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Kerr, K. 2020. Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments:
 stability                              The Case of Colombia. Stability: International Journal of
                                        Security & Development, 9(1): 5, pp. 1–21. DOI: https://doi.
                                        org/10.5334/sta.720

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War
Environments: The Case of Colombia
Katie Kerr

Countries emerging from armed conflict often experience heightened violence and
youth gang activity. Following the signing of peace accords with the ­Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia — People’s Army (FARC-EP), what are Colombia’s risks
in terms of youth gangs? To assess these risks, this article draws from gang
research and literature on post-war violence to identify six factors that recur in
post-war environments and are likely to fuel a rise in gangs: illicit economies and
criminal networks, exposure to violence, marginalization, social ­disorganization,
security gaps and state responses, and former combatants. After analyzing
Colombia’s risks with reference to each of these, the article concludes that the
­strengthening ties between youth gangs and Colombia’s illicit economies, mediated
 by adult-run ­criminal networks, increase gang numbers and violence. Moreover,
 some ­disadvantaged, urban neighborhoods are vulnerable to gang escalation due
 to the effects on local youths of protracted violent exposure, marginalization, and
 social disorganization. Finally, while ex-combatant recidivism and security gaps are
 prominent concerns in Colombia, they are not expected to contribute significantly
 to youth gang dynamics in urban areas.

Introduction                                       and the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército
In November 2016, the Colombian govern­            Popular de Liberación — EPL) (International
ment signed a peace accord with the                Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] 2019),
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia —           while many former FARC-EP strongholds are
People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolu­             experiencing a return to violence (Fundación
cionarias de Colombia – Ejército del               Paz y Reconciliación -Peace and Reconciliation
Pueblo — FARC-EP), the country’s largest           Foundation [PARES] 2019).
guerrilla group. Over three years later, mul­        That post-accord Colombia does not fit
tiple armed conflicts are still under way in       neatly with any common-sense concept of
the country, involving FARC-EP ‘dissident’ or      post-war is not unusual. Countries emerging
successor elements, the National Liberation        from armed conflict often see an escalation
Army (Ejército Nacional de Liberación — ELN),      in violent crime, which can topple peace pro­
the Clan del Golfo (also referred to as Urabeños   cesses. Even when a negotiated settlement
or Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia),     holds up, protracted insecurity precludes
                                                   real recovery and erodes support for peace
                                                   (Darby 2006). In an effort to reconcile such
Independent, US                                    tendencies with a ‘post-conflict situation,’
katiekerr@hotmail.com
Art. 5, page 2 of 21                              Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments

Brown, Langer and Stewart (2011: 4–5) sug­          ethnographic, case study, and quantitative
gest that post-conflict is best understood as       research analyzing risk for gang recruitment
a process continuum that can suffer regress.        and intensification, including compara­
Colombia’s peace accord, ceasefire, and             tive research on other forms of organized
demobilization of most FARC-EP members              youth violence to supplement gang-specific
are milestones on that continuum, represent­        research in developing country contexts.
ing a significant reduction in political vio­       I then reviewed the growing body of litera­
lence and creating space for peacebuilding.         ture on post-war violence to identify recur­
   I worked in Colombia for the International       ring features of post-war environments that
Organization for Migration (IOM)1 from 2000         intersect with major risk factors for gangs.
to 2002, during the peak of paramilitary vio­       This exercise generated a short list of risks
lence, and again from 2011 to 2017, during          that were likely to emerge in the aftermath
the FARC-EP negotiations and the start of           of armed conflict and to contribute to gang
peace implementation. My work involved              intensification. Finally, each of these factors
ex-combatant reintegration, rehabilitation          was applied to the Colombian context, taking
of child soldiers, and prevention of child          account of its experience of armed conflict,
recruitment into illegal armed groups. After        the overall security context, and youth gang
the FARC-EP accord was signed, the ques­            dynamics drawn from academic and institu­
tion of Colombia’s susceptibility to youth          tional literature, media reports, and personal
violence was a frequent subject of debate           communications with Colombian experts.
within the peacebuilding community. Since              This paper is presented in three main
the rise of maras in post-war Central America       parts. The first one provides an overview of
was both the closest-at-hand and most noto­         Colombia’s current security environment and
rious example of gang intensification in the        gangs. The second part mines studies of gangs
aftermath of civil conflicts, these discussions     for major risk factors and the newer literature
often turned to how Colombia was — or,              on post-war violence to posit — where these
more often, was not — perceived as similar to       two bodies of scholarship intersect — prob­
El Salvador and Guatemala in the mid-1990s.         able risk factors for post-war gang escalation.
   This framing seemed to fall short. Post-         The third part analyzes Colombia’s risks with
war gang intensification has been observed          reference to each of these factors. The article
across continents and has historical roots.         concludes that some disadvantaged, urban
In addition to El Salvador (Cruz 2005, 2014),       neighborhoods in Colombia are vulnerable
Guatemala (Demoscopia 2007; Kurtenbach              to increased gang activity in light of their
2008), and Nicaragua (Rodgers 2003, 2012),          prolonged exposure to violence, marginaliza­
increased gang activity has been reported in        tion, social disorganization, and the strength
post-war and transition settings in Europe          of illicit economies. Ex-combatant recidivism
after World War II (Cavan and Cavan 1968;           and security gaps, though acute in Colombia,
Fyvel 1961) as well as in South Africa (Covey       do not represent a first-order threat of escalat­
2010; Jensen 2014), Sierra Leone (Utas 2014),       ing urban street gangs. Moreover, Colombian
East Timor (Timor Leste Armed Violence              authorities may attenuate these risks by
2009), Cambodia (Kurtenbach 2012), Nepal            expanding preventive measures grounded in
(Upreti et al. 2010), and Haiti (Kolbe 2013).       citizen security and avoiding overly repres­
   While these accounts often describe the          sive, militaristic approaches that have exacer­
impacts of armed conflict and peace on              bated gang violence elsewhere.
local gang dynamics, what is missing is a
framework for identifying those features of         Colombia’s Security Landscape
post-war situations that are most likely to         Traditional FARC-EP strongholds with sig­
fuel a rise in gang numbers and violence. To        nificant criminal assets, like coca crops and
develop such a framework, I first reviewed          illegal mines, have been hard hit by post-war
Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments                               Art. 5, page 3 of 21

violence as different criminal actors have            and has 2,500 members (ibid.). The FARC
scrambled to fill the vacuum. PARES (2019)            ‘dissident’ or successor groups have also
reports that 107 municipalities of the 242            strengthened, with estimates in August 2019
vacated by the FARC had suffered a significant        of over 2,200 members, including at least
incursion by other criminal actors by August          400 new recruits, spread across 23 groups
2019. In these municipalities, the homi­              and active in 85 municipalities (ibid.). Recent
cide rate increased enough in 2018 to offset          high-level defections from the peace process
reductions elsewhere and raise the national           and calls to rearm by demobilized command­
murder rate for the first time since the peace        ers may herald greater military and ideologi­
talks started in 2012 (Castillo, Lleras, and          cal consolidation among these groups (The
Suarez 2018).                                         Economist 2019b).
   Underlying these developments is a crimi­             Colombian politics shifted to the right in
nal underworld that feeds off the cocaine             2018 with the election of a president who
trade. Coca production increased throughout           opposed the peace process throughout his
the peace talks and the start of peace imple­         campaign. President Iván Duque’s adminis­
mentation, breaking historic records in 2016          tration launched a new national security pol­
and again in 2017 (Asmann 2018). According            icy in 2019 that favors military solutions over
to the Ideas for Peace Foundation (Fundación          negotiated settlements with armed groups
Ideas para la Paz — FIP), a Colombian                 like the ELN and Clan del Golfo (Alonso and
think tank, the rise is partly attributable to        Robbins 2019). The policy is largely focused
increased output by small-scale farmers in            on rural strategies and is unlikely to impact
anticipation of volunteer eradication pro­            security conditions in cities (The Economist
gramming that many believed would com­                2019a).
pensate farmers based on their production
(Llorente and Garzón 2018). Although the              Colombia’s gangs
number of coca-growing crops levelled off in          For the purposes of this discussion, youth
2018, more intensive cultivation meant that           or street gangs are groups that display some
production continued to rise (Colombian               continuity over time, engage in illegal behav­
Observatory of Organized Crime 2019).                 ior, and consist mostly of members under the
   The ICRC (2019) identified five ongoing            age of 25 (Rodgers and Hazen 2014: 8). The
armed conflicts in Colombia. Four involve             gangs that first appeared in Colombia in the
the Colombian army against illegal armed              1960s were hierarchical, with large member­
groups: the ELN, the EPL, the Clan de Golfo,          ships and territories, and well-established
and successor FARC-EP groups. The fifth               rituals (Perea 2007). Starting in the 1980s,
refers to a conflict between the EPL and              however, these gangs have undergone con­
the ELN. The five conflicts are in addition           tinuous transformations, and vary from
to the ‘other situations of violence’2 identi­        one city to another, depending largely on
fied in numerous cities, such as Medellín,            the city’s relationship with armed conflict
Buenaventura, Cali, and Tumaco (ibid.).               and illicit economies. The number of gangs
   The ELN has grown in numbers, territory,           has increased over time, but they generally
and capabilities since the signing of the             have fewer members and control smaller ter­
accord, rising from 1,100 to 3,000 combat­            ritories (Semana 2018). Their structures are
ants and establishing a presence in 35 new            looser and more horizontal, and the old rules
municipalities (101 to 136 out of a total of          and rituals have largely disappeared (Perea
1,122 municipalities in Colombia) (PARES              2007; Semana 2018). They are also more
2019). The Clan del Golfo, the strongest of           violent, more criminal, and better armed,
the so-called bacrim, or criminal bands, has          especially in those cities where links to the
also expanded into 26 new municipalities,             adult criminal world are strongest (Resource
up from 276 when the accord was signed,               Center for Conflict Analysis [CERAC] 2014).
Art. 5, page 4 of 21                               Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments

   In its recent report on gangs in seven cit­       to focus on gangs’ (Perea 2007: 14). When a
ies, Colombia’s Ministry of Justice (MOJ)            Colombian senator brought the issue up for
observed that contradictory estimates,               parliamentary debate in 2017, he remarked
incomplete data, and divergent methods               that the gang threat grew without notice while
made it impossible to estimate the number            the country worried about the armed conflict
of gangs and their members in Colombia               (HSB Noticias 2017).
(MOJ 2017). The ministry hazarded to say
that in the seven cities in its study, there may     Understanding the Risks:
be some 1,200 gangs with 21,000 members              Contributions from Gang Research
(ibid.). Credible research from other sources        and Literature on Post-war Violence
suggests that gangs are viewed as problem­           Risk factor analysis in gang studies
atic in at least 12 Colombian cities, with Cali      Risk factors here refer to experiences and
and Medellín at the top of the list (El Tiempo       characteristics that increase the probability
2015; Semana 2018). Gang activity is concen­         that a young person will join a gang. Gang-
trated in crowded neighborhoods set apart            related risk is often discussed on two levels:
from the city, with low-quality education            at the micro level, research looks at risk across
and jobs, where young people are effectively         five domains of the individual, family, school,
excluded from the practices of citizenship           peer group, and community; the macro level
(MOJ 2017). Gang members tend to come                takes on the larger forces at work in society
from dysfunctional families with high rates          — the ecology that surrounds and shapes the
of domestic violence; they typically neither         smaller domains (Howell and Griffiths 2016).
work nor go to school (Semana 2018).                    Much of the evidence-rich analysis on risk
   With some exceptions, Colombia’s gangs            has emerged from the US, which benefits
are not as persistent or rooted as many gangs        from the ‘longest and densest’ gang scholar­
in Central America or the US, but they may be        ship in the world (Rodgers and Hazen 2014:
on a development path that is headed in that         9). While there is substantial research on
direction. In his historical analysis of street      gangs from Central America, and, to a lesser
gangs, Howell (2015) mapped five phases              extent, from South Africa and Brazil, much
that describe the development of gangs in            of this literature lacks the statistical rigor to
much of the US. The path starts with social          pinpoint and assess predictors of gang mem­
disorganization in phase 1 and low neighbor­         bership. Comparative research on youth
hood and family control in phase 2, followed         engagement in a broader sample of armed
by the formation of gangs in phase 3 and the         groups, like Dowdney’s (2005) research on
interplay with ‘gang violence facilitators’ like     youth involved in organized armed violence,
drug trafficking and weapons availability in         can help fill the gap.
phase 4, and culminates with widespread,                While findings from global literature must
transformed gangs in phase 5 (ibid.: 76–94).         be applied cautiously to the Colombian case,
Many Colombian gangs would be classified in          risk profiles across countries and group types
phase 3 or 4, but almost all gangs in Medellín       are surprisingly similar (Dowdney 2005;
and some in Cali meet the description for            Hagedorn 2008). It is possible to identify
phase 5. Nationally, the major gang violence         core risk factors supported by solid evidence
facilitators have been adult armed groups            from the US and emerging support from
that bring drugs and weapons, and also gen­          other countries. Drawing from Howell and
erate the cultural conditions for violence.          Griffiths (2016) and Thornberry et al. (2003)
   While cities like Medellín and Cali have          in the US, as well as the Small Arms Survey
made sustained efforts to address youth gangs,       (2010), Higginson et al. (2018), Dowdney
national government attention to gang issues         (2005) and Covey (2010) for international
is relatively new, in part because the ‘complex­     perspectives, the following factors may be
ity of the armed conflict did not leave space        relevant to gangs in Colombia.
Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments                                Art. 5, page 5 of 21

   In the individual domain, prior involvement        communities are uprooted, schools are
with violence and drugs; antisocial attitudes,        destroyed, firearms are cheap, and social
including the belief that aggression is neces­        bonds are tenuous. Three areas of major risk
sary to resolve conflict; traumatic life experi­      identified in gang literature that feature heav­
ences, especially victimization or exposure to        ily in post-war settings are discussed below.
substantial violence; as well as being young,
marginalized, and male, increase the risk of          Exposure to violence
gang involvement. Within families, economic           One explanation for the noted rise in homi­
disadvantage, domestic violence, family dys­          cide during and after wars is that wars change
function, and gang membership within the              societal norms and attitudes toward non-
home are risk factors. In the school domain,          combat violence (Archer and Gartner 1976).
low educational attainment and attachment             The rationale is that people whose daily lives
to school, together with dropping out, are            are imbued with violence will cease to see
associated with higher rates of gang involve­         violent acts as exceptional, while the tradi­
ment. Regarding peers, having friends in a            tional prohibitions on violence lose cred­
gang is one of the strongest factors in the US        ibility when they are breached repeatedly
and elsewhere. At the community level, high-          without consequence. The effects deepen
risk neighborhoods tend to be urban and               over time: as people become inured to vio­
marginalized, with few opportunities, scarce          lence, they are quicker to commit — and
services, and inadequate security provision.          slower to punish — violent acts (Bos 2013).
Firearms and drugs are often on hand, and             Increased violence reaffirms its normality
the bonds among neighbors are weak.                   and erodes communal capacities to resolve
   More research on the risk factors for gang         conflicts pacifically, further entrenching
involvement for girls and young women                 violence into day-to-day affairs (Steenkamp
is needed (Howell and Griffiths 2016;                 2009). Violence imprints on value systems
Organization of American States [OAS] 2007).          as well as emotional and moral lives, thereby
Research to date suggests that risk profiles          leaving a ‘legacy’ that makes violence more
overlap, but some factors weigh more heav­            likely in the aftermath of war (ibid.: 8).
ily in girls’ decisions to join a gang, including        Persistent violence has serious consequences
domestic violence and sexual abuse (Kinnear           for young people whose development, sociali­
2009; Taylor 2008), early sexualized behav­           zation, and transitions to adulthood are
iors, and difficulties in school (Howell and          threatened. Kurtenbach (2012: 8) explains that
Griffiths 2016; Thornberry et al. 2003).              for a young person ‘whose identity has been
   At the macro level, Thrasher’s (1927) views        shaped by the experience of violence and a
on social disorganization resonate with the           lack of even rudimentary forms of security,
international literature. Social disorganization      the development of a stable personality will
describes a situation in which conventional           be much more difficult.’ She further describes
institutions like families, schools, and neigh­       how conflict alters or destroys the sources of
borhood structures lose the ability to control        socialization — families, schools, peers, media,
delinquency. Such disorganization results             institutions — and creates obstacles for transi­
from rapid and unpredictable change that              tions to adulthood (Kurtenbach 2012).
dismantles old institutions without giving               The consequences of youth exposure to,
new ones a chance to consolidate (Hagedorn            victimization by, and participation in vio­
2008). The impact on gangs is twofold: com­           lence on future behavior are echoed in the
munities lose the power to mediate juvenile           gang literature. In their statistical analysis
misconduct and gangs emerge to provide the            of children aged nine to fifteen years in dis­
missing order (Papachristos and Kirk 2006).           advantaged neighborhoods in a midwestern
   Most of these risks are heightened in post-        city, Patchin et al. (2006), find that those
war environments: families are fragmented,            who were more exposed through personal
Art. 5, page 6 of 21                               Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments

experience to community violence self-               to exclude young newcomers, especially
reported higher rates of weapon possession           in communities under strain. The UN has
and aggressive behavior. Youths who witness          noted that refugees and internally displaced
firearm violence are about twice as likely to        persons are at increased risk of recruitment
engage in serious violence within the follow­        by armed groups due to the discrimination
ing two years (Bingenheimer, Brennan, and            and deprivation many confront (UN 2015;
Earls 2005). Writing about gang dynamics             IOM 2017). For forced migrants, the element
in Central America, Cruz (2005) views the            of negative change may increase the risk
ubiquity of violence in the home and school          of gang involvement beyond the usual cor­
lives of many poor, urban youths as a key            relates of marginalization. Cruz (2014) cites
to understanding the extreme violence dis­           research in El Salvador that suggests that
played by the maras.                                 young people who are forced to move into
                                                     poor neighborhoods or drop out of school
Marginalization                                      are more susceptible to joining a gang than
The concept of marginalization refers to             those who have always been poor and never
pushing certain people and groups out of             gone to school.
mainstream society, away from opportuni­
ties, and relegating them to the economic,           Social disorganization
social, and geographic ‘fringes of society’          Post-war research in countries involved in
(Vigil 2002: 7). It can facilitate gang par­         World War II identified a cross-national rise
ticipation when marginalized youths look             in juvenile delinquency and an intensifica­
to the gang for a sense of belonging, social         tion of gang activity (Fyvel 1961). Cavan
recognition, and success. Marginalization            and Cavan (1968) found that juvenile delin­
is rife in countries coming out of conflict.         quency increased during and after World War
The structural conditions that underlie              II even in countries that were not exposed to
marginalization, such as economic inequal­           combat or occupation. War destroyed social
ity, political exclusion, social divisiveness,       institutions and ‘postwar conditions brought
and discrimination, are at the root of many          new problems’ (ibid.: 195). Through the
civil conflicts. These conditions are rarely         lens of gang studies, the picture that forms
resolved — and are frequently exacerbated —          is social disorganization on a massive scale,
by wars that act as ‘development in reverse’         with the corollary impairment of traditional
(Collier 2007: 27). Internal wars often reduce       mechanisms to control youth delinquency.
incomes, exports, investment, and food pro­             Although the battles of many internal
duction and they weaken government and               wars take place in rural areas, civil conflict is
social institutions; their costs are rarely dis­     linked to urban social disorder (IOM 2015).
tributed equitably, and internal wars can            Conflict chaos enters cities when armed
increase individual and horizontal inequality        actors use cities to recruit, restock, and recu­
(Fakuda-Parr 2011).                                  perate; war-fueled criminal networks set up
   Furthermore, forced migration produced            shop in urban areas; economic losses impact
by war often exacerbates marginalization.            on urban livelihoods; and depleted state
Migrants can face discrimination and stigma          resources mean fewer or worse services in
upon arrival in new communities (IOM                 cities, including security services.
2015), compounding the difficulties of social           Internal displacement also interacts with
and economic integration. Immigrant youth            social disorganization. According to IOM’s
are especially vulnerable to marginaliza­            World Migration Report for 2015, forced
tion (Vigil 2002). Differences in language,          migrants often move into cities for safety and
culture, religion, ethnicity (van Gemert and         opportunities. Cities that are already reeling
Decker 2013), rural backgrounds, and per­            from the urban impacts of conflict are ill-
ceived political loyalties are used as grounds       equipped to meet the basic needs of new
Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments                                Art. 5, page 7 of 21

residents. These migrants may be required to          war economies (Geneva Declaration 2008),
start new lives in informal, poorly planned,          weak governance, gaps in public security,
and spatially segregated neighborhoods with           mass trauma (Boyle 2014), former combat­
numerous risks, including violence (ibid.).           ants, and widespread availability of arms
IOM also suggests that urban mobility is              (Kreutz, Marsh, and Torre 2012). Although
more likely to expose newcomers to violence           each of these could contribute to collective
when migration is forced, likely due to the           youth violence, the following discussion is
‘disintegration of established community              focused on three post-conflict features that
dynamics that provide a degree of control             intersect in obvious and recurring ways with
over crimes’ (ibid.: 78).                             youth gangs.
   Human mobility patterns around war may
also connect with gangs by facilitating the           Security gaps and state responses
transmission of gang cultures and meth­               States struggle to establish adequate secu­
ods (Maxson 1998). For example, during El             rity in the aftermath of conflict for at least
Salvador’s conflict, hundreds of thousands of         five reasons. First, some war-ending accords
Salvadoran families became refugees in the            call for security sector reform, which can
US. As a response to intense, layered margin­         debilitate enforcement capabilities in the
alization, and their need for protection, some        short term (Stanley 2000). Second, where
Salvadoran youth joined gangs, including the          law enforcement efforts have been focused
MS-13 and 18th Street gangs (Vigil 2002).             narrowly on winning a war, the state may be
Starting in 1996, the US increased deporta­           short on the skills required for peacetime
tion of Salvadorans, including an unknown             policing (Malan 2000). Third, a state may be
— but significant — number of gang mem­               unable to move into zones previously domi­
bers (ibid.). On arriving in El Salvador, these       nated by non-state actors fast enough to fill
youths again found themselves culturally              a security vacuum (Boyle 2014). Fourth, if
dislocated and marginalized, with the added           police played a combat role during conflict,
stigma of gang membership (Covey 2010).               communities may be resentful or untrusting
They transmitted to El Salvador’s street gangs        (Malan 2000). Fifth, conflicts often take a toll
the organizational culture, brutal violence,          on national revenues, which has impacts on
and brands of their US-based gangs (Cruz              service delivery across sectors, including law
2014; Rodgers and Baird 2015).                        enforcement.
                                                         The resulting security gap leaves some
Contributions from literature on violence             parts of a country or groups feeling vulner­
after wars                                            able to violence or crime, which incentiv­
The frequency with which countries emerg­             izes gangs. Young people frequently cite the
ing from armed conflict see security condi­           search for protection as motivation for their
tions worsen during peacetime lends support           entry into gangs (Howell and Griffiths 2016).
to Boyle’s hypothesis that the experience of          Further, residents who feel that the state
war changes the landscape for violent actors          cannot provide for their safety may seek out
and ‘primes’ post-conflict states for high lev­       non-state security providers, including street
els of violence (Boyle 2014: 52). Research            gangs (Geneva Declaration 2008).
across countries converges around common                 Faced with a security gap and a perceived
drivers of violence in post-conflict situations,      gang problem, many states have added fuel
including the presence of ‘spoilers’ who use          to the fire by adopting repressive, militaris­
violence to prevent peace (Stedman 2000),             tic tactics under the label of zero tolerance.
inadequate social services and infrastruc­            It is easy to see how a country emerging
ture, high rates of unemployment, property-           from armed conflict could follow a path
related disputes, changes in power relations          of least resistance from a war against, say,
and the emergence of power vacuums, illegal           insurgents, to a war against gangs. Hagedorn
Art. 5, page 8 of 21                             Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments

(2008) observed how one war replaced the           recidivism, while educational attainment,
other in El Salvador. Wartime leaders who          family bonds (including having children),
retain overt or behind-the-scenes power may        and effective policing reduced risks (ibid.).
well be more comfortable with militaristic           These same risk factors for recidivism can
approaches or see these as one way to main­        spur young former fighters to form gangs
tain status in a shifting political landscape      (Marcy 2014). Rodgers (2012) described how
(Mani 2000; Stanley 2000).                         demobilized youth in Nicaragua, Guatemala,
   If post-war settings make zero tolerance a      and El Salvador responded to insecurity and
more likely choice by lawmakers, they also         exclusion by starting territorial gangs or pan­
render it a less promising one. Dowdney            dillas to protect themselves and their neigh­
(2005) found that such policies routinely fail     borhoods. He observed that while gangs
in countries lacking social investment and         predated civil conflict in these countries, the
economic opportunities, which are recurring        ex-combatants brought weapons and mili­
features in post-war contexts. Cruz (2014:         tary skills, resulting in better organization
124) described how El Salvador’s harsh anti-       and more violence (ibid.). In Sierra Leone,
gang laws — interwoven with the ‘politics          street gangs that formed following independ­
of violence’ or the institutions, actors, and      ence were recruited into combat roles dur­
policies that made extreme violence nor­           ing the civil war in 1991 (Hagedorn 2008).
mal among youth gangs — played a decisive          According to Utas (2014), in the aftermath
part in the evolution of El Salvador’s maras.      of war, demobilized child and young soldiers
In post-war settings where violence has            recreated gang structures and infused them
become engrained in institutional and com­         with more serious violence learned during
munity culture, zero tolerance pits the gangs      war.
against almost everyone. As Thrasher (1927)
observed, conflict forges the gangs, deepens       Illicit economies and criminal networks
the bond, and incentivizes better organiza­        The criminal underworld is a major factor
tion to survive the onslaught (Howell and          in the prolongation of armed conflict and
Griffiths 2016).                                   the persistence of violence after hostilities
                                                   end. Boyle (2014) described how criminal
Former combatants                                  networks can proliferate during wars where
Former fighters sometimes challenge post-          weak law enforcement is coupled with high
war security with harmful behaviors that           societal tolerance for violence. Parties to a
range from thuggery to derailing a peace           conflict often engage heavily in illicit com­
process (Gamba 2006; Wessells and Jonah            mercial activity, first to fulfill military goals
2006). Based on his research in Congo and          and later, often, as an end in itself.
Sierra Leone, Themnér (2011) concluded                Illegal economies are dominated by adult
that former fighters from groups that lacked       structures designed primarily to perpetrate
economic opportunities, felt threatened,           crime. Youth gangs are not the same thing.
failed to reintegrate politically, retained        Generally, their members are younger and
access to weapons, and lived in insecure set­      they sustain a mix of criminal and non-
tings were more likely to rearm. Kaplan and        criminal purposes (Covey 2010). With some
Nussio (2016) were able to identify risk fac­      important exceptions, youth gangs rarely
tors in the individual domain by tracking          play leadership roles within illegal econo­
recidivism among a sample of almost 1,500          mies, in part because gangs have typically
Colombian former fighters. They found that         lacked the discipline, organizational skill,
having strong personal reasons for joining         and diligence to compete with more sophis­
the group, the duration of a combatant’s           ticated criminal networks (Hagedorn 2008;
stay with the armed group, and resettlement        Kinnear 2009). However, the effects of illegal
in areas with criminal bands correlate with        economies on gangs are powerful. Hagedorn
Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments                                Art. 5, page 9 of 21

(2008: 37) described how organized crime              Third, youth gangs’ relationships with organ­
‘bends the form of area youth gangs to the            ized crime have transformed — and continue
needs of older armed groups.’                         to transform — youth gangs, with harmful
  Drugs, in particular, have altered gangs in         consequences for youths, their communities,
ways that make them more problematic all              and national security.
over the world. Drug use is rampant in many              In general terms, Colombian street gangs
gangs and dealing is increasingly common in           are younger, bounded to a smaller territory,
many contexts (Covey 2010; Kinnear 2009;              and combine criminal activity with some
Rodgers and Baird 2015). Escalating violence          social, identity, and noncriminal interests
by gangs is often attributed to their involve­        that set them apart from criminal bands and
ment in the drug trade (Jütersonke, Muggah            drug-trafficking organizations (CERAC 2014;
and Rodgers 2009). Looking at gangs together          Giraldo et al. 2015). These gangs are also
with other organized armed groups that                more visible than their adult counterparts;
involve children, Dowdney (2005) noted how            they call attention to themselves and seek
the demands of drug dealing make groups               the recognition that comes from public mis­
more territorial, combative, and violent.             behaving (Covey 2010; Perea 2007). Even in
                                                      Medellín, where distinctions between organ­
The Impact of Identified Risks on                     ized crime and youth gangs are at their murki­
Gang Development in Colombia                          est (Semana 2018), the youth gangs or combos
Six major risk factors for post-war gang              are distinguishable from older, more power­
intensification were identified in the discus­        ful criminal groups. Blattman et al. (2019)
sion above: illicit economies and criminal            explain the relationships and points of differ­
networks, exposure to violence, marginaliza­          ence between the city’s street gangs or com­
tion, social disorganization, security gaps and       bos and its more powerful, mafia-like groups
state responses, and former combatants. The           or razones. Based on interviews with combo
following discussion situates these factors in        and razón leaders, administrative crime data,
the Colombian context to gauge their rele­            and surveys of city residents, they observe that
vance and assess the risks of gang escalation.        combo members are typically youths under
                                                      the age of 25 who come from and reside in
Illicit economies and criminal networks               the neighborhood where the combo is active
Among the post-war ills that can contribute           (ibid.). Razones manage broader, often non-
to gang growth, Colombia’s gravest con­               contiguous territories, and are primarily made
cern comes from organized criminal activ­             up of men aged between 30 and 50 years who
ity around the production and distribution            tend to live in Medellín’s more affluent neigh­
of cocaine and other illegal markets. These           borhoods (ibid.).
include illegal gold extraction, extortion,              In many Colombian cities, criminal bands,
arms trafficking, and contraband (InSight             drug-trafficking organizations, mafia-like
Crime 2018). To assess this factor in the             structures, or intermediaries hire gang mem­
Colombian context, it is necessary to under­          bers for a variety of criminal tasks. Gang
stand how gangs relate to these markets               members provide labor for local drug sales,
and the criminal networks that dominate               and act as messengers, lookouts, transport­
them. Their interactions vary enormously              ers, dealers, debt collectors, and contract
between cities, but the three defining char­          killers, but generally do not play leadership
acteristics explored below are generally true         roles in domestic or international markets
in Colombia. First, youth gangs can be dis­           (CERAC 2014; Ordóñez Valverde 2017).
tinguished from the adult actors that domi­           Within these adult groups, gang members
nate the criminal underworld. Second, gang            are generally treated as ‘expendable’ (Bargent
members sometimes participate, but rarely             2015), and their access to upper manage­
play leadership roles, in organized crime.            ment is restricted (Semana 2018). In cities
Art. 5, page 10 of 21                             Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments

like Medellín and Cali, where recruitment by        or being squeezed out by them. The MOJ
adult groups is highly structured, many gang        (2017: 213) suggests that the gangs’ relative
members communicate only with interme­              autonomy and fights for territory may soon
diaries without learning the identity of their      be ‘a thing of the past.’ Gang transformations
employer (Durán-Martínez 2018). Youths in           are occurring at different rates and degrees
gangs are attractive recruits because of their      among Colombia’s cities. The process is most
knowledge of urban geography and warfare            advanced in Medellín (CERAC 2014, MOJ
(Riaño-Alcala 2006), as well as their inno­         2017), where the vast majority of combos are
vation, creativity, and technological skills        dedicated to criminal purposes and subordi­
(Semana 2018). Such recruitment is not new          nate to older, more powerful actors in organ­
in Colombia, but the practice has increased         ized crime (Blattman et al. 2019).
since the 1990s as criminal structures have             In Cali, where gangs and adult groups
fragmented (Bargent 2015) and sought to             have likewise co-existed for several decades,
exploit growing domestic markets in cocaine         the police believe that 31 of an estimated
and marijuana (ibid.).                              104 gangs city-wide have been co-opted
   There are two common patterns of recruit­        by criminal organizations, while others
ment in Colombia. In one, gang members are          retain some autonomy (MOJ 2017). The Cali
recruited by an adult organization, based on        Mayor’s Office finds support for these esti­
their reputation for violence and capabilities      mates in its implementation of an exem­
navigating and securing territory, to perform       plary program to reduce gang involvement.
services connected to local drug sales, includ­     Rocío Gutiérrez Cely, Cali’s Peace and Citizen
ing street-level dealing and transportation         Culture Secretary (2016–2019) explains that
(Ordóñez Valverde 2017). As these gang mem­         the program team has been able to inter­
bers prove themselves, they may be assigned         vene in about 70 per cent of the city’s gangs
a gun and enlisted to perpetrate additional         to persuade some members to exit.3 While
criminal tasks, including murder-for-hire (MOJ      efforts are continuing among the remaining
2017). In this pattern, individual gang mem­        30 per cent, Gutiérrez recognizes that some
bers, as opposed to the gang as a collective,       of these are too attached to organized crime
work for the adult group (Castillo V 2015;          to allow for members to explore exit strate­
Ordóñez Valverde 2017). They may be com­            gies with municipal authorities.
pensated with cash, motorcycles, or weapons,           Gangs in other cities are less attached
and motivated by a boost in status from asso­       to adult criminal networks. For instance,
ciating with an adult group (Semana 2018).          Cartagena lies at the far end of the spec­
   The second pattern, which is well-estab­         trum with gangs that are minimally related
lished in Medellín and increasingly employed        to organized crime (Álvarez 2016). Cartagena
by the bacrim elsewhere (Ávila 2019), involves      confronts similar conditions of marginaliza­
co-opting the gang as a whole. Durán-               tion and social disorganization as Medellín
Martínez (2018: 15) describes this practice as      and Cali but was not impacted to the same
‘criminal outsourcing’ or ‘a situation where        degree by the armed conflict or the ‘criminal
business activities are allocated to an exter­      sagas’ described in the next section.
nal source, and where lines of authority are           The engagement of gangs by organized
fuzzy, but there is a clean alignment between       crime is deeply concerning. In their work
organizations and contractor and some level         on Central American gangs, Jütersonke,
of control.’                                        Muggah, and Rodgers (2009: 385) conclude
                                                    that ‘professionalization is ominous, insofar
Gang transformations                                as the corrosive roles that organized crime
These interactions with organized crime have        can play in developing contexts is extremely
a powerful impact on Colombian gangs.               well-known.’
There is a sense that youth gangs are los­             Colombia’s gangs become better armed,
ing space, morphing into adult structures           exposed to more violence, and increasingly
Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments                               Art. 5, page 11 of 21

combative over territory because of their               Given the strength and numbers of adult
links to organized crime (Castillo V 2015).           criminal groups in many cities, it is remark­
The situation in Quibdó, the departmental             able that many gangs still stand as distinct
capital of one of Colombia’s poorest states           entities with some of the territorial, social,
(Chocó), illustrates a pattern that is repeated       and identity concerns that typically charac­
in war-torn cities around the country. Gangs          terize youth gangs (CERAC 2014; Semana
there started spontaneously, spurred by con­          2018). Their continued existence in cities
ditions of marginalization and social disor­          dominated by adult criminal actors sug­
ganization with roots in the armed conflict.          gests that gangs fulfill a different purpose
According to local officials, youths probably         for young people than adult criminal struc­
joined these gangs for social reasons, but the        tures. The availability of criminal jobs does
situation spiraled when adult groups started          not eliminate the organic demand for youth
offering members ‘an immediate future’ with           gangs. Borrowing from Hagedorn (2008: 49),
guns, phones, and salaries in exchange for            a criminal job may solve a gang member’s
criminal labor (Semana 2018: 55).                     problem of ‘survival,’ but leaves unaddressed
   This association also means worse out­             his problem of ‘meaning.’
comes for the young people who join gangs.
In their research on US gangs, Howell and             Exposure to violence
Griffiths (2016) explain how gang member­             Colombia’s conflict encroached on the
ship, which is a step in escalating delinquent        ev­eryday life of civilians. In the government’s
behavior, sets up an individual for increased         database, the number of civilian victims
risks into adulthood, with higher probabili­          since 1985 is close to nine million, primar­
ties of prison, drug use, poor health, and            ily victims of forced displacement, followed
unemployment compared to former delin­                by homicide, threats and forced disappear­
quents who did not join gangs. In Colombia,           ance (Unit for Assistance and Comprehensive
there is a worrying trend in which young              Reparations to Victims 2020). The National
people join gangs, start using drugs, start           Center for Historical Memory (2013: 32)
dealing, take on escalating criminal tasks            reported that civilians were killed in much
for adult groups (CERAC 2014; Giraldo et al.          larger numbers than parties to the conflict:
2015), and — in exceptional cases —become             82 per cent of the 220,000 conflict deaths
full-fledged members of adult armed struc­            were non-combatants.
tures (Durán-Martínez 2018).                             Further, armed actors exerted a powerful
   Another negative consequence of criminal           and lasting influence in some Colombian
outsourcing is that it appears to generate            cities. The MOJ (2017: 99–101) traced what
more violence than what criminal groups               it called ‘criminal sagas,’ in which different
produce when they rely on internal human              armed actors arrived in waves to Colombia’s
resources (Durán-Martínez 2018). Based                largest cities, each taking on a mythical status
on research in five cities in Colombia and            for the cities’ youths. Cali is a case in point:
Mexico, Durán-Martínez (2018: 15) explains            in the 1980s, as part of peace negotiations,
that ‘where criminals outsource to youth              the M-19 guerrilla group was authorized to
gangs, they…lose the ability or willingness to        set up urban camps in Cali, where members
control their “soldiers.”’ Looking at Medellín,       provided political training to youths; the
the author observes that the city’s most vio­         1990s brought in drug-trafficking organiza­
lent periods are characterized by outsourcing         tions that employed brutal tactics to main­
to gangs (Durán-Martínez 2018). Colombian             tain territorial control; in the late 1990s, the
analysts are concerned that youth gangs pro­          ELN and FARC-EP committed large-scale kid­
vide organized crime a ready stream of urban          nappings in Cali (MOJ 2017). This may have
labor and enable more sophisticated crimi­            paved the way for the right-wing and ostensi­
nals to evade law enforcement by reducing             bly anti-guerrilla paramilitaries to exert more
their visibility (Ávila 2019; Semana 2018).           influence in Cali in the 2000s; after their
Art. 5, page 12 of 21                             Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments

demobilization in 2005, the so-called crimi­        MOJ (2017), in cities like Cali, Medellín, and
nal bands or bacrim filled the vacuum (ibid.).      Bogotá, youth groups learned how to com­
  The incursion of armed actors into some           mit violent crime from a succession of armed
Colombian cities exacerbated urban conflict,        actors, whose methods are mirrored in today’s
normalized violence, and supplied gangs             gang activity. Gangs learned about local net­
with new criminal skills and brutal meth­           working and weapons from the guerrillas;
ods. Describing Medellín, Pécaut (1999: 142)        workforce organization from drug-trafficking
characterizes urban conflict as an interplay        organizations; and recruitment and territorial
of ‘extremely heterogenous’ violence, includ­       control with ‘invisible frontiers’ from paramil­
ing armed confrontations between guerrillas         itaries and criminal bands (ibid.).
and state forces, extortion by urban militias,
paramilitary operations, drug trafficking,          Marginalization and social disorganization
political assassinations, delinquency, organ­       Though costly, Colombia’s conflict did not
ized crime, and inter-gang warfare. Perea           destroy the national economy as often hap­
(2007: 2) describes youth gangs as being at         pens in protracted internal wars. Poverty,
the ‘heart of the urban conflict,’ rejected by      extreme poverty, and, to a lesser extent, income
communities, intermittently hunted down             inequality declined from the mid-2000s until
and recruited by organized crime and armed          2017 (Joumard and Londoño 2013, World Bank
groups, and continuously battling for terri­        2019). Nonetheless, economic marginalization
tory with other gangs.                              is a significant risk factor in Colombia, which
  The prolonged exposure of Colombia’s cit­         remains one of the most unequal countries
ies to conflict has normalized violence for         globally and, contrary to expectations on post-
some urban youth. The MOJ (2017) concludes          conflict economic growth, experienced a rise
that one legacy of the criminal sagas was to        in both poverty and urban income inequality
position violence as the principal method           in 2018 (World Bank 2019).
of resolving disputes. Waldmann (2007: 66)             Young people who were uprooted by armed
sees evidence of cultural norms that pro­           conflict are especially prone to layered mar­
mote violence in Colombia in its widespread         ginalization. A report on protracted displace­
incidence, high homicide rates, entrenched          ment by the UN (Kälin and Entwisle 2017)
armed actors, and the ‘glaring discrepancy          concludes that most internally displaced per­
between the brutality of means and mod­             sons (IDPs) in Colombia were forced to reset­
esty of the ends pursued.’ The consequences         tle in precarious settlements or slums. Kälin
creep into everyday life. Santos (2015) notes,      and Entwisle (2017) observed that even years
for instance, a high correlation between            after displacement, these families remain at
household exposure to armed conflict and            a stark economic disadvantage, and many
domestic violence against women, leading            displaced youths face stigma and discrimina­
him to argue that Colombians are ‘sick with         tion in underserved, high-crime areas, with­
violence,’ which makes them believe that            out access to formal education or livelihood
violence is ‘a valid mechanism to resolve dis­      opportunities.
putes.’ Prolonged exposure to brutality may            Internal displacement and other conflict
also deaden societal responses to loss of life.     shocks can produce social disorganization.
Looking at Colombia and Mexico, Lemaitre            Based on a survey of more than 2,000 dis­
Ripoll (2014: 4) finds the absence of ‘moral        placed households throughout Colombia,
indignation’ to homicides, especially of poor,      Ibañez, Moya, and Velásquez (2006) find
young men of color, as a sign of widespread         that forced displacement stripped victims
habituation to violence.                            of their customs, ways of life, and identi­
  The Colombian case sheds light on an              ties, and deprived them the support from
additional outcome of violent exposure on           social networks and decision makers they
gangs: criminal learning. According to the          relied on in their places of origin. Displaced
Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments                               Art. 5, page 13 of 21

persons typically moved with their nuclear            and Bogota are recognized for their innova­
families, only rarely migrated with neigh­            tive preventive approaches (Cousins 2019;
bors or other relatives, and sharply reduced          Muggah and Aguirre 2018; Muggah, cited in
their participation in communal and civic             Gagne 2015).
spaces after displacement (Ibañez et al.                 In general terms, Colombian policy makers
2006). The writers conclude that ‘displace­           have demonstrated awareness of the soci­
ment obstructs the formation of commu­                etal factors at play in the creation of urban
nity organizations and contributes to the             gangs and the importance of integrated
destruction of social networks and social             carrot-and-stick solutions. For example, in its
capital’ (ibid.: par. 15).                            recent report on gangs, the MOJ’s foremost
                                                      recommendation to the government is to
Security gaps and state responses                     reduce the factors that make young people
As described above, post-war security gaps            ‘easy prey’ to crime and violence by invest­
can increase gang activity both by moti­              ing in education and economic opportuni­
vating youths to join gangs for protection            ties in problem neighborhoods (MOJ 2017:
and by triggering counter-productive state            234). Law 1622 on Youth Citizenship calls for
responses. Regarding the first effect, just as        intervention in the social and political lives
Howell and Griffiths (2016) find among US             of youths to prevent their engagement in
gangs, the search for protection is a common          violence and crime (L. 1622, abril 29, 2013,
motive for a youth to join a gang in Colombia         Diario Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.). Law 1577 —
(CERAC 2014). The strength of this motive             the first national law dealing expressly with
may depend on both objective and subjective           gangs — seeks to rehabilitate young people
factors. Objectively, Colombian youths are dis­       at risk of joining or already involved in gangs
proportionately impacted by violence: almost          and foster their social and economic inclu­
half of all murder victims in 2016 and 2017           sion (L. 1577, septiembre 20, 2012, Diario
were aged between 15 and 29 years (Castillo           Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.).
2018). Subjectively, Colombian city and town-            Finally, the same survey that found that
dwellers perceive themselves as highly inse­          Colombian city and town dwellers are fear­
cure. In a national survey from 2017, 78 per          ful of murder also found that a large majority
cent of respondents reported feeling fearful          of them (70 per cent) favor preventive meas­
of being murdered, mostly by common crimi­            ures, such as job and education opportunities
nals rather than by conflict actors (FIP 2017).       over increasing punishment (28 per cent), as
   In terms of state responses, there is reason       the preferred way for government to reduce
to be optimistic that Colombia can avoid the          homicides (FIP 2017).
kind of zero- tolerance approaches to youth
gang reduction that backfired in Central              Former combatants
America. While the Duque administration               As in other countries emerging from conflict,
has adopted a more militaristic approach to           Colombia’s former combatants are viewed as
organized criminal groups, with fewer options         a source of insecurity. And indeed, the deci­
for negotiations (Alonso and Robbins 2019),           sion by some FARC-EP members to rearm rep­
street gangs are generally treated as issues          resents a serious threat to national security
of urban crime and youth development that             and the peace process (The Economist 2019b).
fall within the purview of city mayors and            However, demobilized combatants of the
police departments (International Institute           FARC-EP are unlikely to join street gangs. First,
for Strategic Studies 2018). Colombia was the         while some former fighters are moving into cit­
first country in Latin America to launch citi­        ies, ex-combatants are mostly from rural areas
zen security programming, with a heavy focus          and the majority have expressed an interest in
on rights, civic engagement, and government           working in agriculture (Kaplan 2017). Second,
responsibility, and cities like Medellín, Cali,       the demographics of the group do not align
Art. 5, page 14 of 21                               Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments

with the profiles of Colombian gang members.          By looking at how Colombia’s gangs have
At the time of demobilization, the average age        developed over time and the differences
among the ex-combatants was 33, almost a              between cities, there is no doubt that asso­
quarter were women, and over half were par­           ciating with organized crime underlies gang
ents (ibid.).                                         mutations that are injurious to gang mem­
   While the FARC-EP historically recruited           bers and their communities.
children in large numbers, recruitment was               Furthermore, absent concerted preventive
sharply reduced during the peace talks, and           efforts, gang membership is likely to grow
only 123 were released under the accord,              among urban youth in cities where conflict
most of whom are now adults (UN 2019).                exacerbated the conditions of marginaliza­
The risk that children released from the              tion, social disorganization, and violent expo­
FARC-EP will join urban gangs is minimal.             sure. Notably, Colombia’s conflict has resulted
Former child combatants benefit from com­             in the marginalization of many young peo­
prehensive rehabilitation support from the            ple who were forcibly uprooted from their
government until they reach adulthood, at             homes, saw their opportunities reduced, and
which point they are entitled to adult social         put at sharp economic disadvantage. The
and economic services (Colombian Family               armed conflict also damaged, and sometimes
Welfare Institute n.d.). Like their adult coun­       destroyed, the social institutions that enabled
terparts, most children released by the FARC          communities to mediate youth misconduct,
are from rural areas and many are expected            resulting in widespread social disorganiza­
to opt for rural reintegration.                       tion. Many young people have been exposed
   More generally, Nussio (2018) argues that          to extreme violence and socialized within
focusing on the relatively small number of            neighborhoods where violence has become
former combatants may distract authorities            normal, tolerated, and even encouraged.
from addressing potentially larger sources of            The risk that former combatants could
insecurity. He notes that youths, especially          create or join gangs was the least relevant
young males, living in Colombia’s marginal­           of the six factors to the Colombian context.
ized neighborhoods are at risk of becoming            Recidivism by the FARC-EP is a security threat,
the ‘human resources of post-conflict violence’       but members’ demographic profiles and rural
(ibid.: 143). Children and youths who have            aspirations make it unlikely that they will
been recruited by criminal bands and drug-            engage with youth gangs in a significant way.
trafficking organizations may be especially vul­         The final factor related to post-war inse­
nerable. They rarely receive the kind of holistic     curity and state responses. Urban insecurity
and sustained support provided to children            and homicide rates remain high, especially
associated with paramilitaries and guerril­           for youths, and some youths will continue
las even though they face many of the same            to seek out gangs for protection. State
­vulnerabilities and reintegration challenges.        responses are difficult to predict, but the
                                                      article posited that Colombia may well avoid
Conclusion                                            so-called zero-tolerance approaches to gang
In order to gauge Colombia’s future risk of           reduction that have proven counterproduc­
gang violence, this article drew from gang            tive in other post-war environments.
research and literature on post-war violence             The Colombian government can mitigate
to identify six factors that recur in post-war        the risks identified in this article by investing
settings and tend to drive gang escalation.           in prevention, including by increasing oppor­
Their application to the Colombian context            tunities for marginalized urban youths, devel­
suggests that Colombia’s street gangs are             oping law enforcement approaches to sever
likely to become more violent, harmful, and           links between street gangs and organized
criminal if they continue to strengthen ties          crime, and supporting communities to design
to illicit economies and criminal networks.           solutions locally. In doing so, Colombia can
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