Trends and Trajectories Since the Decade of Hope - How can Democratic Peace Work in Southern Africa?
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Gilbert M. Khadiagala
How can Democratic Peace Work in Southern Africa?
Trends and Trajectories Since the Decade of
HopeAbout The Author Gilbert M. Khadiagala is the Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations and Director of the African Centre for the Study of the United States at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. He has previously taught comparative politics and international relations in Kenya, Canada, and the United States. Prof. Khadiagala holds a doctorate in international studies from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C. His research focuses on governance, leadership, conflict management, mediation and negotiations in Eastern Africa, Southern Africa, and the Great Lakes region. Cover Art Photograph by Eduardo Matlombe, published with the kind permission of the Centro de Documentação e Formação Fotográfica (FCF) Imprint Published by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Mozambique Avenida Tomás Nduda 1313, Maputo, Mozambique Tel.: +258-21-491231, Fax: +258-21-490286 Email: info@fes-mozambique.org ©Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2018 ISBN: 978-989-20-8528-9 “Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.”
Gilbert M. Khadiagala How can Democratic Peace Work in Southern Africa? Trends and Trajectories Since the Decade of Hope
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 5
THE GOLDEN AGE OF CRAFTING DEMOCRATIC PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 5
Democratic Governance for Peace in the 1990s 6
Security Sector Reforms for Peace in the 1990s 8
Human Development for Peace in the 1990s 11
REVERSALS IN DEMOCRATIC PEACE 13
Democratic Governance for Peace Since the 2000s 14
Security Sector Reforms for Peace Since the 2000s 20
Human Development for Peace Since the 2000s 24
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 31
REFERENCES 35How can Democratic Peace Work in Southern Africa? Trends and Trajectories Since the Decade of Hope
INTRODUCTION 1990s, which provided the background for
the widespread optimism of democratic
Peace is more than the absence of war. In breakthroughs in the region after the end of
its substantive and comprehensive sense, apartheid and racial domination. The second
peace entails democratic governance, civic section examines the changes witnessed in
oversight over the security sector and human the 2000s that led to the growing pessimism
development. States and societies seek to about regional democratic peace. The final
achieve these objectives through building section offers some thoughts on new political
institutions that promote political participation, developments and their impacts on democratic
guarantee citizens’ security, and promote just, peace in Southern Africa.
equitable, and humane livelihoods. In the
1990s, there was tremendous optimism about
southern Africa’s ability to recover from years of
civil wars and apartheid destabilization through THE GOLDEN AGE OF
democratization, security sector reforms, and CRAFTING DEMOCRATIC
human development. In more recent years,
PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
however, this optimism has given way to
profound concern about growing democratic In the 1990s, Southern Africa was
recession, the inability of States to deliver characterized by crucial reforms as part of
public goods, the resurgence of militarism, the political regeneration that accompanied
and growing socioeconomic inequalities. the end of civil wars and the collapse of
Popular protests and discontentment emerged apartheid. Democratic governance entailed
across the region as groups contested political building institutions of accountability,
and economic marginalization and the lack of participation, and representation to
adequate affordable services. States have not overcome the legacies of authoritarianism
been prepared to deal with these expressions and militarism. Similarly, security sector
of popular political will and have often reacted reforms were popularized to denote the wide
violently. range of measures designed to hold security
forces accountable to civilian institutions and
What are the factors that contributed to create competent security forces beholden
these reversals in the region’s democratic to the States rather than regimes. These
development and social peace? How can reforms were critical adjuncts to democratic
Southern Africa recapture the momentum governance because they strengthened
in the 1990s that unleashed democratic civilian institutions and rationalized security
awakening? Who are the key actors and sector expenditures to redirect resources
institutions that are going to play significant towards social sectors. Equally vital is the
roles in constructing positive peace by concept of human development, which refers
broadening political participation, creating to policy shifts meant to address questions
sound civil-military relations, and stimulating of livelihood vulnerabilities, particularly
inclusive growth and development? The first poverty, inequalities, and social marginality.
section of this article examines the experiences Thus, for the region, building peace was
of several countries in building democratic closely connected to popular participation,
governance institutions throughout the security sector reforms, and fostering human
5How can Democratic Peace Work in Southern Africa? Trends and Trajectories Since the Decade of Hope
development. Determination to expand the expansion of civil liberties. Fortuitously,
political space, enshrine human rights, and the decolonization of Namibia in April 1990
economic prosperity were considered the permitted the emergence of a democratic State
driving forces behind dignity and liberation with a model constitution that was lauded for
that Southern Africa yearned for three decades ensuring basic freedoms and respect for human
after the initial liberation from the fetters rights. The Namibian transition signified that
of colonialism. Moreover, the conviction pluralism was indispensable to political renewal
that regional civil conflicts had arisen from as the new State sought to overcome years of
bad governance, political intolerance, and colonial racism. From the outset, the broad
social marginalization gave more credence trends in regional democratic governance
to the importance of political renewal that encompassed the expansion of pluralism, the
informed the transformations. Civic actors rotation of leaders, the ascendance of new
and social movements were the major actors political parties, and growing tolerance for
that drove these processes and provided the social pluralism. Despite the liberation legacy
organizational impetus for change. Contrary of strong and dominant political parties, the
to the past, these actors were also inspired by expansion of pluralism witnessed significant
the belief that democratization of the State shifts in leadership in some of the region’s
required vigilant civic action. Alongside social countries. Unlike other parts of Africa,
movements and civil society were emergent Southern Africa has a long legacy of liberation
political parties that served as the agents of movements led by strong individuals. In the
participation. In addition to the rise of civil era of democratization, one of the key tests
society, the legalization of new political parties of change in these countries was whether
in most countries of the region symbolized the dominant parties would countenance
the fresh stirrings for change. International opposition forces, particularly those that did
actors were also key players in the democratic not participate in liberation struggles or, as in
renewal, providing pressures that prodded Namibia and Mozambique, those parties that
recalcitrant regimes to allow political pluralism. had allied with the oppressive white regimes
With regard to security sector reforms and (Kadima & Booysen, eds., 2009).
human development, the role of donors was
equally pertinent to jumpstart these processes After Namibia, Zambia led the regional
by furnishing resources. democratization wave when Fredrick Chiluba’s
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)
defeated Kenneth Kaunda’s United National
Democratic Governance for Peace Independence Party (UNIP) in the 1991
in the 1990s elections. Zambia’s transition initiated the era
in which civil society organizations, notably
The global demise of the Cold War coincided organised labour, mounted pressure for
with end of white minority regimes and civil democratic rule, a trend that came to dominate
conflicts in Southern Africa. In the majority the rest of the region. Through various
of these countries, these events offered solid leaders, the MMD dominated Zambian politics
grounds for important political changes for almost twenty years before it was ousted
that reversed the postcolonial decades of in 2011. Malawi underwent its democratic
authoritarian regimes and ushered in the era transition in 1994, which saw the long-
of competitive politics, periodic elections, and serving leader Kamuzu Banda deposed and
6How can Democratic Peace Work in Southern Africa? Trends and Trajectories Since the Decade of Hope
the inauguration of a multiparty dispensation. law, and competent government. Despite the
Banda’s demise was important because he had existence of many political parties, Botswana
been one of the most unapologetic supporters continued to be dominated by the Botswana
of white minority regimes in the region. In his Democratic Party (BDP), in power since
first act as President, Bakili Muluzi released independence in 1966 (Maundeni, ed., 2005).
political prisoners and permitted freedom of The power rotation that sees new leaders every
the press, signalling the close of the era of ten years places this dominance in check. In
dictatorships (Chihana et al., 2008; Chirambo, 1997, approved constitutional amendments
2009; Kabemba, ed., 2004). limited the presidency to two five-year
terms. Similarly, Mauritius commenced the
South Africa witnessed the most extensive decade with a strong democratic tradition
changes that symbolized political triumph for underwritten by a constitutional framework,
the entire region. With the first democratic a transparent electoral process, and credible
elections in 1994, South Africa continued electoral management body. All the Mauritian
on the journey that had begun with Nelson elections in the 1990s were characterized by
Mandela’s release in February 1990 and the coalition and alliance building among the
sanction of opposition parties. Although the three major political parties (Electoral Institute
1990-1994 period was marked by violence for Sustainable Democracy in Africa [EISA],
and tensions, negotiations for democratic 2008).
order yielded remarkable compromises that
led to a non-racial constitution. With the At the other end of the Southern African
African National Congress (ANC) assuming democratic governance spectrum was Angola,
power, there was widespread optimism for the Democratic Republic of the Congo
political and economic transformations in (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Swaziland,
South Africa and the region. Similarly, in the and Zimbabwe, who made slow progress
early 1990s, Mozambique emerged after a in promoting popular participation and
bitter civil war with a constitution that allowed legitimacy. Throughout the 1990s, Angola
for multiple parties within its framework for and the DRC suffered civil wars that frayed
liberal democracy. In the 1994 elections, the State institutions, economic infrastructure, and
ruling party, FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação led to large-scale humanitarian emergencies.
de Moçambique), retained power while its These wars consumed the energy of regional
opponent, RENAMO (Resistência Nacional and international actors who attempted to
Moçambicana), obtained a good number negotiate settlements in relentless diplomatic
of parliamentary seats and municipalities. forays. In Angola, efforts by South Africa
Throughout the decade, consistent with the and the United Nations to mediate between
strong legacy of liberation movements in the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação
Southern Africa, FRELIMO was able to prevail de Angola) and UNITA (União Nacional para a
in all elections, even though new opposition Independência Total de Angola) failed as both
parties emerged. sides exploited the country’s rich resources to
fuel the civil war, which only ended in February
Botswana, Southern Africa’s longest 2002 with the death of UNITA’s leader, Jonas
continuous multiparty democracy, entered the Savimbi. Although the Angolan government
1990s with its exemplary record of adherence reached out to some elements of UNITA in
to human rights, freedom of speech, rule of the post-conflict phase, MPLA was reluctant
7How can Democratic Peace Work in Southern Africa? Trends and Trajectories Since the Decade of Hope
to fully embrace pluralism and promote freedom and equal rights for all. But, in the
civil liberties. In regard to the DRC, its civil midst of severe economic dislocations and
war started in the mid-1990s following the political intolerance, a new opposition party,
collapse of the dictatorial regime of President the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)
Mobutu Sese Seko. After it was admitted emerged in 1999 to resist the hegemony
into the Southern African Development of the Zimbabwe African National Union-
Community (SADC) in 1997, the government Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). The MDC’s defeat
of President Laurent Kabila was rescued from of President Robert Mugabe’s bid to change
defeat by the military intervention of Angola, the constitution through a referendum in
Namibia, and Zimbabwe subsequent to the February 2000 marked the beginning of
invasion of Rwanda and Uganda. Diplomatic political turbulence, violence, economic and
efforts led by South Africa helped end foreign social deterioration (Booysen & Toulou, 2009;
intervention in the DRC and resulted in a Makumbe, 2009).
mediated settlement in December 2002 that
launched the transition to peace and stability
(Brito, 2009; Tshiyoyo & Kadima, 2009). Security Sector Reforms for Peace
in the 1990s
Madagascar established a multiparty
democratic system in the early 1990s, but Since the popularization of security sector
subsequently, the country’s political situation reforms (SSR) in the 1990s, the depth
was characterized by significant democratic and quality of these reforms have been
reversals, unconstitutional changes of contingent on participatory and representative
government, and political violence. Major institutions, broadening the notion of
political cleavages were sparked by the highly- security, and the involvement of non-state
contested December 2001 elections set the actors in security. At its core, SSR has five
stage for further political turbulence in the basic principles of interrelated activities: 1)
2000s. Similarly, despite Lesotho’s democratic democratic control and oversight of security
breakthrough, severe disagreements amongst services by parliaments and civil society actors;
the elite and military involvement in politics 2) inclusive, non-partisanship and a flexible,
contributed to violence and unconstitutional transparent, long-term process; 3) effective
government changes (Ploch & Cook, 2012). and accountable security forces that are loyal
To address these instances of instability, to the State and its citizens, not to particular
SADC intervened in 1994 and 1998 to regimes; 4) close links between the delivery
restore constitutional order and initiate broad of security and justice; and 5) local ownership
institutional reforms to pre-empt the resurgence of the reform process. Among the SSR’s core
of violence. Swaziland and Zimbabwe bucked activities are demobilization, disarmament,
the region’s trend towards democratization. and reintegration (DDR); reforms in public
Swaziland clings to the monarchical system sector institutions responsible for internal
that has remained relatively unchanged for and external security; and strengthening
decades. In Zimbabwe, the 1990s started of civilian institutions charged with the
with profound political promise exhibited by oversight, management, and control of
the Commonwealth’s adoption of the Harare security institutions (Bryden, 2007; Hendricks
Declaration in 1991, reaffirming the promotion & Musavengana, 2010; Stanley, 2008).
of peace, security, democracy, individual
8How can Democratic Peace Work in Southern Africa? Trends and Trajectories Since the Decade of Hope
With the democratization trend and the end a professional, politically neutral army. In the
of armed conflicts, Southern African States end, this compromise assisted in solidifying a
prioritized SSR because it was important to new and cohesive Namibian identity within the
combine democratic governance with the defence forces. Most of the former combatants
frequently difficult decisions on security forces that benefitted from the DDR obtained jobs in
reform. Some elite groups were also interested the public sector (Knight, 2009).
in security services that responded to their
needs. Donors played disproportionate roles South Africa pioneered security sector reforms
in SSR, postulating reforms as mechanisms that went beyond the narrowness of DDR to
to support the use of resources to promote strengthen civilian oversight of institutions
development and poverty reduction. From and nurture participatory and inclusive security
the outset, the uneven nature of regional sector transformation. In a sharp contrast
democratization reflected the disparity in SSR from the apartheid legacy where security
implementation. Zimbabwe and Namibia services were major instruments of repression,
provided the formative DDR models the post- the Mandela administration transformed them
liberation phase, reconciling the competing into vehicles to promote national and human
cultures and interests of former opposition security. In a lengthy process that started in
armed forces into national armies. In both 1994 and culminated in the 2002 Defence
instances, the British military provided most of Act, South Africa emphasized a transparent
the integration expertise of disparate forces into and participatory process of downsizing
cohesive national armies. In the Zimbabwean security services, integrating former foes into
case, DDR entailed the merger of Zimbabwe a new South African National Defence Force
African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and (SANDF), and empowering oversight from
the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army civilian institutions (Hendricks & Musavengana,
(ZIPRA) into a newly-trained force of Zimbabwe eds., 2010, pp. 117-144). With regard to
National Forces (ZNF) of about 45,000 troop, DDR, South Africa opted for compulsory
transforming most of the guerrilla forces into programmes to upgrade the skills and expertise
reservists (Hendricks & Musavengana, eds., of the ANC’s military forces so that they could
2010, p.147-174). serve effectively in the SANDF. Although
white officers from the South African Defence
In Namibia, the process of integrating the Force (SADF) continued to occupy senior staff
South African apartheid security structure position in the SANDF, most of them retired
(e.g. the South West African Territorial Force in 1998, permitting newly-trained ANC
[SWATF], the South West African People’s forces to be promoted and lead the security
Organisation [SWAPO] army, the People’s sector transformation. Generally, South
Liberation Army of Namibia [PLAN] into a Africa established a wide range of oversight
Namibian Defence Force [NDF]) presented initial mechanisms that entrenched civilian control
difficulties because of cultural, linguistic, and of the security sector, most of them under the
organizational differences. Military assistance supervision of line ministries such as Defence,
provided by Britain included force integration Police Correctional Services and the judiciary.
planning, training, and the reinforcement of The reforms also created systems of democratic
principles of civilian supremacy. The Defence control, accountability and professionalism to
Force Act of 1990 delineated the institutional ensure that the security services could not be
roles of a civilian-led Ministry of Defence with used to oppress the population. The 1996
9How can Democratic Peace Work in Southern Africa? Trends and Trajectories Since the Decade of Hope
Defence White Paper was developed using reforms that targeted capacity-building of
an inclusive process; it focused on democratic legal training, documentation, and judicial
control and established a human security administration and prison reforms. Although
approach to domestic security (Bryden, 2007, FRELIMO continued to disproportionately
pp. 14-15). South Africa’s comprehensive influence the re-organization of the security
defence review informed regional practices on forces, the post-war Government established
SSR in cases for democratic advancement and a parliamentary oversight committee that was
durable peace agreements to end civil wars. tasked with aspects of the reforms (Hendricks
& Musavengana, eds., 2010, pp. 99-103;
Partially to address the political crises Hutton, 2010, p. 18).
stemming from unstable civil-military relations
in the 1990s, Lesotho launched incremental Although the interface was recognized
reforms in the security services. The reforms between SSR and democratic consolidation
included clear delineation of security forces in that drove policy initiatives in Southern Africa
the 1993 Constitution. The same Constitution in the 1990s, only South Africa was able to
also created a civilian authority to manage the institute wide-ranging institutional measures
affairs of the military and ensure accountability to bring this relationship into reality. Most
to the people, the establishment of the countries in the region opted for easier forms
Ministry of Defence in 1994 whose objective of SSR, particularly DDR and police and defence
was to depoliticise the armed forces, and reforms, without connecting them to broad
the enactment of the Defence Force Act in efforts to build democratic and accountable
1996 to streamline the army’s role. As more civil-military relations. In large part, lukewarm
conflicts involving the army erupted in the late SSR stemmed from the fact that most of the
1990s, SADC engaged several governments in new regimes that came to power found it
Lesotho on deepening security sector reforms difficult to shed past practices of ethnicization
that would restore healthy civilian-military and politicisation.
relations (Hendricks & Musavengana, eds.,
2010, pp. 81-97; Matlosa, 2005). One failure of the SSR processes was that
even countries that conducted DDR initiatives
In Mozambique, the end of the civil war did not have robust reintegration schemes,
ushered in political transformation and which resulted in the impoverishment of
constitutional reforms that affected the security former combatants, forcing many of them
forces. A core part of the 1992 peace agreement into criminal activities. South Africa was the
between FRELIMO and RENAMO was the exception since some demobilized soldiers
demobilisation of both forces as a preliminary joined the growing ranks of private security
step in the creation of a new national army. and mercenary forces. The other vital
Although there were delays in completing challenge was that despite democratization,
the integration, by 1995, the demobilization most States promoted SSR practices that
process had been concluded and allowed did not encompass access to justice, protect
fresh conscription for a new Mozambican human rights and reform prisons. The regional
national defence force. Subsequently, through reticence for comprehensive SSR mirrored the
donor support, Mozambique embarked on common dilemma of liberation movements
other SSR components such as recruiting and parties that were still beholden to militaries
and training a new police force, judicial and security forces for their survival. Hence, in
10How can Democratic Peace Work in Southern Africa? Trends and Trajectories Since the Decade of Hope
the absence of strong opposition parties and challenges inherited from apartheid: low
civil society groups, the dominant ruling parties economic growth, high poverty rates,
had no pressing need for security institution inequitable distribution of wealth and income,
reforms (Hutton, 2010, pp. 1-2). and high unemployment. To meet these
challenges, the Government articulated major
policy frameworks throughout the 1990s that
Human Development for Peace in stressed efficient administrative structures to
the 1990s promote economic and social development.
The policies mainly pivoted around revival of
Alongside SSR, human development economic growth as the vehicle to alleviate
prominently featured in Southern Africa’s poverty, reduce income inequalities and
political and economic transformations in the create employment opportunities. Additional
1990s because livelihoods and development to the overall effects of economic growth,
were acknowledged as vital to sustainable the Government launched initiatives to
peace and prosperity. Widespread human address unemployment problems such as
development advocacy in the region coincided land resettlement schemes, labour intensive
with the 1994 United Nations Development works programmes, and fiscal policies to
Programme (UNDP) Human Development reduce income disparities. During the 1990s,
Report objective that expanded security to Namibia’s economy grew at an average rate
encompass human prosperity and sustainable of 3.5%, allowing its Government to make
development. Thus, as Southern Africa was inroads towards prosperity for all, particularly
transitioning from war to peace, frontal through the expansion of social safety nets
approaches that focused on the vast issues of (Melber, 2005; Wren, 1990).
poverty, social marginalization, and economic
inequality were recognized (Cilliers, 2004). Most countries in the region that had faced
For this reason, the notion of peace dividends tremendous economic doldrums in the 1980s
was linked to democratic governance and embarked on economic reforms that sought
human development. Development as the to conform to political liberalisation and
advancement of human security was tied democratic governance in the 1990s. With the
to questions surrounding the capacity and decline of political and economic monopolies
efficacy of Governments to formulate policies that had coalesced around authoritarian
that would promote inclusiveness and equity one-party States, the new democratic
without alienating groups that had stakes in the regimes tried to build new coalitions with
former systems of repression, marginalization, the proliferating civic organizations. These
and exclusion. groups advocated for programmes that would
enhance development and human security by
Following the end of the Cold War, ruling parties rewarding economic producers and encourage
in Southern Africa that had experimented with social policies to improve education, health,
socialism gradually adopted pragmatic policies and infrastructure. In Zambia, for instance,
to balance equity and growth objectives. At the MMD Government inherited a stagnant
Independence in 1990, the Namibian Ruling economy characterized by excessive debt,
Party SWAPO jettisoned its socialist orientation high unemployment, and poverty.
and embarked on economic management
policies that attempted to confront analogous
11How can Democratic Peace Work in Southern Africa? Trends and Trajectories Since the Decade of Hope
To reverse this, the MMD came up with support for distributing fertilizers and free seed
a manifesto containing a programme for packets of high-yielding maize and legumes to
radical social and economic transformation small farmers (Sen & Chinkunda, 2002).
with several initiatives: liberalization of key
markets, rationalization of the external debt, In 1994, the ANC launched South Africa’s
reorganisation and reduction of public service, Reconstruction and Development Program
privatisation of State-owned enterprises (RDP) as the post-apartheid era’s blueprint,
(SOEs), revitalisation of the mining sector, and which symbolized the yearning for a new
reconstruction of physical infrastructure. The beginning. Crafted through a rigorous
economic reform policies entailed selective consultative process that involved the ANC,
economic disengagement of the State and its alliance partners, and civil society, the RDP
creating an environment where the private constituted the policy framework that would
sector would play a vital role in growth and shape legislation and government policies to
development. By the early 2000s, these reforms redress the legacies of apartheid oppression. Its
had yielded mixed outcomes. Despite notable key pillars were socio-economic programmes
reductions in rural poverty and inequalities to improve the lives of all South Africans;
due to agricultural market reforms, there sustainable economic growth to generate
were minimal reductions in urban poverty. employment, human resources development,
Regardless of the uneven results, the reforms and a high degree of equity; public service
implemented in the 1990s laid the foundation institutional reform to make them more
for a shift from a State-oriented to a market- representative, effective, and efficient;
based economy. Many critics, however, point and educational, scientific and cultural
to the debilitating nature of these reforms, programmes based on non-racial, democratic
including deepening donor dependence and principles. To attain these objectives, the
decimating local capacity for independent RDP underscored optimum utilisation of
development (Hill, 2000; McCulloch, Baulch, government resources to prevent waste,
& Cherel-Robson, 2000). duplication and mismanagement. Thus, the
ANC optimistically aimed for fiscal discipline,
Likewise, in the early 1990s, the Malawian re-organization of expenditure patterns, and
Government embarked on economic reforms planning.
supported by World Bank structural adjustment
loans and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Although the Mandela administration formally
stabilisation programmes to increase fiscal launched the RDP in June 1994 with a modest
discipline, public spending cuts, greater allocation of 2.5 billion rand (about 3% of
accountability and privatisation. In rural areas, the total national budget), both sides of the
where the majority of the population live, racial divide perceived it as a step towards
the primary focus of the economic reform undoing past scourges, in particular arranging
programme was to redress policy bias against clean water and proper sanitation, addressing
small farmers that was prevalent in previous the housing shortage, establishing a social
decades. Consequently, the reforms resulted security system, and improving the health
in significant positive increases in food system. But, the heightened expectations
production between 1994 and 2000. At the around the RDP were soon tempered by its
same time, there was some decline in rural effects on economic growth. Thus, although
inequalities because of donor programme the RDP was considered the cornerstone of
12How can Democratic Peace Work in Southern Africa? Trends and Trajectories Since the Decade of Hope
the Government’s development policy, it faced price for the Mozambican economy, notably
severe fiscal constraints that compromised its the destruction of local industrial capacity,
implementation. Faced with these constraints, heightened donor dependence, and lack of
in June 1996, the Government introduced a economic diversification (Hanlon, 1991).
new macroeconomic policy framework called
the Growth, Employment and Redistribution
(GEAR) strategy to strengthen economic
development, increase employment, and REVERSALS IN DEMOCRATIC
redistribute income. Combining most of RDP’s PEACE
social objectives with the renewed goal of
reducing fiscal deficits, lowering inflation, and
decreasing barriers to trade, GEAR envisaged With the resurgence of authoritarian and
that by the early 2000s, the combination of populist features, political intolerance, and
6% economic growth and inflation at less the shrinking of social and civic spaces in
than 10% would boost employment and the early 2000s, the optimism surrounding
provide resources to meet social investment democratization, security sector reforms,
needs (Jones & Inggs, 2003; Mohr, 2003). and human development as the authors and
anchors of peace in Southern Africa began to
Mozambique made the most spectacular dissipate. Also, the expectations of “second
economic gains in the post-civil war period, liberation” to enhance equality, dignity, and
underscoring the significance of peace for well-being for the majority evaporated in
growth and the quest for equity. Following the face of worsening economic conditions
the 1994 elections, the Government started a in the region. Predictably, the democratic
series of macroeconomic reforms designed to recession has been accompanied by declines
stabilise the economy and begin the arduous in governance through the hollowing-out
tasks of reconstruction. FRELIMO’s manifesto of State capacity, the criminalization of
emphasised integrating rapid growth with public institutions, and popular loss of faith
poverty reduction to reduce social inequalities, in the stability of democratic institutions.
and regional imbalances. By the mid- Furthermore, the consensus around security
1990s, Mozambique had met the targets of sector reforms has declined in some countries
double-digit growth rates, low inflation and with the increasing use of security forces for
currency stability. The challenge subsequently partisan political ends and the militarisation of
translated the impressive performance in politics. The consequences of these reversals
economic growth to poverty reduction and have been growing popular discontent,
improved development outcomes. As part political unrest, and further threats to
of its commitment to social investment, the democratic peace.
Government significantly shifted resources from
military spending after 1994. Thus, in the 1998 Broad explanations for the weaknesses in
and 1999 budgets, the Government allocated democratic governance revolve around the
more capital and recurrent expenditures to novelty of pluralism, the formidable problems
education and health than to military and of building participatory and competitive
intelligence services (Fauvet, 2000). Despite institutions in highly divided societies, and the
these achievements, some critics have pointed continuing conflation of parties and States.
out that the neoliberal reforms came at a hefty Democratic governance promised to heal
13How can Democratic Peace Work in Southern Africa? Trends and Trajectories Since the Decade of Hope
ethnic, regional, and generational cleavages; through periodic elections. But after the
however, in most countries, democratization optimism that surrounded the democratic
has exacerbated these divides as political breakthroughs of the 1990s, Southern
competition amounted to contests for political Africa commenced the 21st century with a
spoils. Similarly, the peace and development mixed political record of democratization.
dividends that were supposed to accrue from On one hand, a minority of countries with a
democratic governance have remained elusive history of multiparty democracies and strong
in light of declining State capacity to deliver State institutions embarked on democratic
public goods and services and the growing consolidation through regular elections,
blight of corruption. leadership rotation, and strengthening of
accountability and probity systems. On the
The closing of democratic space has coincided other hand, the other regional trend was the
with the demobilisation of civic actors and continuation of authoritarian political practices
social movements that were critical to the 90s in countries that had weathered the storms of
reform agenda. As governments have clamped democratization in the 90s. In these cases,
down on civil liberties and basic freedoms, ruling parties barely allowed opposition parties
social movements have encountered severe and in the worst cases, used violence and
organisational difficulties. Increasingly as some intimidation to maintain power. Between these
regimes have utilised security forces against two extremes, the majority of Southern African
opposition parties and civil society actors, countries could be accurately characterised as
new protest movements, such as service fledgling democracies where the incremental
delivery protests, have emerged. These protest efforts to erect participatory and representative
movements have used violence to contest institutions hardly changed political content
economic marginalization of States’ inability and substance. These countries have struggled
to provide public services. Political parties with the teething problems that are typical of
that once held the promise of deepening transitional democracies: weak political parties
participation have also become increasingly and parliaments, strong executives, and
marginal to political processes, subject to apathetic mass political engagement.
overt political harassment and resource
deprivation. While international actors remain Variations on regional democratic
engaged in Southern Africa, their enthusiasm governance nonetheless conceal three
for contributing to political change has major commonalities that have afflicted
somewhat diminished due to political the democratisation process in the second
setbacks in democratic governance, erosion decade. First, particularly in recent years, the
of State capacity, economic mismanagement, widespread global democratic deficit has had a
corruption and illicit financial flows. knock-on effect in Southern Africa, illustrated
by the resurgence of populism, authoritarian
impulses, and political intolerance in most of
Democratic Governance for Peace the countries. Second, the mass participation
Since the 2000s and high electoral turnouts that marked the
90s have dissipated with the ebb of euphoria
For the majority of Southern African States, the from the transitions. Lower voter turnouts are
1990s ushered a period of political liberalism now the norm and a major political concern
that permitted for political competition because they diminish the legitimacy of
14How can Democratic Peace Work in Southern Africa? Trends and Trajectories Since the Decade of Hope
electoral processes and reduce mass vigilance, Khama has been accompanied by accusations
which is critical for accountability. Where the of corruption, mismanagement, and the abuse
electorate is reluctant to participate in the of governmental authority (Mosikare, 2016;
choice of leaders, political cynicism ensues, Motsoeneng & Brock, 2014; Mungai, 2015).
weakening the levers of constraints and Upon leaving power in April 2008 after the
checks on the leadership. Third, decreased expiry of his mandate, Khama left behind a
political participation levels since the early much weaker democracy than the previous
2000s stem from the lack of meaningful Botswanan leaders.
improvements in peoples’ livelihoods; thus,
while democratization has become a regional No less dramatic changes transpired in South
norm, it has not translated into corresponding Africa during the second decade since the
socioeconomic transformations. As democracy successful transition to a multiracial democracy.
has failed to bring political participation, Under the leadership of President Mbeki,
accountability, and economic growth, the South Africa optimistically approached the
majority have lost faith in democratization. 2000s with the notion that was popularized
by the African Renaissance. On the basis of its
The minority of countries with strong patterns Constitution that promotes human rights and
of democratization- Botswana, Namibia, the rule of law, South Africa, through the ANC,
South Africa- reveal the contrasting trends sought to consolidate democracy by expanding
that characterize the entire region. Despite a political participation and legitimacy. The
remarkable record of stable democratic rule 2004 elections boosted the ANC’s unrivalled
under the dominant BDP, Botswana witnessed electoral mandate and strengthened Mbeki’s
some of the region’s major political shifts in position in the party and Government.
governance. Upon taking leadership of the Nonetheless, President Mbeki’s was ousted
BDP in April 2008, President Ian Khama, who at the December 2007 party convention and
has a military background, prioritized the need the election of President Jacob Zuma in the
to consolidate democracy alongside proactive 2009 elections signalled the emergence of
efforts to foster development, social discipline, deep fissures in the ANC that have since had
and service delivery. Although Khama secured dire repercussions on governance, leadership,
a second term in the 2014 elections, the BDP and institutions. Although Zuma momentarily
lost much of its core support, obtaining 32 managed to hold factional conflicts at bay,
of the 57 Parliamentary seats, the smallest his draconian and opaque leadership and
majority in its history. Overall, opposition patronage networks eroded the institutional
parties made vital political inroads because of foundations of the post-apartheid democratic
President Khama’s increasing authoritarianism experiment. The ANC’s 2016 electoral loss in
and intolerance toward the media, civil local government elections was a referendum
society, and political opponents. A widely- on President Zuma’s poor management style
publicized Afrobarometer survey in 2015 but also a testament to the ANC’s declining
showed that Botswana’s political system has legitimacy. Throughout the decimation of
started to display signs of stress; between governance and accountability systems, the
2008 and 2014, the number doubled when judiciary, civil society, and opposition parties
respondents were asked about the risks have staunchly defended South African
of democratic instability. Equally vital, the democracy. Although Zuma’s departure
deterioration in Botswana’s democracy under from the ANC’s leadership following the
15How can Democratic Peace Work in Southern Africa? Trends and Trajectories Since the Decade of Hope
December 2017 elections holds the potential decision-making and unleashed instability.
for democratic renewal, the system he The phase of instability started in 2002 with
entrenched over ten years will take long to Parliament’s defeat by then President Muluzi
dismantle (Chipkin, 2017; Jacobs, 2010). and the United Democratic Front (UDF) to alter
the Constitution to extend the presidential
Of the three democracies, Namibia fared best, mandate. The defeat polarized the ruling party
managing to retain large electoral majorities in in the lead-up to the 2004 elections that were
the 2004, 2009, and 2014 elections. Despite a won by Muluzi’s chosen successor, Bingu wa
2007 split in SWAPO, the party has continued Mutharika. As the new incumbent, President
to dominate political space partly because Mutharika launched an anti-corruption
of its continued investment in infrastructure campaign against key UDF leaders, provoking
and efforts to provide free primary education. Parliamentary to impeachment attempts. As
Moreover, SWAPO has had three peaceful a result, President Mutharika formed a new
Presidential transitions. In the 2014 transition, party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),
Hage Geingob from the minority Damara ethnic which he used to win power in the 2009
group rose to power. To consolidate his power, elections. Facing opposition from diverse
President Geingob established the Poverty sources, the Government resorted to heavy-
Eradication Ministry and has campaigned on handedness toward the media, NGOs (non-
the platform of eradicating poverty by 2025, governmental organisations), and opposition
the end of his expected second term. However, forces. In a clampdown on opposition groups
beneath the democratic façade, there have in July 2009, the security forces killed 20
been concerns about the shortcomings in protesters who demanded accountable
democratic participation and the rule of governance. Following the sudden death
law. For instance, SWAPO’s overwhelming of President Mutharika in April 2012, Vice-
strength has weakened Parliamentary control President Joyce Banda assumed leadership
of executive power, particularly in the face but she was defeated by Peter Mutharika,
of small and splintered opposition parties. brother to the former President, in a closely
Furthermore, SWAPO’s total dominance has fought Presidential contest in May 2014.
blurred the lines between the State and Party, Despite efforts by President Banda to annul
weakening accountability systems. In recent the elections, public outcry dissuaded her.
years, there have been widespread concerns President Mutharika has yet to demonstrate
about Namibia slipping into corruption any leadership on the many problems facing
(Melber, 2009; Melber, 2014). Malawi, including ethnic politics, growing
poverty, and endemic corruption (Cammack,
2014; Chihana et al., 2008).
Malawi and Zambia, the region’s pioneers
of democratisation, have faced enormous Through political persistence, Zambia
complications to enact stable participation has managed to build the foundations for
rules and find leaders that can predictably a pluralistic political system, but ethnic
transform the political systems. In Malawi, polarization, the deaths of two Presidents, and
the second decade of democratization has prevalence of populist leaders has hampered
led to fragmentation and volatility in the Party the consolidation of democratic governance.
system; continuous splits of both ruling and MMD’s era of dominance ended with the
opposition parties have frequently paralysed September 2011 elections when the Patriotic
16How can Democratic Peace Work in Southern Africa? Trends and Trajectories Since the Decade of Hope
Front (PF), led by President Michael Sata, Government placed severe constraints on
emerged triumphant. Prior to Sata’s victory, UNITA as an opposition party. Exacerbating
Zambia underwent political turbulence when governance problems was the MPLA’s
opposition parties contested the 2001 and reluctance to conduct democratic elections;
2008 elections through legal and extra-legal thus, the MPLA postponed parliamentary
means. During the MMD’s rule, one of its elections scheduled for 2006 until 2008
Presidents, Levy Mwanawasa died in office in when it obtained a landslide victory. The
August 2008 due to ill-health. While in power, MPLA also won the 2012 legislative elections.
President Sata was ineffective because of poor Several times the MPLA reneged on holding
health; he died in office in October 2014. Presidential elections until its parliamentary
Before his death, President Sata used violence majority changed the Constitution in January
to intimidate opposition parties, civil society, 2009 to abolish direct Presidential elections.
and the media. In the Presidential by-election The new amendment gave President José
in January 2015, the new PF leader, Edgar Eduardo dos Santos the jurisdiction to control
Lungu, defeated the MMD’s Nevers Mumba political, administrative, and judicial organs,
and the United Party of National Development’s thus whittling the fundamental division of
(UPND) Hakainde Hichilema. In the lead-up power in a democratic system.
to the 2016 elections, Zambia went through
a difficult period, with increased incidences Angola’s slow transition to democratic
of electoral violence and intimidation meted governance only began when President dos
out against opposition parties and their Santos chose a successor, former Defense
supporters. After the elections, the UPND Minister, João Lourenço, who took charge
candidate Hichilema challenged the results in September 2017. In spite of this change,
in the High Court, but the court did not hear President dos Santos guaranteed that into his
the petition. Like President Sata, President retirement some of his family and patronage
Lungu has persisted in draconian colonial networks firmly remained. In addition to
laws to detain opposition figures and muzzle remaining the head of the MPLA, dos Santos
the media and civil society organizations (The passed decrees to freeze appointments
Economist, 2015; Luyando, 2017; Redvers, of military, security and intelligence chiefs
2013; Sishuwa, 2017). until 2025, guaranteeing that his close allies
retain control of State security. President
Southern Africa’s countries that were engulfed Lourenço has partially dismantled the dos
in conflicts during the 1990s and early Santos economic and security networks by
2000s—Angola, the DRC, and Madagascar— disencumbering the dos Santos children from
have made some strides toward recovery and major government and economic positions,
reconstruction; yet, the scars of war continue but it will take time for Angola to undertake a
to weigh heavily on their attempts to build clear path to democratic governance (Cascais,
democratic governance. In Angola, rather 2017; Jensen, 2017).
than marking a new democratic beginning, the
civil war’s end in February 2002 emboldened The DRC’s democratic transition has also
the MPLA to hold onto power, postponing proceeded in fits and starts since the end
meaningful steps toward pluralism. Although of the civil war in 2002. Through prodding
remnants of the defeated UNITA opposition from regional and international actors, the
were permitted political participation, the DRC’s transitional government wrote a new
17How can Democratic Peace Work in Southern Africa? Trends and Trajectories Since the Decade of Hope
constitution that was approved through a Like Angola and the DRC, Madagascar
national referendum in December 2005. In faced turbulent times at the start of the
July 2006 the DRC held its first Presidential and new millennium when a political stand-off
legislative elections in forty years, elections that between the political elites forced the military
marked the beginning of the democratization to intervene on the side of Andre Rajoelina in
process. Despite this optimism, the run-off March 2009. The 2009 coup and the dissolution
Presidential elections in December 2006 and of Parliament ignited sanctions from SADC and
the flawed 2011 Presidential and legislative the African Union (AU). SADC also engaged
elections illustrated profound divisions in the in a relentless three-year bid to mediate the
DRC that have continued to cast a shadow return to constitutional order, efforts that
on building democratic institutions. Under paid off when Madagascar held elections in
President Joseph Kabila, who has been in 2013 that led Hery Rajaonarimampianina, a
power since 2001, the DRC has been unable to former Finance Minister, to become the first
overcome the combination of authoritarianism post-coup, democratically elected President
and a weak State that have characterized in January 2014. In further efforts aimed at
most of its post-colonial period. Moreover, the national reconciliation, the new President
failure to end insecurity in the Eastern Congo invited four of his Presidential predecessors,
and the proliferation of rebellions in other parts including Rajoelina and Marc Ravalomanana,
of the country has adversely affected peace, to meet for talks in December 2014 supported
stability, and reconciliation. As his mandated by the SADC.
second term was coming to a close, President
Kabila invoked all measures to delay the While the elections were meant to bring
holding of elections in December 2016 amidst stability to Madagascar, a political crisis pitting
opposition suspicions that he was trying to the executive against the legislature emerged
amend the constitution to secure a third term. in May 2015, placing national reconciliation
The Government repressed mass protests that and economic reconstruction at risk. The
contested President Kabila’s foot-dragging on crisis was sparked when 121 members of the
the elections. As a result, the Catholic Church 151-member National Assembly attempted
sought to mediate a settlement that would to impeach President Rajaonarimampianina
restore order and chart a way out of the crisis. due to alleged incompetence. The President,
However, Kabila essentially ignored major however, rejected the vote, claiming that
provisions of the December 2016 agreement that there were not enough parliamentarians
for an inclusive government and national present for the vote. In June 2015, the High
elections in 2017. Instead, the electoral Constitutional Court (HCC) ruled in favour
commission announced December 2018 as of the President. The military, a key arbiter
the new date for the Presidential elections. of political conflicts, voiced its concern and
Uncertainties abound about whether the warned Parliament against the attempted
DRC will hold elections in 2018 and the first impeachment. Apart from the conflict
peaceful democratic transfer of power or between the President and Parliament, the
whether, the DRC will revert to widespread volatile political situation was demonstrated
violence and instability, with no elections and by the fact Madagascar has had three different
a continuation of the political stalemate that Prime Ministers since 2014 (IRIN, 2010; World
started in early 2015 (Burke, 2016; Shepherd, Politics Review, ed., 2016).
2016; Vlassenroot & Berwouts, 2016).
18How can Democratic Peace Work in Southern Africa? Trends and Trajectories Since the Decade of Hope
Since the early 2000s, Mozambique determination to seek a permanent solution,
commenced steps to consolidate democracy RENAMO escalated its demands from the
and peace, but in recent years, it has shown Government. In 2015, RENAMO proposed a
signs of political fragility. Building on its constitutional amendment which would grant
continued practice of power transferring provincial authorities 50% of mining, gas and
within FRELIMO and tolerance of opposition oil revenues. Furthermore, it demanded that the
parties, FRELIMO won the 2004 and 2009 provinces in which it had obtained a majority
under President Armando Guebuza. In of votes in the 2014 general elections (Sofala,
both elections, opposition parties steadily Manica, Tete, Niassa, Nampula and Zambézia)
lost significant votes in Parliamentary and be made autonomous territories under its rule.
Presidential contests because FRELIMO’s But through its majority control in the National
strong patronage system made it difficult Assembly, FRELIMO resoundingly defeated the
for opposition parties to recruit members. proposed constitutional amendments in April
National and international observers criticized 2015.
the 2009 election for lacking transparency,
integrity, impartiality, and independence. At Subsequently, Dhlakama agreed to drop his
the same time, Mozambique experienced the claim on the six provinces and return to the
rise in authoritarian tendencies under President negotiating table. End of 2016 a new structure
Guebuza in which opposition parties and the of bilateral talks between the Dhlakama and
media were, at times, subjected to restrictions, president Nyusi resulted in working groups
unlawful arrests, and intimidation (Astill-Brown to come up with proposals for political
& Weimer, 2010; Orre & Rønning, 2017). dezentralization and the integration of
The consolidation of political and economic RENAMO fighters into the security institutions.
power around FRELIMO deepened opposition The unexpected death of Dhlakama in May
resentment that resulted in RENAMO’s leader, 2018 plunged the talks into uncertainty,
Afonso Dhlakama, abrogating the 1992 peace even though both sides emphasize their
agreement in October 2012. In reverting willingness to continue the peace process.
to armed struggle mostly in its traditional Most commentators have suggested that the
strongholds of Tete and Sofala provinces, best way to end the conflict is renewed efforts
Dhlakama demanded more representation in to rebuild trust in the country’s institutions as
electoral bodies before the 2014 elections, well as gradually moving toward decentralized
integration of his supporters into the armed structures (Buchanan, 2016; Jackson, 2013;
forces, and a large share of coal and natural Manning, 2015; Maschietto, 2016).
gas revenues.
Until the military ousted President Mugabe
As violence escalated, President Guebuza in November 2017, Zimbabwe epitomised
invited Dhlakama for negotiations through the democratic governance crisis in Southern
international mediation. During these Africa. The stormy decade started with the
negotiations, the parties agreed to a ceasefire opposition defeating ZANU-PF’s attempt to
and the Government conceded to amend revise the constitution in order to entrench the
the electoral law to accommodate most of power of President Mugabe in March 2000.
RENAMO’s demands, preventing its boycott of This defeat precipitated widespread violence
the 2014 elections. Although the new FRELIMO against opposition and civil society actors and
leader, Filipe Nyusi, signalled the Government’s invasions of white owned farms. Increasingly,
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