Hermeneutical Inspirations in Art History
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MARIUSZ BRYL
Hermeneutical Inspirations in Art History
Hermeneutical inspirations in art history have their relatively long tradition, altho
ugh initially they were developing in a non-linear way, occasionally blocked or
hindered. The possibilities provided by an encounter between philosophical herme
neutics and art history have not always been fully exploited. A model example in this
respect occurred very early, already at the threshold of the 20th century. Richard
Hammann whose doctoral dissertation (Das Symbol, 1902), written under the super
vision of Wilhelm Dilthey, offered a chance to creatively adopt the philosopher’s ideas
to the needs of art history in his later works abandoned the hermeneutical inspirations
and did not continue the distinction between Verstehen and Erklären, choosing
explanation (Erklären) as the task of art history understood as an exact science. The
Diltheyan inspirations fully surfaced in art history only in the 30-ties, in the theory of
Hans Sedlmayr, in his concepts of structure and category of understanding. The
hermeneutic character of Sedlmayr’s "structural analysis" became distinct not only in
the idea of an "anschauliche character" of the work or, for that matter, in the assumed
possibility of an immediate experience of the work’s meaning, but also in the focus on
the "problem of interpretation," or, in other words, the problem of translatability of
works of art into discursive language. Among later historians of art for whom
hermeneutical inspirations played a significant role one should mention Kurt Bauch,
Kurt Badt, and, to a certain extent, Lorenz Dittmann. Still, a programmatic and
systematic development of hermeneutical theories in art history took place only in the
70-ties and 80-ties, and it was related to such scholars as Gottfried Boehm, Max Imdahl,
Oskar Bätschmann, and Michael Brötje.
Gottfried Boehm ’s Hermeneutik des Bildes
Gottfried Boehm, one of the closest co-workers of Hans-Georg Gadamer, has
attempted to outline a hermeneutical perspective referring to art history. "The herme
neutics of the painting has its source at the point where its visual experience passes
into the medium of speech," says Boehm in the opening sentence of his programmatic
text. The task of the hermeneutics of the picture is then double: on the one hand, it has96 Hermeneutical Inspirations in A rt History
to define the particular character of the visual medium - which also means its difference
from the discursive one, and on the other, it has to specify the basis in which the
possibility of a legitimate translation of the image into the word is rooted - this, in turn,
means looking for something that the two media have in common. The point of
departure for a theory of the picture as a "sensually organized meaning" is a claim of
the identity of the picture’s meaning and the sensual energy. According to Boehm, a
conceptual, abstract tendency of perception encounters in the picture strong resistance,
forcing the eye to reduce its synthesizing efficiency; to retreat before the established
products of perception such as figures, things, etc. Since apart from those parts of the
picture which attract and arrest the glance so that they may be identified as "figures,"
there are also blanks which deny any identification and whose task is just to guide the
eye from one point of attention concentration to another. Seeing the picture, the eye
cannot rescind from those blanks, since as a plane, the picture is a continuum of
"figures" and "non-figures." It is on this fundamental nonidentifiability of "non-figu
res," on the nonfulfiliability of blanks, and on the incessant movement of borderlines
that the identity of being and phenomenon, so essential for the picture, is based. What
is going on in the picture is a permanent process of transition from being to phenome
non, as a result of which being does not become fully positive, "established" once and
forever, but on the contrary - it manifests total inexhaustibleness of the origin of its
meaning. Thanks to this, the picture is characterized by the incessant growth of being.
That growth may also be described as an endless play of simultaneity and successive
ness in a picture. Their mutual relation, the "iconic difference" (as Boehm puts it),
annihilates the basis of an abstract, conceptual tendency of perception, it forces
perception to "retard," to move back to the stage that is "pre-conceptual," the stage of
the incessant genesis of meaning. Hence the picture reaches into the prehistory of
thought, before the metaphysical opposition of sensibility and spirit, the inside and the
outside, being and phenomenon, form and content. Defining the essence of the visual
language, the above theory of the picture simultaneously implies its insubstititionality
by the language of discourse.
However, on the other hand, a key issue of the hermeneutic of the picture is the
problem of translatability of both media. Assuming such translation to be not only
possible but necessary, hermeneutics situates its source in the common basis of image
and word. In order to approach it, one should reject the objective theory of language
and develop its different understanding as a dynamic medium characterized by an
incessant emergence of new meanings in the acts of living speech. Here Boehm follows
Gadamer who understands language as a speculative unity of what is and what is
represented. Language is not a finite set of already generated meanings, but it
represents the genesis of meaning which cannot fully absorb its own conditions. For
meaning is always articulated in language, it cannot be separated from what has been
said. A speaker moves within a lateral node of language borderlines, among contrasts
and "metaphorical" passages. That means that the unity of meaning of a given utterance
is composed of both what has been said and what has not been said. A speculative
character of speaking consists in the words not making being present in an objective
way, but in showing its genesis and letting the whole of it have its voce. Hence: theM ariusz Bryl 97
translatability of image into speech is founded on the possibility of return in language
itself to primary figurativeness (Bildlichkeit). The comparability of both mediapertains
exclusively, what Boehm stresses in particular, to that genesis of meaning, and not to
their ever changing articulative structure. A discursive interpretation of a picture
should not, however, attempt at an unattainable substitution, at a change of that picture
into factual statements. Its aim can only be a practice of opening eyes. And besides, it
should not just determine the meaning of a work, but also explain "the immanent
genesis of that meaning," that is, answer the question: "what is the way meaning is
created under given conditions of looking at the picture?"
At last, let us ask the question about the historicality of such a model of interpre
tation. The question is important, inasmuch as the historicality of understanding is in
the center of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. Boehm, distancing himself in his
theoretical statements from the positivistic, "objectivizing" historicism typical of the
humanities, points to Gadamer and his conception of "effective-history" and herme
neutical experience as the proper perspective surmounting the aporias of naive histori
cism. However, a closer look at his own conception of visual experience, which clearly
has a psychologico-perceptive provenance and structure, we will encounter a funda
mental difficulty in determining historical character of understanding. It is caused by
an obvious fact that aphysiologically defined relationship between viewer and painting
is by its nature completely ahistorical; it does not undergo any changes in time and
resists the pressure of meanings trasmitted by tradition. Nevertheless, Boehm ’s theory
implies a possibility of opening the visual experience to "effective-history." Such a
possibility stems from a successful, adequate translation of picture into word which
may be achieved in the process of interpretation.
This thesis may seem arguable, especially in the context of what has been said above
about the limits and tasks of interpretation. Still, it will acquire an appropriate meaning
if we refer to Boehm’s histori co-systematic analysis of the Italian Renaissance portrait
- the only global analysis of this kind in the author’s published work. This extended
study, entitled Bildnis und Individuum, begins with a typically hermeneutical proble
matic. At first Boehm defines the phenomenon of individual portrait, distinguishing
among four basic hermeneutical moments in the interpretation of the genre: silence,
the middle measure of affection, similarity, and the relationship between character and
action. Then he specifies the relations between the language of interpretation and the
portrait as well as characterizes the intention inherent in the painting and its immanent
optics - in all those respects applying the elements of his theory of the picture and
interpretation. Later on, Boehm enumerates four modi of the individual portrait which
differ in the character of represented individuals. All that has been done on the basis
of perceptual analysis and a gnas'i-"phenomenological" description. Being aware of
possible objections, Boehm formulates them himself, asking, "Haven’t we fallen in
the danger of assigning to portraits structures and meanings which they did not contain?
Does perception has no history of its own?" Next, he admits that "[mjethodical
objections of this kind attract attention to the fact that so far the analyses have not
reached far enough. W e have not yet attained the point which would allow for a
feedback between the portrait and its relevant sources and historical references."98 Hermeneutical Inspirations in Art History
In order to make such feedback possible, Boehm introduces new, extra-pictorial
"rhetorical and ethical interprétants." This does not mean, however - as he emphasizes
- that hermeneutical methodological premises have undergone any change. That is
because in the hitherto applicable descriptive terms, such as "solemnity" or "darkness"
of character, the "pose" of the represented individual and his/her "look," there were
included categories of the antique rhetoric and ethic - ethos and pathos, hexis or tykhai.
This is a decisive step which "historicizes" our perception, incorporating our experien
ce of the picture - in this respect of the Renaissance portrait - into "effective-history."
This decisive step is possible thanks to language, the factor mediatizing meanings
transmitted by tradition. It turns out that the terms which we used in translating our
visual experience into discursive language were synonymous to the concepts of
rhetoric, present, as it were, in the intention of the Renaissance portrait anyway.
From then on, all the analyses of works of art are doubly rooted: in perception and
in the language of rhetoric, which allows for full hermeneutical experience; for the
"fusion of horizons" of the viewer and of the picture. This refers to an individual act
of perception and understanding, whereas with respect to portrait painting as a certain
evolving group of works Boehm proposes a redefined category of genre, which, in his
opinion, allows for a historico-semantic analysis without forfeiting the individuality
of a single portrait (and that is a particular concern of hermeneutics, since, after all, it
is founded on the experience of an individual work of art).
Max Im dahl’s Ikonik
Max Imdahl, the founder of iconics, starts from an assumption that the most
complex visual structure of art works should have its counterpart in equally complex
discursive interpretation. Such an approach is marked with a specific ambivalence. On
the one hand, iconics is based upon the essential difference of the iconic from the
linguistic, on the other, though, it is submitted to the directive of maximum proximity
of word and picture. In this context, Imdahl refers to the relationship between "negative
theology" and revealed truth in order to - like theologians who set the boundaries of
their cognitive grasp of Revelation - mark the limitations of discursive language with
respect to the "revealed truth" of an artwork. In itself, interpretation - to use the
language of methodology of science - should be intersubjectively communicable and
verifiable. In order to be so, it must be founded upon the relationship between the
viewer and the picture; only direct perception can make an interpretation legitimate.
It is true, admits Imdahl, that an iconic analysis of, for instance, Giotto’s frescos in
Arena leads to their quite new interpretation. Still, the possibility of such an interpre
tation is inherent in the structure of analyzed works. Iconics only makes actual what
is potentially inherent in Giotto’s pictures; it does not change anything in their
structure, does not move any elements or reduce them to any concepts assumed in
advance.
In the case of Giotto’s frescos, Imdahl distinguished three systems present in them:
a system of perspective projection, a system of stage choreography, and a transscenicM ariusz Bryl 99
system of lines of the picture field. While the first two are characterized by contingency
and changeability, the third system displays necessity and definiteness. If, for example,
we change the grouping of figures or the placement of the ciborium in "Presentation
of Christ," no iconographic or illusionistic changes will follow. What, however, will
be destroyed is the planimetrie structure exposing the proper iconic meaning of
representation. In this case, the meaning can be defined as simultaneous visualization
of a complex narrative constellation: actual separation (of Jesus from Mary), actual
connection (of Jesus and Simeon), and potential connection (of Jesus and Mary). The
above narrative structure is rooted in the system of lines of the picture field constituted
by linear and planar relationships between the figures and the ciborium, among the
figures, and between all elements of the represented world and the surface of the
picture. It is obvious, that every repositioning, either of a figures (resp. figures) or, for
instance, the ciborium, will destroy the planimetrie structure which only as unchanging
- i.e. such as it is, and no different - is able to generate the aforementioned meaning of
representation. That meaning, formulated on the surface, even though it refers to the
represented world, is given directly in the process of seeing, hence its immediate
obviousness, its evidence, as Imdahl puts it. The experience of that meaning is only
possible while using the other kind of seeing than the recognizing one (i.e. wiederer-
kennende Sehen, which is aimed at identification of the objects of the represented
world), namely, the viewing seeing (i.e. sehende Sehen, which is aimed at perceiving
the planimetrico-linear relations inherent in the picture). However, Imdahl does not
isolate both kinds of seeing; on the contrary, he emphasizes their mutual interpenetra
tion (here he refers to the structure of theme and horizon) as an indispensable condition
of a new quality: the cognitive seeing ( erkennede Sehen). In this way he opposes the
isolation of content and form which in iconics are one; they are, in visual experience,
indistinguishable one from another. The transscenic system of lines of the picture field
is a syntactic form of the organization of the picture sense; such a form, which does
not disappear at the very moment of viewer’s understanding of the meaning of the
picture, but which is constantly co-present in each visual experience of that picture.
Imdahl considers the surface to be an area of constitution of the iconic sense of the
painting, to be the basis of the visual language providing the painting its semantic
productivity (Bildlichkeitsleistung). In other words, the surface guarantees the pictu
re’s identity; thanks to it a picture is a picture. The visual medium - if it is to be not
only a reflection of reality or an illustration of a text, if it is not exhaust itself in its
mimetic function or totally submit to the dictatorship of discourse - has to refer to the
surface as to something that determines the difference of the painting from reality as
well as from language; it has to take advantage of the articulative potential of its own
iconic sense which is inherent in the surface. At the same time, the surface as a
guarantee of the identity of the picture, and simultaneously of its semantic productivity,
is able to reveal itself only when it is confronted with the systems that are alien,
heteronomous with respect to the picture (i.e. to the surface); if those non-planimetric
systems may be translated into the planar system immanent to the picture. "The identity
of the picture understood as its unsubstitutability is a fact when the picture is a system
constructed according to the immanent laws and evident in its auto legitim acy; a system100 Hermeneutical Inspirations in A rt History
which moves away from its extraiconic correlative or for which such a correlative does
not exist. It is by dint of its evident autolegitimacy that the picture makes visible what
has so far been un-seen."
Oskar Batschmann’s kunstgeschichtliche Hermeneutik
Oskar Batschmann, the founder of arthistorical hermeneutics, has resolved to
achieve the "critical integration" of the methods of art history, the integration rooted
in a critique of traditional methods and adoption of contemporary ones, including
iconics. Batschmann understands hermeneutics as a theory, a method, and a practice
of interpretation (auslegen) of works of art. W hat lies at the heart of art history
considered in such a way is always an individual art work, something that "it exposes
by itself." Batschmann clearly defends the work’s autonomy as well as an integrity of
the visual medium. He rejects both a submission of the work to general categories and
its reduction to a text. He criticizes the traditional methods such as iconology or
structural analysis as well as the traditional concepts such as intention, influence,
sources, proper attitude, basis or composition, instead proposing a number of new
categories and delineating a new - in his opinion more coherent than the preceding
ones - theory of interpretation of works of art which includes reconstruction of their
origin (the productive labor of an artist), structure (pictorial processes), and reception
(beholder’s seeing). Batschmann’s acceptance of the objective of hermeneutics to be
the traditional task of our discipline, i.e. historical interpretation of works of art, results
in the ability of his theory to modify the paradigm of art history, and in the essential
proximity of arthistorical hermeneutics and one of the wings of the so-called New Art
History, especially if - after Norman Bryson - we define the latter as based on the fusion
of two elements in the process of interpretation: the contextual and the hermeneutic
one. A good example of such an approach may be a conception of "historical
explanation" of art developed by Michael Baxandall which on the one hand redefines
the concept of context ("patterns of intention"), and on the other stresses an importance
of the pictorial order to make an interpretation legitimate. Oskar Batschm ann’s
arthistorical hermeneutics assumes, however, a methodologization of the hermeneutic
perspective; in other words, it leads to deontologization of basic concepts of philosop
hical hermeneutics of Gadamer, such as understanding, explanation, hermeneutical
experience, hermeneutical circle, etc. Wahrheit und Methode, in Batschm ann’s opi
nion, made the alternative between these two concepts even more acute, so that one
should not speak about "truth and method" but rather about "truth or method." Quite
consciously, Batschmann chooses the "methodological approach" which leads to a
"loss of ontological density of the reality under study," and his choice has been made
for the sake of scientific objectivity of art history.Mariusz Bryl 101
Michael Brotje’s existential-hermeneutische Kunstwissenschaft
Michael Brotje, the founder of an "existential-hermeneutical science of art," has
made a different choice: he has chosen truth against method. The very definition of the
projected science of art as "existential-hermeneutical" directs us "before" Gadamer,
towards the source of hermeneutical ontologization in the fundamental ontology of
Heidegger. (This notion appears in Sein undZeit, in a chapter on "speech as a derivative
of the modus of explanation," in order to differentiate the structure of explanation from
the apophanetic structure of speech.) Reference to Heidegger implies an ontological
character of Brotje’s reflection; indeed, he considers issues which for scientifically
oriented hermeneutics remain irrelevant: W hat is the essence of art?, what is human
being?, thus - what does the relation between a viewer and an art work consist in?, etc.
To answer the above questions Brotje draws not only from the hermeneutical tradition,
but - equally, or even more - from the "negative aesthetics" of Adorno. "The viewer -
unintentionally and unconsciously - enters into contact with the art work to unite with
it and so to make it speak" - exegesis of this lapidary statement of Adorno constitutes
one of the key moments of the theory developed by Brotje, all strands of which center
around the problem of an essential relationship between the disposition of a human
being and the system of a work of art.
A work of art, according to Brotje, frees itself from all its contextual determinants
in which it was formed and in which it is perceived. Its historicity is overcome when
it is referred to an extra-historical instance of medium that the work of art owes it
existence to. Painting would be impossible without the previously given surface;
sculpture - without the previously given rock; architecture - without concrete space.
Medium cannot be simply reduced to the external determinant; on the contrary, in the
process of seeing it appears as an absolute quality, given directly, and constituting the
"ur-ground" from which the whole phenomenal world of an artw ork develops. Surface,
as the medium of painting, in the process of seeing is being transformed into an all
penetrating Ebene which becomes the visual synonym of Absolute. This Absolute is
projected by the viewer in the process of seeing. As Brotje argues, it is the task of an
essential-existential disposition of a human being to direct oneself towards Absolute,
to attempt at transcending the limitations of one’s existence. The view taken by Adorno
assumes that the viewer fuses with the art work, submitting himself/herself to the
"ur-ground" of the medium and letting it verify his/her essential disposition. Thus
Absolute is always the postulate, the inner human potential. The art work always makes
the viewer actualize this potential, i.e. project Absolute, and due to that the medium is
attributed its constituent meaning of the visual synonym of Absolute. Given the
decision of the viewer to treat the medium as an initial premise for visual realization
of painting’s reality, and given the decision of the art work to treat the medium as a
premise for constituting that reality - the viewer and the art work fuse in the common
denominator of understanding. The horizon of the art work and the horizon of the
viewer fuse into "the null-instance of the medium" and are replaced by one horizon of
the projection of Absolute.
A general definition of an art work reads as follows: in the work o f art reality is102 Hermeneutical Inspirations in A rt History
revealed as an event of establishing and breaking the contact between the viewer and
Absolute. This event can be realized exclusively in the process of seeing, beyond
consciousness. For the art work does not require the viewer to stick to the previously
acquired conceptual formulae of explanation. The status of the art work is the status
of silent unavoidability, which the viewer should adhere to in his/her inner directing.
In his/her directing towards the art work, the viewer "knows" that each rational
reasoning disrupts his/her communication with the art work, upsets the constantly
renewed - in the process of seeing - balance between him/her and the work of art,
between openness and openness. The most accurate description of the process of
establishing the union between the viewer and the art work was provided, according
to Brotje, by Heidegger: "... the more purely the work is itself transported into the
openness of being - an openness opened by itself - the more simply does it transport
us into this openness and thus at the same time transport us out of the realm of the
ordinary. To submit to this displacement means: to transform our accustomed ties to
the world and to earth and henceforth to restrain all usual doing and prizing, knowing
and looking, in order to stay within the truth that is happening in the work. Only the
restraint of this staying lets what is created be the work that it is." The feeling of being
happy in view of the art work results from knowing oneself and realizing oneself in
our essential-existential disposition of turning oneself towards Absolute. In the process
of retaining this predisposition, the viewer (who is cognizant of his/her imperfection)
goes beyond himself/herself and finds himself/herself in his/her essential structure.
"The concept of the art work implies its success (Gelingen)" - says Adorno. This
success, continues Brotje, is attainable by the viewer in the process of seeing without
any difficulty - since the art work as a project is a priori of his/her work. The ease of
the viewer’s Gelingen in the work of art is what s/he delights in (geniessen ). This
ultimately undermines all efforts for self-realization, self-analysis, self-definition - all
so characteristic of everyday life. Thus, Kunstgenuss should be considered the central
motif and motor of human behavior towards art. Complete, existential understanding
of the art work involves experiencing the Kunstgenuss, experiencing the delight in
view of the art work, both taking place without engaging conscious reflection. This
testifies that the discursive interpretation of art is totally redundant for a proper
experiencing of the art work; contrary, it even hinders realization of that - unintentional
and unconscious - union of the viewer and the work.
Brotje argues, however, that although this redundancy of scientific interpretation
undoubtedly follows from the above theory of art, it should be proved in practice
through the analysis of concrete art works. The first premise for proving this redun
dancy should be to acknowledge one’s ignorance, as the manner in which the art work
transcends is totally unpredictable and possible to be captured - provided it is possible
at all - only after an arduous, long term analysis and only to a certain degree. Since
transcending has never been regarded a systematic objective of studies, the history of
art (Kunstwissenschaft) is practically at its dawn. It is absolutely out of question, says
Brotje, to treat the history of art (Gesch.ich.te der Kunst) as an aesthetic commentary
paralleling the general history of humankind. Through art, the humankind writes
"another history" - the history of constantly renewed self-assurance as to what isMariusz Bryl 103
ultimate and unconditioned. Scientific history of art is incapable of fulfilling the task
of systematic analysis of thus conceived history of art, for it is submitted to the
institution of history. Subject to the latter, the medium becomes a vehicle, an indefi
nable aesthetic preliminary moment; the theme - a relative manifestation of intentions
peculiar to a given age; the analysis - a tool for probing and for making associations;
the viewer - a neutrally engaged recipient. And only when history is replaced by
Absolute, then all the elements - medium, theme, viewer - assume the value they are
all entitled to by the very virtue of their definition; the medium becomes an a priori of
cognition; the theme assumes the highest meaningful value of the constitutive descrip
tion of the world and the individual with reference to Absolute; the viewer realizes
him/herself as a creatively projecting "I." Interpretation based on, such premises
radically conditions the non-fulfilability of the art work via language. Inex
haustibleness of the art work should not - as Brotje claims - be identified with plurality
of interpretations, as it is a quality of one reality of sense experienced by the viewer in
the process of seeing. This reality of sense is tantamount to the phenomenal aspect of
the art work; therefore, only one type of interpretation may exist; i.e. an analysis of the
phenomenal aspect regarded as a structure of communication between the art work and
the viewer. Thus conceived interpretations constitute the main, analytical part of the
fundamental study by Brotje Der Spiegel der Kunst. It is there, in concrete analyses,
that the "existential-hermeneutical science of art" is realized, that the postulated
reconstruction of this "other history" written by human beings through art, takes place.
Brotje’s approach can be most accurately defined as a "return to metaphysics."
However, by turning towards metaphysics, Brotje develops his discourse using the
language of the post-metaphysical age. From this point of view, one should consider,
for instance, the connection between Brotje and Heidegger, as they both used the
concept of pre-structure of understanding as well as the category of project peculiar to
it. When Brotje identifies experience of seeing of the art work with its understanding,
what he really means is Heidegger’s concept of understanding as a way of being of
Dasein. For Heidegger, "understanding as projecting is a manner of being of Dasein
which embodies all possibilities." In other words, understanding "projects the being
of Dasein on its purpose ( Worumwillen) to the same extent as on the worldliness of its
every world." This implies that "understanding is a possibility; it allows for the being
of the one who understands (i.e. Dasein ) and of that what is understood." For Brotje,
the art work - precisely as a project of Absolute coming from the viewer - is perceived
as the ever present possibility of being of the viewer himself/herself. This accounts for
the possibility of the pre-understanding of the art work, prior to any reflection and
interpretation, which involves experiencing of the success ( Gelingen), the feeling of
delight in view of the art work. It can be seen therefore that though Brotje took over
from Heidegger the fundamental concept of understanding and the category of project,
he substantially modified both concepts, introducing the idea of Absolute as a synonym
of the concept of Worumwillen, i.e. the purpose of Dasein. As should be remembered,
Gadamer’s concept of "fusion of horizons" underwent an analogous modification.
Brotje’s attitude to the "negative aesthetics" of Adorno seems more complex, though
one observation is very distinct; Brotje refers to this dimension of Adorno’s theory104 Hermeneutical Inspirations in A rt History
which touches upon the uniqueness of aesthetic experience (defined, for example, by
the idea of Absolute as well as by such concepts as aesthetic Schein, conflict, or
unsolved mystery of an art work), yet totally ignores the critical-social aspect of
Adorno’s thought.
"Existential-hermeneutical science of art" should be perceived within a broader
context of contemporary philosophico-aesthetic reflection according to which the
transcendent dimension is essential for human existence and manifests itself in the
religious or aesthetic experience. This statement, though by no means novel, has been
recently used as an argument in a polemic and directed against the self-consciousness
of our age as a post-metaphysical one. In this context, one should mention Kołako
wski’s Metaphysical Horror as well as an essay by Georg Steiner - Real Presences.
We live, writes Steiner, in a "secondary city" of modern civilization where a direct
experience of art works was replaced by omnipresent discursive commentary. The
most distinct manifestation of the triumph of discourse over art is D errida’s decon
struction seen as an ultimate consequence of the "broken contract" between the world
and being and between the language and the world as well as the emergence of the
philosophy of "real absences" claiming that "the truth of word is the absence of the
world." This statement is derived from M allarm e’s sentence that "the proper sense of
the word ’rose’ is the absence of the real rose," and from subsequent transformations
of this statement, as for example Rimbaud’s testimony: "I am the other," Nietzsche’s
subversion of the "truth" and "proclamation of truth," de Saussure’s linguistics, Freud’s
critique of intentionality, and analytical philosophy of language. According to Steiner,
we should credit it to Derrida that he clearly stresses the theological nature of the
relationship between the word and the world. "The age of sign by its very nature is
theological; the intelligible side of sign is directed towards the world and to the image
of God" - such statements of Derrida mean that to establish a union between the word
and the world is to assume the postulate of existence of God, of Absolute. The only
way out of this dead end of deconstruction - according to Steiner - is through a renewal
of the "broken contract," through restoration - based on confidence, and thus on the
postulate of Absolute - of the union between the word and the being, between the
language and the world, between the art work and the truth. Indeed, each work of art
is "opus metaphysicum" or, in other words - it is defined by the "real presences", by
Absolute. The attitude we should assume in view of the art work is best characterized
- as Steiner claims - by the Latin word cortesia. In the Middle Ages it was used to
express the sense of tact, chivalry, a mysterious sovereignty of two hearts, subtlety and
sense of responsibility of a dialogue, and reserve in view of revelation. Only through
the assumption of such a stance is it possible to assure that two freedoms encounter
each other: the freedom of the art work and that of the viewer. In other words, only
then it is possible for the viewer to experience the "real presences", of Absolute in the
art work.
Leszek Kołakowski formulates a similar thought, saying th a t" different aspects of
the ultimate reality are best expressed in a religious cult and in art - not in the sense
that a painter is able to paint Absolute on his canvas or that the Priest can describe it
in theoretically satisfactory categories. Rather, what I have in mind, is that what isMariusz Bryl 105
nameless or undescribable can be mentioned in such a manner that - at least in intense
religious and aesthetic acts - it evokes a sense of understanding, this type of fleeting
realization which is both legitimate in the cognitive sense, and bears the conviction
that one is ’in touch w ith’ or ’within’ something which is more real that everyday
reality. This realization is by necessity fleeting in nature; it might be substantiated in
the form of a durable achievement, provided its content might be translatable into
theoretical concepts, which by its very virtue remains impossible." Michael Brotje,
quoting and agreeing with the above statement of Kołakowski, argues that only at one
point the Polish philosopher should be confronted. "By no means can the delight be
fleeting in character only because it does not let itself to be expressed in concepts. Due
to the constantly renewed encounter with art works, the experience of art settles within
us, thus allowing us in a permanent existential way to come ’more properly’ and ’more
closely’ to ourselves. Then we introduce the certitude of still-other-being into our
everyday life."
***
The above review of the theories of Boehm, Imdahl, Batschmann, and Brotje
indicates the importance of hermeneutical inspirations for contemporary art history as
well as the diversity of approaches within generally understood hermeneutics of art
history. The two extremes are: on the one hand, the kunstgeschichliche Hermeneutik
proposed by Batschmann, and on the other, the existential-hermeneutischeKunstwis-
senschaft developed by Brotje. In between there are more compromising approaches:
Boehm ’s Hermeneutik des Bildes and Imdahl’s Ikonik. Finally, let us once again ask
the question about the relationship between the above hermeneutics and art history as
an academic discipline of scholarship or, in other words, art history in its institutionally
sanctioned, traditional version, eclectically combining the elements of stylistics,
iconology, and contextual studies. Certainly, the problem is so complex and tangled
that even its cursory analysis would require a separate study. Therefore, on this
particular occasion I will focus on the aspect which is most interesting to me: the
problem of language, i. e. of a relationship between the work of art and the language
of its discursive interpretation. If we assume that for the traditional art history
discursive language is only an instrument serving - on the basis of "terminology"
elaborated in the course of the development of the discipline - to describe works of art
in a "professional" manner, then - regardless of all the critique of such reductionism -
in this frame of reference the most recuperable will be the theory of Batschmann.
Imdahl’s iconics, even though it is a climax of "sophistication" of the discursive
language used in interpreting works of art, still, by virtue of its methodical and systemic
character, it may be adopted to the practice of contemporary academic art history. The
theory of Boehm is a more difficult case, although apparently, thanks to the concept
of the metaphoric character of art (Blidlichkeit), it constructs a bridge between the
image and the word. On the other hand, however, the same Bildlichkeit evades any106 Hermeneutical inspirations in A rt History
kind of systematization and, consequently, incorporation in the "professional” idiom
of "scholarly" art history. The theory of Brotje, with the idea of the uselessness of
discursive interpretation in understanding of the work of art, and dialectical prevailing
over a scholarly interpretation by means of that interpretation itself, situates itself -
programmatically and quite consciously - beyond institutional art history. For the latter,
Brotje’s approach is an insurmountable barrier, since crossing that barrier would
literally mean self-annihilation.
Selected bibliography of a r t historians m entioned in the text:
G O T T FR IE D BO EH M , Einleitung, in: K.Fiedler, Schriften zur Kunst, Hg.G.Bo-
ehm, bd.I-II, München 1971; Die Dialektik der ästhetischen Grenze, in: Ist eine
philosophische Ästhetik möglich?, ("Neue Hefte für Philosophie", 5) Göttingen 1973;
Zu einer Hermeneutik des Bildes, in: Seminar: Die Hermeneutik und die Wissenschaf
ten, Hg. H.G.Gadamer u. G.Boehm, Frankfurt a.M. 1978; Bildsinn und Sinnesorgane,
in: Anschauung als ästhetische Kategorie, ("Neue Hefte für Philosophie", 18/19),
Göttingen 1980; Kunsterfahrung als Herausforderung der Ästhetik, in: Kolloquium:
Kunst und Philosophie 1: Ästhetische Erfahrung, Hg. W.Oelmuller, Padeborn u.a.
1981; Kunst versus Geschichte: ein unerledigtes Problem. Zur Einleitung in George
Kublers "Die Form der Zeit", in: G.Kubler, Die Form der Zeit. Anmerkungen zur
Geschichte der Dinge, Frankfurt a.M. 1982; Mnemosyne. Zur Kategorie des erinnern
den Sehens, in: Modernität und Tradition, Hg. G.Boehm u.a., München 1985; Die
Krise der Reprasäntation. Die Kunstgeschichte und die moderne Kunst, in: Kategorien
und Methoden der deutschen Kunstgeschichte 1900-1930, Hg. L.Dittmann, Stuttgart
1985; Bildnis und Individuum. Über den Ursprung der Porträtmalerei in der italieni
schen Renaissance, München 1985; Der stumme Logos, in: Leibhaftige Vernunft.
Spuren vonMerleau-PontysDenken, Hg. A.Metraux u. B.Waldenfels, M ünchen 1986;
Bild und Zeit, in: Das Phänomen Zeit in Kunst und Wissenschaft, Hg. H.Paflik,
Weinheim 1987; Was heisst: Interpretation? Anmerkungen zur Rekonstruktion eines
Problems, in: Kunstgeschichte - aber wie? 10 Themen und Beispiele, Berlin 1989; Bild
versus Wort, in: In Erscheinung Treten. Heinrich Barths Philosophie des Ästhetischen,
Hg. G.Hauff u.a., Basel 1990 JkonoklastikundTranszendenz, in: GegenwartEwigkeit.
Spurendes Transzendenten in der Kunst, (Katalog), Hg. Wieland Schmid, Berlin 1990;
Die Wiederkehr der Bilder, in: Was ist ein Bild?, Hg. G.Boehm, München 1994; Die
Bilderfrage, in: ibid.
M AX IM DA HL, Baumstellung und Raumwirkung. Zu verwandten Landschafts
bildern von Domenichino, Claude Lorrain und Jan Frans von Bloemen, in: Festschrift
Martin Wackernagel, Köln 1958; Rembrandts "NachöA’ache". Überlegungen zur
ursprünglichen Bildgestalt, in: Festschrift Werner Hager, Hg. G.Fiensch u. M.Imdahl,
Recklinghausen 1966; Jacob van Ruisdael - "Die Mühle von Wijk", Stuttgart 1968;
Vier Aspekte zum Problem der ästhetischen Grenzüberschreitung in der bildenden
Kunst, "Poetik und Hermeneutik", Bd. III, 1968; Bildsyntax und Bildsemantik. ZumM ariusz Bryl 107
Centurioblatt im Codex Egberti, "Giessener Beiträge zur Kunstgeschichte", Bd. I,
1970; Uber einige narrative Strukturen in den Arenafresken Giottos, "Poetik und
Hermeneutik", Bd. V, 1973; Überlegungen zur Identität des Bildes, "Poetik und
Hermeneutik", Bd. VIII, 1979; Giotto. Zur Frage der ikonischen Sinnstruktur,
München 1979; Kontingenz-Komposition-Providenz. Zur Anschauung eines Bildes
von Giotto, in: Anschauung als ästhetische Kategorie, ("Neue Hefte für Philosophie",
18/19), Göttingen 1980; Giotto. Arenafresken. Ikonographie, Ikonologie. Ikonik,
München 1980; Bildautonomie und Wirklichkeit. Zur theoretischen Begründung mo
derner Malerei, Mittenwald 1981; Relationen zwischen Bildnis und Individuum,
"Poetik und Hermeneutik", Bd. XVIII, 1987; Ikonik. Bilder und ihre Anschauung, in:
Was ist ein Bild?, Hg. G.Boehm, München 1994.
Oskar Bätschmann, Bild-Diskurs. Die Schwerigkeit des Parier Peinture, Bern
1977; Beiträge zu einem Übergang von der Ikonologie zu kunstgeschichtlicher Her
meneutik, in: Ikonographie und Ikonologie. Theorien-Entwicklung-Probleme, Hg.
Ek.Kaemmerling, Köln 1979; Dialektik der Malerei von Nicolas Poussin, Zürich-
München 1982; Einführung in die kunstgeschichtliche Hermeneutik. Die Auslegung
von Bilder, Darmstadt 1984; Anleitung zur Interpretation: Kunstgeschichtliche Her
meneutik, in: Kunstgeschichte. Eine Einführung, Hg. H.Belting u.a., Berlin 1988; Bild
- Text: Problematische Beziehungen, in: Kunstgeschichte - aber wie? 10 Themen und
Beispiele, Berlin 1989.
M IC H A E L B R Ö T JE , Die Gestaltung der Landschaft im Werk C.D. Friedrich und
in der holländischen Malerei, "Jahrbuch der Hamburger Kunstsammlungen", Bd. 19,
1974; Ingres in seinem Verhältnis zu Raffael und Michelangelo, "Giessener Beiträge
zur Kunstgeschichte", Bd. III, 1975; Das Bild als Parabel. Zur Landschaftsmalerei
Courbets, "Jahrbuch der Hamburger Kunstsammlungen", Bd.23, 1978; Der Spiegel
der Kunst. Zur Grundlegung einer existential-hermeneutischen Kunstwissenschaft,
Stuttgart 1990; Bild-Begegnungen, in: Fragen an vier Bilder, (Katalog), Hg. H.Lies-
brock, Münster 1993.
The Polish version (more extended) of this article is to be found in: "Artium
Quaestiones", Bd. VI, Poznan 1993, pp.55-84.You can also read
