POLICY, POLITICS, AND THE PUBLIC - THE SECURITIZATION OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN NORTH AMERICA - uO Research
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2019
POLICY, POLITICS,
AND THE PUBLIC
THE SECURITIZATION OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN
NORTH AMERICA
STEPHANIE HENDERSON [5568888]
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
MAJOR RESEARCH PAPER
FALL 2019 SUBMISSION
SUPERVISOR: DR. A. GHECIU
Stephanie Henderson
SN: 5568888
GSPIA Major Research Project (Fall 2019)
Table of Contents:
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………….…....1
1.0 Introduction………………………………………………………………..………………..…2
1.1 Understanding Modern Security Threats………………………………………..……..……4
1.2 Securitization and the Copenhagen School……………………………………………...…..7
2.0 Case Study: United States…………………………………………………………………...13
2.1 Actors………………………………………………………………………………………....13
2.2 Audience………………………………………………………………………………...........18
2.3 Analysis…………………………………………………………………………………..…...21
3.0 Case Study: Canada……………………………………………………………………….....26
3.1 Actors………………………………………………………………………………………....27
3.2 Audience…………………………………………………………………………………..…..31
3.3 Analysis………………………………………………………………………………….........33
4.0 The Rest of the Five Eyes…………………………………………………………………....39
4.1 Trends and Contrasts……………………………………………………………………..…43
4.2 Conclusion...…………………………………………………………………………………..47
Stephanie Henderson
SN: 5568888
GSPIA Major Research Project (Fall 2019)
Abstract: The rise of social and digital media in modern society have resulted in new forms of
security threats which have both shifted the way in which security organizations respond to
threats, but also how political and security leaders communicate their existence in order to
develop a response that counters and contains the threat. The Copenhagen School’s securitization
theory seeks to understand how and why issues facing different sectors – military,
environmental, economic, political, and societal – become matters of national security.
Specifically, it examines the process following the declaration that an issue should be
immediately moved from the political agenda to the security agenda. What makes foreign
interference unique, is that both the securitization process and the attacks focus on the same
method – public discourse. Using securitization theory, this paper will unpack the phenomenon
of foreign interference and how its shift to the security agenda has occurred in two nations: The
United States and Canada. These two case studies will explain how and why foreign interference
has been securitized, what makes it unique, and what the threat of foreign interference on
societal security could mean for policy in North America. Each nation faces distinct threat
environments with specific – and in Canada’s case non-specific – threat actors resulting in
different calls to action, or speech acts, by both securitizing and functional actors seeking the
acceptance of the audience or general public. Unlike traditional security threats such as terrorism
or espionage, foreign interference targets the sovereignty and legitimacy of democratically
elected governments by using digital and social media to manipulate public opinion and
discourse. Thus, the Copenhagen School has been used as the framework for analysis in
understanding how the threat of foreign interference has been perceived and accepted by political
and societal sectors in North America.
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1.0 Introduction
Advances in technology have shifted reality; our understanding of what humanity can do,
where it can go and how it can interact, has ultimately narrowed the distance between people and
places that used to be beyond our reach. These technological triumphs have thrust the 21st
century into a new era of connectivity. Digital communications have made it easier than ever to
engage with people halfway across the globe. Our dependence on technology has also given rise
to a new facet of security. “Defence of critical infrastructure” no longer exclusively refers to
defending physical structures; security forces are now tasked with protecting networks and data
as well. Shifting protective measures to encompass the cyber realm is easy enough – it is a
defined space with specific needs and clear targets. What do we do when the digital threat moves
beyond “ones and zeros” and targets thought and identity? Is it possible to protect the abstract of
ideas? This is the threat posed by foreign interference.
Since foreign interference happens in the social space, it is reliant on socially constructed
realities and public discourse. This is not to say that all digital security threats are social
constructions, merely that interference operations rely on communications. Without the existence
of individual perspectives and social media discourse, foreign interference would not be as
effective as it is. Due to its reliance on perception and individual interpretation, this paper uses
the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory as a means of understanding how foreign
interference has been securitized, as a non-traditional security threat, by political leadership in
Canada and the United States. It will identify how the general public within these two countries
have accepted and understand the threat defined by each respective political leadership group.
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This is not a study on actions taken, but rather why these actions are taken and how democratic
leaders in North American have sought support for these actions through the process of
securitization. A broadly-based threat with varying definitions will result in broadly-based policy
with varying responses.
As previously stated, the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory will be the
framework within which the following analyses will be conducted. The first section of this paper
will define the concept of security and the origins of foreign interference. The second section
will unpack the main characteristics of securitization theory and the Copenhagen School by
applying the characteristics to the threat environment created by foreign interference. There I
will define and identify the target actors, referent objects, and audience and will also break down
the two main security sectors impacted by foreign interference: societal and political. The third
section will contextualize the current situation in both the United States and Canada, two
countries that have developed responses to foreign interference. Following the context portion of
the case studies, I will use securitization theory to define the actions taken by the securitizing and
functional actors in the United States and Canada and assess their impact on their respective
audiences. In the final section, I will compare the similarities and differences in each nation’s
responses to identify which aspects of foreign interference lend themselves to securitization
theory and what trends have emerged. I will briefly touch on the experiences of our allies to
further the claim that foreign interference relies on a socially constructed reality wherein values
and identity play a pivotal role in both the advancement and acceptance of foreign interference as
a legitimate security threat. The purpose of this paper is to determine how political leaders, or
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securitizing actors, define the threat of foreign interference and how they garner public, or
audience, support for the threat definition and the actions taken to protect against it.
1.1 Understanding Modern Security Threats
Security as a concept has been debated and theorized for centuries and follows a
relatively consistent definition across the political thought spectrum, namely that security equals
preservation. A Hobbesian understanding of security follows the laws of protection and
preservation: “…the first and fundamental law of nature, which is: to seek peace and follow it…
[and] the second, the sum of the right of nature, which is: by all means we can to defend
ourselves” (Hobbes, 1651, 80). While the Hobbesian perspective focuses inward on the natural
laws preserving the individual, classical liberal thinkers err on the side of liberty. Montesquieu
writes that the “… political liberty of the subject is a tranquility of mind arising from the opinion
each person has of his safety” (Montesquieu, 1748, 173). A utilitarian perspective drives the
notion that the primary goal must be to increase the happiness of the individual, or as argued by
Jeremy Bentham, “[by] averting pain or danger, which is the chance of pain: that is, by affording
security” (Bentham, 1781, 126). Lastly, John Locke explains that, while dependent on the
establishment of a commonwealth, society “…could nowhere find a greater security to their
peace, liberties, and fortunes than in the rule of a father” (Locke, 1823, 137). This glance into the
history of security is not an exercise in political thought, rather it is to demonstrate that the theme
throughout history in defining security has consistently relied on preservation and protection of
fundamental freedoms. The theorists mentioned above, despite their contrasting attitudes, share
important characteristics in what it means for an individual or society to be secure. This baseline
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understanding of security has influenced centuries of security theory, including the Copenhagen
School, which this paper is based on.
The Copenhagen School is not without controversy. Some authors consider the
methodology used to explain securitization downgrades or diminishes legitimate security threats
because it does not focus on the empirical inclination of traditional security studies (Knudsen
2001, 361). The realist tradition tends to classify issues of identity and welfare to be ‘low
politics’ issues and thus not immediate threats (Hough, 2008, 3). The challenge with foreign
interference is that it is both a matter of soft politics in that it targets identity and public discourse
but does so to destabilize the relationship between the government and the governed. Authors
who argue that the Copenhagen School does not consider the implications “…of whether (or not)
there is a connection between the realm of normal politics and that of security…” may find their
answers to that question by acknowledging that the digital domain has closed that gap – social
politics and governments are facing the same threat simultaneously (Williams, 2015, 117).
There is no internationally accepted definition of foreign interference though according to
various security agencies, as will be discussed later, foreign interference activities typically fall
into two categories: influence operations through domestic diaspora communities, and election
interference via social and other digital media (ASIO, 2017; CSIS, 2018; Nielsen, 2019). Unlike
traditional security threats such as terrorism or even network-based cyber operations, foreign
interference does not have a clear physical target. Interference operations seek to exploit thought
and identity through digital technology. This presents unique policy challenges in addressing the
threat that foreign interference operations pose, particularly in liberal democratic societies where
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freedom and privacy are pinnacle rights for their populations. One must not only define the threat
and the threat environment, but also prepare a reasonable response without compromising
fundamental freedoms. The post-9/11 context sees the security environment operating on a
precedence of immediate national security responses to traditional security threats, but foreign
interference does not operate within the same bounds. Rather than having defined outcomes, the
effects of foreign interference are much more insidious, using prolonged communications
campaigns to slowly eat away at ideology through public discourse rather than physical
infrastructure or networks.
Foreign interference finds its roots in hybrid warfare, a term coined by retired U.S.
Marine Officer Frank Hoffman. Since the first World War, tactics have evolved and shifted
toward what are now considered asymmetrical threats such as those posed by non-state actors
like Al Qaeda or Daesh and state-sponsored firms like the online troll factories operating in
Russia. According to Hoffman, today’s battlefield “incorporates a range of different modes of
warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts
including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder” (Fridman, 2018).
Hoffman’s intention was to develop a more holistic application of tactical analysis and battle
strategy that incorporates the reality of a wider range of actors, tactics, and targets (Fridman,
2018). The result has been the acceptance of a broader base for responding to different types of
threats. The question then becomes what is the best way to respond to it? Traditional security
studies suggest that military deterrence is the best way to ensure that external actors keep their
distance, but how does one prepare a military response for a non-military attack (Hough, 2008,
3)? In terms of proportionality, is a hard power response appropriate for a Facebook campaign?
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Knudsen suggests that the Copenhagen School contradicts itself, arguing that securitization
“…refers to the act (or process) of removing an issue from and raising it above politics…” while
also pointing to “… the act (or process) of taking an issue out of obscurity or neglect and placing
it on the political agenda” (Knudsen, 2001, 361). This is exactly the point of securitization
theory; a double-edged sword for analysis. Politicization of issues can serve two purposes,
advancing a desired political agenda (such as the series of events surrounding the September 11th
attacks), or shedding light on lesser known security issues (such as the 2015 Syrian migration
crisis). Foreign interference provides a unique opportunity for policy analysis because it brings
two typically distinct areas of security together into one threat environment: domestic discourse
and state sovereignty.
1.2 Securitization Theory and the Copenhagen School
The Copenhagen School has greatly contributed to the modern discourse surrounding
security studies, primarily with its focus on the unfolding of non-traditional defence and security
issues and how society responds to them. The most profound application of the Copenhagen
School is its securitization theory. Formally introduced to academia in the 1998 book “Security:
A New Framework for Analysis” by authors Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde,
securitization theory provides a framework of analysis on how security issues are formulated and
what makes something a matter of national security. More specifically, they argue that
“…security is a speech act that securitizes, that is constitutes one or more referent objects… as
threated to their physical or ideational survival and therefore in urgent need of protection”
(Waever in Hansen, 2009, 1156).
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In this theoretical framework, security is not a matter of protecting borders or preserving
the state. Qualifying something as security is an action in and of itself. This is not to say that
traditional understandings of security do not exist; a missile strike or a ground incursion are
security issues. Securitization theory seeks to add an additional scope of analysis in
characterizing threats in two ways: where the call to action against a threat comes from, who is
being threatened, and if those threatened accept the call to action as a matter of their own
security. For Buzan et al., security is “… a move that takes politics beyond the established rules
of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan
et al., 1998, 23). It is not an issue, but rather an action or process. Figure 1 explains the process
of securitization as broken down by Ole Waever, specifically that securitization relies on
causality.
Figure 1: Waever, O. (2011). Politics, Security, Theory. 42(4-5). Security Dialogue:
Denmark. p.477.
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To securitize means to justify action beyond the normal process of public policy and
governance and thus it can be identified with the arrow on the left (Buzan et al., 1998, 24). For
an issue to be properly securitized, the call to action must be legitimized by the audience being
threatened. “A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a
referent object does not by itself create securitization… the issue is securitized only if and when
the audience accepts it as such” (Buzan et al., 1998, 25). This is the cornerstone of securitization
theory, not the action itself, but the recognition of it by an actor and the acceptance of it by an
audience as security matter. This recognition of a specific act as being one of security relies on
what is known as a speech act and is identified in Figure 1 by the central circle. The speech act
hinges on survival, that ignoring an issue will result in catastrophic consequences for the
audience which is being targeted. “In a democracy, at some point it must be argued in the public
sphere why a situation constitutes security and therefore can legitimately be handled differently”
(Buzan et al., 1998, 28). This notion of acceptance is completely reliant on the audience
legitimizing the claim that an issue is one of security. The audience will vary in its understanding
of a security issue being one of immediate importance, lending itself to the intersubjectivity of
interpreting the current reality of a security environment, identified as the right arrow in Figure
1. The social construction of understanding is where the success of a securitization takes place,
requiring “…both intrinsic features of speech and group that authorizes and recognizes that
speech” (Buzan et al., 1998, 32). The intersecting arrow in the middle of Figure 1 brings this all
together; “[the] spatio-temporal contingency of securitization is checked by, for example, risk-
management practices; changing relations between risk, uncertainty and danger…” (Waever,
2011, 477). This means that the process of securitization relies on both a tangible physical
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understanding of the threat while also interpreting the effects of danger as experienced by the
audience, as well as constantly shifting knowns and unknowns, on a specific target.
Buzan et al. point to various forms of securitizing actors, functional actors, and referent
objects. Securitizing actors can be political leaders, firms, movement groups, or any actor with
an ability to act on behalf of a community of people (Buzan et al., 1998, 36). Functional actors
are those who can influence the dynamics of a sector or lens of all possible “constituent units”,
such as interest groups, experts external to the decision-making process, and the media (Buzan et
al., 1998, 36). Referent objects are those things that are being threatened or targeted by a security
issue and can be communities, vulnerable or marginalized groups, or even concepts like freedom
and democracy (Buzan et al., 1998, 36). The audience is the authorizing force, the group that
accepts the claims of the securitizing or functional actors in making something an emergency
(Buzan et al., 1998, 36). In sum, the securitizing actor will be the one that takes a referent object
and moves it onto the agenda as being threatened by a security issue, the functional actors will
contribute to the narrative, and the audience will take the securitizing actor’s claim and either
accept it or reject it. This process is what ensures a matter is being securitized.
As will be explained in the case study section, foreign interference has two main
functions: destabilizing the state and destabilizing communities. For this paper, the securitizing
actor will be focused on political leadership and government officials. The functional actors are
the think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and media who have all furthered the narrative
on foreign interference as an immediate threat. The referent object is democracy, specifically the
main concept that has been threatened by interference through campaigns to destabilize elections
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through the manipulation of political identity. Finally, the audience is the governed within liberal
democratic nations. Each unit of securitization as described above can be linked to a sector of the
international community. Buzan et al. discuss five sectors in total, the environmental sector, the
economic sector, the military sector, the societal sector, and the political sector. Since foreign
interference relies on governance structures and public discourse, the analysis will focus on the
latter two.
The societal sector is primarily about identity and community membership such as
language, religion, nationality, or culture. As Buzan et al. put it “[threats] to identity are thus
always a question of the construction of something as threatening some ‘we’ – …contributing to
the construction or reproduction of ‘us’” (Buzan et al., 1998, 123). In order for the ‘we’ to be
threatened, the identity of the audience or referent object must be the target of the attack. But
what is meant when the term “identity” is invoked? In a response to critical questions about what
the Copenhagen school means by societal security and identity, Buzan and Waever suggest that
identity refers to the “…defining point regarding existential threats for a society because it
defines whether ‘we’ are still us” (Buzan et al., 1997, 242). In the context of foreign interference,
attacks use public political discourse to undermine electoral outcomes in democratic societies.
This attack specifically targets sovereignty which “…defines when a threat is existential, because
if a state is no longer sovereign, it is no longer a state…” (Buzan et al., 1997, 242). For this
paper, the identity area being targeted is the freedom of individuals to engage in society by
understanding and discussing political issues in the context of civic engagement.
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Securitizing the societal sector can lead to extraordinary measures because identity is the
fundamental baseline upon which all other aspects of political, military, economic, and
environmental life are built. “Individuals seek to defend their group boundaries because, as
social identity theory postulates, group belonging satisfies basic cognitive and emotional needs”
(Theiler, 2003, 264). With foreign interference, this is where the political and societal sectors
intersect. While anything can be construed as political, the purpose of this sector is distinct.
Buzan et al. recognize that political security can bridge across the other sectors, but in order for a
security threat to be one that impacts the political sector it must encompass “…threats to the
legitimacy or recognition either of political units or the essential patterns (structures, processes or
institutions) among them” (Buzan et al., 1998, 144). When a security threat targets the national
identity or political ideology of a state (the threads that bind communities to their respective
government), the threat is targeting the stability of the political order (Buzan et al., 1998, 150).
Any threat against a state’s structure or components, especially in liberal democracies where
structure is imposed by the people who elect their governments, is thus an attack on the
sovereignty of the state.
Foreign interference incorporates threats against both the societal and political sectors. In
feeding on public discourse through troll factories, targeted social media ads and pages, and
media engagement, interference operations seek to unravel or influence the collective identities
of those communities within a political order. It challenges sovereignty, state stability, and
security by manipulating norms and values like freedom of speech, freedom of association,
political debate and discussion, and open democracies. The following sections will look at real
world examples of securitizing actor and referent object or audience responses in the United
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States and Canada. Despite geographic proximity, the responses that have emerged from these
two countries are significantly different both in the recognition of the threat and the actions
taken. Following discussion of what has been done to date, an analysis using the securitization
framework will be applied to each nation’s security environment.
2.0 Case Study: United States
The case of the United States is important since this outlines the most recent,
internationally-recognized incident of foreign interference and thus lays the groundwork for the
cascading responses from allied nations. The 2016 U.S. election was a heated race between
Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, leading to extensive coverage of the inner and outer
workings of the election. The interference experienced during the pre-election period has been
said to have originated in Russia, with Kremlin-based sources leading the activity. Following the
2016 election, intelligence awareness of the severity of the threat has grown into social
awareness. This awareness has largely relied on the security of elections, but not solely on
hardline security. For the public, the concern also rests in the notion of electoral integrity, that
Americans are being fed misinformation through targeted efforts by foreign entities to mislead
and potentially direct electoral outcomes to foreign-desired candidates.
2.1 Actors
Approximately eight months prior to the election, it was revealed that hacking activities
targeting the Democratic National Committee had occurred, resulting in the publication of
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thousands of insider emails from the Clinton campaign (CNN, 2016). It was determined that the
hacking attacks originated from Russian-backed groups associated with Russian intelligence
(CNN, 2016). According to CIA reports, the purpose of the attacks was to influence the public
into supporting President Trump over Secretary Clinton (CNN, 2016). In late 2017, it was also
reported that Facebook removed thousands of advertisements posted between June 2015 and
May 2017 linked to Russian accounts that were “geographically targeted” to specific electoral
colleges throughout the campaign period (CNN, 2016).
In 2017, following the release of reports confirming Russian interference in the 2016
Presidential election, the National Intelligence Council published a report outlining an
assessment of what happened. The report specifically notes that Russia’s intention was to
“…undermine faith in the U.S. democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her
electability…” (NIC, 2017, ii). They also wrote that this influence campaign took advantage of
the effects of mass information disclosures and the impact they have on the global
communication network through social media, mainstream media, and global perceptions of the
U.S. government (NIC, 2017, 5). Based on the relative success of the 2016 electoral interference
campaign, it is anticipated that Russia will apply lessons-learned to future operations “…against
U.S. allies and their election processes” (NIC, 2017, iii). During U.S. Senate hearings on
disinformation in 2017 a brief provided by Clint Watts, a senior fellow at the Center for Cyber
and Homeland Security, highlights the largest area of weakness currently facing our security
apparatus: “…the most important actions to diffuse Russia’s modern Active Measures actually
come from outside the U.S. government – the private sector and civil society” (Watts, 2017, 7).
He goes further writing that “[t]ailored news feeds from social media platforms have created
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information bubbles where voters see only stories and opinions suiting their preferences and
biases – ripe conditions for Russian disinformation campaigns (Watts, 2017, 7). A RAND report
corroborates this read on the threat hypothesizing that the fluidity of the cyber environment will
result in ever-more creative methods of manipulation, arguing that current laws surrounding shell
corporations and not-for-profits are not required to disclose their sources of funding; future
influence operations could see money being funneled “…to issue-oriented ‘social welfare’
groups that have divisive goals” (Courtney, 2018).
Despite significant expert and public pushback on foreign interference, President Trump
has only issued two executive orders on the subject. In September of 2018, the President signed
the “Executive Order on Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a
United States Election”. The order explicitly states that “[a]lthough there has been no evidence
of a foreign power altering the outcome or vote tabulation in any United States election, foreign
powers have historically sought to exploit America’s free and open political system” (White
House, 2018). The Order provides the process that will be undertaken regarding any potential
threats identified by the White House. Consultations involving “the Attorney General and the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in concert with the heads of any other appropriate agencies and,
as appropriate, State and local officials…” will lead to a report “...to the President, the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Defense…” providing a threat
impact assessment laying the groundwork for the possible imposition of sanctions on either the
individual or the foreign actor involved (White House, 2018).
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While the executive order reads as a vague acknowledgement of the threat of foreign
interference, this may be by design. It does not explicitly define foreign interference despite
having defined instances covered by the National Intelligence Committee report, the Standing
Senate Committee on Intelligence report, and the Department of Homeland Security. It is a
recognition that there needs to be action and develops a process to produce a report into instances
of interference, but ultimately leaves the responsibility for a formal response to the discretion of
the President. Shortly after signing the foreign interference executive order, President Trump
approved the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2018 (CISA) creating a
cybersecurity directorate within the Department of Homeland Security (White House, 2018).
According to the DHS website, CISA is responsible for advising on risks related to threats facing
the U.S.’ critical infrastructure and serves as an assess-and-advise branch for national security
(DHS, 2018). The U.S. response to foreign interference as of 2019 has been reactive in nature
rather than proactive.
Former Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen delivered remarks at the State of Homeland Security
Address which clarified the direction needed to address the age of foreign interference. In her
speech, she states “the cyber domain is a target, a weapon, and a threat vector—all at the same
time” underpinning the complexity of addressing the challenges arising from a networked society
(Nielsen, 2019). Her address notably recognizes that threat actors like Russia “…have continued
to interfere in our public affairs and have attempted to sow division online among Americans on
hot-button issues” demonstrating that the threat is evolving to destabilize at the social level rather
than the traditional overt methods of attack (Nielsen, 2019). In this vein, she states that we need a
“whole of society” approach rather than simply a whole of government approach to overcome
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these threats (Nielsen, 2019). Boot and Bergmann of the Council on Foreign Relations suggest
that government agencies like CISA share influence attempts with the public to ensure that the
public is aware (Boot et al., 2019). Presidential Candidate Eric Swalwell (D) has proposed
legislation requiring any candidates or campaigns to report opposition research-style information
offered by a foreign power (Swalwell, 2018). Two additional Bills written by Senators across the
political spectrum have also been introduced calling on sanctions for those countries found
interfering and all-encompassing economic sanctions respectively (Boot et al., 2019). According
to securitizing actors around the White House, i is not enough to legislate, investigate, and
retaliate; governments need to be aware of the sectors of society that are being impacted to
determine the appropriate course of action needed in each case.
The White House has opted to enhance cyber assessment capacity but has provided little
direction or resourcing to do so. The 2018-2020 Annual Performance Report for the Department
of Homeland Security notes that “if federal cybersecurity is not effectively implemented,
compliance of directives and understanding of how to leverage tools and services will not occur”
(DHS, 2019, 18). The report also writes that “CISA… faces delays in the hiring process, which
poses challenges and risks to planned staffing levels to support critical infrastructure goals”
(DHS, 2019, 18). A 2018 Report from the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations wrote
that it is essential to assert Presidential leadership and launch a national response to counter
hybrid threats like foreign interference, but so far, the resourcing required to do so has been
lacking (USFR, 2018, 154).
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On September 10, 2019 President Trump extended the notice of emergency passed
through executive order 13848 on foreign interference (White House, September 10, 2019).
Despite this move, President Trump’s commentary and action surrounding foreign interference
in the U.S. has been contradictory. Numerous advisors representing some of the highest levels of
the intelligence community have been fired or resigned during the President’s term (Diehm et al.,
2019). In July of 2016, then Presidential candidate Trump actively called on Russia to hack into
servers to find the deleted emails from Presidential candidate Clinton (CNN, October 11, 2019).
In June of 2019, President Trump confirmed in an interview that he would take opposition
research or scandals from foreign actors if it was offered (Bruggeman, 2019). On October 3rd,
2019, during a media briefing at the White House, President Trump urged the Ukrainian
government to investigate his opponent in the 2020 Presidential election (Friedman, 2019).
Further, countless tweets questioning the process around investigating instances of foreign
interference appear on President Trump’s twitter page, with the latest attempting to discredit the
FBI inquiry into the request for Ukrainian interference in the 2020 election (Trump, 2019).
2.2 Audience
The perceived meddling in the U.S. election has resulted in public and expert outcry to
defend the sanctity of democratic elections. The notion that foreign actors interfered in the
electoral process, and possibly used social media to influence individual voters by manipulating
extremes and feeding them with what has now been dubbed “fake news” has sown distrust in
democratic institutions. While the United States is perhaps the most pervasive example of
foreign interference, lawmakers have yet to formally recognize and define it. At the baseline,
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foreign interference in the U.S. rests at the public level since it targets social behaviours
impacting democratic elections. To understand the personal connection to foreign interference,
the identity assigned to it by the general public, it’s useful to account for what the public
generally believes. A 2018 Pew Research Centre survey sought to quantify what it means to be a
good American citizen. The survey interviewed 4,656 respondents across the United States and
selected at random (Pew, 2018, 113). The results indicate that the top three qualities for being a
good citizen are, from bottom to top, following the law, voting in elections, and paying taxes
owed; the highest level of ‘very important’ responses fell to voting in elections (Pew, 2018, 5).
Americans were also asked what democratic values they view as important. The top response
was that the rights and freedoms of all people are respected (Pew, 2018, 23).
A poll conducted by researchers from Stanford University and the University of
Wisconsin surveyed approximately 3000 adults who were selected to resemble the distribution of
the U.S. voting population (Tomz et al., 2019, 17). The purpose of the poll was to identify
degrees of acceptance or rejection of foreign interference activities based on specific scenarios
ranging from public endorsement, to spreading truth or lies about a candidate, giving money, or
hacking (Tomz et al., 2019, 17). According to the results, 87% of respondents disapproved when
a foreign country “…took concrete action to bolster its favoured candidate”; hacking and
financing raised disapproval to between 86% and 91% (Tomz et al., 2019, 24). Regarding the
dissemination of information about candidates, results showed an interesting trend; regardless of
whether the information was true or not, individuals disapproved of any information sharing by
foreign entities at a rate of 80% for truth and 86% for lies (Tomz et al., 2019, 24). The impact of
foreign interference on the public is perhaps most clear in the results stemming from active
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GSPIA Major Research Project (Fall 2019)
interference campaigns; 75% of individuals indicated distrust in election results and 51%
indicated a drop in faith in democracy in the U.S. as a whole (Tomz et al., 2019, 30).
Another poll conducted by the NORC Center for Public Affairs Research at the
University of Chicago maps sought to map concerns surrounding electoral tampering, influence
campaigns, and information security. The population surveyed consisted of 1,116 individuals of
voting age and higher representative of the U.S. household population from across the country
(NORC, 2019). The NORC poll identifies similar concerns as the Stanford poll with 63% of
Americans concerned about the vulnerability of their future elections to foreign interference
(NORC, 2019). While there are concerns surrounding the hard security of electoral infrastructure
such as protecting against hacking and digital results tampering, 47% of respondents had
“…significant concerns about foreign influence on how Americans think about candidates or on
the candidates themselves during the 2020 election.” (NORC, 2019). The results of these polls,
while only reflective of a small fraction of American society, can be condensed into one
overarching theme – faith in the U.S. system of democratic government is essential to the
American identity and any attack on that system is an attack on the people it represents. Direct
attacks such as those on infrastructure, hacking into polling stations, and tampering with results
are of significant concern. But there is an aspect that is being overlooked by lawmakers in terms
of response. The trust that Americans have in their system of government is also being attacked.
How do you categorize a threat actor that targets a qualitative idea like faith? How must
lawmakers respond to threats against the way their public thinks and acts? Experts in the field of
intelligence and foreign affairs have provided insights into the hard policy aspect of foreign
interference, specifically that society is experiencing interference with the one area of politics
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GSPIA Major Research Project (Fall 2019)
that ultimately decides how people are governed. Without trust in institutions, the very notion of
good government is under threat.
2.3 Analysis
President Trump’s discourse on foreign interference, while contradictory to the various
legislative action his office has taken to date, provides the basis for the speech act. Much of the
audience’s awareness of foreign interference and its impact on the referent object, democratic
elections, has been driven by government officials and advanced by functional actors. Table 1
provides a breakdown of the materials used in the case study analysis of the United States. In the
table, the sources contributing to the securitization process are categorized based on their role.
SECURITIZATION SCENARIO MATRIX: UNITED STATES
Referent
Securitizing Actor Functional Actor Audience
Object
President Trump Media
National Intelligence Committee RAND Corporation
Senate Committee on Foreign Council on Foreign
Relations Relations Democratic Voting
Elections Public
Department of Homeland NORC Centre for Public
Security Affairs Research
Congressional and Senate Stanford and Wisconsin
Representatives University
Table 1: Breakdown of case study subjects for the United States
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SN: 5568888
GSPIA Major Research Project (Fall 2019)
In this scenario, the securitizing actors have been the President, the National Intelligence
Council, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Department of Homeland Security, and
the elected officials who have called for immediate legislative action, and who have laid out the
consequences of continuing to ignore the existence of foreign interference. According to many of
them, lack of action moving forward could irreparably damage public trust in the mechanisms of
government and thus undermine the security and sovereignty of the nation (NIC, 2017, 5;
Nielsen, 2019; USFR, 2018, 154). The intensity and scale upon which Russian bots had
infiltrated and spread fake news were determined to be direct attacks on the stability of U.S.
governmental institutions and were undertaken with the intent of manipulating the way the
audience perceived their government (NIC, 2017, 2). According to Buzan, “…interventions by
one state in the domestic affairs of another… define the category more usefully…”, meaning the
threat posed to the United States is one against the political sector (Buzan, 1983, 77).
Security experts, Senate committee reports, and various government departments have
directed the Executive branch towards options to tackle foreign interference, especially in
democratic processes. The contributions of these civic groups are essential to the construction of
the security environment. “Since the state is a legal and political construct built on the concept of
sovereignty over a defined territory and population, it achieves security by ensuring its continued
sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Theiler, 2003, 250). Many of these inputs, specifically from
those speaking on behalf of the state and Departments like Foreign Affairs and Homeland
Security, have conformed with the grammar of security on the matter of foreign interference by
referencing the threat, categorizing it as an emergency, and demanding action to counter the
negative effects of ignoring it (Wilkinson, 2015, 35). The findings of the National Intelligence
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GSPIA Major Research Project (Fall 2019)
Council indicate as much, noting that the U.S. electoral process is at risk of being targeted again
in future elections (NIC, 2017, iii). Former Secretary Nielsen, one of the recent resignees under
the Trump Administration, went as far as to call out foreign interference as one of the modern
methods of “…weaponizing our own innovation against us” calling on a “whole of society
approach” to combat it (Nielsen, 2019). This is the beginning of the securitization process, “…to
identify a threat to the social and cultural survival of community and a strategy to ward off that
threat…” (Theiler, 2010, 107). These statements have driven much of the action emerging from
the White House.
The formal findings of the bi-partisan committee reports and those of intelligence
officials have suggested that we are in the after-math of a significant threat to our democratic
institutions and thus need immediate action to prevent further meddling in future elections to
preserve the integrity of the system. As a response from the United States government, President
Trump imposed an emergency response for foreign interference by invoking the first executive
order, removing the security action from the regular legislative process. The use of an identified
emergency mechanism, as it is formally understood, amplifies the message being delivered to the
audience for the issue it is securitizing, which factors into the interaction between the state and
the populace (Newman, 2001, 250). Following the various pushes from the functional actors like
the Department of Homeland Security, President Trump moved the issue “…out of the sphere of
normal politics [and] into the realm of emergency politics… [to be] dealt with swiftly and
without the normal (democratic) rules and regulations…” (Taureck, 2006, 54-55). According to
media coverage which has included the thoughts and opinions of functional actors, the response
to foreign interference has been wanting. This, in part, adds to the narrative being pushed in the
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GSPIA Major Research Project (Fall 2019)
United States by functional and supporting securitizing actors (like the various government
agencies) who have contributed to securitizing interference by projecting their positions to the
audience, but may not have a final say on action; in terms of society’s security, “…people look
to the state and count on the state… to generate and to maintain the social condition of safety”
which in this case includes the security of public discourse, free speech, and political thought and
debate (Jackson, 2006, 16). The Brookings institute went as far as calling out President Trump’s
double standard, claiming that he is both threatening to punish foreign interference, as is outlined
by his executive order that says the U.S. will punish it with sanctions, but also by simultaneously
inviting it for opposition research on his political opponents (Wright, 2019). They call on the
government to implement harsher deterrent measures or face further instances of interference in
the U.S’ democratic processes (Wright, 2019).
While the main securitizing actor, the President, has taken few steps to counter the threat,
other government officials have made the point that more needs to be done and functional actors
agree. An NPR report suggests that “…a U.S. election as a whole is almost impossible to hack —
but an adversary doesn't need to affect the whole country. All it needs to do is affect small
numbers of people in key places...” (Ewing, 2019). The threat is thus defined as one that has not
only occurred but is likely to occur again. In this instance, the functional actors are attempting to
shift the discourse surrounding the security issue, acting as the neck to the head of state, pivoting
his view toward how they define the threat and what they think the consequences of inaction
could be. What are the implications of this? In a democratic state, it is not uncommon for special
interest groups and non-governmental organizations to press for the addition of policy issues to
the political agenda. In this case however, what is typically the role of the state (identifying and
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SN: 5568888
GSPIA Major Research Project (Fall 2019)
declaring action on a national security threat) is now being championed by the functional actors.
Such a shift could indicate that the issue has been successfully securitized since the demands for
immediate response are originating in the public sphere. The audience is receiving more
information from the functional actors than the securitizing actors, and public opinion polls
indicate that the message is resonating.
There are further concerns that a soft response to a nuanced threat like foreign
interference will give way to more extensive cyber-based manipulations and attacks (Bloomberg,
2018). Buzan makes this point in another of his writings on securitization theory, specifically
that an “… excessively passive policy… raises the danger that threats will become too large to
deal with except at great cost” (Buzan, 1983, 89). The risk inherent in underestimating foreign
interference is that it could result in the breakdown and even destabilization of the very system
that allows for the fundamental democratic value of free and fair elections. Waever suggests that
this is an important aspect of justifying extraordinary measures; “…the relative advantages of
security handling compared to non-securitized handling” (Waever, 2011, 473). There continue to
be extensive discussions from the securitizing actors in bringing the issue of foreign interference
out of obscurity and into the emergency zone to counteract the possibility of an overly
complacent audience, especially since these actors have stressed the importance of civil sector
responsibility in recognizing the threat (Hansen et al., 2009, 1161). Elections and the right to
vote have been entrenched in liberal democratic countries. If citizens are losing trust in the
electoral process, it undermines the legitimacy of government.
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GSPIA Major Research Project (Fall 2019)
Democratic engagement is one of the main methods of ensuring a government is
accountable to its country, which in turn guarantees the strength of the sovereign state. “[For] a
state, sovereignty defines when a threat is existential, because if a state is no longer sovereign, it
is no longer a state…” (Buzan et al., 1997, 242). One of the polls included herein noted that 75%
of Americans are losing faith in the electoral process due to the potential of foreign interference.
If this poll is indeed representative, it points to a larger security problem facing the securitizing
actor, specifically the legitimacy of their leadership in the eyes of the public. According to the
various polls that have been taken from the general public, awareness of the threat posed by
foreign interference is increasing. In fact, many Americans have identified that voting and being
an informed citizen is important, while also agreeing that action should be taken to protect
institutional stability. Many respondents also consider any form of interference from external
actors to be highly problematic. This signifies at the bare minimum an acceptance of the speech
act; that foreign interference is a security problem and requires immediate and strong action.
3.0 Case Study: Canada
Canada faces both interference and influence operations, but to date Canada’s lawmakers,
the media, and the general public have been prioritizing electoral integrity and security. There
have been few bills dealing explicitly with foreign interference, though public pressure and
political posturing have led to broad interpretations of what that means. Furthermore, unlike its
allies, Canada has yet to fully unpack specific threat actors acting within the bounds of foreign
interference, relying instead on explaining what identified threat actors are known to do on a
broad basis.
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