KEY FINDINGS 2021 - HERVÉ LEMAHIEU AND ALYSSA LENG - Lowy Institute Asia Power Index
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KEY FINDINGS 2021 HERVÉ LEMAHIEU AND ALYSSA LENG
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 3
2021 Rankings 5
Analysis of Key Findings 7
Measures of Power 19
2021 Power Gap 25
Methodology 26
Indicators and Sources 27
Published by Lowy Institute Methodology by Hervé Lemahieu
31 Bligh Street Sydney NSW 2000 Analysis by Hervé Lemahieu and Alyssa Leng
Researchers: Alyssa Leng, Nicholas Bosworth, Hervé Lemahieu
Copyright © Lowy Institute 2021
The principal researchers would like to thank the critical research, review,
All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, editorial and design contributions of Bonnie Bley, Olivia Adams, Anthony Bubalo,
no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into Clare Caldwell, Michael Fullilove, Harriet Goers, Stephen Hutchings, Brody Smith,
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, Alex Oliver, Roland Rajah and Ingrid Schroder on this project.
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written
permission of the copyright owner and above publisher of this book. Cover and internal design by Ingrid Schroder, Be Visual Co
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 2INTRODUCTION
The annual Asia Power Index — launched by the Lowy Key findings in the Asia Power Index 2021 include:
Institute in 2018 — measures resources and influence
• The Covid-19 pandemic has driven down the
to rank the relative power of states in Asia. The project
comprehensive power of almost all states in 2021,
maps out the existing distribution of power as it stands
weakening their capacity to respond to and shape
today, and tracks shifts in the balance of power over time.
their external environment.
The Index ranks 26 countries and territories in terms
• The United States beat the downward trend in 2021
of their capacity to shape their external environment —
and has overtaken China in two critical rankings. But its
its scope reaching as far west as Pakistan, as far north
gains are dogged by a rapid loss of economic influence.
as Russia, and as far into the Pacific as Australia, New
Zealand and the United States. • China’s comprehensive power has fallen for the first
time, with no clear path to undisputed primacy in the
The 2021 edition — which covers four years of data —
Indo-Pacific.
is the most comprehensive assessment of the changing
distribution of power in Asia to date. Among other things, • The region has become more bipolar and less multipolar:
it aims to sharpen the debate on the near- and long-term Japan and India are lagging behind China, and Australia
geopolitical consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic in is more reliant on the United States.
the region. • US partners are enhancing their collective deterrence to
The project evaluates international power in Asia through support a military balance. Yet Asia’s deepening security
131 indicators across eight thematic measures: military dilemma presents a significant risk of war.
capability and defence networks, economic capability • Vaccine diplomacy is the new currency of geopolitics,
and relationships, diplomatic and cultural influence, and the United States leads the field.
as well as resilience and future resources. Over half of
• Indonesia makes it into the top ten, but Southeast Asian
our data points involve original Lowy Institute research,
middle powers are struggling to maintain their collective
while the rest are aggregated from hundreds of publicly
clout or sustain the diplomatic narrative.
available national and international sources.
This year, the Index includes three new indicators that
track Covid-19 vaccine doses administered nationally DIGITAL PLATFORM
as well as regional vaccine diplomacy efforts and The Lowy Institute Asia Power Index is available
donations per capita. These are in addition to new through a specially designed digital platform that
indicators introduced in 2020 that measure climate maximises both interactivity with the data and
change resilience, bilateral and plurilateral defence transparency of the methodology.
dialogues, and perceptions of the domestic and
Dynamic features — including an interactive map,
international handling of the Covid-19 pandemic.
weightings calculator, network analysis, country
comparisons, and drill-down explorations of each
indicator across multiple years and tens of thousands
of data points — establish the Lowy Institute Asia
Power Index as an indispensable research tool for the
study of power globally.
Explore now: power.lowyinstitute.org
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 3Introduction
The Index measures the ability of states A country’s comprehensive power is its weighted
to shape and respond to their external average across eight thematic measures of power:
environment.
ECONOMIC CAPABILITY
Power is defined by the Index as the capacity of a state to Core economic strength and the attributes of an
direct or influence the behaviour of other states, non-state economy with the most geopolitical relevance;
actors, and the course of international events. measured in terms of GDP at purchasing power
parity, international leverage, technological
Power can be measured in two ways. The Index sophistication and global connectivity.
distinguishes between resource-based determinants MILITARY CAPABILITY
of power – in other words, what countries have – and Conventional military strength; measured in terms
influence-based determinants of power – what countries of defence spending, armed forces and organisation,
do with what they have weapons and platforms, signature capabilities and
Asian military posture.
Resources measures RESILIENCE
The first four measures of the Index The capacity to deter real or potential external
— economic capability, military capability, threats to state stability; measured in terms of internal
resilience and future resources — institutional stability, resource security, geoeconomic
are requisite factors in the exercise security, geopolitical security and nuclear deterrence.
of power. FUTURE RESOURCES
The projected distribution of future resources and
Economic capabilities, which play into perceptions of power
capabilty
today; measured in terms of estimated economic,
M pa
nc al
defence and broad resources in 2030, as well
ca
e
ili bi
ue r
fl tu
ta lit
as working-age population and labour dividend
in ul
ry y
C
forecasts for 2050.
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS
Diplomatic
Resilience
RESOURCES The capacity to exercise influence and leverage
influence
through economic interdependencies; measured
in terms of trade relations, investment ties and
INFLUENCE economic diplomacy.
DEFENCE NETWORKS
Defence partnerships that act as force multipliers
D et w
u r re
of autonomous military capability; measured
s
n
ef o
ce
so t u
en rk
through assessments of alliances, regional
r e Fu
ce s
defence diplomacy and arms transfers.
Economic
relationships DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCE
The extent and standing of a state’s foreign
Influence measures relations; measured in terms of diplomatic networks,
The next four measures — economic involvement in multilateral institutions and clubs,
relationships, defence networks, and overall foreign policy and strategic ambition.
diplomatic influence and cultural influence CULTURAL INFLUENCE
— assess levels of regional influence, The ability to shape international public opinion
lending the Index its geographical focus. through cultural appeal and interaction; measured in
terms of cultural projection, information flows and
people exchanges.
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 42021 RANKINGS
COMPREHENSIVE POWER
Rank 0 25 50 75
1 United States 82.2
2 China 74.6
3 Japan 38.7
4 India 37.7
5 Russia 33.0
6 Australia 30.8
7 South Korea 30.0
8 Singapore 26.2
9 Indonesia +2 19.4
10 Thailand –1 19.2
11 Malaysia –1 18.3
12 Vietnam 18.3
13 New Zealand 17.8
14 Taiwan 16.2 S CO R E T R E N D
15 Pakistan 14.7
Upward
Downward
16 Philippines 13.1
No change
17 North Korea 11.5
18 Brunei +1 9.6
19 Bangladesh –1 9.4 G R E AT E S T G A I N S
United States +0.6
20 Sri Lanka +1 8.6
Brunei + 0.5
21 Myanmar –1 7.4 Sri Lanka +0.3
22 Cambodia 7.1
23 Laos 6.0
24 Mongolia 5.7 G R E AT E S T LO S S E S
Malaysia -2.4
25 Nepal 4.5
Japan -2.4
26 Papua New Guinea 3.7 India -2.0
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 52021 RANKINGS
COMPREHENSIVE POWER
Rank Country / Territory Score Trend†
1 United States 82.2
Super powers ≥ 70 points
2 China 74.6
3 Japan 38.7
4 India 37.7
5 Russia 33.0
6 Australia 30.8
7 South Korea 30.0
8 Singapore 26.2
9 +2 Indonesia 19.4
Middle powers ≥ 10 points
10 –1 Thailand 19.2
11 –1 Malaysia 18.3
12 Vietnam 18.3
13 New Zealand 17.8
14 Taiwan 16.2
15 Pakistan 14.7
16 Philippines 13.1
17 North Korea 11.5
18 +1 Brunei 9.6
G R E AT E S T G A I N S
19 –1 Bangladesh 9.4
United States +0.6
20 +1 Sri Lanka 8.6 G R E AT EST GA
Brunei + I0.5
NS
21 –1 Myanmar 7.4 United
SriStates
Lanka +0.6
+0.3
22 Cambodia 7.1
Brunei + 0.5
Minor powers < 10 points
Sri Lanka +0.3
23 Laos 6.0 –
24 Mongolia 5.7 – G R E AT E S T LO S S E S
Malaysia -2.4
25 Nepal 4.5 –
G R E AT E Japan
S T LO S-2.4
SES
26 Papua New Guinea 3.7 –
Malaysia
India -2.4
-2.0
Japan -2.4
*Trend arrows track annual changes in scores above a minimum absolute change threshold (≥ 0.15)
India -2.0
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 6ANALYSIS OF KEY FINDINGS
The Covid-19 pandemic has driven down the COVID-19: A RACE TO THE BOTTOM
COVID-19: A RACE TO THE BOTTOM
comprehensive power of almost all statesYEAR-ON-YEAR
in POINTS CHANGES
YEAR-ON-YEAR CHANGES ININ COMPREHENSIVE
COMPREHENSIVE POWER POWER
2021, weakening their capacity to respond
to and shape their external environment. Country 2019 2020 2021
For a second consecutive year, eighteen states in the Malaysia 1.2 -2.1 -2.4
region experienced downward shifts in their national Japan -0.3 -1.5 -2.4
resources and international influence.
India -0.1 -1.3 -2.0
No country was untouched by the health and economic Thailand 0.8 0.1 -1.7
impacts of Covid-19 in 2021. As a result, a majority are
Australia -0.2 1.1 -1.6
not performing as well in the Index as they were either a
South Korea 0.0 -1.1 -1.6
year ago or prior to the pandemic. The relative distribution
China 1.4 0.1 -1.5
of power in the Indo-Pacific has changed largely as a
consequence of some countries sustaining greater Myanmar 0.6 -0.2 -1.3
losses in their comprehensive power than others. Singapore -0.2 -0.4 -1.2
The effects of the pandemic on state power are varied New Zealand 1.0 -0.9 -1.2
and will be long running. Covid-19 has tested state Vietnam 1.0 1.3 -1.0
capacity, turned societies and governments inwards, and North Korea 1.3 -1.6 -0.8
weakened the ability of many state actors to shape and Indonesia 0.7 -0.7 -0.5
respond to their external environment. Quite apart from Russia 0.6 -1.8 -0.5
the economic toll exacted by the health crisis, countries
Pakistan -0.1 -0.1 -0.5
sustained losses in diplomatic, cultural and economic
Taiwan -0.5 0.8 -0.5
influence, and even defence diplomacy, as a result of
closed borders and interrupted exchanges. Cambodia 0.7 -0.4 -0.2
Philippines 0.7 -0.4 -0.2
A power contest between increasingly acrimonious
Papua New Guinea 0.0 0.0 0.0
Indo-Pacific players competing by degrees of
underperformance poses a stark contrast to the Laos 0.6 -0.4 0.0
‘race to the top’ that fuelled regional power dynamics Nepal 0.6 -0.2 0.0
prior to the pandemic. In 2019, seventeen countries Mongolia 0.2 -0.5 0.0
registered gains in their Index scores, albeit some Bangladesh 0.6 -0.5 0.2
by greater margins than others, as Asia’s economic
Sri Lanka 0.4 -0.3 0.3
transformation and ‘long peace’ continued to reshape
Brunei 0.2 0.0 0.5
the global distribution of power.
United States 0.0 -3.0 0.6
Furthermore, no single tier of powers distinguished
themselves above the others in 2021. Middle powers
Australia, Taiwan and Vietnam, which were the only
countries to improve on their comprehensive power
in 2020, have each succumbed to the broader regional
downward trend. The one standout exception this year
to the pattern of losses among leading powers in the
Indo-Pacific is the United States.
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 7Analysis of Key Findings
Uneven economic impacts and recoveries from the The United States beat the downward trend in
pandemic will likely continue to alter the regional 2021 and has overtaken China in two critical
balance of power well into the decade. Only Taiwan, rankings. But its gains are dogged by a rapid
loss of economic influence.
the United States and Singapore are now predicted to
have larger economies in 2030 than originally forecast The United States has defied the prevailing regional
prior to the pandemic. Yet richer countries, such as downward trend to register its first annual gain in
Japan, have seen their economic prospects improve comprehensive power in four editions of the Asia Power
not just relative to 2020, but also to economies with Index since 2018. The country that experienced the
lower vaccination rates. China, which avoided a largest drop in comprehensive power in 2020 has in
recession last year, is not far behind. 2021 registered the most substantial — albeit still
modest — upswing in power of any country in the region.
Meanwhile, many developing economies, including India,
An aggregate gain of 0.6 points on the year only begins
have been hardest hit in comparison to their pre-Covid
to make up for a three point loss in overall score in the
growth paths. This has the potential to reinforce bipolarity
initial year of the pandemic. Nevertheless, the turnaround
in the Indo-Pacific, driven by the growing power differential
should challenge the perception, among friends and
of the two superpowers, the United States and China, in
rivals alike, that US power is in steady decline.
relation to nearly every other emerging power in the region.
Notwithstanding the reality of China’s rise, America
remains a highly dynamic superpower. It now tops six of
the Index’s eight measures, up from four in 2020. No other
country exerts greater, more multi-dimensional power.
In addition to maintaining substantial leads in its defence
networks, cultural influence and military capability, the
United States has in 2021 narrowly overtaken Japan and
China in the region for diplomatic influence. In parallel, the
United States has for the first time outranked China in the
Index’s measure of future resources, which is a combined
assessment, based on current trends, of the projected
distribution of economic and military capabilities to
2030 and demographic strength to 2050.
Much of this improvement in US performance is
attributable to a combination of domestic renewal and
international coalition building. The new administration
under President Joe Biden has made significant inroads
into subduing the domestic public health crisis and
spurring the economy. The country is up fractionally for
its resilience in 2021 and by more than three points on
last year in economic capability. Faster than expected
US economic recovery and improved prospects to 2030
have coincided with growing economic and demographic
headwinds in China.
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 8Analysis of Key Findings
The United States has also gained a remarkable 15.5 to the region — twice as many as China. Washington has
points in diplomatic influence this year, albeit starting also sought to broaden the appeal of the Quadrilateral
from a low point set by the former Trump administration. Security Dialogue (Quad) — alongside its partners
After years of Chinese diplomatic momentum on the Australia, India and Japan — with an expanded focus
world stage and US apathy on transnational challenges, on the provision of international public goods, and in
Washington has seized the diplomatic initiative by particular Covid-19 vaccines.
presenting a broad-ranging global agenda on issues
President Biden was judged by the Index’s mid-year
from equitable access to Covid-19 vaccines to
survey of regional experts to be the most effective
development finance and climate action.
Indo-Pacific leader in advancing their country’s national
Despite Washington’s initial vaccine nationalism in interests. America’s diplomatic standing in the region
early 2021, two new indicators in the Index point to a appears not to have been significantly diminished by
concerted push by the United States to make vaccine the subsequent chaotic withdrawal of US troops from
diplomacy a cornerstone of US regional engagement. Afghanistan in August 2021 or, a month later, by the
By October 2021, the United States had donated and diplomatic fallout with France following the surprise
delivered more than 90 million Covid-19 vaccine doses announcement of the AUKUS trilateral pact.
US COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN 2021
DIFF ERE NCE IN US –CHI N A IN DEX S COR E S
US COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN 2021
DIFFERENCE IN US-CHINA SCORES
NET CHANGE IN 2020 DISPARITY TRENDING TOWARDS US ADVANTAGE
5 POWER DISPARITY
2020–2021 2021 DISPARITY TRENDING TOWARDS CHINA ADVANTAGE
2
+60
+50
+40
+30 5 2
+20
3 FUTURE DIPLOMATIC ECONOMIC ECONOMIC
RESOURCES INFLUENCE CAPABILITY RELATIONSHIPS
+10
16
17 4 11
0
DEFENCE CULTURAL MILITARY RESILIENCE
NETWORKS INFLUENCE CAPABILITY
-10
-20
-30
-40
-50
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 9Analysis of Key Findings
Notwithstanding tangible US gains in 2021 and the But it will result in more trade, investment and supply
immediate and long-term benefits of a more competitive chain integration among fifteen Asian partners — first
US economy, the ‘Biden effect’ on the overall standing of among them, China.
the United States in the Indo-Pacific has been reduced
The 2021 Asia Power Index points to a resurgent and
by deep-seated structural challenges in its competition
more competitive America. But just how influential it is in
with China. Improvements relative to China across four
Asia will depend in large part on whether it can step up its
measures of US power have been undermined by US
economic engagement in the region. That will determine
losses elsewhere — notably a drop of 1.9 points in military
too whether America’s modest uptick in comprehensive
capability and a much more significant 10.7-point decline
power in 2021 can deliver ‘situations of strength’ for the
in economic relationships.
superpower or more accurately reflects a short-term
These results point to two concerning trends for the reprieve from an established pattern of relative US decline.
United States. The first is the slow but steady relative
There also continues to exist a danger greater than US
decline in US military primacy in the Indo-Pacific. The
decline for America’s Indo-Pacific partners. The single
second is America’s growing irrelevance in the political
biggest risk to US power remains the polarisation of
economy of Asia. These dual challenges will require
US politics and the threat this poses to the stability of
Washington to strengthen and leverage its regional
its democratic institutions and, ultimately, America’s
networks as a force multiplier for its economic and
commitment and reliability as an ally and partner in
military power. However, as the Quad and AUKUS pact
the Indo-Pacific.
illustrate, America has been more proactive at leveraging
its regional networks in service of its military power than it
has in service of the regional economic balance of power.
The US–China disparity in economic relationships has
been a chronic weakness for the United States over many
years. But the rate of deterioration in America’s economic
clout should alarm US decision-makers. China’s market
size and proximity to its Asian neighbours is difficult
for the United States to match. However, obstacles to a
more consequential multilateral hedge against China’s
asymmetric economic power lie chiefly with the anti-
trade tilt in US politics. It remains to be seen whether
a forthcoming US ‘economic framework for the Indo-
Pacific’ can overcome domestic US opposition on trade
and offer the region anything of substance.
In the meantime, alternative models for a rules-based
regional trade environment are well underway. The
ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP), for instance, will enter into force in
January 2022. Unlike the Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), RCEP
has low or no commitments on labour, the environment,
intellectual property and state-owned enterprises.
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 10Analysis of Key Findings
UNITED STATES — CHINA
China’s comprehensive power has fallen for UNITED STATES – CHINA
COMPREHENSIVE POWER IN 2021
the first time, with no clear path to undisputed COMPREHENSIVE POWER IN 2021
primacy in the Indo-Pacific.
o m i c C a pa b i l i t y
Ec o n
China’s comprehensive power has dropped for the first 100
Mi
n ce lit
ue ar
time in four editions of the Asia Power Index, as the fl y
C
In 80
country lost ground in half of the Index’s measures of
ap
l
ra
ab
ltu
power in 2021 — from diplomatic and cultural influence 60
ili
Cu
ty
to economic capability and future resources. This
40
contrasts with the year before when Beijing emerged
c e N et wo r k s
diplomatically diminished from the pandemic but was 20
Re si lie nce
holding ground in overall power, and to 2019 when it
netted the highest gains in the region.
Defen
Yet a loss of 1.5 points in 2021 has not substantially
undermined China’s power differential over the rest of the
region, given that lower ranked countries are also less
Ec
on
powerful than they were prior to the pandemic. Nor is
es
om
rc
ou
ic
China necessarily at risk of losing its superpower status, el
es
R
R
at
io e
ur
with top-two placements in all but two of the measure ns
hip Fu
t
s
rankings. However, in a contested strategic environment, Diplo
matic Influence
China’s rise relative to the United States is more fragile than
many may believe, including those in the one-party state. China
China
United States
United States
The results emphasise the narrow but deep foundations
on which China’s power is built. The country is virtually
on par with the United States for its economic capability deployed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to intimidate
but is vastly ahead in terms of its regional economic Taiwan, jostle with India along its disputed Himalayan
relationships. Trade volumes between China and the border, press its sovereignty claims against Japan in
region are nearly three times that between the United the East China Sea, and exert extra-legal control over
States and the region. China has also become the primary international waters and airspace in the South China Sea.
foreign investor in as many countries in the Indo-Pacific As Beijing downsizes and professionalises the PLA’s
as Japan and the United States combined. The ability to armed forces, it has expanded the country’s nuclear
physically connect and shape the choices of countries deterrent and developed advanced weapons that can
through economic interdependencies forms the bedrock threaten US and allied bases in the region, as well as
of Chinese comprehensive power, just as US defence the US mainland. The net result is that, although China’s
partnerships are the mainstay of US military power. score for overall military capability is unchanged from
Beijing will likely remain a formidable US adversary on last year, it has gained ground on the United States in
this basis alone. 2021 by narrowing the gap in the Index’s sub-measure
Yet Beijing does not only depend on economic statecraft for signature capabilities. Credible reports of a test in
to advance its objectives. It has also made good use of its July 2021 of a new hypersonic Chinese missile that
increasing military strength, backed by defence spending circled the globe via the South Pole, releasing another
now 50 per cent larger than the combined outlays of India, missile on board before detonating close to its intended
Japan, Taiwan and all ten ASEAN countries. Beijing has target, corroborate this trend.
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 11Analysis of Key Findings
China’s largest gain in 2021 was in the Index’s resilience China’s economy at market exchange rates will still
measure, which assesses the capacity of a country to likely overtake that of the United States. But there are
deter external threats to state stability. The world’s largest inherent limits on the speed at which China can continue
trading nation is becoming less dependent on its leading to grow beyond 2030. Significant domestic challenges
trade partners — the European Union and the United await in coming decades. Few policy levers exist to
States — as it shifts to a domestic consumption model. turn around the decline in its working-age population;
However, with the onset of Covid-19, an emphasis on productivity growth is slowing; and China’s investment-
economic self-sufficiency and geoeconomic security has heavy approach for driving the economy will produce
become part of a much broader inward turn. This shift diminishing returns over time.
has hurt China’s relative advantages elsewhere.
On current trends, Beijing is now less likely to pull ahead
In 2019, for instance, China benefited from more arrivals of its peer competitor in comprehensive power by the end
of non-resident visitors from the region than any other of the decade. Importantly, this change suggests that
country, including business travellers, tourists and there is nothing inevitable about China’s rise in the world.
students. But in response to the pandemic, China has Shifts in the relative standing of both America and China
installed one of the world’s strictest systems of border in various elements of power, including military spending,
control and quarantine. This has significantly disrupted are possible and indeed already emerging as policy
international travel to and from China with a pronounced directions and circumstances change. Across the range
knock-on effect on people-to-people links with the region of feasible outcomes, however, it appears unlikely China
— a key driver in the country’s cultural influence. will ever be as dominant as the United States once was.
China’s inward turn appears also to have depressed
its diplomatic influence. Beijing’s pole position in that
measure has been very narrowly overtaken by the
United States in 2021. Despite a frenetic pace of regional
diplomatic activity by senior Beijing officials, President Xi
Jinping himself has not left the country for almost two
years. His leadership on the international stage this year
was outranked in the Index’s regional expert survey by the
leaders of the United States, Russia and even Singapore.
Nowhere has China lost more ground than in the future
resources measure. A growing burden of structural
weaknesses weighs on the country’s prospects. These
include a rapidly ageing population; water scarcity in
stretches of the country, and vulnerability to flooding
in others; a heavy debt load; and a political system that
spends more on projecting power inwards, on internal
security challenges, than it does on projecting it outwards,
on military expenditure.
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 12Analysis of Key Findings
TOP 5 MIDDLE POWERS
The region has become more bipolar and TOP 5 MIDDLE POWERS
AS A PERCENTAGE OF CHINA'S POWER (2018–21)
less multipolar: Japan and India are lagging AS A PERCENTAGE OF CHINA’S POWER (2018–21)
behind China, and Australia is more reliant
on the United States.
The pandemic has made the region more bipolar and less 55%
multipolar. Despite China’s lagging power differential with
the United States, there has been no diffusion of power Japan
away from the top two players to the next tier of regional India
50%
powers. In fact, the two countries with the most potential
to contribute to a regional multipolar order — Japan
and India — have each lost more ground in 2021 than
did China. Separated by oceans and vast demographic 45%
differences representing old and young Asia, Japan and Russia
India have nonetheless registered similar rates of decline
since 2018. Tokyo and New Delhi now both fall just short Australia
of the major power threshold of 40 points in the Index. 40% South Korea
Their loss of standing relative to China has been more 2018 2019 2020 2021
pronounced and continuous than is the case for other
middle powers such as Australia.
Japan continues to wield more influence in the region By the end of the decade, it will only reach 40 per cent of
relative to its available resources than any other country. China’s economic output on current trends. India also lags
This quintessential smart power has gained several in economic diplomacy, dropping one place to finish eighth
points in defence networks as the lead defence dialogue behind Thailand in the economic relationships measure.
partner for eleven countries. However, Japan is down on By comparison, sixth-ranked Australia has weathered
all other measures of power in 2021 and its margins of China’s growing power better than most US partners
influence are being eroded. In particular, Tokyo has lost over the course of the last several years. A loss of 1.6
several points and one ranking for diplomatic influence points in its overall score in 2021, after gaining ground
in the year following former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s last year, means the country’s overall standing is now
resignation. The country has also struggled to sustain approximately back to its pre-pandemic level. Despite
its once formidable regional economic clout, with a loss coming under sustained trade sanctions by its primary
of 7.2 points in economic relationships in 2021. This trade partner, Australia has improved its resilience in 2021.
reflects a relative loss in standing in comparison with The damage wrought by Chinese trade restrictions has
China’s foreign investment inroads into countries been largely offset by untouched iron ore exports to China
across the region. and trade diversion in other sectors.
Whereas Japan is an overachiever, albeit in long-term Australia has responded to a more adversarial relationship
decline, India is an underachiever relative to both its with China by taking significant steps towards greater
resources and potential. India’s rise as a truly multipolar integrated deterrence with its longstanding ally, the United
power — able to match China’s military and economic States. A new AUKUS trilateral pact, which includes the
capabilities — will take a decades-long effort, with no United Kingdom, creates the bedrock for a future fleet
guarantee of success. The country has boosted its of Australian nuclear-propelled submarines that will
resilience and military capability in 2021, yet the world’s eventually allow the country to project power at long
third largest economy has also been one of the hardest hit range into key theatres of the Indo-Pacific. Nonetheless,
in comparison to its growth path prior to the pandemic. Australia is trending down on military capability and,
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 13Analysis of Key Findings
paradoxically, has lost 2.7 points in its regional defence US partners are enhancing their collective
networks in 2021. The first development highlights the deterrence to support a military balance.
fact that the nuclear-powered boats will not arrive for Yet Asia’s deepening security dilemma
presents a significant risk of war.
perhaps two decades, during which time Australia’s
signature military capabilities will remain limited and its The result of greater bipolarity is that US allies, such as
navy reliant on an existing fleet of ageing conventional Australia and Japan, and even key balancing powers,
submarines. The second is a reminder that the trilateral such as India, have never been more dependent on
pact marks a deepening rather than a widening of American capacity and willingness to sustain a military
Australia’s defence partnerships. Though still ranked and strategic counterweight in response to China’s rise.
second for its defence networks behind only the United Likewise, Washington has recognised that it will not be
States, the pace of Australia’s regional defence diplomacy able to do this by itself. That will require the commitment
with non-allies was disrupted by the country’s pandemic- of allied and non-allied US partners to collectively deter
related border closures. China from altering the status quo in the Indo-Pacific
through the use of military force. This approach offers
the United States the best hope of upholding a military
balance in its favour despite the declining margin of US
military superiority in the region.
To this end, the United States has sought to augment
its longstanding bilateral alliances with new flexible
coalitions that are broadly US aligned, but not exclusively
US driven. The Quad, for example, encourages greater
cross-bracing between the United States, its allies
Australia and Japan, and non-allied India. AUKUS is
designed to bolster the sovereign capabilities of a
key ally, Australia, with a fleet of nuclear-propelled
submarines, which could in time contribute to US
efforts to deter China or confront it militarily.
On current trends, China’s military expenditure is still
forecast to lag US defence spending by a substantial
margin until at least the end of the decade. But Beijing
can more easily concentrate its expanding military
assets in key theatres in its near abroad. Washington’s
push to dispense with second-order priorities elsewhere
in the world, most notably the conflict in Afghanistan, is
a tangible sign that it is having to adapt its global military
posture in response.
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 14Analysis of Key Findings
2030 FORECAST MILITARY SPENDING
2030 FORECAST MILITARY SPENDING
MILITARY EXPENDITURE FORECAST BASED ON CURRENT TR E NDS
Vaccine diplomacy is the new currency of
AT ESTIM
MILITARY ATED DEFENCE
EXPENDITURE SECTOR BASED
FORECAST PURCHON
ASING POWERTRENDS
CURRENT PARITY geopolitics, and the United States leads
AT AN ESTIMATED DEFENCE SECTOR PURCHASING POWER PARITY the field.
UNITED STATES
$ 932.3 Bn
There is a striking disjunction between the traditional
security risks centred in Asia, and the fact that in 2021
the region was far more affected by the non-traditional
security threat of pandemic disease. The overriding
concern of virtually every government has been to
minimise the public health impacts and economic burden
of the pandemic, and the ability to procure and administer
Covid-19 vaccines was crucial to determining their success.
QUAD
(excl. US)
$ 291.0 Bn
COVID-19 VACCINE DOSES
CHINA
DELIVERED IN THE REGION
$ 559.0 Bn
TOTAL DONATIONS (TOP 5)
OTHERS
$ 134.2 Bn
United States 91.91M
ASEAN
$ 136.2 Bn CHINA-FRIENDLY China 38.96M
$ 185.7 Bn
Japan 24.56M
Asean countries Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, India 6.75M
Philipines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
ASEAN countries Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
Quad countries
Quad countries
Australia, India, Japan, United States
Australia, India, Japan, United States Australia 3.15M
“China-friendly”
“China-friendly” Russia,
Russia, North North
Korea, Korea, Pakistan
Pakistan
0M 20M 40M 60M 80M 100M
Meanwhile, Beijing has sought to disincentivise Southeast
Asian countries from joining a US balancing coalition and DONATIONS PER CAPITA (TOP 5)
has upgraded its military exchanges and joint exercises
United States 0.28
with countries including Russia and Pakistan. These
strategic partnerships are still a far cry from the US Japan 0.19
alliance network, which involves extensive troop-basing New Zealand 0.17
agreements and joint operability and military capabilities.
Australia 0.12
Nevertheless, Russia, Pakistan and China’s only mutual
defence ally, North Korea, form a formidable trio of Singapore 0.06
China-aligned nuclear-armed powers in the region. 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Whether the emerging balance of military power in the
As a result, vaccine diplomacy has emerged as a key
Indo-Pacific contributes to deterrence and strategic
conduit of foreign policy as captured in two new indicators
stability is an open question. The depth of hostilities in
of diplomatic influence — aggregate Covid-19 vaccine
the region, the breadth of US–China competition, and the
donations to the region, and donations per capita as a
presence of multiple potential flashpoints, with Taiwan
measure of the generosity of donor countries. The
being the most immediate concern, mean the risk of war
United States has led on both counts. By October 2021,
involving two or more parties, or even more than one
the country had donated and delivered more than 90
theatre, is significant. Moreover, the system of safeguards
million vaccine doses to the region — twice as many as
that kept the original Cold War from becoming hot in
China, the next largest donor in aggregate terms — and
Europe is still largely absent in the Indo-Pacific.
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 15Analysis of Key Findings
had been more generous on a per capita basis than any CONTRIBUTIONS TO GLOBAL RESPONSES
other donor in the Indo-Pacific. China, Japan and India TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC IN 2021
have also been active in donating Covid-19 vaccines to TOP 10 COUNTRIES BY SURVEY RESULT, 0-100
Asia, while New Zealand and Australia have been relatively
generous after accounting for their population size. New Zealand 100
Both commercial sales and donations of Covid-19 Taiwan 99
vaccines lead to immediate, tangible and crucial benefits United States 88
for recipient countries. However, donations resulted in
Japan 81
greater reputational gains in the region than commercial
contracts to supply vaccine doses. China, for example, Singapore 79
was ranked just eighteenth of the 26 countries in the South Korea 68
Index’s regional expert survey for its contribution
Australia 59
towards global efforts to end the pandemic, despite
being the second largest vaccine donor in the region. Vietnam 57
The commercial nature of the majority of China’s bilateral Brunei 54
vaccine deals, and the fact that China’s vaccines are 53
India
generally less effective than leading alternatives, appear
to have overshadowed its soft power push and failed to
translate into substantial goodwill in recipient countries. Elsewhere in the region, Singapore’s rapid progress in
vaccinating its domestic population drove a marked
Meanwhile, the generosity of countries such as New
swing upwards in its international reputation for managing
Zealand, the United States, Japan and Singapore in
the pandemic. Conversely, any recognition of India’s
donating vaccine doses, and Taiwan in providing masks,
significant role in global vaccine manufacturing appears
correlated with more positive survey results, indicating
to have been offset by poor perceptions of the country’s
that there are geopolitical as well as humanitarian payoffs
handling of the major Delta outbreak, which peaked in
for countries that deliver medical supplies to the region
May 2021. Australia’s prolonged border closures similarly
primarily through the form of donations.
weighed heavily on external views of the country, despite
Yet vaccine diplomacy has not been the sole driver of its relative generosity in vaccine diplomacy.
shifts in reputation. Among regional actors, the United
States and China dominated the race for the development
of the first successful Covid-19 vaccines. Few other
countries possessed the technology and innovative
capacity to develop and manufacture vaccines at record
speed. As confirmed by a separate Index survey question,
these successes translated into significant reputational
boosts for the superpowers with respect to their ability to
manage the pandemic. Russia also improved its standing
on this measure, reflecting its early mover’s advantage
in developing and manufacturing its indigenous Covid-19
vaccine technology.
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 16Analysis of Key Findings
Indonesia makes it into the top ten, but Taiwan 7.2%
Southeast Asian middle powers are struggling
United States 3.0%
to maintain their collective clout or sustain the 2030 GDP FORECAST
diplomatic narrative. ADJUSTMENT Singapore 0.6%
ADJUSTMENTS IN -0.5% Japan
Developing countries often register influence shortfalls, POST-PANDEMIC GDP
reflecting their unrealised power potential and internal -0.6% Nepal
FORECASTS FOR 2030 (%)
constraints on their ability to project power abroad. -1.2% Vietnam
Indonesia, the most populous nation and largest economy ASEAN countries -2.3% New Zealand
in Southeast Asia, is a prime case in point. Despite ranking -2.5% South Korea
fifth just behind Japan in the Index’s future resources -3.0% Russia
measure, the country languishes in eleventh place for -3.3% Australia
its economic capability and is ranked thirteenth, behind
-3.4% China
both Vietnam and Singapore — a city-state just a fraction
-5.3% Mongolia
of Indonesia’s size — for its military capability.
-5.8% Pakistan
However, Indonesia has for the first time reached a -6.4% Bangladesh
top-ten placement in the Index’s overall power rankings.
-6.9% Indonesia
Despite losing 0.5 points in its comprehensive power
-7.1% Brunei
in 2021, other large Southeast Asian counterparts,
-7.2% Malaysia
including Malaysia and Thailand, sustained losses of
even greater margins. Jakarta is also up two rankings -9.1% PNG
in diplomatic influence, and now outranks Singapore as -9.5% Thailand
the most diplomatically influential player in Southeast -11.0% India
Asia. President Joko Widodo has cemented his position -11.1% Sri Lanka
as a leading statesman on the regional stage. -12.4% Cambodia
Indonesia’s economic fundamentals and prospects have -15.5% Philippines
also been marginally less affected by the pandemic than -18.9% Laos
many other developing Southeast Asian countries, despite -39.5% Myanmar
the nation being one of the hardest hit by the global health
crisis in 2021. In fact, Indonesia is currently forecast to
benefit from the second highest average annual growth However, there are few signs Jakarta will be willing to
rates in the ASEAN bloc in the period since the start of openly align itself with a US-centred balancing coalition
the pandemic to the middle of this decade (2020–25) — — either now or in the future. To the contrary, Jakarta’s
behind only Vietnam. Although there exist key differences reaction to the AUKUS announcement in September
between their political systems, Vietnam and Indonesia 2021 exposed clear differences between Indonesia
share a high degree of institutional stability. This is in and Australia in this regard.
stark contrast to Myanmar, for example, where political Southeast Asian middle powers are inclined to hedge
instability and the pandemic have combined to exact a between the superpowers to manage competing
very significant toll on the country. influences. This is as true of US treaty allies Thailand and
Major allies and partners of the United States hope that the Philippines, both of which have become more China-
as Indonesia grows powerful it will eventually assimilate friendly, as it is of communist Vietnam, whose embrace
anxieties about China’s role in the region and become a of Washington has not ended longstanding party-to-
net contributor to a broader Indo-Pacific balance of power. party ties with Beijing. Furthermore, most countries in
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 17Analysis of Key Findings
Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, lack the military Southeast Asian grouping. AUKUS has raised further
capability required to confront China much outside of their concerns that Southeast Asian powers may become
sovereign jurisdictions, and often even from within them. bystanders to geopolitical changes driven largely by more
powerful outsiders.
ASEAN countries, as a result, are neither suited nor
inclined to participating in a classical concert of powers in Whether or not ASEAN — which as an organisation
the Indo-Pacific. However, their ability to navigate between remains much less than the sum of its parts — can steer
the United States and China by not choosing sides also a path through a more bipolar Indo-Pacific, and retain
faces growing challenges. relevance and cohesion as a broad-based, non-aligned
grouping will depend largely on the capacity of its largest
Power politics and internal weakness have steadily eroded
member state, Indonesia, to exercise leadership and
the ability of ASEAN to uphold a degree of regional order
project power within it and through it.
capable of tying both superpowers to the region. This
has contributed to a rise in ‘minilateral’ coalition building
and the steady decline in the multilateral influence of the
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 18MEASURES OF POWER
ECONOMIC CAPABILITY RESILIENCE
Rank 0 25 50 75 Rank 0 25 50 75
1 China 91.2 1 United States 86.9
2 United States 90.7 2 Russia 79.5
3 Japan 31.9 3 China 74.4
4 India 24.0 4 India 56.2
5 South Korea 18.6 5 Australia 47.9
6 Russia 16.2 6 New Zealand 44.7
7 Singapore 15.5 7 South Korea +2 37.6
8 Taiwan 14.2 8 Malaysia 37.3
9 Australia 12.9 9 Japan -2 37.2
10 Thailand +2 9.0 10 Indonesia 36.8
MILITARY CAPABILITY FUTURE RESOURCES
Rank 0 25 50 75 Rank 0 25 50 75
1 United States 91.7 1 United States +1 80.5
2 China 66.8 2 China -1 75.2
3 Russia 51.6 3 India 48.7
4 India 44.9 4 Russia 18.1
5 South Korea 31.7 5 Indonesia 11.6
6 North Korea 27.3 6 Japan 11.5
7 Japan 26.2 7 South Korea +1 10.6
8 Australia 25.6 8 Pakistan -1 10.4
9 Pakistan 25.3 9 Australia 10.2
10 Singapore 23.9 10 Vietnam 7.2
S CO R E T R E N D Upward Downward No change
* Score trends reflect annual changes in measure scores above a minimum threshold (≥ 0.5)
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 19Measures of Power
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCE
Rank 0 25 50 75 Rank 0 25 50 75
1 China 99.0 1 United States +2 90.4
2 United States 51.1 2 China -1 89.8
3 Japan 40.3 3 Japan -1 84.5
4 Singapore 27.8 4 Russia +2 63.7
5 South Korea 22.3 5 India -1 63.5
6 Australia 19.8 6 South Korea -1 60.1
7 Thailand +1 18.8 7 Australia 55.4
8 India -1 18.6 8 Indonesia +2 54.0
9 Malaysia 18.1 9 Singapore -1 53.4
10 Vietnam 14.8 10 Vietnam -1 48.6
DEFENCE NETWORKS CULTURAL INFLUENCE
Rank 0 25 50 75 Rank 0 25 50 75
1 United States 83.4 1 United States 85.0
2 Australia 67.6 2 China 57.7
3 Japan 48.1 3 Japan 43.5
4 South Korea 44.5 4 India 35.8
5 Singapore 35.0 5 Australia 30.0
6 New Zealand 32.3 6 Thailand +2 28.0
7 India 24.1 7 South Korea 26.0
8 China 24.1 8 Malaysia -2 25.8
9 Philippines +1 21.5 9 Singapore 22.8
10 Russia +1 20.6 10 Russia 18.0
S CO R E T R E N D Upward Downward No change
* Score trends reflect annual changes in measure scores above a minimum threshold (≥ 0.5)
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 20Measures of Power
A country’s comprehensive power is calculated as a weighted average across eight measures of power, each of which
aggregates data from three to five distinct sub-measures.
The Index’s measures and sub-measures seek to capture the diverse qualities that enable countries to pursue
favourable geopolitical outcomes, as well as to shape and respond to their external environment.
ECONOMIC CAPABILITY MILITARY CAPABILITY
Core economic strength and the attributes of an Conventional military strength; measured in
economy with the most geopolitical relevance; terms of defence spending, armed forces and
measured in terms of GDP at purchasing power organisation, weapons and platforms, signature
parity (PPP), international leverage, technological capabilities and Asian military posture.
sophistication and global connectivity.
Defence spending: Annual spending on military
Size: The economic weight of a country as
forces and activities. This sub-measure looks at
reflected by its GDP, which is the total value of all current resources devoted to maintaining, renewing,
final goods and services produced annually within replacing and expanding military capability, measured
an economy. Purchasing power parity exchange in terms of military expenditure at market exchange
rates are used to allow for a reliable comparison of rates and estimated defence-sector PPP rates.
real levels of production between countries.
Armed forces: Total active military and
International leverage: Resources that give
paramilitary forces, readiness and organisation.
governments enhanced financial, legal and This sub-measure is principally focused on the size
sanctioning powers abroad. These include global of armed forces, but also takes account of their
corporations and internationalised currencies, combat experience, training and preparedness, as
as well as sovereign wealth funds, export credit well as command and control structures.
agencies and official reserves.
Weapons and platforms: A country’s stock
Technology: The technological and scientific
of land, maritime and air warfare assets and
sophistication of countries. This is measured capabilities. This sub-measure consists of a
through indicators such as labour productivity, number of proxy indicators for capability across
high-tech exports, supercomputers, renewable the three domains and assesses the sophistication
energy generation and input variables including of weapons and platforms.
R&D spending.
Signature capabilities: Military capabilities
Connectivity: The capital flows and physical
that confer significant or asymmetric tactical and
means by which countries connect to and shape strategic advantages in warfare. These include
the global economy, including through international ballistic missile capabilities, long-range maritime
trade, global inward and outward investment flows, force projection, intelligence networks, and
merchant fleets and international aviation hubs. defensive and offensive cyber capabilities.
Asian military posture: The ability of armed
forces to deploy rapidly and for a sustained period
in the event of an interstate conflict in Asia. This
sub-measure consists of qualitative expert-based
judgements of a country’s ability to engage in either
a maritime or continental military confrontation in
the region.
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 21Measures of Power
RESILIENCE FUTURE RESOURCES
The capacity to deter real or potential external The projected distribution of future resources and
threats to state stability; measured in terms of capabilities, which play into perceptions of power
internal institutional stability, resource security, today; measured in terms of estimated economic,
geoeconomic security, geopolitical security and defence and broad resources in 2030, as well as
nuclear deterrence. working-age population forecasts for 2050.
Internal stability: Institutional and environmental Economic resources 2030: Future economic
factors that enhance domestic governance and size and capabilities. This is measured by forecast
provide protection from external interference in GDP at purchasing power parity in 2030 and the
internal affairs. This sub-measure includes indicators Beckley formula for estimating economic power;
assessing government effectiveness, political multiplying forecast GDP by forecast GDP
stability, climate change resilience, the absence of per capita.
internal conflict and the ability of governments to Defence resources 2030: Future defence
procure and administer Covid-19 vaccinations.
spending and military capability enhancements.
Resource security: Secure access to energy and This sub-measure consists of two indicators. The
other critical resources essential to the functioning first looks at forecasts of absolute levels of military
of a country’s economy. This sub-measure looks expenditure in 2030, holding the current ratio of
at dependency on energy imports, energy self- defence spending to GDP constant. The second
sufficiency levels, refined fuel security and the looks at expected gains in military expenditure as
supply of rare-earth metals. a proxy for investments in military capability above
Geoeconomic security: The ability to defend replacement levels.
against other states’ economic actions on a Broad resources 2030: Estimated score for a
country’s geopolitical interests and economic country’s broad resources and capabilities in 2030.
activity. This sub-measure looks at an economy’s This sub-measure estimates broad resources in
diversity of export markets and products, as well as 2030, based on every country’s current ratio of
its levels of dependency on primary trade partners GDP and military expenditure to their aggregate
and global trade. score for economic resources, military capability
Geopolitical security: Structural and political and resilience.
factors that minimise the risk of interstate conflict Demographic resources 2050: Demographic
and enhance a country’s territorial security. This variables that are expected to contribute to future
sub-measure includes indicators such as population GDP beyond 2030. This sub-measure consists of
size relative to neighbours and geographic a forecast of the working-age population (15–64)
deterrence based on landmass, as well as active in 2050 as well as the expected labour dividend
border disputes and legacies of interstate conflicts from gains in the working-age population adjusted
with neighbours. for quality of the workforce and climate change
Nuclear deterrence: Strategic, theatre and resilience.
tactical nuclear forces that can be used to deter
potential aggressors by threatening a retaliatory
nuclear strike. This sub-measure assesses nuclear
weapons range, ground-based nuclear missile
launchers and nuclear second-strike capabilities.
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 22Measures of Power
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS DEFENCE NETWORKS
The capacity to exercise influence and leverage Defence partnerships that act as force multipliers
through economic interdependencies; measured of autonomous military capability; measured
in terms of trade relations, investment ties and through assessments of alliances, regional
economic diplomacy. defence diplomacy and arms transfers.
Regional trade relations: The ability to Regional alliance network: Number, depth
influence other countries through bilateral trade and combined strength of defence alliances in
flows and relative dependencies. This sub-measure the region. This is measured in terms of codified
focuses on an economy’s relative importance as security guarantees, military personnel deployed
an importer, exporter and primary trade partner in Index countries, joint military training exercises,
for other countries, based on annual bilateral arms procurements from allied partners and
trade flows. combined operation years with allies.
Regional investment ties: The ability to Regional defence diplomacy: Diversity and
influence other countries through foreign direct depth of defence diplomacy in the region. This
investment flows and relative dependencies. This sub-measure assesses defence dialogues, defence
sub-measure focuses on an economy’s relative consultation pacts, foreign deployments between
importance as a source and destination of foreign non-allied defence partners, joint military training
investment for other countries, based on ten-year exercises, combined operation years and arms
cumulative flows of foreign capital investment. procurements from non-allied countries.
Economic diplomacy: The use of economic Global defence partnerships: Arms trade
instruments to pursue collaborative interests and patterns indicative of global security partnerships
beneficial geopolitical outcomes. This sub-measure and collaboration across defence industries,
tracks economic diplomacy through free trade measured in terms of annual arms trade flows
agreements and outward foreign assistance flows. and number of arms export recipients over a
five-year period.
LOWY INSTITUTE ASIA POWER INDEX 2021 23Measures of Power
DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCE CULTURAL INFLUENCE
The extent and standing of a state’s or territory’s The ability to shape international public opinion
foreign relations; measured in terms of diplomatic through cultural appeal and interaction; measured
networks, involvement in multilateral institutions in terms of cultural projection, information flows
and clubs, and overall foreign policy and strategic and people exchanges.
ambition. Cultural projection: Cultural influences and
Diplomatic network: The regional and global exports that help to enhance a country’s reputation
reach of a country’s diplomatic offices, measured abroad. This sub-measure looks at online search
in terms of total number of embassies, high trends in the region, exports of cultural services,
commissions, permanent missions and other global brands, and the international status of a
representative offices. country’s passports, cities and heritage sites.
Multilateral power: A country’s participation Information flows: The regional appeal of a
and diplomatic clout in multilateral forums. This country’s media outlets and universities. This
sub-measure examines membership in select sub-measure looks at the online search trends in
summits, diplomatic clubs and intergovernmental the region for selected national news agencies,
organisations, as well as financial contributions newspapers, television and radio broadcasters, as
to the United Nations and development banks, well as the number of inbound international students
and voting alignment with other countries in from the region enrolled in tertiary education.
UN resolutions. People exchanges: The depth and influence of a
Foreign policy: The ability of government country’s people-to-people links in the region. This
leaders and foreign policy bureaucracies to sub-measure tracks the size of regional diasporas,
advance their country’s diplomatic interests. and the attractiveness of countries as travel and
This sub-measure aggregates qualitative expert- emigration destinations.
based judgements of how effectively leaders
pursue their country’s diplomatic interests, their
demonstrated level of strategic ambition, and
the wider efficacy of a country’s foreign policy
bureaucracy. The sub-measure includes temporary
indicators measuring vaccine donations to the
region and perceptions of how countries have
handled the Covid-19 pandemic in 2021.
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