Disciplined Lethality - Expanding Competition with Iran in an Age of Nation-State Rivalries
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Marine with 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines,
carries sandbag to strengthen security
post during reinforcement of U.S. Embassy
Compound in Baghdad, January 4, 2020
(U.S. Marine Corps/Kyle C. Talbot)
Disciplined Lethality
Expanding Competition with Iran in an Age
of Nation-State Rivalries
By Scott J. Harr
he United States had formerly neither new nor unanticipated. As artic- power in efforts to “expand” the compe-
T enjoyed distinct competitive
advantages prosecuting armed
conflict in the war on terror around the
ulated in the 2018 National Defense
Strategy (NDS), strategic competition
between the world’s Great Powers will
tition, which implies a preference to keep
competition at levels of confrontation at
the level beneath open warfare. As one of
globe. However, the swift ascension of define the new operational environ- the four states identified in the NDS and
states such as China, Russia, and Iran ment moving forward.1 Rising near- the Middle East’s preeminent near-peer
in terms of regional and global capabili- peer competitors are using innovative adversary of the United States, Iran natu-
ties to project power, coupled with the technology and seizing on ambiguities rally dominates discussions on emerging
exhausting U.S. focus on defeating within the new and emerging bat- security challenges, and senior leaders
violent extremist organizations over tlespace to make strategic gains on the from the highest echelons of defense
the better part of two decades, requires margins of peace that nullify or bypass policy have prioritized countering Iran’s
a reevaluation of strategy. This shift is traditional American strengths. “malign” influence in the region.3
The NDS has fittingly put a premium Given the above, the intent of this
on “expanding the competitive space” article is to analyze the nature and pros-
with adversaries.2 While prioritizing lethal pects of expanding strategic competition
Major Scott J. Harr, USA, is a Company
Commander in 5th Special Forces Group
force, the NDS also identifies the impera- with Iran in the Middle East. In order to
(Airborne). tive to leverage all elements of national best understand the nature of strategic
JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Harr 91
Republic of Korea army soldiers stand resolute at Joint Security Area where South and North Korean soldiers stand face-to-face across Korean Demilitarized Zone, Panmunjom, South Korea, June 19, 2018 (U.S. Army/Richard Colletta) competition with Iran, it is first necessary the best chance to stabilize the Middle tive strategy with an eye toward recom- to identify some unique aspects of Iran East amid robust Iranian efforts to the mending effective counterstrategies, it as a near-peer adversary compared to contrary. is useful to compare the attributes of other states. This article first distills the how the four states directly compete salient factors that impact approaches to Gray Zone Competition: A with the United States on the global strategic competition with Iran. Next, Near-Peer Without Peer stage. In defining direct competition, it analyzes the pertinent dynamics gov- The NDS primarily speaks of national the avenues available for direct engage- erning strategic competition given the threats emanating from four nations: ment, the presence or lack of direct prevailing competitive approaches that China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. threats emanating from competitor undergird each country. Finally, based All these states currently compete countries, and the level of innovation on the preceding analysis and findings, against the United States in what some involved in actions that directly target it offers recommendations for strategic have termed the gray zone, which, as the United States comprise the lens for actions to guide U.S. competition against noted by scholar Van Jackson, gener- this analysis. While other important Iran and steer approaches to favorable ally denotes types of conflict “short and significant indirect categories of outcomes for U.S. interests. Competitive of war” or, essentially, “non-war interaction exist, such as economic actions and strategies that are attuned to competition” between states.4 Near- relations and the third-party allies and the unique aspects of Iran as a near-peer peer competition in the gray zone is adversaries of the state threats, this adversary and that account for the exist- not created equal, and the four states analysis focuses on direct actions only. ing dynamics governing Iran’s approach identified in the NDS go about their In this way, unique elements of Iran’s to competition in the Middle East stand competition differently and take up direct competitive tactics and strategy a better chance of thwarting Iranian decidedly diverse competitive strategies emerge that ultimately impact the attempts to undermine U.S. power and tactics undermining U.S. interests range of feasible and desirable U.S. and influence in the space between war and sovereignty. Therefore, in order to approaches to engaging in strategic and peace. Such actions also represent isolate the character of Iran’s competi- competition with Tehran. 92 Features / Disciplined Lethality JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020
As a starting point for analyzing the such, a broader range of options likely and asserts its foreign policy objectives
direct attributes of near-peer competition exists for the United States to engage in even without a buildup of conventional
from the four states, it is perhaps best to strategic competition options that inte- military power. Lacking the resources
examine what (if any) other elements of grate all elements of national power and of a Great Power state, Iran neverthe-
national power (besides military action) imply a supporting role for the military. less effectively undermines the security
exist as a venue for engagement. Both On the other hand, both North Korea interests of more powerful ones (namely
Russia and China maintain diplomatic and Iran routinely issue hostile threats the United States and Israel) by training,
relations with the United States, which of lethal force against the United States arming, and advising capable nonstate
instantly expands the possibilities for while openly flaunting destabilizing actors. As noted by Van Jackson, the use
strategic competition by leveraging military activities such as ballistic missile of proxies is a classic tactic employed in
diplomacy as a cornerstone element of testing. These bellicose threats, coupled gray zone competition and allows the ag-
U.S. power. President Donald Trump has with the lack of diplomatic relations, gressor to offer credible threats of force/
held direct talks with both his Russian restrict the elements of national power retaliation while also obfuscating the ac-
and Chinese counterparts during his that can be leveraged in competition tual role of official state apparatus in the
term.5 Such avenues for dialogue make while also instantly ushering the military support of proxy forces.13
communicating intentions and potentially to the forefront of competitive actions to Using the analytical framework dis-
de-escalating tension profoundly simpler counter the threats. cussed above, Iran’s direct approach to
and, by default, augment the range of op- Finally, the nature of strategic com- strategic competition is unique among
tions available during gray zone conflict. petition between the United States and the four states. In general, it may be
By contrast, limited diplomatic channels the four states can be examined in terms stated that the Iranian “brand” of com-
exist between the United States, North of the level of innovation demonstrated petition restricts the use of all elements
Korea, and Iran. This characteristic in competitive actions. As noted by of national power, takes an overtly hostile
is primarily what distinguishes these General Joseph Dunford, modern war- tone, and employs traditional tactics of
states as “rogue” regimes in the NDS. fare is changing with the advent of new gray zone warfare. In this sense, Iran rep-
While President Trump has held direct technologies that near-peer states exploit resents a “near peer without peer”—that
talks with Kim Jong-un and offered to to make operational gains at the expense is, competitive responses to Iran will have
meet with President Hasan Rohani, the of U.S. power.9 For instance, Russia has to address a distinctly Iranian brand of
lack of official relations and absence of used information operations in creative competition. These aspects also ensure
U.S. Embassies in either country pro- and plausibly deniable ways to hedge the that the starting point for strategic com-
mote hostility while straining efforts at sovereignty of neighboring states and petition with Iran appears decidedly more
communication.6 even allegedly influence democratic elec- aggressive in nature than other threat
Related to the presence or lack of tions in the United States.10 Likewise, states and perhaps diminishes the pros-
diplomatic channels between the United North Korea allegedly perpetrated a pects for expanding competition using
States and the four states is the presence massive cyber hack of Sony to undermine softer elements of national power that
or absence of overtly hostile threats of and delay the release of a commercial film keep the competition beneath thresholds
force emanating from these competitors. portraying the North Korean regime in of warfare.
Both China and Russia have refrained a negative light.11 Not to be outdone,
from issuing direct threats of lethal China continues to build man-made Hard Truths About
force against the United States despite islands to extend its sovereignty in the Soft Approaches
pointed clashes over issues of sovereignty South China Sea and use “debt warfare” In addition to seemingly having fewer
and economic flashpoints. Indeed, the in Africa to assume control of massive elements of national power at its dis-
United States and Russia have gone resources and infrastructure on the posal to expand competition with Iran,
to great lengths to coordinate and de- continent.12 the United States must contend with
conflict their respective actions in the All these activities represent innova- several constraining dynamics regarding
military conflict in Syria to avoid direct tive competitive actions that exploit its competition with Iran that impact
confrontation, despite finding them- technological advances that make attribu- its strategic approach. Perhaps chief
selves on opposite sides of the conflict.7 tion difficult or sovereignty issues where among these dynamics is what might
For its part, China and the United States policy to guide behavior is currently be termed the competition paradox
have recently entered a period of détente limited or vague. Iran stands alone in its that governs the competitive actions of
in a bitter contest of wills regarding in- competitive activities in that it has primar- both the United States and Iran in the
ternational trade and commerce.8 These ily relied on more traditional tactics to Middle East. Simply put, the competi-
dynamics signify that nations, while compete in the gray zone. Using a net- tion paradox theorizes that the freer a
fiercely competitive and assertive in work of proxy forces across the Middle country’s civil society, the less free it
fighting for their interests, are reticent to East (notably in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and is to compete in the gray zone. Coun-
escalate competition to open warfare. As Yemen), Iran successfully projects power terintuitively, a free society’s liberal
JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Harr 93values and democratic processes have a and societal freedom than Iran, from the According to the competition para-
constraining effect on the range of com- strategic competition standpoint dictated dox, Iran is both freer to compete in the
petitive actions available in gray zone by the competition paradox, Iran is free Middle East and more resolved to do so.
competition. Societies based on liberal and the United States is not. Iran, there- Perhaps no one better personified these
democratic ideals that cherish pluralism, fore, enjoys a competitive advantage as it advantages and their effects on Iran’s
individual liberty, and universal human presses its foreign policy objectives in the approach to competition in the Middle
rights will in general impose limits on Middle East. East than General Qasem Soleimani, the
their leaders that restrict competitive Iran’s competitive advantage over leader of Iran’s special forces (Quds Force)
actions that fall outside liberal societal the United States is not only derived and trusted advisor and instrument of
values. Activities such as arming ter- from the greater degree of freedom it the supreme leader himself. His recent
rorist groups, conducting cyber attacks enjoys prosecuting its competitive ac- death only highlights his impact within
on civilian populations, and blatantly tions but also stems from diverging and Iran and in the region. As a main architect
violating national sovereignty (all misaligned perspectives on the stakes of and executor of Iran’s foreign policies in
actions taken recently by nondemocratic the competition itself. For Iran, the stakes the Middle East, Soleimani was revered
near-peer competitors) represent unac- of its competition are its very existence, in military circles for his success in pros-
ceptable actions that will likely not be and it therefore perceives its competitive ecuting asymmetric military operations
sustainable or viable by the ruling elite actions as moves made in a “war of ne- that stymied many regional adversaries
in a democratic country with a free civil cessity,” waged for its survival. As noted and blunted the objectives of regional
society. by Afshon Ostovar in his seminal work and foreign powers—including the
Naturally, there is some subjectivity Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, United States—in the Middle East. While
and relativism at play here. The United and the Revolutionary Guard, since the Soleimani was undoubtedly a gifted leader
States, as a leading democratic state, has establishment of the Islamic Republic who deserved credit for his role helping
undoubtedly perpetrated questionable or of Iran in 1979, Iran has viewed Israel Iran achieve its foreign policy objectives
dubious competitive actions to achieve as a mortal and existentially threatening through asymmetric military approaches,
its interests in the past in spite of societal enemy. Its foreign policy actions, there- he did not have the mystical prowess or
values. However, the important principle fore, endeavor to combat and ultimately supernatural special warfare abilities fre-
that undergirds the competition paradox defeat Israel. Indeed, Iran has persistently quently alluded to or ascribed to him in
is that in a free civil society, opposition framed its wars and conflicts in terms contemporary literature. He was, rather,
voices are always present and active, and of creating a “road to Israel” to destroy the beneficiary of the dynamics described
when thresholds of discontent emerge its nemesis.14 In this regional power above: freer to compete and competing
from the public, democratic mechanisms imbalance, as Kenneth Waltz observes, with more resolve. Bluntly, Soleimani’s
exist to transition the ruling political Iran views itself as a lone Persian state gloves were off in competitive approaches
power to entities more aligned with the surrounded by Arabs and within striking designed to preserve and save the Iranian
dominant societal values. Conversely, in distance of an enemy capable of destroy- state, while U.S. gloves remain cautiously
less free states (like Iran), no mechanisms ing it.15 In this context, the stakes could on as it fights to merely protect its interests
exist to transition political power, which not be higher for Iran, and thus Iran’s abroad. The implications of the U.S.-
makes leaders freer to pursue whatever risk tolerance and resolve to engage in Iranian competitive dynamics described
agenda and interests they choose with lit- competition are high. conveyed decisive advantages to Iran and
tle restraint and no political constituency Conversely, for the United States, cast doubt on the viability and prospects
to worry about. In Iran, the religious rul- conflicts in the Middle East represent a of U.S. efforts to expand the competition
ing elite have effectively eliminated civil war of choice, where only interests—not using reciprocal and/or softer means.
society and concentrated all meaningful existence—are at stake. The risk tolerance Only time will tell if his death will change
political power in unelected bodies and and resolve for competitive actions in these dynamics and in what ways.
individuals. Their actions and foreign wars of choice are decidedly lower. This
policy agendas are carried out with lim- misalignment in perspectives between A Color Evolution: Green-
ited or no opposition and with nothing Iran and the United States regarding Lighting Red Lines in
but the whim of the supreme leader to strategic competition is presumably why the Gray Zone
guide and direct them. This is one reason Iran is seeking to develop its lethal ca- Those who are quick to call for regime
why Iran can arm paramilitary groups and pabilities, apparently unafraid to escalate change or war with Iran are often
nonstate proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, the conflict, while the United States is pejoratively labeled Iran hawks for their
and Yemen that degrade regional stability seeking to de-escalate the competition aggressive stance. By definition, Iran
and engage in terrorist tactics that have by expanding it to elements of national hawks have given up hope on the pros-
been widely condemned by the inter- power that stand a better chance of keep- pects for competition in the gray zone.
national community. While the United ing the competition beneath the level of Yet even given the grim prognosis on the
States enjoys vastly greater individual open warfare. current state of competitive play between
94 Features / Disciplined Lethality JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020the United States and Iran, prospects and that negotiations with U.S. officials lethal response as inevitably escalating
for effective competition in the gray represent fruitless and capricious efforts. the conflict into just the type of open
zone with Iran exist and should be fully As a result, the Middle East remains a and large-scale warfare that competitive
explored before giving in to the gravi- gray zone competitive arena that has seen strategies should be avoiding. However,
tational pull of yet another large-scale an increase in Iranian capabilities and lethal responses to Iran should not be
military conflict in the Middle East. influence with a corresponding decrease automatically equated with an invitation
Van Jackson notes that aggressors in U.S. credibility and capability to deter to open warfare. It is possible to leverage
often make operational gains in the gray Iranian behavior. lethal capabilities in competition without
zone by taking advantage of either weak To decisively reverse this trend, escalating the conflict to open warfare.
or nonexistent red lines from defenders.16 the United States can introduce and The U.S. response to the Syrian regime’s
In this context, red lines refer to explicit, implement red lines that clearly specify use of chemical weapons in Ghouta il-
clearly communicated, and/or codified in unacceptable Iranian behavior and, criti- lustrates this point. After the Syrian regime
international law boundaries that serve to cally, enforce them with disciplined lethal reportedly used chemical weapons in an
govern behavior in the gray zone. These actions to ensure Iran pays a proportion- attack on opposition fighters, U.S. planes
lines specify consequences for aggressive ate price for unacceptable competitive bombed regime infrastructure to send a
actors that cross them. Additionally, the actions. Implementing red lines with message that such behavior would not be
consequences specified for crossing red lethal consequences yields two advantages tolerated.17 In a crisis where U.S. and re-
lines must be credible in order to have to U.S. competition with Iran. First, it gime forces have delicately avoided direct
the desired deterrent effect. That is, clearly delineates acceptable and unac- confrontation, the bombing did not lead
aggressors must believe that defenders ceptable behavior in the gray zone that to an escalation in conflict. Additionally, it
will follow through on the punitive ac- would diminish Iran’s ability to exploit is worth reiterating that the centerpiece of
tions promised for violations of red lines. ambiguity in the Middle East. Identifying Iranian competitive activity in the Middle
Without clear and credible red lines, ag- such actions as transporting lethal aid East hinges on proxy forces created and
gressors can exploit ambiguity and a lack shipments to proxy forces, conducting leveraged specifically because Iran lacks
of credibility to make competitive gains. ballistic missile tests, and closing the the military resources to support large-scale
In the current U.S.-Iranian competitive Strait of Hormuz as unacceptable and conflict with an advanced state. Bluntly,
environment, Iran exploits this dynamic punishable behavior begins to clarify Iran uses proxy forces because it has to
to increase its capabilities to wage war in expected behavior in U.S.-Iranian com- use them, as it lacks fully developed con-
the Middle East at the expense of U.S. petition. Second, imposing disciplined, ventional military capabilities. This reality
credibility. U.S. responses lack either lethal costs on Iran for unacceptable lessens the chance that targeted lethal
the force or credibility to deter Iranian behavior activates and leverages the main strikes against Iran would goad it into a
competitive gains. Sanctions, for example, U.S. strength in interstate competition: war that it is clearly unprepared to fight.
while crippling the Iranian public and lethal capabilities. Targeting the Iranian Second, critics of this proposed
inducing massive hardship in society, are military, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard strategy will also cite the risks to U.S.
too easily circumvented by the ruling Corps, or the regime’s infrastructure and allied forces from the highly capable
regime and its international allies to stand after red line violations would be lethal Iranian proxies in the region. In this line
a real chance at dislodging the regime or enough to send a strong message. It of thinking, lethal strikes from the United
compelling it to change its foreign poli- would degrade Iranian capability but States would beget lethal responses from
cies. In this case, the U.S. competitive be sufficiently targeted to impose costs Iranian proxies that could potentially
action lacks the force necessary to counter only on the offending security or state devolve into a violent back-and-forth
Iranian competition. A competitive action apparatus so as not to signal an appetite contest of wills between U.S. allies in
that is an example of a lack of credibility for large-scale combat. Imposing red lines the region and Iranian proxies leading
is the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint in the U.S.-Iranian competition enforced to destabilization. But these proxies are
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). with lethal capabilities applied in a tar- already destabilizing the region with
With that agreement in 2015, the United geted fashion represents the best way to relative impunity. Backing Palestinian
States and its allies attempted to impose effectively compete in a Middle Eastern terrorist groups against Israel, stalling the
limits on Iran’s potential to develop gray zone, where Iran already holds many formation of a legitimate government
nuclear weapons capabilities in exchange advantages, without giving in to hasty in Lebanon, forming paramilitary forces
for sanctions relief. However, less than and myopic Iran hawk impulses advocat- in Iraq, and arming a violent insurgency
2 years after the deal’s implementation, ing regime change through large-scale in Yemen show that Iran’s destabiliz-
President Trump withdrew from it. combat. ing fingerprints are all over the major
Among other consequences of scrapping Critics of this recommendation are regional conflicts. Implementing red
the JCPOA, the withdrawal likely sent likely to raise two main issues with the lines that carry a lethal response would
a clear message to Iran that American red line and lethal strike competition simply make Iran pay a price for actions
actions and agreements lack credibility strategy. First, they are likely to see the it already conducts. Furthermore, Iran’s
JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Harr 95ability to scale and obfuscate its support approach. The competition paradox Jong Un,” Washington Post, March 8, 2018,
available at ; Judson Berger, “Trump
Offers to Meet with Iranian President Rouhani,
Iran’s conduct of violent activities in their the United States will not outcompete
Without Preconditions,” Fox News, July 30,
own backyard. Iran by trying to expand the competition 2018, available at .
invigorate American sovereignty in the strengths. Rather, introducing the lethal-
7
Connor O’Brien, “Dunford: U.S. Will
Work to Re-Establish Deconfliction Ef-
face of a direct threat. It asserts that the ity resource into the competition enables
fort with Russia in Syria,” Politico, June
United States has a fundamental right to the United States to outcompete Iran and 19, 2017, available at .
terests or allies. Indirect efforts to expand warfare, the lethality resource should be
8
Martin Baccardax, “Stocks Rally on
U.S.-China Trade Detente; Trump Blasts Fed
competition with Iran and/or impose introduced in a disciplined capacity that
Chair Powell,” The Street, November 28, 2018,
meaningful costs on Iranian malign ac- aims to keep competition in the gray available at .
to engage the international community. expectations, and lay ground rules for
9
Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., “The Character of
War and Strategic Landscape Have Changed,”
Neither does covert action seem efficient competition is a measured way to intro-
Joint Force Quarterly 89 (2nd Quarter 2018).
or effective given the fact that U.S. co- duce U.S. competitive advantages that 10
Ronald Sprang, “Russia in Ukraine
vert actions in 1953 (supporting a coup would allow for success in the gray zone 2013–2016: The Application of New Type
d’état) ostensibly fomented the mistrust while keeping competition beneath large- Warfare Maximizing the Exploitation of Cyber,
and resentment from Iran that persist to scale combat. JFQ IO, and Media,” Small Wars Journal, n.d.,
available at .
lines with lethal consequences. Striking 11
Tim Starks, “U.S. Indicts North Korean
a sovereign country with military force
1
Summary of the 2018 National Defense National for Sony Hack, Massive Cyberat-
Strategy of the United States of America: Sharp- tacks,” Politico, September 6, 2018, available
(even when employed with discipline and ening the American Military’s Competitive Edge at . Building in the South China Sea,” New York
2
Ibid. Times, October 27, 2015, available at .
is going well?” tober 8, 2019), available at . tion.”
4
Van Jackson, “Tactics of Strategic Com- 14
Afshon Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam:
In direct competition between states, petition: Gray Zones, Red Lines, and Conflicts Religion, Politics, and the Revolutionary Guard
lethality still rules the day, and capa- Before War,” Naval War College Review 70, no. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
bilities and competitive overmatch in 3 (Summer 2017). 15
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Why Iran Should
force-on-force destruction should not be 5
“Read a Transcript of Trump and Putin’s Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean
begrudged, marginalized, or discounted. Joint Press Conference,” Time, July 31, 2018, Stability,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (July/Au-
available at ; 16
Jackson, “Tactics of Strategic Competi-
out these truths. Prospects of expand- Yen Nee Lee, “What to Expect from the tion.”
ing competition with Iran by leveraging Crucial G-20 Meeting Between Trump and Xi 17
Jon Sharman et al., “Syria Strikes—As It
nonmilitary elements of national power This Weekend,” CNBC, November 30, 2018, Happened: Bashar al-Assad’s Chemical Weap-
are dim from the start given the lack of available at . April 14, 2018, available at .
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