USAID/JORDAN STRATEGIC SYNTHESIS OF PROGRAM LITERATURE ON DEVELOPMENT IN JORDAN
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USAID/JORDAN STRATEGIC SYNTHESIS OF PROGRAM LITERATURE ON DEVELOPMENT IN JORDAN JULY 2019 This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Timothy Reilly, Gustavo Castillo and James Fremming of Management Systems International (MSI), A Tetra Tech Company.
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USAID/JORDAN Strategic Synthesis of Program Literature on Development in Jordan Contracted under Contract Number AID-278-C-13-00009 Jordan Monitoring and Evaluation Support Project DISCLAIMER The authors’ views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.
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CONTENTS
ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................... III
POLITICAL MAP OF JORDAN .............................................................................7
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................8
USAID SUPPORT TO JORDAN .......................................................................................................................... 8
DEMOCRACY, RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE ..................................................9
ELECTORAL GOVERNANCE .............................................................................................................................. 9
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 11
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 11
RULE OF LAW ....................................................................................................................................................... 11
LEGAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................................................. 11
OPEN GOVERNMENT ............................................................................................................................... 12
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 13
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 13
GOVERNMENT CAPACITY AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ............................................................ 13
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 14
LOCAL GOVERNANCE ...................................................................................................................................... 14
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 15
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 16
ANTI-CORRUPTION ........................................................................................................................................... 16
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 17
CIVIL SOCIETY....................................................................................................................................................... 17
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 18
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 19
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ENERGY .................................................19
BUSINESS ENABLING ENVIRONMENT ......................................................................................................... 20
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 20
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 21
MICRO, SMALL, AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT ............................................................. 21
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 22
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 23
EMPLOYMENT ....................................................................................................................................................... 23
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 24
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 25
INVESTMENT, TRADE AND EXPORTS ......................................................................................................... 25
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 26
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 27
PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................. 27
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 28
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 28
ENERGY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ........................................................................................................... 29
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 30
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 30
HEALTH .................................................................................................................31
USAID.GOV STRATEGIC SYNTHESIS | iHEALTH SYSTEMS ................................................................................................................................................ 31
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 32
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 32
QUALITY OF PRIMARY HEALTH CARE........................................................................................................ 33
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 34
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 34
MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH ................................................................................................................. 34
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 35
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 35
NUTRITION ............................................................................................................................................................ 35
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 36
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 36
EDUCATION .........................................................................................................37
BASIC EDUCATION............................................................................................................................................. 37
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 38
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 38
TERTIARY AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION .......................................................................................... 39
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 40
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 40
WATER RESOURCES ..........................................................................................40
WATER AND WASTEWATER INFRASTRUCTURE .................................................................................. 40
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 41
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 41
WATER MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE ......................................................................................... 42
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 43
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 43
GENDER AND SOCIAL INCLUSION ................................................................43
GENDER ................................................................................................................................................................... 43
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 45
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 45
YOUTH..................................................................................................................................................................... 45
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 46
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 46
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES .......................................................................................................................... 47
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 48
SYRIAN REFUGEES ............................................................................................................................................... 48
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 49
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS ......................................................................................................... 49
ANNEX I: WORKS CITED...................................................................................50
ANNEX II: EXTENDED BIBLIOGRAPHY .........................................................57
ii | USAID/JORDAN USAID.GOVACRONYMS AETAM Automatic Electricity Tariff Adjustment Mechanism BEST Building Economic Sustainability through Tourism CDCS Country Development Cooperation Strategy CEPPS Consortium for Elections and Political Processes Strengthening CIS Civic Initiatives Support Program CITIES Cities Implementing Transparent, Innovative and Effective Solutions CSO Civil Society Organization CVE Countering Violent Extremism DOS Department of Statistics ESCB USAID Energy Sector Capacity Building Activity EU European Union FARA Fixed Amount Reimbursement Agreement FRP II Fiscal Reform Project II FRPFM Fiscal Reform and Public Financial Management GDP Gross Domestic Product GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GFMIS Government Financial Management Information System GOJ Government of Jordan HCAC Health Care Accreditation Council HRH Human Resources for Health HSD Health Service Delivery IAF Islamic Action Front ICT Information and Communications Technology IEC Independent Election Commission IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems ILO International Labor Organization IMF International Monetary Fund USAID.GOV STRATEGIC SYNTHESIS | iii
INCL International Center for Not-for-Profit Law JCAP Jordan Communication and Advocacy Program JCP Jordan Competitiveness Project JEGP Jordan Economic Growth Plan JFRBA Jordan Fiscal Reform Bridge Activity JIACC Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission JIC Jordan Investment Commission JIF Jordan INGO Forum JLGF Jordan Loan Guarantee Facility JPFHS Jordan Population and Family Health Survey JOD Jordanian Dinars JSEP Jordan School Expansion Project JWI Jordan Water Infrastructure Project JVA Jordan Valley Authority LDU Local Development Unit LENS Local Enterprise Support Project LNG Liquefied Natural Gas MCM Million Cubic Meters MEMR Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources MENA Middle East and North Africa MESP Jordan Monitoring and Evaluation Support Project MFI Microfinance Institutions MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency MOE Ministry of Education MOF Ministry of Finance MOH Ministry of Health MOITS Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Supply MOPIC Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation iv | USAID/JORDAN USAID.GOV
MOPW Ministry of Public Works MSI Management Systems International MSME Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises MWI Ministry of Water and Irrigation NCD Non-Communicable Diseases NCR National Coalition for Reform NDI National Democratic Institute NEET Not in Education, Employment or Training NGO Non-Governmental Organization NEPCO National Electric Power Company NRW Non-Revenue Water OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development PFH USAID/Jordan Population and Family Health Office PGS Partner Government System RAMP Early Grade Reading and Math Project RMCH+ Reproductive, Maternal, Neonatal and Child Health Plus PMU Project Management Unit PPP Purchasing Power Parity RMS Royal Medical Services ROLPAS Rule of Law and Public Accountability Strengthening SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises SCHEP Sustainable Cultural Heritage through Engagement of Local Communities Project TFA WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement TVET Technical and Vocational Education and Training UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund USAID.GOV STRATEGIC SYNTHESIS | v
USAID United States Agency for International Development USD U.S. Dollars VTI Vocational Training Institution WAJ Water Authority of Jordan WIT Water Innovation Technology WFD USAID Workforce Development Program WTO World Trade Organization vi | USAID/JORDAN USAID.GOV
POLITICAL MAP OF JORDAN USAID.GOV STRATEGIC SYNTHESIS | 7
INTRODUCTION
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is located on the East Bank of the Jordan River and is bordered by
Saudi Arabia to the south, Iraq to the east, Syria to the north, and Israel and Palestine to the west. In
1946, Jordan gained its independence after signing the Treaty of London, effectively ending 30 years
under British rule. It has a population of 10.4 million people, roughly one-third of whom are not
Jordanian citizens (World Bank, 2019a; United Nations, 2019b).
Over the last five decades, Jordan has experienced significant progress establishing state institutions,
promoting economic growth, and increasing social welfare. Life expectancy at birth has increased from
52.6 years in 1960 to 74.3 in 2016. Similarly, the country’s gross domestic product per capita has
increased from USD $511 in 1965 to USD $4,129 in 2017. Lastly, the poverty headcount ratio
(estimated at $1.90 2011 PPP a day) has decreased from 2.9% in 1992 to 0.1% in 2010.
Despite a lack of abundance of resources or land, Jordan plays a crucial role in Middle Eastern politics.
The country is a key ally of the United States and one of only two Arab nations that have made peace
with Israel. Although Jordan is not a party to the 1951 Convention on Refugees or its 1967 Protocol,
the Kingdom has been a haven for forced migrants since the Palestinian exodus of 1948. Jordan’s current
refugee population is estimated to be 1.1 million, including Syrians, Iraqis, Yemenis, and others.
The civil war in Syria and the consequent influx of refugees has become one of Jordan’s most difficult
socioeconomic challenges to manage – the country has experienced an increased competition for jobs
as well as infrastructure and strained social services such as healthcare and education. Additionally,
Jordan faces several daunting challenges as it strives to attain its development and reform goals while
also taking advantage of potential opportunities such as a young workforce and improving health and
education levels. These challenges include a rapidly growing population, gaps in the provision of basic
education, high unemployment, weak citizen participation in governance and politics, water scarcity,
reliance on expensive imported energy, and gender disparities (USAID, 2018a).
USAID SUPPORT TO JORDAN
The United States has provided assistance to Jordan since 1952, years before the creation of USAID.
While aid initially focused on military and infrastructure development assistance, today, USAID’s
development strategy includes programs in education, water, economic development, energy,
democracy, rights and governance, health, and gender equality and female empowerment. Additionally,
USAID supports Jordan’s efforts to address the current refugee crisis in the country while building
resilience to support national stability. The 2013-2019 USAID Country Development Cooperation
Strategy (CDCS) identified three development objectives as well as a special development objective:
• Broad-based, Inclusive Economic Development Accelerated
• Democratic Accountability Strengthened;
• Social Sector Quality Improved; and
• Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Enhanced
USAID support to Jordan in the immediate future will be essential to helping the Kingdom create more
sustainable strategies for economic development, provide better services for its population, equip the
8 | USAID/JORDAN USAID.GOVcountry’s youth with employability and life skills, and spur economic growth, especially for disadvantaged populations. DEMOCRACY, RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a constitutional monarchy in which significant political power rests with the King and within the central government. The Kingdom is divided into twelve governorates and several smaller political districts comprised primarily of Bedouin tribal groups. The Parliament, which can be dissolved unilaterally by the King, was suspended from 1967 to 1989, after which it was reintroduced. It is popularly elected with quotas established for geographic regions, religious populations and women. Domestically, the government balances its policies to represent two primary factions of Jordanian society – although there is considerable overlap. Jordanians of primarily Bedouin descent – or East Bank Jordanians - have historically (and to a lesser extent today) received preferential treatment in government hiring and form the bulk of the population employed in the military, government and public sector. This population, to a large extent reliant on the public sector, has generally advocated for continued state intervention in the economy and are accommodated by public services and subsidization policies. The second group – Jordanians of Palestinian origin – have historically been prevented (unofficially) from attaining positions within the public service, including especially leadership positions in the security forces. This population has focused on the private sector and comprise much of the business elite of the country which favors more neoliberal policies and greater integration into the global economy. “Since parliamentary life was reintroduced with the 1989 elections, the division of parliamentary seats across the Kingdom has favored populations outside of the three largest urban centers, Amman, Irbid and al- Zarqa, where the majority of Jordan’s Jordanian-Palestinian population reside” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 7). Jordan is an upper-middle income country, but in the poorer ranks of this category, and by those standards, it performs well by most metrics for governance. According to the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicator data for 2017, Jordan scores well above average for the lower-middle income group in the areas of government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. It scores below the average in the areas of political stability and voice and accountability. In each of these categories, it also scores above the average for the MENA region. However, on a less optimistic note, Jordan’s scores in the areas of political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law have all decreased during the last decade (World Bank, 2017). ELECTORAL GOVERNANCE Jordan has a bicameral parliament with a 65-seat upper house (Majlis al-Ayan) appointed by the King and a popularly elected lower house (Majlis al-Nuwab). The size of the lower house has fluctuated with nearly every recent election, but is currently set at 130 seats, of which 115 are elected with the remainder reserved for women chosen to represent each of the 12 governorates and 3 Badia districts for Bedouin representatives. Twelve of the seats in the lower house are reserved for religious and ethnic minorities. The terms of service for representatives of each house is four years. The government is structured such that despite the presence of a freely elected lower house of parliament, political authority is concentrated in the executive branch (Freedom House, 2018a). USAID.GOV STRATEGIC SYNTHESIS | 9
In 2015, Jordan passed a new election law that changed the nature of representation from a one-person- one-vote system to a proportional system. “The new law also redrew district lines to mitigate acute malapportionment that had long placed urban voters at a disadvantage and inflated the influence of the regime’s rural supporters. However, even after the changes, rural and tribal voters remained heavily overrepresented” (Freedom House, 2018a). Among the other notable changes implemented with the 2015 Election law is the lowering of the voting age to 17 years (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). Parliamentary elections are administered by an Independent Election Commission (IEC) that was established in 2013. Although irregularities continue to be reported for the most recent elections, the IEC has generally received positive reviews. “In the most recent elections, cameras were installed in voting booths to ensure propriety and build public confidence, and approximately 86% of the votes cast were ruled to be valid. While public confidence improved as a consequence of these measures, it remains fragile” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). There is universal suffrage in Jordan, although active members of the army and security forces are not permitted to vote. There are quotas for women in both national parliamentary and sub-national council elections, but women have generally fared poorly in both outside of the quota system. In the 2016 parliamentary elections, five women were elected Deputies outside of the quotas, while in the 2017 local elections, only four women won governorate council seats beyond those reserved for women. There have been modest recent improvements in the numbers of women candidates running for office (10% of all candidates in 2013 versus 20% in 2016), but these have not generally translated to electoral gains for women candidates. Cultural prejudices remain the main obstacle to women’s full participation in practice (Freedom House, 2018a). As of 2016, Jordan had 31 recognized political parties, which fall into four broad categories: Islamist parties, Arab nationalists, leftists and national conservatives. The largest of these groups is Islamists and the largest and best organized of the Islamist parties is the Islamic Action Front (IAF), which has boycotted Jordan’s most recent parliamentary elections until 2016. In 2016, the IAF partnered with several other parties to form the National Coalition for Reform (NCR). Although the NCR won the most seats of any political party, independent candidates won a far greater percentage of overall seats and the NCR won fewer seats than the IAF had won on its own during the last election in which it participated (2003). Despite the relatively high number of political parties, very few have organizational strength, and in a recent USAID-sponsored poll, three-quarters of respondents did not know the name of any political party (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018; Center for Insights in Survey Research, 2018). To date, Jordanian voters have continued to predominantly vote for independent candidates based upon familial, tribal, or ethnic ties, or for local development (Singh, 2017). The 2016 parliamentary elections were implemented without violence and were deemed by international monitors to be free and fair. However, voter turnout was far lower (31%) than it had been in previous elections, including 2013 (58%) (IFES, 2019). Turnout was also uneven in several important respects. Post-election surveys noted that turnout was low among young people, who expressed apathy at the electoral process, and among urban dwellers, possibly reflecting the continued gerrymandering that dilutes the voting power of this constituency (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2017; Freedom House, 2018a). For example, turnout in the rural Southern Badia district was 83%, whereas turnout in Amman was only 23.5% (OECD, 2017). 10 | USAID/JORDAN USAID.GOV
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES
• While women have universal suffrage, the proportion of female parliamentarians remains low,
with most of the seats held by women required by the quota system. Continued cultural
prejudices against women serving in these roles serves as a de facto ceiling on increased
representation by women absent increases in the quota (Freedom House, 2018a).
• Political parties are largely poorly managed and organized. As a result, they have not to date
been effective in persuading voters and capturing elected positions – most of which still tend to
be filled by independent candidates based upon tribal considerations (Bertelsmann Stiftung,
2018).
• The very low turnout of the 2016 parliamentary election suggests that voters are apathetic
about the democratic process as it currently exists. There is reason to believe that the relative
weakness of elected officials (vis-à-vis the executive) and the disproportionate representation of
rural areas are contributing factors.
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS
The USAID Elections and Political Processes Project (2017-2020) encourages and enables more
pluralistic and representative political competition in Jordan by strengthening the foundation for political
participation and democratic development throughout the Kingdom. This project is a successor to the
Consortium for Elections and Political Processes Strengthening (CEPPS) program, which ran from 2010-
2017, with the goal of “strengthening the development of more democratic and open political processes
and the participation of candidates, activists, monitors, and voters in elections.”
A 2018-2019 evaluation found that CEPPS and its successor contributed to the stated goal and that the
IEC was more capable of election administration. However, the evaluation recommended continuing
support to electoral governance in Jordan, specifically in the areas of political party development, greater
civil society engagement and increasing engagement by women, youth and persons with disabilities. The
evaluation also recommended the adoption of a more collaborative approach with parliament.
RULE OF LAW
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The Jordanian legal framework does not delineate clear relationships between the executive, legislative
and judiciary branches. Power is concentrated within the role of the King, who can unilaterally dissolve
parliament and has strong influence over the appointment of judges at all levels. The Kingdom has four
main types of courts: constitutional, civil, religious and special courts that rule on issues related to the
military and security. The King may unilaterally appoint the members of the Constitutional Court and
the chair of the Judicial Council, an institution composed primarily of senior judiciary members that
nominates judges for the civil court system (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018).
The Jordanian civil court system hears all civil and criminal matters that do not fall under either religious
or special courts. It is composed of a hierarchy of courts hearing matters of increasing significance, as
well as courts of appeal. The religious courts in Jordan have jurisdiction solely over personal matters.
These include areas of family law such as marriage or divorce, child custody, adoption, and inheritance
USAID.GOV STRATEGIC SYNTHESIS | 11matters. While there are courts for different religious groups, the primary religious courts are Sharia (Islamic law) courts—which handle personal status matters for Muslims. Judges of both the civil and Sharia courts are formally appointed by royal decree (Freedom House, 2018a). The Jordanian civil legal framework does not apply protections equitably across all citizens. Specifically, women are disadvantaged in several respects. In family law, it is more “difficult for women to acquire custody of children in the event of a divorce, and the law does not recognize marriages between Muslim women and non-Muslim men, although such unions between Muslim men and non-Muslim women are recognized” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018:13) Women are also disadvantaged in property rights and do not have equal access to property under Sharia-based inheritance rules (Freedom House, 2018a). Likewise, Jordan’s large non-citizen population, which includes approximately 350,000 children of Jordanian mothers, do not receive equal protection under the law. Non-citizens face restricted rights to work, own property, travel from and return to Jordan (where many were born and live), access public education and health care, and acquire a driver’s license (Human Rights Watch, 2018). This issue is most prominent for the children of non-Jordanian Palestinian fathers that have lived in the country for decades. In the criminal system, authorities have broad discretion in the use of pre-trial detention. Governors are empowered to impose administrative detention for a period of up to one year and police may hold suspects without charge for up to six months. While changes to the law enacted in 2017 were intended to limit the use of these measures, in practice they remain common. Individuals continue to be held for lengthy periods prior to trial, and the non-legal application of force (including torture) by police and security forces continues without accountability. Prison conditions are generally poor, and inmates reportedly suffer from beatings and other abuse by guards (Freedom House, 2018a). Overall, public trust in the legal system is weak, with the Arab Transformations Project registering a trust rating of 44.7% (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). OPEN GOVERNMENT There is relatively little transparency in governance. The laws regarding public access to information are vague, do not provide procedural guidance and contain many exceptions to disclosure (OECD, 2017; Freedom House, 2018a). In general, there are few requirements for proactive disclosures by government and few avenues for the public to request and receive information. Although the constitution guarantees freedom of speech and expression, media laws in fact are applied restrictively (and arbitrarily) both to censor publication of unfavorable views and to promote self- censorship (Freedom House, 2016). Various laws penalize criticism of the royal family or state institutions or actions that harm Jordan’s foreign relations and attempts to loosen the restrictions posed by these laws have met with resistance. For instance, a 2014 law was passed to limit the ability of the quasi-military State Security Court to try citizens and journalists for crimes related to freedom of expression. Amendments to the anti-terrorism laws later in the year, however, loosened the definition of terrorism and restored the ability of State Security Court to prosecute journalists for acts that “threaten the country’s relations to foreign states or expose the country or its citizens to retaliatory acts on them or their money” (Freedom House, 2018b). In a similar scenario, while the Press and Publication Law prohibits jailing journalists for press offenses, the 2015 Cybercrime Law allows journalists to be imprisoned if offending print articles appear online, thereby rendering the immunity of journalists irrelevant with respect to the primary means of dissemination (Freedom House, 2018b). 12 | USAID/JORDAN USAID.GOV
These restrictions are not merely theoretical, although to date the purpose of the restrictions seems to
be to instill a chilling effect on the press. In 2015, a number of Jordanian journalists were arrested for
their coverage of the Syrian conflict and the Islamic State militant group. Although most of these
journalists were released after brief detentions, subsequent surveys of the press indicate that most
journalists (upwards of 90%) practice self-censorship when reporting on topics such as the royal court,
the armed forces, the judicial system and religious issues (Freedom House, 2018b).
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES
• The legal framework does not apply equal rights to women or to Jordan’s large populations of
non-citizens in critical areas of property, access to public services and the right to work.
• The police and authorities maintain broad discretion to hold imprison individuals for longer
periods of time without charge. This is compounded by the lack of accountability of the police
and security forces for the use of torture and mistreatment.
• The legal framework provides minimal protections for the press, and the arbitrary application of
statutory authority to censure the press further limits the already minimal transparency of
governing authority.
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS
The USAID Rule of Law and Public Accountability Strengthening (ROLPAS) activity (2015-2020)
strengthens democratic accountability and effective rule of law through improved institutions, systems
and processes and increased civic and private sector participation. Specifically, ROLPAS focuses on
enhancing judicial independence and effectiveness, strengthening GOJ accountability and transparency,
and increasing public demand for accountability, transparency, rule of law, and protection of human
rights.
GOVERNMENT CAPACITY AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Jordan is a highly centralized, unitary state with two levels of sub-national government – governorates
and municipalities. The central government provides most basic services, including water, electricity, gas,
sewerage, primary education and healthcare. These are provided through line ministry directorates at
the governorate level (OECD, 2017). Governorates and municipalities, by contrast, play a very limited
role in providing public services, have few financial resources and little political power (OECD, 2017).
However, this may be changing with the approval of the 2015 Decentralization Law and Municipality
Law.
There are several Jordanian government institutions responsible for the management and oversight of
the public sector at the central level. The Department of Institutional Performance Development and
Policies under the administrative system of the Prime Minister is responsible for coordinating the
Jordanian government strategy on and management of the public sector. It replaces the Ministry of
Public Sector Development, which was abolished in late 2018. Jordan’s Civil Service Bureau is entrusted
with applying laws and rules pertaining to civil service recruitment and selection, developing processes
for such functions, and collecting statistics to build databases for human resources management (Jreisat,
2018).
USAID.GOV STRATEGIC SYNTHESIS | 13Government administrative capacity is relatively low at all levels of government, especially when viewed
in terms of the government’s effectiveness in delivering services to the public. One contributing factor
to low government capacity is the tremendous growth of the Jordanian population. According to
World Bank data, the population of Jordan in 2000 was 5.1 million people. Today, the population is over
9.7 million, and a significant proportion of this population consists of refugees from the region (World
Bank, 2019a). This dramatic increase in population has understandably strained the delivery of public
services (OECD, 2017).
Another factor may be the roles of nepotism and patronage in civil service staffing. This issue was
prominent in 2016, as correspondence between the Prime Minister and the Speaker of Parliament
discussing the appointment of parliamentary staff became public. An ensuing investigation by the Jordan
Times demonstrated that many of the individuals staffing parliament were either sons or other relatives
of parliamentary members (Jreisat, 2018). The problems of nepotism and patronage are believed to be
widespread across government. This both negatively impacts public confidence in the civil service and
“inhibits the development of needed knowledge and skills among public employees to build institutional
capacity” (Jreisat, 2018: 88).
Finally, the Jordanian civil service lacks technical and managerial skills, especially with respect to planning
and development processes, and especially at the sub-national level. This may be a function of the highly
centralized nature of decision-making, which places relatively little emphasis on the development of
institutional processes and roles. “Management fails because what needs to be done, by whom, and at
what cost are not defined” (Jreisat, 2018: 787).
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES
• The adoption of the 2015 Decentralization Law and the Municipality Law (discussed in the Local
Governance section below) vest Governorates and Municipalities with additional responsibilities
for which institutional capacity has not been developed. Challenges will include defining
responsibilities and developing managerial and technical competence (OECD, 2017).
• USAID’s recent CITIES (Cities Implementing Transparent, Innovative & Effective Solutions)
Evaluation Baseline Study found that local councils have no resources and are generally unclear
about their role in local governance, while governorate councils are still determining their roles
vis-à-vis municipalities and central ministries. In addition, a rapid assessment of CITIES
conducted in early 2019 found that while the project is generally in a positive position to further
support effective decentralization the GOJ policy agenda for decentralization is unclear and
subject to change. This uncertainty poses a risk for continued support to decentralization.
• The recent scandals involving nepotism and patronage reflect the lack of transparency in civil
service recruitment and hiring. The lack of merit-based hiring and appointment will continue to
limit administrative effectiveness and professionalism.
LOCAL GOVERNANCE
Each of Jordan’s twelve governorates is headed by a governor appointed by the King and responsible to
the Ministry of Interior. Each governorate contains Directorates that are extensions of the country’s line
ministries. While there have been some movements towards making the governorates more responsive
to the needs of local populace, the system remains highly centralized – politically, administratively and
financially.
14 | USAID/JORDAN USAID.GOVThere are over 100 municipalities with distinct legal authority and some measure of autonomy, having
the right to levy and collect a limited range of local taxes and fees. These municipalities are supervised
by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. Municipalities hold regular elections and the majority of local
councils are democratically elected. With the exception of Amman, the mayors of these municipalities
are also elected. Municipalities are, for the most part, institutionally weak, and many responsibilities
remain vested in centrally-controlled agencies (World Bank, 2017). While recent changes in the law
have increased the autonomy of municipal governments, they remain highly reliant on central
government for fiscal transfers to support their operations – overall, only about 22% of total revenue is
collected by the municipality itself (OECD, 2017).
In 2015, the government passed two major laws intended to provide greater autonomy and authority to
local governments. The 2015 Decentralization Law created new institutions within the governorate,
including an executive council and a governorate council, the latter of which is substantially popularly
elected, and which is supposed to provide greater levels of legislative oversight over executive functions.
The Decentralization Law also expanded the role of the Local Development Units (LDUs), which were
established in 2002 to promote socio-economic development in the municipalities and governorates
across the country. LDUs are now responsible to develop proposals based upon the needs of their
constituents following consultation with local stakeholders, such as Civil Society Organizations (CSO)s
and non-governmental groups (OECD, 2017).
The 2015 Decentralization Law represents a step in Jordan’s gradual devolution of power. However, the
results of these laws to date has been greater scope for advisory responsibilities of local entities, while
political power remains vested centrally. For example, while there is greater scope for the popular
election of governorate officials, the executive council of each governorate – including the governor,
deputy governor, district officials, and heads of each ministry’s local executive offices – are still
appointed and answerable to the Ministry of Interior (Sowell, 2017a). In addition, governorate
institutions do not have authority to raise revenues, making them wholly dependent on the central
government for resources.
A similar dynamic is apparent with the 2015 Municipalities Law. The law allows for greater
democratization through the election of municipal councils and mayors – except in Amman where the
mayor continues to be appointed. “However, in the absence of political and financial autonomy, the role
of municipalities remains limited. Moreover, previous experience suggests that there is a gap between
the responsibilities assigned in the laws and the functions exercised in practice (i.e. delivery of public
services)” (OECD, 2017: 9). Furthermore, there are also gaps within the legal framework related to the
Decentralization and Municipalities Laws yet to be addressed by the GOJ.
Enthusiasm for the devolution process, or at least the manner in which it is being conducted, appears to
be muted. Turnout for the 2017 municipal elections was only 31.7% (IFES, 2019). Polling conducted after
the election revealed that a significant majority of the population did not know the main purpose of
decentralization and did not know that provincial and municipal councils were now democratically
elected (Center for Insights in Survey Research, 2017).
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES
• Despite recent steps to devolve authority, Jordan remains highly centralized. Local government
units continue to be primarily answerable to central government, both because of the continuing
hold on political authority by central actors and because all (in the case of governorates) or
USAID.GOV STRATEGIC SYNTHESIS | 15most (in the case of municipalities) resources available to local governments derive from the
center.
• Provincial and municipal governments have limited capacity, which will hinder the greater
devolution of power and responsibility to these institutions.
• The Jordanian public largely does not understand the purpose of the devolution process, the
scope for popular election of subnational government officials or the authorities granted to
provincial and municipal actors.
USAID PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS
The USAID CITIES project aims to increase the effectiveness of municipal governance and support
decentralization in Jordan through four sub-goals: improved service delivery, increased sustainability of
municipal and decentralized government operations, increased responsiveness to citizen priorities and
enhanced capacity to promote community cohesion and resilience. USAID’s recent CITIES impact
evaluation baseline study (March 2019) found that: (a) Municipalities suffer from significant structural
burdens that impair the provision of quality services to citizens; (b) More time will be needed to
determine the sustainability of specific CITIES interventions, but a number of risks to sustainability are
evident; and (c) There has been some initial coordination between CITIES and other donor activities,
but there are salient gaps to overcome in overall donor coordination and synergy.
ANTI-CORRUPTION
Corruption continues to have a significant negative effect on perceptions of the public sector by
Jordanians and on views of Jordan as a destination of foreign direct investment. In a recent public
opinion poll, corruption was cited as the fifth biggest problem facing Jordan today (Center for Insights in
Survey Research, 2018). However, recent reforms to improve the legal framework for combating
corruption, combined with a relatively high number of ongoing corruption cases by new institutions,
suggests an earnest attempt to combat corruption within the Kingdom.
Corruption in Jordan manifests itself in many ways. The most common form of corruption faced by
most Jordanians is the practice known as wasta, or the use of connections to advance professional and
business interests. This continues to be seen as part of doing business for many Jordanians. In a recent
poll, 49% of respondents stated that they viewed this practice as either “fully acceptable” or “somewhat
acceptable” (Center for Insights in Survey Research, 2018). However, the recent high-profile scandal
involving parliamentary jobs being given to the close relatives of parliamentarians suggests that the
practice is increasingly (or at least widely in this context) seen to be illegitimate (Bertelsmann Stiftung,
2018).
There is also evidence of significant corruption in the awarding of public contracts, where surveys
identify competitive disadvantages in the procurement process, including inconsistencies in the
application of award criteria on bidders, disregard of procedures for changing tender documents during
the tender, and unsatisfactory responses to inquiries regarding tenders (SIGMA 2016). There also exists
a perception by the public of encountering corruption (e.g. bribery) when dealing with the police, the
judiciary and the tax authorities (U.S. Department of State, 2018).
While the Jordanian Anti-Corruption Commission was established in 2004, it has not been a highly
effective institution for most of its existence. The prosecution of corruption by the Commission was
sporadic and arbitrary and has not led to confidence among the public (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). In
2016, Prime Minister al-Mulki announced a new anti-corruption initiative, “The National Strategy for
16 | USAID/JORDAN USAID.GOVIntegrity and Anti-Corruption 2017-2025.” As part of this initiative, the government merged the Anti-
Corruption Commission with the Audit Bureau to form the Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption
Commission (JIACC). The JIACC is now the main body responsible for combating corruption, although
the Anti-Money Laundering Unit is responsible for combating money laundering. In addition, the
Ombudsman Bureau continues to receive and investigate public complaints about corruption and
misconduct by public officials (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018).
The progress of the JIACC in prosecuting corruption is not clear at this time, but there are promising
developments. The JIACC took on 30 ongoing cases of alleged corruption from the Anti-Corruption
Commission, and there appears to be an increase in the number of investigations by the institution. In
addition, several high-ranking government officials have recently been indicted for corruption. The
former Water and Irrigation Minister and the former Director of Customs, among other officials, have
recently been indicted for bribery and abuse of power as part of a cigarette smuggling enterprise
(Associated Press, 2019). While these developments are welcome, the successful prosecution of high-
ranking officials remains rare and “some local observers questioned the JIACC’s effectiveness due to its
limited jurisdiction, insufficient staff [and] legal obstacles” (U.S. Department of State, 2018).
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES
• Public attitudes towards some forms of corruption are lax. Specifically, the practice of using
personal and familial connections as a means of obtaining jobs and contracts is seen as legitimate
by roughly half of the population.
• The recent emphasis on combating corruption espoused by the King and high government
officials will need to be matched by an additional commitment in terms of staff and resources for
the main anti-corruption institutions.
• The restrictions on the free exercise of the press, including strict defamation laws, continue to
hinder investigative journalism – one of the main avenues through which public corruption could
be brought to light.
CIVIL SOCIETY
Civil society in Jordan has expanded dramatically during the last decade, and especially since the
enactment of the 2008 Law on Societies, which limited government engagement in organizational affairs
and loosened restrictions on CSO activities. Over the last decade, the number of officially registered
CSOs has more than tripled from approximately 1,500 in 2008 to over 5,100 by 2016 (USAID, 2016a;
INCL, 2019). While the legal regulatory framework has improved, there remain structural obstacles to
the operations of CSOs that are compounded by organizational weaknesses within the CSO community.
The 2008 Law on Societies, as amended, simplified registration procedures for civil society, many of
which are focused on charitable and aid activities. However, bureaucratic obstacles remain that limit the
activities of independent CSOs – although Royal NGOs and Government NGOs benefit from the
financial support and operational freedom granted by the authorities (OECD, 2017).
There are several significant restrictions faced by CSOs, including:
• CSOs are prohibited from receiving foreign funding absent the approval of the Ministry of Social
Development, which also has broad powers to supervise CSO operations and activities. These
USAID.GOV STRATEGIC SYNTHESIS | 17powers are not exercised transparently and, in 2017, the Ministry denied funding requests and
issued warnings to dozens of CSOs (INCL, 2019).
• The Law on Societies prohibits CSOs from engaging in political activities, although the law does
not provide a definition of “political.” Such vague terminology invites government discretion and
potentially subjects societies to a chilling effect in their expressive activity (INCL, 2019).
• In April 2017, the Council of Ministers stated that the Anti-Money Laundering Law and
Counter-Terrorism Financing Law of 2007 would apply to NGOs, thus requiring them to verify
information about their “customers” – a vague term in this context which could apply to funders
or beneficiaries. While concerns about the influence of terrorist organizations are not
unreasonable, the lack of clarity on the application of the law poses a potentially chilling effect
on CSOs (Freedom House, 2018b).
• Jordanian law makes it a criminal offense to make defamatory or libelous expressions – which
the Penal Code defines as “attaching false accusations to a person or treating a person
disrespectfully through speech, writing, drawings, and other forms of communication.”
Defamation or libel of government officials carries more severe penalties, ranging from two
weeks to three years of imprisonment. “Under Jordan’s Cybercrimes Law, amended in 2018,
these offenses along with ‘hate speech,’ if conveyed online, are subject to even steeper penalties
than under the Penal Code.” These consequences likewise pose a chilling effect on CSOs (INCL,
2019).
In addition to the structural challenges faced by CSOs in Jordan, the reliance by independent CSOs on
donor funding has created an incentive structure that has limited the development of these
organizations. The 2016 USAID Civil Society Assessment found that “civil society remains donor-driven
and donor-dependent. Most CSOs are established first and foremost to access donor funding. As a
result, they lack a clear mission and an organic connection to the communities or constituencies they
claim to serve. Instead, they react to the priorities of donors and thus tend to be project- or activity-
driven” (USAID, 2016b: 7).
CSOs also have limited organizational capacity, especially in the areas of strategic planning, advocacy and
fundraising (outside the strict confines of donor grant funding). The Civil Society Assessment found that
CSOs lack the capacity to effectively conceptualize programmatic responses to the needs and issues
they identify as well as the ability to implement projects. The advocacy component of civil society
remains underdeveloped with CSOs insufficiently specialized and working on a vast array of activities.
(USAID, 2016b). A critical requirement for the development of a robust civil society will be orienting
CSOs towards domestic constituencies and building their domestic legitimacy.
SECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES
• The legal and regulatory framework for CSOs in Jordan lacks clarity, which potentially subjects
CSOs to penalties for a variety of potentially legitimate activity and has a chilling effect that
hinders their representation of domestic constituencies.
• CSOs remain oriented towards the priorities of western donors who are their primary funders.
The sustainability of these organizations will require the development of a domestic
constituency and funding base.
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