London Underground and the PPP - The first year 2003/04 - Transport for London
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Transport for London
London Underground
and the PPP
The first year
2003/04
As at financial year end 2003/04
Issue date: June 2004
MAYOR OF LONDONLondon Underground and the PPP The first year 2003/04 Contents 1. Foreword 2 2. Background and overview 8 3. PPP contractual performance 9 4. PPP financial performance 20 5. Asset performance 22 6. Asset management 37 7. Safety performance 39 8. Relations with the PPP Arbiter 42 9. Underground operations 43 10. Conclusion 54
2 Transport
Transportfor
forLondon
London
1. Foreword
In April 2003, London Underground Infracos based upon actual system
completed the transfer of the performance, and the efficacy of this
responsibility for the care, maintenance quite experimental system is unproven
and renewal of its assets - its rolling in the world of urban rail transport.
stock, stations, track and signals - to the Second, many of the promised
private sector through a Public Private improvements of PPP - including the line
Partnership. This past financial year, upgrades intended to increase capacity -
concluding on March 31, 2004, marks are not intended to be delivered until
the first full year of London after the end of the first 7.5 years of the
Underground and Infraco performance contract, and PPP scope, pricing and
under this ‘PPP’. This report is a review funding could all be subject to significant
of that performance. renegotiation at that point. Finally, the
Government imposed significant
The one observation with which affordability constraints when previous
everyone would agree is that London management negotiated the details of
Underground suffers from a range of the PPP, with the result that the bidders
deep-seated problems resulting from pushed out promised improvements
decades of under-investment. This from the first 7.5 year period to the
under-investment produced persistent second and from the second to the
asset failures that, in turn, led to an third. There is no committed funding for
acceptance of inadequate performance. the periods beyond the first 7.5 years.
Management grew to accept doing more Even if the PPP is fully implemented as
with less while perfecting the art of intended, existing assets will not be fully
apology and passengers’ expectations restored to a state of good repair until
were driven down. the year 2025.
PPP. After much debate and dispute, the For current users of the Tube that is an
Government adopted the PPP as its unacceptable eternity. And for future
antidote to this spiral of inadequate passengers, the capacity increase
investment. Over the first 7.5 years of promised by the PPP must be
this 30-year arrangement, billions of substantially accelerated if the London
pounds will be paid to three private Plan forecasts of 800,000 more
sector companies, Tube Lines Ltd., Londoners and 630,000 additional jobs
Metronet BCV Ltd. and Metronet SSL by 2016 are to be realised.
Ltd. (the ‘Infracos’). This investment was
intended to be in exchange for the Current management of London
restoration and upgrade of the Underground took charge in July 2003
Underground’s assets. when control of the Underground
transferred to the Mayor of London and
It remains to be seen whether the scope became part of Transport for London.
of improvements promised by the PPP We have had less than a year to observe
will prove real or ephemeral. This is a the performance of the Infracos under
function of several interrelated factors. private ownership and their relationship
to the operations of the remaining
First, the scope of work of the PPP is publicly-controlled portions of the
primarily driven by financial incentives system.
intended to reward or penalise theLondon Underground 2003/04 3
Over the past year, £1.1 billion was paid Future reports will benefit from our joint
to these companies. During that same efforts with Tube Lines and Metronet to
year, the Underground’s assets establish an asset register and a capital
continued to provide dramatic programme reporting system. These new
demonstrations of their inadequacy: data systems will measure the
● Central Line fleet withdrawn for 8 effectiveness of maintenance regimes
weeks following the 25 January 2003 and the performance against schedule
Chancery Lane derailment with and budget of planned capital
continuing effects on services programmes. Improved information will
● Inability to cope with excessive heat provide a common understanding of
in August exacerbated discomfort of performance and will assist the parties
passengers to the PPP in focussing on and tackling
● Power outage on August 28 revealed
problems.
shortcomings of communications
network and signalling and control Improved maintenance practices and
resulting reliability improvements should
systems
be observable in the short term. Tube
● Hammersmith and Camden Town
Lines and Metronet have predicted
derailments
reductions in failures within different
● Continuing track, signalling and rolling
asset categories of between 15 and 49
stock failures at a rate not per cent over the first 7.5 years. We
demonstrably different from pre-PPP intend to do everything in our power to
performance years. hold them to these predictions. Under
the renewals programme, the PPP must
It is clear that the failure of historically
deliver major asset upgrades in the form
neglected, long-lived assets is
of new trains, signalling systems and
continuing. It is impossible to determine
rebuilt track structure, which will permit
at this early point, however, in what way
a step change in performance. Many of
this continuing failure may be tied to the
these major upgrades are years away, but
structure of the PPP. One cannot as yet
their delivery – as well as the overall
clearly distinguish between the
success of the PPP – is dependent on
performance lag in programmes that are
the Infracos’ proper execution of current
just being implemented, teething
design and planning activities. These too
problems, structural problems and
will be monitored vigorously.
genuine performance issues. We have
attempted, therefore, to ground this
In some respects, the parties to the PPP
report on a presentation of data that will
contract are working co-operatively and
form a baseline to judge future
are demonstrating a willingness to
performance. We set forth performance
consider joint solutions to management
under the contractual and financial
problems. Certain joint initiatives have
measures, as well as Infraco
shown early promise, such as the anti-
performance with regard to planning,
graffiti programme. The Underground
reporting and asset failures for the key
agreed with the Infracos to attack the
asset classes. We have added
paint on trains as a symbolic first step in
commentary within each asset class to
demonstrating a greater concern for the
provide a context for the data.
Underground’s assets and the travelling
environment for passengers. All fleets4 Transport for London
on the Underground are now being reduced the scope of the work
cleaned and new graffiti is removed performed. Many track renewal projects
within 24 hours. Metronet particularly done so far have achieved 50-60% of
has demonstrated effective management what should have been delivered.
in cleaning the fleet most defaced by Because of the modest amount of
graffiti, the sub-surface fleet. Metronet renewal work that was scheduled over
has also introduced new management this first year, this shortfall can be
teams to improve the performance of recovered, but this early pattern cannot
rolling stock, demonstrating early be allowed to continue: the Infracos
success on the Central and Circle Lines. must undertake the promised work,
Tube Lines successfully brought forward while protecting service.
the opening of the eastern end of Canary
Wharf station. The effectiveness of maintenance
programmes will be revealed over time,
However, the first year also gives however the past year has left much to
significant cause for concern. The area of be desired. Again, proper planning is
greatest concern is in planning and critical. Smart planning, efficient delivery
programme/project management, which and professional supervision in the field
drives the effectiveness of the are attributes in short supply across the
maintenance programmes as well as Infracos. Addressing these weaknesses
major capital programmes. High-level will require a greater addition of outside
asset management strategies have been talent from Infraco shareholders or
haltingly produced and suffer from extensive training and recruitment
inadequate engineering input, while programmes.
detailed work plans have sometimes
been either non-existent, incomplete or Over the coming year, the first major
inconsistent rather than competent and station rebuilds will be underway with
professional. The planning capability work on 19 stations and more track
demonstrated this past year will not be renewal work will be undertaken. The
adequate to manage the volume of work rebuilding of the District Line between
once the renewals programme Earl’s Court and Whitechapel should
accelerates. reduce asset failures and produce a
smoother ride, but at the cost of loss of
A very troublesome example of that service over numerous weekends.
inadequate planning is the damaging Planning for the first major line upgrades,
engineering overruns that frequently the Jubilee, Victoria and Northern line
interrupted peak service in the last programmes, must develop to the point
months of the year under review. of accurately developing schedules and
Metronet and Tube Lines priced their accountabilities.
bids for work under the PPP based upon
plans to perform heavy maintenance at Good management can overcome some
night and on weekends. This is an of the shortcomings we have observed
inefficient and expensive way of doing in Infraco planning activities, but all the
the work, but was designed to protect parties to the PPP remain captive to the
weekday service. Infraco overruns limitations of the PPP contracts
occurred from weekends and nights into themselves. It is likely that there will
service hours because of poor planning. need to be changes to the PPP contracts
In response, the Infracos have often reflecting actual experience during theLondon Underground 2003/04 5
first year or two of their execution. We together to London Underground’s
will also be evaluating whether the advantage, with the consequence that
financial incentives engrained in the the public sector is exposed to
contracts in fact motivate appropriate significant cost risk.
behaviour and outcomes, and whether
the work the Infracos elect to perform is Prestige is the ticketing PFI that now
the highest priority work in light of the supplies ticketing systems for TfL
condition of Underground assets and the generally, including the new smart card
needs of Underground customers. technology. In the past year, the Oyster
card has been introduced and the
I was not a party to the process that led underlying technology has performed
to PPP. I came to London to restore the remarkably well. The card’s full
Underground’s lost reputation as the functionality has not yet been
world’s premier rapid transit network. In introduced however, and the coming year
this brief time, I have been struck by the should see the delivery of further smart
opportunity presented by the new card applications.
investment and the dedication of many
of the people who work on the The Power PFI contract with Seeboard
Underground. But I have also been Powerlink was entered into in
disappointed by the overly convoluted connection with the decommissioning of
processes that the contracts require, the the Underground’s Lots Road power
limitations on London Underground’s plant. The Power PFI’s resilience was
rights and the inadequacies of real world called into question during last year’s
technical planning and analysis that went power outage. We have worked with
into the PPP. These conditions need to Seeboard Powerlink to strengthen
be changed. management and communications with
the Underground, EdF and the National
PFI. Metronet and Tube Lines essentially Grid to remedy shortcomings. An
control the performance of the additional concern, however, is the need
Underground’s assets, which is the to provide power to support line and
major determinant of service quality. rolling stock upgrades under the PPP.
Nonetheless, they are not the whole Over the past year, we have put together
story. Prior to the PPP, London the planning apparatus to bring forward
Underground entered into a series of any such power upgrade, and we have
Private Finance Initiatives for delivery of co-located teams with Seeboard
discrete systems. Tube Lines has Powerlink and the Infracos to define the
inherited one, the Alstom provision of future power requirements in an attempt
Northern Line trains. Another, stations to ensure that we do not contract for
for the British Transport Police, has been (and hence incur unnecessary costs for)
largely delivered. Three others, Prestige more power than is required. This work
(ticketing), Connect (communications) is on the critical path for PPP upgrades
and Power, present enormous challenges and will require substantial infrastructure
in themselves and in combination with improvements by the end of the decade.
the PPP. These PFIs and the PPP were
not planned or designed to work6 Transport for London
Connect is the PFI under which the Following the discussion of PPP
Underground’s current radio system is performance, this report summarises
maintained and its new radio system is and reviews London Underground’s
to be delivered. The delivery of the new operating performance for those aspects
radio system is already two years late of the system that remain under its
and over budget. In the Connect PFI, we control.
have inherited a poorly managed
contractual arrangement that has so far We face many of the same challenges as
failed to deliver the system that is the Infracos. We must upgrade our
critical to our efforts to improve project management practices if we are
operations, safety and information. The to effectively integrate the number of
system is now scheduled for delivery in competing capital schemes that are
2006. That deadline will be met and before us. We must complete the
substantial cost overruns avoided only if development of systems that will permit
the Connect team, working in co- effective coordination of all renewal
ordination with the Infracos, completes work, including non-PPP investments.
the basic engineering and construction
work over the next 18 months. In order The PPP scope calls for the renewal of
for this to happen, Connect must share existing stations but does not deliver
limited engineering hours and draw on major necessary changes that will relieve
the Infracos’ engineering trains, congestion. For example, Victoria Station
protection personnel and other assets, must be expanded or it will limit the
creating an enormous co-ordination exploitation of the new trains and signals
challenge, rife with potential conflict and on the Victoria Line. Moreover, the
resulting delays. Underground is an inhospitable
environment for many Londoners. The
Underground Operations. Following the PPP provides some relief for users with
adoption of the PPP, Transport for special needs, particularly those with
London assumed control of London hearing or sight limitations. But the PPP
Underground on July 15, 2003. provides very little in the way of
In assuming control, we have articulated improved step-free access to the
three immediate challenges: Underground. There currently are 40
● Management of the PPP and PFI step-free stations and the PPP station
relationships and responsibilities programme will make 16 more stations
● Improved operations step-free. The Mayor and Commissioner
● Investment in stations to expand of Transport wish to make at least half
access, building on the PPP the network step-free within 15 years.
investment programme where That imperative and the need for
possible. congestion relief come together to
define additional investment, as yet
Over the past year, we have defined unfunded, that must be undertaken
improved operations as the delivery of a coincident with the PPP stations
safer, cleaner and more reliable service. programme.
In the face of the extreme conditions
faced over the past months, substantial In the end, the PPP contracts were a
progress has already been made. product of substantial compromise,London Underground 2003/04 7 trading time and scope for reduced The complexity of turning the investment. Projects were removed from Underground around within the context the programme or moved far into an of these novel contractual and unfunded future to reduce the cost of management structures makes for an the PPP. This compromise creates grave endless list of performance metrics and potential risk because the sizeable commentary. At the end of the day, investment in the early years does not however, the system’s performance as produce the kinds of visible outcomes experienced by passengers will provide that would inspire confidence in the the only judgement that counts. project and rally financial commitment going forward. Billions of pounds will be spent, but little change will be apparent, save possibly the effects of improved maintenance – but even this is uncertain, given the continuing degradation of the assets. Therefore, support for the long- Tim O’Toole term programme of renewal is at risk of Managing Director short memories and demagoguery. London Underground Limited Government must follow through on its June 2004 commitment to 30 years of investment, and the parties to the PPP will have to look for ways to accelerate visible improvements.
8 Transport for London
2. Background and overview1
On 31 December 2002, Tube Lines, the approach was not deemed adequate; for
private consortium comprising Bechtel, these areas, the scope of work is more
Jarvis and Amey, assumed the precisely defined. Infracos are then paid
responsibility for the maintenance and a fee every four weeks that is adjusted
renewal of the assets of the Jubilee, upwards or downwards on the basis of
Northern and Piccadilly lines. On 4 April actual performance.
2003, Metronet, the private consortium
comprising Balfour Beatty, W. S. Atkins, In assessing first-year performance, this
Thames Water, Bombardier report reviews:
Transportation and Seeboard assumed ● PPP contractual performance: How
responsibility for two entities: Metronet the Infracos are performing against
Rail BCV, which has responsibility for the performance output benchmarks
maintenance and renewal of the assets and with respect to progress on the
of the Bakerloo, Central, Victoria and major projects required in the
Waterloo & City lines, and Metronet Rail contract, such as line upgrades and
SSL (Sub-Surface Lines), which has station improvements.
responsibility for maintenance and ● PPP financial performance: How
renewal of the assets of the District, contractual performance is reflected
Circle, Metropolitan, Hammersmith & in the payments. We also look at the
City and East London lines.
extent to which the increased
resources anticipated by the PPP have
The idea underlying the PPP was that
materialised so far.
private sector companies were better
● Asset performance: How the assets
positioned than the public sector to
deliver improved performance for have performed since transfer.
● Asset management: Infracos’ plans
London Underground through access to
specialist technical resources, greater for whole-life asset management.
● Safety performance: How the PPP
financial certainty and more efficient use
of financial resources, project has performed in delivering the
management skills, and knowledge of requirement of ‘no degradation in
good industry practice (particularly in the safety.’
area of whole-life asset stewardship). ● Relations with the PPP Arbiter. How
London Underground has worked
The Infracos are expected to optimise with the PPP Arbiter.
cost and performance by looking at the ● Underground operations. How
whole asset life-cycle. The PPP contract London Underground’s operations
is based significantly on output-based have performed over the last year and
performance specification, with the plans for the future.
expectation that Infracos decide what
maintenance to do and which All measures are as of 31 March 2004,
investment projects to carry out to the financial year-end for 2003/04,
deliver the required performance. In unless otherwise indicated. This
some areas, such as station represents the one-year anniversary of
improvements, an output-based the Metronet contracts and 15 months
of the Tube Lines contract.
1. Nothing in the report shall create any legal relations between London Underground and
any other party nor shall it be deemed to interpret, amend, waive or otherwise affect any
provision of any contract or agreement identified herein. The report is issued without
prejudice to the exercise by Transport for London or London Underground of their rights
under any contract or agreement identified herein.London Underground 2003/04 9
3. PPP contractual performance
The PPP contracts define three primary surrogate for quantifying the total
output performance measures: amount of delay caused by that incident
● availability, a measure of day-to-day to customers across the network.
service reliability;
● capability, a measure of the potential Infraco LCH performance is measured
capacity of the assets ultimately to against a benchmark set at 105% of
reduce journey time; London Underground’s historic level of
● ambience, a measure of the quality of
lost customer hours, with performance
the travelling environment. worse than benchmark incurring
abatements. Performance worse than a
In addition, the contracts measure further ‘unacceptable’ level incurs
performance according to a regime of additional abatements.
service points, which are allocated for
facilities faults and faults that are not Performance
rectified within a set time. BCV
Performance against the availability
Each of the first three measures benchmark has been mixed over the
compare Infraco performance to a year. In the last quarter of the year
benchmark based on previous London performance on all BCV lines was better
Underground performance. Performance than benchmark, although a slight
better than benchmark receives a deteriorating trend could be observed
financial bonus,2 while performance over the quarter.
worse than benchmark receives a
financial abatement. Central line performance was worse than
benchmark for the majority of the year,
In addition, the Infracos are required to which was consistent with performance
deliver a series of defined major projects immediately preceding transfer. Apart
such as line upgrades and station from an escalator problem at Bond
modernisations. Performance on major Street in period 4, the most significant
projects is measured by progress against cause has been ongoing problems with
contractual milestones for a defined the line’s rolling stock. The Chancery
scope of work. Lane incident (which occurred before
transfer) also caused an increase in both
3.1 Availability staff and customer sensitivity to unusual
train noise, which led to an increase in
Definition and measurement reporting of unusual noise and therefore
Availability takes into account each an increase in trains withdrawn from
disruption to the service that lasts two service in response to these reports. The
minutes or more. The actual length of step change improvement in
each incident is then multiplied by a set performance towards the end of the year
factors (which varies by the location and shows the positive effect of the
time of day of the incident) to determine Metronet remedial programme.
the impact on customers. This produces
Lost Customer Hours (LCH), which are a
2. Except for service points, where only abatements are applied for failure to meet
threshold.10 Transport for London
Bakerloo line - Lost Customer Hours
120
Abeyance
100
80
Agreed
60
Unacceptable
LCH (000's)
40
20
Benchmark
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Period
Central line - Lost Customer Hours
1000
900 Abeyance
800
700
600 Agreed
500
400
Unacceptable
LCH (000's)
300
200
100 Benchmark
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Period
Victoria line - Lost Customer Hours
250
200 Abeyance
150
Agreed
100
LCH (000's)
Unacceptable
50
0 Benchmark
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
PeriodLondon Underground 2003/04 11
Waterloo & City line - Lost Customer Hours
25
Abeyance
20
15 Agreed
10
Unacceptable
LCH (000's)
5
Benchmark
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Period
Poor performance on the Victoria line On the Bakerloo line, average
(with results worse than benchmark in performance has improved since
half the year’s periods) resulted transfer; performance has been better
principally from a combination of signal than benchmark for most of the year.
failures and train failures. BCV’s interim
programme of improvements to the SSL
signalling assets have led to improved Metronet SSL is performing better than
performance in recent periods and benchmark on all lines as at year-end. To
should deliver further performance address the reliability of the Circle line,
improvements. Ultimately, the Victoria which has always been weak, Metronet
line upgrade due in 2013 will provide a have put more technicians in place over
completely new signalling system. the last year; this appears to be
improving response time to incidents
Poor performance in the first half of the and thereby improving contractual
year on the Waterloo & City line was performance.
primarily due to ongoing rolling stock
and track defects. It uses the same Scores for the East London line were
rolling stock as the Central line and worse than benchmark due to problems
therefore has suffered from similar associated with the installation of a new
problems. However, as with the Central computerised signalling control system
line, performance has been improving, midway through the year. These
with the most recent quarter’s problems have now been substantially
performance better than benchmark. resolved, as measured by a return to a
normal fault rate.3
3. Due to the limited size of the East London line, a single defect has a disproportionate
effect (just as on the Waterloo and City). This means performance for these lines will
tend to be more volatile than other lines.12 Transport for London
Metropolitan, Circle and Hammersmith & City lines - Lost
Customer Hours
600
500
Abeyance
400
300 Agreed
LCH (000's)
200 Unacceptable
100 (494K LCH)
Benchmark
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Period
District line - Lost Customer Hours
600
Abeyance
500
400
Agreed
300
Unacceptable
200
LCH (000's)
100
Benchmark
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Period
East London line - Lost Customer Hours
5 Abeyance
4
Agreed
3
2 Unacceptable
LCH (000's)
1
Benchmark
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
PeriodLondon Underground 2003/04 13
JNP Northern line availability has been
Availability on the Jubilee line has been variable, with scores worse than
variable, with scores worse than benchmark for half the post-transfer
benchmark in 11 of the 16 periods post- periods. Performance was substantially
transfer. Although recent performance worse than benchmark in Periods 4 and 7
has improved, the allocation of a large due to a number of significant signal
number of lost customer hours relating failures at various locations. The
to the signal problems at Green Park has allocation of responsibility and financial
still not been agreed; this is likely to be abatement for the Camden Town
referred to dispute resolution4. The derailment in Period 8 has not yet been
Green Park problems have now been agreed and is likely to be referred to
solved and additional improvements to dispute resolution.
the Jubilee line signalling system are
underway; further improvements will be
delivered with the line upgrade.
Jubilee line - Lost Customer Hours
250
Abeyance
200
150 Agreed
100 Unacceptable
LCH (000's)
50
Benchmark
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Period
Northern line - Lost Customer Hours
900
800 Abeyance
700
600
Agreed
500
400
300 Unacceptable
LCH (000's)
200
100 Benchmark
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Period
4. Following three internal stages of discussion, disputes are then referred to
adjudication. The adjudication decisions can be appealed and are then heard by a court.14 Transport for London
Piccadilly line - Lost Customer Hours
450
400 Abeyance
350
300
Agreed
250
200
150 Unacceptable
LCH (000's)
100
50 Benchmark
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Period
Piccadilly line availability scores have ● Station ambience includes elements
been worse than benchmark for roughly such as condition of platform roofs
half of the 16 post-transfer periods; and canopies; condition of seating,
however, availability is on an improving waiting rooms, toilets, signs, etc;
trend and has been better than cleanliness and levels of litter and
benchmark in the last 8 periods. graffiti.
Problems were due to rolling stock and a
number of major signal failures. Tube Ambience is measured through a
Lines are implementing a major wheelset quarterly ‘Mystery Shopping Survey’
modification programme to rectify the (MSS) conducted by an independent
axle box problems, which should organisation. The score is compared
improve reliability and reduce the need against a benchmark derived from
for further work until the fleet is previous London Underground
refurbished in 2014. The issue of the performance.
amount of abatements to be charged for
the effects of the axle box problems is Performance
likely to go to dispute resolution. BCV
Metronet BCV’s average post-transfer
3.2 Ambience ambience score is slightly better than
benchmark. Both train and station scores
Definition and measurement are better than benchmark. The
Ambience is a measure of the quality of substantial improvement in the BCV
the travelling environment, including score post-transfer is primarily the result
both train and station ambience. of work done by BCV, both before and
● Train ambience includes elements
after transfer, on the Central line. While
such as the condition of seats; the Central line was closed after the
cleanliness of surfaces and train January 2003 Chancery Lane incident,
exteriors; levels of litter and graffiti; BCV used the time to deep-clean
stations which appears to have
public address (PA) audibility; ride
somewhat improved BCV’s ambience
quality and in-car noise; lighting,
scores.
heating and ventilation.London Underground 2003/04 15
Ambience - BCV
71
70
69
MSS Score
68
67
66
65
64
Q1-2003/4 Q2-2003/4 Q3-2003/4 Q4-2003/4
Quarter
MSS Benchmark
SSL down the SSL average to be worse than
Metronet SSL’s average ambience score benchmark. The successful anti-graffiti
is slightly below the benchmark. Stations initiative is expected to move SSL’s
ambience is better than benchmark but scores in subsequent periods above
graffiti on the rolling stock has pulled benchmark.
Ambience - SSL
71
70
MSS Score
69
68
67
66
Q1-2003/4 Q2-2003/4 Q3-2003/4 Q4-2003/4
Quarter
MSS Benchmark16 Transport for London
JNP cleaning. Ambience scores are still
Tube Lines’ ambience performance has marginally worse than benchmark at
improved since transfer due to a series present but are forecast to exceed
of new initiatives including train washing, benchmark next quarter.
improved station cleaning and seat
Ambience - JNP
72
71
MSS Score
70
69
68
67
66
Q1-2003/4 Q2-2003/4 Q3-2003/4 Q4-2003/4
Quarter
3.3 Service points Performance
All three Infracos are performing better
Definition and measurement than benchmark on fault rectification.
Service points are allocated for failures Performance on facilities faults has been
by the Infraco to meet certain mixed, as detailed briefly below.
contractual obligations according to a
regime set out in the contract. Some of BCV
the significant types of failures that can On facilities faults, Metronet BCV scores
contribute to service points are: poorly due to ongoing faults with CCTV
● Facilities faults (a failure of a and PA systems. BCV launched a series
customer facing asset, such as a PA of targeted initiatives to improve its
system) performance on facilities faults in the
● Fault rectification (the failure of a
last quarter of 2003, which may explain
non-customer facing asset and faults the improvement in Period Nine
not rectified within standard performance (although this was still
clearance times) slightly worse than benchmark).
● Engineering overrun service points (a
However, towards year-end performance
deteriorated again, due in part to faults
failure to return Underground assets
on CCTV and PA systems. BCV have
by commencement of traffic. Service
implemented a remedial programme and
points are applied to the first two
expect to see results in upcoming
hours of an overrun to supplement
periods.
the availability abatements).London Underground 2003/04 17
Service Points - BCV - Facilities faults
9,000
8,000
Service Points
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Period
Service Points Threshold
SSL half of the year. This is due primarily to
After weak performance in the first half improved performance of Dot Matrix
of the year, Metronet SSL’s performance Indicators (DMIs), together with some
on facilities faults improved and was improvement in CCTV and PA systems.
better than benchmark in the second
Service Points - SSL - Facilities faults
8,000
7,000
Service Points
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Period
Service Points Threshold18 Transport for London
JNP main issues have been CCTV, DMIs and
After good performance in the first PA system faults. Tube Lines has
quarter, Tube Lines facilities faults developed a new source of supply to
performance has been worse than resolve the DMI spares shortage.
benchmark for most of the year. The
Service Points - JNP - Facilties faults
18,000
16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Period
Service Points Threshold
3.4 Major projects Performance
BCV
Definition and measurement No specific information has been
The PPP contracts require the Infracos to received from Metronet BCV on the
deliver certain defined projects by Victoria Phase 1 upgrade (which will use
specified dates. These include: existing trains and signalling to improve
● line upgrades to increase the journey time by March 2006). Similarly,
capability of the line (involving the the Central line upgrade, which promises
replacement of trains and signalling) modest improvements, has not been
● train enhancements (including arm
explained or documented.
rests, CCTV, emergency help points,
and visual information displays on the Metronet BCV’s Victoria line Phase 2
train) upgrade has been one of the key areas
● train refurbishment (including
of focus this year, as it is both a
substantial amount of work and is due
replacing flooring and scratched glass,
to be completed in the medium-term
reducing noise, improving ventilation,
(August 2013). The upgrade will include a
etc.)
new signalling system and a new fleet of
● improvements to stations (wide range
47 trains. We understand from BCV that
of work including accessibility, design work on the Phase 2 Victoria line
increasing platform seating, displays train layouts has started. BCV has also
of expected arrival times, structural told us that conceptual design for the
repairs, repair and/or renewal of most new signalling system is underway,
aspects of the station including including a survey of stations and
floors, lighting, signs, etc). tunnels to verify where and how the
signalling system will be put in place.London Underground 2003/04 19
Computer simulations are being run to ● The seventh car upgrade for the
test the post-upgrade patterns of train Jubilee line is proceeding on
service. The upgrade will also require schedule. Tube Lines have placed the
comprehensive renewal of the Victoria rolling stock order and manufacturing
line track; currently BCV are working on has started. The first car will be
heavy track maintenance on the Victoria delivered for testing in early 2005.
Line.
London Underground and Tube Lines are
SSL currently engaged in discussions as to
Metronet SSL has reported a six-month the scope of station projects. So far, the
programme delay for the District line work plans submitted for the enhanced
rolling stock refurbishment as a result of refurbishments have been rejected by
supply issues. However, the target date London Underground as inadequate.
for first train back in service is still
achievable. As regards the line upgrade Tube Lines is also in the process of
work, preliminary feasibility work has completing several additional special
begun and the overall programme is on projects.
target. ● Leicester Square, Knightsbridge
stations. These are the remaining
SSL has also provided a delivery major station improvement projects
programme for station works, despite that were inherited by Tube Lines
initial delays due to requests from SSL from before transfer. These projects
to change (often to reduce) the scope of are proceeding according to plan.
work. Changes in scope require London ● Piccadilly Line Extension (PiccEx) to
Underground approval as to whether the Heathrow T5. The British Airports
new proposed output is acceptable, Authority is providing the PiccEx to
both in terms of the contract’s intent London Underground; Tube Lines will
and in terms of safety. London provide the signalling system for this
Underground and SSL had to discuss
project through a specified right
these and come to a mutually agreeable
currently being negotiated with Tube
solution. There were delays in SSL
Lines. We are having some difficulties
producing the necessary safety
in reaching agreement on terms and
documentation but work is now
progressing. conditions and one element of the
cost is now in formal dispute. These
JNP issues need to be resolved urgently if
Progress on the early phases of the line the project is to be delivered on time.
upgrade works appears to be proceeding ● Wembley Park station. The Mayor has
on schedule. now accelerated this project so that
● Tube Lines have submitted their work the completion date will be in line
plans to London Underground for the with the reopening of the stadium. An
signalling and control systems for the extensive investment of time by both
Jubilee and Northern line upgrades London Underground and Tube Lines
(which are the first stage of the work). over the year means that the project
They have informed us that the is expected to be delivered on time.
signalling contract has been placed
for these upgrades.20 Transport for London
4. PPP financial performance
The PPP, through the Infracos, Major projects and renewal. The
introduces approximately £5bn of long- Infracos inform us that they are on target
term private finance, which London to spend their budgets for the year on
Underground repays through the maintenance and renewal. Based on the
infrastructure service charge (ISC). The limited information available, London
ISC is adjusted on the basis of contract Underground has some concerns
performance as outlined in the previous regarding progress on major projects and
section, with levels of performance tied track renewal work. The Infraco accounts
to adjustments to the ISC in the form of for the penultimate period of 2003/04
bonuses and abatements. indicate actual capital expenditure at 80-
85 per cent of budgeted capital
Cash payments of ISC, bonuses and expenditure for all three Infracos for the
abatements for 2003/04 are summarised year. The concern in this area is not so
in the table below. BCV and JNP have much the absolute levels of spend, it is
both ended the year with net the amount of work being produced per
abatements, while SSL has a net bonus. pound spent. For example, completing
It is worth noting that all three Infracos 50 per cent of a given length of track
did worse on availability than they had renewal work in the time allotted due to
projected in their bids but better than poor planning and inefficient working
they had expected on ambience. JNP still incurs the budgeted cost for the full
and BCV outperformed their bid scope of work.
expectations on net performance
payments by 35 per cent and 65 per Risks and contingencies. The complexity
cent respectively, while SSL of the PPP contracts and of their
underperformed their expectations by interfaces with other contracts
delivering less than half the expected net (particularly the large PFIs, as discussed
bonus. in the Foreword) means that there is
Apart from the high-level financial substantial risk around delivery. Many of
outcomes in terms of ISC and these risks will not be reflected in the
performance adjustments, which are budget for 2004/05, as they will only
relatively modest in the context of materialise once these works are
overall ISC payments, it has been performed. As these risks are currently
difficult so far to draw conclusions evolving, we would expect that as the
about performance from the financial volume of work accelerates, the level
data. Cost information that should of contingency would need to increase
ultimately be available through the as well.
master projects database was not
yet available at year-end due to the
drawn-out dispute over this issue over
the course of the year.London Underground 2003/04 21
FY 2003- ISC Bonus Abatements Value of Net Net Net
2004 Paid Paid Paid Lost Bonus Bid Variance
Customer /Abatement Forecast*** Bonus
Hours in Out-turn Bonus /Abatement
Abeyance * Range /Abatement Out-turn
Range
£m £m £m £m £m £m £m
Metronet 333 +1.6 -3.0** -4.9 -1.4 to -4.0 +2.6 to -
BCV -6.3 2.3
Metronet 385 +5.4 -2.5 -1.1 +2.9 to +4.9 -2.0 to -3.1
SSL +1.8
Tube Lines 356 +0.5 -8.1 -8.4 -7.6 to - -10.4 +2.8 to -
16.0 5.6
Total 1,074 +7.5 -15.9 -14.4 -6.1 to - -9.5 +3.4 to -
20.5 11.0
* Period 9 and prior Lost Customer Hours in abeyance when Period 11’s ISC Adjustment Statement
was issued
** Includes +£2.3m of agreed ‘roll back’ adjustment of abatements incorrectly charged
*** Cash forecast for performance per Bidder’s final financial models
Costs for additional works and services. the charging arrangements, for example
There have been some delays in securing on-costs and profits for additional works
additional services and works through that London Underground considers
the Infracos. London Underground is excessive. In the event these issues are
examining its own processes as well as not resolved, London Underground will
reviewing the performance of the seek to have these services provided
Infracos. There are some disputes over through other means.22 Transport for London
5. Asset performance
Definition and measurement however, is that the number of failures
For the purposes of this report, six key arising from these underlying problems
asset groups are discussed: rolling stock, appears to have increased in the last
track, signals, points, lifts and escalators. year.
Asset performance since transfer is
compared with London Underground The reasons for points failures are
historic average performance.5 typically complex as points performance
is heavily dependent on the quality of
Within the 12-15 month period since the track and track maintenance. The
transfer, it would be difficult to observe service impact is very high when signals
the type of improvements in asset and points fail, as these failures tend to
stewardship that would be expected in a take a substantial time to fix.
few years’ time. With that caveat,
however, changes in asset performance Performance
can be detected year on year. Below we Across the network, there has not been
provide data and commentary on any significant improvement in the
performance for the major asset classes performance of the signalling system,
(i.e., those where failures have a and in key areas such as points there has
significant impact on the service).6 been a decline in performance.7 There
are a number of likely contributing
5.1 Signalling system factors:
● The level and quality of supervision
Background over the technicians doing the work
Many of the root causes of signal has declined over the last few years;
failures predate transfer in that they are this does not appear to have been
related to pre-existing component reversed under Infraco management
weaknesses. What has been of concern,
5. Asset performance is measured in a number of different ways. There are certain
measures that can be looked at consistently across different asset types, i.e. total
number of failures, average downtime per failure and mean service hours or distance
between failures. In addition, each asset class has a wide range of specific measures
that can help in further understanding the condition and underlying root causes for the
performance of that asset. A mix of measures is used for the six asset types in the
section below.
6. In looking at the asset performance data:
● Number of failures data cannot necessarily be directly compared between Infracos,
as Infracos with more lifts (say) would tend to have more failures. The benchmark
data provided is meant to partially overcome this.
● There can often be some correlation between the number of failures and the
duration of failures; this is because the greater the number of failures, the less the
likelihood the Infraco will have the resources (additional trains, skilled technicians,
etc) to fix the incremental failure.
● Base data comes from systems shared with the Infracos and used for incident
attribution. Differences from aggregated Infraco data will only arise if certain
underlying causes are included/excluded.
7. For purposes of this report, the term ‘signalling systems’ will be used to refer to
signals and points.London Underground 2003/04 23
● There have been some difficulties better than the first half. Signal
over the last year in agreeing access performance has improved somewhat as
to the track for signalling technicians. against pre-transfer performance.
This appears to be due to a Downtime for both signals and points
combination of factors, including new has been slowly worsening.
staff and adjustments to the new
BCV has implemented a number of
system including concerns about
initiatives to address ongoing problems:
accountability and liability for
● Automatic Train Protection (ATP)
decision-making (now that different
system problems on the Central line.
companies employ the technicians
BCV is moving towards a
and operational staff).
maintenance regime determined by
● The quality of signalling system
volume of traffic rather than set time
engineers is quite variable across the
periods.
Infracos and indeed across different
● Circuit controller problems on the
lines, with different levels of
Central line. BCV is in discussions
experience. The historic practice of
with the manufacturer to come up
‘loaning’ engineers from one line to
with a solution to this problem.
another has not been continued by
● Component obsolescence in the
Infracos at the same rate as pre-
Central line control system. New
transfer.
sourcing arrangements for
There are some encouraging signs of functionally equivalent parts are being
joint working across all three Infracos. pursued with BCV’s suppliers to
For example: address this.
● Redressing the technical skills ● Signalling relay problems on the
shortfall through joint recruitment Victoria line. BCV are working with
programmes and training, including a the manufacturer on a long-term fix
new training school at Stratford. for these problems.
● Developing renewal programmes for
SSL
degraded components of the system
Overall, SSL’s signalling system
(e.g., broken track wires, defective
performance has been mixed. SSL
blockjoints, tuning units). In some
started off the year with an
cases, one Infraco is trialling solutions
improvement in the number of signalling
on behalf of the others, which is failures but since then has shown a
positive (e.g. SSL testing a new worsening trend. We would expect
material for redressing contact signalling downtime to improve in future
failures). as SSL have recently increased their
number of signalling technicians. Points
BCV
failures were improving in the first half
On the BCV lines, average points
but have been worsening in the second
performance for the year is not
half, although points downtime has been
significantly changed as against pre-
decreasing in the second half of the year.
transfer performance, although
performance in the second half was24 Transport for London
Signals
Metronet - BCV
Metronet - BCV - Signals Metronet - BCV - Signals
Number of in service failures resulting in Service Disruptions > 2 minutes Average Duration of in service failures resulting in Service Disruptions > 2 minutes
120 80
70
100
60
80
50
60 40
Number of Failures
30
40
20
Minutes
20
10
0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Period 02/03 to 03/04 Period 02/03 to 03/04
Actual Post Transfer - 6 per. Mov. Avg. (Actual Post Transfer) Actual Post Transfer - 6 per. Mov. Avg. (Actual Post Transfer)
Tube Lines - JNP
Tube Lines - JNP - Signals Tube Lines - JNP - Signals
Number of in service failures resulting in Service Disruptions > 2 minutes Average Duration of in service failures resulting in Service Disruptions > 2 minutes
120 80
70
100
60
80
50
60 40
Number of Failures
30
40
20
Minutes
20
10
0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Period 02/03 to 03/04 Period 02/03 to 03/04
Actual Post Transfer - 6 per. Mov. Avg. (Actual Post Transfer) Actual Post Transfer - 6 per. Mov. Avg. (Actual Post Transfer)
Metronet - Subsurface
Metronet - Subsurface - Signals Metronet - Subsurface - Signals
Number of in service failures resulting in Service Disruptions > 2 minutes Average Duration of in service failures resulting in Service Disruptions > 2 minutes
120 80
70
100
60
80 50
60 40
Number of Failures
30
40
20
Minutes
20 10
0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Period 02/03 to 03/04 Period 02/03 to 03/04
Actual Post Transfer - 6 per. Mov. Avg. (Actual Post Transfer) Actual Post Transfer - 6 per. Mov. Avg. (Actual Post Transfer)London Underground 2003/04 25
Points
Metronet - BCV
Metronet - BCV - Points Metronet - BCV - Points
Number of in service failures resulting in Service Disruptions > 2 minutes Average Duration of in service failures resulting in Service Disruptions > 2 minutes
45 160
40 140
35
120
30
100
25
80
20
Number of Failures
60
15
10 40
Minutes
5 20
0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Period 02/03 to 03/04 Period 02/03 to 03/04
Actual Post Transfer - 6 per. Mov. Avg. (Actual Post Transfer) Actual Post Transfer - 6 per. Mov. Avg. (Actual Post Transfer)
Tube Lines - JNP
Tube Lines - JNP - Points Tube Lines - JNP - Points
Number of in service failures resulting in Service Disruptions > 2 minutes Average Duration of in service failures resulting in Service Disruptions > 2 minutes
45 160
40 140
35
120
30
100
25
80
20
Number of Failures
60
15
10 40
Minutes
5 20
0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Period 02/03 to 03/04 Period 02/03 to 03/04
Actual Post Transfer - 6 per. Mov. Avg. (Actual Post Transfer) Actual Post Transfer - 6 per. Mov. Avg. (Actual Post Transfer)
Metronet - Subsurface
Metronet - Subsurface - Points Metronet - Subsurface - Points
Number of in service failures resulting in Service Disruptions > 2 minutes Average Duration of in service failures resulting in Service Disruptions > 2 minutes
45 160
40
140
35
120
30
100
25
80
20
Number of Failures
60
15
10 40
Minutes
5 20
0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Period 02/03 to 03/04 Period 02/03 to 03/04
Actual Post Transfer - 6 per. Mov. Avg. (Actual Post Transfer) Actual Post Transfer - 6 per. Mov. Avg. (Actual Post Transfer)26 Transport for London
Of particular concern is signal reliability indicated above, the Infracos have not
on the northern section of the Circle continued this practice to the same
line. A significant problem is water extent post-transfer.
ingress and poor drainage. SSL and
London Underground are in discussions The first step towards addressing these
with Thames Water to resolve these problems effectively is much more
problems, which have worsened in the aggressive analysis of asset performance
last year. Other problems include points data by the Infracos to understand
failures, broken track wires, and underlying trends behind failures and
blockjoint failures, giving rise to a then to develop the appropriate
concern about the quality of the response.
maintenance regime for blockjoints.
Signal lamp failures have risen On the Piccadilly line, reliability
dramatically due to manufacturing problems with the control system
defects in the recent batch of lamps; have continued due to component
this is expected be redressed once a obsolescence. JNP is buying up
new batch is put in place (and ultimately second-hand components to
through plans to move to a newer signal supplement the stock of spare parts,
lamp technology). On the District line, which is intended to reduce the level
control cables at the eastern end of the of disruption.
line have experienced problems over the
year due to degradation from age and
5.2 Rolling stock
damage from track fires. Background
JNP The Underground network includes
The number of points failures on JNP fleets with a wide range of ages and
has roughly doubled since transfer, different designs. Analysing the
which has been matched by a doubling performance of rolling stock can be
in downtime as well. The number of complicated since the trains’
signal failures has remained relatively performance is substantially driven by
stable over the year, while signal the interface with the track - in other
downtime has nearly doubled. In our words, the same rolling stock can
view, this overall decline in performance perform differently on different lines due
is due in part to: to variations in track conditions.
● There appears to be insufficient
management attention given to Performance
signalling system problems. This was
exemplified by problems with a faulty BCV
track circuit at Green Park which had a BCV is the only Infraco showing some
major impact on service, with trains improvement on mean distance between
having to terminate at Green Park failures over the year. Looking at
numerous times including during the number/duration of failures, BCV’s mean
morning peak. These problems have distance between failures performance
has been on a worsening trend for most
now been addressed but follow a long
of the year, but this was due to the
period of failure
increase over the course of the year in
● Historically JNP lines were weaker on
mileage operated as the Central line was
signalling and relied on technicians
gradually reintroduced following the
from other parts of the network. As Chancery Lane derailment.London Underground 2003/04 27
Rolling stock
Metronet - BCV
Metronet - BCV - Rolling Stock Metronet - BCV - Rolling Stock
Number of in service failures resulting in Service Disruptions > 2 minutes Average Duration of in service failures resulting in Service Disruptions > 2 minutes
120
500
450
100
400
350 80
300
250 60
Number of failures
200
40
150
100
20
Minutes
50
0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Period 02/03 to 03/04 Period 02/03 to 03/04
Actual Post Transfer - 6 per. Mov. Avg. (Actual Post Transfer)
Actual Post Transfer - 6 per. Mov. Avg. (Actual Post Transfer)
Metronet - BCV - Rolling Stock
Mean Distance Between Failure
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
Kilometres
2000
1000
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Period 02/03 to 03/04
Actual Post Transfer - 6 per. Mov. Avg. (Actual Post Transfer)
As measured by the mean distance between The mean distance between failures
failures, the Central line shows consistent measurement improved for the Bakerloo and
improvement over the course of the year as the Victoria lines over the year. The two main issues
rolling stock problems highlighted by the with the Victoria line fleet over the year were
Chancery Lane derailment are being addressed. A problems with doors not closing properly at
programme of heavy maintenance was initiated stations and faults relating to Automatic Train
during the year, and a new management team has Operation (ATO). A revised maintenance regime
been put in place for the Central line fleet, has been put in place to address the door
including resource from Bombardier. This problems. The ATO faults are due to equipment
programme appears to be starting to show that has become unreliable. Faults cause the
results in terms of improvements in asset trains to stop between stations, at which point
performance, particularly since the programme the driver must switch to manual operation.
was accelerated at the end of the year. The replacement of the trainborne ATO
equipment by the end of 2004 is expected to
improve performance.You can also read
