Burkina Faso and the Sahel Crisis: What Options for Italian Foreign Policy? - Istituto Affari Internazionali
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Burkina Faso and the Sahel Crisis:
© 2020 IAI
What Options for Italian Foreign Policy?
by Marco Davì
ISSN 2532-6570
Triggered by the 2012 collapse of the supporters.
Malian state, when the threat posed by
an alliance of separatist and Islamist From its origins, the Sahel crisis has
militants to the country’s territorial progressively morphed into a complex
integrity prompted a French military multidimensional emergency. It is
intervention, insecurity and conflict primarily characterized by the interplay
have continued to spread across the of manipulated intercommunal
Sahel, crucially amplified by instability tensions over resources, socio-
spill-overs from Libya and underpinned economic exclusion and political
by inherent fragility drivers.1 marginalization, along with the erosion
of mutual trust between security
Chronically porous borders enabled providers and local communities
al-Qaeda-linked groups and the resulting from poorly-executed
Islamic State in the Greater Sahara counterterrorism responses. With
(ISGS) to exploit local fragilities and the deteriorating humanitarian and
undermine socio-political systems security situation increasingly posing
IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 38 - MAY 2020
across the region, with radical ideology a threat, European powers have been
catalysing pre-existing grievances, searching for comprehensive strategic
generational divides and distrust in responses to the combined challenge
central governments and their Western of jihadist violence, transnational
criminal networks and migration.
1
Notably, weak governance and state legitimacy,
limited human development, vulnerability to
climate change, ineffective community conflict
resolution mechanisms.
Marco Davì is a conflict and security consultant with the World Bank. A peacebuilding and
stabilization expert, he was deployed as a Security Sector Reform Officer in Burkina Faso
(UN Peacebuilding Fund Immediate Response Project), in the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO) and in the United Nations Operation in
Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI). The views expressed in this article are personal and do not reflect
official policy of the World Bank Group or of the United Nations.
1Burkina Faso and the Sahel Crisis: What Options for Italian Foreign Policy?
Despite a limited footprint in Africa,2 Conflict dynamics have progressively
Italy has also recently strengthened its revealed the interconnected strategic
engagements in the Sahel, including objectives pursued by armed groups
the 2019 high-profile visits of Prime in Burkina Faso: target the presence
Minister Giuseppe Conte to Niger and of state institutions; trigger, catalyse
Chad; that of former Defence Minister and exacerbate intercommunal
© 2020 IAI
Elisabetta Trenta in Niger; and the visit tensions; polarize national politics; and
by Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister weaken the legitimacy of the central
Emanuela Del Re in Niger, Mali and government, including by eroding trust
Burkina Faso. in security forces and their handling of
the crisis.
Against this backdrop, Burkina Faso3 has
ISSN 2532-6570
experienced a continuous worsening In the politically delicate context
of its domestic security environment. stemming from the 2014 popular
The country, until 2015 relatively uprising that ended the 27-year-
untouched by regional developments, old regime led by President Blaise
has turned into a major Sahelian crisis Compaoré and the failed 2015 coup, the
hotspot and a link of insecurity to the government’s militarized response to
wider area of the Gulf of Guinea. A rapid the crisis has achieved limited results.
progression of kinetic events across its It has been specifically challenged by
territory, including multiple attacks chronic capacity deficits to confront an
in the capital, resulted in over 2,000 asymmetric threat with considerable
casualties as of 2019.4 Violent attacks operational resilience and by the lack of
by militants linked to al-Qaeda (Ansar a national security vision.
Dine, Ansarul Islam) and the ISGS,
initially concentrated in Burkina Faso’s More worryingly, the military’s human
Sahel region bordering Mali and Niger, rights abuses have alienated local
have steadily spread to other parts of communities5 and played into the
the country, targeting army bases, jihadist narrative, facilitating ideological
police and gendarmerie posts, the local penetration and opportunistic
IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 38 - MAY 2020
public administration and civilians. exploitation of local grievances. Inter-
communal violence and the contentious
role of self-defence groups, now
promoted by the government to exercise
2
basic security functions, increasingly
Rome has 22 embassies in Africa, against the
44 of France and the 39 of Germany.
threaten social and national cohesion,
3
One of the least-developed countries, fuelling youth radicalization. Finally,
ranking 182nd out of 189 in the 2019 Human the progressive loss of control over
Development Index. national territory enables armed groups
4
José Luengo-Cabrera, “Burkina Faso: to control and distribute resources,
Reported Fatalities”, Twitter post, 14 January
2020, https://twitter.com/j_luengocabrera/ demonstrating strength.
status/1217215487974760448; Armed Conflict
Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Political
5
Violence Skyrockets in the Sahel According Human Rights Watch, Burkina Faso: Atrocities
to Latest ACLED Data, 28 March 2019, https:// by Armed Islamists, Security Forces, 22 March
acleddata.com/?p=14444. 2019, https://www.hrw.org/node/328438.
2Burkina Faso and the Sahel Crisis: What Options for Italian Foreign Policy?
Against this backdrop, conflict Conflict transformation problematizes
diagnostics increasingly emphasize the status quo and calls for a
an insurgency dimension in the renegotiation of the social contract,
region, suggesting the need for a no easy task. In addition, the path
paradigm shift beyond aggressive dependency inherent to current
counterterrorism that risks repressive strategies, undermines
© 2020 IAI
undermining the social contract. commitments to conduct complex
Given the complexity of the crisis, the analyses required to adapt the military’s
current Burkinabé security response operational posture. Finally, significant
is facing considerable operational and resource constraints limit the scope of
strategic challenges, both in terms a strategic pivot towards population-
of countering threats effectively and centric security and conflict-sensitive
ISSN 2532-6570
delivering population-centric security development, due to dependency on
to reduce risks of conflict extension. external donors’ political agendas.
This deficit specifically jeopardizes
government-led and internationally- Nevertheless, Burkina Faso should
supported humanitarian and balance immediate security responses
development efforts to reduce fragility with a comprehensive peacebuilding
and support the restoration of state strategy, under strong national
presence (Programme d’urgence Sahel, leadership to defuse the jihadist
EU-UN-World Bank Prevention and rhetoric of neo-colonial interference.
Peacebuilding Assessment).6 In addition, reforms to improve
security sector accountability and
Crucially, what is needed is not “less rebuild trust with the population should
security and more development”, be accelerated, by placing security
but a radically different approach sector reform (SSR) at the core of a
that places human security at national HDP strategy that prioritizes
the core of peacebuilding and a restoration of public administration
conflict transformation strategies presence to improve the welfare of local
to comprehensively tackle drivers populations.
IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 38 - MAY 2020
of violence and fragility. Pursuing
such a paradigm shift across the Critical improvements in Burkina
humanitarian-development-peace Faso’s operational effectiveness
(HDP) nexus obviously remains and human security outcomes are
politically challenging. contingent on sustained progress of
SSR measures embarked upon by the
first democratically-elected civilian
government since independence.
6
Burkina Faso Government, Programme While SSR efforts aim to improve
d’urgence pour le Sahel au Burkina Faso (PUS- civilian control of the armed forces,
BF): le Conseil d’orientation stratégique (COS) a
tenu sa deuxième session, 30 September 2019, accountability, effectiveness and
https://www.sig.bf/?p=19034; Christian Lara governance, the uneasy relationship
and Gabriel Delsol, Sustaining Peace in Burkina between the government and the
Faso: Responding to an Emerging Crisis, New
York, International Peace Institute, May 2020,
military, given the history of military
https://www.ipinst.org/?p=28555. coups and the worsening security
3Burkina Faso and the Sahel Crisis: What Options for Italian Foreign Policy?
emergency, have complicated an signalled the inception of a strategic
already delicate reform trajectory. shift, including enhanced security
cooperation between G5 Sahel
These reforms, however, are not countries and France, European
only important for democratic support mobilization, strengthening
consolidation, but key to address the the Alliance Sahel development aid and
© 2020 IAI
spread of violent extremism. Civil- advancing the Partnership for Stability
military relations, accountability and and Security in the Sahel (P3S).
oversight of the security sector remain
top priorities to execute responsible This changing strategic landscape,
counterterrorism interventions and along with a phase-out of US military
deliver inclusive security. In particular, assistance in the region, is ushering
ISSN 2532-6570
rebuilding mutual trust between in opportunities for Italian foreign
security forces and the population is policy to shape international support
critical to effectively counter a hybrid in the Sahel, building on its ongoing
threat through collaborative early- engagements in the area, and
warning and improve human security, particularly in Libya and Niger.
thus strengthening state legitimacy.
Italy already contributes to multilateral
National-level efforts can only succeed security efforts9 through the UN
if ongoing regional initiatives are Multidimensional Integrated Stabiliza-
strategically aligned. Since 2013, tion Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (7
international intervention in the region elements),10 EUCAP Niger (2), EUCAP
expanded from the French Serval Sahel (4), the EUTM in Mali (12), and
operation in Mali, to the Sahel-wide the Spain-led GAR-SI Sahel project.11
Barkhane operation, and the G5 Sahel Between 2017 and 2019, Italy also
countries Joint Force (Burkina Faso,
Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger).
State, 13 January 2020, https://www.diplomatie.
In addition, bilateral and multilateral gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-
capacity development initiatives have disarmament-and-non-proliferation/news/
IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 38 - MAY 2020
also been deployed by the EU.7 news-about-defence-and-security/article/g5-
sahel-pau-summit-statement-by-the-heads-of-
state-13-jan-2020.
Despite such density of security actors, 9
Italian Ministry of Defence website:
failure to adequately address deep Operazioni Internazionali in corso, http://www.
fragility drivers risks undermining difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op_intern_corso/
Pagine/Operazioni_int.aspx.
progress toward the ultimate objective 10
Versus Germany’s 346 and Romania’s 218
of peace and security. In this regard, troops. See UN Department of Peace Operations,
the France-G5 Sahel Pau Summit8 Troop and Police Contributors: Contributions
by Country and Mission, April 2020, https://
peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/03_
7
European Union Training Mission in Mali, country_and_mission_23_0.pdf.
(EUTM Mali), European Union Training Mission 11
Rapid Action Groups-Monitoring and
in Niger (EUTM Niger), European Union Intervention in the Sahel. See European
Capacity Building Mission in the Sahel (EUCAP Commission website: EUTF- (GAR-SI SAHEL),
Sahel). ht t p s://e c .e u rop a .e u /t r u s t f u nd for a f r ic a /
8
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, G5 Sahel region/sahel-lake-chad/regional/gar-si-sahel-
– Pau Summit – Statement by the Heads of groupes-daction-rapides-surveillance-et_en.
4Burkina Faso and the Sahel Crisis: What Options for Italian Foreign Policy?
entered into bilateral agreements development support to defence
with Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad, forces (such as the battlefield evidence
contributing to the work of the G5 Sahel analysis assistance Italy is already
coalition. A provider of development delivering in Burkina Faso), dovetailing
aid in the region, Italian bilateral ODA to with ongoing efforts by Nordic partners
Burkina Faso stands at over 4.9 million to improve confidence between local
© 2020 IAI
euro in 2018,12 against the 82 million US communities and the state. In this
dollars of France.13 regard, by linking its participation in the
French-led Takuba Special Operations
With scope for deeper engagement Task Force in Liptako-Gourma14 to the
and building upon established local development and delivery of ambitious
partnerships and the experience from its comprehensive peacebuilding actions,
ISSN 2532-6570
military assistance to Niger, Italy could Italy could strategically influence the
contribute to articulate an innovative direction of European security and
regional strategy that works across development assistance.
the security and development nexus,
promoting coherence between bilateral, As noted, innovative long-term
EU and multilateral interventions. response strategies need to include
Starting with Burkina Faso, given comprehensive peacebuilding
its sources of resilience, including approaches addressing the root
traditional peaceful interethnic relations causes of insecurity and violence,
and strong civil society, Italy could pilot while promoting conflict-sensitive
support to a decisive strategic response development focused on inclusive
along the following engagement options. and accountable governance. With
Africa increasingly essential for “glocal
Firstly, as part of the bilateral political jihadists”,15 a systemic prevention
dialogue, Italy could advocate for and approach across the HDP nexus
support implementation of prevention remains crucial to lower the resonance
and peacebuilding strategies, focused of radicalization messaging and limit
on governance and human rights, exploitation of local tensions. With a
IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 38 - MAY 2020
particularly critical in the lead-up renewed engagement in the region,
to the November 2020 presidential Italy has the potential to support a
elections. Secondly, Italy could much-needed paradigm shift in the
endeavour to strengthen policy global response to the crisis, addressing
coherence of multilateral and regional complex insecurity roots in Burkina
initiatives to improve security/military Faso and in the Sahel through a human
accountability, including capacity security approach.
12
Italian Development Cooperation Agency, 20 May 2020
Open Aid: Burkina Faso, http://openaid.aics.gov.
it/en/recipient-country/BF?year=2018.
14
13
“Coopération pour le développement: le A high threat density region across Mali,
Burkina a reçu 828 milliards FCFA en 2018”, Burkina Faso, and Niger.
15
in L’Economiste du Faso, 30 December 2019, See for instance Jean-Luc Marret, “Al-Qaeda
https://www.leconomistedufaso.bf/2019/12/30/ in Islamic Maghreb: A ‘Glocal’ Organization”,
c o op e r at ion-p ou r-le - d e v e lopp e m e nt-le - in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 31, No. 6
burkina-a-recu-828-milliards-fcfa-en-2018. (2008), p. 541-552.
5Burkina Faso and the Sahel Crisis: What Options for Italian Foreign Policy?
Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)
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founded in 1965 on the initiative of Altiero Spinelli. IAI seeks to promote awareness of
international politics and to contribute to the advancement of European integration and
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