The War of the Monuments in Estonia: the Challenges of History and the Minority Population - Ålands Fredsinstitut
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REPORT FROM THE ÅLAND ISLANDS PEACE INSTITUTE
Rapport från Ålands fredsinstitut
The War of the Monuments in Estonia:
the Challenges of History
and the Minority Population
Vadim Poleshchuk
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ÅL UT
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PEACE I
F R E D SI NS
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No. 1-2009Vadim Poleshchuk, Mag. iur., Legal Advisor-Analyst, Legal Information Centre for
Human Rights (LICHR), Tallinn, Estonia. He is dealing predominantly with legal and
political aspects of minority protection in Estonia and Latvia. Among his recent publi-
cations are: “Estonia – In Quest of Minority Protection”, in S. Spiliopoulou Åkermark
et al. (eds.) International Obligations and National Debates: Minorities around the Bal-
tic Sea, The Åland Islands Peace Institute, 2006 (co-authored with J. Helemäe); “Esto-
nia”, in C. Mudde (ed.) Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe, Routledge,
2005; “The Baltic States before European Union Accession: Recent Developments in
Minority Protection”, in A. Bloed et al. (eds.) European Yearbook of Minority Issues,
vol. 2, 2002/2003, Martinius Nijhoff Publishers, 2004 (co-authored with B. Tsilevich).
The War of the Monuments in Estonia:
the Challenges of History and the Minority Population
Vadim Poleshchuk
Proof reading: Sarah Stephan
Report from the Åland Islands Peace Institute
Rapport från Ålands fredsinstitut
No. 1-2009
ISSN 1797-1845 (Printed)
ISSN 1797-1853 (Online)
ISBN 978-952-5265-34-7 (Printed)
ISBN 978-952-5265-35-4 (Online)
Published by the Åland Islands Peace Institute
PB 85, AX-22101 Mariehamn, Åland, Finland
Phone +358 18 15570, fax +358 18 21026
peace@peace.ax www.peace.ax
This report can be downloaded from www.peace.ax
© The author, 2009.
Printed in Finland by the Åland Islands Peace Institute 2009.VADIM POLESHCHUK The War of the Monuments in Estonia
Preface Förord
T he Åland Islands Peace Institute has in re-
cent years focused research and publica-
tions in three core areas: security in the Baltic
U nder senare år har Ålands fredsinstituts
forskning och publikationer fokuserat på
frågor om säkerhet i Östersjöregionen, om mi-
Sea region; minorities; and comparative stud- noriteter och om självstyrelseformer, ofta med
ies of self-government models with the Ålan- Åland som ett väsentligt jämförelse- och ana-
dic autonomy as a prime object of analysis and lysobjekt.
comparison. The present report covers the over- Denna rapport rör både frågor om minoritets-
lap between on the one hand minority issues skydd och etniska relationer i Estland och säk-
and ethnic relations and on the other hand se- erhetsaspekter i Östersjöområdet till följd av in-
curity concerns in the aftermath of the so called cidenterna kring bronssoldaten i Tallinn. Vikten
‘war of monuments’ in Estonia. For most outsid- av dessa frågor blev tydlig efter de våldsamma
ers the importance of the issue became evident kravallerna våren 2007 som överraskade delar av
in the spring of 2007 when the controversy and det estniska samhället och övriga Europa. Vadim
the clashes around the Bronze Soldier in Tallinn Poleshchuk bjöds in att skildra och försöka tolka
shocked parts of Estonian society and wider Eu- dessa händelser vid symposiet Minority Policies
rope. Vadim Poleshchuk was therefore invited to in Transition – Experiences and trends around the
give a presentation on this issue at the sympo- Baltic Sea som Ålands fredsinstitut anordnade i
sium Minority Policies in Transition – Experiences Uppsala i november 2007, i samarbete med flera
and trends around the Baltic Sea, organized by the svenska vetenskapliga institutioner och med
Åland Islands Peace Institute in Uppsala (Swe- stöd från Nordiska kulturfonden.
den) in November 2007, in cooperation with Vadim Poleshchuk ger här en rik, balanserad
several other institutions and with the support och klar analys av de motstridiga tolkningar som
of the Nordic Culture Fund. träder fram i Estland beträffande landets his-
Vadim Poleshchuk gives a lucid analysis of the toria, i synnerhet gällande andra världskriget.
diametrically different interpretations given in Han visar hur motsättningarna har utnyttjats
Estonia with regard to the history of the country, för politiska, opportunistiska syften som förvär-
in particular as regards the Second World War. rat dessa motsättningar. Utöver de folkrättsliga
He shows also how the controversy was used for och juridiska frågor som uppstår kring diskus-
political purposes by several actors. While there sionen om ockupation eller annektering av Es-
are many legal questions involved, some of them tland 1940-1944, diskuterar Vadim Poleshchuk
touched upon by the author, for instance as re- de svårigheter som härrör från den modell av
gards the question of occupation vs. annexation ’etnisk demokrati’ som enligt författaren domin-
and the consequences of the one or the other po- erar i Estland. Han argumenterar på ett över-
sition, Vadim Poleshchuk makes a forceful argu- tygande sätt för att nationalistiska projekt står i
ment on the effects of choosing a model of an konflikt med moderna uppfattningar om män-
‘ethnic democracy’ and the incompatibility of na- skliga rättigheter och minoritetsskydd. Hans an-
tionalist projects with modern notions of human alys ger oss ny information och värdefulla insik-
rights and protection of minorities. His analysis ter i aktuella debatter i de baltiska länderna.
gives new information and insight about current
debates in Estonia and the Baltic States.
Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark Sia Spiliopoulou Åkemark
Director, The Åland Islands Peace Institute Direktör, Ålands fredsinstitut
Report from the Åland Islands Peace Institute 1-2009 3VADIM POLESHCHUK The War of the Monuments in Estonia
Contents
1. Introduction............................................... 5
2. The war of the monuments 2004-2007....... 5
3. Interpretation of the April crisis: Defining
the task.......................................................... 10
4. The year of 1940 and its importance in the
Estonian political discourse.......................... 12
5. Estonian “cultural nation” and “ethnic
democracy”.................................................... 15
6. Political participation of minorities and
equal opportunities....................................... 20
7. Conclusion............................................... 23
Notes............................................................. 25
Bibliography.................................................. 26
4 Report from the Åland Islands Peace Institute 1-2009VADIM POLESHCHUK The War of the Monuments in Estonia
1. Introduction to the Soviet past, in the life of modern Estonia.
It is necessary to look at the specificities of the
T he year of 2004 heralded the onset in Es- majority – minorities relations, in particular in
tonia of events promptly dubbed “the war the political sphere. This will give us the key for
of the monuments” – the spurious or well-staged understanding the algorithm of “the war of the
harsh public criticism of the monuments estab- monuments” in its ethnic aspect.
lished on graves from WWII to commemorate
the Soviet soldiers. The events were triggered by
the erection of a monument “to Estonian sol- 2. “The war of the monuments”:
diers in the German uniform” in the locality of
2004-2007
Lihula in September 2004, reaching their apogee
in April 2007 with the removal and transfer of
the so-called Bronze Soldier on Tõnismägi hill
in Tallinn, which brought about an avalanche of
B y way of introduction, the main events of
“the war of the monuments” need to be pre-
sented.
mass disturbances in the capital city and some
In 2002 a monument honouring the Estonians,
towns in northeast Estonia.
fighting on the side of Germany during WWII,
Estonia faces the collision of two community
stood in Pärnu, a resort town, for 9 days. The
myths, both vying for supremacy, one concerned
plate on the monument said that it was erected
with “the great victory of the Soviet people in
in memory of “all the Estonian soldiers fallen in
WWII”, the other – with “suppression and re-
the Second War for Liberation for their mother-
sistance in the years of WWII against the totali-
land and free Europe in 1940-1945“. The mon-
tarian Stalinist regime, by Estonians who aspired
ument was removed in response to pressure by
to lofty aims even when clad in German uni-
the central authorities, worried about the image
forms” (popular journalistic clichés). “The war of
of Estonia abroad. In 2004 the same monument
the monuments”, formally starting with the con-
was going to be erected in Lihula, a locality in
flict of the central government with the authori-
West Estonia. After some alterations it took the
ties of the rural municipality of Lihula, signifi-
form of a bas-relief of a machine gunner, wearing
cantly affected the mood in Estonia, making the
an SS uniform, a helmet and carrying a “Cross of
schism between the two most prevalent ethno-
Freedom” Order and a German “Iron Cross” dec-
linguistic communities even more evident.
oration on his regimental uniform. The Lihula
This paper is not meant to make a pronounce-
authorities initially planned to place the monu-
ment on the right or the wrong approaches to
ment beside the secondary school, but later de-
the events of WWII in Estonia. Just a cursory
cided to put it up at the local cemetery - oppo-
statement shall be made to this effect, not delv-
site the monument to Soviet soldiers, which was
ing into the mutual accusations of Estonia and
erected on their common grave. Prime Minister
Russia in the matters of the conflict, spurred on
J. Parts, primarily for reasons of foreign policy,
by the transfer of the Bronze Soldier. The au-
tried to put pressure to bear upon the Lihula au-
thor will rather focus on differences in approach,
thorities to stop unveiling of the monument, but
which are endemic in representatives of the main
without any success. T. Madisson, a district elder
population groups of this country. To understand
and ultra-right politician, was a central figure in
“the war of the monuments” and “the April cri-
this complex situation.
sis” it is necessary to find out, how important the
The Lihula monument stood only for two
role of history is, more specifically the approach
Report from the Åland Islands Peace Institute 1-2009 5VADIM POLESHCHUK The War of the Monuments in Estonia weeks. It was removed on 2 September 2004 by with fierce criticism of the cabinet. A telephone order of the government. Formally the decision poll held by the company “Faktum” showed that was based on the fact that the monument was the opinions of ethnic Estonians and Russians erected on public lands without proper author- (Russian-speakers)1 on that subject were total- isation. The process of dismantling the monu- ly different: 58% of Estonians called the actions ment struck the Estonian residents’ imagina- of the government unjust and 25% of Russians. tion: it took place at dusk; moreover, the location Similarly, 29% and 64% of respondents consid- was surrounded by police with dogs. The agi- ered these actions just. In the Estonian ethnic tated crowd (mainly teenagers) started to throw group many of those opposed to the authorities stones at the crane, which resulted in the injury were either young (15-29 years old) or only had of the crane operator. The Lihula inhabitants’ re- primary education (Information 2004a). sistance to the police did not result in any severe The direct consequence of the events in Lihu- penalties. la was the mass desecration of monuments and The specialists in semiotics, who were com- obelisks to Soviet soldiers throughout Estonia. missioned by the police to carry out research on A number of similar incidents also took place the monument, arrived at the conclusion that in the spring of 2005. Since the Lihula monu- it did not glorify Nazism. Nevertheless, “a de- ment was criticised by many for its German uni- viation of what is considered good practise lead form and Iron cross, “symbols of a totalitarian to an extremely controversial interpretation of regime”, demands were heard for the removal of the meaning of the monument and a conflict the Bronze Soldier (a monument in Tallinn) for at its location” (not far from the common grave the same reasons. However, in 2004-2005 pro- of Soviet soldiers) (Information 2004b). On the test actions against “alien monuments” were not grounds of that expert report an investigation numerous. that had been started by the police on the suspi- In the beginning of March 2005, it became cion of incitement of social hatred, was dropped known that the President of Estonia, A. Rüü- due to the absence of criminal elements in the tel, declined an invitation to attend the festiv- act. In October 2005, the Lihula bas-relief was ities held in Moscow on 9 May, dedicated to erected on the territory of the private war mu- commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the seum in Lagedi, near Tallinn; T. Madisson was end of WWII. In the address of the President present at its opening as a guest of honour. of 7 March 2005, the motivation of that deci- After the removal of the Lihula monument, sion boiled down to the assertion that the vic- the Estonian government made a decision about tory of the USSR over Germany resulted in the necessity of public regulation of the “com- the strengthening of the Soviet Regime in Es- memoration of Estonians having struggled for tonia, under which Estonia and Estonians suf- the freedom of their country in the German fered. Opinions concerning the decision of Pres- army”. At the instigation of the Estonian gov- ident Rüütel (the former secretary of the Central ernment, a new monument appeared in Maar- Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia) jamäe, Tallinn: three large crosses, with plates to decline the invitation from Moscow again re- alongside bearing the names of German mil- vealed the differences between ethnic Estonians itary units, including the Estonian Legion and non-Estonians. As suggested by the data of (20-th SS division). the opinion survey company, “Saar Poll”, sup- After the Lihula crisis the nationalist parties port for the President was expressed by 61.0% and some public figures immediately came out of Estonians and only 6.2% of non-Estonians; 6 Report from the Åland Islands Peace Institute 1-2009
VADIM POLESHCHUK The War of the Monuments in Estonia 21.5% and 91.1% respectively, expressed discon- on Tõnismägi: laying wreaths from the veterans’ tent with the decision of the President (Sildam organisations, and a picket by opponents of the 2005). monument. The picket consisted of only a few In May 2006, “the war of the monuments” re- people, who were holding the national flag and a ceived a new impetus, stimulated by the events home-made poster in Estonian: “Estonian peo- around the Bronze Soldier. The sensitivity of the ple, don’t forget: this soldier occupied our land situation concerning the transfer of this monu- and deported our people“. After standing by the ment was increased due to its location, situat- edge of the crowded square for a few minutes, ed opposite the buildings of the Security Police the picketing group was pushed out to the road, (Estonian special service), the National Li- from where they were evacuated in a police van. brary and one of the main Lutheran churches Earlier, the Estonian-language press did not of the country. Nationalist parties had repeated- pay any special attention to the celebration of ly called for the removal or the destruction of the 9 May in Estonia. However, in 2006 the the Bronze Soldier, in particular the “Pro Patria events at the Bronze Soldier were covered by the Union” (Isamaaliit). The monument was locat- press in detail, and in a negative manner. For in- ed in the centre of the capital city, on municipal stance, allegations were made about the crowd land. However, the city authorities, despite nu- of Russians desecrating the Estonian flag (it was merous discussions, never adopted a decision on not confirmed by police authorities). As early as the removal or transfer of the monument. Nev- the following day the well-known Estonian rad- ertheless, the monument itself had assumed a icals T. Madisson and J. Liim, with a group of different appearance over the past decade. First, like-minded persons, threatened to remove the the “eternal fire” burning before it, was put out. monument. Further, Liim threatened to place a Thereafter, the plates inscribed with the names bomb at the memorial. of the Soviet soldiers buried there were removed. On 20 May 2006 a few hundred people held At the end of 1990s, there appeared the plates in a “patriotic action” beside the Bronze Soldier. Estonian and Russian on the monument, trans- Like the organisers of the 9 May picket and T. forming it into a common memorial to all fallen Madisson’s supporters, many ethnic Estonians in WWII. of different ages with national flags came to the The monument on the Tõnismägi hill be- monument. A small group of young skinheads came the centrepiece of celebrations of the Rus- with German military symbols on their clothes sian community twice a year: on 9 May (Victory was also present, as well as a small group of Rus- Day), and to a much lesser degree on 22 Septem- sian-speaking people who were radically op- ber (the day Red Army troops entered Tallinn). posed to “the enemies of the monument”. In the On Victory Day the monument was usually vis- evening of the same day, the Bronze Soldier was ited by several thousand people. Normally, in the smeared with paint in the colours of the Estoni- morning veterans’ organisations carried out the an flag. During the following week, a so-called festive laying of wreaths. Afterwards, during the “Night Watch” began around the Bronze Soldier day, which is a working day in Estonia, common – young Russian-speaking volunteers came to citizens brought flowers to the Bronze Soldier, protect the monument from vandals. This ini- with up to several hundred of people at the mon- tiative later grew into an organisation. ument at any one time. Then the opponents of the monument an- On 9 May 2006 the Tallinn authorities sanc- nounced their intention to have a picnic on 27 tioned two public events beside the monument May 2006 beside the Bronze Soldier. In opposi- Report from the Åland Islands Peace Institute 1-2009 7
VADIM POLESHCHUK The War of the Monuments in Estonia tion, appeals spread among young people from March 2007 when a group of radicals solemnly the Russian community to come to the mon- placed at the Bronze Soldier a wreath made of ument and fill the space in front of it, mak- barbed wire). ing the event of the opponents impossible. The The key figure in the case of transfer of the Tallinn police acted very efficiently and prevent- monument was Prime Minister A. Ansip, who ed a clash of dozens of people, who came to the actively used the topic of “the symbol of the So- Bronze Soldier: the Estonian and Russian parts viet occupation” in the process of his pre-election of the crowd were separated from each other, af- campaign. This tactic yielded positive results at ter which the Russians were pushed out to the the elections held in March 2007, allowing the side of one of the central city squares. There were Reformist Party, headed by A. Ansip, to attract many young people on both sides. The Russians more of the votes of the nationalist elector- came to the monument with little flags of the ate. According to the opinion survey company European Union, while Estonians were carrying “Emor” at the beginning of April 2007, sup- national flags. port for the new government (again headed by The Bronze Soldier’s destiny was actively dis- A. Ansip) among ethnic Estonians constitut- cussed in the Estonian and local Russian-lan- ed 77% (among non-Estonians– only 21%). At guage press. According to the authors of a spe- the same time only 5% of Estonians and 13% cial media monitoring report for May-July 2006, of non-Estonians thought that the question of carried out at the request of the Integration the monument on Tõnismägi was one of the two Foundation, “among the statements in [the me- most urgent problems of the government (State- dia] the prevailing ones were that ethnic Estoni- ment 2007). ans’ attitude to the transfer of the monument is On the night of 26 April 2007, a police opera- opposite to that of ethnic Russians and that the tion was carried out, in the process of which the Bronze Soldier as a monument of occupation people protecting the monument and on duty should not be situated in the city centre. In addi- there were pushed out from Tõnismägi. A tent tion, in the Russian-language media a prevalent was erected over the memorial and the burial opinion is that the wish of Estonians to trans- place of the Soviet soldiers. From a legal point fer the monument is nationalistic (if not fascist) of view, the exhumation of these remains took in its substance. Hence the conclusion follows place under the War Graves Act, which was spe- that both in the Estonian and Russian-language cially adopted in January 2007. The Act refers media-space national consciousness plays a very to art. 34 of the First Additional Protocol to the important role in arguments for or against the Geneva Conventions of 1949, but takes a wid- transfer of the monument” (Kõnno 2006: 11). er interpretation than many understand. The re- After those events the authorities left a fence burial of the remains allows, under Estonian law, at the square beside the monument and set up a to relocate the grave monument or another grave police patrol. On 21–22 September 2006, Tallinn mark to the new burial site of the remains. witnessed both the sanctioned meeting of na- By the evening of 26 April 2007 a large group tionalists and the meeting of the socially active of people, most of them Russian-speaking, gath- Russian youth with flowers and candles. On 9 ered at Tõnismägi and expressed their discon- October 2006 the police ribbons were removed: tent with the governmental actions. The crowd access to the monument was opened on the eve chanted “Shame!” and “Fascists!” The police or- of the visit of the Queen of England. There were dered them to leave the square but to no effect. further incidents at the monument (e.g. on 25 Observers say that some protesters threw empty 8 Report from the Åland Islands Peace Institute 1-2009
VADIM POLESHCHUK The War of the Monuments in Estonia bottles in the direction of the police. Then a mo- lets and plastic handcuffs, people were put face ment came when the law enforcers began break- down on the ground. The detainees were tak- ing up the rally using special equipment. Some en to “filtration points”. It is clear that most of participants of the meeting responded by throw- the detainees were released without any charges ing stones at the policemen. The protesters were but also without apology. In total, according to pushed out of Tõnismägi to the neighbouring the police, the lists of the detainees kept in the streets where vandalism and looting of stalls and “filtration points” include more than a thousand shops soon began, while the law enforcers were names. surprisingly passive. From 30 April till 11 May 2007 all street During the first night of disorder, the police events in Tallinn were prohibited by order of the staged mass arrests of people on the streets, in- police prefect. This left no space for the open cluding those who protested near the monument expression of discontent with the actions of the at Tõnismägi. The offenders involved in vandal- authorities. A section of the Russian-speaking ism were also detained. population chose, at the end of April – begin- Small groups of Russian youths carried Rus- ning of May as a form of civil disobedience to sian flags during the street disorders and chanted drive slowly from 12.00 to 12.20 p.m. signal- “Russia!” There were also minor fights between ling with horns. The police imposed fines on Russian and Estonian young people. A few those who breached the traffic laws and public- young Estonian nationalists were present, some ly thanked those who informed the police about of them carrying Estonian flags. Most clashes the breaches. were between Russian youths and the police. The April mass disturbances were an unprec- Early on the morning of 27 April 2007, by the edented event in the modern history of Estonia. decision of the Government of the Republic, the In its 2006 report, the Estonian special serv- monument was removed from Tõnismägi and ice called the conflict round the Bronze Sol- some days later it was installed at the city military dier spontaneous, pointing to its ethnic aspect cemetery. On the evening of 27 April, protest- and describing the interests of the local Russian ers returned to Tõnismägi. The police changed political figures and the Russian authorities in their tactics and immediately started mass ar- the conflict. There has been an information war rests near Tõnismägi hill and within a large area carried out against Estonia, as thought by the around it. Disturbances again started in Tallinn special service, while “the main goal of Russian and in some towns in the north-east of Estonia, extremists and supporting Russian media is to mostly involving the Russian-speaking popula- create an image of split Estonia with two hos- tion. In the capital the police surrounded com- tile communities – noble Russians and “Estoni- plete blocks of the city centre and detained those an Fascists”” (Yearbook 2007: 6). According to the inside, in particular Russian-speaking people. Security Police the population of Estonia is not Meanwhile there were no official prohibitions divided on the basis of ethnicity, but due to the against visiting the centre of Tallinn where en- existence of two completely antagonist infor- tertainment facilities worked as usual. But on mation sources (namely: many Russians are not April 27 recommendations “to stay home” were oriented to “the free press of Estonia and oth- published in the mass media, sent to e-mail ad- er European countries”, they watch the Russian dresses and cellular phones. Federation television and therefore fall prey to The arrests were carried out with use of special “the imperialist ideology and chauvinistic prop- equipment: the police used batons, rubber bul- aganda”) (Ibid). Report from the Åland Islands Peace Institute 1-2009 9
VADIM POLESHCHUK The War of the Monuments in Estonia
The Estonian authorities denied that the Rus- international organisations, primarily European,
sian-speaking minority in Estonia could have of which Estonia is a member, to exert a sober-
any serious problems that could provide grounds ing influence on the Estonian authorities” (In-
for spontaneous actions of discontent, triggered formation 2007b).
by the police operation at Tõnismägi. The au- The situation was also worsened by the protest
thorities tried to explain the April events by the actions of the pro Russian Government youth
Russian Federation’s influence (or even by orders at the Estonian Embassy in Moscow in May
from Moscow). In June 2007 A. Laaneots, Es- 2007.
tonian commander-in-chief, publicly declared The diplomatic warfare between Estonia and
that the April disorders in Estonia had been “a Russia has not yet ended. For instance, the Min-
large-scale special operation of the Russian Fed- istry of Foreign Affairs of Russia does regularly
eration against Estonia, approved at high polit- raise the issue of investigation into the killing
ical level, thoroughly considered and prepared” in the days of April events of Russian citizen D.
(Kook 2007). Interestingly, in their most recent Ganin.
report the Estonian special service argued that it
had not been able to “ascertain directing the vio- 3. Interpretation of the April crisis:
lent events [of April 2007] from the side of Rus-
sian special services” (Yearbook 2008: 5). Howev- Defining the task
er, the same report said that mass riots had been
provoked by Russia (Ibid 2008: 1).
In 2008, court proceedings continued over A s early as in June 2007 the company “Saar
Poll” carried out a sociological survey of
the population, dedicated to the events at the
the Russian social activists that were accused
of organisation of mass riots. Three of them are end of April 2007. The survey evidenced the
members of the “Night Watch”. differences in opinions of the Estonian and the
In its turn, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of non-Estonian sections of the population. While
Russia made a statement as early as in January 51% of ethnic Estonians, participating in the
2007 to the Ambassador of Estonia in Russia, poll, thought that the decision of the authorities
that the steps to dismantle the Tõnismägi mon- was “absolutely right” and 28% – “fairly right”,
ument and relocate the remains of the Soviet only 4 and 7% of non-Estonians gave those an-
soldiers cannot be qualified “otherwise as a sac- swers, respectively. Among those surveyed from
rilegious undertaking and a crying fact of dese- the minorities, 40% of respondents evaluating
cration of the memory of soldiers, having freed the correctness of that decision chose the variant
the world of the Fascism” (Information 2007a). “no, another solution should have been found”
On 26 April 2007, when the excavations were and 36% – “absolutely not, I completely oppose
starting at the Tõnismägi hill, the Ministry of it”. Evaluations of government activity to resolve
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation said: the April crisis were also completely opposed.
“We are indignant that Estonian authorities did Most ethnic Estonians qualified it as “very suc-
not heed our appeals. This means but one thing: cessful” (23%) or “fairly successful” (43%), while
Estonia’s leadership wants to rewrite the lessons most minority members considered it “total-
of World War II […] Naturally the events oc- ly unsuccessful” (56%) and “fairly unsuccessful”
curring in Tallinn will be considered by us in (28%) (Saar 2007: 27-28).
building relations with Estonia. Among other Estonians and non-Estonians also have dif-
things, we will continue to use the resource of ferent opinions about the reasons for the riots
10 Report from the Åland Islands Peace Institute 1-2009VADIM POLESHCHUK The War of the Monuments in Estonia
(Ibid 2007: 28-29). The following explanations, ent among ethnic Estonians and non-Estoni-
offered by the mass media, were the most popu- ans. The respondents were asked to select one
lar (more than 70%) among the representatives of three possible interpretations of the procla-
of the ethnic majority: activity of “inciters of ha- mation in 1940 of the Estonian Soviet Social-
tred” and provocateurs; Russia’s will to use the ist Republic, when the republic was incorporat-
Bronze Soldier to destabilise the (political) situ- ed in the composition of the USSR: 1. It was
ation in Estonia and demonstrate its influence; a military occupation that lasted until 1991; 2.
different sources of information (mass media) Estonia was annexed to the USSR by using the
for ethnic Estonians and Russians. The majority threat of military intervention; 3. Estonia joined
of non-Estonians tended to think that the caus- the USSR voluntarily. Among ethnic Estoni-
es of the trouble were the decisions and acts of ans, the first variant was selected by 64% of re-
the Estonian Government and the police. spondents, and the second by 27%. The variant
The following explanations attracted a com- of voluntary joining was selected by less than 1%
paratively larger level of support among both of Estonians. With non-Estonians, a different
ethnic Estonians and non-Estonians (Ibid): picture is revealed. The variant of military oc-
• Estonians and Russians interpret the cupation was selected by as few as 7%. The sec-
notion of fascism differently (Estoni- ond variant was opted by 31%, and the voluntary
ans – 60%, non-Estonians – 50%); joining by 40%. True enough, with non-Estoni-
• Estonians and Russians interpret the ans 1/5 of respondents found it difficult to an-
meetings of Russian-speaking people swer (with Estonians – only 7%). Similar data
at the Bronze Soldier differently (44 was also obtained in the process of other soci-
and 38% respectively); ological surveys (Poleshchuk & Semjonov 2006:
• Conflict of geopolitical interests of 55-56). A considerable percentage of the polled
large international players (44 and non-Estonians were youths in their twenties,
38% respectively). whose school years had passed at least partial-
There were also some answers that manifested ly in the period after 1991, when the content of
a difference of up to six times between the opin- history handbooks dramatically changed in in-
ions and perceptions of ethnic Estonians and dependent Estonia. In other words, this view of
non-Estonians. Thus 42% of Estonians agreed the events cannot be reduced to lack of knowl-
that the disorders were caused by “activities of edge of certain facts, only.
Russian special services” (compare to 7% of non- Opinions of Estonians and non-Estonians
Estonians); 13% of Estonians and 71% of non- about the friendliness of Russia with regard to
Estonians disagreed with that statement (Ibid Estonia are also diametrically opposite. It is to
2007: 30). be noted that according to the data of the Es-
For our topic, it would be important to point tonian Open Society Institute, ethnic Estonians
out the differences in estimates of the ethnic have become more entrenched in their negative
Estonians and minorities regarding the events opinion in the recent years and/or after April
of 1940 (when Estonia was made part of the 2007, while for non-Estonians a reverse trend
USSR) and estimate to the policy of modern was noted (which can be accounted for as dis-
Russia with regard to Estonia. satisfaction from the semi-official version of the
As revealed by data of the survey conducted in April events). In 2007 the majority of ethnic
2005 in Tallinn, the attitudes to the events that Estonians (53%) blamed the political figures
date back over 65 years are substantially differ- from Russia for the tense Estonian-Russian re-
Report from the Åland Islands Peace Institute 1-2009 11VADIM POLESHCHUK The War of the Monuments in Estonia
lations, however 59% of non-Estonians blamed the political and social life of Estonia:
the Estonian politicians for that. One third of • Attitudes to the facts of recent histo-
both Estonians and non-Estonians opined that ry by and large determines the politi-
tense relations were as a result of faults by both cal discourse;
parties (Proos & Pettai 2007: 48). • Perceptions of Estonians about them-
In other words, the representatives of the Esto- selves (“cultural nation”) made it pos-
nian and the non-Estonian sections of the popu- sible to form a special political regime
lation evaluated the causes of the crisis situation of the “ethnic democracy”;
differently in many respects, as well as the role of • Participation of minorities in political
the government in its resolution. Most non-Es- and social life of the country is neither
tonians, unlike ethnic Estonians, do not share the significant nor comprehensive.
official historical views (i.e. they distance them-
selves from the official state ideology). They also
refuse to see in Russia a state unfriendly to Esto- 4. The year of 1940 and its
nia. The data presented above shows the results
of the poll on public opinion about the events importance in the Estonian
of 1940, about the harsh acts of the government political discourse
in Lihula, about the visit of President Rüütel to
Moscow on 9 May and on the question of the
removal/transfer of the Bronze Soldier. For all
these issues, the representatives of the Estonian
T he issue of the official interpretation of the
events of the beginning of the Soviet peri-
od is the keynote to Estonian ethno-policy. The
and Russian-speaking communities held differ- mainstream strategy of the Estonian movement
ent opinions. for independence was to prove the legal invalid-
How great was the influence of the elites in ity of incorporating Estonia in the composition
forming opinions in this case? What were the of the USSR in 1940: those events are invaria-
realistic possibilities of radicals from both com- bly named in national official documents as the
munities? To what degree were the attitudes of “Soviet occupation”. This approach envisaged
the different groups of the population formed the necessity of restitution, and a return to the
under the influence of mass media, including pre-war status quo in the country (restitutio ad in-
the foreign reports/media coverage? There are tegrum). 2 Practical application of that ideology
no unambiguous answers to these questions, al- (first of all, regarding citizenship) had far-reach-
though it is evident that explaining away all the ing consequences for the non-Estonian popula-
woes by the perfidy of the elites, politician-rad- tion. As has been argued by the Estonian politi-
icals or mass media would be a gross simplifica- cal scientist P. Järve (2000: 32), ”[t]he Estonian
tion. It is as empty as simply saying that “the war Constitution and many laws were created as a
of the monuments” is a manifestation of the “in- part of the political agenda of restitution to help
ter-community conflict”. restore the pre-war republic and save the eth-
Whoever is sowing the seeds of discord, in or- nic nation from becoming a minority on its own
der to breed strife they must fall in the fertile soil, traditional territory. Therefore, the open agen-
get sufficient sun, warmth and moisture. In what da of these legal acts was to promote the eth-
follows it will be shown, that the crisis concern- no-nationalist aspirations of Estonians, the core
ing us here would hardly have occurred, should group, whereas their hidden agenda was to en-
there not have been the following specificities of courage the re-emigration of Russians and other
12 Report from the Åland Islands Peace Institute 1-2009VADIM POLESHCHUK The War of the Monuments in Estonia non-titular groups from Estonia to their histori- ment, that what is taking place in Estonia has cal homelands.” to be considered as a mass violation of human Reference to the continuity of the Repub- rights on the grounds that hundreds of thou- lic of Estonia proclaimed on 24 February 1918, sands of people were deprived of citizenship and has been laid down in the Constitution of Es- consequently “the right to many other rights”. tonia (preamble), in resolutions of the Supreme As expounded by an Estonian jurist, “the con- Soviet of the Republic of Estonia of 20 August tinuity of the Estonian state cannot be disput- 1991 “On state independence of Estonia” and in ed. With regards to matters of nationality, the the declaration of Parliament of 7 October 1992 Baltic States based their nationality legislation “On restitution of the constitutional state pow- to a large extent on legislation which had been er”. Estonia considers as still effective the Tartu in force in each of the countries before 1940” Peace Treaty of 2 February 1920, in which Bol- (Kerikmäe 1997: 28). shevist Russia recognised the independence of Estonian authorities have internationally Estonia. shared concerns that “history has been instru- The Russian Federation does not conceive the mentalised in some occasions in order to ques- events of 1940 as occupation or annexation. It tion the right of Estonia to exist as a legitimate supports its case by claiming that that the deci- state” (Report 2008: 13-14). The problem of as- sion to accede was formally adopted by Estonia’s sessment of the events of 1940 and 1944, has re- Parliament elected under laws of Estonia. Rus- cently been treated as a question of state secu- sia does not accept the continuation of the va- rity in Estonia. According to the opinion of the lidity of the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 (e.g. In- Ministry of the Internal Affairs (shared also by formation 2000). Russian academics also usually the Estonian special services), “the allegations proceed from the premise that “the post-Soviet about voluntary accession of Estonia into com- Baltic States or the post-Soviet Central Asia are position of the USSR, justifying the annexation just post-Soviet states, not any “reborn forma- or denying occupation shall be considered as at- tions” (Poloskova 1999: 129). tacks at the Constitution” (Letter 2006). The representation of the Soviet period as oc- The mass pilgrimage to the Bronze Soldier on cupation and the discourse of restitution became 9 May was carried out by representatives of wide- an important component of state building after ly different social and age groups of the non-Es- 1991, and they also served as a justification and tonian population. There are valid grounds to basis of the ethno-policy, which was conducted believe, that victory in WWII is an important with regard to Russians and other ethnic groups element of their identity. As a matter of fact, it of the population, which settled in Estonia pre- was only on that day that the Russians and oth- dominantly after WWII. If the events of 1940 er groups of the non-titular population indulged are regarded as occupation, persons having ar- in acts, which the Estonian section of society (at rived after that time could be considered as il- least its elite) perceived as an open manifestation legal immigrants, a position that makes it hard of disloyalty. for them to claim Estonian citizenship. Further- Disputes were also based on the events of more, their right to stay in the territory of the 22 September 1944 (the day troops of the Red country rests entirely and completely on the dis- Army entered Tallinn). What the Russian veter- cretion of the national government. From this ans of WWII name “liberation of Estonia from perspective, it is easy to dismiss the accusation German Fascist invaders” is officially treated in Russia has brought against the Estonian govern- Estonia as “beginning of the second Soviet oc- Report from the Åland Islands Peace Institute 1-2009 13
VADIM POLESHCHUK The War of the Monuments in Estonia cupation”. In 2002 the current President of Es- and Russian-language schools). As declared by tonia T.H. Ilves (2002: 323) argued: “One must the Estonian government after the incident in have a rather restricted understanding of history Lihula, it “esteems highly the valour of people, and the host country to call the replacement of fighting at times of different occupations for in- one set of thugs, rapists and murders by another dependence and freedom of Estonia, and consid- “liberation””. ers it important to immortalise and perpetuate The question of interpretation of the events of their memory…” However it needs be done “in a 1940 cannot be considered in isolation from at- dignified way, respecting the true goals and mo- titudes to WWII as a whole; one can see a fusion tives of those people, not the uniform imposed of contradictory views in this case. According to on them by the others” (Press release 2004). the official approach, Estonia did not participate Active participation of Estonians in the war on in WWII. At the same time it is well known that the side of the Germans is frequently account- Estonians did fight either in the Red Army (in ed for by Stalinist repressions, which came down the first place in Estonian Rifle Corps), or in the upon the country in 1940-1941. According to German army (including the voluntary military the research of the historical commission, set up troops of SS – Waffen SS). If Estonia was occu- by then President of Estonia, L. Meri, in 1940 pied in 1941-1944 by Nazi Germany, according the Soviet People’s Commissariat of the Interior to formal logic the Estonians in German uni- (NKVD) arrested in Estonia almost one thou- form can be regarded as traitors-collaboration- sand people, whereof at least 250 were executed, ists. However, Estonians, who in the form of the and 500 died in places of detention. In 1941 even SS soldiers tried to stop the passing of Soviet 6 thousand people were arrested, of whom more troops into the territory of the country, are usu- than 1,600 were executed and almost 4 thou- ally viewed as fighters for the freedom of Es- sand people died in places of detention. Over 2 tonia, not willing to permit a repetition of the thousand people were killed in summer and au- horrors of Stalinist repression. The Estonian tumn 1941 by operatives of NKVD, the exter- soldiers of the Waffen SS are often identified as mination squads, withdrawing troops of the Red counterparts of the participants of the War for Army etc. In June 1941 over 10 thousand peo- Liberation.3 As Prime Minister A. Ansip put it ple deemed politically unreliable were deported in his recent speech at the Gathering of Fight- from Estonia. Out of that number, about 3,000 ers for Freedom (mainly Estonians who fought men and 150 women were taken aside and put in 1944 in the German Army and “forest broth- into camps, where the majority of them were ex- ers” 4), “[y]our fight is a heroic deed that must be ecuted or died (Conclusions 2006: 12-14).5 highly appreciated now and in the future. Al- According to the data of the same historical though Estonia’s independent statehood was not commission, during the years of German oc- restored at the time, your fight played a large role cupation 950-1,000 Estonian Jews were killed, in the ability of the Estonian nation to keep up several thousand Jews from other countries and their struggle for freedom throughout the Soviet 400-1,000 Roma. At least 7 thousand people occupation. As you used to say among yourselves were executed for political motives (of whom 6 - We lost the battle, but we won the war in the thousand ethnic Estonians and a thousand ba- end” (Press release 2006). sically ethnic Russians). Besides that, approxi- Making heroes of the Estonians having fought mately 15 thousand Soviet prisoners of war (out in German uniforms has now been inserted in of a total of more than 30 thousand people) died the school curriculum (common to Estonian on the territory of Estonia. The commission 14 Report from the Åland Islands Peace Institute 1-2009
VADIM POLESHCHUK The War of the Monuments in Estonia
makes a note of involvement of collaborationists end of WWII, was not believed by many politi-
from among local population in crimes against cians and ordinary people. It can be argued that
humanity (Conclusions 2006: 18-21). the fight against fascism was considered by Es-
The aspiration of Estonians to visualise pos- tonians as a smokescreen, whereas Russians con-
itively the defence against the advance of the sidered such behaviour justification of fascism
Red Army in 1944, organised by Germans is (see e.g. the media monitoring report for May-
easy to explain: the German occupation is open- July 2006 in Kõnno 2006).
ly or covertly considered by many in Estonia as As it was shown above, a majority of the Rus-
“less onerous” than the Soviet period. Because sian-speaking population of Estonia doubts that
“the Soviet advance grew into the Soviet occu- the events of 1940 can be regarded as occupa-
pation before 1991”, the USSR represents in the tion. Because the historical component plays an
minds of many Estonians the idea of absolute important role for the identity of both ethno-
evil, while Nazi Germany is perceived as a rela- linguistic communities of Estonia, and many
tive evil. Furthermore, the Stalinist repressions events are interpreted differently, the task of de-
continued also after WWII.6 veloping a common civil ideology, uniting all
Incorporation of Estonia into the USSR in residents, appears exceedingly difficult.
1940 took place without real large scale use of As far as the international dimension is con-
violence – there was no resistance. It is impor- cerned, Estonian politicians and experts have
tant, from a psychological perspective to under- not lost the hope of clarifying to their foreign
line the desperate resistance put up by Estonians, colleagues (including Russians) the specificities
in the course of the battles of 1944 with the Red of the local understanding of the history. For in-
Army, although under a foreign flag. The serious stance, the well known political scientist R. Ve-
trauma, inflicted by Soviet repressions and espe- tik (2006) analysed in one of his speeches the cir-
cially deportation, cannot be dismissed. cumstances, in case of which Russia would make
Furthermore the question of Stalinist repres- apologies to Estonia for the events of 1940. The
sions and the events of WWII impinge on mod- main thesis of his presentation was the assertion,
ern political discourse in Estonia. Under the that for making apologies, it is necessary to ac-
Public and National Holidays Act, 14 June – the cept that the single and “right” history does not
anniversary of the June deportation of 1941 is exist. Hence Russia must acknowledge that dif-
annually a day of mourning, when Estonian flags ferent peoples have their own perspectives and
are hung out with black ribbons, and all events that “the Estonian view of history is not inher-
incompatible with mourning are prohibited. ently erroneous”.
According to an amendment to the Act, adopt-
ed in February 2007, September 22 became the
Day of Resistance. 5. Estonian “cultural nation”
It must be acknowledged, that regardless of
some official declarations, in Estonia the events and “ethnic democracy”
of 1944 are not, commonly considered in the
context of WWII. As a matter of fact, the con-
troversial picket appeared in 2006 at the monu- T he restitution ideology in the sphere of eth-
nic relations gave rise to clear-cut demar-
cation lines between Estonians and non-Estoni-
ment on 9 May, not 22 September. The fact that
on 9 May at Tõnismägi the local Russian-speak- ans, who found themselves on different sides of
ers did not mark the conquest of Estonia, but the the “status” barricades. This accords with the sit-
Report from the Åland Islands Peace Institute 1-2009 15VADIM POLESHCHUK The War of the Monuments in Estonia uation where Estonians present themselves in- (“dialects”) or household (costumes, architecture trinsically as a “cultural nation”, having marked of the dwellings) character. This “Estonianness” borderlines with the surrounding world and op- is based on a common culture, whose most im- posing outside groups, including local minori- portant element is a common language. Estoni- ties. Below, are some explanations of the spe- ans have specific connections with their native cificities of interrelations between the ethnic land, where they know the name of any mean- majority and the minorities, and also why that ingful geographical object. Moreover, Estonia is may be important in the context of “the war of the only place where Estonians can develop their the monuments”. language and culture. In other words, Estonians In the Estonian academic community, as visualise themselves as a group with clear (in the among ordinary people, the existence of the representation of someone even opaque) bor- problem of the divided society has gained recog- ders, separated from the whole external world, nition. When staying within the framework of to which the minorities are referred, too. It is not the Estonian version of political correctness, the a coincidence that in Estonia the Language Act matter concerns (ethnic) “Estonians” and “non- (art. 2) names all languages, besides Estonian, Estonians”. There is a general understanding foreign languages (including the languages of throughout the country that these two groups national minorities). differ by ethnic characteristics, but not exclu- Estonia is little different from other former sively. The official integration programme of neighbours in the Soviet communal apartment. 2000 states that “as a result of the extensive mi- As pointed out by L. Barrington (1995: 134), gration that took place during the Soviet period, “[t]o those who study central Europe and the a community using Russian as its first language former USSR, it is no surprise to hear that Esto- has developed in Estonia, and many of its mem- nians define their nation in ethnic terms. Some... bers lack a sufficient outlet to the rest of society” saw the nation not as defined by blood but by (State Programme 2000: point 3.1). culture. Yet, even this does not limit the ethnic The question of the nature of national/ethnic character of the nation. One can become Esto- characteristics has been given little attention in nian only by adopting the Estonian language Estonian academic circles. Even in post-Soviet and customs. There is no idea of merging cul- Russia, there are heated debates concerning pri- tural features of non-Estonians into this cultural mordial and constructivist approaches to ethnic nation or defining “Estonian” based on loyalty to questions, but not in Estonia. However, there are the state”. no doubts that in Estonian academia, it is pri- The Estonian version of nationalism is close- mordialism which prevails.7 The idea that na- ly linked to the local representations of the Es- tions “have existed through the mists of time, ei- tonian nation. As the Estonian intellectual E. ther oppressed or waiting to be “awakened” – so Soosaar said, “[f ]or centuries, Balts had only two popular among nationalists” (Melvin 1995: 1). choices: to survive or to merge into larger na- For describing the perceptions of Estonians tions. You could say that we decided, subcon- about themselves, a standard set of myths can be sciously but collectively, to survive. So for us, na- listed, which allowed certain western research- tionalism is a mode of existence” (Lieven 1994: ers to regard Estonians as a “cultural nation”. For 18). Understandably, against the background of instance, Estonians existed almost “always”8 (up such interpretations, there sprouted in Esto- to 4 thousand years), retaining their unity in the nia not a civil, but specifically ethnic national- framework of a large multiplicity of linguistic ism, which “views the nation as an ethno-cultur- 16 Report from the Åland Islands Peace Institute 1-2009
VADIM POLESHCHUK The War of the Monuments in Estonia al category, as an entity, having deep historical tai & Hallik 2002: 508). The Soviet period and roots, social-psychological or even genetic na- Soviet power (colloquially vene aeg – Russian ture” (as defined by V. Tishkov (1997: 78)). The time) were associated with ethnic Russians and attempts to introduce into official discourse the the Russian language, and was normally stigma- deliberations about the civil nationalism, about tised as being alien and inorganic for the coun- the civil nation were made in the framework try. Those attitudes were also based on real and of the integration programme of 2000, howev- perceived negative characteristics of the Soviet er, it was emphasised there too that “[i]n social regime and particularly on demographic chang- dialogue all cultures functioning in Estonia are es that occurred in the country after WWII. equal. In relations with the State, however, the Thus, the declining percentage of ethnic Esto- status of Estonian culture is different of that of nians was regarded as a threat to their survival, the minority cultures, since one of the objectives and was exacerbated by the fact that the level of of Estonian statehood is the preservation and Estonian language proficiency among minori- development of the Estonian cultural domain” ties was extremely low. Additionally, the use of (State Programme 2000: point 3.4). This passage Russian in the country was widening and there is based on the preamble of the Estonian Con- were reasonable doubts that the Estonian lan- stitution. guage could successfully compete with it. Non-willingness to recognise the Russian- The Latvian researcher A. Pabriks (1998: 7) speakers as a legitimate part of the social and po- argued that the Baltic governments declined au- litical system was formalised at the beginning of tomatic granting of citizenship to all permanent the 1990s even through the use of certain specific residents (i.e. “zero variant”) “since the Baltic terminology. As noted by Estonian-Russian re- States cannot be considered to be the new states. searcher A. Semjonov (2002: 113), “[t]he dom- In 1991 they restored their independence, there- inant concept has gone from descriptive neu- fore, they had to restore but not define the body tral terms, such as “non-Estonians”, “migrants”, of citizens. However, the correct legal approach and “other-language population”, to words with created the space for inadequately restrictive and negative connotations: “illegal immigrants”, “al- illiberal treatment of the Russian immigrants in iens”, “colonisers”, and “invaders”. In accordance Latvia and Estonia”. Indeed, the phenomenon with the principle of restitution, the problem it- of mass statelessness among ethnic non-Estoni- self has been transformed: from the need to reg- ans was a fully expected outcome of application ulate interethnic relations in a basically multi- of the principles of restitution to the question ethnic society to the necessity of decolonisation, of citizenship. That situation is one of the most resocialisation or “voluntary remigration””. So- spectacular examples of intrusion of historical cial scientist M. Raudsepp argued that “former- interpretations into the area of ethno-policy. ly legitimate (although often disliked) and fully Reinstitution in 1992 of the validity of Citi- valued members of the society have been trans- zenship Act of 1938 marked the victory of radi- formed in a social sense into illegitimate and in- cal political elements, the ideological defeat of ferior state subjects” (Ibid). the Supreme Soviet elected in 1990 in the strug- It needs to be understood, that for most ethnic gle with the parallel body of power– the Esto- Estonians, the essence of their nationalism lays nian Congress. When adopting the decision on in a profound perception of injustice over the loss citizenship “[s]overeignty and independence in of their interwar independence in 1940 through the interests of protecting the Estonian nation their incorporation into the Soviet Union (Pet- were still the name of the game. However, it was Report from the Åland Islands Peace Institute 1-2009 17
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