North Korea: A Month in Review - An analytic look at the main developments of the August 1 and August 31 period - NK News
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PLACEHOLDER:
PLACE: PLACE PLACEHOLDER
Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll
Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll
North Korea: A Month in Review
An analytic look at the main developments
of the August 1 and August 31 period
By NK Pro Staff Analysts
1
PLACEHOLDER:
PLACE: PLACE PLACEHOLDER
Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll
Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll
North Korea: A Month in Review & What’s Ahead
An analytic look at the main developments of the August 1 and August 31 period
By NK Pro Staff Analysts
NK Pro has conducted an in-depth analytic review of news on the peninsula for the period between August 1
and August 31.
In addition to an Executive Summary providing top-line findings, the following review includes detailed analysis
on a wide range of other specialist focus areas.
Furthermore, it also includes a look ahead at the five events most likely to create news in August.
Please send any feedback about this feature to chad.ocarroll@nknews.org
Published by Korea Risk Group, the world’s premier resource for analysis, research
tools and data on North Korea (www.korearisk.com)
2
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Contents
Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll
Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll
04 Executive Summary
WMD: North Korea launches five sets of missiles, minimal activity
07
at Yongbyon/Pakchon sites
Foreign Relations: DPRK-U.S. working-level talks unclear,
10
exchanges with Russia a high priority, Venezuelan embassy opens
Military: Joint military exercises trigger DPRK missile launches, North
13
Korea and China commit to military exchanges
Leadership: Military continues to be predominant theme of Kim
16
Jong Un appearances
Sanctions: Singapore investigates beverage companies for illicit
19
trade, DPRK ships sail unabated
Human Security / Human Rights: Updates on two defector families,
22
new UN report on human rights violations in prisons
Economy: DPRK media puts pressure on economic officials,
25
exchange rates fluctuate
Inter-Korean: North Korea has no intent to speak to South, Seoul
29
remains calm
32 DPRK State Media: New and notable
33 The Month Ahead: What to expect
3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll
Men sit by a waterfall in North Korea | Picture: NK Pro
WMD: NORTH KOREA LAUNCHES FIVE SETS OF MISSILES, MINIMAL ACTIVITY AT
YONGBYON/PAKCHON SITES
Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll
The month of August witnessed five rounds of short-range missile launches, following two sets of launches at
the end of July. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un observed all of the tests in-person, according to state media
coverage. The missile types tested flew at high-velocities, low apogees, short ranges and were launched from
mobile vehicles – all of which demonstrate advancing DPRK technological capabilities. Those tested appeared
to included a multiple launch rocket system, KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles and a system resembling the
United States’ MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). North Korean state media said the launches
were a “suitable warning” in response to U.S.-ROK downscaled joint military exercises held from August 10 to 20.
In another related development, satellite imagery obtained in August indicated minimal activity at the Yongbyon
Nuclear Facility and Pakchon Uranium Concentrate Pilot Plant, obtained by 38 North and the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), respectively. CSIS expressed concern Pakchon may have been offered to
the Trump administration at the Hanoi Summit in February 2019, even though it appears it has been out of
commission since 2002.
RISK: While senior U.S. officials won’t readily admit it, the sustained testing in August and July is a mounting
embarrassment for President Trump and underscores the lack of concrete achievements resulting from three
summits with Kim Jong Un. As a result, if North Korea continues short-range missile testing in the weeks ahead,
there is a risk that it may undermine the relationship between Trump and Kim. Trump’s reference to Xi Jinping
on Twitter as an “enemy“ due to trade war issues shows how quickly his view of a one-time “friend” can change if
negotiations don’t yield results.
4
Executive Summary
FOREIGN RELATIONS: DPRK-U.S. WORKING LEVEL TALKS UNCLEAR, EXCHANGES WITH
RUSSIA A HIGH PRIORITY, VENEZUELAN EMBASSY OPENS
Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll
Throughout North Korea’s five sets of projectile salvos during August the U.S. maintained that the short-range
nature of the tests did not put further U.S.-North Korea diplomacy at risk. President Trump was upbeat, describing
on August 9 another “beautiful letter” he received from the North Korean leader – which notably included a “small
apology” for recent missile launches. But Secretary of State Mike Pompeo finally expressed disappointment on
August 20, stating that he wished the missile tests would stop. Seemingly, the U.S. had expressed hope throughout
the month that North Korea would return to working-level negotiations after U.S.-ROK joint military exercises
concluded on August 20. It even sent U.S. Special Representative Steve Biegun to South Korea on a three-day visit
which began the same day exercises wrapped up. However, no public information has been shared to indicate
there was any direct contact between the U.S. and DPRK during the visit – which sometimes takes place at
Panmunjom. And since, North Korean foreign minister Ri Yong Ho said the DPRK is “ready for both dialogue and
confrontation” with the U.S., and warned that North Korea would remain the biggest ‘threat’’ if the U.S. continued
its confrontational policy.
RISK: One major risk in the North’s strategy is that it might push its luck too far with the Trump administration.
Though Washington has effectively tolerated its short-range missile tests throughout 2019, should they continue
through early September they could embarrass Trump significantly ahead of the UN General Assembly (UNGA).
This could logically result in him taking on a more combative tone and damage the allegedly special nature of his
relationship with Kim Jong Un. Furthermore, Ri’s scathing attack on Pompeo in August could make it difficult for
him to enter into credible dialogue with the U.S. during the UNGA in September.
MILITARY: JOINT MILITARY EXERCISES TRIGGER DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES, NORTH
KOREA AND CHINA COMMIT TO MILITARY EXCHANGES
Section by Caroline Kearney
The downscaled U.S.-ROK joint command post exercise (CPX), which served as an alternative to the now-terminated
Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) drills, took place from August 11 until August 20. South Korean military officials
stressed the purpose of the exercise was to prepare for the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from
the U.S., but the North perceived it as aggressive nonetheless. On August 5, DPRK state media said they “will be
compelled to develop, test and deploy mighty physical means” in response to the exercises. The next day, North
Korea launched two probable KN-23 short-range quasi-ballistic missiles, which DPRK state media described as a
“suitable warning” in response. After joint drills concluded, a DPRK foreign ministry spokesperson said the North
has no interest in conducting further talks as long as “military threats” by the U.S. and South Korea continue. The
statement referred to the recent joint exercises, Seoul’s acquisition of new F-35A stealth fighter jets and a cruise
missile flight test by the U.S. on August 19 as “dangerous” steps that could lead to a new cold war in the region.
RISK: Recent North Korean foreign ministry and media commentaries have increased focus on the country’s
arms buildup and warned that it will continue to strengthen “physical deterrents” if talks with the U.S. fail to
make significant progress. As a result, if DPRK state media clings to the F-35A issue and other perceived
security concerns in the medium term, it’s likely these could be used to justify far more significant North Korean
military actions after the end of the year – Kim Jong Un’s stated deadline on leaving the door open for talks with
Washington. Thus, the DPRK has already laid the groundwork for a smooth transition into launching medium and
long-range missiles and even conducting nuclear tests next year.
LEADERSHIP: MILITARY CONTINUES TO BE PREDOMINANT THEME OF KIM JONG UN
APPEARANCES
Section by Minyoung Lee
Kim Jong Un made five public appearances from August 1 to 26, a slight decrease from his six appearances
between July 1 and 26, and a significant drop from his 11 appearances in the same period in 2018. Notably, Kim’s
public activities so far this month have been military-related – a stark contrast to the same period in August 2018,
when 10 out of 11 appearances were economic visits.
5 5
Executive Summary
SANCTIONS: SINGAPORE INVESTIGATES BEVERAGE COMPANIES FOR ILLICIT TRADE,
DPRK SHIPS SAIL UNABATED
Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll
During the month of August, North Korea continued to reject dialogue and engagement offers from the South in
all areas, including silence on Seoul’s ongoing efforts to send food aid to the country through the UN system. Also,
Seoul’s Ministry of National Defense announced its five-year defense spending plan.
HUMAN SECURITY / HUMAN RIGHTS: UPDATES ON TWO DEFECTOR FAMILIES, NEW UN
REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN PRISONS
Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll
During the month of August, reports surfaced about the tragedy of a North Korean family who died in Seoul, while
a DPRK diplomat who defected last year is said to be under security service protection in a third country. A new
UN report meanwhile described gross human rights violations in North Korean prisons. And the 1718 sanctions
committee granted four exemptions to NGOs, while the Global Fund considered a return to North Korea.
ECONOMY: DPRK MEDIA PUTS PRESSURE ON ECONOMIC OFFICIALS, EXCHANGE RATES
FLUCTUATE
Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll
In August, North Korean state media increased pressure on government officials to meet the country’s economic
goals. Data indicated fluctuation in unofficial USD and Euro exchange rates and gas prices, while trade data
remained relatively consistent. North Korea both hosted and attended international trade fairs this month.
INTER-KOREAN: NORTH KOREA HAS NO INTENT TO SPEAK TO SOUTH, SEOUL
REMAINS CALM
Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll
During the month of August, North Korea continued to reject dialogue and engagement offers from the South in
all areas, including silence on Seoul’s ongoing efforts to send food aid to the country through the UN system. Also,
Seoul’s Ministry of National Defense announced its five-year defense spending plan.
6 6
WMD: NORTH KOREA LAUNCHES FIVE SETS OF MISSILES,
MINIMAL ACTIVITY AT YONGBYON/PAKCHON SITES
Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll
North Korean missile launch during the month of August | Picture: Rodong Sinmun
DPRK weapons tests spilled over into August and continued even after the U.S.-ROK downscaled military drills
concluded on August 20. Meanwhile, minimal activity was observed at the Yongbyon Nuclear Facility and Pakchon
Uranium Concentrate Pilot Plant based on satellite imagery analyzed through August.
North Korea
The month of August witnessed five rounds of short-range missile launches, following two sets of launches at
the end of July. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un observed all of the tests in-person, according to state media
coverage. The missile types tested flew at high-velocities, low apogees, short ranges and were launched from
mobile vehicles – all of which demonstrate advancing DPRK technological capabilities:
== On August 2, North Korea tested what appeared to be a guided multiple launch rocket system (MLRS),
following on from a test of the same type of system on July 31. The system launched two rockets that
reached a speed of Mach 6.9, an apogee of 25km and a trajectory of 220km, suggesting the projectiles
were low-flying and fast. Initial reports of the launch came from U.S. military sources which were
confirmed several hours later by South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) data. This is the reverse of
the usual practice and could indicate that the system proved difficult for Seoul to detect.
== Just days later on August 5 the DPRK launched two probable KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles,
the same type seemingly tested on May 4 and 9, and on July 25 of this year. The two missiles flew
with a low apogee of 37km, at high speeds of at least Mach 6.9 and a range of 450km, according to
the ROK JCS on the same day. On August 6, DPRK state media said the missile launch the day prior
was a “suitable warning” in response to U.S.-ROK drills.
7
WMD: North Korea launches five sets of missiles, minimal activity at Yongbyon/Pakchon sites
== On August 9 and 15, Pyongyang fired two more sets of short-range ballistic missiles, which analysts
say bear strong resemblance to the United States’ MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).
The first set of missiles launched had a 400km trajectory, an apogee of 48km, and speed of 6.1 Mach or
more. The missiles on August 16 traveled at a similar speed but around only 230km in trajectory and an
apogee of 30km. DPRK state media on August 17 described the test as “perfect” and “cement[ed]” greater
confidence in the system. Analysts speaking to NK Pro agreed at least in part, saying the test “implied a
high level of accuracy” compared to recent tests.
== South Korea’s JCS detected two short-range ballistic missiles launched from the North on August 24,
later determined to be another test of the MLRS system which was previously tested on August 2. The
projectiles flew at an approximate range of 380km, an apogee of 97km and a maximum speed of Mach 6.5
or more. South Korea’s standing committee of the National Security Council expressed “strong concern
that North Korea continued to launch short-range projectiles” after ROK-U.S. joint exercises. North
Korean state media KCNA on August 25 described the purpose as an “indomitable offensive campaign …
for resolutely frustrating the ever-mounting military threats and pressure offensive of the hostile forces.”
Responses from U.S. and ROK leadership to the flurry of launches were mostly calm. President Trump and
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo downplayed the significance of the launches in their statements on August 2,
7, and 10 and expressed expectations that talks with Pyongyang would continue after the exercises concluded.
South Korea’s meeting of ministers on August 10 called the recent launches a “show of force” in response to the
downscaled joint exercises and after each launch urged North Korea to cease the tests, suggesting they may
elevate tensions on the peninsula.
Minimal operational activity observed at Yongbyon and Pakchon
Ongoing, minimal activity has been observed at Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, according to
satellite imagery obtained by 38 North and released on August 2. Images of the Uranium Enrichment Plant
showed some vehicular movement but neither of the two reactors nor Radiochemical Laboratory appeared
operational. There was also ongoing dredging of the Kuryong River and some movement of materials at
buildings surrounding the Radioisotope Production Facility.
Meanwhile, satellite imagery of the Pakchon Uranium Concentrate Pilot Plant also indicates there has not been
any significant movement at the facility from 2002 to August 2019, according to the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) on August 21. The CSIS report expressed concern that this plant may have been
offered to the U.S. at the Hanoi summit in February 2019 as one of five nuclear facilities to shut down and
cautions that this plant may have been dormant for nearly two decades already.
8 8
WMD: WHY IT MATTERS
Government
North Korea historically has not classified U.S.-ROK moratoria since November 2017 – importantly,
military drills in South Korea as a “threat” to” national without breaching Kim Jong Un’s word to President
security”. As a result, recent tests have been notable Trump about not testing ICBMs and nuclear weapons.
for a number of reasons – though they risk damaging Secondly, the sustained testing in August served as a
White House sentiment towards Kim Jong Un should means to provide a firm reminder to Washington that
they continue much longer. it will need to take bold actions to placate the DPRK in
any renewed working-level negotiations.
Above all, August saw North Korea use the reduced-
scale U.S.-ROK exercises as a clear pretext for its While senior U.S. officials won’t readily admit it, the
testing. State media, for example, said that the sustained testing in August and July is a mounting
August 5 launch of KN-23 missiles was a “suitable embarrassment for President Trump and underscores
warning” against exercises, indicating its actions the lack of concrete achievements resulting from
were a justifiable military response from Pyongyang’s three summits with Kim Jong Un. As a result, if North
perspective. Korea continues short-range missile testing in the
weeks ahead, there is a risk that it may undermine
Pointing to U.S.-ROK military exercises as the stimuli the relationship between Trump and Kim. Trump’s
for its tests therefore provided North Korea a twofold reference to Xi Jinping as an “enemy” on Twitter due
opportunity in August. Firstly, it provided Kim Jong Un to trade war issues shows how quickly his view of a
the geopolitical latitude to satisfy those in the DPRK one-time “friend” can change if negotiations don’t yield
munitions sector who may have been technically results.
frustrated by Pyongyang’s unofficial missile testing
Business
Stakeholders awaiting business opportunities with threats, such as the rumored discussion to place
North Korea ought to monitor U.S. President Donald ground-based, intermediate-range missiles in Asia.
Trump’s response to more potential DPRK missile Such developments could logically be used to justify
testing closely. In the event Pyongyang miscalculates further DPRK military actions, including additional
Trump’s patience and tolerance, it’s possible he could ballistic weapons testing.
react in public ways to further missile testing which
creates a significant hurdle to rekindling working-level A niche opportunity could emerge for South Korean
talks. This could, logically, add significant obstacles to and U.S. military vendors as a result of North Korea’s
the emergence of any business opportunities relating testing of its new MLRS system, however. As the first
to North Korea and even result in a push for new test on July 31 was misinterpreted and the second test
sanctions at the UN Security Council or via unilateral on August 2 resulted in a delayed reading by the JCS,
U.S. legislation. there may be new pressures on military stakeholders
to invest in new systems to provide improved early
Furthermore, it will be important to track how the detection, warning and defense capabilities.
DPRK publicly responds to other perceived military
9 9
FOREIGN RELATIONS: DPRK-U.S. WORKING LEVEL TALKS UNCLEAR,
EXCHANGES WITH RUSSIA A HIGH PRIORITY, VENEZUELAN EMBASSY OPENS
Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll
DPRK flags waving in Pyongyang | Picture: NK Pro
During the month of August, North Korea continued to delay resumption of working-level talks with the U.S. yet
focused notable efforts on exchanges with Russia. Also, Venezuela opened its first embassy in North Korea.
DPRK shifts priorities, U.S. pushes to restart working-level talks
Throughout North Korea’s five sets of projectile salvos during August the U.S. maintained that the short-range
nature of the tests did not put further U.S.-North Korea diplomacy at risk. President Trump was upbeat, describing
on August 9 another “beautiful letter” he received from the North Korean leader – which notably included a “small
apology” for recent missile launches. But Secretary of State Mike Pompeo finally expressed disappointment on
August 20, stating that he wished the missile tests would stop and admitted that negotiations had not resumed
as quickly as Washington had hoped.
The U.S. had expressed hope throughout the month that North Korea would return to working-level negotiations
after U.S.-ROK joint military exercises concluded on August 20. It even sent U.S. Special Representative Steve
Biegun to South Korea on a three-day visit which began the same day exercises wrapped up. However, no public
information has been shared to indicate there was any direct contact between the U.S. and DPRK during the
visit – which sometimes takes place at Panmunjom. Also noteworthy is that the U.S. chose to refrain from
signing onto a statement by Germany, France and the UK following a closed-door UN Security Council meeting
on August 27, which condemned North Korea’s recent missile launches.
Perhaps the most notable of North Korea’s gestures to the U.S. came in a rare statement by its foreign minister
on August 23 and in an August 26 KCNA commentary. Foreign minister Ri Yong Ho said the DPRK is “ready for
both dialogue and confrontation” with the U.S., and warned that North Korea would remain the biggest ‘threat’’ if
the U.S. continued its confrontational policy. The KCNA commentary then specified that the DPRK would never
trade its “strategic security” for sanctions relief, an apparent policy shift from the goal of securing sanctions
relief earlier in the year. This statement appeared to be consistent with Kim Jong Un’s July 26 statement and Ri’s
August 23 pronouncement that emphasized the country’s national security needs.
10Foreign Relations: DPRK-U.S. working-level talks unclear, exchanges with Russia a high priority, Venezuelan embassy opens
Russia-DPRK high-level exchanges remain frequent
Russian vice foreign minister Igor Morgulov and three counterparts arrived in Pyongyang on August 14 for
a series of meetings with their North Korean counterparts. Significantly, first-vice foreign minister Choe Son
Hui – believed to be the current point-person on U.S.-DPRK negotiations – and regular Russia specialist vice
foreign minister Im Chon Il were in attendance. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the two
countries discussed the situation on the Korean peninsula and agreed to “continue strengthening cooperation”
on the issue. The two sides also agreed to an “implementation of trilateral projects on the Korean Peninsula,”
referring to long-discussed plans between Seoul, Pyongyang, and Moscow.
DPRK foreign ministry officials also met with local Russian officials in Vladivostok on August 20 to discuss
boosting cooperation through people-to-people exchanges. Separately, a delegation from North Korea traveled
on August 19 to Moscow to attend a joint commission on fishery cooperation, according to Russia’s embassy
in Pyongyang. The embassy said it hoped the visit would lead to “urgent” steps taken by the DPRK to end illegal
fishing activities by North Koreans in their waters.
Venezuela opens embassy in Pyongyang
Venezuela, a decades-long friend of North Korea, opened its first embassy in the country on August 21 after
plans initially emerged earlier in the year. Venezuela’s vice-minister of foreign affairs for Asia, the Middle East,
and Oceania delivered a welcome speech and was accompanied by his North Korean counterpart. Venezuela’s
vice-minister said the new embassy would strengthen the DPRK-Venezuela alliance amidst “attacks and threats
from North American imperialism,” according to a Facebook post from the Russian embassy. The opening of
the embassy in Pyongyang comes after the DPRK opened its embassy in Caracas in 2015.
11 11FOREIGN RELATIONS: WHY IT MATTERS
Government
DPRK official pronouncements through August Trump administration or was a determination decided
continued to reiterate that Pyongyang remained by North Korea’s interpretation of events remains to
open to resolving tensions with the U.S. through be seen.
dialogue if possible, while making clear that it would
return to strengthening its “physical deterrent” if the One major risk in the North’s strategy is that it might
U.S continued its “confrontational posture.” While it push its luck too far with the Trump administration.
appears North Korea will eventually return to working- Though Washington has effectively tolerated its
level negotiations, its hardening stance and shift away short-range missile tests throughout 2019, should
from South Korea indicates that it may not be as soon they continue through early September they could
as the U.S. had been expecting. embarrass Trump significantly ahead of the UN
General Assembly (UNGA). This could logically result
North Korea’s strategy appears to be two-fold. Firstly, in him taking on a more combative tone and damage
the DPRK’s aggressive statements and actions this the allegedly special nature of his relationship with
month appear aimed at strengthening its negotiation Kim Jong Un.
leverage with the U.S. by increasing tensions and
delaying talks. Secondly, it appears to be shifting its The forthcoming UNGA will, however, provide a clear
policy away from requests for UN Security Council opportunity for the U.S. and DPRK to resume talks
(UNSC) sanctions relief and instead aiming for security again. It will therefore be important to monitor foreign
assurances from the U.S. The motivation for this may minister Ri Yong Ho’s speech there, in order to confirm
be because North Korea realizes that timing is running whether or not Pyongyang is fully shifting away from
out and there may not be sufficient time during Trump’s seeking sanctions relief towards gaining security
first administration to achieve UNSC sanctions relief. concessions.
Whether or not this message came directly from the
Business
It is likely that North Korea has calculated that there U.S. presidential term in January 2021 to pick up the
is not sufficient time during Trump’s current term to issue of sanctions relief again.
gain sanctions relief and determined that its most
basic financial needs are being met through increased The opportunities reflected by events in August are
economic exchanges with Russia and China. If primarily linked to Russian and DPRK economic
accurate and Pyongyang is indeed shifting its focus exchanges. However, Russian businesses eager to
to negotiate security assurances from the U.S. instead explore emerging opportunity will need to conduct
of UNSC sanctions relief over the next several months, significant due diligence to ensure they are not
this could translate to further delays for businesses violating UNSC or U.S. Treasury sanctions.
waiting to conduct exchanges with the DPRK. North
Korea may consequently decide to wait until the next
12 12MILITARY: JOINT MILITARY EXERCISES TRIGGER DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES,
NORTH KOREA AND CHINA COMMIT TO MILITARY EXCHANGES
Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll
U.S. soldiers training to conduct virtual missions | Picture: The U.S. Army
The month of August saw North Korea respond to U.S.-ROK joint military exercises with missile launches,
China and North Korea commit to bolstering military ties, and the DPRK’s notable promotion of scientists for
contributions to national defense.
U.S.-ROK joint military drills prompt ire from North Korea
The downscaled U.S.-ROK joint command post exercise (CPX), which served as an alternative to the now-
terminated Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) drills, began with a preliminary four-day Crisis Management Staff
Training (CMST) on August 7, then kicked off with the full scale portion on August 11 – lasting until August
20. South Korean military officials stressed the purpose of the drills was to prepare for the transfer of wartime
operational control (OPCON) from the U.S., but the North perceived the exercises as aggressive nonetheless.
On August 5, two days before the preliminary CMST began, DPRK state media said they “will be compelled
to develop, test and deploy mighty physical means” in response to the exercise. The next day, North Korea
launched two probable KN-23 short-range quasi-ballistic missiles, which DPRK state media described as a
“suitable warning” in response.
The day after the joint drills concluded, a DPRK foreign ministry spokesperson said the North has no interest
in conducting further talks as long as “military threats” by the U.S. and South Korea continue. The statement
referred to the recent joint exercises, Seoul’s acquisition of new F-35A stealth fighter jets and a cruise missile
flight test by the U.S. on August 19 as “dangerous” steps that could lead to a new cold war in the region. Also
on August 21, a separate Rodong Sinmun article said recent hostile actions by the U.S. forced the North to take
“self-defensive countermeasures” and develop “powerful physical means.”
13Military: Joint military exercises trigger DPRK missile launches, North Korea and China commit to military exchanges
North Korea commits to strengthening military ties with China
A top DPRK military official traveled to Beijing on August 16 and 17 and pledged to improve ties with China’s
armed forces, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on August 19. Kim Su Gil - the Director of the
General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) - and other officials met with Zhang Youxia, vice
chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Zhang reportedly
hailed the delegation’s visit as being of “crucial significance in bilateral exchange” and a “historic” event following
five summits between the DPRK and Chinese leaders between March 2018 and June of this year. Kim also
met with Admiral Miao Hua, who serves as director of the Political Work Department of China’s CMC, media
indicated. Miao’s presence was a “clear political sign” that military exchanges would indeed begin, according to
Lee Seong-hyon, Director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
Kim Jong Un promotes 103 scientists for achievements in national defense
DPRK leader Kim Jong Un ordered the promotion of 103 scientists in the field of national defense science,
KCNA said on August 13. The promotions reportedly came as a reward for their efforts to bring about a “turning
point” in the country’s military capabilities. The scientists “have solved high-level and difficult technical issues
of the ultra-modern national defense science,” the Rodong Sinmun said on the same day. The newspaper also
carried a full list of the scientists’ names on its front page, indicating the significance of the event. One of the
most notable promotions was of Chon Il Ho to three-star colonel-general. Chon was present at Kim Jong Un’s
side at all five missile tests between July 25 and August 10, and on April 17. An NK Pro analysis said this may
be the first reported military promotion for defense scientists.
14 14MILITARY: WHY IT MATTERS
Government
Pyongyang’s missile launches and elevated rhetoric in Ho’s speech at the United Nations General Assembly
response to U.S.-ROK military exercises appear to be a in September, which he paradoxically used last year
tactical move aimed at advancing a possibly changing to pivot away from security concerns towards seeking
negotiating position ahead of resuming talks with the sanctions relief.
U.S.
Recent foreign ministry and media commentaries
Taken in light of an August 25 DPRK statement which have increased focus on the country’s arms buildup
said “we will never barter the strategic security of the and warned that it will continue to strengthen
country for the sanctions relief” – as well as earlier “physical deterrents” if talks with the U.S. fail to make
North Korean presentations of U.S. and ROK military significant progress. As a result, if DPRK state media
activities in July as “threats” to “national security” – clings to the F-35A issue and other perceived security
it’s possible Pyongyang will now prioritize security concerns in the medium term, it’s likely these could
above sanctions relief in any renewed talks. Indeed, be used to justify far more significant North Korean
Kim Jong Un may have judged it impossible to secure military actions after the end of the year – Kim Jong
much relief from sanctions in the remaining time of Un’s stated deadline on leaving the door open for talks
the Trump administration, instead preferring to opt with Washington. Thus, the DPRK has already laid the
for substantial efforts towards a peace treaty with the groundwork for a smooth transition into launching
U.S. as more favorable. An important indicator in this medium and long-range missiles and even conducting
regard will be North Korean foreign minister Ri Yong nuclear tests next year.
Business
Defense providers to the U.S. and ROK should monitor complained on multiple occasions that South Korea,
media coverage of North Korea’s laundry-list of not the U.S., should have paid for the two Terminal High
complaints if and when nuclear negotiations with the Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) launchers deployed
U.S. resume. This is because it appears as though the to the South in 2017. While the U.S. and ROK will not
DPRK is now defining all joint military exercises and make major military concessions to North Korea, it is
any significant weapons acquired by South Korea possible that Trump will be in favor of halting further
from the U.S. as threats to the country’s national exercise activities and/or deploying equipment which
security. The Trump administration’s response to he perceives as expensive for Washington. In addition,
these complaints could therefore have repercussions if U.S.-ROK cost-sharing discussions do not go well
to defense industry vendors supplying or supporting in future months, this could be compounded with an
forces in South Korea. emerging White House interest in bringing a number
of troops back in next year’s election campaign
Trump has made public his aversion for U.S.-ROK period. These issues could combine to see reduced
joint military exercises since the Singapore summit opportunities for vendors either providing forces
in June 2018, and as recently as August 10 referred in South Korea with equipment or supporting their
to the drills as “ridiculous” and “expensive.” He also activities on the ground.
15 15LEADERSHIP: MILITARY CONTINUES TO BE PREDOMINANT
THEME OF KIM JONG UN APPEARANCES
Section by Minyoung Lee
DPRK leader Kim Jong Un celebrates after a successful August missile launch | Picture: Rodong Sinmun
Kim Jong Un made five public appearances from August 1 to 26, a slight decrease from his six appearances
between July 1 and 26, and a significant drop from his 11 appearances in the same period in 2018. Notably, Kim’s
public activities so far this month have been military-related – a stark contrast to the same period in August 2018,
when 10 out of 11 appearances were economic visits. Kim’s last economic visit this year was on June 1, when he
provided guidance on Kanggye and Manpho reconstruction “master plans.”
In August, North Korean media gave an unusual promotion to the defense science and munitions industry sectors,
following signs since April that Kim Jong Un was seeking to give a boost to these sectors.
North Korea’s top economic officials visited the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone and Samjiyon County –
among the country’s most important construction sites.
Kim guides five weapons launches
The North Korean leader continued to guide weapons launches in August: a “large-caliber multiple launch-
guided rocket system” on August 2; “new-type tactical guided missiles” on August 6; a “new weapon” on
August 10 and 16; and a “super large multiple rocket launcher” on August 24. North Korea since May has
carried out nine weapons launches, two in May, two in July, and five in August. State media rhetoric of
Kim’s guidance of weapons launches escalated, with the last two readouts even using “war deterrent” or
“nuclear war deterrent.” DPRK media had largely refrained from using “war deterrent,” a euphemism for
missiles and nuclear weapons, after Kim Jong Un made a policy shift in April 2018. State media started to
mention the term again at authoritative levels in recent months, culminating in its appearance in the latest
Kim Jong Un activities reports.
16Leadership: Military continues to be predominant theme of Kim Jong Un appearances
Further boost to munitions industry personnel
According to state media readout of Kim’s weapons test guidance on August 2, officials of the party and
the defense science sector “guided” the test-fire “with” the leader. This appeared to be the first time officials
accompanying the leader to an event carried out an activity “with” Kim. Even in 2017, when the North Korean
defense science and munitions sectors had reached new heights in line with the emphasis on weapons
development and testing, accompanying officials went so far as to “observe” weapons tests guided by Kim
Jong Un. This unusual boost to the defense science and munitions personnel was followed by yet another
unprecedented move -- military rank promotions to 103 defense scientists who “made great contributions to
strengthening self-defensive national defense capabilities.” Notably, Jon Il Ho, who accompanies Kim Jong
Un on almost all weapons launch-related events, was promoted to a three-star colonel general, putting him in
the same military rank as Jang Chang Ha, the president of the Academy of National Defense Science. Jon’s
affiliation and title are unknown, but he was former director of the Automation Research Institute of Kim Chaek
University of Technology.
Economic officials visit major construction sites
Pak Pong Ju, vice chairman of the State Affairs Commission (SAC) and vice chairman of the party Central
Committee (CC), and Cabinet Premier Kim Jae Ryong paid on-site guidance visits to the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal
Tourist Zone and Samjiyon County construction sites, respectively. Samjiyon County and the Wonsan-Kalma
Coastal Tourist Zone, along with the Onchon Tourist Zone, are among the top economic projects in North
Korea. Kim Jong Un visited all these sites in April this year, underscoring the importance of these projects. Pak
started making economic visits as party CC vice chairman in July. Kim Jae Ryong started in late April, soon
after his election as cabinet premier. Choe Ryong Hae ceased giving economic guidance as of May 2, when he
visited the Onchon Tourist Zone construction site. Choe had frequently made economic guidance visits prior
to April, when he likely ceded his party CC vice chairman title and was elected as Supreme People’s Assembly
(SPA) Presidium president.
17 17LEADERSHIP: WHY IT MATTERS
Government
North Korea’s unveiling of a new “super large multiple In recent weeks, state media have justified the
rocket launcher” after the conclusion of U.S.-ROK country’s weapons tests by highlighting U.S.-ROK
military exercises, as well as its highly unusual efforts joint military exercises as “threats to national security,”
to solidify the defense science and munitions sectors, using external media outlets to say that the North’s
seem to suggest that it will continue to escalate focus has shifted from sanctions relief to removing
pressure on the U.S. to maximize its negotiating threats to national security, one of which includes U.S.-
position before returning to talks. ROK joint military exercises.
Pyongyang appears to be strengthening its negotiating
leverage by paving the way for including U.S.-ROK joint
military exercises in its denuclearization talks agenda
with the U.S.
Business
Despite the continued uptick in Kim’s military However, if DPRK-U.S. talks fail to make meaningful
activities, the economy continues to be the main progress by the end of this year, the North could shift
narrative of state media. The North’s top economic away from the current economy-focused policy and
officials, Pak Pong Ju and Kim Jae Ryong, continue to start to further escalate tensions in 2020, when the
provide guidance to key economic installations across year-end deadline Kim Jong Un has set will have come
various sectors, which underscores the importance to an end.
Pyongyang attaches to economic improvement.
It is highly unlikely that Kim Jong Un will go back on
his moratorium on ICBM and nuclear tests this year.
18 18SANCTIONS: SINGAPORE INVESTIGATES BEVERAGE
COMPANIES FOR ILLICIT TRADE, DPRK SHIPS SAIL UNABATED
Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll
Pokka drinks obtained in Pyongyang in September 2018 | Picture: NK Pro
During the month of August it was revealed that the Singaporean government is focusing investigatory efforts
on two companies for conducting possibly sanctioned trade with North Korea. Meanwhile, DPRK-linked ships
continued to loiter near the coast of Shanghai, and one vessel sailed under Cambodia’s flag this month. Finally,
the UN is reportedly investigating 35 North Korean cyber attacks on 17 countries.
Two Singaporean companies spotlighted for sanctions violations
SinSMS Pte. Ltd. - a Singapore-based affiliate of a Chinese freight-forwarding company - was charged by
Singaporean authorities on August 15 for illegally shipping alcohol to North Korea. The exports included wine
and liquor totaling SGD600,000 ($432,384) over four separate shipments between October 2016 and January
2017, according to Channel News Asia. The company was sanctioned last year by the U.S. Treasury Department
for facilitating illicit DPRK shipments and falsified shipping documents that included exports of alcohol and
tobacco products.
In addition, Pokka Corporation Singapore Pte. Ltd., a Singaporean-based company, is currently under investigation
by domestic authorities over concerns the company has been exporting its products to North Korea, NK News
confirmed. Pokka Singapore produces drinks by the famous Japanese brand Pokka Sapporo which have been
widely available in North Korea since at least 1997 and as recently as June 2019. This development follows
NK News reporting in 2018 that revealed Pokka Singapore was scouting companies that would be willing to
distribute their products to North Korea. Singapore has since November 2017 enforced an outright trade ban
to the DPRK, which would mean any direct or indirect sales there could likely breach sanctions.
UN Panel of Experts report describes 35 cyber attacks and illicit trade by the DPRK
The UN Panel of Experts (PoE) is reportedly investigating 35 cyber attacks in 17 countries which may have
been linked to North Korea, according to a report seen by the Associated Press (AP) on August 5. The PoE
19Sanctions: Singapore investigates beverage companies for illicit trade, DPRK ships sail unabated
reportedly submitted a report to the UN Security Council (UNSC) alleging that the DPRK illegally acquired up to
two billion dollars by conducting cyber attacks on financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges. South
Korea was apparently the target of 10 attacks alone, with the next highest being India as the target of three
attacks, a second AP article on August 12 revealed. The report also detailed ongoing illicit coal exports and
imports of luxury items and oil products by North Korea. It said funds raised in these illicit means may be
supporting the country’s nuclear and missile programs and requests the UNSC sanctions committee to place
additional sanctions on companies and vessels illicitly shipping oil products to the country.
DPRK-linked vessels sail region undeterred, updates to North’s chemical complex
After being off-grid for several years the North Korean ship Kum Gang San 2 signaled that it was sailing under
the Cambodian flag on August 15 according to NK Pro’s Ship Tracker. If the flag data is correct, this would be
a breach of UNSC sanctions. Meanwhile, August also saw two DPRK-flagged ships – the Chong Bong and the
K Morning – engaged in suspicious activity near the coast of Shanghai. The U.S. and UN sanctioned Chong
Bong turned off its AIS transmitter on August 3 once reaching the area, while the K Morning loitered in the area
then turned off its AIS transmitter before returning to a DPRK port. And a VOA report based on Planet Labs
imagery said a probable cargo vessel was docked in North Korea’s Nampo port on August 13 with materials
that resemble coal stacked near it. The article also noted the presence of four other ships docked in the same
port since August 1.
Meanwhile, on August 1, a Hong Kong-flagged oil tanker – the Lighthouse Winmore – departed a South Korean
port after being detained by authorities at the end of 2017, according to NK Pro data. The tanker was originally
detained following evidence the vessel illegally transported North Korean oil in 2017. ROK foreign ministry
officials released the ship in July, concluding the oil transfer “was not deliberate,” according to a Reuters article
on July 2. The ship is able to sail freely and was headed towards an island near Shanghai upon its departure
from South Korea.
Separately, satellite imagery of North Korea’s Pongwha Chemical Complex gathered over the last four years
indicates a possible expansion of the facility, according to an NK Pro report on August 4. A catalytic cracking
unit, which would more efficiently produce lighter oils like gasoline and diesel from heavier oils, may have
been constructed between 2015 and 2017. While the construction would have been completed prior to UNSC
sanctions covering oil exports to the DPRK, it still would have allowed Pyongyang to increase its refined oil
supplies. Similarly, satellite imagery obtained by NK Pro on August 22 shows North Korea added two new
fuel storage tanks at a site near Nampho oil terminal during the second half of 2017. The UN Panel of Experts
named Nampho as an area which receives illicitly obtained oil supplies, yet continued upgrades to the area
show sanctions have had little effect on the port’s ability to import oil.
20 20SANCTIONS: WHY IT MATTERS
Government
While cyber attacks linked to North Korea are not new to attack within the Asia region and especially South
phenomena, the leaked UN PoE investigation into Korea. Therefore, Asian nations in particular may want
frequent attacks allegedly committed by Pyongyang to scrutinize their capacity to secure their government
suggests that cyber operations may be becoming networks and those of key financial institutions.
an increasingly popular avenue for the DPRK to raise
funds. As a result, they should serve as a forewarning Secondly, the leaked UN PoE report cites Pyongyang
for governments for two reasons. as raising up to $2 billion to date through cyber
operations. While this amount may have been acquired
Firstly, cyber attacks can be committed on both over a few years, with an annual GDP of between $24.5
government networks and on financial institutions billion and $30.7 billion and cyber attacks becoming
that are central to the stability of a nation’s economy. a growing practice for the DPRK, it is worthwhile for
As a result, governments will likely benefit from closely UN member states and the 1718 sanctions committee
collaborating with financial institutions in order to to factor this concern into their policy-making. These
build systems to protect strategic components of attacks are also further reminders that the DPRK has
their national economies, and as a result better become increasingly sophisticated in its methods to
defend national security. In addition, subjects of DPRK circumvent sanctions and discover various avenues to
cyber attacks are global, though there is a tendency generate illicit funding.
Business
The UN PoE report should serve as an alarm for systems, account management protocols, and a lack
financial institutions about emerging DPRK cyber of coordination with other banks.
capabilities. Since at least 2011, North Korea has
allegedly utilized its cyber capabilities to attack To fortify their systems, financial institutions worried
financial institutions such as four banks in South about DPRK exposure should therefore increase
Korea in 2013, the Central Bank of Bangladesh in 2016 coordination through intelligence and information
and Taiwan’s Far Eastern International Bank in 2017, to sharing amongst specialist information providers,
name a few notable cases. In the hacks in Bangladesh other banks, and with their own and foreign
and Taiwan, Pyongyang allegedly used the SWIFT governments. In addition, it may be sensible to create
system to steal funds from financial institutions. The 24 hour hotlines with their banking partners, and
bank in Taiwan was able to recoup most of the $60 strengthen their defense systems, especially SWIFT.
million stolen by responding rapidly. However, the
Central Bank of Bangladesh has only been able to An example of best-practise coordination can be seen
repossess about one-fifth of the $81 million lost so far. in the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the UK,
It suffered from a slow response to the hack in part as which has developed an information sharing network
a result of differing business hours with the Federal that includes a membership of 175 businesses. While
Reserve Bank of New York and the lack of a 24 hour a full guarantee to prevent cyber attacks is likely
hotline to connect the two banks. The destruction be impossible, sharing information, strengthening
was extensive in both cases due to deficiencies in defense systems, and efforts to coordinate can at
the banks’ information security and SWIFT safety least lead to better mitigation of risk.
21 21HUMAN SECURITY / HUMAN RIGHTS: UPDATES ON TWO DEFECTOR
FAMILIES, NEW UN REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN PRISONS
Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll
North Korean women waiting for a bus in downtown Pyongyang | Picture: NK Pro
During the month of August, reports surfaced about the tragedy of a North Korean family who died in Seoul, while
a DPRK diplomat who defected last year is said to be under security service protection in a third country. A new
UN report meanwhile described gross human rights violations in North Korean prisons. And the 1718 sanctions
committee granted four exemptions to NGOs, while the Global Fund considered a return to North Korea.
North Korean mother and son passed away in Seoul, DPRK diplomat in protection
A North Korean woman, Han Sung-ok, who defected from the DPRK, and her son were found dead in their
apartment in Seoul in July, NK News reported, citing a demonstration on August 16. While autopsy results are
pending, there are concerns the two died from starvation as no food was found in their home and the two were
only drawing a small portion of the government benefits for which they were eligible. The Moon administration
drew criticism for the family’s death from some conservatives, who alleged there was insufficient effort on the
government’s part to ensure that North Korean defectors are aware of the benefits for which they qualify.
Separately, a former DPRK diplomat who last year reportedly defected from the country’s embassy in Rome
is believed to be under security service protection in a third country, an official from South Korea’s National
Intelligence Service was reported to have said on August 1. Jo Song Gil is believed to have defected with his
wife in November 2018, though his whereabouts have not been made public since then.
UN report details executions, beatings and sexual violence in DPRK prisons
A new report to the UN General Assembly reportedly describes gross human rights violations committed against
prisoners in North Korea, according to a copy obtained by the Associated Press on August 3. The report details
public executions for attempted escapes and for stealing by detainees and other prisoners being subjected to
sexual violence and severe beatings. The UN human rights office wrote the report based on conversations held
22Human Security / Human Rights: Updates on two defector families, new UN report on human rights violations in prisons
between September and May 2019 with over 330 North Koreans who had left the country. The AP also said the
report describes detention cells as being too overcrowded for prisoners to lie down and that malnourishment
and serious illnesses such as tuberculosis, hepatitis and typhoid are rampant, with little to no medical care
provided.
UN grants four sanctions exemptions, Global Fund considers return to DPRK
The UN’s 1718 sanctions committee granted four approvals this month for NGO’s to conduct further
humanitarian work in the DPRK. French NGO Triangle Génération Humanitaire was granted permission
to send machinery and equipment to support food security projects in the DPRK on August 1. The U.S.-
based Christian Friends of Korea (CFK) was authorized on August 7 to procure and ship materials to treat
tuberculosis, hepatitis and pediatric patients, and two days later the Eugene Bell Foundation was also
granted approval to ship equipment to diagnose and treat tuberculosis in North Korea. Supplies for a child
nutrition project conducted by Première Urgence Internationale were also granted permission to be sent to
the country on August 9.
Meanwhile, a spokesperson for the Global Fund said it is considering a return to the country to restart
treatment for tuberculosis and malaria patients, though a timeline was not specified, according to NK News
on August 8. Global Fund spent a total of $103.3 million on DPRK aid work from 2010 to 2018 and its
February 2018 withdrawal from the country prompted a wave of criticism and concern.
23 23HUMAN SECURITY / HUMAN RIGHTS: WHY IT MATTERS
Government
The death of Han Sung-ok and her son in Seoul sparked Yet the incident comes amid diminished overall
shock and outrage among some in South Korea who support by the Moon administration towards North
question how such a tragedy could have occurred in Koreans living in the South. The ROK Ministry of
a developed country which is supposed to provide Unification’s 2019 budget reduced spending for
welfare to families in her situation. Some say the defector resettlement by 31.6% – citing lower annual
failing is on the part of the ROK government for being arrival numbers – and for the North Korean Human
indifferent or discriminatory, while others are more Rights Foundation by 91.6%. In contrast, the current
concerned about the cultural differences and prejudice ROK administration has tried repeatedly in the past
that the family may have encountered with their native 12 months to increase unilateral humanitarian aid
South Korean neighbors. The reality, however, is that for civilians still living inside North Korea. But with its
defectors have never had a particularly easy time gestures increasingly falling on deaf DPRK ears, it is
adjusting to life in South Korea, meaning this tragedy probable that this incident will now lead to growing
was likely the result of a chronic underlying problem as calls from human rights activists for the Moon
opposed to a particular policy misstep by the current administration to do more to help former North Korean
administration. citizens now resident in South Korea.
Business
The UN’s 1718 sanctions committee granted seven past. As a result, this could lead to more approvals
exemptions to humanitarian organizations seeking being granted and could therefore provide a modest
to conduct in-country work between July 22 and opportunity to those businesses selling inputs to
August 9, a frequency which suggests that the NGOs providing humanitarian assistance inside
process may be smoothing. Further analysis shows North Korea. Furthermore, in the event that the Global
that some of the approvals had turnarounds of only Fund eventually resumes its work in the country,
two weeks, while others came after partial approvals opportunities of this sort could increase significantly
given to the same organizations months earlier. The for vendors in the public health space. This is because,
big picture emerging from recent weeks, then, could in comparison with other NGOs working inside the
reflect a softening in approach to the issue from the North, Global Fund has a significantly higher budget,
U.S. – the only member of the UNSC known to have having spent over $100 million on TB and malaria
intentionally delayed the approvals process in the control there since 2010.
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