THE US' VIEW ON JUST WAR - DIVA
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The US’ view on Just War
____________________________________________________________________________
A content analysis of the Trump administration’s justification of the attack on
general Soleimani
Anna Wallerå
Uppsala University
Department of Government
Bachelor's thesis in Political Science
Autumn 2020
Supervisor: Joakim Kreutz
Word count: 13 260Abstract
On January 3, 2020, Iranian major general Qasem Soleimani was killed through a targeted
drone strike at the authorisation of the US President Donald Trump (United Nations, General
Assembly, 2020). This thesis examines if, and in that case how, the arguments presented by the
Trump administration used to justify the killing of general Soleimani are in line with the
principles of Just War theory. By conducting a case study, through a qualitative content
analysis, analysing four official statements made by the Trump administration during a two
months period after the killing, this thesis will examine the moral discourses in the arguments
presented. Drawing on insights from studies regarding the justification of War on Terror,
preemptive war, and targeted killings according to the Just War theory, lays the foundation for
a deeper reasoning of the legality of the argumentation based on the principles of Just War. This
thesis will show that in some aspects, the arguments presented by the Trump administration can
be interpreted to be in accordance with one of the principles, but none of the statements satisfy
the criteria in all of the principles. Therefore, the overall conclusion of this analysis is that the
Trump administration has the intention of justifying the attack, but the arguments used are not
rooted in Just War theory. Further, this thesis will also show an inconsistency over time in the
arguments presented. The contribution from this study lays in the analysis of the arguments on
the basis of the principles of Just War theory, not from the perspective of international law. The
intention from this thesis is not to analyse if the attack itself can be seen as just according to
Just War theory but looking at the argumentation presented by the Trump administration.
Keywords: Just War theory, jus ad bellum, targeted killing, imminent threat, Trump
administration, Soleimani, content analysis.
1Table of Contents
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 3
1.1. Aim and Research Question ..................................................................................................... 4
1.2. Contribution ............................................................................................................................. 5
1.3. Disposition ............................................................................................................................... 5
2. Background..................................................................................................................................... 6
3. Theoretical Framework and Previous Research ......................................................................... 7
3.1. Just War Theory ....................................................................................................................... 7
3.2. Previous Research .................................................................................................................. 10
4. Research Design ........................................................................................................................... 14
3.1. Content analysis ..................................................................................................................... 15
3.2. Selection of material .............................................................................................................. 16
3.3. Operationalisation .................................................................................................................. 18
5. Results and Analysis .................................................................................................................... 19
4.1. Remarks by President Trump on the Killing of Qasem Soleimani ........................................ 19
4.2. United States Mission to the United Nations ......................................................................... 22
4.3. United States Military Action Against Qassem Soleimani .................................................... 24
4.4. Opening Remarks by Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo Before the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs .............................................................................................................................. 26
4.5. Summary ................................................................................................................................ 27
6. Conclusion..................................................................................................................................... 29
7. Further discussion ........................................................................................................................ 31
8. Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 32
21. Introduction
On September 20, 2001, days after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the former
President of the United States, George W. Bush, declared during an address to a joint session
of Congress and to the nation, the War on Terror. Bush stated that:
“Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until
every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated” (President
George W. Bush, 2001).
The War on Terror is the international military campaign targeting groups and individuals
designated as terrorists. Ever since the attack on September 11, 2001, it has been the US’
primary focus and main political and military purpose in both domestic and foreign
policymaking. The Bush administration claimed the right to use military force not only against
terrorist organisations but also against states that support these groups. Bush stated that:
“Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or
you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or
support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” (President
George W. Bush, 2001).
Further, it is in the United States´ 2002 National Security Strategy stated that the US after the
September 11 attacks has asserted a right of preemptive self-defence against threats posed by a
terrorist organisation, even if these are non-imminent (United States, 2002). A strategy in the
War on Terror is the usage of targeted killings, the intentional use of lethal force with
deliberation to kill, targeting individuals. The phenomenon of targeted killing has throughout
history been present but is viewed as very restricted. However, today, targeted killings are
gaining legitimacy as a method of counterterrorism as some states, including the US, have
acknowledged their usage of targeted killings in an effort to avert terrorist actions (Melzer,
2008). One recent targeted killing conducted at the authorisation of the US President Donald
Trump is the killing of Iranian major general Qasem Soleimani on January 3, 2020 (United
Nations, General Assembly, 2020).
The targeted killing of a high-level state official is extraordinal and cannot be compared with
the killing of a leader of a non-state terrorist organisation (United Nations, General Assembly,
2020). In an immediate release after the attack on general Soleimani, the Department of Defence
3stated that the action was defensive and that Soleimani was “actively developing plans to
attack American diplomats and service members” in the region. The Department states that
“This strike was aimed at deterring future Iranian attack plans.” and that “The United States
will continue to take all necessary action to protect our people and our interests wherever they
are around the world.” (Department of Defense, 2020). Whether or not the usage of targeted
killings can be justified within international law is heavily discussed. In a recently presented
report, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Agnes
Callamard, concluded that “the course of action taken by the US was unlawful” according to
international law (United Nations, General Assembly, 2020). However, instead of looking at
the legality for the killing of general Soleimani from the perspective of international law as in
the report by the Special Rapporteur, this thesis will take another perspective and focus on the
moral use of military force. The theory of Just War will be used for the conduction of the
analysis for this thesis. It approaches the ethics of using military force and argues that war can
be morally defensible only under certain conditions when principles that justify the right to
resort to armed force are met (Silverstone 2011).
1.1. Aim and Research Question
The aim of this thesis is to investigate if, and in that case how, the Trump administration justifies
the killing of general Soleimani and, by analysing four official statements made by the Trump
administration in a two months period after the killing, examine the moral discourses in the
arguments presented. This thesis intends to give a deeper understanding of how the Trump
administration views and respects the principles of Just War theory and how it justifies the
killing of general Soleimani in relation to these principles. Therefore, the research question this
thesis aims to answer is:
If, and in that case how, are the arguments presented by the Trump administration
used to justify the killing of major general Qasem Soleimani in line with the
principles of Just War theory?
Further, this thesis will also analyse if and how the arguments may change over time and
depending on to whom they are addressed, thus the consistency of these arguments over time
and regardless of the recipient is to be examined. However, this thesis will not be able to
determine if differences in the arguments presented depend on different authors or sources, the
recipient, or if the argumentation changes over time as new information arises. Thus, the four
4official statements will be analysed according to the same principles of Just War theory. The
research question will be answered through a content analysis where the four official statements
are analysed by actively searching for wordings and expressions presented by the Trump
administration that could indicate an argument to be just in accordance or not in accordance
with Just War theory. This thesis will show that in some aspects, the arguments presented in
the official documents can be interpreted to be in accordance with the principles of Just War
theory, but none of the statements satisfy the criteria’s in all of the principles. Therefore, the
conclusion of this thesis is that the Trump administration has the intention of justifying the
attack but does not seek to justify the killing om general Soleimani with an argumentation
rooted in Just war theory. Further, the analysis also shows an inconsistency in arguments
presented.
1.2. Contribution
Whether the killing of major general Qasem Soleimani was in accordance with international
law or not has been evaluated by Special Rapporteur Callamard (United Nations, General
Assembly, 2020). The contribution from this study lays in the analysis of the argumentation
presented by the Trump administration, whose arguments used to justify the killing of general
Soleimani are analysed to see if those are in line with the principles of Just War theory. Thus,
this thesis does not intend to analyse if the attack itself can be seen as just according to Just
War theory, but to look at the argumentation presented by the Trump administration. The killing
of general Soleimani is an extraordinary killing as it concerns a state official. Therefore, it is of
greatest interest to analyse how the Trump administration justify this killing from the moral
perspective of Just War theory. The Jus War theory has not been used in any scientific paper
analysing the killing of Soleimani, despite being used in the analysis regarding other terrorist
leaders, thus hoping to fill this void within the research area.
1.3. Disposition
Following this introduction, the thesis begins to present a background on the case and the
history behind the US and Iran’s relationship. Further, a theoretical framework will be
accounted for, the Just War theory and previous research. This is followed by a section for
research design whereas the methodology, material and operationalisation will be presented to
explain how this study has been conducted, together with limitations. Next is a section for the
result where the empirical findings of this study are presented and analysed. The two final
5sections will conclude the results and its implications and suggest future questions to be
researched, and also bring out a broader discussion about the topic of this thesis.
2. Background
On January 3, 2020, Iranian major general Qasem Soleimani of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) was killed together with nine other persons through a targeted drone
strike near Baghdad International Airport in Iraq at the authorisation of the US President
Donald Trump (United Nations, General Assembly, 2020). Thus, thee attack took place in a
third state, Iraq. However, this thesis will not take this fact into account while analysing as the
scope of this study is limited. General Soleimani was considered the second most powerful
person of Iran, subordinate to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and was commander of
the IRGC’ Quds Force, which has been designated a terrorist organisation by the United
States, Canada, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain (Crowley, Hassan, and Schmitt, 2020). The attack
sharply escalated tension between the US and Iran, with rising fear of a military conflict
between the countries. Five days after the attack, on 8 January 2020, Iran launched numerous
precision ballistic missiles at the Ain al-Assad airbase in Iraq, from where the US drone strike
against Soleimani was launched, where American personnel were located (United Nations,
General Assembly, 2020).
The US and Iran have a long history, with roots that can be traced back to at least 1979 and the
Islamic revolution when Iran’s US-backed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi was overthrown by
secular and religious opponents. The Islamic religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini returned
from exile and the country was proclaimed an Islamic republic. The same year, the US embassy
in Tehran was seized and American personnel were held hostage for 444 days, where the last
hostages not were released until January 1981, thus leading to frosty relationships between the
two countries. In 2013, an opening in the diplomatic relationship was seen after Iran’s more
moderate President Hassan Rouhani took office and had contact with the US President Barack
Obama by phone. In 2015, Iran agreed to limit its nuclear programme in a deal with the P5+1,
the US, UK, France, China, Russia and Germany. In the deal, Iran agreed to limit its nuclear
activities and allow international inspectors in return for the lifting of economic sanctions.
However, in 2018 the US President Trump abandoned the nuclear deal and reinstalled economic
sanctions leading to Iran’s economy falling into a deep recession. Relations between the US
and Iran further worsened in May 2019 when President Trump tightened sanctions on Iran’s oil
6export. The relations deteriorated when explosions hit six oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman in
May and June 2019, to which Iran denied Washington’s accusations. In December 2019, the
US accused Iran-backed militia for a rocket attack killing an American contractor, to which the
US retaliated with bombing bases in Iraq and Syria associated to that militia, killing at least 15
servicemen (US-Iran relations: A brief history, 2020 and The US, Iran and Qasem Soleimani
story explained in 400 words, 2020). The attack on general Soleimani led to Iran reducing its
commitments to the 2015 international nuclear deal, saying it will no longer abide by its
enrichment limits (Soleimani killing: Iran abandons nuclear deal limits, 2020).
3. Theoretical Framework and Previous Research
This section aims to present the Just War theory, followed by a review of the previous research
regarding the War on Terror, preemptive war and targeted killings.
3.1. Just War Theory
The Just War theory approach to the ethics of the use of military force and is based on the claim
that war can be morally defensible only under certain conditions. With roots in both secular and
religious sources, the theory can be traced back to the fourth-century writings of St. Augustine,
in ideas by Thomas Aquinas during the thirteenth century, to Immanuel Kant and Michael
Walzer (Silverstone 2011). Elements of the Just War framework have today been incorporated
in both treaties and international law. While agreement over important questions or whether a
particular war is just have not always been met, they share the approach to argue around the
justice of war. Discussions regarding the Just War theory does not treat it as a theory per se,
rather, the Just War tradition is a “framework for ethical reasoning grounded on the belief in
human dignity”, intended for dialogue about the just causes and conducts for war (Crawford,
2003). The Just War theory is usually divided into two categories – jus ad bellum and jus in
bello, which are defined as “the conditions that justify engaging in war” versus “the rules
governing how war should be fought once it has started”, the moral conduct within war
(Silverstone 2011).
James Turner Johnson (1999) presents the seven principles that according to jus ad bellum
justify the right to resort to armed force in Just War theory. These are just cause, legitimate
authority, right intention, reasonable hope, proportionality of good over harm, last resort, and
the aim of peace, where the three first has priority over the rest (Johnson, 1999). The principles
7for jus in bello are the protection of non-combatants and proportionality of means, wherein the
first refers to the defining of non-combatants, the avoidance of direct, intentional harm and the
efforts to protect them, while the second refers to that the violence must be in proportion to the
aims (Crawford, 2003). This thesis will analyse the official documents regarding the killing of
major general Qasem Soleimani based on the principles of jus ad bellum, and thus, not include
an analysis for the principles of jus in bello. This because the UN, including Special Rapporteur
Callamard, does not consider there to be an ongoing International Armed Conflict (IAC)
between the US and Iran (United Nations, General Assembly, 2020). Callamard states that “The
existence of previous attacks could be a legal argument for the legality of the use of force under
international humanitarian law [IHL] – if an international armed conflict between the states
existed prior to the strike.”. However, the US and Iran cannot be considered to be involved in
an IAC, and, thus, the principles of jus ad bellum should apply. Callamard continues to say that
“the strike itself cannot be justified on the basis of retaliation/reprisal/degrading forces under
jus ad bellum.” (United Nations, General Assembly, 2020). However, today we are moving in
a grey area which lacks clear distinction of what is an IAC and what is not, thus, the question
arises of in what situations the principles for jus ad bellum respective jus in bello should apply.
This problem will be further reviewed at the end of this thesis.
The following section builds on Wallerå (2019) but have been added to. Pursuant to
international law, wars waged of aggression are unjust (Crawford, 2003), and according to
Johnson, self-defence is the only unambiguously legitimate justification to resort to force under
the contemporary definition (Johnson, 1999). However, the fundamental concept of just cause
is that it “justifies the use of force not out of self-interest but for the sake of others: those who
are in need of defence or who have suffered wrongs needing to be righted” (Johnson, 1999).
Legitimate authority on the other hand means that “the person or body authorizing the use of
force must be the duty authorized representative of a sovereign political entity, the authorization
to use force implies the ability to control and cease that use” (Johnson, 1999). This because
only a competent authority can make the other determinations required by the Just War theory
(Crawford, 2003). The third principle of right intention states that the intention must be in
accordance with the just cause and not with the aim of territorial expansion, intimidation or
coercion, thus the pursuit of peace and reconciliation. Reasonable hope means that the
calculation of the likelihood that the means used will bring the justified ends sought.
Proportionality of good over harm that the levels and means of using force must be appropriate
to the just end sought and it must be calculated to produce more good than the harm it
8necessarily causes. Last resort means that “Determination at the time of the decision to employ
force that no other means will achieve the justified ends sought”. Finally, the aim of peace
means that the aim must be to establish international stability, security, and peaceful interaction,
rather than for the intervening state to gain power (Johnson, 1999). The second principle
regarding right authority implies that both national governments and the UN Security Council
can be the right authority to justify the use of force, provided they both have a sovereign
political entity and the ability to control that use. Contemporary interpretations of the principle
leans toward the UN Security Council being the right body to authorize military intervention,
and not individual states (Johnson, 1999). All principles of jus ad bellum have to be met for
engaging in war within the Just War theory to be seen as just. Since the three first principles of
just cause, legitimate authority and right intention have priority over the rest (Johnson, 1999),
only the three first principles will be used for the analysis of this thesis.
Outcomes
In this thesis, the arguments presented by the Trump administration in the four official
statements will be applied to the three first principles of jus ad bellum, to analyse if, and in that
case how, the argumentation correspond with the principles. Thus, if the cause, authority and
intention argued for are in line with Just War theory. This thesis sees several possible outcomes
for the research question asked, derived from the theory. The possible outcome for the
arguments presented by the Trump administration to justify the killing of general Soleimani
are:
1. The argumentation does not intend to justify the attack.
2. The argumentation does intend to justify the killing, but not based on the principles of
Just War theory.
3. The arguments are in some aspects in accordance with the principles of Just War Theory
but does not satisfies all the criteria’s.
4. The arguments are entirely in accordance with the principles of Just War theory
5. The arguments reflect a perspective of retaliation.
6. The arguments reflect a situation of jus in bello, where different principles for
justification applies.
These possible outcomes will be further discussed in the analysis.
93.2. Previous Research
Firstly, the US has waged a far-reaching war against terrorism, and since Soleimani is argued
to be a terrorist, this thesis needs to examine the background to how the US argues in this case.
Further, it will be discussed when under Just War theory it is just to use self-defence. Self-
defence is a key code word in the legitimation of attacks, which is why this discussion on the
limits of self-defence is conducted. It is also of importance to examine the limits of preemptive
actions under Just War theory when analysing arguments regarding the justification of
preemptive actions. Lastly, central from the background on the attack on general Soleimani is
also the fact that the attack was a targeted killing (United Nations, General Assembly, 2020).
Thus, it is of the highest importance to evaluate the legality of targeted killings under Just War
theory.
The War on Terror
Ever since the US declared its War on Terror, there has been an intense debate about the legality
of this “war”, the right to use force extraterritorially against terrorism, and where to draw the
line for self-defence. We can see that, since 9/11, the US has asserted and exercised the right to
use military force against both terrorist actors and governments that harbour them (Weiner,
2007). According to Allen S. Weiner (2007), the US “characterizes the war against terrorism
as a real war, a war in the legal sense, and it is exercising many of the extraordinary authorities
that are available only during wartime”. The US has also claimed the right to, not only treating
the conflicts with one terrorist group as a war but also to extend the “war regime” to all terrorist
organisations. Thus, the means by which the US has conducted, and still is conducting, the War
on Terror does not “satisfy the formal international law definition of war” and “undermines the
justification for threatening the conflict as ‘war’” (Weiner, 2007).
Following this approach, according to Rittberger et al., (2019), the US has suspended the role
of international law. The US is “placing itself outside the rules, norms and institutions of
international society in its prosecution of its war on terrorism” (Rittberger et al., 2019).
However, Christian J. Tams (2009) states that during the last two decades, the international
community has “increasingly recognized a right of states to use unilateral force against
terrorists. This new practice is justified under an expanded doctrine of self-defence”. However,
he argues that the long-term use of a broader defined right to self-defence has led to their use
of force regularly served non-defensive purposes, but that of retaliation. It has “turned into a
10self-perpetuating military campaign serving a range of objectives. It is submitted that that
campaign has clearly overstretched the boundaries of even the broadest understanding of self-
defence.” (Tams, 2009).
Under Just War theory, the only anticipatory force allowed is preemption as a response to an
imminent attack (Dais, 2007). Following Tams´ (2009) statement on a wider definition of self-
defence, Eugene E. Dais (2007) argues that “The difficulty with waging a counterwar on
terrorism is that the war against terrorist networks has to be waged in states from whom no
imminent armed attack would be observable or even forthcoming. Such use of force clearly
goes beyond the preemptive self-defense that JWT […] permit.”. Thus, even with the
justification of the use of a wider definition of self-defence when attacks are carried out by non-
state actors, difficulties arise. Weiner (2007) continues that “There can be no question that
governments that harbour terrorists act in violation of international law.”, and, thus, can be the
subject of an attack under the use of self-defence. Weiner asserts that “Nevertheless, unless
terrorists engage in forcible acts that are legally attributable to the supporting state under
principles of state responsibility – that is, unless the terrorists are acting on the instructions or
under the control of the supporting state – such violations do not justify the use of force against
the supporting state.” (Weiner, 2007).
Preemptive war
Under international law, states can refer to self-defence for using preemptive actions when an
act of aggression by another state is imminent (Rittberger et al., 2019). The same applies to jus
ad bellum criterion, where preemptive actions to prevent a credible threat of an imminent attack
from being realised is seen as just. However, to wage a preemptive war to defeat a potential
adversary before it poses a direct threat or before its military power can grow to rival your own,
is not just (Crawford, 2003). In many ways, the commonplace of non-state actors operating
transnational terrorism has transformed the concept of war. The traditional methods for warfare
and self-defence has been challenged and has changed the preconditions for war (Hunter, 2009).
Terrorist organisations can be in the constant state of mobilization and preparedness, thus
putting pressure on leaders to make immediate decisions (Crawford, 2003). Since the terrorist
attacks of 9/11, the US has greatly increased the use of military preemption (Hunter, 2009). The
Secretary of Defence during the Bush administration, Donald Rumsfeld, argued that “The only
way to deal with the terrorists that has all the advantage of offense is to take the battle to them,
and find them, and root them out. And that is self-defense.” (Rumsfeld, D. 2001a), and that “I
11will say this, there is no question but that the United States of America has every right, as every
country does, of self-defense, and the problem with terrorism is that there is no way to defend
against the terrorists at every place and every time against every conceivable technique.
Therefore, the only way to deal with the terrorist network is to take the battle to them. That is
in fact what we're doing. That is in effect self-defense of a preemptive nature.” (Rumsfeld, D.
2001b).
According to Crawford (2003), the Bush administration’s preemptive strategy is in large a
preventive war strategy seeking to “maintain U.S. preeminence by reducing or eliminating the
military capabilities of potential adversaries even before potential rivals have acquired that
capabilities – and in the absence of a clear intention and plan to use weapons against the United
States.”, where preventive war strategies are considered unjust (Crawford, 2003). Even so, the
2002 US National Security Strategy states that “The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of
inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves,
even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent
such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."
(United States, 2002). The Bush administration argued that a terrorist attack will give little
evidence in advance, and, thus, the requirement for evidence should be reduced to the fear of
means and motive for an assault (Crawford, 2003). However, the Bush administration still
claimed that the preemptive war doctrine is legitimate and in accordance with international law
(President George W. Bush, 2002).
Targeted killings
According to Melzer (2008), targeted killings are the intentional use of lethal force, used with
“intent, premeditation and deliberation to kill”, targeting an individual or individuals specially
selected in advance, with the specific goal of the operation to kill the targeted individual or
individuals. Targeted killings are according to Thomas Byron Hunter (2009) a form of
preemption, where the “goal is to proactively eliminate terrorists before they have a chance to
inflict harm on the affected state’s citizens and or homeland.”, and can, according to Hunter
(2009), since the tradition of war has changed, in some cases be just, and even necessary in the
war against terrorism, in order to prevent an imminent attack. The US´ killing of major
general Qasem Soleimani is regarded as a targeted killing. If a targeted killing is legal depends
on the context; whether it is conducted outside of an armed conflict (jus ad bellum) or in an
armed conflict (jus in bello). According to the UN report by the Special Rapporteur on
12extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, the legal framework for a targeted
killing outside an armed conflict is that “A State killing is legal only if it is required to protect
life […] and there is no other means, such as capture or nonlethal incapacitation, of preventing
that threat to life” (United Nations, General Assembly, 2010). However, targeted killings
“cannot be legal because, unlike in armed conflict, it is never permissible for killing to be the
sole objective of an operation”. Nonetheless, states have under humanitarian rights law “an
obligation to exercise “due diligence” to protect the lives of individuals from attacks by […]
terrorists.” Thus, lethal force is legal under human rights law if it is “strictly and directly
necessary to save life” (United Nations, General Assembly, 2010).
Since the attacks of 9/11, targeted killings have become an accepted part of the American
foreign policy (Hunter, 2009). According to the Legal Adviser to the Department of State
during the Obama administration, Harold Hongju Koh (2010), the Government’s legal
justifications for targeted killings is the country’s inherent right to self-defence. Koh stated in
2010 that “the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and
associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use force consistent with its
inherent right to self-defense under international law”. Thus, the justification for targeted
killings comes from the US claim that the country has been and still are involved in an ongoing
armed attack. Koh (2010) refers to the US as “continue to fight a war” and that “in this ongoing
armed conflict, the United States has the authority under international law, and the
responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to defend itself, including by
targeting persons such as high-level al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks.”. The US
justifies the approach of targeted killings as a part of the War on Terror, where terrorists are
seen as combatants and not civilians, thus, legitimising them as targets (Hunter, 2009).
Following this, this thesis would in its analysis have to take its stance from the principles of jus
in bello, and the statement of an ongoing war should also apply to the killing of general
Soleimani.
An important question is what constitutes as an armed attack, and thus, justifies the use of
extraterritorial force within the framework of self-defence. Alston (United Nations, General
Assembly, 2010) states that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has “established a high
threshold for the kinds of attacks that would justify the extraterritorial use of force in self-
defence”. From this view, the occasional and discrete attacks do not constitute an armed attack
to which the use of extraterritorial force in self-defence is justified. However, Robert D. Sloane
13(2008) argues that the legality of a defensive response in contemporary jus ad bellum instead
should be judged by the “accumulation of discrete attacks […] – even if no one of these attacks
would, in isolation, justify force against that state – may in the aggregate be deemed an "armed
attack" under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, giving rise to a right of self-defense.” (Sloane,
2008). Other, as the US scholar Kenneth Anderson (2009), advocates a broader view of the
legality regarding self-defence sees that the self-defence doctrine can “justify the use of force
against an individual.”. Thus, as Alston (United Nations, General Assembly, 2010) states, this
would mean that “once the doctrine is invoked, no other legal frameworks or limiting principles
– such as IHL – would apply to targeted killings”. This, according to Alston, shows a trend
where the broadening view of self-defence justifies the extraterritorial use of force in targeted
killings that leads to a further blurring of the line between jus ad bellum and jus ad bello (United
Nations, General Assembly, 2010). To conclude, as Tams (2009) states, the developments that
have been made in the practice of international law during the two last decades illustrates that
the law of jus ad bellum is capable of adaptation. Unlike international law, “jus ad bellum is
not deducted from some legal principle but borne out by actual practice of states” (Tams, 2009).
4. Research Design
The following section will present the methodology, the material used along with source
criticism, and the operationalisation, thus how this study is implemented. The section will also
present the limitations for this study, the possible problems which need to be taken into account.
The research question posed compels for the design of a case study in order to provide a
“detailed and intensive analysis” of the issue (Bryman, 2012). Bryman (2012) writes that “case
study research is concerned with the complexity and particular nature of the case in question.”,
where the case is an object of interest in its own. The criticism of the case study concerns
restricted extern validity. As Bryman (2012) says, a case study does not have the purpose of
being generalizable to other cases, but rather the aim is to “generate an intensive examination
of a single case, in relation to which they then engage in a theoretical analysis”. However, the
choice of a single case study as a research design is motivated by the ambition to contribute to
the understanding of how the Trump administration justifies its actions. According to Bryman
(2012) a case study often includes a longitudinal element, when “a case that has been studied
is returned to at a later stage.”. This study examines if the arguments presented by the Trump
14administration are consistent over a time period of two months, thus using a longitudinal
element.
3.1. Content analysis
This thesis originates from the moral principles of Just War theory and seeks to analyse if, and
in that case how, the arguments presented by the Trump administration used to justify the killing
of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, is in line with this theory. In order to interpret the
arguments given in the official statements made by the Trump administration to justify the
killing of general Soleimani, an analytical tool for the language-based approach is the
qualitative content analysis, a study of documents to examine patterns in the communication in
a replicable and systematic manner (Bryman, 2012). Qualitative content analysis allows for an
analysis that focuses on some selected aspects of the material and, thus, providing a substantial
and relevant discussion of the research problem. The method involves the search of underlying
themes in the material, which divides the material into different categories. The initial
categories are taken from the theory guide of the study, with the operationalisation emerging
during the reading of the material. Thus, the method provides for flexibility in the analysis that
is useful in the search for different arguments in the material. However, this leads to a risk of
certain themes being missed to be categorized (Bryman, 2012).
A further critique against the use of qualitative content analysis is that the processes through
which the themes are obtained are not particularly detailed. While conducting a qualitative
content analysis, it is vital for this thesis to take into account the problem with reliability. Good
reliability is the lack of unsystematic errors, whether the results would be replicable. To avoid
possible problems with reliability in this thesis, transparency becomes crucial. To avoid
misinterpretations, the statements have been analysed several times and quotations of the
material and discussions regarded the interpretation of the quoted paragraphs hopes to show
how the analysis has been conducted. The method of qualitative content analysis enables a
focus on the core of the material valuable for the research question, namely the arguments
presented for the justification of the killing of general Soleimani. Thus, a qualitative content
analysis is considered the most applicable method for this study.
153.2. Selection of material
In order to analyse if, and in that case how, the arguments presented by the Trump
administration used to justify the killing of general Soleimani are in line with Just War theory,
this thesis will analyse statements from the Trump administration in the time period of just
under two month after the attack. The analysis will build upon four official statements
containing discussions regarding the aims justifying this attack from the perspective of the US.
Starting from the afternoon after the attack, the first official statement that this thesis will build
its analysis upon is the “Remarks by President Trump on the Killing of Qasem Soleimani”
issued by the White House on January 3, 2020. The remark analysed is a transcribed speech by
President Trump from his private resort in Mar-a-lago and is to a large extent directed to the
American public. The second official statement is a statement to the President of the UN
Security Council, Ambassador Dang Dinh Quy, by the Permanent Representative, Ambassador
Kelly Craft. The statement was sent on January 8, 2020, five days after the attack. Third, a
“United States Military Action Against Qassem Soleimani”, by the Trump administration sent
to the Committee of Foreign Affairs on February 14, 2020 was analysed. Lastly, the fourth
statement analysed is a transcribed speech from a hearing in the Committee of Foreign Affairs
by the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, on February 28, 2020. The statements have been
found on the White House’s and the Committee of Foreign Affairs’ website. The materials used
for this thesis are concluded in Table 1.
Title Source Date
Remarks by President Trump on the US President Donald Trump January 3, 2020
Killing of Qasem Soleimani
United States Mission to the United United States Mission to the January 8, 20202
Nations United Nations by the Permanent
Representative, Ambassador
Kelly Craft
United States Military Action Against The Trump administration February 14, 2020
Qassem Soleimani
16Opening Remarks by Secretary of State US Secretary of State Mike February 28, 2020
Michael R. Pompeo Before the House Pompeo
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Table 1: Materials
These four statements are central statements from the Trump administration. While other
statements exist, as the initial statement from the Department of Defense (Department of
Defense, 2020) and comments made to the press, these have not been included in the analysis
as they are too concise or not touching on the justification of the attack. Thus, it is possible that
another selection of materials would yield a different conclusion. The first and the last
statements, by President Trump and Secretary Pompeo, are more rhetorical, and thus, does not
have as their main purpose to justify the attack based on international law. However, the other
two statements aim to seek legitimacy from the UN Security Council and the Congress, more
specifically the Committee of Foreign Affairs. The speech by President Trump is of importance
to this thesis as is the first statement from the President and the initial justification presented to
the American people. The letter to the UN is the US obliged to send according to Article 51 of
the UN Charter (United Nations. 1945). Thus, this statement shows the justification presented
to an actor as the UN. Further, the statement to the Congress is included as the President has
responsibilities under the Congress, and thus, the Trump administration must answer to them.
Lastly, the speech by Secretary Pompeo is of importance as it is a complement to the notice to
Congress, as Secretary Pompeo after his speech where to answer questions from the
representatives on the Committee of Foreign Affairs.
The materials used for this thesis are subjective in nature, they are chosen because they speak
for how the Trump administration justifies the killing of general Soleimani to the American
people, to the Congress and the UN, not because they capture the actual intended motives
behind the attack, as this is not the aim om this thesis. The view in the statement are not meant
to represent the US as a whole and they have been criticised for example by the chairman of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, representative Eliot Engel (2020). Justifications for the
attack presented before the event occurred are either non-existent or not open to the public,
which is why no such statements are included in the material. The usage of statements from
only after the attack leads to a risk of the arguments presented to justify the attack being
reconstructed after the event, which this thesis is aware of and will discuss in the analysis.
173.3. Operationalisation
In order to analyse if, and in that case how, the arguments presented by the Trump
administration used to justify the US’s action are in line with the principles of Just War theory
through a qualitative content analysis, we need to look at the definitions of the principles of jus
ad bellum, and how these should be interpreted. First and foremost, this thesis will search for
if there is, or is not, an attempt made to justify the killing of general Soleimani based on the
Just War theory in the statements analysed. Thus, this thesis will also acknowledge what is not
stated. Further, this thesis will, if there is an attempt to justify the killing of general Soleimani
based on the Just War theory, search for how these arguments are used. This thesis will firstly
search for the phrases cause, legitimate authority or intention. However, as we cannot expect
the statements to be structured in the way of cause, authority and intention, we further need to
actively search for wordings and expressions that can be interpreted to express these principles.
In Table 2 below, wordings and expressions that can be interpreted to express the cause, the
authority and the intention, are presented. The analysis is not based on the literal phrases given
in Table 2, but the broader interpretation of these phrases that indicates justifying arguments to
the respective principles.
Definition of principle (Johnson, Could indicate a Could indicate a
1999) justification in line with justification not in line
Just War theory with Just War theory
Just Cause Justifies the use of force not out of § Protect civilians § Response to previous
self-interest but for the sake of § Inherent right to self- attacks
others: those who are in need of defence § Fight against
defence or who have suffered § Imminent threat terrorists
wrongs needing to be righted § International peace § War on Terror
and security
Legitimate The person or body authorizing the § According to UN § Unilaterally
Authority use of force must be the duty Charter
authorized representative of a § International law
sovereign political entity, the § President authority
authorization to use force implies § Authority from
the ability to control and cease that Congress
use
18Right The intention must be in § Restore international § Regime change
intention accordance with the just cause and peace and security § Protect national
not with the aim of territorial § End hostilities interests
expansion, intimidation or coercion
Table 2: Operationalisation
These phrases are decided on by the author of this thesis and build on the definition of the
principles defined above in the section for theory. As the operationalisation is constructed by
the author of this thesis, another author might interpret the definition differently and thus chose
other key wordings to build their analysis upon, thus creating problems of validity. Validity is
the lack of systematic errors, that the operationalisation corresponds accurately with the
theoretical definition, that we analyse what we intend to analyse (Esaiasson et al., 2017). The
operationalisation builds upon the definition and discussion regarding the principles made by
Johnson (1999) and uses wordings and expressions that could indicate a justification in line
with or not in line, the antonyms of these wordings and expressions, with the Just War theory.
5. Results and Analysis
In this section, the empirical findings of this study will be presented and analysed. The section
will begin by analysing each of the four official statements structured after the principles of just
cause, legitimate authority and right intention, according to the wordings and expressions
presented in the operationalisation. Lastly, this analysis will conduct a summarising discussion
comparing the similarities and differences in the arguments presented. Examples of arguments
from the material will be presented in forms of quotations and discussed. Each part of this
section will be explored in the light of the selected theory and argue in accordance with the
research question - if, and in that case how, are the arguments presented by the Trump
administration used to justify the killing of major general Qasem Soleimani in line with the
principles of Just War theory?
4.1. Remarks by President Trump on the Killing of Qasem Soleimani
Just Cause
In his speech on the afternoon on January 3, 2020, President Donald Trump opens with calling
general Soleimani the “number-one terrorist anywhere in the world” and refers to Soleimani
through the IRGC´ Quds Force for years being leading in attacks against “American civilians
19and servicemen”, contributed in the planning of terror plots around the world, and that
Soleimani “has been perpetrating acts of terror to destabilize the Middle East for the last 20
years.”. By labelling Soleimani a top terrorist, one could say that Trump justifies the killing as
part of the US´ War on Terror doctrine, where Soleimani on the basis of being a designated
terrorist becomes a legitimate target, although not mentioning the War on Terror explicitly.
Trump refers to protecting American civilians in the Middle East region and on American
ground from terrorist attacks in the future. In a broader perspective, Trump also speaks of the
protection of civilians around the world from future terrorist attacks. In the remarks, it is also
said that Soleimani recently led the “repression of protestors in Iran” were “civilians were
tortured and killed by their own government”. Referring to the protection of civilians, not only
American civilians in the region but also Iranian civilians, is an argument seeking to justify the
US´ action on humanitarian ground with references to the Iranian state committing crimes to
their own people. The definition for just cause states that force should not be used out of self-
interest but for the sake of others. Thus, the use of military force based on humanitarian ground
is to be seen as just according to the Just War theory. However, this argument is not brought
up as the reason for the attack, but rather seems to be a reconstruction after the attack in an
attempt to justify it.
What is of deepest interest is the statement is that “Soleimani was plotting imminent and sinister
attacks on American diplomats and military personnel, but we caught him in the act and
terminated him.”. The cause here becomes clear, it is to stop an imminent attack and protect
American diplomats and military personnel. However, looking at the other official statements
from the Trump administration analysed in this thesis, this is the only notion of an imminent
attack. With the knowledge in present time, no evidence of an imminent attack planned by Iran
exists, which is also affirmed by the UN report regarding the killing of Soleimani from June
2020 (United Nations, General Assembly, 2020). Instead, we look at the previous attacks
mentioned to find the arguments justifying the attack killing Soleimani. The preceding attacks
mentioned extend over a long period of time and cannot be seen as an imminent threat which
constitutes the ground for self-defence. Trump also does not explicitly state that the US acted
in self-defence, only that as President “my highest and most solemn duty is the defense of our
nation and its citizens.”. Thus, the underlying motive for the attack can be interpreted as
retaliation, which cannot be said to be in line with the principle of just cause.
20Legitimate Authority
Throughout the statement, Trump points to his responsibility and authority as President to take
action. He starts by referring to the duty as a president and uses the language of “at my
direction” and “Under my leadership”. The US has the military power to and the ability to
"control and cease that use” of force, as stated in the definition of legitimate authority. However,
never once in this remark he lifts the topic of international law, if this attack is authorised by
the Charter of the UN, if this lies within his mandate as the President or if he has obligations
under the Congress. Towards the end of the speech, Trump states that “I am ready and prepared
to take whatever action is necessary.”, meaning that his administration unilaterally is prepared
to use military power to answer threats or attacks. Thus, it can be questioned if President Trump
was an authorized representative under the UN and Congress.
Right Intention
In this statement, the intention can be interpreted to be bisectional. Trump says that “We do not
seek regime change.” and that he has the deepest “respect for the Iranian people. They are a
remarkable people, with an incredible heritage and unlimited potential.”. However, he also
states that “The future belongs to the people of Iran – those who seek peaceful coexistence and
cooperation – not the terrorist warlords who plunder their nation to finance bloodshed abroad.”
and that “the Iranian regime´s aggression in the region, […] must end, and it must end now.”.
Thus, implying he wants to see another government, even though he claims the opposite. The
last quote might indicate the intention to prevent attacks on American citizens in the region,
but, however, it also breaths that the intention is to deter Iran from carrying out further attacks,
thus, going against the definition for the right intention for using deterrence. In his statement,
Trump also uses intimidation when he declares that “To terrorists who harm or intend to harm
any American, we will find you; we will eliminate you.”. This quote is not specifically
addressed to Soleimani, the IRGC´ Quds Force, or Iran, but constitutes a threat to the regime.
By using intimidation, the argumentation goes against the principle for the right intention. The
speech is a rhetorical statement that could be seen as self-confident and which does not see the
need to justify the killing according to moral principles of Just war or to international law.
214.2. United States Mission to the United Nations
Just Cause
The arguments presented to justify the cause of the attack on Soleimani in the letter to the UN
differs from President Trump's remarks. The letter, published on January 8, takes its stance on
the US´s “exercise of its inherent right of self-defense.”, pointing to Article 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations. The letter states that “These actions were in response to an escalating
series of armed attacks in recent months by the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iran-supported
militias on U.S. forces and interests in the Middle East region” implemented in order to
maintain “international peace and security”. The letter brings up several examples of attacks,
and even threats of attacks, which all can be seen as rather moderate and, thus, not in proportion
of killing a high-ranking military leader of a state. What is notable is the change in what
arguments are used depending on whom is the recipient. References to international peace and
security or the UN-Charter did not occur in the remarks by the President on the morning after
the attack, but is of importance in this letter, given the recipient is the Security Council. What
is further notable is the absence of any reference to an imminent threat. This can be interpreted
as the Trump administration lacks substantial evidence for the imminent threat brought up in
the remarks by the President and haven't found such evidence at the time of publishing this
letter. As the existence of an imminent threat is a key vindication for an act of self-defence, it
is remarkable. The principle of self-defence can, thus, be questioned. As in the remarks from
the President, the underlying motive for the attack can be understood as retaliation, which does
not go in line with just cause.
This letter also addresses the importance of diplomacy, in the quote “we remain committed to
a diplomatic resolution. We stand ready to engage without preconditions in serious negotiations
with Iran, with the goal of preventing further endangerment of international peace and security
or escalation by the Iranian regime.”. The mentioning of diplomacy and the usage of words
such as negotiations are new and is in line with the more moderate appearance of this letter and
demonstrates the change in how the arguments used to justify the attack are presented.
However, this does not change the stance that the arguments presented in this letter are not in
line with Just War theory. In contrast to the remarks by the President, there is no mention at all
of Soleimani´s name and no claims of him being a terrorist or the IRGC´ Quds Force being a
terrorist organisation, which may come from the UN not having designated the IRGC´ Quds
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