THE RISE, FALL, AND RECONFIGURATION OF THE MEXICAN E IDO
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THE RISE, FALL, AND RECONFIGURATION OF
THE MEXICAN E]IDO*
ERIC P. PERRAMOND
ABSTRACT. After the Mexican Revolution of 1910 the Mexican federal government created a
comnmnal resource-holding institution, the ejido, to redress long~standing land-tenure in-
equality. Between the 1930s and the late 1970S, the period of active redistribution of federalized
and previously private resources, half of Mexico's entire area was transferred to the ejido sector.
Local ejidos became the driving political and economic force at the mrmicipio level for agrar-
ian reform, redistributing local power and affirming the national stamp of the Partido
Revoludonario Institucional, the dominant national party of the t\'O'entieth century. Although
the 199:!-1993 reforms to Article 27 of the ~kcican Constitution prohibited any future c:q)an-
sion of communal lands and allowed privatization of conununal resources, few widespread
privatization schemes have taken hold in the vast majority of ejidos. ln this article I provide
examples of this new communal framework and its implications, with illustrations based on
fieldwork in the states of Guanajuato and Sonora. Keywords: ejido, Gwwajuato, Mexico,
privatization, Sm1ora.
Mexico's long e-x-periment with state-led agrarian reform (stAR), between 1917
and 1992, has ended. During the 199os, counterreforms ·were seemingly in full swing
throughout N1exico's communal landscapes. Or, at least, that was the impression
left by social science literature of the late 1990s as lviexico joined a number of other
countries in implementing a new wave of so-called market-led agrarian reforms
(:;...lLAR). Just as new redistributive land reforms are emerging in some less-devel-
oped countries, others are gradually being modified from their original purpose
(Moseley and McCusket· 2008). Merica abandoned the idea of addressing inequali-
ties through state-led measures (Bobrow-Strain 2007). The postrevolutionary and
communal resource institution, the ejido, has heen loosened from state support,
and the fate of any individual ejido depends largely on its location and socioeco-
nmnic context. And yet the story of the collapse of SLAR and the triumphal nature
of NILAR is not so dear in Mexico.
During the twentieth century, governments attempted to mitigate inequalities in
resources, largely through land reforms (de Janvry 1981; Randall1997; Rosset, PS by the An:crk.m Geugr aphi~.ll Society of New YorkRECONFIGUitATION OF Tllfi MEXICAN E]IDO 357
nically, ejido members neither owned nor held title to landi ralher, they had usufruct
rights to the land and waters redistributed by the lvlexican government to so-called
agrarian nuclei. Despite the apparent benefits of hmd redistribution in Mexico, re-
gional inequalities and ethnic imbalances remained, and pockets of resistance persist
(Stephen 2002; Bobmw-Strain 2007). Mexico'sexperiencecontrasts rather sharply with
those of other Southern Hemisphere and Latin American countries, in which such
efforts were either long delayed or, as in Brazil, ine!Tectual (\Vright and \\'alford 2003).
My main argument in this article is that mapping ejido boundaries or even plots
does not transtatc to privatization per se. Instead, these communal groups have
chosen a variety of pathways through the cadastral survey of communal lands, with
some choosing to only map the outer boundaries separating communal ti·om pri-
vate properties and with only a minute percentage pursuing individual title owner-
ship to parcels. Thus the latest counterrcforms have not produced wholesale, evenly
distributed privatization in Mexico tied to the so-called VVashington Consensus of
free-market globalization (Gore 2ooo). These newly outfitted tOrms of privatized
development initiatives are being countered on the sarne terms as past eflorts to
privTHE GEOGRAl'i-IJCAI. REVIEW
to this problem was the lack of benefit derived from the green revolution at the level
of the ejidos, as many communal fanners and ranchers were not able to aftOrd the
improvements potentially offered by new technologies, seeds, and improved live-
stock breeds (Sonnenfeld 1992).
Critics used this lack of benefit as a basis for calling the ejido a ii1ilure. Indeed,
many neoliberal pundits have accused state-led land reforms of inefficiency in purely
microcconomic terms. The strident note of their critique has not fallen on deaf
ears, as other contributors to this issue of the Geographical R:eviewrnake dear (Fraser
2oo8; Herlihy and others 2008; Klepeis and Luis 2008; Lunstrum 2008; Moseley
and McCusker 2oo8). Lmd and agrarian reforms are finding new and broad appeal
in nation-states across Asia, Latin America, and Africa, and Mexico's long experi-
ence and conversion frmn state-led to market-led agrarian reform holds some les-
sons for these more recent efforts.
CLosiNG or THE LAND-REPORl\t fnoNTIER, 1982--2007
After the economic crisis of 1982 Mexican ejidatllrios experienced a retraction of
tCderal.supports, as the state withdrew from special programs such as price guaran-
tees for corn and other staple crops. As one ejido member told me one day in Sonora,
"Since [the presidency of Luis Echeverria Alvarez, 1970-1976], we knew we're going
to be screwed." Such pessimistic local expressions are not unusual, even in hind-
sight. The collapse of the !vlexican economy in the early 198us was the first shock
and trigger to the federal state withdrawing from the countryside. The so-called
lost decade of the 19Xos was drarnatic not only for Mexico but also for sever;ll other
Latin American countries that were struggling with the in1pact of foreign debt. The
public sector, including the ejidos, felt the shifting priorities of formerly neopopulist
countries. Momentum to change the corporate communities and their relationship
to the Mexican state was already shifting during this decade, and the 1992-1993
counterreforrns in the agrarian code were to affect the coup de grike, allowing for
the possibility of privatization.
And although it is indeed true that Mexico has ntlempted to privatize or, at least
decentralize, many aspects of the public sector (MacLeod 2004), and in some in-
dustries did so quickly, the government has not pursued total privatization or what
i\-lichael VVatts called the "privatization of everything" (199,1). Between 1982 and
1992, dccentraliZHI:CONI'IGURATION Of THE lviEXICAN EJlDO .\59
ejidatariosagreed to pursue parcelization, the Registro Agrario Nacional (RAN) trans-
formed "usufruct" flelds into mapped "parcels;' and obtaining full title to them (or
to house lots) became possible. Ejidos, however, were not forced to privatize all
portions of the commons, so individuals pursued ownership of titles to their fium-
plot parcels while ejidos retained overall communal control of such resources as
fOrests and grnzing lands.
Ironically, as Craib has noted, the process for presumably undoing the ejido was
remarkably similar to the process used in creating them in pnstrevolut ionary Mexico
(2004). The phrase "dominio pleuo" refers to full title ownership by ejidatarios to
the properties ;.md parcels formerly owned in common and used by previous occu-
pants and allows for private i1westment, leasing, orconlracl fJrming. Contract brm-
ing, between ejidatarios and agroindustrial firms, has been one .such response in}60 TilE GEtHiRAPHICAL ltEVIEW tial results of the PRUCEDE program used to title out communal lands produced much scholarship (Nuijten 2003), even if the complexities of the actual process were poorly understood, given the circuitous route of bureaucratic networks. In many ways the carly~twcntieth-ccntury reform measures, along with the late-twentieth- century counterrefonns, highlight the ambivalent attitudes
RECONFlGlJRATION Of TilE i\1EX1CAN EfWO of riparian settlements in Sonora, increasing tension between private ranch owners
}62 I'Hl' GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW
hold on land and water resources held communally in the ejido system (MacLeod
2004; De Ita 2006). An era of limited aid for rural ejidos, mollified only by some
early price supports for Mexico's critical grains~con1 and wheat-resulted. necause
price .supports for all grains will disappear in 2008 as less-expensive Canadian and
U.S. grain imports Hood Mexico, the concern is that this rural market squeeze, com-
bined with the possibility for privatization of forn1erly communal lands, will place
Mexican rural smallholders at greater risk. Yt't the ejido smallholders in Gunnajuato
were quick to rnodify both the type of crops they grew and the associated contract
rncchanisms to produce crops fOr private companies during the late 1990s.
Since the late 1970s) little in the way of redistribution has occurred in either
state) despite strong exceptions in parts of .southern Mexico (concerning Chiapas)
see Bobrow- Strain 2004). The last major act of redistribution in Sonora was in the
Yaqui River region, completed under President Echeverria (1970-1976). In both stales)
however, privatization or at least private leasing has been increasingly attractive in
districts where a viable land market exists. In Guanajuato, this has occurred in the
Bnjio region, where the market has been especially active as compared to Sonora.
The next section examines how this slow decoupling of federal supports and agrar-
ian communal effOrts has occurred in both cases.
EJIDO RESPONSES IN SONOHA AND GUANAJUATO
Ejidatarios in some Mexican states, especially those in the north, divided their for-
merly usufruct properties and then achieved dominio plcno. Yet a north-versus-
south contrast is less helpful here than one that fully appreciates where ;.md why
privatization-or at least mapping--has taken place quickly. full titling was com-
mon in highly capitalized districts because of industrial agriculture, specific agro-
indust rial firms, or increasing suburbanization. 1n Sonora, cjidatario.s pursued parcel
titling aggressively near the large metropolitan areas and along the agroindustrial
coastline. Farther inland, in contrast, ejido members were rnuch more skeptical of
the logic of pursuing title to the hu·gcr communal resources like grazing lands. "I need
control over my crops," argued one ejidatario from Bavi;\cora, Sonora, "but it's
better for me to run my few animals on a larger piece of land." So, although parcel-
ing and titling the croplands in the valley made sense, he saw little reason to have
the ejido break up the larger communal grazing grounds thHliCONl'JGURATlON OF Tl-ll! iv!EXICAN Ji]WO
Stetfen has shown, though such ejidatarios are not in full tlight but, rather, creo.1ting
new forms or contract agriculture with large firms (2oos).
Thus my own work in Guanajuato and Sonora illustrated both sides of the
privatization debate in Nlexico and the ejidatarios' apparent ambivalence toward
pursuing full title ownership. ln areas like PCnjamo, Guanajuato, close to the Bajio's
productive, neovolcanic soils, the attraction of fully rented lands and contract agri-
culture was understandable, given the activities of st:veral multinational corpora-
tions in the region. Of the thirty-eight cjidatarios I surveyed in the summer of 2ooo,
fully half were already engaged in contract agriculture with national or interna-
tional firms, mostly growing strawberries and broccoli. Another five were legally
renting land to another ejidatario, but only three were renting to a nearby local,
private landowner. ln contract agriculture, t>jidatarios frequently cited the "stable"
or "predictable" prices offered by companies as an incentive to keep farming their
now-titled land. The rurnl landholders who were renting their allocated plots ar-
gued that no one in their immediate family was interested in fanning and that the
rentnl generated income to supplement their full-time, nonagricultural jobs. All
but two ofn1y thirty-eight informants, however, thought that the refonns provided
more secure ownership and more flexibility for their households. Interestingly, only
five inf(nmants cktimcd that the changes made them nervous for other, nearby fami-
lies because they were fearful of being surrounded by tc11THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW bounds of their communal grazing resources even
RECONI'IGURATION OF TilE i\lEX!CAN Ejlf)O
PIWCEDE recognized the value of de facto control over individual parcels even if
they were not willing to f()llow de jure ru1cs for individual, privatized ownership.
These compnrisons and contrasts should not cloud the general lessons learned dur-
ing this last wave of counterreforms in Mexico.
HvnRin MuTATIONS OF 'fHE Epoo SEcroR
Three aspects are of concern, or at least underscored, in my Hndings. First, \VC dare
not assume that ejidos "sold nut" or completely dissolved communal lands held in
trust. This is especially visible where cultural identities or kinship bonds at the local
level arc strong-ns they arc, for example, in long-standing indigenous groups in
Chiapas, Guerrero, and OaxTHE GE0{1RAPHICAL REVIEW
But the totnl percentage of individual, titled parcels within ejidos remains low-less
than 1 percent-so those perceptions may be false reflections.
Third, and finally, we should begin to analyze the desires of those who are pur-
suing full title to their properties. VVe cannot assume that these lands will be lost to
the community; in fact, new and o]d arrangements arc appeltECONJi!GURATlON OF TilE MEXICAN EJ/IlO flli. 2- This is not a neo!iheral ejido. The e_jidat
368 l'llh GEOGRAPHICAl. ltEV!EW ma.rket rela.tim)s, mosHy in ~he (orn!. of lan.d rentals. Other arrangements were also conUlJo.n. These inclw;led condudlazgo and private landowners who retained their cjido l):"tcm.bcrsh,ip. For tho.se ejidatarios wh,o no longer work their land, and for family members left behind in Mexico by migrating hous.ehold heads, the formal- ized l.an
RECONI'IGURATTON OI' TilE MF.XIC,\N E/lDO
a new form of evidentiary landscape, one thal lies beyond the original purposes of
the countcrreforms to map communal lands. If they are heing forced to create a
Western-like cadastral system for taxation and control, they nre using custornary
land boundaries and understandings to force the forrnal system to recognize their
own claims (Unruh 2006).
The .Mexican state has not been able to retreat unilaterally and undo the agrarian
reforms of the past century because the current process requires governance, and
smallholders from Baja California to Zacatecas are taking advantage of the PROCEDE
process. As one mocking cjidatario frorn Aconchi, Sonora, remarked to me. "Yes, I've
been globalized, but I'm the boss loo!"Yet thcunderlying370 THE GEOGHAI'IIICAL UEVIEW
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