Governing practices and strategic narratives for the Syrian refugee returns
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Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 00, No. 0 VC The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press.
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doi:10.1093/jrs/feaa121
Governing practices and strategic narratives
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for the Syrian refugee returns
Z E Y N E P ŞA H I N M E N C Ü T E K
Canada Excellence Research Chair in Migration & Integration Program Ryerson
University, 350 Victoria Street Toronto, ON M5B 2K3, Canada
zeynepsahinmencutek@gmail.com
MS received May 2020; revised MS received September 2020
How do host states attempt to speed up returns of refugees before peacebuilding and
the lack of official arrangements with the home state? Building on the conceptual
framework, which coalesces governing practices, strategic narratives, and issue link-
ages, the article explains the early stages of policy formulation and discourses on
refugee returns. Empirically, it draws from Turkey’s return initiatives targeting
Syrians since 2016. It argues that the Turkish government seeks to advance in (1)
practices promoting self-organized voluntary returns of a small number of refugees
and (2) the preparation of ground for mass repatriation and resettlement back to
Northern Syria. The strategic return narrative has 2-fold target audiences and aims.
While keeping the domestic constituency stands as the main motivation by conveying
the message of ‘Syrians are returning’, legitimizing unilateral cross-border interven-
tions targets the international audience. The article contributes to the lack of research
on the governance of refugee returns by examining the host states’ strategic narrating
in relation to the domestic and geopolitical interests.
Keywords: returns, governance, issue linkage, strategic narratives, Syrian refugees,
Turkey
Introduction
The return of ‘unwanted migrants’ remains a vital component of migration man-
agement. It comes to be considered as a multi-tool that may promote to the
development and peacebuilding of sending states and protect security and welfare
of receiving countries (Black and Koser 1999; Koser and Kuschminder 2015; van
Houte and Davids 2014; Triandafyllidou and Ricard-Guay 2019). Among the
migrant return forms, voluntary repatriation is referred as one of the durable
solutions by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
particularly for the protracted refugee situations in the Global South. Receiving
countries are often impatient to see repatriation—voluntary or not—especially
given large numbers of refugees but limited international ‘burden’ and responsi-
bility sharing for the protection of refugees. They seek ways to urge returns,2 Zeynep S¸ahin Mencütek
sometimes even before reaching the definitive end to the conflict, causing displace-
ment, regardless of discharging state obligations on human rights and the princi-
ples of refugee protection.
The refugee return emerges as governing process in which multiple actors for-
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mulate and implement policies, programmes, and techniques in interaction.
Unpacking the governing of returns necessitates a response to several interrelated
questions: Which local, national, and international agencies are involved in man-
aging returns? Which legal frameworks and regulations are referred to? What are
the political and policy narratives preceding returns to or garner support or legit-
imize them? How do actors relate returns to other issue areas such as security,
domestic politics, and welfare in the receiving country, as well as peacebuilding
and development in the sending country?
The current case of the Syrian refugee situation may provide responses to these
questions. The main host countries of displaced Syrians refugees, Turkey,
Lebanon, and Jordan, acted to speed up so-called ‘voluntary’ returns by framing
it as releasing their refugee burden, contributing peacebuilding in Syria, and well-
being of displaced Syrians (Ic¸duygu and Nimer 2020). However, conditions in
Syria are not proven to be conducive for returns to be safe and sustainable. The
majority of Syrians’ wish to return one day, but do not intend to return in the near
future (UNHCR 2019; Al-Khateb 2020), as there is recurring violence, political
instability as well as the devastated infrastructure and lack of adequate access to
livelihoods inside Syria. The journalistic evidence shows that some returnees con-
fronted with the mistreatment, torture, disappearance, and persecution at the
hands of the Syrian government’s security apparatus (Vohra 2019). The prospect-
ive mass repatriation has not yet been at the stage of the internationally supported
process, as neither a peace agreement nor repatriation arrangements addressing
sustainable return options is present. Against this background, Turkey, due to be
the largest refugee (I use the term refugee when referring to Syrians in Turkey,
even though they are not recognized as refugees, instead legally defined as people
with temporary protection status in Turkish national asylum law) host country,
offers a unique case to discuss evolving strategies, governing techniques, and
narratives on refugee returns. Due to its strong involvement in the Syrian war
and growing anti-refugee sentiments of the public, the case of Turkey also enables
to examine both the relevance of geopolitical dynamics and domestic politics to
the refugee returns.
Theoretically, the study scrutinizes the return governing process, focusing on
practices and discursive dimensions. The practices are discussed in relation to
literature on the refugee studies that focus returns and repatriation policies (i.e.
Bradley 2013; Gerver 2018; Koser and Kuschminder 2015). The studies on the
discursive dimension are scant, except the growing literature on the role of
European Union (EU), International Organization of Migration (IOM), and
the UNHCR in the cases of assisted voluntary returns from Europe (i.e. Koch
2014; Slominski and Trauner 2018). The policy and politics of refugee returns at
the national level remain undertheorized in general, while its relevance to geopol-
itics is inadequately discussed (Blitz et al. 2005; Hendrie 1991). This articleGoverning practices and strategic narratives 3
attempts to bridge this gap by building on growing scholarship theorizing the
international politics of forced migration (Tsourapas 2019; Sahin-Mencutek
2018). These studies so far showed how international politics is decisive for admit-
ting forced migrants. The article seeks to add some empirical research to this
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literature by investigating an understudied dimension, geopolitics, and refugee
return nexus. It furthers the debate by questioning how the international politics
is related to return of forced migrants and how this is strategically narrated for the
domestic and international audience.
Conceptual framework of the study builds on three pillars: refugee returns,
governing practices, and strategic narratives. Recognizing the complex meanings
about return, repatriation, and voluntariness, this article follows the UNHCR’s
terminology defining durable solutions for Syrians that is ‘voluntary return’ of
Syrian refugees (UNHCR 2020). To describe the return process, the emphasis is
put on governing practices that comprise the problematization of issue, pro-
grammes, policies, legal regulations, and techniques (Brady and Lippert 2016:
10). To elaborate the politics behind the refugee returns, this study adopts the
concepts of strategic narratives and issue linkages that are borrowed from the
discipline of Politics and International Relations. A general definition of narrative
refers to discourse ‘with a clear sequential order that connect[s] events in a mean-
ingful way’ (Hinchman and Hinchman 2001: xvi). As a sub-category of political
narratives, strategic narratives stand as ‘means for political actors to construct a
shared meaning of the past, present and future of international politics to shape
the behaviours of domestic and international actors’ (Miskimmon et al. 2015:
341). Similarly, narratives on policies denote stories to build a shared normative
and causal understanding of each policy choices. In crafting narratives, political
actors may build issue linkages that refer to simultaneous negotiations on two or
more issues aiming for joint settlement.
Building on this conceptual framework, which coalesces return migration,
governing practices, and strategic narratives, the article explains the early
stages of policy formulation by host states for refugee returns. It argues that the
Turkish government, led by the Justice and Development Party (JDP), uses a
set of practices and strategic narratives to advance in (1) the promotion of
self-organized voluntary returns of a small number of refugees since 2016 and
(2) the preparation of ground for large-scale repatriation operation in 2018 and
2019.
For the first objective, local and national authorities use several practices
encompassing incentives and assistance to return such as organizing ‘go and see
visits’, information campaigns, and logistical support to prospective returnees.
The pertinent authorities arbitrarily use the forced return as a punishment in
the cases of refugees’ lack of papers or suspecting on ‘terror link’. Also, limitations
on access to shelter and public services work as deterrence techniques.
For the second objective, the Turkish government gradually crafts a strategic
narrative. While the main narrators are the president and the ministers of interior
and foreign affairs, the audience are multiple stakeholders including Turkish so-
ciety, refugees, countries involved in the Syrian war and the international4 Zeynep S¸ahin Mencütek
community, mainly donors of humanitarian aid. The narrative mirrors the gov-
ernment’s geopolitical anxieties and electoral concerns. The government adopts
tactical issue linkage by coupling refugee returns with the border security related
to power vacuum in Northern Syria. Return narrative is also empowered by meta-
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narrative on Turkey as a humanitarian actor who used the Syrian refugee issue as
a showcase. Through the linkages, the return narrative becomes more strategic as
it expects to garner support for government’s cross-border military incursions, its
plans for the construction of a ‘safe zone’ for the resettlement of returnees in
Northern Syria as well as to appease growing anti-Syrian attitudes among domes-
tic constituency.
The article proceeds as follows. I first review a strand of refugee studies litera-
ture on returns and repatriation with an emphasis on concepts and governing
actors. Then, I discuss the discursive dimension from the perspective of strategic
narratives and the issue linkages. The main text presents evidence from Turkey’s
governing of returns, starting with the research methods section. After providing
general characteristics of meta-narratives of the country, I map out governing
practices. In the next step, I discuss the preparation for formulating large-scale
repatriation by emphasizing strategic narratives and issue linkages. Then, I focus
on the domestic politics as a driver of return initiative. The paper concludes by
summarizing findings and insights for comparative research.
Complexity of Concepts and Multiplicity of Actors in Governing of Returns
As a multifaceted and heterogenous phenomenon, return migration has been
defined and located in time and space (Cassarino 2004: 253). The IOM identifies
return as ‘the movement of persons returning to their country of origin after
having moved away from their place of habitual residence and crossed an inter-
national border’ (IOM 2019: 186). The concept repatriation, used interchangeably
with return, is preferred to explain the state-involved mass returns of asylum
seekers or refugees from the neighbouring host countries to the countries of con-
flict, particularly the UNHCR-led processes in Africa and Asia (Black and Koser
1999). The adjective list of return and repatriation varies in relation to character-
istics detected during the process, such as voluntary, compulsory, state-induced,
self-organized, or assisted returns on the one hand, and those appeared after the
process as safe, sustainable, permanent, or temporary on the other hand (Chimni
2004; Crisp and Long 2016; Koser et al. 1998; Black and Gent 2006). EU legis-
lation uses technical terms, removal and readmission, to refer to the forced return
of rejected asylum seekers or irregular migrants back to the country of origin
(Baldaccini 2009).
Since the early 1990s, international community has encouraged and assisted
voluntary return as the most desirable of ‘durable’ solutions for all refugees
(Hammond 1999; Omata 2013; UNHCR 1996). UNHCR holds an authority to
engage in repatriation and resettlement as well as to assist ‘governmental and
private efforts to promote voluntary repatriation’ (Statue 1950), while the IOM
takes role in assisted voluntary returns. UNHCR proposes to the creation ofGoverning practices and strategic narratives 5
‘tripartite commissions composed of the country of origin, the country of asylum
and UNHCR’ to ensure adherence to the international standards, namely volun-
tariness, safety and dignity (UNHCR 1996: 25). At the minimum level, the
UNHCR proposes the ‘bilateral negotiations and bipartite repatriation agree-
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ments or memoranda of understanding with both the country of origin and the
country of asylum’ and ‘UNHCR’s cross-border coordination role’ (UNHCR
1996: 26). Such commissions and agreements were formed in several occasions
such as the repatriation of Liberian refugees from Ghana in 1997 and 2005;
refugees of Angola from five neighbouring states in 2002 and from Bangladesh
to Myanmar in 2017 (Chowdhury 2019; Essuman-Johnson 2011). The UNHCR’s
initiatives have been criticized rightly to encourage return movements in the sit-
uations when conflicts continue, as the voluntariness of return is violated, and
asylum right is denied (Chimni 2004).
Despite international norms and agencies, in practice, host states used to be
main agenda setters and those taking a collaborative or unilateral action that may
potentially manipulate existing international standards about returns or bypass
the UNHCR’s monitoring role. They may encourage spontaneous returns, coerce
refugees to go back by restricting access to rights and livelihoods or threaten with
deportation. These mechanisms are easily masked with the concepts of ‘voluntary’
or ‘assisted’ return considering the power asymmetry between the host state
authorities and the refugees (Chimni 2004; Chowdhury 2019; Essuman-Johnson
2011; Koch 2014).
For host states, returning refugees is a matter of governing as it necessitates
decision-making about the timing and forms, the exact limits of policies, its im-
plementation, and monitoring. Many challenges arise in each stage, such as how
states would ensure voluntariness in the pre-return stages and safety on the way.
When there is a lack of official relations between the host and home country, it is a
serious challenge how two counties will agree on a joint initiative for coordinating
logistics, and securing the conditions of returnees, their dignity and reintegration.
Even though home countries may be in favour of returns for peacebuilding and
creation prosperity (Skran 2020), it may not feasible and desirable for entire refu-
gee population to return because of political and institutional constraints (Lamey
2020). The entire process encompasses the political-discursive, legal, and technical
aspects.
The Discursive Dimension of Return Governance: Strategic Narratives and
Tactical Issue Linkages
There is no doubt that migration is a highly mediatized, securitized, and politicized
issue across the globe. Migration discourses draw selectively from frames of refer-
ences and information and some of them are collated as narratives to be more
persuasive (Gadinger et al. 2016; D’Amato and Lucarelli 2019). They serve as ‘a
political device for generating legitimacy’ and extend actors’ influence, ‘manage
expectations, and change the discursive environment in which they operate’
(Fenton and Langley 2011: 1171; Gadinger and Bueger 2020: 9). The construction6 Zeynep S¸ahin Mencütek
of strategic narratives about migration is often a complex process as the aimed end
is to create a common understanding over the issue, to determine and justify the
formulation or rearrangements of migration policies and persuade a wide audi-
ence about the proposed solution(s) (Pécoud 2015).
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I argue that the governing actors adopt tactical issue linkage(s) to empower
their migration narratives, particularly refugee returns. The issue linkages inten-
tionally scale up the ambiguity of the narratives to give a space for manoeuvring in
relation to whom the audiences are and what the agenda is, and where the
speaking-statement is taking place. Issue linkages, bridging distinct regimes
such as security and migration can take two forms: substantive and tactical issue
linkage (Hall 2016: 6). The first is ‘real or perceived-to-be-real causal relationship
between two discrete issue areas’, such as between climate change and health (Hall
2016: 6). It requires ‘a consensus or agreement between a number of influential
actors that there is a causal link between two discrete areas’ (Ibid.). The other one,
tactical issue linkage, occurs ‘when issues are combined in interstate negotiations
through conditionality to facilitate bargaining’ (Ibid.). It is for building support
and/or mobilizing resources for achieving certain interests or policy processes
despite the lack of any causal relations.
The concept of issue linkage has taken the attention of international relations
scholars studying forced migration (Betts 2011; Tsourapas 2017, 2019). Betts uses
issue linkage to explain the UNHCR strategy and ‘epistemic role’ to influence
Northern states for refugee protection (Betts, 2011: 53). Tsourapas (2017) adopts
the term in addressing the strategies of interstate cooperation or coercion in the
Global South (Tsourapas 2017: 2378). Existing studies provide significant insights
on migration politics in general, but needed to be elaborated further for refugee
returns’ relation to the geopolitics. Particularly, the tactical issue linkage can be
put into dialogue with strategic narratives as will be attempted in the following
analysis. In order to understand the discursive dimension of refugee return gov-
erning, it is important to examine who narrates, what is narrated, how it is linked
with other issues and why they are narrated in a certain way (Riessman 2008).
Research Methods
Out of the variety of cases of countries hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees,
such as Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Germany, and others, Turkey is the most exem-
plary case to investigate the spectrum of return dynamics, practices, and narratives
for the following reasons. (1) Turkey has been the largest refugee host country
with 3.6 million Syrians since 2014 (UNHCR-GoT 2020). (2) It places increasing
emphasis on returns despite its initial open-door approach towards Syrians. (3)
The country observes the largest number of spontaneous voluntary returns to
Syria. While Turkish government representatives claim that more than 300,000
Syrians returned between 2016 and 2019, UNHCR provides the number of 84,725
for the same period (UNHCR 2020). (4) The government assertively links return
aims and country’s domestics affairs, regional, and international politics.Governing practices and strategic narratives 7
I collected two sets of empirical evidence to understand both narratives and
governing practices. First, I focus on the content of narratives by asking the
questions of who talks about the returns of Syrians, what they tell and in which
contexts. I look at the speeches of government party representatives for the period
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of 2016–2020 that are mostly available on Turkish online dailies. The words,
metaphors, and linkages used in the speeches are examined as they constitute to
the components of narratives. To see possible counter narratives, I critically exam-
ine discourses of opposition parties relying on party manifestos and politician
speeches. Then, to understand the legal framework and existing governing prac-
tices, I made textual and media analysis of policy documents, national laws, and
compiled reports. Given that sources on Syrian refugee return remain limited, I
also rely on interviews conducted with key informants during the several rounds of
field work carried out in three provinces—Istanbul, Gaziantep, and S¸anlıurfa
from 2017 to 2019. The 45 key informants consist of state and non-state govern-
ance actors including bureaucrats dealing with refugee issues, representatives from
local governments, experts from international organizations, representatives of
national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), refugee associations, lawyers,
and scholars. Semi-structured interview questions focused on return rhetoric, pol-
icy proposals, formal and informal practices, perceptions, and future scenarios. I
also observed dozens of policy-oriented workshops in which officers from the
UNHCR, the EU, the IOM, and donor countries expressed their views about
the evolutions of Turkey’s refuge governance, Syrians possible return, and situ-
ation inside Syria. To capture the perceptions of refugees about competing return
narratives, the study relies on 40 in-depth interviews with Syrian refugees resided
_
in Izmir and S¸anlıurfa. Interviewee sampling was designed to approach represen-
tativeness in terms of the time span of arrivals, gender, age, employment, and
variations in legal status. The questions were open-ended to enable refugees telling
their migration stories, their encounters with locals, links with Syria, and plans for
future. Ethical approval was taken via the RESPOND Project’s ethics committee
and national authorities. Consent forms were circulated and explained to partic-
ipants before starting the interview process. The collected interview data were
coded through a thematic analysis approach, for which NVivo software was
utilized. Coding reflects the dimension of return discourses, practices, changes
over time, and their impact on institutions and individuals.
Refugee Return Governing in Turkey
The analysis of the data illustrates that key actor in refugee return narratives is the
Turkish government run by the same party—JDP—since 2002, mainly President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, his spokesperson and ministers of interior and foreign
affairs. The JDP led Government (hereafter the Government) mostly shape the
refugee policy and political narratives by initiating overarching agenda through
framing priorities, making issue linkages, providing options, and limiting alter-
natives. Beside the Government’s leading role, the opposition parties, involve in
debates mainly by criticizing the ‘hardline position taken by the Government in8 Zeynep S¸ahin Mencütek
favour of Syrian’s presence’ (Ic¸duygu and Nimer 2020: 420). Among plethora of
civil society organization, which used to ‘assume a supporting role to the Turkish
state in refugee reception’ (Danis¸ and Nazli 2019) and integration at the local level
(Sunata and Tosun 2019), few of them, mainly pro-government NGOs engage in
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reconstructing return narratives and supporting to post-return phases inside
Syria. A small number of municipalities and semi-state agencies operate with state
authorities to facilitate small-scale return practices (Sahin-Mencutek 2019).
Media play a limited role by disseminating return narratives and influencing pub-
lic opinion (Atasü-Topc¸uoglu 2019). The opinions of Syrian refugees, except few
refugee organizations, are rarely consulted in overall discussion, but they closely
follow-up return narratives through media and their networks (Sahin-Mencutek
2020). Right-based advocacy groups and scholars vehemently criticize strategic
narratives on returns (Adar 2020; Ic¸duygu and Nimer 2020).
The multiple roles and stances about return mirror the national context in
which Syrian refugee migration has emerged as ‘complex interplay between its
security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions and the multifaceted re-
lationship between the growing number of state and non-state institutions’
(Memisoglu and Ilgit 2017: 317). Since 2011, the Government constructed a
unique and ambiguous narrative about the Syrian refugee issue that is entrenched
in a broader political narrative on the Turkish complicated diplomatic and mili-
tary involvement in the Syrian war. Unlike its traditional restrictive border pol-
icies towards refugee flows from the Middle East, this time—at least until 2015–
16—the Government opened the borders for large number of Syrian refugees by
framing it as a humanitarian situation. It followed a liberal policy and created a
temporary protection status for Syrians that gave them more rights than other
refugees in the country including access to education, health, and formal employ-
ment (Ic¸duygu and Nimer 2020; Sert and Danis¸ 2020).
The policies targeting Syrians are often preceded or endorsed by strategic pol-
itical narratives of the Government describing a plot and roles along with adopt-
ing appealing metaphors. It linked the humanitarian-civilized country narrative
with the religious-based guest-host narrative. Through the guest-host narrative,
populist rhetoric was used by essentializing Ottoman and Islamic heritage to mo-
bilize cultural intimacy between Turkish and Syrian people (Rottmann and Kaya
2020) in order to manage public reactions to the mass arrivals (Sert and Danis¸
2020). Interpretation of interviews reveals that all these narratives are internalized
by the Turkish audience including bureaucrats, hosting communities, and local
civil society organizations in the early reception of Syrians. In the words of the
head of an ethnic solidarity organization close to the Government, ‘Turks and
Syrians used to like an uncle and nephew’ (Interview Urfa 2018). Several local
administrators from a border city recalled the historical records that Syrian ter-
ritories are a part of the Ottoman to explain why Turkey opened its doors
(Interviews Gaziantep 2017, Urfa 2018). All these references blurred boundaries
between fact and imaginaries, by silencing all tensions in the near history between
two countries, they were expected to create welcoming and cohesive topoi. The
Government avoided using ‘crisis’ narrative to control and silence differentGoverning practices and strategic narratives 9
stakeholders such as media, academics, researchers, and right-based advocacy
groups (Sert and Danis¸ 2020).
The political narratives were not situated only as tools for the legitimization of
policy choices on the domestic level, but also, they were mobilized to create a
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positive country image globally and gaining an international leverage. In addition
to the guest-host narrative, Turkish political leaders drew from the broader nar-
rative about its ‘rising’ place in the international system and its role to carry out
humanitarian ‘moral’ responsibility (Erdogan 2016; Tolay 2016). As Korkut
argues, ‘the Syrian crisis led to the formation of a new Turkish forced-
migration management narrative while having also allowed Turkey to engage
with forced migration beyond its neighbourhood’ as in the case of Syrian and
Rohingya refugee crisis (Korkut 2019). Nevertheless, both narratives and subse-
quent policies entangled both with the government’s geopolitical interests and its
public diplomacy (Sahin-Mencutek 2018).
Although the initial main narratives centre on the notions of the historical,
moral, and religio-social responsibility of Turkey and its citizens towards refugees,
it shows ambiguities, selective attitudes, and fluctuations. Since 2015–16, the gov-
ernment has decisively deterred new arrivals and restricted protection spaces and
limited integration opportunities. The return of refugees to Syria or further
migrating to Europe becomes the most desired policy option. The quest for return
as a policy option aligns with the government’s narrative-based host-guest as it
implies temporality while it contradicts the previous narratives on humanitarian.
Any return operation may high risks of violating return’s principles of the safety
and voluntariness that may hamper Turkey’s international image as a generous,
responsible rising state (Tolay 2016). On the other hand, the Government seems to
be responsive to the increasing negative public opinion towards Syrians
(C¸irakoglu et al. 2020) and expectations for their forcibly return to Syria
(Erdogan 2020) that will be elaborated further in the section on domestic politics
of return.
Empirical data highlight that the policymakers from the ruling party tend to
frame the return issue gradually and selectively to lay the conceptual groundwork
for the future course of action that aims to appease both the domestic constituency
and the international community. As observed in framing in any policy field, it
tends to ‘highlight aspects of a situation while disregarding others, creating a
coherent narrative that defines and explains a problem in a particular way and
from that identifying what needs to change’ (van Hulst and Yanow 2016: 99).
Turkish politicians convey the message of Syrians are looking forward to return
by providing evidences of increasing return numbers in the last years and the
Turkish government is about to prepare ‘ideal’ conditions inside Syria for returns
as a continuation of its humanitarian stance. These selectively reflect the practices
on the ground regarding refugee returns. The overall aim is 2-fold: First, to en-
courage as many Syrians as possible to return through the mechanisms of assist-
ance, incentives, and deterrence; second to prepare the ground for the large-scale
repatriation and legitimize it domestically and internationally.10 Zeynep S¸ahin Mencütek
Incentive and Deterrence in Governing Practices about Refugee Returns
As of August 2020, there is no internationally agreed plan to regulate Syrian
refugees’ return. The most formal international attempt is the UNHCR a
Strategy Paper and a Return Plan (2018) that response the developments on the
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ground by identifying two phases: self-organized spontaneous returns and a large-
scale facilitated refugee repatriation operation. The first phase occurs with returns
from Lebanon and Turkey. The second phase is supposed to operate with the
support of the international community, the UN, NGOs, host governments, and
the Government of Syria (UNHCR 2018a, 2018b; DATA-UNHCR 2019). The
plan itself refers to the ‘full recognition of the primary role and responsibility of
the concerned States in relation to refugee protection and assistance’, implying
that it gives legitimacy to the host states, like Turkey, for their practices in regu-
lating returns (UNHCR 2018b: 2).
The regulation of individual returns of asylum seekers in Turkey is under the
authority of the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), the
main national official migration agency affiliated with the Ministry of Interior
(MoI). Turkish asylum law promises support for voluntary returns and DGMM’s
cooperation with the authorities in relevant origin countries, as well as other
public institutions and agencies in Turkey, international organizations and civil
society. The DGMM requires seeking a formal application from returnees and
signed voluntary return form.
DGMM encourages and assists small numbers of self-organized returns by
coordinating with other national governing authorities, rather than the
UNHCR or Syrian government. Turkey’s first type of governing practice is an
incentive mechanism, allowing Syrians to make ‘go-and-see’ visits to Syria (up to 3
months) during religious festivals. Syrians could leave Turkey, assess conditions in
their home places and check on their vacated properties. If they wished, they could
choose to remain in Syria. This incentive does not have any legal basis, rather the
decision of the government and is implemented by the DGMM and border
authorities that issue temporary travel permits. The DGMM revokes temporary
protection status if Syrians fail to return within the permitted period. In 2017,
40,000 Syrians (15 per cent of goers) remained in Syria, while it increased to
252,000 Syrians (57 per cent) in 2018 (DGMM 2020). Although the government
was delighted by this practice for simultaneously displaying its religious empathy
and facilitating returns, the main opposition party, harshly criticized it, claiming
that these visits demonstrate the security of Syria for full returns (Cumhuriyet
2018).
The second incentive practice is the provision of logistical and information
assistance to facilitate returns. This happens at the local level with coordination
between municipalities and provincial DGMM offices. The targets are the most
densely Syrian-populated municipalities. For example, Istanbul’s Esenyurt muni-
cipality organized a return campaign in 2018, including a total of 30 trips to the
Syrian border to support the return of 3724 Syrians. For 2019, the same munici-
pality set the target of returning 25,000 Syrians (Haberturk 2018). After arriving atGoverning practices and strategic narratives 11
the border, returnees are escorted by Kızılay and the Disaster and Emergency
Management Presidency (known as AFAD) under MoI inside Syria. Each of the
return trips was presented in the national media, being portrayed as a ceremony in
which ‘our guest[s] [are] returning [to] their homes’ (Yeniasir 2018). Another in-
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centive technique consists of small ad-hoc information campaigns. In my inter-
views conducted in the summer of 2018, with a representative of an NGO in
Istanbul and a refugee in Izmir_ coming from Syria’s Afrin province reported
having received telephone calls from the officers of Turkish state agencies
whom informed them about the return option, the improvement of security con-
ditions, and the reconstruction of infrastructure in cities such as Afrin and Idlib
under the control of Turkey.
The third practice, the restriction of access to welfare benefits, is based on the
logic of deterring refugees to stay in Turkey. In 2018, Turkey announced to close
all refugee camps in a year. More than 100,000 Syrians, making 4 per cent of the
total refugee population, have provided shelter in these camps since 2012 as they
do not have any other option. The refugees from the closed camps left with two
challenging decisions: either moving to cities where housing is expensive or return-
ing to Syria. Additionally, a regional coordinator of a prominent NGO in and a
high-level office holder explained current practice to ensure returns of Syrians who
are crossing the borders for emergency situations. They said that ‘right now, legal
entries are only possible if there is a health emergency, such as if a person comes in
an ambulance. While they are crossing, they are obliged to sign a paper, called
‘voluntary return’ form. They are sent back immediately after the medical emer-
gency ends’ (Interviews Gaziantep and Urfa 2018).
The fourth technique is the usage of forced returns, in fact deportation, under
the mask of voluntary returns and legitimization with supposed ‘terror/security
links’. During an interview, a high-level state officer told that any suspicion about
terror link, such as social media posts propagating armed groups fighting in Syria
can be counted as adequate reason to immediate deportation of Syrians (Interview
Urfa 2018). A regional coordinator of a national NGO defended deportations
arguing for security reasons. He said that ‘almost 99% of deportations occur on
the security grounds. There are no spontaneous deportations, there is no raid or
street checks with the aim of deportation’ (Interview Gaziantep 2018). However,
reports of human right organizations and watchdog journalism attested that some
of apprehended Syrians due to lacking identity cards were forced to sign voluntary
return forms under the duress from state officers (Harekatact 2018; HRW 2019).
When I asked for the practices of signing forms, a lawyer specialized in the refugee
rights interviewed in Sanliurfa explained it: ‘an apprehended refugee is not able to
read and understand the form, he does not know what it is. Also, receiving this
form, a police officer who orders him that ‘whether you sign this form or not we
will send you back’ and the person required to sign this form, considering not
staying here but go’ (Interview Urfa 2018).12 Zeynep S¸ahin Mencütek
Geopolitics of Return: Preparations for Large-Scale Repatriation Endorsed by
Strategic Narratives
As shown above, Turkish authorities adopt some ad-hoc practices in encouraging
and governing a small number of returns. Meanwhile, the Government seeks ways
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to initiate large-scale repatriation by mobilizing strategic narratives that link it
with ‘a context of creating “safe zones”’ (Ic¸duygu and Nimer 2020: 415). The
government ‘has been adamantly advocating for the establishment of safe zone’
in Northern Syria’ since the eruption of the Syrian war in 2011 (Adar 2020: 1). As
noted by Ghráinne (2020a: 335), ‘although there is no accepted legal definition of a
“safe zone”, the term generally refers to the establishment of areas where civilians
may find refuge from armed conflict’. In Government’s discourse, ‘safe zone’
(along with no-fly zone) was first endorsed for the aim of challenging Assad re-
gime by supporting rebels (Ibid.). After 2014, the ‘safe zone’ proposal was linked
with Turkey’s border security that is believed to be threatened by a power vacuum
in northern Syria and expansion of armed group in areas close to the Turkish
border. After 2015–16, ‘circumvention of refugee flows’ and ‘establishing an area
inside Syria where refugees can be resettled’ have become additional priorities of
the Government to push for ‘safe zone’ proposal internationally (Ghráinne 2020a:
336; TRTWorld 2019). Erdogan’s speech to EU authorities in Brussels in 2015
illustrates this: ‘The migrant crisis could be solved in three easy steps: training and
equipping the Syrian opposition, declaring a safe zone along the border in north-
ern Syria where ISIS fighters would be cleared, and refugees could be resettled by
creating a no-fly zone’ (Cendrowicz 2015).
Since 2016, Turkey has taken concrete steps to establish a ‘safe zone’, in north-
ern Syria although ‘this course of action was also previously considered by the US,
Iraq, France and Russia’ who did not push forward due to the inherent risks of
establishing such zones and lack of international consensus (Ghráinne 2020a: 336,
2020b: 5). In the absence of UN-mandated safe zone or no-fly zone, the active
conflict parties Turkey, Russia, and Iran have implemented four de-escalation
zones in Syria. Turkey attempted unilateral military incursions, Operation
Euphrates Shield (2016–2017) and Olive Branch (2018) that both made issue
linkages between geopolitics and return more obvious. The Government legiti-
mized them as self-defence acts and anti-terror operations mainly against the
Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) that is the Syrian offshoot of
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), insurgent armed militia, that Turkey has
been fighting since the mid-1980s (Gürcan 2019). Beside stressing on national
security priorities, the government underlined that the incursions aim to prevent
any new refugee flows as well as to create conditions for returns. Policymakers and
the pro-government media mentioned that the planned zone inside northern Syria
under Turkey’s control would be safe for return (Mazi 2019). During Operation
Euphrates, President Erdogan emphasized that: ‘the refugees would return back
this zone; thus, it would alleviate the burden over Turkey for accommodating
Syrian refugees’ (TRTWorld 2017). In the early days of Olive Branch Operation,
Ibrahim Kalın, the spokesperson of the President, said: ‘our military operationsGoverning practices and strategic narratives 13
would continue until our Syrian brothers, whom 3.5 million lives in our country,
return safely to their homes’ (Diken 2018).
Meanwhile, Turkey has expanded its power of sphere by adopting multiple
actions of intervention, combining military operation with support to political
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elites, humanitarian aid, and economic policies to prepare the ground for returns.
As the interviews with Turkish and Syrian-led NGOs highlight Turkish agencies
under the MoI, cooperating with Ankara-aligned oppositional Syrian groups,
have provided services in camps for internally displaced Syrians, and rebuilt
hospitals, schools, mosques, universities, houses, and other infrastructure
(Interviews Gaziantep 2019; Sanlıurfa 2018). The military and development
agenda are implemented through the appointed Turkish heads of the closest
Turkish border provinces, mainly those of Kilis, Gaziantep, Hatay—as the co-
ordinator governorates of Syrian cities of Cerablus, Tel-Rifa, and Afrin. Turkish
coordinators deal with the coordination of border crossings, the activities of se-
curity forces, the delivery of aids, education, health, and municipal service provi-
sions (AA, 2018; Yenisafak, 2018).
The Turkish coordinators work with Kızılay, AFAD, and a few government-
supported NGOs such as Humanitarian Relief Foundation (known as IHH). The
director of IHH explained to me the details of services which I also verified from
news and reports. He says:
We have more than 33 camps in Syria, they are coordinated through 10 centres
in Turkey. We have 800 staff over there, 92 partner institutions, we have 6
container camp-cities, 27 tent camps, we also have one university, 43 schools, thir-
teen orphanages, as well as children and community centre. All of these are on the
border inside the Syrian. We also have 35 free clothes stores, 14 health centres, 61
bakeries, and 30 common kitchens where we serve to Syrian brothers (Interview
Urfa 2018).
Another interviewed NGO president reported that ‘we deliver aid to inside
Syria, such as to the Afrin and Cerablus regions. In Afrin, we constructed houses
for the stay of Syrians’ (Interview 26).
Beside these unilateral attempts for expanding sphere of influence in Northern
Syria and operating in de-escalation zone in Idlib with Russia, the Government
continued its efforts for internationalization of ‘safe zone’ idea. In September
2019, Erdo gan, once again, proposed the idea of ‘safe zone’ at the UN General
Assembly. The plan relates border security with speeding up the return of as many
as Syrian refugees as well as aligning these interests with European priority of
halting onward migration. He said:
If this safe zone can be declared, we can resettle confidently somewhere between 1 to
2 million refugees. Whether with the US or the coalition forces, Russia and Iran, we
can walk shoulder to shoulder, hand in hand so refugees can resettle, saving them
from tent camps and container camps . . . if we can extend the depth of this safe zone,
we can increase the number of Syrians who will return from Turkey, Europe and
other parts of the world (Wintour 2019).14 Zeynep S¸ahin Mencütek
Such a ‘safe zone’ and mass repatriation plan require financial support. To this
end, Erdo gan proposed the necessity of an international UN-led donor conference
which could garner financial help for those returning to safe areas (Gall 2019).
Otherwise, he threatened European leaders to ‘send 3.6 million refugees your
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way’, in retaliation to international criticism of Turkish military operation
(Baynes 2019).
The Government maintained the elevated status of the return issue. It further
boosted the narrative during the episode of 2 weeks cross-border operation in
October 2019, called Operation Peace Spring. Turkey claimed to exercise ‘its right
to self-defence on the basis that Kurdish forces close to its border’ ’continue to be a
source of direct and imminent threat as they opened harassment fire on Turkish
border posts’ (Ghráinne 2020b: 2). However, Turkey’s claims are found ‘highly
controversial to verify and cannot be said to be generally accepted in international
law as a justification of cross border operations’ (Ghráinne 2020b: 3). During the
heydays of the operation, the government made it an appealing, tactically linking
security goals, and future plans for a large-scale repatriation of Syrians. This time,
the Government targeted multiple audiences, including the Turkish public, op-
position parties, Syrian refugees, and international actors.
The government defined the situation, proposed a solution, and presented a
detailed plan to convince the audience that this would be ‘ideal’ for all. By defining
the situation, it uses familiar metaphors such as ‘Syrian brothers and sister’,
echoing the previous humanitarian narrative and targeting refugees as audience.
The following words of President Erdogan exemplify these components of the
narrative ‘our goal is to settle at least one million Syrian brothers and sisters in our
country in this safe zone. . .If needed, with support from our friends, we can build
new cities there and make it habitable for our Syrian siblings’ (Gall 2019). The
creation of issue linkage between border security and refugee returns becomes
more apparent in the words of the Minister of Foreign Affairs:
the one goal of Turkey is to create a safe zone across the border. Let me explain what
is the logic behind it: This is very important for our national security. Surely, we
should clean up our border and eliminate terrorists. Secondly, we create founda-
tions of safe and voluntary return (Posta 2019).
Such statements have a strong national and international resonance as they
frame the operation having a 2-fold benefit, namely the ‘fight against terrorism’
and ‘solving the refugee problem’ simultaneously. The issue linking is expected to
bring more legitimacy to the military incursion and seeks alliances or coalitions to
secure the success of future repatriation plans.
When the operation ended with the signing of the Sochi memorandum between
Turkey and Russia on October 22, 2019, Erdogan once again maintained issue
linkage saying that ‘we have signed an historic agreement that secures the fight
against terrorism, the territorial integrity of Syria and the return of refugees’
(Zaman 2019). The memorandum has a specific article on a joint commitment
for facilitation the return of refugees in a safe and voluntary manner (AljazeeraGoverning practices and strategic narratives 15
2019) as well as the control of areas between the Syrian towns of Tal Abyad and
Ras al-Ain by Turkish backed Syrian rebels and Turkish military, meaning de-
facto establishment of ‘safe zone’ from the perspective of Government. This act is
outside the framework of international law as ‘resettling refugees in the safe zone
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in Syria would very likely constitute refoulement’, ‘even if the zone set up by
Turkey was somehow safe, the conflict in Syria has proven to be highly unpre-
dictable’ and severe human rights risks are present (Ghráinne 2020b: 4–5). From
the political perspective, the criticism about Turkey’s possible ‘demographic en-
gineering’ in Northern Syria and the attacks on the Kurdish population during
operations was responded by capitalizing on Syrian Kurds readiness to return that
is difficult to verify (Zaman 2019; Adar 2020).
Domestic Politics on Return
Not only geopolitical considerations, but also Turkish domestic politics laid the
groundwork for reinforcing narratives and practices about return because of
‘Turkey’s frustration of shouldering a disproportionate responsibility for Syrian
refugees’ (Ghráinne 2020b: 5) as well as ‘strong polarization in attitudes towards
refugees between the supporters and opponents of the ruling party’ (Altindag and
Kaushal 2020: 1). Kemalist centre-left Republıcan People’s Party (RPP) devel-
oped an anti-Syrian stance to criticize the Government’s Syria policies and advo-
cate the return as an option (Erdogan 2019: 20). Although RPP raised
parliamentary questions to urge MoI to be more transparent about refugee pol-
icies, its questions have not been responded (Yüksek 2019) and the RPP was
silenced in the mainstream media controlled by the Government. Other oppos-
ition parties—right-wing Nationalist Movement Party and the pro-Kurdish
People’s Democratic Party seldomly raised their own points of criticism on the
basis of their ideological stance and accepted Syrians on a selective basis. Both
government and opposition parties’ election manifestos set their commitments on
Syrian refugee policy, with an emphasis on returns in June 2018 presidential elec-
tion. In several platforms, the RPP talked about its plan of returning Syrians,
using the phrase of ‘sending Syrians back to their home country’ if it had become
the government party (Manifestos 2018: 10). As a response, the government party
committed to increas[ing] ’the efficiency of deportation processes and establish-
ment of ‘National Voluntary Return Mechanisms’ for those under the scope of
deportation. The 2018 election was won by the government party, but return
discussions have remained on the public and political agenda since then. The
increasing emphasis on a return during the 2018 elections caused panic and fear
among refugees as explained by an interviewed Syrian female teacher. She said:
we got very afraid that the RPP would have come to power and it would make a
peace with Syrian regime. If it had happened, it would make all Syrians return to
Syria, we felt this fear until Turkish elections finalized. It was very terrifying fear. We
prayed for the winning of Erdogan. It is difficult for us to return amid of war and live
there with our kids (Interview Urfa 2018).16 Zeynep S¸ahin Mencütek
When I asked her what about government party’ statements on return, she
reflected on the perceived differences between two:
Erdogan says the possibility of return to safe zones. It means that these zones would
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be under the protection of a state. In the case of an international protection of us, I
can return, but I cannot return to the places which are under the control of Syrian
regime (Interview Urfa 2018).
The issue of Syrian returns was highly politicized again by the RPP during the
local election campaigns in May and June 2019. To gain a public appeal, the RPP
embraced as a populist position, to fight against long-run populist discourses of
the ruling party JDP (Wuthrich and Ingleby 2020). One strong element in RPP’s
populism is an anti-Syrian stance narrated as one reason of the economic hard-
ships experienced by Turkish people. The domestic audience was attentive because
anti-Syrian sentiments and populist narratives have been rising in the last years
through the deepening recession, soaring unemployment, and inflation. The initial
political discourse of JDP emphasizing cultural intimacy has not been socially
reciprocated by the majority of the Turkish citizens any longer. Although there
has been strong polarization in attitudes towards refugees between the supporters
and opponents of the JDP in the 2012–16 period (Altindag and Kaushal 2020),
this has diminished because of the growing number of Syrian refugees. It has
aggravated tensions between local communities and Syrians, which manifested
socio-economic problems and political-societal polarization (Kaya 2019: 220). As
Simsek (2018: 6) noted, ‘the rising number of Syrian nationals living in cities opens
up discussions around issues of permanency, economic stabilization, political rep-
resentation and accessibility of public services, for both the refugees and wider
society’. Populist anti-refugee discourse has been increasingly reflected in public
opinion surveys and social media (Özerim and Tolay 2020; Erdogan 2020). Survey
results are illustrative. In 2019, as an answer to the question about where should
Syrian live, the 44.8 per cent of Turkish respondents support to the statement of
‘should be sent to safe zones to be established in Syria to live there’ and 25.0 per
cent of them support the idea of ‘they should definitely be sent back’ (Erdogan
2020: 98). Interviews with locals and refugees confirm the growing anti-refugee
tendency in local levels. An administrative head of neighbourhood (muhtar)
responded to my question about integration as following: ‘Integration? Do you
mean their long stay here. The only solution is to the quick return of all Syrians’
(Interview Urfa 2018). A dozen of interviewed Syrians in the summer of 2018 told
that they were occasionally stopped by local people on the public spaces and were
asked why they have not yet returned back to Syria, although ‘war ended in Syria
thanks to the Turkey’s military operations’. In reality, although Turkish society
does not look positively to living together with Syrians, majority of Syrians plan
not to return to Syria under any circumstances (51.8 per cent), only 5.9 per cent of
respondents are positive to return if a safe zone in established (Erdogan 2020: 176).
The 2019 election resulted with the first-time loss of a majority in two large
provinces, Istanbul and Ankara, for the government party. The government partyGoverning practices and strategic narratives 17
annulled the first local results in Istanbul with arguably unlawful grounds. The
second consecutive defeat in the Istanbul mayoral election was attributed to the
Turkish constituency’s reaction to the high number of Syrians in the city
(Ahvalnews 2019), although refugee inflows did not have a significant impact
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on election outcomes during the 2012–16 period even in areas with high intensity
of refugee presence (Altindag and Kaushal 2020). The result signalled that both
government and opposition parties would harden their stances about Syrian ref-
ugees (Erdogan 2019: 25).
Just after the elections, the government mobilized new restrictive measures
targeting irregular migrants such as workplace raids, identity checks, as well as
denial of new registrations. The police started to deport some unregistered Syrians
directly across the border (Amnesty 2019). Although the government party is not
in favour of forced returning of refugees, they support restrictive regulations to
expedite voluntary returns to satisfy the constituency. The timing of the imple-
mentation of these control practices can be explained by the government’s
attempts to make its narrative on return more convincing through concrete action.
These might help to disseminate the populist message to the opposition parties
and public that the government now takes actions to reduce the number of Syrian
refugees by returning some of them, despite the discrepancy between rhetoric and
actual formal practices.
To the same end, the numbers of Syrian returnees are much frequently shared
by the ministers who aim to convey the message that the government concentrates
on the return issue. On December 3, 2018, the Minister of the Interior announced
that 285,424 Syrians returned to their homes (Hurriyet 2018). Three months later,
official news agency informed public that ‘around 315,000 Syrians living in
Turkey have so far returned voluntarily to their home country after Turkey’s
anti-terror operations cleared their hometowns of terrorists’ (Mazi 2019). In
October of 2019, the Minister of Foreign Affairs noted that ‘more than 360,000
Syrians returned from Turkey to two regions where we conducted operation’
(Posta 2019). For the period of 2016–19, the UNHCR documented only 50,422
returns from Turkey. A politics of numbers seems to be in play, as there a source of
origin of the numbers given by the government is absent. The gap between gov-
ernment and UNHCR statistics can be said to stem from the inflating of numbers
provided by the Turkish government and the UNHCR’s non-involvement of
returns.
Conclusion
This article has examined how receiving countries urge for refugee returns before
peacebuilding in the country of origin. Through in-depth case-study design, it has
attempted to unpack the return governing process by focusing on both practice
and discursive dimension. In doing so, it has shown the variety of governing
practices that aim to either incentivize refugee to returns or deter them to stay.
These practices seem to increase the number of spontaneous individual returns.
The article has also demonstrated that receiving governments craft furtherYou can also read
