also attacked and its buildings, lands,
and factories partly plundered, the Oei Tiong Ham Concern and its
senior staff unlike most other large peranakan firms fared relatively
well under Japan’s military administration and did comparatively bet-
ter than many other ethnic Chinese firms during the period.
Prior to the arrival of Japanese troops on the north-coast of Central
Java, Oei Tjong Hauw and Tan Tek Peng had been instructed by
Dutch authorities to leave Semarang and to move inland in order not
to fall into Japanese hands. Together with three of his brothers, Tjong
Hauw, Tan Tek Peng, and Tan Swan Bing (including their families)
took refuge in Tawang Mangu (a mountain resort near Solo owned
by Mangkunegoro VII where the Oei family had a villa). Before leav-
ing Semarang it was decided that Tjoa Soe Tong would stay behind
to “defend the fortress” and that Tan Swan Bing would go on to the
Yogya branch and from there keep an eye on the still active sugar
factories in Madiun and Malang. Jack Oei Tjong Ie, who together
22
This transformation has convincingly been described by Twang (1998).
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with his mother Lucy Ho had lived in The Netherlands to study law
and had returned to Java in April 1940 ( just prior to Germany’s occu-
pation of The Netherlands), was working at Kian Gwan’s Surabaya
branch at the time of the Japanese invasion.
In April 1942 Oei Tjong Hauw and Tan Tek Peng were summoned
by Yamamoto Moichiro, Head of the General Affairs Department, to
come to Batavia and were fetched for that purpose by two Japanese
officers to undergo the cumbersome journey from Tawang Manggu
to the capital. When after many difficulties they arrived in Batavia,
the Japanese authorities questioned them and called them all sorts of
names. They were primarily interested in Tjong Hauw’s ideas about
Japan’s mission in Asia. Tjong Hauw pointed out that in his house
he had two photographs hanging on the wall, one of Wang Ching
Wei (president of the Japanese puppet regime in Nanking), the other
of Sun Yat Sen, father of the Republic.23 This apparently convinced
the Japanese officers that he was not collaborating with the Chunking
regime of Chiang Kai-shek and subsequently Tjong Hauw and Tek
Peng were sent home without any directives.
In the meantime, all the warehouses of the company had been put
under seal and nothing could be done until, in June 1942, they got a
new summon and again proceeded to Batavia, now by their own means,
which meant the slow train that had started running again between
the most important cities of Java. In this meeting with Yamamoto an
ultimatum was submitted to Oei Tjong Hauw; either agree with the
conditions stipulated or the Kian Gwan concern would be closed and
all the assistant-managers, managers, and higher ranking officials in
the concern would be put into custody. The condition included the
acceptance of Japanese trusteeship and the voluntary offering of their
stocks of sugar and tapioca flour in the factories (more than 20,000
tons with a nominal value of about two million guilders). Having little
choice and being convinced that it was in the interest of the company
and its personnel, Oei Tjong Hauw accepted the terms and signed the
document. They were allowed to go home and the seals could be lifted
from the warehouses.
It took, however, some time before Kian Gwan could start work
again. Staff members were strayed in all directions and had to be
recalled and reorganized; the Netherlands East Indies banknotes had
23
Interview with Benny Oei Tjong Tjay, Amstelveen, December 2003.
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to be exchanged into the new Indonesian notes issued by the Japanese
at the rate of 1:1, and the Japanese trustees had to be appointed.
Until this trusteeship formally became effective, Kian Gwan trading
company was allowed to continue its business, the major difference
being that it had to concentrate on retail trade, rather than import
and export trade, which was reserved for Japanese zaibatsu like Mit-
sui Bussan and Mitsubishi Shoji. In the first 1.5 years of the Japanese
occupation the branch in Surabaya, for example, had sufficient stocks
of goods and was still able to make good profits.24 Also, the sugar
factories during this period were still producing. In 1942, eighty-nine
sugar factories produced a total of 1,311,235 tons of sugar. Among
these were the Krebet and Redjo Agoeng factories of OTHC that pro-
duced 21.110 and 24.522 tons respectively, which was almost the same
as production in 1930.25 However, despite their cooperative attitude,
Oei Tjong Hauw c.s. could not prevent the tremendous losses to the
firm during the first year of the occupation. When in November 1942
the Japanese trusteeship formally came into effect, OTHC assets had
fallen to half of their origin level, amounting to thirteen million guil-
ders in Java and 1.7 million in the Outer Islands (Twang 1998, 88).
For most people working in the company it was understandable that
the preconditions of the Japanese war economy were different from
that of the semi-open economy which had prevailed under the Dutch
in the 1930s. And if necessary they were willing to accept these. But
to all of them it was absolutely clear that “business is business” and
that profits needed to be made for the good of the company and the
families dependent upon it. In their minds there was no such a thing as
a “black market” or “illegal” trade; all trade was considered acceptable
under the Japanese war economy. It was the niches in this controlled
and military-run economy that should be used optimally, and it was
considered not business-like if these opportunities were not fully used.
If temporarily hoarding goods would mean getting a better price later
elsewhere, this was considered a quite logical and rational business
practice.26 This of course was not an attitude solely of the Oei family
24
Interview Jack Oei Tjong Ie, Singapore, July 2004.
25
Economisch Weekblad voor Nederlandsch Indie (EWNI), April 20, 1946, 12e jrg. No. 6: 45.
26
Interviews Tan Swan Bing, Jack Oei Tjong Ie; Personal Memoir Tan Tek Peng.
On the so-called “collaboration” of OTHC and the reactions to it, see Twang (1998,
86–91).
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and its managers—most Chinese Indonesians tried to adapt to the new
rulers and for “strategic” reasons often collaborated, thereby adher-
ing to the Japanese principle that “Chinese capacities and commercial
talents should be properly utilized for the purpose of our Southern
construction” (Twang 1998, 90).
Members of the Chinese elite families like the Oei, Be, and Kwee
in Central and East Java did not seem to have suffered much under
the Japanese. In their mountain resorts where most stayed during the
period there was always plenty of food and clothing, they had their
servants to look after them; and in the cities they kept on entertaining
themselves at dancing and dinner parties, in the cinema, did some
occasional fun shopping and even went on tourist outings. The major
problem they had was that luxury items like cars and pianos were
confiscated and that life in general was boring, since traveling around
freely became hazardous and families and friends could not easily
been seen. To many the major difference was that in the streets and
the public space “white faces” gradually disappeared, but since most
of them hardly mingled with the Dutch, British, and Americans, this
too was accepted as a fact of the new life.27
Things became different once it turned out that Japanese economic
policies did not produce the anticipated results and the war economy
demanded a full restructuring of the Javanese economy. Central to
Japan’s concern was rice production and rice distribution (Sato 1994,
115–53). This meant, for example, that the sugar factories had to trans-
form their estates into paddy growing fields and that the sugar industry
had to cut back its production. All these measures demanded a strict
control over prices, production, and distribution. “Economic control”
became the catch-phrase and was implemented from the higher lev-
els of the (international) economy to the local level of the Javanese
27
This didn’t mean, however, that there were no personal hardships and tragedies.
On the contrary. Chinese elite members did not only suffer from the Japanese kenpetai
for political reasons, but also simply because they were rich and wealthy and belonged
to the upper layers of society. And not only the native population, but many in the
lower ranks of the Japanese military and the civilian administration, enjoyed hassling
them and making it physically clear that their life of luxury was over. Tan Tek Peng
spend three weeks in jail and was severely beaten by the kenpetai, Tan Swan Bing
was accused of anti-Japanese behavior and “dangerous thoughts” and was sent to
prison for eight months from mid-1942 until early 1943. Whereas Jack Oei Tjong Ie,
always a rebel and not afraid of the devil himself, hid Moluccan soldiers in his house
in Surabaya and secretly listened to the BBC radio, was sentenced to death in early
1943 and spend the occupation period in a kenpetai prison in Jakarta.
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peasantry. In practice these measures were to no avail, actually lead-
ing to a thriving black market, hoarding of agricultural produce, an
increasing discrepancy between urban and rural areas accompanied
by the dismantling of social-economic structures in the peasant soci-
eties, and an increasing poverty among the Java population. On the
other hand, it also affected the field of operation of trading companies
like Kian Gwan, and demanded much of the individual business tal-
ents of senior staff and managers.
Social-Political Roles
On the social and political level, Oei Tjong Hauw and Tan Tek Peng
played important roles under Japan’s military rule. Both became cen-
tral figures in Japanese efforts to organize, seek cooperation from and
deal with the Chinese in Central and East Java. In December 1942,
under the energetic leadership of Toyoshima Ataru, a “Preparatory
Committee for the Foundation of a General Association of Chinese
Immigrants” was established for which Tjong Hauw and Tek Peng
were also invited.28 Six months later, all over Java local Chinese
Associations were formed, which oversaw and directed socio-politi-
cal and cultural developments within the Chinese communities. The
powerful Chinese Association (Kakyo Sokai) in Semarang was chaired
by Oei Tjong Hauw, whereas Tan Tek Peng acted as its vice-chair-
man. Other members of the Semarang Association were Oei Tjong
Ik and Oei Tjong Tjat, younger brothers of Tjong Hauw.29 Also, in
other Javanese cities members of the Oei family and staff members
of OTHC came to hold important positions in the Kakyo Sokai. His
brother-in-law Kwee Zwan Lwan for example was appointed chair-
man of the Kakyo Sokai in Cirebon. Holding these positions gave
28
Toyoshima Ataru came to Batavia in 1939 to head the Chinese Affairs Section at
the Japanese Consulate-General. In 1941 he was promoted to vice-consul. During this
period he was very active in gaining the cooperation and support of Chinese in Java
for Japan’s policies and established a wide-ranging network among prominent Chi-
nese leaders and influential Japanese in the Indies. See Didi Kwartanada “An Expert
on Chinese Affairs or a Pacifier?: Toyoshima Ataru and the Campaign towards the
Chinese in Java, 1939–1945,” paper presented at ICAS 4, Shanghai, August 20–24,
2005.
29
NA, the Hague, Archive Procureur-General 2.10.17, inv. No. 411 “Oei Tiong
Ham File.”
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people like Tjong Hauw, Tan Tek Peng, and Kwee Zwan Lwan much
negotiating power with the General Affairs Department of the Gun-
seikanbu (the most important department in the military administra-
tion) and made it possible not only to promote their own business and
private family interests, but also assist and help unfortunate members
of the Chinese community and the Dutch and Eurasian populations
that were interned. Tjong Hauw’s pre-war record as a “secret and
silent” business associate of the Nanking government and a friend of
Cheng Kung Po undoubtedly played a part in being accepted as a
trustworthy and reliable partner of the Japanese military.30 He was
also instrumental in setting up, under Japanese guidance and initiative,
a Committee on Overseas Chinese Voluntary Defense Army. The aim
of this defense army was twofold. One was to train and militarize
young Chinese in order to help the Japanese to defend Java in case
of an allied attack. Secondly, to set up a paramilitary Chinese self-
defense force that was undoubtedly necessary when popular unrest
might again turn against the Chinese. This committee was formed in
March 1944 and Tjong Hauw was appointed its chairman.31 Early
in 1945 this “self ”-defense organization came into being and initially
counted around 2,000 members in Batavia alone.
In the meantime, Oei Tjong Hauw and Tan Tek Peng c.s. were
also in close contact with Indonesian leaders like Hatta and Sukarno,
and prominent pribumi businessmen, discussing the future economic
development of an independent Indonesia. In October 1943 the Japa-
nese set up the Chuo Sangi’in (Central Advisory Board), which became
the key institution for political participation and economic matters.32
Oei Tiong Hauw was one of the four Chinese members of this all-
embracing council. His important and influential position during this
central year of the Japanese occupation can be gauged from a photo-
graph taken of the official installation of the Chuo Sangi’in in October
1943.
30
Dutch sources also mention that he good relations with several kenpetai officials;
but this might also be due to the fact that he successfully negotiated the ultimate
release of his brother Oei Tjong Ie, who was sentenced to death. Nobody in the Oei
Family knew exactly how Tjong Hauw had been able to keep Tjong Ie from not being
executed by the kenpeitai.
31
Ministery of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, NEFIS Archives, Inv. no. 2756
“Chineesche Beweeging.”
32
On the Chuo Sangi’in see Sato (1994, 64–71) and Post et al. (2010, 482–3).
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Figure 2.
Source: Boekoe peringtanan Tyoo Sangi-in (s.l., Impressum, 1943).
In this picture we see Oei Tjong Hauw (white suite and black tie)
standing in the centre, third row, right behind Raden M.A.A. Kusumo
Utoyo (vice-chairman of the Chuo Sangi’in) and next to Vice-Admiral
Maeda Tadashi. Sukarno (chairman of the Chuo Sangi’in) is standing
in the centre, front row, whereas Lt.-Gen. Harada Kumakichi (Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Sixteenth Army) is standing in front.33
In April 1945 an Investigating Committee for the People’s Economy
was established by the Japanese military. Indonesian pribumi business-
men dominated this committee, Tan Tek Peng being the only Chinese
representative, and when one month later the “Investigation Body for
the Preparation of Indonesian Independence” was inaugurated, Oei
Tjong Hauw gained a seat (Kanahele 1967, 100–102, 192–4; Twang
1998, 118–19). In the discussions at these committees about the
future development of the Indonesian economy, it was made clear by
33
Maeda Tadashi (1898–1977) was head of the Naval Liaison Office in Jakarta and
played a decisive role in the final days of the Japanese occupation period when he
offered his residence to Sukarno and Hatta to prepare the Proclamation of Indepen-
dence. Harada Kumakichi (1888–1947) succeeded Imamura Hitoshi as C-in-C of the
Sixteenth Army (November 1942–April 1945). Post et al. (2010, 499–500; 544–5).
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