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EU2020 essay

 Willing and able?
EU defence in 2020

        ★

 Daniel Keohane
and Tomas Valasek
about the CER
The Centre for European Reform is a think-tank devoted to improving the quality of the debate on
the European Union. It is a forum for people with ideas from Britain and across the continent to
discuss the many political, economic and social challenges facing Europe. It seeks to work with
similar bodies in other European countries, North America and elsewhere in the world.
                                                                                                                                               Willing and
The CER is pro-European but not uncritical. It regards European integration as largely beneficial
but recognises that in many respects the Union does not work well. The CER therefore aims to
promote new ideas for reforming the European Union.                                                                                            able?
                                                                                                                                               EU defence in 2020
                                                  Director: CHARLES GRANT
                                                    ADVISORY BOARD

PERCY BARNEVIK........................................ Board member, General Motors and Former Chairman, AstraZeneca
ANTONIO BORGES..................................................................................................... Former Dean of INSEAD
NICK BUTLER (CHAIR)...................... Director, Centre for Energy Security & Sustainable Development, Cambridge
IAIN CONN ................................... Group Managing Director and Chief Executive, Refining & Marketing, BP p.l.c.
LORD DAHRENDORF .......................... Former Warden of St Antony’s College, Oxford & European Commissioner
VERNON ELLIS............................................................................................ International Chairman, Accenture
RICHARD HAASS.................................................................................. President, Council on Foreign Relations
LORD HANNAY.................................................................................... Former Ambassador to the UN & the EU
LORD HASKINS .......................................................................................... Former Chairman, Northern Foods
FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG................................................ Senior Adviser, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique
LORD KERR............................... Chairman, Imperial College London and Deputy Chairman, Royal Dutch Shell plc
CAIO KOCH-WESER................................................................................ Vice Chairman, Deutsche Bank Group
FIORELLA KOSTORIS PADOA SCHIOPPA............................................... Professor, La Sapienza University, Rome
RICHARD LAMBERT........................................................ Director General, The Confederation of British Industry
PASCAL LAMY......................................................... Director General, WTO and Former European Commissioner
DAVID MARSH.......................................................................................... Chairman, London & Oxford Group
DOMINIQUE MOÏSI................................................ Senior Adviser, Institut Français des Relations Internationales
JOHN MONKS.............................................................. General Secretary, European Trade Union Confederation
BARONESS PAULINE NEVILLE-JONES......................... National Security Adviser to the leader of the oppposition
CHRISTINE OCKRENT...................................................................................... Editor in chief, France Télévision
STUART POPHAM............................................................................................. Senior Partner, Clifford Chance
WANDA RAPACZYNSKI....................................................... Former President of Management Board, Agora SA
LORD ROBERTSON............................ Deputy Chairman, Cable and Wireless and Former Secretary General, NATO
KORI SCHAKE................................................................................................ Senior Policy Advisor, McCain 08
                                                                                                                                               Daniel Keohane and
LORD SIMON ........................................................... Former Minister for Trade and Competitiveness in Europe
PETER SUTHERLAND....................................................... Chairman, BP p.l.c. and Goldman Sachs International
                                                                                                                                               Tomas Valasek
LORD TURNER ....................................................................... Non-executive Director, Standard Chartered PLC
ANTÓNIO VITORINO...................................................................................... Former European Commissioner

Published by the Centre for European Reform (CER), 14 Great College Street, London, SW1P 3RX
Telephone +44 20 7233 1199, Facsimile +44 20 7233 1117, info@cer.org.uk, www.cer.org.uk
© CER JUNE 2008 ★ ISBN 978 1 901229 84 4
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
                                                                                                                  Contents
Daniel Keohane is a research fellow at the EU Institute for Security
Studies. He was previously a senior research fellow at the Centre for
European Reform, and a research associate at the Institute for
National Strategic Studies, National Defence University in Washington
DC. His previous CER publications include ‘The EU and counter-                                                    About the authors
terrorism’, May 2005; (as co-author) ‘A European way of war’, May
2004; and ‘The EU and armaments co-operation’, December 2002.                                                     Authors’ acknowledgements

Tomas Valasek is director of foreign policy and defence at the Centre                                             1   Introduction                                     1
for European Reform. He previously worked as policy director and
head of the security and defence policy at the Slovak Ministry of                                                 2   EU defence in 2020                              5
Defence. His previous CER publications include ‘France, NATO and
                                                                                                                  3   The EU, NATO and the US in 2020                 17
European defence’, May 2008; ‘The roadmap to better EU-NATO
relations’, December 2007; and (as co-author) ‘Preparing for the                                                  4   European military capabilities                  25
multipolar world: European foreign and security policy in 2020’,
December 2007.                                                                                                    5   Conclusion: Three things the EU should do now   41

AUTHORS’ ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Daniel Keohane would like to thank Sophie de Vaucorbeil for her help
with research, and Giovanni Grevi for his useful feedback. Tomas
Valasek would like to thank his colleagues at the CER for their
comments on earlier drafts, especially Bobo Lo and Charles Grant,
and to Kate Meakins for design and layout. The views expressed
within and any errors are, of course, the authors’ alone.

We are grateful to the German Marshall Fund of the United States for
supporting this publication.

                                                     ★

Copyright of this publication is held by the Centre for European Reform. You may not copy, reproduce, republish
or circulate in any way the content from this publication except for your own personal and non-commercial use.
Any other use requires the prior written permission of the Centre for European Reform.
1 Introduction

What is EU defence? In principle, defence forms only one part of the
European Union’s foreign and security policy. This policy uses a wide
range of tools from diplomats and development workers to judges
and police, and – when necessary – soldiers. The EU works on the
assumption that terrorism or collapsing states cannot be tackled
using only military means. The European Union’s broad approach to
international security is more similar to that of the United Nations
than to NATO, which has a much narrower approach. The alliance
mainly uses military resources, although it 1 House of Commons Hansard
strives to work with non-military debates, response by Desmond
organisations. As the British defence Browne MP to parliamentary
minister, Des Browne, put it: “Working with question from    Liam Fox MP,
                                              January 21st 2008,
our EU partners comprehensively, we have http://www.publications.
an opportunity to bring to bear capabilities parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/
that NATO does not have and is unlikely cmhansrd/cm080121/
ever to have.”1                               debtext/80121-0002.htm.

In practice, the European security and defence policy (ESDP) is a
crisis management policy, helping to prevent conflict and re-build
societies emerging from war. Since its first peacekeeping operation in
2003, the EU has completed or is carrying out around 20 ESDP
missions. They have been relatively small in size; the largest was a
7,000-strong peacekeeping operation in Bosnia (which now numbers
2,500). But the smaller missions – like the one that prevented ethnic
conflict in Macedonia – have been among the most useful.

Their complexity and range has been interesting, too. The EU has
helped reform the Congolese army and the Georgian judicial system;
train Afghan and Iraqi police forces; monitor the Rafah border
2                                       Willing and able? EU defence in 2020   Introduction                                                             3

                                                                                                                                   3
                                                                                                                                     Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni
    crossing in Gaza; and oversee the implementation of a peace                    neighbourhood mean that the EU’s already
                                                                                                                                   Grevi, ‘The new global puzzle –
    agreement in Aceh in Indonesia.                                                challenging security agenda could be more       what world for the EU in
                                                                                   difficult by 2020, and new risks will surely    2025?’, European Union
    Demand for EU action is growing. In February 2008, EU                          emerge (see chapter two).3                      Institute for Security Studies,
    governments ordered 1,800 police, judges and customs officials to                                                              October 2006.
    Kosovo, where they are to operate alongside 16,000 NATO                        Second, the EU will increasingly have to assume roles previously
    peacekeepers, to help prevent a return to violence in that country.            played in and around Europe by the United States. The US is thinly
    They also started deploying a peacekeeping force to Eastern Chad,              stretched by the demands of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the
    which will be composed of 3,700 soldiers. Later in 2008 the EU will            medium term it will not be as willing as in the past to take on new
    help to reform the Guinea Bissau army and police forces.                       military responsibilities.4 When and if it does, these are unlikely to
                                                                                   focus on Europe or its neighbourhood. US 4 See Kori Schake, ‘The US
    For all these notable achievements, the EU has not yet carried out a           military priorities these days are not in the elections and Europe: The com-
    military operation on anything like the scale of the NATO operation            Balkans or North Africa, but in Asia and ing crisis of high expectations’,
                                                                                                                                 CER essay, November 2007.
    in Afghanistan or the UN mission in Congo. For instance, NATO is               the Middle East.
    leading 43,000 soldiers in Afghanistan, some of whom are fighting
    in extremely dangerous conditions, while the UN has 16,600                     While no future security challenge can be resolved by force alone, on
    peacekeepers in Congo. It may be that the EU does not need to carry            occasion EU governments may need to deploy robust armed forces.
    out military operations of a similar size and nature to the UN or              For instance, the experience of multinational peacekeeping in places
    NATO. Perhaps it will continue concentrating mainly on smaller                 such as Afghanistan, Lebanon and Somalia has shown that well-
    humanitarian and state-building operations for many years to come,             intentioned missions can quickly turn into situations that resemble
    for which there is already considerable demand. But looking to                 war-fighting. Or the EU may need to intervene in a nearby country
    2020, this assumption seems risky for at least two reasons.                    with a large-scale force to separate sides in a civil war, or to prevent
                                                                                   a humanitarian crisis. If it were really necessary, would the EU be
2
 European Council, ‘A secure   First, the world in and around Europe               prepared to fight? No one knows, since the EU has not yet carried
Europe in a better world –     may well be a more dangerous place by               out combat missions.
European Security Strategy’,   2020. The threats identified in the
December 12th 2003.
                               European security strategy (ESS), a                 And even if the EU governments were 5 European Defence Agency,
    document agreed by EU governments in 2003, remain unresolved.2                 willing to fight, would they be able? The ‘European - United States
    The risk of the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has                EU-27 governments collectively spend defence expenditure in 2006’,
    probably increased, as has the demand for interventions on behalf of           S200 billion on defence.5 But despite these European Defence  Agency,
                                                                                                                               December 21st 2007,
    human rights (as in Darfur). The possibility of ethnically-motivated           hefty financial resources, Europeans do not http://www.eda.europa.eu/.
    violence remains high (in Kosovo, but also Bosnia and elsewhere).              have nearly enough soldiers with the
    Other challenges have become more salient since 2003 (climate                  necessary skills. The EU-27 governments have close to 2 million
    change, energy security) while some old ones, prematurely consigned            personnel in their armed forces, but they can barely deploy and
    to history, have returned (a nationalist Russia). An unstable mix of           sustain 100,000 soldiers around the globe. Many of the rest are
    demographic, economic and political pressures in Europe’s                      inexperienced draftees.
4                                         Willing and able? EU defence in 2020

Eurosceptics will scoff at the idea of a more assertive EU defence               2 EU defence in 2020
policy. When not accusing EU defence of being an anti-NATO plot,
they tend to say that Europeans lack the resources, and the will to
fight without the Americans. Conversely, another group of
Europeans fear that EU foreign policy is already becoming
‘militarised’. They do not want the EU to fight, and would prefer
that soldiers carried out nothing more than peacekeeping missions –              Under what conditions and where should EU governments be
if they must be used at all. But both eurosceptics and europacifists             prepared to use their armed forces in 2020? Europe should be worried
are missing the point.                                                           about the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), failing
                                                                                 states, terrorism and the possible re-emergence of major wars between
Europeans will increasingly have to take more responsibility for                 states by 2020. In fact it already is. The European security strategy
their own security, as they are doing in Bosnia. They will also                  outlines five key threats to European security: terrorism; proliferation
increasingly be asked to intervene to protect refugees, as they are              of WMD; regional conflicts; state failure; and organised crime. The
doing in Chad. They will probably frequently be asked to keep the                2003 ESS did not predict a major inter-state war involving European
peace in difficult places, like the Israeli-Lebanese border, where               governments. But since then, a resurgent, nationalist Russia has
Europeans lead a UN operation. European governments will                         threatened to point nuclear missiles at EU member-states, has used
probably have to carry out many more autonomous military                         military force against one neighbour, Georgia, and questioned the
operations in the future, especially in their turbulent neighbourhood.           territoral integrity of another, Ukraine. So the spectre of state-to-state
And sometimes those missions may not only involve peacekeeping,                  conflict needs to be considered too. The ESS also says that the EU
but also fighting. If they wish to meet these growing demands on                 cannot afford to be myopic – what happens in North Korea and
their defence policy in a more effective way by 2020, EU                         South Asia is of direct relevance to the EU.
governments have little choice: they are condemned to co-operate.
                                                                                 However, Europe cannot cope with all the potential threats facing
                                                                                 the world, nor should it aspire to. The US, similarly, does not plan
                                                                                 to intervene in every conflict around the world, and even if it wanted
                                                                                 to, it would not have the resources to act. As Frederick the Great
                                                                                 told his generals “to defend everything is to defend nothing”. If the
                                                                                 EU is to be effective in the future, it will need a clear sense of its
                                                                                 security priorities, and what it is prepared to do. It is much easier to
                                                                                 predict what the EU will not do. For example, the EU will not fight
                                                                                 wars in East Asia.

                                                                                 The EU should be most concerned about future developments in its
                                                                                 common neighbourhood with Russia, and in the broader Middle
                                                                                 East (including North Africa). By 2020, sub-Saharan Africa will be
                                                                                 increasingly important too, not only for humanitarian reasons, but
6                                          Willing and able? EU defence in 2020   EU defence in 2020                                                    7

also because it supplies energy to meet Europe’s growing demand,                  mid-1990s has tended to favour EU defence over NATO,
and because its poverty breeds terrorism. As the ESS puts it: “even               continues to contribute more personnel and money into NATO
in an era of globalisation, geography is still important”. Enlargement            than ESDP. 6 By 2020, this is likely to 6 Leo Michel, ‘Sarko’s window of
brings the EU closer to the arc of instability that runs around its               change somewhat. The trend in Europe opportunity’, European Voice,
                                                                                  is towards more common operations at June 28 2007.
                                                                                                                                  th
eastern, south-eastern and southern flanks. Romania and Bulgaria
joined the Union in 2007, while Croatia, Turkey and other countries               the expense of national ones (because of costs and higher
of the Western Balkans may enter in the coming decades. The EU                    legitimacy) and, where common operations are concerned,
will therefore have many weak and malfunctioning states close to its              towards more EU missions at the expense of NATO (in part
borders. It is bound to become more involved in countries such as                 because NATO is keen to shift responsibility for some of its
Belarus, Georgia and Moldova. Across the Atlantic, the US will                    operations to the EU). But non-EU missions will remain a part of
remain focused on countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and                   the mix.
North Korea, and potential conflicts such as China-Taiwan and
India-Pakistan. Washington will be reluctant to become too involved               ★ Europe’s neighbourhood with Russia
in conflicts around the EU’s eastern and southern flanks.
                                                                                  Russia’s own trajectory may take it into some form of a
The EU will need to develop a more effective set of policies for                  confrontation with the West by 2020. Over the past several years,
stabilising North Africa, the Balkans and the countries that lie                  the Putin government has behaved with increasing hostility to the
between its eastern border and Russia. Many of these policies will                United States and, to a lesser extent, Europe. Russia’s current
involve trade, aid and political dialogue. But the EU’s strategy for its          mindset can probably best be described as 19th century great power
neighbourhood will also have to include a military component.                     nationalism. Observers differ on whether this aggressive
Europeans should not expect the US to put out fires in their own                  nationalism is meant for domestic political audiences, or whether
backyard. After all, the principal rationale for the Anglo-French                 Russia really has an appetite for confrontation in the future (but
initiative at St Malo in 1998 – which begat the European security                 history shows that one often leads to the other). Equally, it is
and defence policy – was to improve on the EU’s poor performance                  unclear whether Russia’s tough rhetoric to 7 Christopher Langton et al,
in coping with the Balkan crises of the 1990s.                                    the West masks weakness or strength. ‘The military balance 2007’,
                                                                                  While Russia spends more on defence International Institute for
                                                                                                                                 Strategic Studies, 2007.
The EU’s efforts to tackle conflicts in its hinterland may require                (almost $60 billion) than Britain or
more than ‘mere’ peacekeeping. For example, if the delicate situation             France,7 its military is largely unreformed since the Soviet days, and
in Kosovo turned into a civil war someday, the EU should be ready                 Russian military sources themselves say much of the equipment is
to intervene with forces that could separate the warring factions. In             in a very poor shape. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov
such situations the British soldiers might be fighting alongside those            said in February 2008 that Russia’s fleet of military transport planes
from France, Germany, Italy and Spain, but not necessarily with                   is so old that none may be flying by 2015.8 8 RFE/RL Newsline, Vol.12, No
American troops.                                                                  It is possible that Russia is sounding tough 39. Part I, February 27th 2008
                                                                                  as a defensive move, to forestall what it http://www.rferl.org/newsline/
                                                                                                                                 2008/02/270208/asp.
Many European countries will continue to take part in operations                  may see as European or US challenges to
under the UN or NATO. Even France, whose diplomacy since the                      the post-Putin regime.
8                                          Willing and able? EU defence in 2020   EU defence in 2020                                                     9

    What is clear is that ‘Putinism’ in one shape or another, and its                resurgence could therefore put an onus on the EU to harmonise its
    associated foreign policy, is set to stay for a while, possibly until            military plans, standards and hardware with NATO, to avoid
    2020. The Russian military, though having wasted much – possibly                 duplication of resources.
    most – of the new funds Putin put in the defence budget, will grow
    stronger nonetheless. And both the EU and Russia would like to be                ★ The Middle East
    the dominant influence on the neighbourhood countries between
9 Charles Grant with Tomas
                              them. As Charles Grant wrote, Moscow                   By 2020 the peace process between Israel and the Palestinian
Valasek, ‘Preparing for the   “will see itself as competing … against the            territories may have advanced to the point of producing an
multipolar world:
                              EU (and the US) in the Southern Caucasus               independent Palestinian state. The probability of this happening is
European foreign and security
policy in 2020’, CER essay,   and in the countries that lie between itself           impossible to assess. After so many false starts, neither the Israeli
December 2007.                and the EU”.9                                          nor Palestinian leaders seem to believe in the possibility of peace
                                                                                     with much conviction. The international community, too, has been
   For the EU, this rivalry is likely to be more political than                      suffering from ‘Middle East fatigue’. But the conflict continues to
   military. Should Moscow overtly undermine the independence of                     radicalise Muslims across the world, and as such it impacts on
   countries like Georgia or Ukraine, the European Union would                       security globally. So periodically new attempts at peace appear, like
   probably respond by freezing relations, not by using military                     the US-organised Annapolis conference in 2007.
   force. Nevertheless, the EU should be ready to put troops into
   places like Moldova or Nagorno Karabakh, where the resolution                     If by 2020 the peace process yields an independent Palestinian
   of frozen conflicts may necessitate the deployment of a                           state, Israel may request international peacekeepers to be
   peacekeeping force. The EU will also have a strong role to play                   deployed on its borders. If so, the EU should be ready to send a
   reforming the armed forces of countries in the belt between the                   combined military and police force. Its job would be to prevent
   EU and Russia. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine will continue to                      weapons smuggling, and to stop rocket attacks on Israel. The EU
   need European money and expertise as they seek to reshape                         already runs an operation at the Rafah border crossing
   Soviet-era militaries into lighter, expeditionary forces capable                  (currently suspended because of the violence in Gaza), which
   of dealing with regional conflicts.                                               monitors the traffic between Egypt and Gaza. European soldiers
                                                                                     are also leading the UN peacekeeping mission on the Israeli-
   As for Russia itself, there is little, if any, military role for the EU.          Lebanese border.
   If the Europeans felt the need for military planning and operations
   with regard to Russia, they would probably prefer to act                          By 2020, the Middle East may have several new nuclear powers. If
   individually or through NATO rather than through the EU. But                      Iran acquires the capacity to build a nuclear weapon, which appears
   the EU would feel the impact nevertheless. If Russia were to                      to be its objective, it will likely prompt others in the region to follow
   threaten Europe, some EU member-states would prioritise NATO                      suit. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for instance, do not want Iran (a non-
   commitments over EU ones. This matters because defence budgets                    Arab country) to become the regional superpower.
   are stretched extremely thin. If governments devoted more
   resources to NATO territorial defence, they would have less                       But with each new nuclear power in the Middle East, the possibility
   available for EU peacekeeping missions. Russia’s military                         of a nuclear weapon ending up in the hands of terrorists increases.
10                                          Willing and able? EU defence in 2020                                                                      11

    Europe therefore will likely still be patrolling the sea passages from            ★ Oil, gas and Africa
    the Middle East to Europe, to intercept shipments of WMD or their
    component parts. The EU member-states are already doing so                        The European Commission says that by 2020 the EU will be
    through the international ‘proliferation security initiative’, which the          importing at least 70 per cent of the oil and gas it will consume.12
    US set up in 2003. Because the United States will probably want to                Russia, North and West Africa as well as 12 European Commission,
    keep up its military presence in the seas around the Middle East,                 the Middle East will supply almost all of ‘A European strategy for
    Europeans are likely to run their contributions either as a direct co-            these imports. Gas will be the most sustainable, competitive and
    operation with the US or through NATO, rather than through the                    sought-after commodity between now and secure energy’, March 8th 2006.
    EU. However, if the US needed the Europeans to take sole                          2020, and while Russia provides most of Europe’s supplies for
    responsibility for Mediterranean patrols in the future, they should be            now, by 2020 gas-rich Algeria is set to emerge as a key supplier,
    prepared to do so. One member of the European Parliament – and                    and join oil-exporting Nigeria as one of Europe’s most important
    former head of UN forces in Bosnia – Phillipe Morillon has                        energy providers.
    proposed that the EU should set itself “the medium-term objective
10
   European Parliament,           of providing support, with a European or            By 2020 the EU could be faced with the need to intervene militarily
‘Draft report on the new          even a Euro-Mediterranean fleet, for the            to protect these energy sources. Already, Nigeria’s oil fields and
European security and defence     US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, until          pipelines are regularly attacked by local forces hostile to the
architecture’, February 5th 2003. possibly taking over from it if the                 Nigerian government. The government has trouble projecting
                                  Americans so requested.”10                          authority throughout its territory, including places like the Niger
                                                                                      delta where some of the most important oil fields lie. So Western
    In 2020, the EU might also be more involved in Iraq than it is today              energy firms operating in the country have resorted to hiring large
    (it is currently training Iraqi police, judges and prison officers).              private security forces to protect their assets.
    The EU-27 and the European Commission have pledged S14.2
    billion worth of financial assistance to Iraq since 2003 (including               Algeria, an important gas source, has suffered a series of major
    grants, debt relief and loans). After years of seemingly endless                  terrorist attacks. Foreigners as well as pipelines have been
    violence, the US in 2008 had more success in pacifying Iraq. But to               targeted. In one such attack, on December 11th 2007, a double car
    build on these improvements Iraq will need more police and                        bomb attack killed over 30 people, including 17 employees of the
    military trainers, and possibly more combat troops. So the EU                     United Nations.
    needs to think again about its future strategy for Iraq. As Richard
11 Richard Gowan, ‘The EU and        Gowan of the US Center on International          Will the EU assume responsibility for helping to protect energy
Iraq: Starting to find a strategy?’, Co-operation has pointed out: “You can           supplies with force? It is bound to be a controversial question
European Council on Foreign          pull out of Iraq, but you can’t make the         because the EU would certainly be accused of trading blood for oil.
Relations, January 26th 2008.        problem go away.”11 If Iraq failed as a          And that is a politically powerful charge, one that could discourage
    state, it would destabilise the Middle East and greatly complicate                governments from sending troops. Many EU member-states are
    the EU’s relationship with key countries such as Iran and Turkey. So              reluctant to put militaries in any line of fire (see below). So Europe
    the EU may have to send more troops and trainers to Iraq in the                   will probably focus on strengthening local security forces rather
    coming years.                                                                     than deploying soldiers itself.
12                                          Willing and able? EU defence in 2020   EU defence in 2020                                                  13

   To a large degree the same principle holds true for EU humanitarian                (see chapter four). Critics of EU defence policy point to the
   interventions in Africa. Although the EU has deployed peacekeepers                 ‘cosmetic’ nature of some current EU missions, such as the 2006
   to protect refugees in Chad, it has prioritised building up African                deployment to Congo. They argue that the German-led force,
   military and police forces. This takes the form of expert advice,                  while intervening at one point to protect a presidential candidate
   financial assistance, equipment transfers or logistical help, such as              (and a few European diplomats) from crowd violence, in general
   lending transport planes. For example, the EU has supplied                         stayed far from harm’s way. The mission was more about
   equipment and expertise to the African Union peacekeeping                          “European form than African substance, comforting rhetoric than
   operation in Darfur. It has conducted three security sector reform                 relevant action”, Jean-Yves Haine and 14 Jean-Yves Haine and Bastian
   missions in Congo to help strengthen the country’s military and                    Bastian Giegerich concluded.14 Likewise, Giegerich, ‘In Congo, a cosmetic
   police, and it is about to do the same in Guinea Bissau. The EU has                US scholar and former senior State EU operation’, International
                                                                                      Department official, Kori Schake, has Herald Tribune, June 12 2006.
                                                                                                                                                            th
   also set up a ‘peace facility’ worth S250 million to finance
   peacekeeping operations managed by the African Union and other                     described the small-scale missions 15 Kori Schake, ‘An American
   sub-regional organisations.                                                        undertaken by the EU so far as “luxury eulogy for European defence.’
                                                                                      indulgences” because they are neither Anne Deighton and Victor
                                                                                      central to Europe’s security, nor sufficient Mauer, ‘Securing Europe?
   Will the EU fight wars?
                                                                                      to solve the problems in those crisis areas. Implementing the European
                                                                                                                                   security strategy’, Zürcher
     The EU has shown that it can act outside Europe. As outlined above,              Therefore the EU has “actually increased Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik
     it will probably have to deploy military forces abroad frequently in the         scepticism about its seriousness of Nr. 77 (Zurich contributions to
     future. Furthermore, the EU is working hard to improve its mix of                purpose rather than built a foundation for security policy), Center for
     military and non-military resources – such as police, judges and aid             more complex and more demanding Security Studies, Switzerland,
                                                                                                                                   2006.
     workers – for coping with crises. This makes sense since all                     undertakings”.15
     international security problems require a combination of policy
     responses. The reforms contained in the Lisbon treaty would help the             The critics are right: the use of force has been largely absent from
     EU to further develop its holistic approach to international security.           EU thinking on foreign and security policy to date. For this reason
13
   The Lisbon treaty would       The treaty – in limbo after Ireland voted            the authors of the European security strategy found it hard in 2003
create a European external       against it in a referendum in June 2008 –            to say anything clear on the subject. They concluded somewhat
action service, by merging those would merge some of the diplomatic and               vaguely that “with the new threats the first line of defence will often
parts of the Council of the      military power of the member-states with             be abroad”, and the EU should “develop a strategic culture that
European Union that deal with
foreign policy with the European
                                 the vast development assistance, state-              fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention”.
Commission’s directorate-general building and reconstruction resources of the
for external relations.          European Commission.13                               The European defence community has debated ever since the
                                                                                      strategy’s release whether ‘robust’ also means ‘using force’. Future
   But will the EU ever do more than peacekeeping? To date, the                       events may settle the question for them. If the need arises, for
   member-states have been very reluctant to send the EU into a                       example, to counter WMD proliferation in the Middle East, the
   war. It has become a cliché that Europe lacks the military                         likelihood is that the US would lead such missions. If the
   capabilities and the will to conduct large-scale combat operations                 Americans chose to be supported by an international military
14                                          Willing and able? EU defence in 2020   EU defence in 2020                                                      15

    coalition, NATO would probably be the lead institution. But if the                get involved in operations in Africa. His remark seems outdated,
    US were preoccupied with other security concerns in the world                     even ironic, now that Germany has led an EU operation in Congo
    (like North Korea), and if the Europeans were faced with a                        in 2006. But his general point holds true. The public will not always
    compelling terrorist or WMD threat in an area such as North                       be aware why EU missions in faraway places are important. If
16 The Presidency Conclusions      Africa, they might have no other option            disaster struck during an EU operation, 18 Richard Gowan, ‘Is the EU
from the Thessaloniki European     but to act alone. EU governments have              and there were a number of casualties, the ready to take casualties?’, The
                                                                                      commitment of those governments Globalist, September 15 2006,
                                                                                                                                                            th
Council, June 19th-20th 2003, say: committed themselves to use force to
“The European Council endorses stop WMD proliferation. The EU’s                                                                     http://www.theglobalist.com/Story
                                                                                      involved would be severely tested.18          Id.aspx?StoryId=5080.
the....declaration.…on non-
proliferation of weapons of mass
                                   WMD strategy, agreed by EU
destruction adopted by General     governments at the Thessaloniki summit             However, the responsibility for fighting – if the EU resorts to force
Affairs Council on June 16th       in June 2003, says that coercive measures          – would at any rate be spread unevenly. Some countries like France
2003”. This declaration mentions can be used – as a last resort – for                 and the UK are simply more willing to fight and more capable of
“as a last resort, coercive        preserving       international      non-           doing so. They would probably lead any high-intensity operations,
measures in accordance with the                           16
UN charter”.
                                   proliferation regimes.                             since they account for half of EU defence spending, have the most
                                                                                      advanced military capabilities, and have the most experience of
    The difficulty is that EU governments have very different military                leading high-intensity missions. Aside from contributing to various
    strengths, and diverse attitudes towards the use of military force.               military coalitions, Britain and France have acted alone. Britain sent
    Lawrence Freedman of King’s College London has argued that these                  troops to Sierra Leone in 2000, while France deployed soldiers to the
    differences mean that the EU would produce a dysfunctional                        Côte d’Ivoire in 2002.
    military doctrine – a necessary requirement before using force – if it
17 Lawrence Freedman, ‘Can the    tried to create one.17 Since the EU is now          The countries most willing and able to use force should lead a
EU develop an effective military  conducting peacekeeping operations,                 debate in the EU on when the European Union should fight wars.
doctrine?’, in ‘A European way of elements of an EU military doctrine for             That is not to suggest that the EU should be in the business of
war’, CER pamphlet, May 2004.     future missions are bound to emerge from            waging imperialistic campaigns, like Britain and France in the 19th
    these experiences. But peacekeeping is not the same as war-fighting.              century. The EU is not a super-state with its own zones of interest.
    Offensive operations bring up unique and difficult questions: how                 The public in Europe would not support that kind of EU defence
    many dead soldiers will the various countries tolerate? And how                   policy either.19 Rather the ‘war-fighting’ debate should be about if
    many civilian deaths are acceptable? The risk that the 27                         and under which circumstances the EU 19 Eurobarometer polls
    governments would disagree and thus produce a dysfunctional EU                    would have to use high-intensity military usually show high support for
    doctrine is high.                                                                 forces when intervening in another country EU defence policy per se, but
                                                                                      – for example to separate warring factions it is questionable how many
                                                                                                                                    Europeans actually know what
   Also, even if the EU had a military doctrine, member-states would                  in a civil war, or, in extremis, to stop the the EU is contributing to
   not necessarily share the same commitment to participate in EU                     proliferation of WMD.                         global security.
   operations. The former German defence minister, Volker Rühe,
   infamously remarked in the mid-1990s that the EU should not try                    Thinking about robust EU operations is important for three reasons.
   to “re-invent the Afrika Korps”, meaning that the EU should not                    First, Europe’s neighbourhood might become more unstable in the
16                                          Willing and able? EU defence in 2020

    coming years, and the EU may be forced to act. If EU governments are              3 The EU, NATO and the US in
    to manage future shocks, they should be prepared to discuss the full
    range of potential military responses. Second, it makes sound military
                                                                                        2020
    sense to be prepared for the worst. Even on relatively benign
    peacekeeping missions, there is always a chance that soldiers may
    come under attack and they need to be equipped and trained for such
    eventualities. Third, the point of EU defence policy should not be to
    improve ‘brand Europe’, or to generate a feel-good factor among                   There is no doubt that the EU and NATO will change considerably
    European bureaucrats. 20 If EU governments really do plan to                      by 2020. Both organisations will be coping with a new set of
    contribute more to international security, then they cannot avoid                 challenges to global security. Also, the membership of both
20
   Jean-Yves Haine and Bastian   discussing the use of force – or using force         organisations might grow in the future. The EU may have 30 or
Giegerich, ‘In Congo, a cosmetic when the circumstances absolutely require            more members by 2020, including Turkey. NATO could include
EU operation’, International     the EU to do so.                                     non-transatlantic countries like Australia or Japan. New members
Herald Tribune, June 12 2006.
                        th
                                                                                      would change both the strategic focus and internal politics of the EU
                                                                                      and NATO.

                                                                                      The future of NATO
                                                                                      NATO has found it difficult to adjust to the post-Cold War world.
                                                                                      It has survived by expanding into new types of missions (like
                                                                                      protecting human rights in Kosovo) and new regions (like
                                                                                      Afghanistan). However, the alliance is running short on useable
                                                                                      military forces, and allies are unwilling to underwrite new missions.
                                                                                      The Afghanistan operation in particular has shown allied solidarity
                                                                                      to be weak. Germany and France21 have been largely ignoring calls
                                                                                      from the US, Canada, UK and the 21 France announced in April
                                                                                      Netherlands to come to their help in 2008 that it would send 700
                                                                                      Afghanistan’s south, where the fighting has additional troops to Afghanistan
                                                                                                                                     – but not to the volatile south.
                                                                                      been at its most intense.

                                                                                      Another contentious issue between the allies is the informal
                                                                                      division of labour, in which the US fights wars and Europeans
                                                                                      send in peacekeepers to sort out the aftermath. The arrangement
                                                                                      leads many Europeans to suspect that the US is using NATO
                                                                                      missions as a means for getting European troops to serve
18                                           Willing and able? EU defence in 2020   The EU, NATO and the US in 2020                                        19

     American strategic interests.22 They point to the example of                       There may also be future threats that would revive NATO’s role in
     Afghanistan, where European governments complain they have                         defending Europe, as opposed to intervening elsewhere. If Iran
22
   William Pfaff, ‘A growing rift’, little influence over US policy in the              developed inter-continental missiles with nuclear warheads, the
International Herald Tribune,       country, despite providing thousands of             organisation would surely move to build missile defences. Since
February 11th 2008.                 peacekeepers. This division of labour is            NATO has already conducted studies in this area it would make
23
   The Times has even suggested     not sustainable. The US needs to do a               sense for the allies to develop their missile defences together.
that NATO needs to be               better job sharing control over missions            Likewise a more aggressive Russia may help to re-energise NATO’s
re-designed into two groups of      where Europeans are heavily involved.               territorial defence role. One point of friction could be the Arctic,
members: “The first tier countries
                                    And EU member-states need greater                   and its mineral resources. In 2007 Russia claimed control over a
would provide, and decide when
to deploy, properly equipped and military power, to counter US assertions               large part of the Arctic, arguing that it is a part of the Russian
operationally compatible fighting that Europe should be left out of                     landmass and that under international law it belongs to Moscow.
forces. Those unable or unwilling political decisions because, with few
to fight would make up a NATO exceptions (the British, French and the                   Russia’s claim to a large part of the Arctic challenges the territory
second tier, concentrating on aid
                                    Dutch), it tends to bring very little useful        and mineral resources of European countries themselves, particularly
and nation-building” (‘NATO II’,
The Times, February 8th 2008).      military force to the table.23                      Denmark and Norway (not an EU member-state but a NATO ally,
                                                                                        as well as an active participant in Europe’s security and defence
   Between now and 2020, NATO will act in those prospective                             policy). The size of the Arctic’s oil reserves is unclear but one US
   scenarios where neither the EU nor the US want to act alone                          geological survey estimates them to be around 50 billion barrels of
   (because they need additional force or legitimacy). This is                          oil or, as one analyst put it, “the equivalent 24 Dave Cohen, ‘An oil & gas
   assuming that the US does not succumb to the temptation to                           of a small Persian Gulf state in the North Shangri-la in the Arctic?’,
   form ‘coalitions of the willing’. But Iraq has shown such                            Atlantic”.24 By 2020, the legal status of the ASPO-USA/Energy bulletin,
                                                                                        Arctic’s resources may still be uncertain. October 10 2007.
                                                                                                                                                 th
   coalitions to be too fragile (the vast majority of coalition forces
   left within three years, leaving the US practically alone with a                     Countries around it are likely to try to create ‘facts on the ground’
   small UK force), and they do nothing to legitimise the mission in                    like Russia did, when it planted a flag on the seabed underneath the
   the eyes of the world. One possible scenario in which the                            North Pole. Denmark and Norway (as well as Canada and the US)
   Americans and Europeans might conduct high-intensity military                        could enhance their military presence in the region, increasing the
   operations together would be a collapsing Pakistan. Suppose                          possibility of skirmishes with Russian forces.
   that an Islamabad government started to lose control of the
   country, and the prospect of extremists acquiring nuclear                            By 2020, however, NATO will also further evolve from a strictly
   weapons became real. Under such circumstances, US and                                military alliance to one playing a broader political role as well. It
   European ground forces could conceivably seek to intervene to                        already does: by asking the candidates for membership to reform
   restore order in that large country. Instability could also affect                   their militaries and their political systems, NATO has helped to
   key large countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, or Congo.                    transform much of Central and Eastern Europe. The enlargement
   All these cases would require large multinational deployments,                       process continues: in 2008, NATO invited two more countries,
   perhaps led by NATO.                                                                 Albania and Croatia, to join.
20                                                                      The EU, NATO and the US in 2020                                21

   EU-NATO relations
                                                                           encouraging their members to acquire much of the same types of
    Both the EU and NATO would benefit from working closely                equipment, such as transport and tanker aircraft and precision-
    together on a range of security issues, from counter-terrorism to      guided munitions. They should also co-ordinate their military
    the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Ideally, the two     plans to avoid competition for member-states’ soldiers. For
    institutions would co-ordinate much more closely: the EU               example, if instability in Europe’s neighbourhood required the
    countries should be able to switch seamlessly between acting           EU to intervene more often, then EU governments would probably
    through NATO or acting under the EU flag. That would require           be less willing to send their soldiers on NATO missions elsewhere
    EU and NATO member-states to use the same military standards           around the world. A situation could even require Europeans to
    for all their equipment and procedures (the EU already uses most,      pull troops out of NATO missions, such as the current
    but not all, NATO standards). The two organisations should fully       Afghanistan operation, which could have major implications for
    co-ordinate their roles in helping the member-states improve their     transatlantic relations.
25 See Tomas Valasek, ‘France,
                               military capabilities, and occasionally
NATO and European defence’,    pool their resources into standby rapid-    All this will require greater dialogue between the EU and NATO.
CER policy brief, May 2008.
                               reaction forces.25 They should also be      Since his election in May 2007, President Sarkozy of France has
    discussing strategy, so that they have a common understanding of       dramatically changed the context of EU-NATO relations. This is
    the day’s issues.                                                      because he unexpectedly announced in August 2007 that France
                                                                           might return to NATO’s integrated military structure – from which
    Unfortunately, EU-NATO co-operation is currently limited to joint      General de Gaulle withdrew France in 1966.
    operations – of which there is just one, in Bosnia – and military
    capabilities. This is mainly because of a dispute between Turkey (in   The change in French attitudes towards NATO has since been
    NATO but not the EU) and Cyprus (in the EU but not NATO). As           matched by a change in US views of EU defence. The US has
    a result, Brussels’ two security organisations do not discuss many     sometimes been hesitant about a military role for the EU, for fear
    subjects, such as Afghanistan, Darfur and Iraq. Presently, there are   that it would undermine NATO. But over time, it has accepted
    a number of political obstacles to deeper co-operation, which is a     that an effective EU defence policy is in the US interest. Victoria
    shame, since they could do a lot of things to help each other. For     Nuland, the US ambassador to NATO, told an audience in Paris
    instance, Afghanistan needs more police, judges, engineers and         that the Bush administration supported a strong EU defence
26
   Daniel Keohane, ‘Unblocking development advisers – resources            policy. She said: “I am here today in Paris to say that we agree
EU-NATO co-operation’, CER     available to the EU but not to NATO         with France – Europe needs, the United States needs, NATO
bulletin, June/July 2006.      (although the EU has deployed 160 police    needs, the democratic world needs – a stronger, more capable
                               to Afghanistan).26                          European defence capacity. An ESDP 27 Ambassador Victoria Nuland,
                                                                           with only soft power is not enough.”27 Speech to Press Club and
   But there are other longer-term challenges facing the EU-NATO           On the back of President Sarkozy’s AmCham, Paris,
                                                                           proposals and the change in US attitudes, February 22 2008.
                                                                                                                                nd
   relationship. Both the EU and NATO find it hard to get their
   members to provide the military capabilities that they need. So         the hope is that the EU and NATO can find more effective ways
   they should ensure that if faced with future shortfalls they do not     of working together in the future, given that many of their
   compete to use the same equipment. The two organisations are            agendas overlap.
22                                                                        The EU, NATO and the US in 2020                                           23

   EU-US co-operation
                                                                             and NATO to find ways of complementing each other’s efforts
   Another important factor will be the development of EU-US                 when their security agendas overlapped.
   relations in the future, especially on security issues. For subjects
   such as counter-terrorism, the EU-US framework makes more sense           The shift of economic and political power       30
                                                                                                                                On current trends, in 2020, the
   than EU-NATO (since the Atlantic alliance has no say over its             from west to east means that the West may       US, China and the EU will each
                                                                                                                             have a little under 20 per cent of
   member-states’ laws or police co-operation). The EU, on the other         look for ways to shore up its weakening
                                                                                                                             global GDP, while India will have
   hand, does much in that domain.                                           power vis-à-vis China, India and other          almost 10 per cent and Japan
                                                                             rising powers. 30 For many western              about 5 per cent (Figures quoted
    EU justice and interior ministers meet regularly to pass laws and        countries, stronger European-US co-             in Charles Grant with Katinka
    to agree common policies for police and judicial co-operation (as        operation is the most sensible answer, and      Barysch, ‘Can Europe and China
    do their foreign and defence counterparts for their policy areas).       there is no shortage of proposals on how        shape the new world order?’, CER
                                                                                                                             pamphlet, May 2008).
    The EU is the only organisation in which European governments            this co-operation should be organised. A
    can collectively ‘join up’ the counter-terrorism parts of their law      recent report written by five former allied     31 Gen Dr Klaus Naumann and

    enforcement, border control, immigration, foreign and defence            chiefs-of-staff proposes that the US, NATO      others, ‘Towards a grand strategy
28
   Daniel Keohane, ‘The EU and  policies. 28 Furthermore, the US has         and the EU establish a permanent co-            for an uncertain world, renewing
counter-terrorism’, CER working signed agreements with the EU on             ordinating body.31 The French academic,         transatlantic partnership’,
paper, May 2005.                                                                                                             Noaber Foundation, 2007,
                                sharing passenger data, screening            François Heisbourg, has proposed that the       http://www.csis.org/
    shipping cargoes and procedures for extraditing terrorist suspects.      EU and the US set up their own secretariat      media/csis/events/080110_grand_
    A nascent co-operation between the US Department of Homeland             to co-ordinate the full range of policy areas   strategy.pdf.
    Security and the EU institutions is already in place. The EU and         that concern the two sides, including trade
                                                                                                                             32 François Heisbourg, ‘The
    the US should develop these types of foreign policy, border, justice     and aid as well as international security.32
                                                                                                                             European security strategy is not a
    and policing co-operation further.                                       France’s former prime minister, Edouard         security strategy’, A European way
                                                                             Balladur, has even suggested that Europe        of war, CER pamphlet, May 2004.
     More generally, the EU and the US should at some point start            and the US should form one union because
                                                                                                                             33
     discussing global issues with each other. Charles Grant and Mark        “history is starting to be made without the       John Vinocur, ‘A Union of the
     Leonard have pointed out that NATO is not the place where               West, and perhaps one day it will be made       West? Balladur says it's time’,
                                                                                                                             International Herald Tribune,
     Europeans or Americans want to talk about big strategic questions.      against it”.33                                  January 7th 2008.
     None of the existing transatlantic institutions allows for high-level
     strategic discussions on important subjects such as democracy in
29
   Charles Grant and Mark        the Middle East or the rise of China.29
Leonard, ‘What new transatlantic The close EU-US co-operation on the
institutions?’, CER bulletin,    Iranian nuclear issue points to the way
April/May 2005.
                                 forward: a deepening of the EU-US
     strategic dialogue on security. This would help avoid transatlantic
     misunderstandings on key questions of threats and responses. A
     deepening of EU-US co-operation would also encourage the EU
4 European military capabilities

Ultimately, the quality of the US-European relationship, and the
ability of EU countries to provide for their own defence, will depend
on Europe acquiring the right kind of weapons and expertise for
tomorrow’s conflicts.

How exactly wars will be fought in 2020 is not easy to predict.
Defence ministries will certainly employ new types of technology.
The Pentagon, for example, is developing laser weapons,
miniature robotics and hydrogen fuel cells that would power ships
and aircraft much more efficiently than diesel or petrol. Some
European governments lead the world in 34 The French, for example, have
certain technologies with potential conducted experiments with
                                            transferring energy from satellite
military application.34 But on the whole, to satellite using laser beams.
European governments lack the resources This could help to keep military
to adopt the whole range of US satellites longer in orbit or to
technological ambitions. At the same make them more manoeuvrable.
time, Europe cannot afford to fall too far 35
                                               ‘Annual report to Congress:
behind the new developments lest it be Military power of the People’s
overtaken by today’s developing Republic of China’, US
countries. Advanced technologies are Department of Defence, 2008.
spreading around the globe. China for http://www.defenselink.mil/
instance, is building and deploying pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report
                                            _08.pdf.
navigation and reconnaissance satellites
at a rate of 15 per year.35

In particular, satellites and information and communication
networks will become increasingly important. They are already
fully integrated into US military practice. Whereas coalition forces
used 21 satellites during the 1991 Gulf War, the number climbed to
26                                         Willing and able? EU defence in 2020   European military capabilities                                        27

36                            over 50 satellites for the 2003 Iraq war.36
  All figures taken from Michael                                                       as the US.38 European governments should      38 NATO news, ‘NATO agrees

O’Hanlon, ‘Neither star wars  While the Pentagon used less than 1,000                  continue developing their own, more           on missile defence way forward’,
                              precision-guided missiles in the 1999
nor sanctuary: Constraining the                                                        limited, missile defences, and find ways of   NATO, June 14th 2007,
military uses of space’,      Kosovo conflict, US forces launched over                 plugging them into the US system. And, as     http://www.nato.int/docu/update/
Brookings Institution Press,                                                                                                         2007/06-june/e0614a.html.
                              5,000 such weapons in Afghanistan in                     discussed below, the EU may want to
2004.
                              2001, and over 6,000 in the 2003 Iraq                    consider building early-warning satellites,   which provide crucial
     war. European countries, too, are increasingly moving into                        information on launches of enemy missiles.
     satellite-guided ammunition. Precision bombing protects the
     soldier (because one needs to make fewer sorties into enemy
                                                                                       A programme for military reform
     territory to destroy a target) and helps to protect civilians in
     conflict zones (because militaries can hit targets with less damage               European governments, with few exceptions, have been slow to
     to surrounding areas).                                                            reform their armies. All EU member-states – some with more success
                                                                                       than others – are moving away from heavy, large forces built for the
     Another crucial technological issue will be the use of unmanned                   defence of the home territory towards lighter, more mobile militaries
     aerial vehicles (UAVs). Currently, armed forces mainly use these                  better suited for international deployments. Europe’s armies are also
     pilotless aircraft to survey battlefields. But like any aircraft, the             making better use of new technologies. But if Europe wishes to
     UAVs can be configured for attack. The Americans are increasingly                 continue to fight alongside the Americans, or to conduct a wide
     equipping their UAVs with missiles, and the UK has bought several                 range of missions alone, the reforms need to go much deeper.
     such aircraft too. In the future, unmanned aircraft will to some                  European countries that have fallen behind the rest of the continent
     extent replace manned fighter jets like the Eurofighter and Rafale,               (like the new member-states of Central Europe) need to work
     since UAVs allow air forces to strike equally precisely without                   especially hard to keep up with the continent’s leaders (like the
     putting pilots at risk.                                                           Netherlands or the UK).

37 Anthony Seaboyer and Oliver  The spread of missile technology could                 There are grounds for cautious optimism. The EU recognises
Thränert, ‘What missile         transform the nature of future warfare.                military reform as an absolute precondition for meeting its security
proliferation means for Europe’,Western intelligence services estimate that            aims. Both the EU and NATO are urging their member-states
Survival, Summer 2006.          Iran and North Korea will have inter-                  towards reform by issuing collective reform targets, and
     continental missiles by 2020.37 The two countries could thus strike               monitoring progress in meeting them. The process of military
     at targets in Europe. A direct attack is not likely, although it remains          reform in Europe continues, albeit at a tortuously slow pace. EU
     a sobering possibility. But countries with long-range missiles will               member-states have not met their initial ‘headline goal’ – a list of
     probably try to deter EU governments from intervening in other                    military capabilities that EU governments agreed to acquire by
     countries. If Europe wants to retain its relative freedom to carry out            2003, and on current trends they probably will not meet the
     military operations abroad it should invest in some form of missile               revised 2010 goal either.
     defence. Most EU governments signed a NATO communiqué in
     June 2007, which calls on the alliance to explore how American                    But with each new mission the EU launches, the task of military
     missile defence bases in Europe could protect the continent as well               reform becomes more evident. Europe’s military operations to date
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