CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT - China-friendly Narratives and the 2020 Taiwan Presidential Election - Atlantic Council
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CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT China-friendly Narratives and the 2020 Taiwan Presidential Election
CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT
The Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is a start-up
incubated at the Atlantic Council and leading hub of digital
forensic analysts whose mission is to identify, expose, and
explain disinformation where and when it occurs. The DFRLab
promotes the idea of objective truth as a foundation of
governance to protect democratic institutions and norms
from those who would undermine them.
The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works
to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address
the most important security challenges facing the United
States and the world. The Center honors General Brent
Scowcroft’s legacy of service and embodies his ethos of
nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support
for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners,
and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation
of leaders. The Scowcroft Center’s Asia Security Initiative
promotes forward-looking strategies and con-structive
solutions for the most pressing issues affecting the Indo-
Pacific region, particularly the rise of China, in order to
enhance cooperation between the United States and its
regional allies and partners.
COVER PHOTO (BACKGROUND): “Taipei 101” by Remi Yuan
(@remiyuan), Unsplash. Published on February 21, 2018.
https://unsplash.com/photos/JMB3Efb8yoQ
This report is written and published in accordance with
the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence.
The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and
recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not
determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for,
any of this issue brief’s conclusions.
Atlantic Council
1030 15th Street NW, 12th Floor
Washington, DC 20005
For more information, please visit
www.AtlanticCouncil.org.
December 2020
2
CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT
Chinese
Messaging
Across the
Strait
China-Friendly Narratives
and the 2020 Taiwan
Presidential Election
3
CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT
Table of Contents
Introduction 5
“One China” Policy and China’s Approach to Taiwan 6
The 2020 Taiwan Presidential Election 8
Taiwan’s Social Media Landscape 10
Chinese Interference in Taiwan’s Information Environment 11
Social Media Findings 12
Conclusion 24
4
CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT
Introduction
T
aiwan has grappled with foreign interference at a administration.3 Moreover, as awareness of Chinese
scale that dwarfs the challenges faced by many information operations has grown, some social media users
other democracies. The island nation remains a in Taiwan have exacerbated the partisanship by labeling
flashpoint for Chinese projections of power and any China-friendly narratives – and anyone advancing them
sovereignty that date back to the Chinese civil war in the – as Chinese in origin. This has further increased the climate
late 1940s when the Kuomintang Party (KMT) was driven of paranoia and distrust.
out of the mainland by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Since that time, the CCP has contended that Taiwan is a Despite growing Western attention on China’s interference
part of broader China yet to be united with the mainland, in the democratic institutions of Taiwan, there has been
while the government of Taiwan has been caught up in a limited academic research that accounts for the full scope
debate as to whether it represents the legitimate “China” and impact of such information operations during the
(i.e., democratic and free) or whether it is “Taiwan” (i.e., no 2020 Taiwan election and their effects upon Taiwan’s
longer connected to China at all).1 broader political landscape. This report identifies instances
of Chinese political messaging from both official Chinese
Chinese information operations targeting Taiwan have government accounts as well as unattributable accounts
intensified alongside China’s more aggressive foreign that promote consistently pro-China narratives that align
policy. These operations have been conducted, in part, with CCP propaganda. The DFRLab found that, while
through the targeting and denigration of pro-independence China sought to apply influence on the election through
or less China-friendly politicians within Taiwan. The 2018 coordinated information operations on social media
local elections in Taiwan saw a range of pro-mainland, platforms, such operations achieved far less impact and
anti-independence patriotic trolling campaigns and fake pro-CCP sentiment than the party likely anticipated, likely
personas that aligned with CCP interests and that spiked thanks in part to general awareness of Chinese efforts
particularly during periods of geopolitical tension. The following the 2018 legislative elections. Despite low levels
situation only exacerbated as Taiwan approached the 2020 of digital engagement, however, this pro-China material
presidential election, when social media, both Western offers a window into the next iteration of Chinese narrative
platforms like Facebook and YouTube, as well as platforms propagation.
originated from Chinese mainland like Weibo, were
entangled with conspiracy theories and disinformation.
Although not all of them can be attributed back to the CCP
government, they align with China’s “discourse power”
projection that favors China’s vision of the cross-strait
relationship and criticizes politicians who challenge its
authority in the region, including the presidential candidate
Tsai Ing-Wen.
Echoing the experiences of other democracies, social media
has made this challenge more difficult. As communities
have grown more insular and opinions more entrenched,
fact-based information has become harder to come by,
replaced by political polarization and mutual recrimination.2
For example, pan-Blue (pro-KMT) constituents are more
likely to believe and disseminate negative disinformation
about the current Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
1 For more on the understanding of Chinese government’s approach toward Taiwan, see 孙代尧, “中国共产党对台政策演变论析” (“On the Evolution of the Chinese
Communist Party’s Policy on Taiwan”), 中共党史研究 6 (2006): 32-40, accessed on November 20, 2020, http://www.cqvip.com/qk/81413x/200606/23230795.
html; Eleanor Albert, “ChinaTaiwan Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 7, 2016, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/
gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/CFR-China-Taiwan%20Relations.pdf.
2 Taiwan Election: Disinformation as a Partisan Issue, Stanford Internet Observatory, January 21, 2020, https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/taiwan-disin-
formation-partisan-issue.
3 杜兆倫, “謠言分藍綠？政治傾向與社群媒體謠言傳播之關聯性研究 Pan-Blue or Pan-Green Rumors? The Relationships Between Political Preferences and
Dissemination of Political Rumors in Social Media,” Degree Thesis of National Taiwan University Journalism Research Institute, January 1, 2018, accessed on
November 20, 2020, https://www.airitilibrary.com/Publication/alDetailedMesh?docid=U0001-0902201814560900.
5
CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT
“One China” Policy and China’s
Approach to Taiwan
T
he Chinese Civil War began in 1945 between the Meanwhile, the KMT has – contrary to its origin – deepened
KMT and the CCP, splitting the military alliance its cooperation with the CCP based on the 1992 Consensus
they maintained throughout World War II, as the that initiated the “One China” policy. Both parties agree
two parties sought to maintain control of the levers that there is only one China, but the definition is left open
of government for the entire Chinese territory. Although for interpretation. The People’s Republic of China’s “One
the KMT gained military ascendancy at first with the help China” policy, which sees Taiwan as an integral part of
of the US military, the Communists later secured military China, is a fundamental part of its foreign policy. A goal
victories in 1948, culminating in the KMT’s forced retreated of reunification by 2049 was included in the Communist
from the mainland to Taiwan, where it retained a strategic Party of China’s 2049 “National rejuvenation” centenary
position and industrial capacity in part because of its goals. China’s use of media and public diplomacy to further
geographic isolation from the mainland.4 In Taiwan, the the “One China” policy targets three key audiences: local
KMT remained the only political party on the island for an Taiwanese, as a means of building support for unification;
extended period. Initially, the KMT declared martial rule a foreign audience, intending to isolate pro-independence
with an intent to prevent infiltration from CCP spies and Taiwan political powers; and a domestic Chinese audience,
prepare the society for a war to conquer the mainland, an to reassure the legitimacy and ascendency of the CCP
aspiration that was never acted upon or realized. Several government.7 While the CCP sees this as a way of temporary
dissidents from the KMT secretly founded DPP in 1986, compromise, it has adhered to the agenda of persuading
with the hope of creating a more democratic society that Taiwan to reunite with the CCP government as opposed
honors basic human rights and freedom for its citizens. to more aggressive military action. On the other hand,
Since the early 1990s, when Taiwan shifted to true a multi- while the KMT government in Taiwan signed onto the 1992
party democratic system, the DPP has promoted a separate Consensus with the CCP government, the DPP leadership
identity of Taiwan from mainland China, an accelerating has been an adamant opponent of the compromise and
trend since the party first claimed power in 2000. The regards Taiwan as an independent country separate from
new generation in Taiwan embraces an increasingly the nation of China.
democratic identity, favoring Western culture, political
ideals, and economic systems over Chinese culture, unlike The key organs of CCP information operations in Taiwan
their forebearers who had a deeper cultural and familial are the United Front Work Department, the People’s
connection with mainlanders. Under current President Tsai Liberation Army, and the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO).8
Ing-wen, who was first elected president when the DPP The first two organs set out the official guidelines for the
reclaimed power in 2016,5 the Taiwanese government has strategy of China’s approach to Taiwan issues within the
maintained a rather hostile relationship with its counterpart CCP. More specifically, the United Front Work Department
across the Strait. While Tsai has officially rejected the 1992 focuses on political maneuvering through the recruitment
Consensus, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s administration of influential figures, collection of intelligence information,
has responded with tough measures including restricting and covert activities of establishing and maintaining
Chinese tourists access to Taiwan.6 connections with influential individuals and organizations
in targeted communities, while TAO serves as the face of
4 Amy McKenna, edit, “Nationalist Collapse And The Establishment Of The People’s Republic Of China (1949),” Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/
event/Chinese-Civil-War/Nationalist-collapse-and-the-establishment-of-the-Peoples-Republic-of-China-1949.
5 DPP held the Taiwan presidency from 2000 until 2008 and again from 2016 until present.
6 Yeni Wong, Ho-I Wu, and Kent Wang, “Tsai’s Refusal to Affirm the 1992 Consensus Spells Trouble for Taiwan,” The Diplomat, August 26, 2016, https://
thediplomat.com/2016/08/tsais-refusal-to-affirm-the-1992-consensus-spells-trouble-for-taiwan/; “中国首次暂停赴台自由行对台湾观光及政治的冲击” (“The first
time China suspended free travel of its citizens to Taiwan and its influence on Taiwan tourism and politics”), BBC News, July 31, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/
zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-49178224.
7 Richard Bush, What Xi Jinping Said about Taiwan at the 19th Party Congress,
The Brookings Institution, 19 October 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/10/19/what-xi-jinping-said-about-taiwan-at-the-19th-
party-congress/
8 Peter Hartcher, “Rundown of China’s spy agencies will make uncomfortable reading for some,” The Sydney Morning Herald, July 14, 2020, https://amp-smh-
com-au.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/amp.smh.com.au/world/asia/rundown-of-china-s-spy-agencies-will-make-uncomfortable-reading-for-some-20200713-
p55bhs.html
9 Takashi Suzuki, “China’s United Front Work in the Xi Jinping era – institutional developments and activities,” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Stud-
ies 1(2019):83-98, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24761028.2019.1627714. For more on United Front Work, read Michael M. Tsai/Po-Chang
Huang, “China’s United Front Strategy and its Impacts on the Security of Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific Region,” Fletcher Security Review 3(2017):91-96 https://
heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/fletsrev3&div=18&id=&page=.
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CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT
publicly released information.9 The conventional methods
of the United Front Work Department include engaging
Taiwanese media, politicians, businesses, civil society, and
other societal influencers. Some of the examples include
organizing visits of Taiwanese politicians and chief editors
from media outlets to China and emphasizing trade benefits
to Taiwanese businesses operating in China.
Another branch that is key in influencing public opinion in
China on Taiwan issues is the Cyberspace Administration
of China, the CCP’s primary organization for oversight of
the internet, including monitoring public opinion, which
works closely with the United Front Work Department.
The goal of the Taiwan-related information influence is
centered around reunification under CCP rule. As social
media platforms attract increased attention and their
large user base rapidly shift discussion, there has been
an increasing focus on using non-CCP affiliates such as
internet celebrities to deliver pro-China messaging to both
Chinese and Taiwanese citizens.
7
CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT
The 2020 Taiwan
Presidential Election
T
he tension of these competing narratives – China’s
discourse power and the Taiwanese government’s Under the pretext of the “One China” policy, China expressed
push for continued autonomy – has redefined the its own discontent with the 2020 election results on the
traditional power dynamics in the region and came island. Shortly after the election, China Daily and Xinhua
to a climax ahead of the 2020 presidential election in News, CCP-controlled official news outlets, released several
Taiwan. A month before the election, the legislature passed commentaries on the 2020 election.14 The consensus of these
the Anti-Infiltration Act with no opposition votes, aiming at op-eds was that DPP won not because of its popularity but
“curbing Chinese influence on the island politics.”10 The DPP because of the agenda-setting capabilities of the first Tsai
administration under President Tsai Ing-wen’s leadership administration, external influence from and involvement of
has had an active agenda of countering foreign interference the United States, and the KMT’s inadequate capability in
by the CCP, both in her first term and again following her uniting the disparate forces within its party.
reelection.
While the landslide victory for Tsai, who campaigned on
On January 11, 2020, incumbent Tsai won a second term a platform of Taiwanese independence, was far from a
in a landslide victory over Han Kuo-yu, the KMT candidate desired result for the CCP, China is highly unlikely to give
for president. Tsai received more than 8 million votes and up its influence operations – following its philosophy of
set a record for any presidential candidate in Taiwan’s “discourse power” – pushing Taiwan’s residents toward pro-
democratic history.11 Out of the 113 seats in the Yuan China political values that align with the CCP’s interests.
(Taiwan’s national legislative body), the DPP maintained its 15
Following the election, one article by Xinhua News, “The
majority but dropped from 68 to 61 seats. Although the cloud will eventually fade away and reveal the Sun: how to
DDP successfully secured the presidential seat, the KMT evaluate the result of Taiwan’s ‘presidential election’” (“莫
gained an additional three seats from the prior legislative 道浮云终蔽日——台湾‘大选’结果当何以看待”) was republished
session.12 The DPP’s presidential victory amid a legislative directly 37 times on various Chinese and overseas news
slide followed its substantial losses during local elections in outlets, mostly state affiliated news outlets.16 These narratives
2018, which researchers assessed to have been influenced demonstrated the grave concern of China, which sees Tsai’s
by disinformation operations originating from China on reelection as jeopardizing the possibility of reunification.
both Chinese and Western social media platforms that Chinese official media have generally been highly critical of
favors the winning of Han Kuo-yu in the municipal election the pro-independence DPP and Tsai in particular, accusing
of Kaohsiung.13 The 2020 presidential election victory, them of manipulating the information environment in
however, can be interpreted as a direct rebuke of KMT’s Taiwan by undertaking online misinformation operations.17,18
close ties with the CCP. For example, Global Times and presidential candidate Chiu
10 Nick Aspinwall, “Taiwan Passes Anti-Infiltration Act Ahead of Election Amid Opposition Protests,”The Diplomat, January 03, 2020, https://thediplomat.
com/2020/01/taiwan-passes-anti-infiltration-act-ahead-of-election-amid-opposition-protests/.
11 Cedric Sam, “Taiwan 2020 Election Results,” Bloomberg News, January 11, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-taiwan-election-results/;
Lily Kuo, “Taiwan election: Tsai Ing-Wen wins landslide in rebuke to China,” The Guardian, January 11, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/
jan/11/taiwan-re-elects-tsai-ing-wen-as-president-in-clear-message-to-china.
12 Sam, “Taiwan 2020 Election Results.”
13 Josh Rogin, “China’s interference in the 2018 elections succeeded — in Taiwan,” Washington Post, December 18, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2018/12/18/chinas-interference-elections-succeeded-taiwan/; “Cyber Threat Activity Targeting Election,” Fireeye, 2019, https://www.fireeye.com/
content/dam/fireeye-www/products/pdfs/pf/gov/eb-cyber-threat-activity.pdf.
14 吴下阿蒙, “蔡英文当选连任，怎么看？（侠客岛）,” (“What do you think about Tsai Ing-wen being re-elected? (Xia Ke Island)”), People’s Daily, January 13, 2020,
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2020-01/13/content_1966500.htm; “莫道浮云终蔽日——台湾“大选”结果当何以看待,” (“The cloud will eventually
fade away and reveal the Sun: how to evaluate the result of Taiwan’s ‘presidential election’”) Xinhua News, January 11, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/
tw/2020-01/11/c_1125450579.htm; “蔡英文赢了选举，和平发展与和平统一无望了吗？” (“Tsai Ing-wen won the election. Is there no hope for peaceful development
and peaceful reunification?”), People’s Daily Taiwan, January 13, 2020, http://tw.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0113/c14657-31545686.html.
15 Chinese Discourse Power: China’s Use of Information Manipulation in Regional and Global Competition, Digital Forensic Research Lab, Atlantic Council,
December 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/dfrlab-china-reports/.
16 DFRLab using SerpApi on November 15, 2020. SerpApi is a tool to scrap search results from Google.
8
CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT
Yi from the New Party, a Taiwanese political party that
subscribes to the “One China” principle, accused the DPP
(and, indirectly, Tsai) of directing information operations
executed by an internet army under the leadership of Slow
Yang.19 Slow Yang has achieved some notoriety in Taiwan,
as the Taiwanese government charged him with spreading a
false story online that culminated in the suicide of one of the
island’s diplomats.20 The evidence Global Times and Chiu
cited to back their claims was a contract signed between a
marketing company founded by Slow Yang and the DPP in
2018 before the local election. The DPP rejected the claim,
stating that the contract was for a public opinion survey to
be run by the company and denying any relationship with
the information operation later charged against Slow Yang.
17 “Tsai Ing-wen won the election. Is there no hope for peaceful development and peaceful reunification?” 中国台湾网, January 11, 2020, http://www.tai-
wan.cn/plzhx/plyzl/202001/t20200111_12231914.htm; 吴下阿蒙, “What do you think about Tsai Ing-wen being re-elected? (Xia Ke Island)”; 陈星, “2019年
台湾政局回顾,” (“Review of Taiwan’s political situation in 2019”), 现代台湾研究 1 (2020): 10-17, accessed on November 20, 2020, http://www.cqvip.com/
qk/97723x/202001/7101485498.html; 吴为, “2019年台湾政局回顾,” (“Review of Taiwan’s political situation in 2019”), 统一论坛 1(2020):21-23, http://www.cqvip.
com/qk/81541x/202001/7100968646.html
18 While China invests significant resources in mainstream media in target locales, especially Taiwan and Hong Kong, the remainder of this paper will focus
on China’s social media activities. For more on its use of mainstream media as a tool for influence, see Yimou Lee and I-hwa Cheng, “Paid ‘news’: China using
Taiwan media to win hearts and minds on island,” Reuters, August 9, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-china-media-insight/paid-news-chi-
na-using-taiwan-media-to-win-hearts-and-minds-on-island-sources-idUSKCN1UZ0I4; “One Country, One Censor: How China undermines media freedom in
Hong Kong and Taiwan,” Committee to Protect Journalists, December 16, 2019, https://cpj.org/reports/2019/12/one-country-one-censor-china-hong-kong-
taiwan-press-freedom/.
19 “蔡英文原来是这样操控网军的！” (“This is how Tsai Ing-wen manipulated the internet army!), Global Times, December 26, 2019, https://tech.sina.com.cn/
roll/2019-12-26/doc-iihnzahk0015556.shtml
20 Keoni Everington, “DPP influencer Slow Yang charged with spreading fake news, causing death of Taiwanese diplomat in Japan,” Eye on Taiwan,
December 2, 2019, https://www.eyeontaiwan.com/slow-yang-charged-with-spurring-suicide-of-taiwanese-diplomat-in-japan-with-fake-news.
9
CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT
Taiwan’s Social Media
Landscape
W
hile China still uses traditional media to extend (“LINE 訊息查證”) after the user-created fact-checker bot
its sphere of influence in Taiwan, where 77 Aunt Meiyu (“美玉姨”) went viral on the platform in late
percent of the population relies on television 2018. Separately, Taiwan Factcheck Center, a Taiwanese
as sources for news, 88 percent now turns nonprofit organization, has been one of the most reliable
to social media as a news source as well.21 According to a fact-checking institutions on the island since its inception
January 2020 report of selected countries from Statista, in July 2018.
Taiwan had the second highest social media penetration in
the world, at 88 percent, behind the United Arab Emirates.22
On average, Taiwan hosts 8.4 social media accounts per
person.23 According to Taiwan Network Information Center,
the most popular social media platforms in Taiwan are
US-based platforms Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter;
Taiwan’s PTT and Dcard; and China’s Weibo. The most
influential instant messaging apps are Japan’s LINE and
China’s WeChat. While Facebook harbors users of diverse
generations, Instagram, PTT, and Dcard attract a mostly
younger audience. In the case of the latter two platforms,
university students are also the primary users and content
producers.24
Matching the high social media penetration, Taiwan has
witnessed the rapid growth of platform use as users’
primary source of information, especially for younger
generations. According to Reuters Institute, in 2020, 83
percent of Taiwan’s population preferred to read news
online and 59 percent of the population received news via
social media platforms.25 The top social media platforms
that people use for news are LINE (49 percent), Facebook
(47 percent), and YouTube (41 percent).26
Taiwan’s relationship with its information environment is
inextricably linked with a national identity based in conflict
with – or fear of infiltration to diminish its sovereignty
from – mainland China. According to Reuters Institute,
Taiwan ranked the 28 out of 30 polities in terms of trust in
media, with only 24 percent of trust in news in general.27
Moreover, Taiwan suffers from rampant disinformation –
both domestic and foreign. As a result, Taiwanese social
media platforms have implemented measures intended to
counter the influence of disinformation. For example, in July
2019, LINE launched the official LINE message verification
21 “This is how Tsai Ing-wen manipulated the internet army!”, Global Times.
22 “Active social network penetration in selected countries as of January 2020,” Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/282846/regular-social-net-
working-usage-penetration-worldwide-by-country/.
23 Simon Kemp, “Digital 2020: Taiwan,” DataReportal, February 18, 2020, , https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-taiwan#:~:text=There%20were%20
20.51%20million%20internet,at%2086%25%20in%20January%202020.
24 Taiwan Internet Report 2019, Taiwan Network Information Center and InsightXplorer Ltd., https://report.twnic.tw/2019/assets/download/TWNIC_Tai-
wanInternetReport_2019_EN.pdf.
25 Nic Newman, Richard Fletcher, Anne Schulz, Simge Andı, and Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2020, Reuters Institute, 2020,
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-06/DNR_2020_FINAL.pdf
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
10CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT
Chinese Interference in Taiwan’s
Information Environment
C
hina’s information operations in Taiwan reasons why Han was successfully voted out of office in a
adhere to the CCP’s philosophy of “discourse recall election in June 2020.32
power,” the concept that a country can attain
increased geopolitical power by setting agendas The Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau in Taiwan has
internationally by influencing the political order and also located disinformation stemming from China during
values both domestically and in foreign countries.”28 When the COVID-19 pandemic. In April 2020, World Health
applied to Taiwan, the principle seeks to emphasize the Organization President Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus
“One China” policy, to reassert that the CCP government accused Taiwanese internet users of spreading racist
is the only legitimate government for the “One China,” comments against him online.33 While Tsai denied the
to accentuate the close relationship between China and accusations, a Twitter account named “自由徐州電台”
Taiwanese people, and to push pro-China messaging in the (“Freedom Xuzhou Radio”),34 fashioning itself after Radio
hopes of instilling warm sentiment toward the mainland Free Asia, posted “I am Taiwanese. I am extremely ashamed
more broadly in the residents of the island. of Taiwanese people attacking Tedros in such a vicious
manner. On behalf of the Taiwanese people, I apologize
During the 2018 local elections in Taiwan, for instance, Paul to Tedros and beg for his forgiveness.”35 Despite the low
Huang, a freelance reporter, traced a popular Facebook engagement of the post, it quickly caught the attention
group supporting populist KMT mayoral candidate Han of the government, which then traced the account back
Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) to “a [highly likely] professional cyber to China, concluding that the post defamed Taiwanese
group from China.”29 Three out of six administrators of people in front of the international community and dimmed
the Facebook group in question, “韓國瑜粉絲後援團必勝！ Taiwan’s chances of being accepted into international
撐起一片藍天” (“Han Kuo-yu Fans For Victory! Holding organizations like the World Health Organization.36
up a Blue Sky!”), were related to a network of 249 fake
persona accounts with simplified Chinese names on Finally, recent studies on Chinese interference in the 2020
LinkedIn.30 Although Huang was unable to establish a Taiwan election focused mainly on China’s use of Western
connection between the information operation and the social media platforms. The most popular Western platforms
Chinese government, the vocal support for Han was in studied were Twitter and Facebook. A study by the Oxford
line with China’s strategic goal in the region: as a China- Internet Observatory found heavy coordination between
friendly candidate, Han had a history of campaigning for a number of Twitter accounts posting pro-Chinese state
and advancing policies aimed at enhancing the trade content.37 These accounts featured identical profile pictures
relationship between China and Taiwan as well as at and highly similar header images and handles, followed a
stimulating Chinese tourism to Taiwan.31 As mayor of similar list of other accounts, and posted 190,000 and
Taiwan’s third largest city, Kaohsiung, Han’s pro-China 334,000 times during their time of operation. Another study
view – complimentary to the goals of Chinese discourse by Stanford Internet Observatory identified two content
power – was ripe for overt and covert amplification from farms that were responsible for spreading disinformation
the mainland. They were also, however, one of the foremost about the Tsai and the Taiwanese government.38
28 DFRLab, “Chinese Discourse Power.”
29 Paul Huang, “Chinese Cyber-Operatives Boosted Taiwan’s Insurgent Candidate,” Foreign Policy, June 26, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/06/26/
chinese-cyber-operatives-boosted-taiwans-insurgent-candidate/
30 Ibid.
31 Chris Horton, “The Taiwanese Populist Advancing China’s Interests,” The Atlantic, April 16, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ar-
chive/2019/04/taiwanese-populist-han-kuo-yu-china/587146/.
32 Chris Horton and Amy Chang Chien, “Voters in Taiwan Oust a Pro-China Mayor,” The New York Times, June 6, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/06/
world/asia/taiwan-recall-mayor.html.
33 Will Feuer, “WHO chief addresses death threats, racist insults: ‘I don’t give a damn,’” CNBC News, April 8, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/08/
who-chief-addresses-death-threats-racist-insults-i-dont-give-a-damn.html.
34 Xuzhou is a city in northern China.
35 楊清緣, “抓到了！陸網軍假台人「向譚德塞道歉」指導文曝光,” (“Caught it! Guidance Exposed on the Fake “Apologizing to Tedros” by Main-
land Internet Army”), MSN News, April 10, 2020, https://www.msn.com/zh-tw/news/national/%E6%8A%93%E5%88%B0%E4%BA%86%EF%B-
C%81%E9%99%B8%E7%B6%B2%E8%BB%8D%E5%81%87%E5%8F%B0%E4%BA%BA%E3%80%8C%E5%90%91%E8%AD%9A%E5%BE%B7%E5%A1%9E%E9%
81%93%E6%AD%89%E3%80%8D%E6%8C%87%E5%B0%8E%E6%96%87%E6%9B%9D%E5%85%89/ar-BB12q5IE#image=3.
36 “大陸網民假臺灣之名集體散布假道歉文 調查局火速溯源說明,” (“Mainland internet users collectively spread false apologies by pretendingn to be Taiwanese; the
investigation bureau quickly traced the source and announced to the public”), Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Justice, April 10, 2020, https://www.
mjib.gov.tw/news/Details?Module=1&id=594.
37 Renée Diresta, Carly Miller, Vanessa Molter, John Pomfret, Glenn Tiffert, Telling China’s Story: The Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign to Shape Global
Narratives, Stanford Internet Observatory, July 20, 2020, https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/new-whitepaper-telling-chinas-story.
38 Ibid.
11CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT
Social Media Findings
T
he DFRLab found influence operations producing
pro-China narratives aligned with the government’s
“One China” policy on more open platforms,
including Chinese domestic social media platform
Weibo and Western social media platforms Facebook and
YouTube. There was little evidence tying the accounts and
pages posting the content to the CCP, but the messages
being disseminated aligned with those from the party-state
apparatuses. Despite the inability to directly attribute these
activities to China, the proximity of the narratives to those
of Chinese discourse power does warrant monitoring. For
contrast, on domestic Taiwanese social media platforms
PTT and Dcard, the DFRLab found no significant evidence
of information operations originating from China, which is
likely due to the platforms’ stricter information monitoring
protocols during the election.
Facebook
The DFRLab found two Facebook pages with ties to the
party-state that propagate disinformation online. “兩岸頭條”
(“Headlines Across the Strait”), one of the two Facebook
pages, maintained 753,754 followers as of September 1,
2020. The page has undergone a series of name changes
– one indicator of inauthentic behavior – since its creation
in 2015; some of the previous names indicated an intention
to influence politics on the island. The first name, adopted
Screenshot revealing the sequence
on October 31, 2015, prior to the 2016 Taiwanese election,
was “2016 台湾大选” (“2016 Taiwan Presidential Election”).
of name changes the Facebook page
(currently named) “兩岸頭條” (“Headlines
The page switched to another name in simplified Chinese Across the Strait”) has undergone.39
– again, not the traditional Chinese typically used in Taiwan
– “向蔡英文建言” (“Provide Suggestions to Tsai Ing-wen”) on to a search on QCC.com, an open-source platform for
January 20, 2016, shortly after Tsai won the 2016 election. public information about Chinese companies, the majority
On May 2, 2016, the name changed yet again to “两岸领导 shareholder of VTV Internet Technology Jiangsu Limited
人,” (“Leaders Across the Strait”), still in simplified Chinese, Co. is 亿利资源集团有限公司 (“Elion Group”), an energy
before settling on its current name on May 19, 2016. The earlier company based in Erdos, Inner Mongolia, whose chairman
name-changing process echoed political developments in of the board, Wang Wenbiao, is a businessman who also
Taiwan, especially around the 2016 election. Since May 19, holds important position in the CCP’s Chinese People’s
2016, however, the page has portrayed itself as a Taiwanese Political Consultative Conference, the “highest-ranking
media outlet, with a name in traditional Chinese characters. entity overseeing the United Front system.”
The owner of the Facebook page is 中華微視 (“China VTV”
or “CVTV”), a product of 微视网络科技江苏有限公司 (“VTV
Internet Technology Jiangsu Limited Co.”). According
39 DFRLab query using CrowdTangle. performed on November 22, 2020.
40 “董事长简介,” (“Introduction of the Chairman”), Elion Group, accessed on November 22, 2020, http://www.elion.com.cn/index.php?menu=232; DFRlab via
QCC, performed on November 22, 2020, https://www.qcc.com/firm/6a81f38e173ffb92e150aae5254d33b2.html; Alexander Bowe, China’s Overseas United
Front Work Background and Implications for the United States, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, August 24, 2018, https://www.uscc.
gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%27s%20Overseas%20United%20Front%20Work%20-%20Background%20and%20Implications%20for%20US_fi-
nal_0.pdf
12CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT
China. Some of the channel’s videos targeted the
Tsai Administration with titles like朱立倫體檢蔡英
文：蔡英文執政三年，把台灣民主踩成重殘... (“Zhu
Lilun’s criticism towards Tsai Ing-wen: Tsai Ing-
wen has been in power for three years and has
greatly compromised Taiwan’s democracy”)
and “不祥之兆！蔡英文聖露西亞演說 升“國旗”卻掉下
來場面尷尬” (“Bad omen! During Tsai Ing-wen’s
St. Lucia speech, the ‘national flag’ that was
supposed to be raised fell off, the scene was
embarrassing”). While not directly targeting
the 2020 presidential election in Taiwan, the
content was likely intended to instill a negative
impression of Tsai and sway potential voters
away from supporting her.
The two Facebook pages for CVTV, 兩岸頭條
and 中華微視, have both promoted misleading
information intended to discredit Tsai and her
administration. For example, a post on July
4, 2019, included a picture of people taking
pictures of a violent interaction between police
and a passenger on a train. The caption said, “I
saw a 25-year-old unarmed police officer killed.
There were several people around watching the
scene and taking pictures. This image was taken
in today’s Taiwanese society, in the ecstasy of
‘Taiwan value’ that Tsai Ing-wen was proud of.”43
As of November 10, 2020, the post had 588
engagements, although the page’s 754,831
Screenshot from QCC.com showing that the majority shareholder for 中華微視/ followers would have had access to this post.
中华微视 (“CVTV”), is Elion Group.41 While directly calling out Tsai, the post also
intended to discredit the “Taiwan values” of the
While the official websites for CVTV (http://www.cvtv.us/ Tsai administration, thereby notionally linking
and http://zhonghuaweishi.cn/) and the its channel on the the people in the photo with Tsai. The term “Taiwan values”
Chinese mainland-facing video platform 西瓜视频 (“iXigua”) was introduced by Tsai in 2018 – although the precise
only feature a limited number of videos on Chinese culture definition was not clear, she has used the term to refer to
(e.g., Chinese calligraphy, film, and festivals), its channels the importance of “Taiwan national sovereignty.”44
on Facebook and YouTube, platforms accessible to
Taiwanese citizens, have a number of political commentary The photo used in the post, however, misrepresented the
videos.42 Out of the political content on these pages, actual situation. Although the police officer was killed by
the general sentiment is anti-Tsai Ing-wen and pro- a passenger with mental issues, the people in the same
reunification. For example, the YouTube channel 中華微視 car of the train did not stand by the situation. In a news
(“China VTV”) features videos with outspoken pro-China article published by ETtoday, an online outlet owned by
Taiwanese celebrities, including Joyce Huang, a famous the popular EBC News (“東森國際”), a witness at the scene
TV commentator; Wang Ping-chung, a senior official with recounted what actually happened.45 The passengers who
the New Party; and XiaoYu, a Taiwanese YouTuber with were filming the scene were requested to do so by the train
more than 7,520 followers who previously lived in mainland conductor, and they were also advised by the police to not
41 DFRlab via QCC, performed on November 22, 2020, https://www.qcc.com/firm/6a81f38e173ffb92e150aae5254d33b2.html
42 “Taiwan Headlines,” Facebook page, accessed on November 22, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/taiwanheadlines/;%20; “China VTV,” Facebook page, ac-
cessed on November 22, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/Chinavtv/about/?ref=page_internal9aNdZT2R7PDsS2_zMWb0SQ?e=NMDZoT&CID=9304ecc3-
4d44-5285-0703-801b0015eba0. “China VTV,” China VTV, accessed on November 22, 2020, http://zhonghuaweishi.cn/; ”China VTV,” YouTube video, ac-
cessed on November 22, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCZlZ8IDyZxRjeBfGfBrdz0w.
43 Taiwan Headlines, “I saw a 25-year-old unarmed police officer killed. There were several people around watching the scene and taking pictures. This image
was taken in today’s Taiwanese society, in the ecstasy of ‘Taiwan value’ that Tsai Ing-wen was proud of.” Facebook post, July 4, 2019, https://www.facebook.
com/taiwanheadlines/photos/a.853898308065031/2296908357097345/.
44“柯文哲：想知道蔡總統的台灣價值是什麼” (“Ko Wen-je: I want to know what does Taiwan value means for President Tsai”), Central News Agency, January
23, 2018, https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/201801230117.aspx; 蕭婷方, “當著柯文哲面 蔡英文說明「台灣價值」” (“In front of Ko Wen-je, Tsai Ing-Wen
explained Taiwan Values” ), Liberty Times, January 26, 2018, https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/2323764
45 鄒鎮宇, “影／勇警遭殺乘客全圍觀？女乘客「淚PO全程」訴真相：怎麼救？你教我” (“Passengers did nothing on the scene of the murdered police? The fe-
male passenger posted the whole story in tears, telling the truth: how to save the police? you tell me!”), ETtoday, July 11, 2019, https://www.ettoday.net/
news/20190711/1486908.htm
13CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT
come close to the conflict.46 Even so, passengers across YouTube
the carriage were trying to help in different ways, including
helping the police and finding first-aid tools.47 YouTube is a popular source for news among Taiwanese
citizens, and the platform contains posts of pro-China
disinformation that attempt to discredit Taiwan’s
independent government as well as Tsai’s presidency.
Previous researchers found that Chinese influencers
use YouTube to shape narratives around Taiwanese
affairs with varying degrees of success. Influence
operations researcher Puma Shen observed
advertisements recruiting Taiwanese YouTube
influencers posted by organizations affiliated
with the United Front Work Department.49 One
widely studied YouTube channel is “Xida speaks
on Taiwan at the foot of Yushan,” which features
videos of Chinese National Radio journalist Zhang
Xida speaking Mandarin with a Taiwanese accent
and attacking Tsai, her administration, and the DPP
broadly.50 China National Radio is state-owned
media in close contact with the CCP and often
features videos targeting a Taiwanese audience,
indicating the party-state’s intention of directly
influencing Taiwanese citizens. Included among
these operations, Zhang’s YouTube channel –
now removed – spread disinformation about Tsai,
accusing her of “selling Taiwan” to Japan and
jeopardizing national interest while supporting
the claim with unrelated evidence of legitimate
international trade.51 As of November 11, 2020,
“XiDA Speaks on Taiwan at the foot of Yushan” had
removed all of its data and changed its name to “吵
新聞” (“Loud News”), but an associated Facebook
page with much fewer followers was still operating.
Created in 2014, the YouTube channel acquired
around 5,910 subscribers by August 2020.
The screenshot of the post (top) by Taiwan Headlines with the caption “I
saw a 25-year-old unarmed police officer killed. There were several people With unclear links to the party-state, unlike
around watching the scene and taking pictures. This image was taken in Zhang’s channel, another channel 点亮历史【真
today’s Taiwanese society, in the ecstasy of ‘Taiwan value’ that Tsai Ing-wen
相解密 最新史料 欢迎订阅 (“Light up the history
was proud of.” The bottom two photos, on the other hand, showed that two
passengers tried to help police officers control the situation.48
[the truth is deciphered; the latest historical
materials; welcome to subscribe]”) spreads
similar disinformation about Tsai and promotes
narratives about China’s assertiveness toward reuniting with
Taiwan, including discussing possible military interventions.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Taiwan Headlines, “I saw a 25 years old policeman killed;” 鄒鎮宇, “Passengers did nothing on the scene of the murdered police?”; “勇警遭捅流血緊抱壓制嫌
犯…送醫命危 網看影片超心疼” (“Brave police was stabbed and hugged tightly to restra the suspect...He was sent to a doctor and his life was in danger.”), SET
News, July 3, 2020, https://www.setn.com/news.aspx?newsid=564691
49 Brian Hioe, “Fighting Fake News and Disinformation in Taiwan: An Interview with Puma Shen,” New Bloom, January 6, 2020, https://newbloommag.
net/2020/01/06/puma-shen-interview/.
50 “【台語成紅色滲透利器】連台灣人都認不出來！中共官媒記者當起台 YouTuber ，每週發影片穿插台語散播假消息,” (“Taiwanese becomes the weapon for ‘red infil-
tration” Even Taiwanese people cannot recognize the accent! Journalist from Chinese state-controlled media is now a YouTuber who posts videos of disin-
formation with Taiwanese dialect every week”), Buzz Orange, October 25, 2019, https://buzzorange.com/2019/10/25/china-journalist-youtuber/,
51 玉山腳下, “蔡英文賣台證據前，實錘！到底誰在愛台灣？誰在害台灣？！” (“With the evidence of Tsai Ing-wen selling Taiwan, solid proof! Who loves Taiwan? Who
is harming Taiwan?!”), Facebook Video, August 23, 2019, https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2480426898881897; the YouTube video is no longer avail-
able.See “「蔡英文賣台」影片竟是統戰手法 調查局：轉傳恐觸法” (“’Tsai Ing-wen selling Taiwan‘ video is united front work; Investigation bureau: reposting the
video can violate the law”), Apple Daily, October 21, 2019, https://tw.appledaily.com/local/20191021/25CAUQ6O7HIDYF7GXU5AG4TS6Y/ for factchecking.
14CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT
Despite his outspoken pro-China political lean, the
channel also attacked former Kaohsiung mayor
Han Kuo-Yu, including after he announced the
“20-Words Slogan” (the slogan: “國防靠美國, 科技
靠日本, 市場靠大陸, 努力靠自己,” which translates to
“National defense depends on the United States,
technology depends on Japan, the market
depends on the mainland [China], and efforts
depend on ourselves”).55 In a video titled “韩国瑜
捅了马蜂窝！习近平点名怒骂：吃里扒外！” (“Han Kuo
Yu stabbed a hornet’s nest! Xi Jinping called out
Han for being hypocritical, benefiting from China
yet helping the enemies”), the narrator criticized
An archived screenshot of Zhang Xida’s YouTube channel on August 18, Han for relying on Japan and the United States,
2020, before it removed all of its data.52 China’s two biggest geopolitical rivals, while
asking help from China.56 If this narrative had some source
The channel garnered 160,367,730 views and more than in CCP messaging, it would represent a turnabout for China,
256,000 followers between when it first joined YouTube which is documented to have covertly supported Han’s
on September 28, 2018, and November 11, 2020. Some of successful mayoral campaign in 2018. Similarly, this would
the video titles, posted in the lead up to the January 2020 signal to any notionally pro-China Taiwanese politician that
presidential election, included “北京放话了：统一后台湾可以拥 shifting away from reunification as an objective would not
有这10项权利。台民众大吃一惊！” (“Beijing announces: Taiwan just lose them China’s support, but instead would subject
can have these 10 rights after reunification. The people in them to its criticism and attacks.
Taiwan were surprised!”), which had garnered 3,320 likes
as of November 11, 2020, and “刚刚蔡英文又来忽悠：大陆很
穷的。北京：全面叫停！” (“Just now, Tsai Ing-wen fooled the
citizens again: the mainland is very poor. Beijing: Full stop
on Chinese Tourists to Taiwan!”), which had garnered 583
likes as of November 11, 2020.53
A screenshot of a video posted to the “Light up the history”
YouTube channel on August 1, 2020, with the title of “Just
now, Tsai Ing-wen fooled the citizens again: the mainland is
very poor. Beijing: Full stop on Chinese Tourists to Taiwan!”54
52 玉山腳下, YouTube, archived on August 18, 2020, https://web.archive.org/web/20200818150004/https://m.youtube.com/channel/UCyx-
N7RptKcBH9dDVm9RZDQ/featured.
53 Light up the history [the truth is deciphered; the latest historical materials; welcome to subscribe], “Beijing announces: Taiwan can have these 10 rights
after reunification. The people in Taiwan were surprised!”, YouTube video, March 5, 2019, accessed on November 11, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=b0n6u-gwoDM; Light up the history [the truth is deciphered; the latest historical materials; welcome to subscribe], “Just now, Tsai Ing-wen fooled
the citizens again: the mainland is very poor. Beijing: Full stop on Chinese Tourists to Taiwan!”, YouTube video, August 1, 2019, accessed on November 11,
2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d2X792s_XhA&t=256s.
54 Light up the history, “Tsai Ing-Wen fooled the citizens again.”
55 “韓國瑜：國防靠美國 科技靠日本 市場靠大陸 努力靠自己,” (“Han Kuo Yu: National defense depends on the United States, technology depends
on Japan, the market depends on the mainland [China], and efforts depend on ourselves”), Yahoo News, April 11, 2019, https://tw.news.yahoo.
com/%E9%9F%93%E5%9C%8B%E7%91%9C-%E5%9C%8B%E9%98%B2%E9%9D%A0%E7%BE%8E%E5%9C%8B-%E7%A7%91%E6%8A%80%E9%9D%A0%E
6%97%A5%E6%9C%AC-%E5%B8%82%E5%A0%B4%E9%9D%A0%E5%A4%A7%E9%99%B8-%E5%8A%AA%E5%8A%9B%E9%9D%A0%E8%87%AA%E5%B7
%B1-023407925.html
56 Light up the history, “Han Kuo Yu stabbed a hornet’s nest! Xi Jinping called out Han for being hypocritical, benefiting from China yet helping the enemies,”
YouTube video, April 28, 2019, accessed on November 11, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A3OxKEXPiZ8&t=7s.
15CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT
up the history,” though the content is
different for each channel. YouTube
users in Taiwan have also contributed
to a list of channels, named “大外宣”
(“External Propaganda”), that compiles
channels deemed to be responsible for
spreading pro-reunification narratives,
propagating China’s soft power, and
criticizing Taiwanese politicians.58 While
there is no evidence directly connecting
the fifty-nine channels in the list to each
other, they all contain videos with long
titles and title pages formatted similarly
to those on “Light up the history,” though
A screenshot of the video posted on August 1, 2020, with the title of “Han Kuo Yu the content is different for each channel.
stabbed a hornet’s nest! Xi Jinping called out Han for being hypocritical, benefiting
from China yet helping the enemies.”57 Among these similar seeming channels,
only four of them exclusively focus on Taiwan, including
a channel called 我愛台灣 (“I love Taiwan,” in traditional
YouTube users in Taiwan have also contributed to a list of
channels, named “大外宣” (“External Propaganda”), that
Chinese), which has over 18,100 subscribers, and another
compiles channels deemed to be responsible for spreading
channel called “健康與健康生活” (“Health and Healthy Life”),
with 22,900 subscribers. A third channel, 台湾新闻 Today
pro-reunification narratives, propagating China’s soft
power, and criticizing Taiwanese politicians.58 While there
(“Taiwan News Today”), had 804,978 views as of November
is no evidence directly connecting the fifty-nine channels
11, 2020, but did not disclose the number of subscribers on
in the list to each other, they all contain videos with long
the page, and a final channel, “更新新聞” (“Update News”),
titles and title pages formatted similarly to those on “Light
had over 54,300 subscribers. The layout of the videos
differed a bit from the previous style but followed similar
patterns of adding emotive news headlines in large fonts
to the video title page and narrators appearing in voice
only (i.e., not showing their faces). The remaining thirty-
seven YouTube channels that touched on Taiwan’s politics
also propagated narratives on other adversarial powers,
including the United States, pro-independence Hong Kong
activists, and India. These narratives also aligned with the
official tone of the Chinese government.
Screenshot of the videos page for YouTube channel “Light up the
history [the truth is deciphered; the latest historical materials;
welcome to subscribe]”59 (top), side-by-side with two other
YouTube channels, 有猫腻来啦 (“There is something hidden,” bottom
left) and 洞察天下 (“Insight into the world,” at bottom right), that
feature similar video formats and propagandistic themes.60
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 “大外宣”, YouTube List, http://youtube.board.tw/rank.php?tagid=15.
60 “Light up the history,” YouTube channel, accessed on November 11, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCvYes_0afVM6GeTTFzELW4Q.
16CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT
any other subject of interest on over 20,000 bulletin
boards.63 Founded in 1995 by a college student at
National Taiwan University and run by a student
organization named Electronic Bulletin Board System
Research Group, National Taiwan University, it is one
of the most popular social media platforms in Taiwan
among the younger generations, with over 560,000
users in Taiwan as of 2016.64 PTT also attracts overseas
users from the United States, China, Japan, and
Hong Kong. The platform plays an important role in
organizing protests, revealing political scandals, and
stoking vehement debate around political issues.65
Prior to 2019, the platform was notorious for spreading
disinformation, including from China and domestically
from Taiwan. For example, in May 2019, a claim that
Honduras was considering breaking diplomatic ties
with Taiwan was spread on the platform by a content
farm based in China.66 The Su Chii-cherng incident,
perhaps, provides a more ignominious example of
the platform being used to spread misinformation.67
Following the Osaka typhoon in 2018, internet users
on PTT started to single out Taiwan’s lead diplomat,
Su Chii-cherng, in the city for a failure to successfully
evacuate tourists from the island after the typhoon.
An unsubstantiated – and ultimately false – claim that
China, and not Taiwan, had assisted in the evacuation
went viral, picking up mainstream media attention,
which led to attacks on Osaka-based Taiwan officials.
The claim was initially traced back to a Chinese IP
address in Shanghai, but the Taipei District Prosecutor’s
Office found that the pro-DPP “Green Camp Internet
Army” leader Slow Yang was responsible for fueling
its spread on PTT. The incident, which culminated
with Su’s suicide, prompted the platform to suspend
registration for a year and a half.68
Throughout the entire 2020 presidential campaign
in Taiwan, PTT did not accept new users and actively
monitored its existing users, especially suspicious
Three screenshots showing the videos page for YouTube channels activities from shared IP addresses, reports from other
“I love Taiwan” “Health and Healthy Life,” and “Taiwan News users, and obvious bot-like behaviors. It actively executed a
Today.” The title page for the videos are mostly similar to the strict set of rules – adapted from previously established rules
others in the list and to the “Light up the history” page.61 – on content moderation during the election period. Among
the preexisting rules included that a newly registering user
PTT would have to verify their employers and schools prior to
completing registration; on the “Gossip” board, a new user
Besides Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, US platforms that
is required to log onto the platform for a total of 700 days
are well-studied, China also targets Taiwan on social media
before he or she can post to the board; on the same board,
platforms that are primarily used by Mandarin speakers.
a user is only allowed to post one piece of news per day
These platforms include the micro-blogging and bulletin
and, if he or she is to post a news item older than three days,
board platforms PTT, Dcard, and Weibo.
there needs to be a newly written introduction over 20
words, thereby preventing the simple copying and pasting
PTT is a nonprofit bulletin board system in Taiwan on
of the news; and the board owner has the ability to shut
which anonymous users discuss politics, anime, gossip, or
61 “There is something hidden,” YouTube channel, accessed on November 11, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/channel/UChcKM-XUrL4AjzFJOYEgdQQ;
“Insight into the world,” YouTube channel, accessed on November 11, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCMrOWtXrYPXtpTv9TQW8CiQ.
63 “BBS-themed movie stirs up campuses,” Taiwan Today, June 8, 2020, https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=10,23,45,10&post=16736.
64 “帶風向？做新聞？政府和媒體在PTT的行為數據大解密！,” (“Setting the Trend? Working on the News? The government and the media deciphered PTT behav-
ioral data.”), Big Data Group, April 5, 2016, https://group.dailyview.tw/article/detail/975
65 吳學展, “【解構 PTT】有自己的法律、法院和貨幣，沒被臉書淘汰的 PTT 是台灣民主化的重要推手” (“[Deconstruction of PTT] It has its own laws, courts, and cur-
rency. PTT, which has not been outcompeted by Facebook, is an important driving force for democratization in Taiwan”), Buzz Orange, November 12, 2015,
https://buzzorange.com/2015/11/12/ptt/
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