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BRAZILIAN NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
BOLETIM
GEOCORRENTE July 15th, 2021 ISSN 2446-7014
JOURNAL OF GEOPOLITICS AND OCEAN POLITICS YEAR 7 • Nº 143
Ecuador’s stance on illegal fishing
This and a further 12 articles in this edition
BOLETIM
RESEARCHERS OF THE CONJUNCTURE
GEOCORRENTE ASSESSMENT GROUP
Boletim Geocorrente is a fortnightly publication written
by the Conjuncture Assessment Group (NAC), which is part SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
of the Department of Research and Post-Graduation (SPP) at Bruno Gonçalves (Ufrj)
the Naval War College (EGN). NAC studies the International Franco Napoleão A. de Alencastro Guimarães (Puc-Rio)
Isadora Jacques de Jesus (Ufrj)
Conjuncture from a geopolitical framework, in order to supply
João Victor Marques Cardoso (Unirio)
the global demand for information, making it more accessible Vivian de Mattos Marciano (Uerj)
for the general public. Moreover, it seeks to intertwine society
into defense and security issues, and to disseminate updated SOUTH AMERICA
knowledge of international conflicts and crisis to meet the Naval Ana Laura Marçal Monsores (Uff)
Staff's demands. Bruna Soares Corrêa de Souza (UniLaSalle)
The research group responsible for this Boletim is Carlos Henrique Ferreira da Silva Júnior (Egn)
José Martins Rodrigues Junior (Ufrj)
composed of members from different areas of expertise, whose
Matheus Souza Galves Mendes (Egn)
multiple backgrounds and experiences provide a comprehensive Pedro Emiliano Kilson Ferreira (Univ. de Santiago)
approach to the latest international issues. It seeks to analyse the
major themes, motivational factors and the main actors regarding NORTH & CENTRAL AMERICA
the escalation of conflicts, ongoing crises and its outcomes. Ana Carolina Vaz Farias (Ufrj)
Thus, this journal aims to publish short articles concerning Jéssica Pires Barbosa Barreto (Egn)
current issues about ten macro-regions in the globe: South Rafael Esteves Gomes (Ufrj)
America, North and Central America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Victor Cabral Ribeiro (Puc-Rio)
Victor Eduardo Kalil Gaspar Filho (Egn)
Middle East and North Africa, Europe, Russia and former
USSR, South Asia, East Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania, ARCTIC & ANTARCTIC
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"Special Topics" section. Gabriela Paulucci da Hora Viana (Ufrj)
Gabriele Marina Molina Hernandez (Uff)
BRAZILIAN NAVAL WAR COLLEGE'S Pedro Allemand Mancebo Silva (Puc-Rio)
DIRECTOR Raphaella da Silva Dias Costa (Ufrj)
Rear Admiral Silvio Luis dos Santos EUROPE
RESEARCH AND POST-GRADUATION Guilherme Francisco Pagliares de Carvalho (Uff)
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE BRAZILIAN Marina Autran Caldas Bonny (Ufrj)
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Melissa Rossi (Suffolk University)
Rear Admiral (Retd.) Marcio Magno de Farias Franco e Thaïs Abygaëlle Dedeo (Université de Paris 3)
Silva Victor Magalhães Longo de Carvalho Motta (Ufrj)
EDITORIAL BOARD EAST ASIA
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF João Pedro Ribeiro Grilo Cuquejo (Ibmec)
Captain (RETD) Leonardo Faria de Mattos (Egn) Luís Filipe de Souza Porto (Ufrj)
Marcelle Torres Alves Okuno (Egn)
EXECUTIVE EDITOR Maria Claudia Menezes Leal Nunes (Usp)
Captain-Liutenant Bruno de Seixas Carvalho (Egn) Philipe Alexandre Junqueira (Uerj)
Rodrigo Abreu de Barcellos Ribeiro (Ufrj)
SCIENTIFIC EDITOR Vinicius Guimarães Reis Gonçalves (Ufrj)
Captan (RETD) Francisco E. Alves de Almeida (Egn)
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
ASSISTANT EDITORS Adel Bakkour (Ufrj)
Jéssica Germano de Lima Silva (Egn) Ana Luiza Colares Carneiro (Ufrj)
Noele de Freitas Peigo (Facamp) Dominique Marques de Souza (Ufrj)
Thayná Fernandes Alves Ribeiro (Uff) Isadora Novaes dos Santos bohrer (ufrj)
GRAPHIC DESIGN Pedro da Silva Albit Penedo (Ufrj)
Ana Carolina Vaz Farias (Ufrj) RUSSIA & FORMER USSR
Bruno Gonçalves (Ufrj)
José Gabriel de Melo Pires (Ufrj)
Isadora Novaes dos Santos bohrer (Ufrj)
Luiza Gomes Guitarrari (Ufrj)
TRANSLATION AND REVIEW Pedro Mendes Martins (Eceme)
Rodrigo Oliveira Dutra Marcílio (Ufrj) Pérsio Glória de Paula (Uff)
PUBLICATION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES SOUTHEAST ASIA & OCEANIA
To publish in the Boletim, the author is required to be a researcher Maria Gabriela Veloso Camelo (Puc-Rio)
of the Current Geopolitics Group of NAC and submit his or her Matheus Bruno Ferreira Alves Pereira (Ufrj)
article containing a maximum of 400 words to the peer review Thayná Fernandes Alves Ribeiro (Uff)
assessment process. Vinícius de Almeida Costa (Egn)
CONTACT SOUTH ASIA
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Superintendency. João Miguel Villas-Boas Barcellos (Ufrj)
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- Rio de Janeiro/RJ - Brazil Rebeca Vitória Alves Leite (Egn)
PHONE.: +55 (21) 2546-9394 | E-mail: geocorrentenac@gmail.
com SPECIAL TOPICS
This and other editions of BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE, in Alessandra Dantas Brito (Egn)
portuguese and english, can be found at the Brazilian Naval War Guilherme Novaes Silva Pinto (Ufrj)
College Webpage and in our Google Drive Folder.
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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 143 • July | 2021
BOLETIM
GEOCORRENTE
INDEX
SOUTH AMERICA RUSSIA & FORMER-USSR
Ecuador’s stance on illegal fishing.........................................................................5 Naval Power as a Ukrainian diplomatic tool in the Black Sea..............................12
Sputnik V and nuclear power plants: the geopolitics of vaccine between................
EAST ASIA
Russia and Argentina.............................................................................................6
The Chinese nuclear agenda and its implications for international politics..........13
NORTH & CENTRAL AMERICA
SOUTHEAT ASIA & OCEANIA
The benefits and risks of new vessel limits in the Panama Canal..........................6
The murder of Jovenel Moïse and its implications for the American........................ Beijing stands still in the South China Sea...........................................................14
.continent.................................................................................................................7
ARCTIC & ANTARCTIC
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Escalating military tensions in the Arctic: NATO's Formidable Shield 21.................
Elections in Ethiopia and foreign policy trends of Abiy Ahmed's ............................. Exercise................................................................................................................15
.administration.........................................................................................................8
SPECIAL TOPICS
EUROPE
Disruption or Crypto Summer?.............................................................................16
Italy-Libya Agreement finances Coast Guard in the Central Mediterranean..........9
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
Nuclear Agreement with Iran, new opportunities?................................................10
Selected Articles & Defense News............................ 17
Turkish Geopolitics: The Istanbul Canal............................................................... 11
Geocorrente Calendar............................................... 17
References................................................................ 18
Risk Maps................................................................. 19
TOP GLOBAL RISKS
Disregarding the COVID-19 pandemic
For more information on the criteria used, visit page 19.
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BOLETIM
GEOCORRENTE
THE COUNTRIES WITH THE
MOST CASES
Data according to the "WHO COVID-19 Dashboard", published on July 15 th, 2021.
VACCINE MONITORING
Sources: World Health Organization; The New York Times
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SOUTH AMERICA
Ecuador’s stance on illegal fishing
Carlos Silva Júnior
T he fleet of fishing boats involved in illegal fishing has
reached the Galapagos Islands again. The monitoring
system of the Ecuadorian Navy has identified that 295
and international cooperation scope, the South American
country has better prospects, which some of them should
be highlighted: (i) discussions for effective participation
vessels are already around the limits of the Exclusive in the marine corridor that will link Ecuador, Colombia,
Economic Zone (EEZ) of the archipelago, rich in Costa Rica, and Panama, with the expansion of the
biodiversity. During the same period in 2020, more than Galapagos Islands Marine Protection Area; (ii) Canadian
300 boats were identified. Therefore, it is vital to analyze support, from the Dark Vessel Detection program, in
how Ecuador has responded to this persistent problem. monitoring foreign vessels from data sharing and satellite
The Dirección Regional de los Espacios Acuáticos y analysis; and (iii) negotiations in the World Trade
Guardacostas Insular (DIRGIN) identified around 281 Organization for the end of fishing subsidies, which end
Chinese-flagged boats, 6 Panamanian, 2 unidentified, and up promoting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.
6 from different countries. Thus, the Ecuadorian Navy The introductory text for this discussion disregards
has mobilized at least two Esmeralda-class corvettes, this prohibition for developing countries, which would
with two support vessels (a Quito-class speedboat) and include China, owner of the largest deep-sea fishing fleet
Bell-230 helicopters. It should be expected that fishing in the world.
vessels will remain in the region until at least September, The Ecuadorian effort and concern about protecting
following the cycle of illegal fishing in South American its marine space, both for its fishing stock and for the
waters, which encircles the Peruvian and Chilean EEZs damage it can cause to the local biodiversity, is notable.
and advancing into Argentina (Boletim 128). However, even considering the recurrence and the
In 2020, the dialogue between China and Ecuador overflow of the problem from coast to coast, there is
on the topic (Boletim 122) resulted in some decisions, a lack of South American regional cooperation for the
especially the Chinese zero-tolerance for illegal fishing, governance and protection of the maritime space, which,
but that was unsuccessful. Considering that, in the although comprehensively divided, is the same for all.
bilateral sphere, solutions seem incipient, in the regional
Source: CMAR
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n143.p05.
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Sputnik V and nuclear power plants: the geopolitics of vaccine between Russia and Argentina
Guilherme Novaes
T he COVID-19 vaccine, Sputnik V, has been used
by Russia as an instrument of influence in South
America. According to Argentine journalist Jorge Latana,
enterprise's technical, human, and technological capacity,
causing resistance to the acceptance of the project by
the Argentine government. Rosatom's international
the Kremlin is looking forward to constructing nuclear operations would bring Argentina into Russia's direct
power plants in Argentinean territory and betting on the sphere of influence, besides being a mechanism to
commercialization of the vaccine to strengthen bilateral encourage the export of goods and services with
relations, making such projects possible. What would high-added value. In this sense, Moscow would have
be Russia’s interest in plants in the region, and what interference, for example, in decisions related to the
advantage could Argentina take from this? supply of energy to specific regions, a possible threat to
The idea of a nuclear power plant constructed by Russia national sovereignty for Buenos Aires.
on Argentinean territory is not recent. Nuclear cooperation On the other hand, the expansion of nuclear capacity
agreements between the countries were signed in 2008 would allow Argentina to diversify its energy matrix.
and 2015, but the plant construction projects have not Currently, the country heavily depends on fossil fuels,
progressed. However, the Russian government perceived especially natural gas, which requires investments from
the weakened Argentinean context due to the pandemic, prospecting for new reserves to expanding the distribution
with difficulty in purchasing vaccines, as an opportunity. network, besides emitting large amounts of CO2. The
As the Russian ambassador in Buenos Aires confirmed, installation of nuclear power plants could reduce the
besides the vaccine negotiations, proposals were made to dependence on hydrocarbons and prepare the country
build a large or medium-sized nuclear power plant. to face energy crises. It remains to be seen whether the
The proposals include construction, ownership, and geopolitics of the vaccine, which has already brought
operation entirely by Rosatom, Russia's nuclear energy advances for Russian interests, will have enough drive to
company. However, according to the initial offers, convince the Argentinians that the nuclear proposal is a
Argentina would not have the autonomy to control the good prospect.
plants or contribute with strategic issues related to the
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n143.p06.
NORTH & CENTRAL AMERICA
The benefits and risks of new vessel limits in the Panama Canal
Victor Cabral
T he Panama Canal is currently the second most
important waterway for international maritime trade,
and it may gain further importance by expanding the
tugboat captains, who have little room to maneuver in the
locks. The professionals fear that the Canal (which has
already had cracks in the locks and failures in the water
limit of vessels that can transit it. In June 2021, the Canal supply) will not keep functioning with the new standards.
Authority increased the maximum overall length of The Canal, which opened in 1914, underwent
permitted vessels to 370.33 meters and the draft to 15.24 an expansion in 2016, led by the Spanish company
meters, allowing 97% of the world's fleet of container Sacyr Vallehermoso. The expansion was shrouded in
ships to pass through. Although positive for international corruption allegations and questions about the quality
trade, the risks of this change are questionable, given the of the constructions, given that the Spanish budget was
existing infrastructure and the implications for climate inferior to its competitors by USD 1 billion and there was
change. not enough concrete in the planning for a considerable
The recent increase of around three meters over the expansion of the locks.
allowed length and only 27 centimeters in the draft may Regarding climate impacts, a new source of water
not seem significant, but it expands the possibilities of supply was not considered by the builders. The Canal
navigation through the Canal. After capacity tests that makes use of Lake Gatun, which also supplies the
have been carried out since 2019, the measure is intended Panamanian capital. In times of drought, transit is
to provide greater safety for heavy vessels when making hampered by low average water depths in the lake,
use of the locks, as well as more flexibility for carriers forcing the boats to be unloaded so that they are light
using the connection between the Atlantic and Pacific enough to pass through without hitting the bottom of the
Oceans. However, the change does not please local Canal or running aground. »
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The positioning to commercial demand is valid; security at risk. Low rainfall and possible inadequate
however, it does not seem to consider the possibility of management of Lake Gatun may incur water shortages
the medium and long-term impact of climate change in at the locks, generating a possible stranding, jeopardizing
Panama, which could exacerbate droughts and de-supply, international maritime trade.
putting the Canal's operation and the nationals' water
Source: Wikipedia
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n143.p06-07.
The murder of Jovenel Moïse and its implications for the American continent
Rafael Esteves
I n 2021, Haiti faced the climax of its ongoing structural
crisis, culminating in the assassination of its president
Jovenel Moïse on July 7th. The Caribbean state is the
population below the poverty line, and public insecurity
(Boletim 133). Thus, from a domestic point of view,
Moïse's death increases instability in Haiti due to the
poorest in the Americas, with a GDP of USD 13.4 billion dispute over the power succession and the escalating
and more than 11.4 million inhabitants, according to the violence caused by the rise of paramilitary groups
World Bank, in 2020. The structural crisis in the country considering the reduced security forces (a force of
is historical, due to a troubled independence process, approximately 16,000 police officers in 2020).
several coups d'état, unsuccessful foreign interventions, In this scope, at the regional level, Haiti's political
and environmental disasters that have debilitated the instability could trigger new migratory crises, affecting
population and motivated forced migration. Therefore, mainly the Caribbean region and impacting the
what are the developments of Moïse's murder for the socioeconomic situation of the main countries around it.
American regional context? The Dominican Republic stands out, sharing the island of
Elected with 600,000 votes in 2016, Moïse had a Hispaniola with Haiti – which enables the displacement
considerably troubled mandate, as he was unpopular of Haitians to its territory. In 2019, the country received
and accused of authoritarianism by the opposition. His 491,000 of the 1.586 million migrants. Furthermore, the
government violently repressed social demonstrations Dominican Republic is the most affected economically,
caused by the economic crisis, the growing share of the having a significant trade exchange with Haiti, estimated »
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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 143 • July | 2021
at USD 1.2 billion a year. and push away the country from Taiwan, currently
Haiti's instability also affects the United States' recognized as a sovereign nation by Haiti.
strategies regarding the northward migration movement, Thus, the assassination could increase instability
the relationship with its Caribbean partners, and the in the country and affect the entire Caribbean and
regional security of the Caribbean and Central America, Central American region. Notably, the issue could be
spaces of historic U.S. influence and power projection. included in the power struggle between Washington and
On the other hand, Moïse's assassination could also mean Beijing.
an opportunity for the Chinese to increase their influence
Source: IAN (adapted)
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n143.p07-08.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Elections in Ethiopia and foreign policy trends of Abiy Ahmed's administration
Franco Alencastro
H eld on June 21st, 2021, Ethiopia's elections could
consolidate Abiy Ahmed's government by weakening
his opponents — the Tigray People's Liberation Front
marginalization of the TPLF are the main new factors
in this election, there is still another critical element:
the political persecution of the Oromo. The government
(TPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Partial cracked down on the 2020 protests in Oromia, a
results in Ormia, Sidama, and Amhara regions indicate a traditionally disfavored region in Ethiopian politics. The
government victory in 49 of the 53 contested seats. OLF and the Oromo Federalist Congress, two of the
Favored in the election, the Prosperity Party, created main parties in the region, decided to boycott the election
by Ahmed in 2019, is the successor to the ruling coalition in March after their leaders were arrested. Although
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front Abiy Ahmed is an Oromo, the increased repression is
(EPRDF), which governed the country for 27 years. At explained as a tactic to prevent the emergence of another
the time, only the TPLF — the party that led the former leadership that could challenge his authority among this
EPRDF coalition — did not join the new arrangement. group, which is the most populous in Ethiopia.
The tension between Ahmed and the TPLF only increased After a challenging period, Ahmed's consolidation
after that, culminating in the Tigray War, which has as Ethiopia's leader may represent a turning point in the
plagued the region since November 2020. external context for the country. As soon as his ascension
Although the Tigray War and the political happened, Abiy Ahmed sought to diversify Ethiopia's »
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international partnerships, which he had established with scared away these investments.
the country’s close relationship with China over the last In late May, the U.S. also changed its discourse,
fifteen years. Based on considerable state investment in establishing sanctions against Ethiopian officials for what
infrastructure and Chinese external financing, Ethiopia's U.S. officials called a "lack of commitment to ending
economic model was facing signs of exhaustion. In the conflict." In a setting of permanency of the Ahmed
response, Ahmed sought to liberalize the economy and administration, the result of these measures could mean a
attract support from the West and international financial course correction for Ethiopia, which will move closer to
institutions, such as the World Bank, which lent USD Beijing and gradually away from Washington.
9 billion to the country in 2019. However, the war has
Source: The Africa Report
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n143.p08-09.
EUROPE
Italy-Libya Agreement finances Coast Guard in the Central Mediterranean
Melissa Rossi
V iolations of the law of the sea in the Central
Mediterranean continue to take place in a complex
reality where asylum seekers risk their lives daily in
The hardening of the European countries border
policies still guides the external policy of the European
Union (EU), including putting third countries in charge
dangerous crossings from Libya to safe countries, such of migration towards the bloc, situation that has been
as Italy. On June 30th, a German non-profit organization exacerbated along its maritime borders since 2015. In
called Sea Watch filmed an attack by the Libyan Coast Italy’s case, the country has already funded the Libyan
Guard against a boat with dozens of migrants about 45 Coast about USD 32.6M since signing the memorandum
miles off the coast of the Italian island of Lampedusa. for this specific end. However, the ongoing violent
Several of these attacks have already been registered in actions of the North African country´s Coast Guard
the past. Since 2017, a bilateral memorandum signed directly violate international law, putting at risk the
between Italy and Libya delegates the responsibility lives of people lost at sea. According to the International
of managing migration crossings in the Central Organization for Migration (IOM), 766 people have
Mediterranean to the North African country through lost their lives in the Central Mediterranean this year,
the funding and training of the Libyan Coast Guard. compared to 262 deaths during the same period in 2020.
Nevertheless, does the agreement in question respect the This indicates that more people are attempting to cross
law of the sea and of refugees? the Mediterranean and that there are fewer rescue vessels »
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and perhaps more violent attacks against those who find its support of forced displacement of migrants to Libya.
themselves lost at sea. It is important to recall that Article Currently, the country continues on a dangerous path,
98 of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the though now not directly responsible for the pushbacks.
Sea requires that vessels lost or in need of assistance at Nonetheless, in the future, Italy might find itself in dire
sea must be aided, while Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva straits, facing further condemnation for its current policy
Convention prohibits the expulsion of potential refugees of funding other countries to manage part of its migration
(principle of non-refoulement). policy, nations considered unsafe and whose actions
Finally, Italy had already been condemned in 2012 directly violate international law.
by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasburg for
Source: IBTimes News
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n143.p09-10.
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
Nuclear Agreement with Iran, new opportunities?
Isadora Bohrer and Marina Corrêa
T ensions between Iran and Western countries
intensified with the United States' withdrawal from
the Nuclear Agreement in 2018. However, in early 2021,
is believed to have resumed its nuclear projects, which
worried the nations involved. The unilateral departure of
the North Americans occurred alongside the imposition
the Commission of the Nuclear Agreement was resumed, of sanctions, which forced European companies to leave
seeking to make the actors involved discuss it again. the country and which blocked Iranian oil sales, strongly
However, with tensions between the U.S. and Iran (such impacting its economy.
as the death of General Qasem Soleimani by the U.S. at After four years, the other signatory powers of
the beginning of last year), will it be possible to resume the Agreement aim at the return of the U.S. and the
the Agreement, seeking to mitigate the possibility of engagement of Iran to fulfill it. During a videoconference
nuclear proliferation? between Emmanuel Macron, Angela Merkel, and Xi
It is worth remembering that, in 2015, Iran signed the Jinping, a "window of opportunity" was pointed out
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the for the Vienna negotiations to be resumed, given the
P5+1 and the European Union, which consisted of Iran's escalation of regional instability (Boletim 138) that
responsibility to dismantle its nuclear projects, give up makes the Middle East a " powder keg" about to explode.
uranium enrichment and reduce its infrastructure related However, the recent Iranian elections guaranteed the
to nuclear processes. However, after the U.S. exit, Iran presidency to the chief justice, Ebrahim Raisi, belonging »
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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 143 • July | 2021to the wing of Islamic conservatives and against the will be announced before Raisi's inauguration in August.
Agreement. Since his election, Raisi has emphasized that Iranian leaders seem to lack an effective willingness
he will not give in to the “pressure from the West” nor to give up the possibility of owning a nuclear device,
to its sanctions. On the American side, Joe Biden argues undoubtedly a great element of power. For Americans,
that respect for human rights is essential to advance in the relative reduction of interest in Middle East issues
foreign negotiations, but the same precept does not seem and Israel's partnership to deal with tensions with Iran
to be applied with any other country in the Middle East, seem to serve for now. In this way, it is possible to affirm
considering the rapprochement with Israel. that Iran does not intend to collaborate and that the U.S.
Therefore, it is unlikely that the new nuclear deal will not ease the path of negotiations.
Source: AFP
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n143.p10-11.
Turkish Geopolitics: The Istanbul Canal
Dominique Marques
T urkey's geographical position comprises one of the
busiest focal points in the world: the Bosphorus
Strait. About 40,000 ships pass through it annually,
warships, restricting Russia's ability to use the Strait to
carry out operations that threaten its neighbors.
Considering the geopolitical issues surrounding
roughly three times as many as the Suez Canal. However, the Bosphorus Strait, the Istanbul Canal seems like an
Turkey has not benefited economically from its strategic important strategic bet. Although it costs USD 15 billion,
location, for example, by imposing traffic taxes. In this it is expected to have a merchant flow of about 160 ships/
regard, Turkey announced approval for the construction day and an estimated USD 8 billion in revenue per year,
of the Istanbul Canal in March. What are the possible quickly recouping the construction costs. However, the
outcomes of this measure? enterprise has been criticized for its environmental and
It is essential to emphasize the potential of this new social impacts, like the potential change in the water
Canal, considering what the Bosphorus Strait means salinity level and the forced displacement of people. It is
today. Currently, through the Strait, the countries with a also debated how much the new Canal would contribute
coastline on the Black Sea can reach the Mediterranean. to regional stability and security if it respects the same
In geopolitical terms, the most important country is agreements that apply to the Bosphorus and limit the
Russia, which is restricted in its access to warm-water passage of warships into the Black Sea.
ports despite having great military capabilities. It is Besides the geopolitical elements involved in the
worth mentioning that Turkey was part of NATO's opening of the Canal, in the domestic sphere, Istanbul
first enlargement in 1952, precisely to control Russian can socioeconomically grow through the taxes and jobs
expansion. However, there are restrictions imposed by generated and collaborate to a recovery in the Turkish
the Montreux Treaty (1936), which limit the passage of economy, which suffers sanctions from the USA and the »
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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 143 • July | 2021European Union. role as a regional power, known as "neo-Ottomanism".
It is noteworthy that the attitudes of the Turkish Thus, it is possible to state that Erdoğan is making Turkey
president are often seen as an attempt to resume Turkey's an important actor in the geopolitics of the Mediterranean.
Source: Canal das Curiosidades
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n143.p11-12.
RUSSIA & FORMER-USSR
Naval Power as a Ukrainian diplomatic tool in the Black Sea
Luiza Guitarrari
T he Black Sea is a geographic region in which Russian
expansionism and NATO military contentiousness
are evident. Thus, the current disputes over the rights
member countries and their respective partners. According
to a statement from the United States Sixth Fleet, Sea
Breeze 2021 (SB21) focused on different areas, such as
of coastal states, the rotational presence of NATO amphibious warfare, maritime interdiction operations,
members, and maritime traffic are highlighted. In this anti-submarine warfare, etc. This year, SB21 had the
scope, Ukraine, a country with the 34th highest military largest number of participating countries in its history:
spending in 2020, according to data from the Stockholm during 13 days, the exercise included 32 countries from
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), aims to different regions of the globe, 5,000 military personnel,
develop its maritime power through coercive diplomacy 32 ships, and 40 aircraft.
to maintain the balance of power in the region. The exercise began just days after the signing of the
Consequently, on July 4th — Ukraine's Navy Day — Implementation Memorandum between Ukraine and
President Volodymyr Zelensky stressed the importance the United Kingdom (UK) at the Ukrainian naval base
of multilateral cooperation in maritime security and the in Odessa. The memorandum includes enhancement of
subsequent improvement of naval capabilities. How can the capabilities of existing naval bases, modernization of
we verify the practices arising from speeches like this Ukrainian shipyards, and acquisition of Sandowns class
one? minesweepers. As part of the Ukraine Naval Capabilities
The multilateral Sea Breeze exercise, co-organized Enhancement Program (UNCEP), on June 21st, on board
by Ukraine and the United States, which has been taking the destroyer HMS Defender, the tripartite agreement
place in the Black Sea region since 1997, is an example. was established between the Ministry of Defense of
Gradually, this exercise becomes a major annual event Ukraine, the UK, and Defense Industry, namely the
to train the interoperability of the Navies of NATO British company Babcock International. »
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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 143 • July | 2021Therefore, the investment in Ukrainian naval power, posture propounded by Ukraine. Moreover, the presence
anchored in joint operations such as the SB21, boosts the of the Navies of NATO member countries gradually
coercive diplomacy that Kyiv has been seeking to adopt makes the Black Sea a standoff zone for Russian
in the region, demonstrating in practice the diplomatic military expansion.
Source: Warsaw Institute
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n143.p12-13.
EAST ASIA
The Chinese nuclear agenda and its implications for international politics
Philipe Alexandre
T he search for a balance of power influences the
development of technology by the States, so that they
guarantee its defense and deterrence and that nuclear
1967, a hydrogen bomb was tested.
Subsequently, by the logic of integrating itself into
the international order, in 1992, China adhered to the
weapons show the paroxysm of risks involved in this Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and defended a “no first
dynamic. Currently, nine countries have the capability to use” policy. However, the worldwide environment has
use the device in arms, and its proliferation has worried changed since then. Currently, the Chinese government
the international community. Thus, given its rise in global sees an international system that is more threatening to
geopolitics, it is important to analyze how it has been its national development, in an evident competition with
addressed in China. the U.S. and other powers.
Since the 1990s, the country has maintained At that juncture, satellite images from June 2021
continuous and consolidated economic growth. However, showed that China is building at least 119 missile silos
actions in favor of its defense, territorial integrity, and in the desert near Yumen, Gansu province. Spread over
survival of the regime refer to the previous period 700 square kilometers, the site includes the construction
by Mao Zedong. Mao's strategy was to guarantee the of cable trenches, roads, a small military base, and
country's self-sufficiency and challenge the prevailing underground bunkers, which can act as launching
bipolar order: the U.S. capitalist and Soviet models. With centers. According to the American expert Jeffrey Lewis,
this objective, the Chinese government achieved nuclear China is expanding its nuclear forces in part to maintain
capability in 1964. By 1966, the country already had a deterrence, as it could survive a first U.S. attack with
fission bomb capable of being placed on a missile; in enough warheads to defeat U.S. anti-missile defenses. »
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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 143 • July | 2021According to the Stockholm International Peace Research challenging, the Chinese government seeks to expand
Institute, China is believed to have about 350 nuclear its nuclear capabilities in a context of modernization and
devices, 30 more than in 2020. expansion of the scope of action of the Asian country's
Therefore, as the setting becomes increasingly armed forces.
Source: News.com
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n143.p13-14.
SOUTHEAST ASIA & OCEANIA
Beijing stands still in the South China Sea
Matheus Bruno Pereira
T he arbitration in 2016 that denied China's nine-
dash line claim did not change Beijing's behavior
in the South China Sea (SCS). Actually, actions have
the declarations of 1992, 2002, and the current stalled
Code of Conduct. On the other hand, China shows itself
to be collaborative while gaining time for its expansion
escalated over these years: artificial islands with military in the region.
installations, expansion of the maritime militia, coast It is noteworthy that the ASEAN countries cannot
guard action, and Chinese navies. Five years later, how is overcome China militarily, although they are seeking
the balance of power in the region? to strengthen their military power. Moreover, each
The speed of incursions is clear, and they may have country responds differently to China: Vietnam keeps a
gained strength because of the establishment of support firm hand, with official notes and even the deployment
areas in the Spratly Islands. Some episodes have already of its maritime militia. In contrast, the President of the
happened in 2021, such as the 16 planes that flew over Philippines says it is useless to challenge a neighbor with
Malaysian airspace in May. On June 4th, the Chinese greater military-naval capacity. Whenever confronted in
Coast Guard escorted Malaysian vessels into an area the Natuna Islands, Indonesia follows Chinese vessels in
with natural gas wells. a sign of presence and vindication.
On June 7th, the Chinese foreign minister met with Although the format of the ASEAN Political-Security
his counterparts from the Association of Southeast Community is based on peaceful resolution processes,
Asian Nations (ASEAN), issuing a statement to promote it is necessary to understand that the idea of a common
maritime security and prevent actions that destabilize the vision and goals does not occur outside the organization.
region. These objectives have already been attempted in For China, the best possible context is to prolong such »
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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 143 • July | 2021negotiations while hardening its settlements in the SCS. the same one that was disregarded by the international
In the end, it is observed that Beijing uses diplomacy as tribunal in 2016. Ultimately, it has its ships and aircraft
a safeguard: it makes itself available for negotiations on permanently deployed by the SCS. The tendency is for
the problem while maintaining its actions. When pressed the Chinese posture to remain unscathed in the region in
further, it appeals to the argument of historical right, the short or the medium term.
Source: FT (adapted)
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n143.p14-15.
ARCTIC & ANTARCTIC
Escalating military tensions in the Arctic: NATO's Formidable Shield 21 Exercise
Raphaella Costa
T he increase in military forces in the Arctic dates back
to the Cold War when the U.S. and Soviets massively
invested in regional security. Today, there is an increase
Armed Forces (Boletim 141) to establish a partnership
in the Arctic due, above all, to the interest of military
strengthening in the region.
in exercises commanded by NATO and the Russian In contrast, Admiral Aleksandr Moiseyev, commander
Northern Fleet, the most important fleet in the country. of Russia's Northern Fleet, had already declared as
Thus, in early June 2021, NATO's Formidable Shield 21 provocative the NATO's increased presence in the
(FS21) Exercise, stressed as Europe's largest and most Arctic, threatening regional security. Thus, although
complex missile exercise, moved to Northern Norway not classified as a direct response to Exercise FS21,
while 20 Russian warships headed to an exercise in the more than 20 Russian warships, submarines, aircraft,
Barents Sea. In this scope, Arctic military security should and helicopters, in a joint activity, also evaluated their
be analyzed in the current geopolitical context. practical firefighting skills in defense of the Russian
Exercise FS21, which began on May 15th, 2021, Arctic coast in the Barents Sea.
featured 16 ships and 10 aircraft from ten NATO nations Therefore, while the increasing militarization of
that traveled from Scotland to Andøya, Norway, in the nations is clear, there are efforts in the diplomatic
Arctic Circle. In Arctic waters, the Norwegian Navy environment to maintain the Arctic as a peaceful
highlighted the training carried out with the frigate region. The update of the Norwegian-Russia Incidents
KNM Fridtjof Nansen, which for the first time reached at Sea Agreement and the recent meeting in Geneva,
a training target with supersonic speed from the launch Switzerland, between Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir
of a surface-to-air missile. It is noteworthy that the Putin, highlight the region as an important arena for
Norwegians signed a recent agreement with the U.S. international cooperation, with the U.S. and Russia willing »
15
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 143 • July | 2021to work together for the sake of security. Therefore, it is cooperation and security mechanisms beyond the Arctic
undeniable that military tensions are progressively more Council.
recurrent in the region, although the nations articulate
Source: Google Maps + The Barents Observer (adapted)
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n143.p15-16.
SPECIAL TOPICS
Disruption or Crypto Summer?
Maria Claudia Nunes
O n June 10th, 2021, El Salvador approved the Bitcoin
Law, legalizing the cryptocurrency alongside the
dollar, the local currency. The international community's
of fiat currency to benefit the reserve currency country
politically.
However, Bitcoin offers risks as a legal currency,
reaction to the news ranged from optimism to pessimism, going beyond its volatility. Besides the possible
globally dividing opinions between favorable and compromise of the loan with the IMF, adopting Bitcoin as
unfavorable. Just over a month after the law was passed, a legal currency could introduce convertibility problems
several countries announced discussions on adoption, due to the volatility of the asset, making convertibility
regulation, transformation to an asset, or banning. a difficult task to execute at the point of transaction
What would be the consequences of Bitcoin's eventual even with Lightning Network technology. Despite these
dominance over the dollar in the long term? obstacles, several countries seem to have incentives
Almost all international exchange transactions take to adopt Bitcoin as legal currency, as we can see from
place in dollars through the SWIFT interbank system, the stock-to-flow model (a mathematical model used
which allows the hegemony of the United States in to estimate the value of commodities such as gold and
the international system, as it controls the application silver), where the asset value is predicted to reach USD
of sanctions. It also directly aids the operation of 1 million by 2028.
International Monetary Fund’s interests that align with Therefore, the adoption of cryptocurrencies can
American economic interests. With its decentralized bring economic benefits. Furthermore, cases such as El
technology, Bitcoin becomes a major rival to the dollar, Salvador, whose dollar reserve level is at its lowest mark
as it allows countries that suffer sanctions to bypass the in 25 years, may indicate changes in the international
SWIFT system and protect against the influence of the monetary system. The dollar may lose its hegemonic
U.S. economy on the value of the dollar. This is due to the power in the long run, and the Bretton Woods institutions
decentralized system that does not allow the manipulation lose their global influence.
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n143.p16.
16
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 143 • July | 2021SELECTED ARTICLES & DEFENSE NEWS
► The EU’s unsustainable China strategy
CHATHAM HOUSE, Pepijn Bergsen
► Cyber Capabilities and National Power: A Net Assessment
IISS
► Automation in nuclear weapon systems: lessons from the man who saved the world
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BLOG, Nina Miller
► https://geopoliticalfutures.com/chinas-search-for-a-negotiated-settlement/
GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES, George Friedman
► Becoming Strong: The New Chinese Foreign Policy
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Yan Xuetong
GEOCORRENTE CALENDAR
JULY AUGUST
Angela Merkel Olympic
and Joe Biden’s
• Presidential
15 meeting
(Washington,
Games closing
ceremony (Tokyo, 8
Japan)
primaries in United States)
Chile General
• Presidential 18 The World
12 Elections in
Zambia
Elections in Saint Economic
Thomas and International
Conference on Forum
Prince
17-20
Special
19-20 Geopolitics
of Energy Annual
Meeting
(Helsinki,
Finland) 2021
Opening (Singapore)
Ceremony of
the Olympic 23 23 Crimean Summit
(Kyiv, Ukraine)
Games (Tokyo,
Japan)
Nuclear power
28
New Peruvian
President
plant referendum
in Taiwan 28
takes office
17
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Naval Power as a Ukrainian diplomatic tool in the
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MALYARENKO, T.; KORMYCH, B. Symbolism of Military Diplomacy: Growing
Chair introduces revised fishing subsidies text to facilitate 15 July ministerial
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UCRÂNIA. Presidência da Ucrânia. In Odesa, Volodymyr Zelenskyy
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vaccine between Russia and Argentina Kiev, Jul. 04th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 09th 2021.
Rusia quiere instalar centrales nucleares en la Argentina a cambio de las
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18
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 143 • July | 2021RISK MAP
T he map entitled “Top Global Risks” on the 3 rd page
of this Boletim was prepared by the Conjuncture
Assessment Group (NAC) members of the Brazilian
which may become red or orange, depending on the
conflict's aggravation.
Due to the increase in the number of cases
Naval War College (EGN). The appearance of the (infected, hospitalized and dead) of COVID-19, there
international phenomena on the map considers their was an adaptation in the analysis of the scenario.
relevance to Brazil, analyzed through criteria, namely In this way, a separate map was drawn up, with the
the number of Brazilians living in the region, direct countries with the highest number of infected people,
or indirect influence on the Brazilian economy, and according to the latest WHO bulletin released until
their impact on the Brazilian Strategic Surroundings. the publishing date of this bulletin. Thus, the countries
Besides, the interests of the United Nations Security were painted in red or orange according to the number
Council permanent members will be considered. of total cases.
After selecting the phenomena, they are categorized The analyzes are redone at each Boletim edition,
as high risk (red) or medium risk (orange), following aiming to reassess and update the demarcated regions
parameters that reflect the severity of the risk, and the color used in each one. Therefore, the main
namely: number of victims, the relevance of the phenomena are always observed, distributed at
actors involved, impact on the global economy, and high and medium risk. Below are links to the risks
the possibility of tensions escalation. The countries indicated on the map:
painted in gray represent conflicts under analysis,
► HIGH RISK:
• AFGHANISTAN — Regional insecurity: Turkmenistan Sending Heavy Weaponry, Aircraft To Afghan
Border Amid Deteriorating Security. Afghan Online Press, Jul. 11th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
• ETHIOPIA — Conflict between government and insurgent forces: Rebels claim military gains in
Ethiopia’s restive Tigray region. Al Jazeera, Jul. 12th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
• HAITI — Structural crisis: Historia de un magnicidio: las horas finales del presidente de Haití. El País,
Jul. 11th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
• YEMEN — Civil war and humanitarian crisis: How the West is fuelling the war on Yemen?. Theran
Times, Jul. 12th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
• MOZAMBIQUE — Conflict between government and insurgent forces: EU to train Mozambique army
against IS-linked jihadists. Africa News, Jul. 12th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
• MYANMAR — Military coup: Myanmar coup latest: Telenor ‘evaluating’ presence in country. Nikkei
Asia, Jul. 04th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
• VENEZUELA — Structural crisis: Maduro renovó las jefaturas de las Regiones Estratégicas de Defensa
Integral. El Nacional, Jul. 12th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
► MEDIUM RISK:
• BELARUS — Political crisis and tensions with the European bloc: Lukashenko warns EU that Belarus
won't stop migrant border surge. Politico, Jul. 06th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
• GULF OF GUINEA — Conjunctural maritime insecurity: IMDEC 2021 focuses on security at sea to
ensure free trade in Gulf of Guinea. DefenceWeb, Jul. 12th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
• LEBANON — Structural crisis: Lebanon implements ration card program as economic crisis worsens.
Al-Monitor, Jul. 12th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
• MALI — Political instability: France to close three military bases in northern Mali by early 2022. RFI,
Jul. 12th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
19
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 143 • July | 2021• NIGER — Escalation of terrorist activity in the region: 49 killed in Niger armed attack. Africa News,
Jul. 12th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
• NIGERIA — Insurgent attacks: Addressing the Boko Haram challenge in Nigeria. SPG Global, Jul. 11th
2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
• SYRIA — Tensions in the South: Security Scenarios for Syria in 2021-2022 (An executive summary of
a longer report). Reliefweb, Jul. 12th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
• SOMALIA — Electoral instability: Somalia: Wrangles Emerge Over Somaliland Electoral Teams.
AllAfrica, Jul. 12th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
• UKRAINE — Russia-Ukraine cross-border tensions: EU extends sanctions against Russia over Ukraine
for 6 months. Daily Sabah, Jul. 12th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
► MONITORING:
• ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN – Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: Azerbaijan steps up talk of peace
deal with Armenia. EurasiaNet, Jul. 09th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
• COLOMBIA — Structural crisis: Colombia en el ojo de la comunidad internacional: ¿regresamos al
pasado?. El espectador, Jul. 10th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
• CUBA — Structural crisis: Cuba vive las mayores protestas contra el Gobierno desde la crisis de los años
noventa. El País, Jul. 12th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
• EL SALVADOR — Political crisis: Bukele expulsa de El Salvador al periodista mexicano Daniel
Lizárraga, editor del medio digital El Faro. El País, Jul. 08th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
• LYBIA — Ceasefire: Libya detention centre blast exposes dangerous conditions for refugees. Middle
East Eye, Jul. 08th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
• SOUTH AND EAST CHINA SEA, HONG KONG & TAIWAN — Chinese expansion in these regions:
China military ‘drove away’ US warship in South China Sea. Al Jazeera, Jul. 12th 2021. Accessed on: Jul.
12th 2021.
• EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN — Tensions between Greece and Turkey and the occupation of Cyprus:
Greece in the eastern Mediterranean: Turning engagement into influence. European Council on Foreign
Relations, Jul. 02th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
• NICARAGUA — Political crisis: Eurocámara: sanciones contra Nicaragua, “si es el único lenguaje que
entiende Ortega”. DW, Jun. 27th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
• PERU — Electoral crisis: Proclamación de resultados se retrasa por demora de votos en minoría de
Rodríguez Monteza. El Comercio, Jul. 12th 2021. Accessed on: Jul. 12th 2021.
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