Tracing Individual Perceptions of Media Credibility in Post-3.11 Japan
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Volume 18 | Issue 10 | Number 3 | Article ID 5397 | May 15, 2020
The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus
Tracing Individual Perceptions of Media Credibility in
Post-3.11 Japan
Sonja Petrovic
Abstract credibility, social media
The 3.11 disaster revealed many shortcomings
in Japan’s mass media organisations and
government, the most prominent arguably
being the poor handling of the disaster by
central government and TEPCO, including Information needs and communication
miscommunication and delays in releasing gaps
accurate data on the dispersal of radioactive
The 3.11 disaster in Japan is the epitome of an
materials. The lack of transparency in mass
media coverage of the nuclear meltdown and
unforeseen, catastrophic and intrinsically
levels of radiation resulted in growing distrust disruptive event. On 11 March 2011, the
among the public, who turned to online sources northeast coast of Japan was struck by a
and social media to confirm or challenge powerful earthquake, which caused a chain-
information provided by the mass media. reaction of events: a devastating tsunami,
continuous aftershocks and tremors, and
Based on in-depth interviews with 38 Japanese damage to nuclear reactors in the Fukushima
individuals, this study explores individual Daiichi Nuclear Plant, resulting in nuclear
perceptions of media credibility in a disaster meltdown and considerable dispersion of
context and in the present, elaborating how radioactive materials into the environment. In
changes in trust in media intersects with the all phases of the disaster, Japan’s media played
changes and dynamics in media use and how a crucial role in how people communicated and
the 3.11 disaster continues to influence media coped with a complex catastrophe. Nine years
use and perceptions of credibility today. The after 3.11, social recovery, reconstruction in
main findings of the study suggest that in the disaster-stricken areas and delays in
wake of the unprecedented national disaster, decommissioning the Fukushima Daiichi
Japanese media users moved from using Nuclear Plant, which could take decades,
traditional mass media as their sole source of remain ongoing concerns for Japanese public.
news to a personalised, inter-media
environment which integrates both online and Trust is a critical component of disaster
traditional modes of communication without communication, and it is often tested in
replacing traditional media players. This situations such as natural disaster and crisis
further facilitated the practice of seeking and (Mehta, Bruns, & Newton, 2017), where
evaluating information and media credibility citizens’ demand for credible information
through new media forms of connectivity such increases. The exposure to inconsistent news
as social media platforms and news websites. and media reports can significantly alter
people’s perceptions of media credibility
Keywords: 3.11 disaster, communication gap, (Gaziano & McGrath, 1987). Furthermore, in a
inter-media environment, mass media, media disaster situation, the fragility of media is
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exposed (Endo, 2013) and people seek different Delivering information to the general public
ways to find the information they need and look about levels of radiation was especially
for trusted media sources to reduce uncertainty problematic shortly after the explosion in the
and ambiguity (Lachlan et al., 2014a). During nuclear plant. The inability of government,
crises and natural disasters, many people rely TEPCO, and national media to accurately
on Twitter for its ease of access, timely updates communicate information and educate the
and real-time information, and ability to public (Hobson, 2015) subsequently created
identify users’ specific needs and concerns. confusion among citizens who, without prior
However, despite social media’s critical role in knowledge on the levels of radiation, could not
communicating risk and disaster response, understand whether the reported levels of
their fast and immediate dissemination comes radiation were dangerous or not, or whether
with the risk of incomplete, misleading or and how best to leave the area. This study has
inaccurate information. Another reason for been driven by data collected from participants
questioning social media credibility is the highlighting the lack of transparency in mass
shifting role of “gatekeepers” from producers media coverage of the meltdown and levels of
to consumers (Westerman et al., 2014), which radiation, which led many to turn to alternative
is why many people seek information from sources of information as the disaster was
official and checked sources (Lin et al., 2016). unfolding and to connect with a variety of
sources and communities. In this context,
The 3.11 disaster was both a “natural” and a individual perceptions of media credibility and
“man-made” disaster (Kingston, 2012). This confidence in Japanese media were
overlap between natural and complex disaster significantly shaped and reconfigured by the
setting, with high levels of uncertainty, 3.11 disaster and its changing media
amplified the critical need for credible, up-to- environment.
date and timely information on rapidly evolving
events necessary for effective disaster
management. Within the complex 3.11 media
landscape, social media served as a new The erosion of public trust in Japan
information tool and an essential medium for
up-to-date, real-time news when other In the years following the 3.11 disaster,
communication systems were not working, Japanese people have been expressing
even as television remained a widely used declining levels of trust in media institutions
medium in the first moments of the disaster and government. According to the 2018
(Jung, 2012).1 However, the complexity of what Edelman Trust Barometer, public distrust at
came to be known as the “Triple Disaster,” the global level is on the rise, with 20 out of 28
especially the nuclear meltdowns and the countries polled being categorised as
diffusion of radioactive materials, altered this ‘distrusters.’ The survey from Edelman shows
significantly. The opaque nature of mass media that Japan belongs to the category of
reports and the communication gap between ‘distrusters’ with continuously low levels of
local and central government alongside institutional trust; the most recent report
contradictory announcements by Tokyo Electric shows 32 percent for media and 37 percent for
Power Company (herein TEPCO) 2 and media the government (see Table 1.1.). Japanese trust
institutions, and the contradictory or in social institutions, including NGOs, media,
insufficient information from the government, government and business institutions is 11
contributed to profound public distrust towards percent lower than the global average in 28
government and mainstream media institutions countries surveyed, 37 percent versus 48
(Funabashi & Kitazawa, 2012; Hobson, 2015). percent, placing Japan at the bottom of the list
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as the world’s least trustful, after US (43 1.2.).
percent), Germany (41 percent), Australia (40
percent), Canada (49 percent), and UK (39 Table 1.2. World Press Index Report
percent). The report also shows overall distrust 2010–2018: Japan
in both mass media and social media in Japan,
with an insignificant gap of 4 percent between World Press Freedom: Japan Ranking Index
trust in journalism (41 percent) and social Year Rank Index
media platforms (37 percent). Thus, it is 2010 11
necessary to highlight factors that led to such 2011 22
low media credibility in Japan. 2012 22
2013 53 25.17
Table 1.1. Trust in media and government 2014 59 26.02
institutions in Japan 2010–2018 2015 61 26.95
2016 72 28.67
Trust in Institutions: Japan 2017 72 29.44
Media Government 2018 67 28.64
2010 36% 42%
Source: World Press Freedom Index
2011 48% 51%
2010-2018, Reporters Without Borders
2012 33% 24% (https://rsf.org/en/ranking_list/archive)
2013 34% 27%
2014 38% 39%
2015 30% 36% According to the media advocacy group
2016 38% 39% Reporters Without Borders, Abe’s
2017 32% 37% administration poses a threat to media
2018 32% 37% independence by its interference in the
editorial policies of Japan’s public broadcasting
Source: 2010-2018 Edelman Trust Barometer service, and its dismissal of journalist reports
Global Report that are critical of the ruling party, taking little
account of the citizens’ right to information.
Since the State Secrecy Law was launched in
Japan in 2013, “investigative journalism has
According to the World Press Freedom Index declined in Japan, as the government became
reports released in the period 2010–2018, it is legally entitled to designate sensitive
evident that media freedom in Japan has been information (such as national defense and
on the decline since 2012. With regard to the Fukushima-related issues) as state secrets. The
changes in ranking over eight consecutive public’s right to information has become
years, Japan fell from being 11th on the list in restricted.” (Oishi & Hamada, 2019, p.116).
2010, to ranking 67th in 2018 (see Table 1.2.).
From the time of 11 March 2011, there have Numerous studies of the 3.11 disaster raise
been significant developments and changes in pressing issues in Japanese journalism
Japan’s government and political landscape, including mass media’s heavy dependence on
which also affected media institutions. Ever government, thereby lacking independent and
since the current Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s critical perspective in coverage of the disaster
administration took office in 2012, media (Galbraith & Karlin, 2016; Gill, Slater, &
freedom in Japan has been declining (see Table Steger, 2013; Kingston, 2012; McNeill, 2013).
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After 3.11, due to the closed kisha club system,3 in media have significantly decreased since the
in which only professional journalists affiliated 3.11 disaster (Aldrich, 2012; Newman,
with the government are permitted to attend Fletcher, Levy, & Nielsen, 2016). A recent
press conferences, freelance and foreign study by the Disaster and Media Research
journalists faced many discriminatory measures Group is one of the first attempts to assess the
taken by TEPCO and the Japanese government. media’s lessons learned from media coverage
They were prevented from attending press of the Great East Japan Earthquake through
conferences and denied access to direct qualitative in-depth interviews with
information (Segawa, 2011). Similarly, representatives from Japanese mainstream
Pacchioli (2013) highlights the difficulty in national media outlets (Okumura, N., Hayashi,
understanding the risks and overall severity of K., Igarashi, K., & Tanaka, A., 2019). The extant
the disaster because of lack of government studies on the 3.11 disaster focus
explanation of the issues, while Friedman predominantly on questions of how and why
(2011) discusses the problem of a shortage of media lacks credibility, and the general lessons
specialist reporters with technical knowledge learned after 3.11 with regard to trust in
about nuclear disaster and radiation risks. The government institutions and mainstream media,
lack of communication from the government’s utilizing different types of data, but rarely
side led to the promotion of the view in mass examining users’ perceptions of media
media that the situation in Fukushima Daiichi credibility in the context of the 3.11 disaster
Nuclear Plant was stable and under control and the present day. This makes invaluable
(McCarthy, 2014, p. 185). Concerning this, investigation of individual media experiences
McNeill (2014) argues that mass media through voices of media users in the context of
sanitised news on the disaster to suppress the complex, inter-media environment that
panic and maintain a good image of the state, emerged with the 3.11 disaster. This study
by limiting and often suppressing investigative explores this issue through qualitative analysis
reporting, to broadcast homogenised content. of individual trust in mass media and social
Furthermore, some studies argue that NHK did media concerning the 3.11 disaster and the
not report on nuclear disaster thoroughly, present day.4
despite being the only television station with
nuclear specialists among its journalists. Furthermore, in addition to experiences gained
Instead, it relied on TEPCO and government by media executives and general surveys about
information sources, rather than utilising the trust levels in Japan, knowledge of how media
expertise of independent sources (Ito, 2012; users trust different media platforms and
Yamakoshi, 2015). Although the focus of this sources may have implications for how these
study is Japan, a recent comparative analysis media will evolve to better support disaster
shows that Japan is not unique in respect to low communication in the future. Having in mind
media credibility and decreased trust in social that people heavily rely on media in the time of
institutions and media. Nancy Snow (2017) disasters and crises for timely and reliable
draws parallels between the post-3.11 Japan information and that there is an anticipated
under the Abe administration and the post-9/11 risk of another major inland earthquake in the
propaganda and opinion control by the Bush Tokyo metropolitan area, it is essential to
administration to show how governments utilise lessons learned from both sides, media
utilize manipulative media and public relations representatives and media users, to prepare for
strategies to control opinion and rhetoric in future disasters.
times of national crises and wars.
Previous research has shown that levels of trust
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Research Methodology evacuation and displacement. Further, digital
engagement of people in the severely affected
This study employs a qualitative approach to region was limited due to demographics and
develop an in-depth understanding of changes geography (Slater, Nishimura, & Kindstrand,
and dynamics in participants’ media use in the 2012). I spoke to participants living in Tokyo,
context of the 3.11 disaster. Open-ended, in- the neighbouring cities of Kawasaki, Yokohama,
depth interviews were designed to prompt Saitama and surrounding areas who were less
individual participants to reflect on their affected by the earthquake and tsunami than
experiences, convey opinions and provide people on the north coast of Japan, but who
insight into specific matters (Creswell, 2013). could still feel the effects of the disaster, such
Analyses of the individual experiences with as infrastructure disruptions, food and water
using media garnered from the interviews is shortages, electricity outages, mobile network
positioned within the context of the immediate failure and many others. Commuter trains,
3.11 disaster and the point of reflection, thus subways and bullet trains were all shut down
enabling us to understand the dynamics of the due to the earthquake. Phone signals were
individual’s media usage. mostly dead, preventing calls and messages
from getting through for hours after the
Having in mind that the aim of this study is not earthquake, so people formed lines in front of
to seek statistical generalisability, a snowball public phone booths. However, internet
sampling method was used to select services were available in the areas with
participants for the study. During two-months- undamaged infrastructure, so people in Tokyo
long fieldwork in Tokyo, 5 I interviewed 38 were able to use email, Skype, Line, Facebook
Japanese nationals, who were recruited by or Twitter to establish contact with family and
utilising my professional connections to reach friends. Many Tokyo residents remain fearful
some of the first participants, who about the impact of the nuclear disaster, as
subsequently provided referrals for further there were several hot spots with high levels of
interviews. Drawing on the notion that the radioactive caesium in the metropolitan Tokyo
small sample size in qualitative research area (Oishi & Hamada, 2019, p.114)
enhances data richness and a variety of
participants (Moser & Korstjens, 2018), I As the study uses the case of the 3.11 disaster
intentionally selected participants differing in to examine individual perceptions of media
age (25–59), who could provide diverse credibility, by looking at individuals’ recounting
perspectives on media use and credibility. of media habits and experiences in using
Participants represented a wide range of different media forms: TV, newspapers and
occupations including managers, office online media (social media, news websites), the
workers, freelancers, consultants, dentists, main population of interest for the study is
students, professors and others. Table 1.3. media users who lived in a densely populated
shows basic demographic information about urban environment in Japan at the time of the
the interviewees, along with a brief overview of 3.11 disaster, and who actively used some or all
their main source of news during 3.11 disaster. the above-mentioned media forms. As shown in
Table 1.3, most participants whom I
In the recruitment process, I avoided interviewed are residents of Tokyo, the city
interviewing participants from the Tohoku with the highest population density in Japan
region as it was directly affected by the triple (Statistics Bureau of Japan, 2019).6 Extensive
disaster, and participants’ media usage reliance on a Tokyo sample allows for an
patterns were disrupted and limited by the adequate investigation of individual attitudes
severity of the disaster, loss of electricity, and perceptions of trust in a media-saturated
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environment and exploration of variations in Hiroshi Male 30–39 Tokyo Tokyo
TV, Facebook,
Twitter, YouTube
individual media use in high-density urban Mayumi Female 30–39 Melbourne Tokyo
TV, Line,
Facebook
environments, and is driven by the notion that Yahoo News, TV,
Saki Female 30–39 Tokyo Tokyo
Tokyo is the city with Japan’s highest rate of Twitter, Facebook
TV, online
mobile phone subscription, the highest mobile Shinji Male 30–39 Melbourne Tokyo newspaper, Yahoo
News, Twitter
Internet penetration (63.3 percent), and second radio, TV,
Rika Female 30–39 Kyoto Kyoto
highest Internet penetration rate (71.9 percent) Facebook, Mixi
TV, news
(Slater et al., 2012, p. 98). Given their heavy Wataru Male 30–39 Tokyo Tokyo websites, online
newspaper
use of text messaging and internet, mobile TV, news
phones play a significant role in the Ayako Female 40–49 Tokyo Tokyo websites,
Facebook
dissemination of news and disaster-related Chieko Female 40–49 Tokyo Yokohama Facebook, TV
information in Japan. This is consistent with the Atsushi Male 40–49 Tokyo Tokyo
TV, Facebook,
Line
research aim of reaching Japanese individuals, Daichi Male 40–49 Tokyo Tokyo
TV, Facebook,
news websites
who can provide evidence of their changing Yahoo News,
notions of trust and current attitudes towards Hana Female 40–49 Osaka Osaka Facebook, Line,
TV
diverse media forms, including new digital Naoki Male 40–49 Chiba Yonezawa TV, news websites
TV, Mixi, news
technologies and platforms. Kensuke Male 40–49 Tokyo Tokyo
websites
Yahoo News,
Masayuki Male 40–49 Tokyo Tokyo
Facebook, TV
Table 1.3. Basic demographic information TV, YouTube,
Takuya Male 40–49 Tokyo Saitama
about participants (name, gender, age, Facebook
Kazuya Male 40–49 Tokyo Tokyo TV, news websites
city/region where participants resided during Fuji Female 50–59+ Tokyo Kawasaki TV, news websites
3.11 and at the time of interviews) and the Kenjiro Male 50–59+ Tokyo Gunma
radio, TV, news
websites
media platforms that they used in the three Kaori Female 50–59+ Tokyo Tokyo TV, news websites
main phases of the 3.11 disaster Ryota Male 50–59+ Tokyo Tokyo TV, news websites
Haruna Female 50–59+ Tokyo Tokyo TV
Takahiro Male 50–59+ Tokyo Tokyo TV
Name Age City City Media Use
Gender Momoko Female 50–59+ Tokyo Tokyo TV
(pseudonym) Group (present-day) (3.11) (3.11)
TV, Twitter,
Hideki Male 20–29 Tokyo Fukushima YouTube,
2channel Note: In the ‘Media Use’ column, media
Twitter, Yahoo
Toshi Male 20–29 Tokyo Tokyo
News, TV sources are listed in the order of their
Mei Female 20–29 Tokyo Kobe
Facebook, importance to the participant as an information
Twitter, Line
TV, Line, Yahoo source in the immediate aftermath of the 3.11
Kenta Male 20–29 Tokyo Tokyo
News
disaster
newspaper, TV,
Miyuki Female 20–29 Tokyo Tochigi
Yahoo News
TV, Facebook,
Sana Female 20–29 Tokyo Tokyo
Twitter, Line
online newspaper,
outside
Takashi Male 20–29 Tokyo Facebook,
Japan
Twitter, YouTube This article aims to trace changes and
TV, news dynamics in the individual’s media use in
Tomoki Male 20–29 Tokyo Nagano websites,
newspapers relation to shifting levels of trust in media, in
Yumi Female 20–29 Tokyo Nara TV, Facebook
the context of post 3.11 Japan, through
TV, newspaper,
Michiko Female 20–29 Tokyo Kanagawa
news websites participants’ retrospective reconstruction of
Yahoo News, TV
Ayumi Female 30–39 Tokyo
outside
and online their past experiences. To do this, I first
Japan
newspaper
examine participants’ perceptions of the
Facebook, TV,
Eiji Male 30–39 Tokyo Tokyo
news websites credibility of media they utilised in the context
Twitter,
Hiro Male 30–39 Tokyo Tokyo Facebook, Line, of the immediate and aftermath phases of 3.11,
Yahoo News
to understand the implications their
TV, Yahoo News,
Yoshi Male 30–39 Tokyo Fukuoka
Twitter perceptions have for shifts and changes in their
Line, TV,
Naoko Female 30–39 Tokyo Tokyo
Facebook media use habits. Then, I examine participants’
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current perceptions of media they use and disaster, comes from the established role of
changes in general information seeking. The NHK as official public institution mandated to
comparison of the immediate phase with the report on major national events including
present-day phase revea;s how participants’ disasters and safety warnings and designated
notions of media credibility fluctuate and to contribute to disaster prevention and crisis
intersect with everyday media use, and why management through its broadcasts. In
participants assign higher credibility to certain addition to broadcasting national events, NHK
media forms. has long been established as a national
medium, providing a wide range of news at
fixed times as well as well researched features.
NHK significantly underpins the habitual use of
Rethinking media credibility and changing TV in Japan (Yoshimi, 2003). The centrality of
media use NHK in delivering timely and accurate news on
the disaster as it unfolded strengthened
Familiarity, gatekeeping and live images
participants’ high levels of trust in the public
broadcaster. In contrast, commercial
The primary source of news for most
broadcasters are only moderately trusted due
participants immediately after the 3.11
to their perceived sensationalism and
earthquake was television, often complemented
imbalance in reporting. In the context of 3.11,
with social media and news websites, but
the focus of commercial broadcasters was
occasionally used as a sole source of news.
primarily on sensationalist reporting which
More than half of the total number of
could bring higher ratings, such as screening
interviewed participants (38), recount using TV
high-impact images of the earthquake and
as their first source of news. Familiarity is one
rescue operations (Tanaka, 2013). NHK, as a
of the main reasons why it is considered highly
public institution mandated to disaster
credible, and most participants referred to TV
prevention, focused more on keeping the public
as a common medium to which they turn in an
informed about safety measures, tsunami
emergency such as a natural disaster. The term
warnings, evacuation sites, to protect lives and
“shūkan” (habit) was used to explain this. For
property and help people in the disaster area
example, one of the interviewees, Shinji, 7
(Tanaka, 2013).
perceives TV as the primary medium for
obtaining crucial information in a time of
In this way, besides prompt and balanced
natural disaster:
coverage of the 3.11 disaster, participants like
Shinji and Atsushi refer to NHK as a habitual
“At least it is my habit to first turn on NHK, and
source for the first news and updates, which
if there is an earthquake, it has become
indicate that participants’ perception of NHK
customary to watch NHK. For now, it seems
as credible comes from a positive personal
that many Japanese people have this habit of
experience and trust earned over many years.
turning to NHK.”8
Another overarching theme emerging from the
Another participant, Atsushi, similarly assumes
interviews is that participants express
that many people turned to NHK for the first
confidence in the credibility of traditional mass
news on the disaster: “The primary source of
media sources over social media due to the
information for most people at that time was
gatekeeping process through which information
probably TV.”9
is filtered for publication and broadcasting
The notion of NHK as a familiar source of news (Newman & Fletcher, 2017). In explaining the
in a time of emergency such as the 3.11 reason behind the preference for television as a
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source of information during the 3.11 disaster, induced anxiety or calls to action. When tweets
Chieko compares TV and social media with such content are retweeted, rumours
(Facebook): spread (Umejima, Miyabe, Aramaki, &
Nadamoto, 2011). Participants like Yoshi
“Of course, Facebook provides information, but associate the credibility of news with
precisely because it is Facebook, I do not know professionally produced information and the
whether the information is accurate or not gatekeeping process, which is essential to
because it is written by individuals. It is good prevent rumours and misinformation:
as a communication tool, but I am not sure if it
is appropriate for information dissemination. “In terms of social media, after all, there is a
That is why I trust TV… The information flow of rumours, because there is no filtering…
dissemination is at least based on pre- social media is not bad, but its negative side is
established rules, so in such cases, I can indeed spreading rumours.”12
probably trust it.”10
Similarly, Ryota discusses social media
Some participants, like Sana, refer to the free credibility referring to the information coming
flow of personally posted information found on from unofficial sources, which are more likely
various social media platforms, which to circulate opinionated and biased information
significantly separates social media from and cause confusion:
traditional mass media forms in terms of source
credibility: So there are heaps of individual opinions there,
and people with different standpoints have
“Because something that’s posted and shared different opinions, but because it is not
on social media differs depending on the organised, there are too many extreme
individual’s perspective and feelings, I think opinions...13
mass media is more reliable for confirming the
facts without involving emotions.”
11
Keeping in mind the problem of rumours and
the absence of gatekeepers in social media to
While social media is considered useful for check the accuracy and quality of information,
collecting local and personal information, more it is evident that participants have more
than half of participants associate the confidence in mass media sources, television
credibility of news with professionally produced and newspapers than in social media. This is
information that is filtered, verified, accurate, because they perceive TV, particularly NHK, as
clearly communicated and fair. This official sources of news, less open to
corresponds to professional integrity and work manipulation, at least when it comes to facts
of media producers, journalists, and reporters, obtained through live broadcast.
particularly from NHK and mainstream press.
The convenience of and open access to social Besides familiarity, the power of visuals, raw
media means that the diffusion of rumours is videos and moving images was essential for
more rapid than in traditional mass media. This perceiving television as a highly reliable
can cause significant confusion, as was the medium (McLuhan, 1964). This is evident from
case with the rumour tweets about the the repetitiveness in the use of the word:
chemically contaminated rain that circulated in “eizō” (映像) when participants explain their
the wake of the great 2011 earthquake preference for television in the immediate
(Takayasu et al., 2015). In the disaster context, aftermath of the earthquake, tsunami and
rumours on Twitter often contained ambiguous nuclear explosion. The word “eizō” is translated
information and private opinions about various as “video image” or “screen image.” It was
topics concerning safety and danger that concurrently used across participants of
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varying ages, in the context of reliance on TV during the 3.11 disaster, she explained: “It
television and confidence in television’s was quite like a movie, how can I say… flowing,
credibility. because the media conveyed what was
16
happening, and not the instant picture.” In
One of the interviewed participants, Fuji, case of such a complex disaster as 3.11, it is
explains she mainly watched television for its these “moving” video images and the
live coverage of the evolving disaster, and the immediacy of broadcast that gave participants
constant flow of information which she can the confidence to make sense of information
easily access on TV. More importantly, Fuji overload and believe that what they are seeing
notes that her preference for television during is a true representation of the situation
the 3.11 disaster over other media forms comes unfolding. Döveling et al. (2011) argue that the
from the perspective that video can best visual proximity of the camera can convey the
capture the real nature of a disaster. As an emotional tone of a disaster, thereby reducing
example, she mentions live footage of a the uncertainty and perception of media as
helicopter flying over the Fukushima nuclear unreliable, or only moderately credible. Live
plant shortly after the explosion on 17 March performance and images on the TV screen are
2011, which helped her understand the perceived as more “convincing” than text on
situation immediately after the nuclear something which has already happened, and
disaster: the familiarity with events comes from the
“reality effect” which live television facilitates
“Yes, I thought it was reliable. A video image (Gripsrud, 1999).
does not lie. Rather than saying I believe it or
not, I have to accept that video image is a fact. Immediately after the 3.11 earthquake, a live
It is not that I can trust what people in the video stream from the disaster area was
company are saying, but I took it as a fact continuously broadcast in a small square at the
because the person is in position to say that top of the screen, while the main TV screen
this kind of thing occurred in the nuclear power showed news commentators and presenters
plant.”14 speaking in the studio. The continuous flow of
disaster news enabled participants to visualise
The helicopter footage was mentioned by other the disaster and evaluate live news as highly
participants, like Takuya as one of the more credible. As one participant, Ryota, explains:
effective ways to understand the evolving
nuclear disaster: “I found it reliable because there was a real-
time video stream as soon as the earthquake
“The good side of television is still video image, happened. One good thing was that close, real-
isn’t it? Real-time… Horrible images are time information was continuously
coming in real-time…”15 appearing.” ʼ 1 7
As Takuya’s statement shows, live, closeup These examples suggest that there was no
images of a hydrogen explosion and later of the suspicion of immediate live TV broadcast of the
helicopter dropping water on the nuclear plant, disaster, and no particular suspicion of
helped people visualise the disaster and newspaper and other media platforms at that
understand its scope. The vividness of video time. Participants’ scepticism in news arose
images was often contrasted with a later, in the aftermath of the 3.11 nuclear
photograph, when discussing the role of TV in disaster, including suspicion of government
the immediate phase of the 3.11 disaster. statements in TV broadcasts and print
publications. Further, participants’ confidence
For example, when I asked Hana if she trusted
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in news and the high levels of trust come from complemented television watching with
the notion that the moving image and audio- internet and international media sources,
visual material show actual information because he felt that Japanese mass media was
through the simultaneous reception of the same hiding critical information on the radiation
news and the sense of witnessing the disaster levels and overall risks of the nuclear disaster:
as it happened.
“In the foreign media there was like a map
showing where radioactive substances would
be dispersed given the wind direction, but I
Growing scepticism and selective media wonder why Japanese media did not do the
use same. I think I lost confidence in Japanese
media after that. Information was given in
Following the 3.11 nuclear disaster, foreign media… Japanese media did not release
participants report a lack of trust in television information… everyone was really worried.”19
and/or newspaper reports, stemming from the
overall perception that the nuclear disaster was Although Kenjiro felt that NHK was neutral in
poorly covered and that unbalanced, partial, covering the necessary information on the
inconsistent reports and media censorship, earthquake and tsunami, without the
were caused by the media’s affiliations with the sensationalist dimension found on some
government and kisha clubs. Indeed, the commercial TV stations, he is convinced that
reporting, or lack thereof, of the nuclear the Japanese mass media, including NHK, did
meltdown was the main trigger for a strong 20
not utilise the SPEEDI system to release
distrust towards mass media including NHK. accurate data on radiation levels, which could
Participants mainly refer to the lack of help people evacuate to safe areas. He
impartial coverage of the nuclear disaster, the concludes that the Japanese mass media failed
poorly communicated information on levels of to release critical data and fulfil their
radiation, the censoring of information on the responsibility to provide detailed, unbiased and
nuclear meltdown, and the propaganda that the independent coverage of the disaster. This
situation is under control. For example, made him question its reliability and turn to
Atsushi, who was following TV news alternative sources—international media and
immediately after the great earthquake and the internet:
tsunami, explains that it was hard for him to
understand the news after the nuclear disaster: “The power of the state suppresses mass media
“I watched TV, but I didn’t understand …, media is being watched carefully. If you
anything. It has been explained, but with a long report on something unwanted, you will be
explanation, I didn’t understand the meaning at dismissed. There is no independence, which is
all…”18 dangerous.”21
While participants generally agree that Scepticism towards mediated information and
television delivered useful, real-time, factual gradual loss of trust and growing
information on the earthquake and tsunami, disappointment in Japanese mass media was
their suspicions arose after the 3.11 nuclear also voiced by other participants, who felt that
disaster. Kenjiro used television as his primary accurate and critical information was not
source of news on the 3.11 disaster, perceiving adequately communicated to the public.
NHK as extremely useful for its instant and live Negative responses towards repetitive and
updates in the immediate aftermath of biased coverage of the disaster led to
earthquake and tsunami. However, after the participants’ perception of mass media as only
explosion at the nuclear plant, Kenjiro moderately reliable. Kensuke, who was
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following TV news from the start of the triple source of information is especially prominent in
disaster, became sceptical of the mass media, Hideki’s reference to 2channel, 24 an online
due to repetitive and biased coverage: bulletin-board service, which helped him
evaluate the accuracy of local information by
“I didn’t trust information about the nuclear comparing other users’ comments and
power plant. It seemed to be controlled. The reactions, as they offer a broad range of
bad thing was…there was a lot of anxiety about alternatives and views about his local
the nuclear plant, and I don’t know which side community in Fukushima:
of the story I received… (continues in English)
(they exaggerated news on nuclear disaster, Many people have comments about the people
treating nuclear disaster as a political issue… I of Fukushima prefecture. They had comments
feel they didn’t show the truth; the mass media which never appeared in the news, such as that
has a position like left and right wing ... mass people in Fukushima are exposed to radiation
media belongs to the government side, it shows every day and that the food there is
22
good news, people doing their job).” contaminated and cannot be eaten…That was
what other people were thinking… I used
Consequently, participants’ shifting 2channel to find out what other people think.25
perceptions of media credibility led to changing
media use with utilisation of online media Takuya started utilising Facebook to circulate
sources to complement mass media use due to information on radiation levels in his hometown
uncertainty and gradual loss of trust in mass in Saitama, a city located about 18 miles north
media. of central Tokyo, that he measured himself with
a Geiger counter. He says that Japanese mass
The changing role of social media in the media is biased and strongly linked to political
context of the 3.11 disaster is seen in its parties and sponsored by advertising agencies,
potential to provide new visual representations which significantly affects its impartiality and
of the calamitous national disaster, with user- the neutrality of its content. Therefore, Takuya
generated videos and images that could help found it necessary to check information on
viewers gain alternative knowledge of events as different sources and decide which is credible,
they unfold. In some cases, growing distrust as he notes: “There is nothing that can be
towards mass media institutions resulted in done.”26 This phrase “shōganai,” was used by
higher social trust and/or increasing utilisation another participant. Daichi, who felt sceptical
of different (online) sources which can provide about the news in media after the nuclear
critical information on radiation or nuclear explosion:
disaster not provided by mass media. In such
an environment, where participants feel that “TV was the most…I watched TV all the time. I
they cannot rely on mass media sources, was a bit suspicious, in particular, I was
especially at the time of the 3.11 nuclear thinking whether the (situation in) Fukushima
disaster, social media provided some with an nuclear power plant was true. I didn’t really
alternative channel which offered multiple know if what was said on TV was true, I didn’t
views and perspectives on matters of life and know if it was safe, if I needed to evacuate or if
death. In this sense, participants like Atsushi, I shouldn’t go outside.”27
perceive social media and the internet as a vital
tool for safety and security. He notes that: “At For Daichi, the most significant impact of mass
that time, there was Facebook and it was really media (particularly TV) was its unbalanced
useful.”23 coverage of the disaster, which he found to be
overwhelming, saying that he could not have a
This notion of social media as alternative
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calm attitude towards media TV broadcast of they incorporated both traditional and social
the disaster, but like Takuya concluded that media to evaluate news content and develop
nothing could be done about it: independent judgment. Within this new inter-
media environment, the generational divide is
“At that time, because I wasn’t calm, I couldn’t gradually decreasing, as younger participants
take a calm attitude towards the media. I in their 20s and 30s increasingly migrate to
watched TV, shocked, and there was nothing new digital platforms for news, and older
much to look at…There’s nothing that can be participants in their 40s and 50s slowly
28
done about the media.” gravitate to online media as a back-up and
additional source of news.
The phrase “shōganai” reflects the view that
Japanese mass media is unlikely to re-think the The first significant change in participants
focus of reporting and broadcast and provide media use triggered by the 3.11 disaster is the
fair and balanced coverage, which is free of reliance on cross-media use or combination of
government and corporate (TEPCO) influence, older and newer media for better evaluation of
especially in a time of disaster when there is credibility, accuracy and up-to-date
much negative content. The use of shōganai information. A minority of participants who find
indicates that Takuya and Daichi resigned social media to be moderately credible are
themselves to the limitations of traditional those who used social media as their primary
mass media, and that making radical changes source of news during 3.11, for real-time
in their media consumption patterns is beyond updates and facts or for checking on what their
their control. However, the following section friends were talking about, to verify credibility
offers personal accounts of media utilization of information. For example, besides watching
and opinions across wide range of age groups, television at work immediately after the quake,
as an evidence of progressive changes in the Toshi (age group 20-29) utilised a variety of
traditionally established patterns of media use official sources on Twitter. As he did not have a
in the aftermath of 3.11. TV at home, Toshi accessed breaking news and
mass media reports on the earthquake on
Twitter, for its immediate and real-time nature
and ability to provide instant updates and
Building trust through inter-media use
deliver accurate reports on earthquake
intensity and aftershocks. Reflecting on 3.11,
The changing levels of trust in mass media and
Toshi explains that he only trusted immediate,
general scepticism concerning news in the
real-time reports on earthquake and tsunami,
wake of the nuclear disaster had significant
which he accessed on Twitter. He noticed
implications for the participants’ approach to
changes in the way he used Twitter to
media use and reliance on media. Within
continuously access updates and news from
Japan’s broader mediascape, a new inter-media
trusted news media sources on earthquake
environment emerged in the aftermath of the
intensity, aftershocks and other critical
3.11 disaster. Inter-mediality is defined as the
information:
interconnectedness of social media and
traditional mass media, in which their role and
“Twitter use, as I thought, has increased, and I
influence develop in a complementary manner
looked at it for a long time…because it is fast
(Endo, 2013, p. 5). Inter-media use among
and information immediately comes in…When
participants in a wide range of age groups,
the earthquake happened, I immediately looked
from their 20s to their 50s, was caused by
at Twitter and saw that the earthquake was at
participants’ sceptical attitude towards the
that seismic intensity and that something
credibility of mass media and online media, as
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absolutely terrible had happened…”29 a combination of user consumption and
production of media content (see Petrovic,
Toshi relied on cross-media use to access 2019, p. 92). Another reason for participants’
credible and verified information and facts reliance on social media, which emerged from
about the earthquake, which could help him interviews, is the familiarity of sources in
realise the severity of the disaster, indicating online and offline space. Participants explain
new media trends in Japan, as mass media use that they put their trust in the comments and
extended to digital platforms. Similarly, Hideki feedback provided by their friends, or same-
(male, 20-29), who was in Fukushima at the community users, as a guide to what is relevant
time of 3.11, started checking YouTube for real- and credible. People believe that interactivity
time footage posted by other users, useful for around information facilitates their
understanding the situation and providing understanding of the reliability of stories, as
alternative sources of information on the others offer feedback and alternatives
complex disaster. Hideki positively (Newman & Fletcher, 2017). The discussion
acknowledges the real-time feature of this and sharing of news among friends or more
social media platform: generally among other social media users’ help
participants understand the severity of the
“I started using YouTube videos to sort out situation and realise whether the information is
what happened at that time. Since many people a fact or a rumour. After watching dramatic
took videos with cameras from various places, I news reports, due to information overload,
could find out what I did not know, so I started participants explained that they found it
watching videos on YouTube. I think social necessary to confirm what they had seen on
media is really useful…After all, I think it is television with others, and share information
useful because we could receive information about earthquake intensity, the scope of the
from social media when the TV station was disaster and many other concerns. This could
damaged and couldn’t broadcast… ”30 help them cope with uncertainty and anxiety.
For example, Mayumi (30-39) recalls that she
In this case, user-generated and real-time
discussed the news from TV with friends and
videos of the disaster coming from “back-up”
family, to understand the complexity of the
sources (other social media users) helped
disaster:
Hideki gain alternative information on the
disaster and evaluate accuracy by comparing “Even if it was said to be confusing,
different sources. Furthermore, these unofficial earthquake, tsunami, nuclear power plant… the
communication channels, regarded as opinion of friends and family was very
“backchannels” (Sutton et al., 2008, p. 625) valuable… well, the next week it was really
served as a vital source of information, rather quite difficult (to watch), just watching that,
than merely an alternative source of but because there was no other choice I turned
information, for participants who could not on the TV and watched it.”ʼʼ31
access TV news.
Most participants who were living in Tokyo at
However, the need for information was not the the time of 3.11 felt that Tokyo was in danger
only reason for participants’ reliance on online of being directly affected by radiation.
sources. I have argued elsewhere that, in the Furthermore, the safety of food and water
context of the 3.11 disaster, social media became real issues for Tokyo residents with the
platforms served as a space where individuals passage of time and concerns about radiation.
can experience and express closeness in time of All participants note that immediately after
crisis, creating and maintaining new forms of watching the news about the nuclear plant,
affective communities in digital space through
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they discussed the information they gathered abroad, it is quite different…I wonder which
from the media, either among family, friends one is better…”34
and neighbours or in the digital community of
users who follow the same news or join the These participants’ responses indicate that they
same online groups, as a guide to establish turned to their friends, family or community of
reliable information. The main concerns media users to establish what news is reliable
discussed in online or offline space were and relevant. This demonstrates how
related to the nuclear plant: the seriousness of discussing information with their immediate
the disaster, the location of safe zones, community of audience members or social
radiation effects, and the safety of food and media users contributed to the formulation of
water due to radiation. When I asked Ryota perceptions and evaluation of media credibility.
(male, 50-59) whether he discussed disaster
news with friends and others, he explained: In the context of 3.11, participants conclude
that trust comes from comparing multiple
“We talked about the damage, and whether we sources in the emerging inter-media
could help in any way, and how the nuclear environment and relying on personal judgment
disaster would end… and because there was a to determine its credibility. This indicates that
story on radiation, where should we go and the complexity of the 3.11 disaster triggered a
which food and vegetables are unsafe…”
32
combined media use in the form of inter-media,
integrating both old and new media
Similarly, Saki (30-39) explains that even technologies to critically analyse and evaluate
though she did not join any online groups or news content and develop independent
post information on social media, she was judgment. These findings suggest an overall
actively involved in a discussion with friends understanding that television is more
and family about the rumours and professional and competent than online media
contradictory information on radiation effects in delivering accurate and reliable news, as
they heard on TV: participants tend to seek information from
official and checked sources, still having
“We talked about the accuracy of information confidence in the professional integrity of
and what to believe. In particular, information journalism and live broadcasts above the
about the radiation is completely different random sources and unregulated flow of
depending on the medium and each day. I think information on social media. At the same time,
about this even today. After all, I think it is findings of the study show that in the inter-
controlled and that someone controls it. media environment that emerged with the 3.11
Especially TV…”33 disaster, the interplay of traditional mass media
and online media spheres facilitates the
Another participant, Hana (40-49), who was in evaluation of media credibility and
Osaka, talked to her friends from Malaysia who development of personal opinion.
followed the same broadcast, discussing the
difference between international and Japanese
mass media coverage. After that discussion,
Hana found it challenging to decide which Present-day notions of trust in media
coverage was more reliable:
The 3.11 disaster altered some participants’
“At that time, a friend living in Malaysia told views towards media and government
me that the way of reporting is very different in institutions, changing perceptions of media
Japan and overseas. In Japan, it is fragmented credibility, which consequently led to changes
due to such damage, but there is no such thing in media use, mainly concerning the inclusion
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of online media, social media and news There are many people on Twitter. There are
websites within one’s media routine. Sixteen some you can trust, and others that you
participants recall using online media, social definitely cannot. Some of them are acting as
media or news websites, during and shortly influencers, and what they say and the things
after the 3.11 disaster. Interviews show a they introduce, they’ve checked them out to a
significant increase in participants who use certain extent, so they have a track record.
online media, from 16 to 31, thereby showing Rather than saying whether I can trust Twitter
that at the time of interviews, six years after or not, there are people whom I can trust, so
the 3.11 disaster, online media, social media Twitter is suitable for making direct contact
36
and news websites were afforded a similar level with them.
of importance as traditional mass media in
participants’ everyday media use. Therefore, Hiroshi and Takashi’s responses
indicate that reliability depends not on the
Familiarity with the source is an essential medium itself, but on the source. For example,
factor in how respondents perceive the familiarity with the source leads to credibility,
credibility of online media. Post 3.11, in the case of family and friends. Sources of
participants still tend to communicate with information that have a “track record” (jisseki)
friends and people they already know, which or that are “factual” (jijitsu) are also considered
gives them more confidence to regard the trustworthy.
information that comes from familiar sources
as credible. As one of the lessons learned from Social media is still perceived as less credible
the 3.11 disaster, participants explain they than mass media, without significant changes
became more cautious when accessing in participants’ levels of trust since the 3.11
information posted by unknown sources and disaster. Low trust in social media still comes
random individuals, as they perceived it as from a perception of biased, incomplete,
running a higher risk of being misinformation, misleading or inaccurate information, caused
a poor-quality message or fake news. For by its unregulated flow of information,
example, discussing his post 3.11 media immediacy and unchecked sources. Although
orientation and news consumption, Takashi many believe that social media can to some
(age group 20-29) explains that if he is not extent overcome or complement mass media
familiar with the person who posted shortcomings, social media is still seen as less
information, he cannot find it credible, because credible than television and newspapers. The
there is a risk of misinformation or rumours. minority of participants (three) who still turn to
He goes on to explain that: TV as their only source of news, refer to the
habitual use and familiarity of an established
“Since there are times when I don’t know the pattern of television watching.
source on social media, it might be a
rumour On mass media, I try only to listen to As mentioned earlier in the article, Kenjiro
facts.”
35
(50-59) believes there is a strong link between
Japanese mass media and the government and
Similarly, Hiroshi (30-39) who often uses maintains that greater independence in
Twitter, tend to communicate with people he reporting is essential. Due to the poor
already knows, which gives him more television coverage of the 3.11 nuclear disaster,
confidence to regard the information that he said he lost trust in Japanese mass media,
comes from familiar sources, or in the case of including NHK and commercial broadcasters.
his explanation below, Twitter influencers, as However, years after the disaster, because of
credible to some extent: his long-established habit of watching
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television, Kenjiro still perceives it is the most One of their comments was:
reliable medium for news. He especially credits
NHK for its factual reports, but also mentions Toshi: “It is difficult…I don’t trust it at all. I
that there are times when some issues and think that Japanese media has not done much
events are not reported: of the critical articles in journalism, and I know
the world’s press ranking, I know it is low in
“TV watching has become a habit because the Japan…”40
latest news is delivered at a fixed time. I don’t
think that is all, but I trust NHK to some extent. After the nuclear disaster, Atsushi (male,
However, I think there are times when some 40-49) started doubting news from mass media,
things are not reported.”37 realising it is biased and controlled, without
providing alternative views and reliable
One of the rare younger participants who information. For Atsushi, media bias that
choose mass media forms over social media, emerged post 3.11 nuclear disaster is the main
like Michiko (female, 20-29) and Miyuki reason for his distrust in mass media or as he
(female, 20-29) both make a note that their explicitly says a few times in the interview: “I
perception of traditional mass media (television hardly ever watch TV or read newspapers
and newspaper) as credible, comes from because it is full of lies!”41
habitual use:
When it comes to media bias, the problem of
Miyuki: “I’ve watched it (TV) ever since I was political and institutional bias comes into
little, so there is no need to doubt it.”38 consideration when discussing the credibility of
Japanese mass media. Another participant,
Michiko: “I think newspaper is the most Wataru (male, 40-49), explains that his main
reliable media. When I was a child, I think my decision to cancel his subscription to the Asahi
parents have taught me to read newspapers, and Yomiuri Shimbun comes from the view that
and reading newspaper became ordinary…”39 major Japanese newspapers are tightly linked
with political parties, and that this has
These comments indicate that changing media significantly affected the coverage of 3.11
habits in terms of incorporating social media in nuclear disaster.
their accustomed media environment becomes
difficult for three participants whose media Although there is a consensus that mass media
habits still tied to traditional media and news forms provide verified and general information,
that comes on TV at a scheduled time, or gets online media sources are also thought to offer
delivered directly to their home. different perspectives on events, thereby
suggesting that trust comes from a combination
Most participants seem to agree that the major of multiple sources. One participant, Mei
media outlets, such as NHK television news and (female, 20-29), talks about how she views the
national dailies such as the Asahi and Yomiuri, information provided by mass media and online
separate fact from fiction, but there are mixed media as being different. She explains that
opinions about whether such outlets are critical mass media delivers official information at the
and transparent enough due to their tight link macro level, while online media, especially
with political parties. When discussing their social media, offers individual perspectives and
preference for online and international media opinions, which she sees as micro-level
sources, Toshi (male, 20-29), Kaori (female, information. Mei stresses the importance of
50-59) and Haruna (50-59) refer to a lack of comparing both sources to see different
critical coverage and transparency, as the viewpoints. Although she thinks Japanese mass
primary reason for not trusting these sources. media is not biased, she does say that it is
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