2018 Journal - ALLIED RAPID - NATO

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2018 Journal - ALLIED RAPID - NATO
ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS
                              ALLIED RAPID
                              REACTION CORPS
                              Ready for Today - Evolving for Tomorrow

                              Journal
                              2018
Journal 2018
2018 Journal - ALLIED RAPID - NATO
FOREWORD

ALLIED RAPID                              2017 was a seminal year for HQ ARRC. We remained on
                                          standby as the Land Component HQ for the NATO Response
REACTION CORPS                            Force and tested our ability to deploy at speed through a
                                          successful test exercise to Bulgaria and Romania alongside
Ready for Today - Evolving for Tomorrow
                                          the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (Land).

                                          2017 also marked the first full year of our 4-year Recalibration
                                          Plan, aimed at developing us into a modern, agile Corps
                                          HQ capable of operating and winning in the Contemporary
                                          Operating Environment. This, coupled with our burgeoning
                                          Concept Development and Experimentation Plan, an
                                          innovative Terrain Walk and our extensive Training Support
                                          to other formations, have all served to identify myriad lessons
                                          from which we, and others across NATO, can learn.

                                          The articles contained in this Journal are necessarily wide-
                                          ranging and reflect many of those lessons. They’ve been
                                          written by men and women from across the 23 Participating
                                          Nations who care and think deeply about their chosen
                                          profession, and to whom I am extremely grateful.

                                          Lt Gen Tim Radford CB DSO OBE
      www.arrc.nato.int                   Commander, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps

      /Allied Rapid Reaction Corps

      @HQARRC

      HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps

      /HQARRC
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                                          they are free to use the ideas expressed in it, and may copy, distribute or publish the work or
                                          part of it, in any form, printed, electronic or otherwise, for non-commercial purposes without
      pao.mr@arrc.nato.int                further permission from the author, any such use must clearly credit the author, recognise
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                                          copies, electronically or printed, for personal, academic and classroom use. Any commercial
      +44 (0)1452 718500                  use must be negotiated directly with the author(s).

2     ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS
2018 Journal - ALLIED RAPID - NATO
CONTENTS
		                                                    Page   		                                                   Page

1.   The Evolving Global Security Situation and its          14. Delivering Corps Deep Fires in a High Tempo
     Impact on the European Theatre, NATO and                    Multinational Environment
     HQ ARRC                                                     Lt Col Tim Iddon GBR-A                           38
     Maj Alex Michael GBR-A                            4
                                                             15. Air C2 Challenges in Corps Warfighting
2.   Multinationality: Harnessing its Strengths and              Gp Capt Chris Mullen GBR-AF                      42
     Minimising its Weaknesses
                                                             16. Federated Mission Networking
     Maj Gen Roberto D’Alessandro ITA-A                6
                                                                 Lt Col Martin Bever GBR-A                        44
3.   Development of the NATO Response Force
                                                             17. Know your Audience: The value of analysing
     Maj Alex Michael GBR-A                            8
                                                                 sentiment during NATO Operations
4.   Near Real-World Planning – Turning Wales                    Lt Col Martin Browning GBR-A and
     and Warsaw Summits into Reality                             Maj Chris Bell GBR-A                             47
     Col Richard Clements GBR-A                       10
                                                             18. Inland Waterways – Expanding the Capacity
5.   The Increasing Importance of a STRATCOM                     of Military Movement
     Mindset                                                     Maj Phil Lawrence GBR-A                          50
     Wg Cdr Peter Clarke GBR-AF                       12
                                                             19. The Utility of Risk Management to Underpin HQ
6.   Gender Advising at HQ Allied Rapid Reaction                 ARRC’s Planning, Readiness and Operations
     Corps – A Success Story?                                    Lt Cdr Charlotte Yemm GBR-N                      52
     Capt Nina Schommers DEU-A                        15
                                                             20. Maritime Security in the Baltics
7.   Enabling Crisis Response: Lessons from                      Cdr John Payne GBR-N                             54
     NOBLE JUMP 17
     Capt Mark Matthews GBR-A                         18     21. Unlocking Non-Commissioned Officers’ Talent
                                                                 in a Peacetime, Multinational Environment
8.   Ex ARRCADE LIGHTNING 17 – A New Model                       SSgt Amy O’Hara GBR-A                            56
     for Professional Study?
     Brig Paul Tennant GBR-A                          20     22. Bias – How Can It Affect Intelligence Support
                                                                 to Decision-Making?
9.   Developing Leadership Through Adventure                     Maj Jim Buchan GBR-A                             58
     Training - Exercise SELVA BACKSTOP 2017
     Maj Dave Latimer GBR-A                           22     23. Risk to the Mission, Risk to the Force – Why
                                                                 Does Countering Corruption Matter?
10. Operations Planning - Using the NATO                         Mr Peter Appleby GBR-C and
    Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive                  Col Alex van Nieuwburg NLD-A                     60
    (COPD) at the tactical level: A comparison
    between the UK planning process and the COPD             24. Positioning Air Defence for Re-Introduction
    Lt Col Ole Stephan DEU-A                          24         of M-SHORAD
                                                                 Maj Trey Guy USA-A                               62
11. Survive to Command and Innovation
    Lt Col Martin Bever GBR-A                         30     25. Developing Capability for Deception Operations
                                                                 LTC Rachelle Hathaway USA-A and
12. Lessons in Corps Warfighting from the                        SFC Laurens Maliepaard USA-A                     64
    Battle of the Bulge – Exercise ARRCADE
    BUGLE 2 2017                                             26. The Lost Art of Battle Damage Assessment
    Lt Col Scott Morrison CAN-A                       33         WO1 Andrew Herrity GBR-A,
                                                                 SSgt Marco Orru ITA-A, Sgt John Vivani GBR-A
13. Enabling the Commander’s Freedom                             and Bdr James Cheetham GBR-A                     68
    of Manoeuvre (or not!)
    Lt Col Brian Tritten GBR-A,
    Maj Daniel Lyons GBR-A and
    Maj George McCrea GBR-A                           36

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2018 Journal - ALLIED RAPID - NATO
ARRC JOURNAL

THE EVOLVING GLOBAL SECURITY
SITUATION AND ITS IMPACT ON
THE EUROPEAN THEATRE, NATO
AND HQ ARRC
Maj Alex Michael (GBR-A)

We live in a security environment that contains a broad and evolving set of challenges.
The international order and norms are changing. Both known and emerging actors are
regularly adjusting their strategic aims and so unpredictability is flourishing once more.

As we approach the end of the second          explosive demography with insufficient         operations enabled her to promote a
decade of the 21st Century, the NATO          economic growth, have created a series         competitive advantage in the region.
Alliance faces both new and resurgent         of challenges on Europe’s southern             Thus the impression of perceived threat
threats to our security. Within an ‘arc       borders. It is the second and third            (West against East) ferments.
of instability’, to the east a single state   order effects of this instability that can
actor is vying to strengthen its sphere of    influence NATO and the EU the most.            What is NATO doing to reduce
influence, while to the south the threat      As an example, Daesh’s ideological             the threat in the East?
is two-fold, security threats from radical    expansion and its focus upon Western           What has been done in answer to
Islam, and the economic threats and           societies has caused an unprecedented          Russia’s violence in Eastern Ukraine,
humanitarian challenges of migration.         refugee movement into Europe which,            its occupation of Crimea, her arming
                                              in addition to the administrative burden,      of the separatists and a general desire
To the East... Russia’s strategic
                                              has masked the movement and intention          to want her to move from confrontation
objectives appear to restore its
                                              of past and potential terrorists.              back to cooperation? NATO’s role is
international status and, against the
tide of NATO expansion, strengthen            What is more, these two apparently             one of deterrence, where the Allies
its influence in ‘near abroad’ states. In     distinct challenges create complexities        are leveraging all instruments of state
order to rebalance regional power and         where they converge on Europe’s                power. The military component has been
status, Russia’s hybrid tactics aim to        borders. Although Russia shares a              based predominantly on a relatively new,
cause regional instability and expose the     number of objectives with the West in          flexible, NRF model that holds responsive
capacity weaknesses of the European           Syria and Iraq, it exploited an opportunity,   and mobile forces at high readiness
Union (EU) and NATO. Looking for a            manifested by a lack of coordinated            in addition to a rotational forward
solution to this might be easier if our                                                      presence within some of the states
relationship with Russia was not so multi-                                                   bordering Russia. While this certainly
dimensional. A complex, contemporary,                                                        reassures the nations geographically
strategic environment, caused by themes                                                      close to Russia, it does not deny the
of common interest between the Alliance,                                                     effects ‘below the threshold of open
the EU and between individual countries                                                      aggression’ that promote the interests of
and Russia, demands a sophisticated                                                          Russia as a competing nation. But while
and pragmatic approach. This means                                                           sometimes aggressive competition can
that some problems might be better                                                           be easily mistaken for confrontation, a
managed together with Russia, and not                                                        better understanding of Russian aims is
in opposition.                                                                               required to tailor our overt approach.
                                              Russia’s military strength has been decisive
To the South... A potent mix of state
                                              and efficient Western action to project
                                                                                             What more can be done to
and non-state actors, interwoven with
                                              strength. Russia’s rapid decision making,      reduce the threat in the East?
migration, organised crime, traditional                                                      Although there is recent evidence that
                                              no viable political opposition to decisions
rivalries and the combination of an                                                          both sides can cooperate effectively,
                                              and public willingness to accept military

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READY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW

Russia has chosen a different path. But
why?
President Putin has chosen anti-Western
rhetoric and nationalist self-assertion
as the foundation for his regime and
he justifies Russia’s aggressive actions
on the basis of perceived Western
encirclement. This means that current
Russian sentiment will not change
quickly. But should we not be looking
to dispel his fears? While deterring,
competing and engaging do not exclude
each other, a flexible, adaptable political
approach and military posture is still
needed. Avoiding mis-calculation and
achieving conflict prevention, regardless
of the competition, remains crucial.
While politicians and diplomats engage
with Russia to understand the mutually
acceptable middle ground, they also
need to understand when deterrence
can antagonise. History has shown that
Russia will rise to the challenge, but we        Russian cartoon highlighting Deterrence or Provocation

do not need to make it a challenge.
                                                 • Make time to train. The SACEUR-                         with each other and their processes;
                                                  endorsed LTRP dictates when certified                    an essential aspect of high readiness
Future
                                                  HRFs are at Readiness. For HQ                            deterrence forces.
A state will rarely need to fight if it deters    ARRC it shows us when we are to
effectively enough. The military arm of                                                                   With this in mind, between LTRP
                                                  be at Readiness either as a Joint HQ
NATO must improve its understanding of                                                                    commitments, HQ ARRC has chosen to
                                                  (Strategic/ Operational level) or LCC
deterrence, and ability to deter – indeed                                                                 focus training towards the role of a Corps
                                                  HQ (Operational). The issue is that
it should always look to, particularly while                                                              HQ; to allow time to specialise, and
                                                  there is no time set aside to specialise
the threat changes so regularly. How                                                                      because it is arguably easier to scale
                                                  as a NATO Corps HQ (higher-tactical)
can the military arm of NATO improve?                                                                     down the complexity of a certified Corps
                                                  and you cannot become a warfighting
                                                                                                          HQ to that of a LCC HQ. In addition,
• Make training complex. Training must            Corps HQ overnight. Ex ARRACE
                                                                                                          it enables our UK and multi-national
 be as complex as the most demanding              FUSION 17 also demonstrated that it
                                                                                                          Divisional training affiliations to nest
 scenario.      A truly responsive and            takes time to excel at commanding at
                                                                                                          into an operational Corps HQ; enjoying
 effective multi-national military force          the Corps level: it is the most challenging
                                                                                                          support from an experienced rather than
 can only be established through more,            role that the ARRC undertakes.
                                                                                                          adhoc HICON structure. More still, our
 and better, training.        Forces also        • Specialise. A Corps HQ operates within                 potential adversary uses the Army and
 can improve through specialisation               the detail of the higher-tactical level                 Corps levels of command effectively –
 - because they are able to train more            thus more, not less, time is needed to                  we therefore need a capable counter
 regularly for that discipline.                   maintain/ improve processes. Rotating                   to deter (and potentially defeat) at that
• Use the Corps HQ. For warfighting               through different roles can contribute                  scale of command.
 at scale (an essential skill for effective       to the challenges a HQ staff will face
                                                  and potentially accelerate skill fade. To               The challenge is finding the time and
 deterrence), the Corps HQ role is
                                                  maintain and improve the ability of a                   resources to get this specialisation
 missing in the NATO Long Term
                                                  HQ it stands to reason that they should                 right, while concurrently meeting LTRP
 Rotation Plan (LTRP). This manifests
                                                  specialise on a particular discipline. We               commitments.      Although we remain
 itself in capability gaps, and reduced
                                                  are beginning to see this emerge while                  ready if committed to the ‘fight tonight’,
 understanding of the challenges of
                                                  MNC-NE now has a regional function -                    our current target is to be certified as a
 warfighting at scale against a peer
                                                  this approach should be expanded.                       Corps Warfighting HQ within five years.
 adversary in the complex environment
                                                                                                          However, to be able to war fight at this
 of the 21st Century. The Corps HQ also          • Training with Corps troops. Corps
                                                                                                          scale and complexity not only requires
 provides the important gearing between           troops are essential to enabling
                                                                                                          a change of mind-set but also a radical
 the Land Component Command (LCC)                 the success of the corps level of
                                                                                                          adjustment to the structure and training
 and Divisional levels of command and             operation.   Thus to train and fight as
                                                                                                          of our NRF HQs. Acknowledging this,
 can coordinate the activity of up to five        a corps requires dedicated corps-
                                                                                                          perhaps we should make the bold
 divisions (a LCC HQ cannot because               level capabilities (not double hatted
                                                                                                          adjustments sooner rather than later?
 it sits at the Operational level and             as divisional capabilities) which are as
 thus has a longer planning horizon)              familiar with the HQ Staff as the staff are
 and corps troops. It will also focus             with them.   The complexity of fighting                 ABOUT THE AUTHOR
 on shaping the various levels of deep            the corps battle (Deep, Close and Rear                  Maj Alex Michael is currently SO2 Policy
 battlespace to ensure success in the             across all domains) and management                      in the G7 Branch at HQ Allied Rapid
 Close battle.                                    of the battle space requires familiarity                Reaction Corps. Previously he worked
                                                  and cohesion that is difficult to achieve               as the exercise planner for Ex NOBLE
                                                  rapidly unless formations are familiar                  JUMP.

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ARRC JOURNAL

MULTINATIONALITY –
HARNESSING ITS STRENGTHS
AND MINIMISING ITS FRICTIONS

Maj Gen Roberto D’Alessandro (ITA-A)

“Working in international organisations and living in foreign countries is not only an
adventure and experience for life, but it also generates issues. Some issues you can
prepare yourself for during the phase prior to posting, and others will come at a later date
and unexpectedly, but, that is why it is called an adventure.”

NATO is a multi-national organisation.                airmen, they are sent as ambassadors for           operability is much more than that; it starts
It gets its strength through being an                 their Nation and their Service. As military        with people understanding each other.
alliance of 29 nations behind a common                professionals they are often at the top of         Within the NCS/NFS it is the people not
goal - Peace in Europe. However,                      their game, trained and educated to a              equipment that are the critical capability.
that very strength can easily become                  high level, and destined for promotion.            A ‘non-compatibility’ of understanding
weakness without careful management                   But the challenges they face once in post          makes command and control harder and
and understanding and nowhere is this                 are numerous and, if not understood and            can endanger our rate of success.
truer than within the military headquarters           managed, potentially damaging.
                                                                                                         In ancient history a story was written
of the NATO Command Structure (NCS)
                                                      Language                                           about the Tower of Babel; the people who
and NATO Force Structure (NFS).
                                                                                                         were building it were able to do so initially
The NCS and NFS bring together the                    The most obvious challenge is language.            because they spoke the same language
best and brightest of NATO’s military                 Inter-operability is a phrase frequently           but when language failed the task failed.
personnel. Selected by their nations for              used in conjunction with multi-national            This principle counts for international
their abilities as soldiers, sailors and              operations, and usually refers to non-             organisations as well. Without a
                                                      compatible      equipment.  But    inter-          common and clear understanding of our
                                                                                                         doctrine, processes and tasks, a NATO
                                                                                                         headquarters can easily become a box
                                                                                                         of expensive but incompatible parts
                                                                                                         rather than a finely-tuned engine.
                                                                                                         While language is a beautiful thing
                                                                                                         and our ability to integrate 29 nations
                                                                                                         something to be proud of, how do we
                                                                                                         minimise the friction of language? Here
                                                                                                         are three thoughts:
                                                                                                         • As nations, we must prepare our
                                                                                                          people in a good and sufficient way
                                                                                                          so they can maintain themselves.
                                                                                                          Language classes before posting
                                                                                                          help to overcome the most common
                                                                                                          communication problems, but they do
                                                                                                          not teach dialect or colloquialisms.
                                                                                                         • As Headquarters, we must stick to one
                                                                                                          operational language, write down most
Italian Army Major General Roberto D’Allesandro, deputy commander for the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps,    of our procedures and practices and
speaks with an ARRC British Army officer during Exercise ARRCADE Fusion 2015                              stick to them.

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READY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW

• As individuals, we must understand               can be more than one way to skin a                  unity of command, but we need to get
 the difference between ‘hearing’ and              cat’ if I am permitted to use an English            as close as we can in building a real
 ‘understanding’. NATO Standard English            colloquialism and, just sometimes, the              professional multinational organisation
 has its limitations and the speaker needs         ‘other way of doing it’ might just have             with shared responsibilities.
 to ensure the listener has understood             its merits.                                        • Every nation sees different values
 and not just heard. This brings a big                                                                 in the NATO Alliance, and uses their
 responsibility to native speakers.               So What?                                             membership in a different way. Some
                                                  As DCOM ARRC, I have had the                         nations invest a lot of money in their
                                                  privilege to observe both the strengths              defence organisations to reach NATO
                                                  and weaknesses of a multi-national
                                                  headquarters from above and, now at
                                                  the end of my tour, I can look back at an
                                                  interesting and intense 3 year period. A               “While language is a
                                                  period where I truly learned what can
                                                  be achieved when you not only harness
                                                                                                         beautiful thing and our
                                                  the military experience and intellectual               ability to integrate 29
                                                  power of multiple nations, but share
Spanish and British Army personnel conduct        responsibilities as well and put it to work.           nations something to
weapons familiarisation during Exercise Trident
Juncture 2016
                                                  The ARRC is rooted in its operational                  be proud of, how do we
                                                  high readiness role, but at the same time
Culture
                                                  it is at the forefront of experimentation
                                                                                                         minimise the friction of
Another challenge is culture. Working
in     an     international    organisation
                                                  and development activities. It invokes                 language?”
                                                  transformation and evolution - for
requires awareness, acceptance and                                                                       Maj Gen D’Alessandro
                                                  example the new UK Doctrine on Corps
understanding of multiple cultures. Just
                                                  Operations; largely written by the ARRC’s
as misunderstood language can create
                                                  multinational, multicultural community
frictions, different cultures can and will
                                                  - and it works hard to be a career and
cause similar problems if not managed.                                                                 standards, others invest less money.
                                                  life opportunity. But we need to be more
This is not only the ‘social’ cultural                                                                 The same could be said about NATO
                                                  forward looking;       thinking ourselves
difference experienced by ‘foreigners’                                                                 policies and doctrine. Some nations
                                                  deeper into the future and try to predict
when they choose to live abroad, but also                                                              have included NATO doctrine in their
                                                  what we need to be and planning how we
the different ‘professional’ cultures. At its                                                          national ones, others vice versa.
                                                  get there ahead of our adversaries, so
core, culture is a set of standards, values                                                           • Resurgent     threats have different
                                                  for my closing points I offer the following
and beliefs which determines the way we                                                                responses from different nations. For
                                                  thoughts:
think, how we act and what we cherish.                                                                 some it is ‘ah, back to the good old
It is impossible to instantly put aside                                                                days’, for others it is completely new and
our cultural norms when posted in an                                                                   for others ‘we warned you’. However,
international organisation, because they                                                               the world has changed since the fall off
are the root of our identity. Where our                                                                the Berlin Wall in 1987. The ways we
posting is only temporary, and not for life,                                                           conducted major military operations in
it is even harder, because Internationals                                                              the past differs very much from how we
will go back home sooner or later.                                                                     see it today. This difference demands
We must accept that, to succeed, an                                                                    a change of mind set for all of us and
international organisation needs to be a                                                               a realisation that we cannot just reach
‘melting pot’ for cultures, give room for         British, Croatian and Italian service personnel      back to the things we have learned in
                                                  assigned to the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
those differences and work to ensure              conduct operational wargaming during Exercise        the past. We have to understand, we
we provide a ‘safe environment’ for               ARRCADE Fusion 2017                                  have to learn and, most importantly, we
people to work in. We then will be able to                                                             have to adapt; and we must do so now
                                                  • The importance of NATO becomes                     if we are to be ‘Ready for tomorrow’.
generate cohesion and an atmosphere
                                                   ever more evident, and the ability of
that delivers success because of our                                                                  I started by saying that the strength of
                                                   the Alliance to adapt is crucial for its
differences rather than despite them.                                                                 NATO is in its diversity, unity and the
                                                   survival. The freedom to grow, shrink,
So, how can we harness the advantages              focus and re-role as necessary are                 common goal. The potential damaging
and minimise the frictions of cultural             becoming increasingly important factors            internal dangers lay in that as well. We
differences? There is no one answer, but           for success. Mass migration, natural               need to guard against these internal
here are my suggestions:                           disasters caused by climate change,                dangers. We have to be prepared as
                                                   geo-political issues and diminishing               an alliance against external threats and
• As leaders we must understand all                                                                   should continue to minimise the potential
                                                   natural resources cause tensions
 those under our command and ensure                                                                   for internal friction.
                                                   around the globe and NATO must have
 we maximise their strengths and help
                                                   the means to respond to them all; and if
 minimise their weaknesses. We must
                                                   necessary concurrently.                            ABOUT THE AUTHOR
 create an atmosphere where cultural
 differences are valued, recognised and           • We need to remember that military                 Maj Gen Roberto D’Alessandro is the
 harnessed (the good ones anyway).                 personnel serving in the NCS/NFS                   Deputy Commander at HQ Allied Rapid
                                                   have their own national chain of                   Reaction Corps.
• As individuals we must understand
                                                   command, Rules of Engagement and
 that cultural differences and ways of
                                                   caveats. This has an effect on the
 working are not inferior, that ‘there

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ARRC JOURNAL

DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATO
RESPONSE FORCE (NRF)

Maj Alex Michael (GBR-A)

The NATO Response Force (NRF) provides the Alliance with the capability to conduct a
rapid demonstration of force and provide an ‘early entry’ military presence in response
to an emerging crisis. This article considers the work conducted by Headquarters Allied
Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ ARRC), as the NRF Land Component Headquarters for 2017, to
further develop the NRF concept.

How did the NRF concept                       challenges faced by the Alliance. Under      NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs1)
develop before 2017?                          changes introduced through the RAP, the      in order to speed the Receipt, Staging,
                                              Land portion of the NRF was enhanced         Onward Movement (RSOM) of NRF
The NRF concept was launched in
                                              to make it more responsive, more             elements through the Joint Operational
November 2002, following the Prague
                                              flexible and significantly larger and more   Area (JoA). Note that MND-SE will
Summit. Subsequently, during a meeting
                                              capable. Three echelons were formed at       also be able to execute 2* command of
in June 2014, Allied Defence Ministers
                                              graduated readiness;                         national and NATO Land forces up to
discussed the strategic implications of
                                                                                           Divisional scale (for Article 5 operations
Russia’s actions in and around Ukraine.       • The Very High Readiness Joint Task
                                                                                           in the south-east).
The implications of a resurgent Russia,        Force Land (VJTF(L)), a multi-national
coupled with a concern that the NRF was        brigade-size force held at 5-7 days         Refining the NRF(L)
already falling short of its mission, led      notice to move, with Spearhead
Ministers to agree to develop a Readiness      elements deployable within 48-72            As the first NRF Land Component
Action Plan (RAP) detailing how NATO           hours;                                      Command (LCC) HQ, NRDC-ESP
would respond to the challenges posed                                                      forged changes in the design, readiness
                                              • An Initial Follow-on Forces Group          and structure of the interim NRF(L)
by Russia. The RAP was to be ready for         (IFFG), at 45 days notice to move;
approval at the September 2014 Wales                                                       model. With little conceptual guidance,
                                              • A Follow-on Forces Group (FFG).            NRDC-ESP contributed significantly to
Summit.
                                                                                           the current NRF Directive and helped
                                              In addition, speed of deployment
The two mutually supporting pillars of the                                                 to ensure that the NRF reached full
                                              would be increased by establishing the
RAP are the Assurance Measures and                                                         operational capability by the end of 2016.
                                              necessary strategic lift mechanisms, a
the Adaptation Measures. Assurance                                                         Through staff visits and observations
                                              Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG)
enacted through a continuous presence                                                      from training, HQ ARRC was able to
                                              would be formed to provide theatre level
and activity in the eastern part of the                                                    benefit greatly from this work, confirming
                                              logistic support, and advanced planning
Alliance, and adaptation carried out to                                                    improvements in the speed of
                                              would enable accelerated decision-
address the current and evolving security                                                  deployment, the STRATCOM plan and in
                                              making. A new and ambitious exercise
                                                                                           the management of this larger and more
                                              programme was also designed with an
                                                                                           complex force. NRDC-ESP put the new
                                              accompanying STRATCOM plan that
                                                                                           and improved NRF model on the road
                                              would publicise the new capabilities
                                                                                           and handed the baton to HQ ARRC to
                                              to friends (assurance) and potential
                                                                                           continue the evolution in 2017.
                                              adversaries (deterrence) alike.
                                                                                           Noting the requirements laid down in
                                              Finally, regional HQs such as Multi-
                                                                                           the new NRF Directive, the detailed
                                              National Corps-North East (MNC-NE)
                                                                                           observations provided by NRDC-ESP,
                                              based in Poland and Multi-National
                                                                                           and our own observations from our
                                              Division-South East (MND-SE) based in
                                                                                           preparation year, HQ ARRC sought to use
                                              Romania would take control of assigned
The Readiness Action Plan was agreed at the                                                the planning and deployment periods of
Wales Summit

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READY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW

Ex NOBLE JUMP 1 and 22 as the means                                It became clear
to further develop the NRF concept. HQ                             that there were a
ARRC also supported the continuation                               number of risks to
training of JFC-NP during Ex TRIDENT                               the NRF which were
JOUST.  From these we identified three                             neither     captured
key areas of development:                                          nor being managed.
                                                                   To address this, HQ
• Deployment     Under the control of
                                                                   ARRC developed
  JFC-NP3, the NOBLE JUMP 17 series
                                                                   a risk register to
  of exercises rehearsed, for the first
                                                                   enable this HQ
  time, the procedures and alerting
                                                                   and     others      to
  concept for all forces designated as
                                                                   understand        the
  the NRF 17. Subsequently, using an
                                                                   implications of risks
  amended response plan to shape the
                                                                   to the NRF and
  deployment, Ex NOJP 2 enabled the
                                                                   identify ways to
  first deployment of elements of the                                                                The Spanish 7th Infantry Brigade handed over the VJTF(L) role
                                                                   mitigate them.
  VJTF(L) to the Alliance’s south-eastern
  flank, supported by HQ MND-SE.  This                           • 2* Level of Command                                       • Coherent     Narrative A coherent
  was aided significantly by the early                             Coherent command and control is                             narrative that links all NATO exercise
  deployment of the core-staff element                             essential and this year confirmed that a                    activity (and other national or bi-
  from the JLSG (HQ ARRC). The                                     Divisional level of command is needed                       lateral exercises) will help cohere
  exercise validated the NATO Command                              for the NRF. The LCC HQ command                             our STRATCOM messaging. Crisis
  Structure’s ability to rapidly deploy a                          and control of 29 (Land) divisional troop                   Response Planning periods (using the
  ready and capable spearhead. It also                             force elements is unsustainable. In                         same ACO-directed exercise scenario)
  provided a better understanding of the                           addition, a layer of complexity is added                    could also align across the other
  amalgamated challenges created by                                when a LCC HQ attempts to coordinate                        Components, ensuring collaborative
  multiple nations, deploying by multiple                          the battle rhythm between the campaign                      planning (up, down and sideways) to
  means4, involving transit through                                planning of a JTF HQ and the execution                      maximise the value of training. Coherent
  multiple countries. Once in the JoA,                             through tactical actions of the Land                        exercise, training and communication
  HQ ARRC rehearsed the transfers of                               Component. As an Operational/higher-                        objectives could be issued to HRFs to
  authority while MND-SE (supported by                             tactical HQ, the LCC must be able to                        ensure that they are linked through all
  NFIU ROU and BGR and the Hellenic                                develop and refine plans up to 96 hours                     NRF exercise activity. The same link
  Movement Control Centre) controlled                              in advance although its battle rhythm                       could flow to national exercise activity
  the RSOM. The inward movement                                    needs to also elongate to synchronise                       to achieve a fully holistic preparation.
  of force elements over twelve days                               with the higher HQ. With an intermediate                  • Training Complexity and Realism
  provided a suitably complex scenario                             2* HQ, the complexity created between                       Further investment and development
  for MND-SE and the NFIUs, allowing                               3* and 1* HQs is mitigated.                                 of the ISR , Influence and CMI
  them to develop their understanding                                                                                          training environment is required. We
  of their role throughout RSOM. It                              Recommendations                                               should also ensure that we replicate
  also confirmed the importance of                               Following our year as the NRF(L), HQ                          reality (Future Character of Conflict
  understanding how the NRF uses Host                            ARRC has identified a number of key                           complexity) within the training construct
  Nations and the associated liaison                             areas for further development to support                      and     maximise     opportunities    for
  requirements. The exercise enabled                             NRDC-ITA as they take on the mantle for                       experimentation activities. Wherever
  the development of the relationships                           2018:                                                         possible, NRF exercises should be led
  and processes between the JLSG and                             • Larger Exercising Forces Not all
                                                                                                                               with an operational (J5/3) approach,
  the regional HQs. It also enabled the                            VJTF(L) forces participated in Ex NOJP                      rather than a training (J7) approach.
  LCC HQ to rehearse the deployment                                2 and only small elements from the other                    They should also be Joint by nature,
  of its Forward Coordination Element                              Components deployed. Although this                          owned by ACO and drive innovation at
  and practice distributed command from                            year we increased the complexity for the                    every level of command.
  its permanent HQ in Innsworth, UK.                               deployment phase, to further develop the
  Operationally and conceptually the                               mechanics of a large scale deployment                     ABOUT THE AUTHOR
  exercise projected active deterrence                             (and the message that it sends), future
  and concept validation while building                                                                                      Maj Alex Michael is currently SO2 Policy
                                                                   deployments could be larger in scale                      in the G7 branch at HQ Allied Rapid
  the capacity of MND-SE and NFIU                                  and include more elements from the
  ROU and BGR.                                                                                                               Reaction Corps. Previously he worked
                                                                   Component Commands and Forward                            as the exercise planner for Ex NOBLE
• Risk Management There is value in                                Presence. Additionally, a table top                       JUMP.
  identifying and managing risks to the                            exercise that included the whole NRF
  NRF effectively so they can be reported                          would benefit future planning and
  upon as part of routine procedure.                               help inform the process of adjusting
  Their utility is also realised if captured                       the European theatre to enable rapid
  in the operational planning process.                             deployment of the largest force.

1	New in-place force enablers.
2 Ex NOBLE JUMP 1 = AERTEX, Ex NOBLE JUMP 2 = ALERTEX followed by DEPLOYEX.
3 HQ ARRC G7 provided the Co-OPR for this exercise.
4 Eight countries by road, rail, air and sea.
5 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.
6 The degree of complexity, however, needs to be coherent with the scope (level of ambition) of the exercise

                                                                                                                          ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS                 9
2018 Journal - ALLIED RAPID - NATO
ARRC JOURNAL

NEAR REAL-WORLD PLANNING –
TURNING WALES AND WARSAW
SUMMITS INTO REALITY

Col Richard Clements (GBR-A)

In early 2017, Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ ARRC), whilst stood by
as the NATO Response Force (NRF) Land Component Command (LCC) Headquarters,
undertook a period of crisis response planning (CRP) in preparation for Exercise NOBLE
JUMP 2 (Ex NOJP2). Ex NOJP2 was a readiness and deployment exercise, in which
elements of HQ ARRC and the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (Land) (VJTF(L))1
brigade deployed to another NATO Alliance Country.

HQ ARRC’s planning was the first of its                         the complexities of rapid deployment                                Unit (NFIU) staff. NFIUs are relatively
kind by a High Readiness Force (Land)                           planning and the potential value of                                 new NATO staff capabilities in HNs; not
Headquarters as it was based on a                               incremental deployments.                                            only do they provide an immediate link
modified real world regional Graduated                                                                                              between NATO forces and HQs with HNs
Response Plan (GRP). This enabled HQ                            Value of Near-Real World                                            forces and HQs, but they are critical in
ARRC to develop a LCC Operation Order                           Planning with Host Nation and                                       early enablement of NATO forces.
(OPORD), replicating what would occur                           Key Staff
for real should that GRP be activated.                          The first significant lesson was the
                                                                                                                                    Inconsistencies in GRPs
As such, it was the first time that a GRP                       value of using near-real world or real-                             Unsurprisingly, planning also identified
had been subject to notable scrutiny,                           world plans. This lesson had previously                             inconsistencies between and within
and the first time that it had been used                        been identified during 2015, when HQ                                the levels of GRPs, which can only be
to plan for real troops deploying to the                        ARRC planned and deployed to the                                    found when testing the plans thoroughly
region; albeit in a planned exercise using                      Baltics. ARRC’s lessons from 2015 were                              through execution, albeit in a training
                                                                incorporated into the development of the                            context. GRPs are constructed with plans
                                                                GRP for that region. Whilst NATO policy                             at the strategic, operational and tactical
                                                                is not to exercise real world plans, a                              (component) levels. Whilst developed
                                                                small amount of revision of these plans -                           collaboratively, these plans are complex
                                                                to de-sensitise them and build in a near-                           and detailed and it is challenging to
                                                                real world scenario - enables significant                           achieve perfection. Consequently, some
                                                                training value to be gained. Members                                of the details contained in the plans were
                                                                of the planning staff at HQ ARRC were                               inconsistent between the different levels
                                                                able to develop a great understanding                               of plans, while others were inconsistent
Romanian troops assigned to NATO’s Multinational                of the detail in the real-world GRP,                                within a plan. For example, some plans
Division Southeast conduct a live fire exercise in              undertake detailed branch level analysis                            talked of ‘X’ days of supply (DOS), whilst
the Cincu Training Area in Romania during Exercise                                                                                  others articulated ‘Y’ DOS; indeed one
Noble Jump 2017                                                 and understand the implications of
                                                                the geography, regional dynamics and                                plan talked of ‘X’ in the main body and ‘Y’
a scenario. This short article aims to                          Host Nations’ (HN) capabilities. This                               in the annexes. Whilst seemingly trivial,
highlight some of the lessons identified                        experience will be invaluable if the real-                          such detail becomes important in the
during CRP, in particular: the value of                         world GRP is to be activated at any stage                           timely execution of plans and can now
near-real world planning; the challenges                        whilst enhancing the value of ARRC’s                                be corrected.
faced when writing GRPs with sufficient                         readiness training and professional
detail to be executable rapidly, whilst                         development.  Another lesson confirmed                              Command and control
also being sufficiently generic to cater                        was the immense value of HN liaison                                 Command and control (C2) is a persistent
for numerous potential eventualities;                           officers and NATO Force Integration                                 challenge in an Alliance context.    C2

1	The VJTF(L) is a brigade sized force conceived at the Wales Summit in 2014 and now in its second year of combat effectiveness.

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                                                                                                                   a realistic and credible strategy of
                                                                                                                   incremental deterrence, with increasingly
                                                                                                                   capable and sizeable forces being
                                                                                                                   deployed to ensure a balance is retained
                                                                                                                   between the provocation and deterrence
                                                                                                                   of a potential adversary. The concept of
                                                                                                                   incremental deterrence should be further
                                                                                                                   developed in the revision of GRPs for
                                                                                                                   the VJTF. It should be noted that force
                                                                                                                   elements deployed in such an incremental
                                                                                                                   approach must consist of balanced force
                                                                                                                   packages. For example, deployment of
                                                                                                                   combat forces with no logistics support
                                                                                                                   or firepower, is unsustainable and lacks
                                                                                                                   credibility. Tailoring of force packages
                                                                                                                   is required; for example some regions
                                                                                                                   require bespoke capabilities, such as
                                                                                                                   wet-gap crossing capabilities in areas
                                                                                                                   with wide rivers.

                                                                                                                   Conclusion
                                                                                                                   In sum, planning for Ex NOJP2 using
                                                                                                                   a near-real world GRP provided an
                                                                                                                   excellent opportunity for HQ ARRC to
                                                                                                                   rehearse and refresh skills in planning
                                                                                                                   for the execution of a real-world GRP.
                                                                                                                   Not only did the staff learn notable
                                                                                                                   lessons on the details in the plans,
Soldiers with the British Army’s 20th Armoured Infantry Brigade conduct a patrol in the Cincu Training Area in     identifying inadvertent inconsistencies,
Romania during Exercise Noble Jump 2017                                                                            but they also gained a considerably
arrangements are already well defined                    this in a timely manner. As a result,                     greater understanding of a region and
in all GRPs, but what is often not well                  a combination of the NFIUs and a                          HN capabilities not previously studied.
defined in order to retain agility, is                   nominated tactical HQ will be required                    The detailed lessons identified can
which HQ is to undertake which role.                     to deliver RSOM. Ex NOJP2 employed                        now be fed back into the revision of the
For example, the plans do not stipulate                  HQ Multi-National Division (South-East)                   real-world GRPs to make them more
which HQ would act as the LCC HQ as                      (MND(SE)) as the tactical level RSOM
there are several different options above                HQ and this HQ developed the tactical
that of HQ ARRC in 2017. This said, the                  level RSOM, ably supported in turn by
lengthy and complex discussions over                     HQ ARRC Enabling Command staff, who
exact C2 between force elements for Ex                   have supported Joint Force Command
NOJP2, further blurred and compounded                    (Naples’) JLSG in 2017. HQ MND(SE)
by national, real-world and exercise C2                  managed        numerous        complexities
differences, highlighted how essential                   and multiple competing pressures of
early and detailed clarity of C2 is.                     different force contributing nations with
Execution of a GRP under time-pressure                   a deployment over 3 different countries.
does not afford NATO the opportunity to                  This complex RSOM planning must be
discuss and resolve these C2 challenges                  sufficiently pre-developed that rapid                     Soldiers with the Polish Army’s 10th Dragoons
in the face of a real opposition; which                  refinement can be conducted to ensure                     Battalion conduct a movement to contact drill in the
                                                                                                                   Cincu Training Area in Romania during Exercise
HQ is delivering what C2 must be more                    that RSOM structures and C2 are in                        Noble Jump 2017
clearly defined in the baseline GRP.                     place as lead elements of the VJTF(L)
                                                         deploy.     Tactical RSOM planning is                     effective. Ex NOJP2 and the planning
Reception Staging and                                    the most time and resource pressured                      using a near-real world GRP tangibly
Onwards Movement Planning                                requirement in an emerging deployment                     demonstrates that the concepts of the
                                                         and will represent one of the greatest                    Readiness Action Plan, GRPs and the
Another notable challenge is timely and
                                                         risks to delivery of timely notice to effect.             VJTF as conceived at the Wales summit
effective tactical level Reception Staging
                                                                                                                   in 2014 and refined at Warsaw 2016, are
and Onwards Movement (RSOM)
planning. In all GRPs, the operational                   Incremental Deterrence and                                now being delivered as truly deployable
                                                         Balanced Force Packaging                                  and credible capabilities.
commander directs a tactical HQ to
undertake the tactical level RSOM                        The utility of the VJTF(L) in early
planning and then command the tactical                   deterrence was reinforced by planning                     ABOUT THE AUTHOR
execution of RSOM in the land domain.                    for Ex NOJP2. Only part of the VJTF(L)                    Col Richard Clements is ACOS G5 Plans
Whilst NATO doctrine is that this tactical               brigade deploy on Ex NOJP2 and the                        at HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps.
RSOM should be commanded by the                          deployment is being ‘played’ on the
Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG), a                   exercise as an incremental deployment,
lack of standing JLSG at high readiness                  with further simulated follow-on forces
precludes the JLSG from delivering                       deploying.     This design represents

                                                                                                                 ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS                        11
ARRC JOURNAL

THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE
OF A STRATCOM MINDSET?

Wg Cdr Peter Clarke (GBR-AF)

StratCom is now an established military buzzword, one which many use but few
understand. To make matters worse, we are now expected to adopt a ‘StratCom mindset’;
difficult if you aren’t really sure what StratCom is in the first place. So, what is a StratCom
Mindset and why does it matter?

Military Committee Policy                    ‘StratCom is not a stand-alone function,       policy, is to place responsibility with
The      recently   introduced    NATO       but it ensures the coherence and               the Chief StratCom (in the case of HQ
Military Committee Policy on Strategic       effectiveness of existing capabilities.        ARRC, Ch JFIB) for understanding,
Communications (MC0628) goes some            This model is most appropriate to the full     coordinating and synchronising all
way to bringing clarity to the issue. As     range of activities covering peacetime,        activity (words and deeds) that may have
noted in COS SHAPE’s letter to NATO          crisis and conflict in the modern security     a strategic communications effect on our
Command Structure (NCS) & NATO               environment’.                                  audiences and stakeholders; and a focus
Force Structure (NFS) Commanders1,                                                          that should be maintained throughout
                                             The cumulative effect of these two key
the Policy directs the introduction of a                                                    peace, crisis and conflict.
                                             statements, reinforced throughout the
separate pillar, grouping together all
communications disciplines and reporting
directly to the Commander, in order to
oversee and integrate information effects
‘during peace, crisis and conflict’. In
doing so, the policy recognises that the
information environment is already a
contested space, in which our potential
adversaries are already manoeuvring.
The Policy also redefines StratCom for
the NATO Military structure as:
‘the integration of communication
capabilities and the information staff
function with other military activities,
in order to understand and shape the
Information Environment (IE), in support
of NATO aims and objectives.’
Not only does this definition now focus
StratCom specifically towards the
strategic (NATO Aims and Objectives),
but it places equal emphasis on both the
activity and the outcomes.
The policy also goes on to say that:         The Operational Spectrum in the 21st Century

1 SH/SAG STC/AM17-318278 dated 17 Aug 17.

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What It’s Not                                    So Communications is an action, it              objectives; not an activity. Objectives
Before we look at what it is, let’s consider     requires only a sender. It is what you          should    wherever      possible     be
what StratCom is not.                            do.                                             achievable, measurable, focused on
                                                                                                 outcomes not outputs, and related to
• Not   (just) Public Affairs. While             Communication (noun): “The imparting
                                                                                                 changing attitudes and/or behaviour.
 Military Public Affairs (MPA) is often          or exchanging of information” “The
 the primary communications function             successful conveying or sharing of ideas        Audience Insight (The Who and
 for delivering StratCom effects, it is          and feelings”. The key element here is          Why)
 not StratCom. MPA conducts activity             the receiver – Communication is an              If we try to communicate with
 to deliver the effects assigned to it, but      effect, it is what is understood by the         everyone, all the time, all at once, we
 the identification, planning, sync, coord       receiver, it is what you achieve.               will fail. To achieve your objectives
 and measurement of those effects is             The final element in a basic                    will require an understanding of who
 conducted by the StratCom function.             understanding of communications theory          your key audiences and stakeholders
                                                                                                 are, and why. Identifying those who
                                                                                                 can help or hinder your ability to
                                                                                                 achieve your objective will enable
                                                                                                 effective communications activity and
                                                                                                 minimising wasted effort.
                                                                                                 Strategy/Idea (The What and When)
                                                                                                 Once we understand who can affect
                                                                                                 our outcome and why, we need to
                                                                                                 consider what effect we need to
                                                                                                 have on them and why. The effect
                                                                                                 could be one of change - attitudinal
                                                                                                 or behaviour – or it could be one
                                                                                                 of reinforcing existing beliefs and
                                                                                                 behaviours.
                                                                                                 Implementation (The How)
                                                                                                 It will be rare that we will be able to
Strategic Communication is everyone’s business                                                   have the desired effects on all our
                                                                                                 audiences from a single message
• Not (just) at Strategic level. Strategic       is to appreciate that what you say is not       delivered through a single channel.
 impact can come from the most tactical          always what is heard. To communicate            This means that, to be effective, our
 action. Commanders at all levels                effectively we need to understand our           messages should be tailored to our
 should ensure they have an advisor              audience, understand how they hear,             audiences and as much thought given
 whose role is to keep a weather eye             how they make sense of the world. For           to the channels (how we deliver the
 on the strategic situation and intervene        example, try telling an American that           message) as the message itself.
 should they believe a decision, however         walking on the pavement is the safest
 tactically sound, may have adverse              place to be!
 strategic impact.
• Not (just) someone else’s business.
 StratCom is everyone’s business. Our
 actions speak louder than our words,
 and the best scripted statements and
 media engagements will come to
 naught if our actions contradict them.
So, now we know what it’s not, let’s
consider what it is.

Communications Theory for                                                                                         Reassurance of Home
Beginners                                                                                                         and Host Nation
                                                                                                                  Audiences is vital to
To understand StratCom you have to                                                                                success on operations
understand its nature, and the importance        So, now we have an understanding of the         Evaluation and Scoring (the How
of language. That involves at least a little     ‘What’; we need to think about the ‘How’.       Good)
knowledge of communications theory.              For this, NATO has adopted the OASIS            Measurement       of     Performance
Communicate       (verb):    “Share   or         model for communications planning:              (MoP) is a straightforward exercise;
exchange information” “Succeed in                  Objectives (The Outcome)                      combining outputs and audience reach
conveying one’s ideas or in evoking                                                              to demonstrate message penetration.
understanding in others” In other words,           Like all activities, if you don’t know
                                                                                                 Unfortunately,    Measurement       of
to communicate requires a sender                   where you are going, you will
                                                                                                 Effect (MoE) is much more difficult; a
and a receiver.                                    probably end up somewhere else.
                                                                                                 merging of art and science, of insight
                                                   Effective StratCom planning has to
                                                                                                 and evaluation. This is an area into
Communications     (noun):   “Means                start with an clearly defined endstate
                                                                                                 which much time and effort is being
of sending or receiving information”.              and     supporting      communications
                                                                                                 devoted; but we’re not there yet.

                                                                                             ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS                  13
ARRC JOURNAL

                                                                                         Conclusion
                                                                                         A StratCom mindset has to:
                                    Objectives                                           • Start with a desired endstate not an
                                                                                          activity;
                                                                                         • Understand that communication is a
                                                                                          key objective to all activity, and that all
                                    Audience Insight                                      activity communicates;
     Review and refresh                                                                  • Be able to view our activities (both
     the approach after                                                                   words and deeds) through                       the
     each phase of the                                                                    audiences’ eyes, ears and brain.
     campaign                                                                            • Understand that sound tactical action
                                    Strategy/Idea                                         may have adverse strategic effects; we
                                                                                          may win the battle but lose the war!

                                                                                         ABOUT THE AUTHOR
                                                                                         Wg Cdr Peter Clarke is currently Chief
                                    Implementation                                       PAO in the Joint Fires and Influence
                                                                                         Branch at HQ Allied Rapid Corps.
      Feedback
      to optimise
      implementation
                                   Scoring/Evaluation

So What?                                     Strategy: While nationally, politicians
It is vital that all personnel in an         have no concerns messaging their
organisation understandand are aligned       populations to achieve a desired
to a StratCom mindset, thereby ensuring      effect, the same is not true of external
that finite resources are focussed on        organisations, however friendly. This
the desired end state and its supporting     gives the NFS a key role in enabling,
objectives. If they do not, energy and       coordinating and supporting bi-lateral
effort will be wasted on non-essential       NATO/National communications to their
activities, and well-meaning tactical        home audiences.
activity could undermine the strategic       Implementation: To be effective, NATO
intent. But what does this mean for the      communications need to be conducted
NATO Military structure?                     at all levels; making clear direction and
Objectives: NATO’s ‘raison d’etre’ is        delegation essential. NATO StratCom
the deterrence of potential adversaries,     Frameworks, correctly used, enable
and reassurance of alliance members          NCS/NFS personnel to effectively direct
and their populations. Both of these are     their organisations communications
communication effects – so NATO’s key        outputs; and to understand when and
output is communications. Consequently.      how to get direction if they are unsure.                 Deterrence of potential adversaries is a
                                                                                                                  fundamental role for NATO
Commanders at all levels need to ensure
that measurable effects for all activities
conducted by their organisation include
the delivery of one or both of these
effects; and communications form part of
all initial scoping and planning.
Audiences: NATO has 29 Allies,
numerous       partners,  and     several
potential adversaries. Those audiences
span a huge range of cultural, linguistic
and ethnic diversity; each with a deeply
ingrained narrative. Understanding each,
communicating with each, and ensuring
that those communications are mutually
supporting and do not contradict each
other is a huge task that can only be
done if Alliance and National capabilities
are brigaded and aligned; a role ideal for
the NFS.

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GENDER ADVISING AT
HQ ALLIED RAPID REACTION
CORPS – A SUCCESS STORY?

Capt Nina Schommers (DEU-A)

Adopting a gender perspective means considering the socially constructed attributes
of men, women, boys and girls, thus taking the entire population into account, whilst
recognising their differences. The point to prove is that the implementation of gender
perspective into the planning and conduct of military operations will have a positive
effect on immediate, and more importantly long term, mission success.

                                                                                                               officer. The focus of the GENAD,
                                                                                                               however, is directed outward. He or she
                                                                                                               observes the behaviour and the effects
                                                                                                               of a military unit in its assigned area of
                                                                                                               operations. GENADs focus on the civilian
                                                                                                               population in theatre, not on equality and
                                                                                                               equal rights within HQ ARRC or NATO
                                                                                                               Forces.
                                                                                                               “Women’s participation in global security
                                                                                                               isn’t a favour to women. There can be
                                                                                                               no lasting peace without equal inclusion
                                                                                                               of both men and women.” (Secretary
                                                                                                               General Stoltenberg, 2016).
                                                                                                               It is a fact that wars have different effects
                                                                                                               on men, women and children. All too
                                                                                                               often, conflicts cause great harm to the
                                                                                                               civilian population, especially to those
                                                                                                               who are particularly vulnerable. Gender-
Diversity - Representatives from 11 NATO headquarters, 12 nations, soldiers and civilians came together to     based crimes such as mass or gang
discuss the integration of the Gender Perspective within NATO
                                                                                                               rapes, trafficking of women and girls,
For this purpose, the position of Gender                of the GENAD at HQ ARRC is to raise                    slave trade, forced marriages and the
Advisor (GENAD) at HQ ARRC was                          awareness for gender-related issues.                   recruitment of child soldiers are often
introduced in 2014. During peacetime                    This includes clarifying the term and its              used as warfare strategies. This is why
establishment, the GENAD position is a                  impact on the conduct of operations.                   they have to be assessed as part of
part-time job which becomes a full-time                 HQ ARRC follows the NATO guidelines                    the enemy situation, just like the type,
position in exercises and missions, as                  on the subject and has now firmly                      strength and behaviour of the enemy
staff numbers are increased. A GENAD                    established its position as both an                    forces.
is the point of contact for the commander               advocate and a pioneer in the field of
                                                                                                               NATO has officially applied the gender
when it comes to gender-specific issues                 gender at the highest tactical level.
                                                                                                               perspective since 2009. The work is
during missions.
                                                        Why is the Integration of the                          based on NATO’s Bi-SC Directive 40-1
Viewing operations from a different angle                                                                      (“Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender
                                                        Gender Perspective Important
turned out to be a real necessity for HQ                                                                       Perspectives in the NATO Command
ARRC for the first time in 2015, when it
                                                        for HQ ARRC?                                           Structure Including Measures for
assumed its role as a Joint Task Force.                 Often, the GENAD is associated or even                 Protection during Armed Conflict”). The
At the moment, the most important job                   confused with an equal opportunities                   directive determines that the gender

                                                                                                             ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS                15
ARRC JOURNAL

aspect has to be considered in the early             in conflicts to a significantly lesser                “female searchers”, as part of female
planning stages of operations. Thus, it              extent than men – into the post-conflict              engagement teams (FET) or mixed
is the duty of the HQ ARRC GENAD to                  peace and reconstruction process via                  engagement teams (MET). Through the
be involved in the working and planning              networking and inclusion measures. The                inclusion of women, all measures can
process from the beginning until the                 aim of integrating the gender aspect is to            contribute to a better understanding of
end. He or she provides support through              expand the military sphere of influence               the operational environment and the
                                                     by gaining more information and a more                protection of forces.
                                                     complete operational picture.
                                                                                                           The Integration of the Gender
“Women’s                                             Gender in NATO Missions                               Perspective at HQ ARRC
participation in global                              Abroad                                                To guarantee that the gender perspective
                                                     Current operations such as KFOR in                    is taken into account across the
security isn’t a favour                              Kosovo and RSM in Afghanistan have                    whole HQ, all Branches have Gender
to women. There                                      already seen the successful integration               Focal Points (GFP). The GFPs act as
                                                     of GENADs. While these positions are                  multipliers and sensors for the GENAD.
can be no lasting                                    manned by individual nations, they ensure             In addition to completing an online-
                                                     that NATO as a whole has integrated                   based NATO training programme, they
peace without equal                                  the gender aspect into deployments.                   are offered courses on the subject of
inclusion of both men                                Not every nation necessarily needs to                 “gender in operations” and learn what
                                                     provide such a position. For example                  to watch out for in their respective field.
and women.”                                          during ARRC’s time as the NRF in 2017                 They provide the GENAD with access
                                                     Spanish, British, Italian, Czech and other            to their department and he or she can
Secretary General Stoltenberg, 2016                  military units had to report to the HQ. All           benefit from their expertise. Together
                                                     those countries have trained GENADs,                  they ensure that the military action taken
                                                     as do 21 out of the 29 NATO member                    by the HQ incorporates the gender
specialised expertise, similar to the                states. Whether one of their GENADs                   perspective.
political advisor (POLAD) and cultural               would actually be available in the event
advisor (CULAD). This can, for instance,                                                                   In its role as a Corps HQ, ARRC is
                                                     of an operational deployment however,
take the form of contributions or annexes                                                                  the highest tactical level of command.
                                                     could not be determined.
to Operation Orders. These can deal with                                                                   Specific points of contact with the
everything from general gender aspects in            The number of women in theatre – or                   population in theatre however are to be
operations, sex desegregated reporting,              rather the fact that there are female                 found at lower levels of command. Ideally
sexual and gender based violence as                  soldiers available for NATO missions                  and in the future, the HQ should further
well as the code of conduct in the area of           at all – is important for many different              intensify cooperation on gender issues
operation. Another aspect of their job is to         reasons. Depending on the mission                     with its subordinate units. The network of
integrate women – who often participate              and the security situation, female                    GENADs and GFPs must reach all the
                                                     soldiers are needed and employed as                   way down to the lowest tactical level, in

A First - In May 2017 HQ ARRC hosted the 8th ACO Gender Conference. Mandated by SHAPE, this was the first time the conference was hosted by a Corps level HQ.

16      ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS
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