Postscript: The End of Football, or: Football in the Time of Corona

Page created by Christian Park
 
CONTINUE READING
Postscript: The End of Football, or:
      Football in the Time of Corona

On Friday, 13 March 2020 the PL and FL as well as the DFL and DFB
interrupted the ongoing season in their respective competitions. The esca-
lating Covid-19 crisis forced Europe’s national governing football bodies
to hit the pause button. The French association announced its own deci-
sion to do so on that day as well. After the leagues in Spain and Italy had
called a halt a few days before, live football—medially the most ubiq-
uitous popular cultural phenomenon on the continent—had suddenly
stopped. For the first time since WWII, European league competition
was suspended.
    What follows is a rather essayistic account of my thoughts on football
during the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic and might not necessarily meet
the standards of academic scrutiny. Given its topicality and the tremen-
dous effect this crisis has had on football, this seems to be the right way
to go forward at this point, in the knowledge that some of the statements
I make here might already prove to be incorrect next week. I also apol-
ogise in advance for the slightly cynical undertone here and there, but
what has unfolded in terms of football with the pandemic hitting Europe
was both unexpected and unbelievable in many regards and still leaves me
speechless here and there. I expect this extreme case of an external shock
to make the multiple schisms that exist within football—and anywhere
else—even more visible and test the resilience of the system as such. I
will try to go about this in a way similar to how I have structured the

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive     289
license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
D. Ziesche, Lower League Football in Crisis,
Football Research in an Enlarged Europe,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53747-0
290   POSTSCRIPT: THE END OF FOOTBALL, OR: FOOTBALL …

book, meaning to recount the ongoing processes in the top sphere of
football, describe its repercussions on the actual object of study—lower
league football—and consider the effects on the specific clubs in the case
studies. Finally, I will apply what I learned in the field during the years
I have kept myself occupied with football to make some predictions on
what might be forthcoming. This account will be as balanced as possible,
but I am closer to the German case by mere geographical vicinity, so this
will be presented here in more detail.
    When after weeks of no live football, German league play resumed,
nobody even pretended that this was about the sport and the need to
conclude an ongoing competition in a fair manner. Any attempts to hide
the true intention of the relaunch as anything other than an attempt to
meet the contractual requirements to obtain the last instalment of TV
money for the ongoing season had been abandoned. The relaunch itself
then was carefully prepared. While football never really left the news head-
lines during the weeks of restrictions on public life, officials repeatedly
stated that while the situation for football was indeed dire, there were of
course more pressing matters requiring attention; there were more impor-
tant things than football, after all. After a hygiene concept for a relaunch
without a stadium audience and including a strict code of conduct for
players was drafted, state interior ministers sanctioned it as viable. This
was the political backing required to present the national government
with the plans. On 6 May, German chancellor Angela Merkel allowed
the season to continue. The whole decision-making process was accom-
panied by voices from the media which argued for a sign for a return to
normalcy as represented by the commencement of the football season;
as a bit of distraction for the weary German soul. With nine match days
to go and excluding live audiences from the stadium, football in the first
and second Bundesliga resumed on 16 May. The 3. Liga resumed on
30 May with eleven match days to go. For a few weeks in May and June
and much to the delight of officials, German football lead the world foot-
ball market since other leagues, including the English league, were far
from relaunching. Schedules were extremely tight, with two games a week
until the season was due to be finished by the end June/early July. The
German cup semi-finals were also scheduled in this period. In England,
football resumed on 17 June, almost precisely a month after the German
top leagues resumed play on similar terms.1 The Championship continued
its season on 20 June, with League 1 and 2 voting to end the season by
POSTSCRIPT: THE END OF FOOTBALL, OR: FOOTBALL …      291

determining the final league table on a points-per-game—PPG—basis and
only play the play-off matches.
    The mode in which football was continued was nothing short of a trav-
esty of ‘the beautiful game’. Perhaps the significance of the supporters in
the creation of the cultural good that is a football match has now become
clear once and for all, and perhaps this is also part of the answer to the
question of why they still call it ‘the people’s game’. Because in the end,
it is the people around the pitch that create the spectacle, who comment
on every move on the pitch and create atmosphere where otherwise there
is just the hollow thump of a ball being kicked around and the occa-
sional shout from the sideline. This way of playing and presenting the
game has truly ripped the heart and soul out of football. The German
word Geisterspiel to denote matches behind closed doors resonates the
eerie atmosphere in the empty stadiums. While every decent training pitch
would suffice for playing these matches and might make the lack of a
crowd less apparent—and, moreover, save a lot of costs—the clubs for
some reason still use their gigantic, empty stadiums.
    In both countries in the leagues below, the third tier clubs voted in
favour of a termination of the season and to determine the final league
standings on a PPG basis. There is no reason—except TV revenue—that
this should not have worked for the top leagues as well. In fact, one might
argue that out of all the possibilities for ending the season, the calcula-
tion on a PPG basis is perhaps the least unfair, especially regarding the
competitive fairness on a European football level. There exist all sorts of
issues arising from the unilateral decision-making with regard to resuming
national league competitions. The break in playing practice might be a
crucial factor once UEFA resumes its competitions in the CL and EL
over the summer. Differing regulations regarding promotion and relega-
tion might cause a wave of lawsuits which could spill over to the European
level if clubs feel they might have been defrauded of a lucrative CL
starting position.
    The time of growth seems over for now, as the most recent selling
of PL rights has already indicated. The untimely sale by auction of the
German national TV rights for the seasons 2021/2022 to 2024/2025
was delayed by a month. Still, the price finally agreed upon fell short
of the envisaged increase from e4.64 to e5.2b n made earlier in the
year (Kicker 2020c). With some e240m less in TV revenue and the first
decrease in twelve years, a more balanced distribution down the leagues
becomes even more unlikely. In England, the BBC reported a loss of
292   POSTSCRIPT: THE END OF FOOTBALL, OR: FOOTBALL …

£340m per club for the current season even it being continued behind
closed doors (Roan et al. 2020). In Germany, too, the TV money for the
2020/2021 season has already been reduced from e1.35bn to e1.2 bn
due to a fallout of payments from various DFL contractors, among them
Eurosport (Kicker 2020a).
    The systemic mid- to long-term repercussions are even harder to
foresee. How widespread rebates for sponsors and TV broadcasters will
be treated is hard to say at the moment but will surely have a significant
impact on the clubs; newly negotiated contracts might raise much less in
actual revenue. Still, my best estimate is that clubs at the top will largely
be spared any significant losses, they are simply too big to fail. While
the financial severity of the situation in the top two leagues in Germany
has been talked up quite a bit—perhaps in order to raise pressure for a
continuation of league competition—I doubt whether there would have
been actual cases of insolvency, especially of clubs in the first Bundesliga.
The numbers presented in this study speak for themselves: no first tier
club in Germany has ever filed for administration, while England has only
had one—see Chapter “Economic Crisis: Number Games”. Even if some
risk financial trouble, private and public sponsors and investors will help
to get them through. Thus, while the e380m instalment of TV money is
surely needed to stabilize the situation at individual clubs, the top clubs
were never the ones in real trouble in the first place.
    This assessment changes dramatically when looking at the situation in
the leagues below. As opposed to the clubs at the very top, gate and
match-day revenues contribute much more to financing lower league
clubs, as this study has also shown. Since playing in front of a crowd was
out of the question and TV money was not a significant issue, clubs in
most leagues below the second tier voted to suspend the season to keep
expenditures as low as possible. The German 3. Liga is an exception in
this regard—and the restart of the season against the will of a significant
number of clubs is likely to have dire consequences (MDR 2020a). On
17 June 1. FC Kaiserslautern was the first team from this league to file for
administration with FSV Zwickau on the verge of doing so. In both cases
it is evident that the Covid-19 crisis was not the only reason for this step,
but it certainly sped up an inevitable process. The DFL and DFB knew
what to expect from their clubs and announced early on that clubs filing
for administration this season would not suffer the obligatory nine-point
deduction (Ruf 2020). In any case, far-reaching fallout for clubs from the
third tier down is certainly to be expected in the months to come.
POSTSCRIPT: THE END OF FOOTBALL, OR: FOOTBALL …        293

    It cannot be foreseen how the clubs will react and whether those
who feel disadvantaged by their respective governing bodies’ decisions
will quietly accept their fate. It is not unlikely that some clubs will seek
compensation in one form or another; a long list of lawsuits in this
regard is not an unrealistic scenario. The case of the German second
Bundesliga side Dynamo Dresden is exemplary. The team had two players
test positive for Covid-19 shortly before the restart of the season, which
meant that the whole team had to remain in quarantine for fourteen
days (Wilson 2020). While plans for the relaunch were not interrupted
by the incident—or other such occurrences such as violations of the
hygiene rules at other clubs—Dynamo started late into the remainder of
the season on an even tighter schedule than the other teams while trying
to fend off relegation on the basis of a significant team training deficit of
two weeks.
    The clubs dealt with in this study—and I will only include the ETFCs
in the following—are affected by this gap in different ways. Of the English
teams, MTFC have secured a place in League Two and finished in posi-
tion twenty-one of the league table. On the other hand, CFFC have barely
managed to stay in the National League, finishing nineteenth, only two
positions short of relegation and only two points more than the first
relegated team. While salaries where paid in full in March, the players
and staff have accepted a twenty per cent reduction in wages and have
been furloughed (Reid 2020). In Germany’s Regionalliga West, RWE
had a chance at promotion this season when the table’s current leader,
SV Rödinghausen, announced that they would not apply to start in level
three, even if they won the championship. This means that the second-
placed team would enter the play-off, a position RWE—as the team
ranked third at the time of suspension—might have reached if the season
had continued uninterrupted. This was why RWE was the only team to
vote against a termination of the season: a PPG decision would not help
them. That said, the team in second place, SC Verl, was unsuccessful in its
first application for a licence for the third tier since its stadium does not
meet the minimum requirements (Wozniak 2020). It is, however, likely
that Verl will gain a licence in a second application. In any case, they have
been declared the team to play the play-off against the champion of the
Regionalliga Nordost. In this league, LOK was declared champion after
the final league standings were determined by a PPG calculation. VSG
Altglienicke, the team in first position and Energie Cottbus, ranked third,
opposed the PPG solution. Altglienicke proposed a championship final
294   POSTSCRIPT: THE END OF FOOTBALL, OR: FOOTBALL …

against LOK, while Cottbus wanted a play-off solution (MDR 2020b).
The regional football association NOFV decided in early June for PPG.
Thus, LOK might look at promotion to the third tier by the official end
of the season and, in a slightly different scenario, might have faced RWE
in the play-offs.
    Generally, it is noteworthy that PPG-decisions will have much more
severe effects in the German lower leagues as the schedules are more
irregular than in England. Whereas in England games played differ
by a maximum of one—League Two—or two—League One, National
League—games respectively, in Germany, the difference is up to four
games in the Regionalliga West and Nordost. Furthermore, structurally,
it will be challenging to manage the competitions from the lower league
levels up to the European level and manage promotions, relegations and
starting positions in the competitions fairly. Structural changes are also
being discussed: there are plans to create a two-division third tier in
Germany next season. One tier below, the Regionalliga Nord will defi-
nitely be split into two divisions and together field four more teams than
currently (Kicker 2020b).
    In Germany, the relaunch requests were accompanied by solemn oaths
that the sport would be reformed and provide its clubs a financially
more sustainable basis. In an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, Christian Seifert, CEO of the DFL said that it was ‘not easy
to have a discussion on negative developments in a system which has
been so successful in recent years’ and that it ‘perhaps took a real crisis
to come to a halt and to introspect’ (cited in Horeni 2020, my trans-
lation). He also announced a task force on the future of football and
the possibility of salary caps on players’ wages (ibid.). By the time of the
interview, it had become clear that—unexpectedly—the public backing
for a resuming of league play was limited. According to a Yougov poll,
only thirty-four per cent wanted to see a restart behind closed doors,
while forty-six per cent were opposed to continuing the season at all
(Schneider 2020). The organised fan scene also criticised the DFL’s
course in the crisis in no uncertain terms, calling a return to play
an ‘unadulterated mockery towards the rest of society’, there should
be no ‘Lex Bundesliga’ (Fanszenen Deutschlands, cited. in Faszination
Fankurve 2020, my translation). The communique also called for greater
solidarity and a distribution of TV revenues down the leagues. Both the
opposition of the fans to the relaunch as well as the well-known tendency
of supporters to show up in front of stadiums despite a match being
POSTSCRIPT: THE END OF FOOTBALL, OR: FOOTBALL …         295

played behind closed doors, sparked fears that larger crowds might gather
in front of stadiums in order to purposely violate the hygiene concept and
force a termination of matches. Britain’s sport minister Nigel Huddle-
ston said that these gatherings would ‘threaten football’s culture’ (cited
in Ingle 2020). It is reassuring to hear that playing a total of ninety-two
PL matches behind closed doors and limiting the contact between players
on and off the field poses no such threat.
    As mentioned, this current crisis has made the prevalent, severe fragility
of the system as outlined in this volume all too clear. A few days or
weeks in which business is not as usual and the first major cracks appear.
Although this is true for the top, it is all the more true for the lower levels
where—as this study has shown—club finances are especially imbalanced
with regard to the amount of the budget swallowed up by player wages.
No business can be kept afloat on such a basis if the only continuous
income stream ceases to bring in fresh money.
    Many fans want to see the current crisis as the herald of a long overdue,
impending end of football as we know it and as a chance for fundamental
renewal. I am sceptical. I believe that an outcome where the system
as such returns to old habits once the current shock is over is much
more likely. The system would have to truly renew itself from bottom
up, if major changes are to be expected. A wide-reaching collapse of
clubs throughout the leagues—the top ones included—could bring about
such revolutionary change. However, I do not see a fallout on such a
scale is imminent at the top. In the past weeks, football once more fell
short of showing true solidarity, the topflight still exists in and for itself
alone. The abandoned plans of Liverpool FC to follow the examples of
Newcastle United and Tottenham to put staff on furlough on the basis
of the UK government’s job retention scheme speaks for itself (Hunter
2020). The vast majority of players did not accept actual cuts to their
salaries in support of ‘their’ clubs. In England at least, clubs managed to
reach agreements with their players on wage deferrals. To my knowledge,
a meaningful discussion on a fairer—or more solidary—redistribution of
TV money has not taken place, neither in England nor Germany. Despite
all the calls for and claims of solidarity and of football as community, it
seems to be pretty much every man for himself.
    It is a strong display of the ties between football, politics and economy
in Germany and England that the top leagues were able to continue their
competitions when the top leagues of other sports could not. Moreover,
the special status football enjoys becomes apparent as top football can
296   POSTSCRIPT: THE END OF FOOTBALL, OR: FOOTBALL …

now claim to be officially ‘system-relevant’, as it was allowed to continue
its business at a time when only sectors attributed such status were kept
running. It will remain to be seen what changes this current crisis will
bring about to this relationship and the system itself. Lower league foot-
ball, as the study has shown, has already faced a number of crises. This
further challenge—for now—only makes these more apparent. There is
still a beauty to the game itself, but I see little beauty in the conditions in
which it is currently played. Whether this crisis heralds the end of football
as we know it remains to be seen; it certainly meant a pause and thus, for
once, a time to think on it.

                                    Note
   1. In Spain, La Liga and La Liga 2 had already resumed play on the weekend
      of 10–12 June. In Italy, Seria A and B relaunched on 20 June.

                               References
Faszination Fankurve. (2020, April 16). Fanszenen Deutschland: ‘Geisterspiele
   sind keine Lösung’. Faszination Fankurve. https://www.faszination-fan
   kurve.de/index.php?head=Geisterspiele-sind-keine-Loesung&folder=sites&
   site=news_detail&news_id=21677.
Horeni, M. (2020, April 28). DFL-Chef Seifert im Interview: ‘Es muss möglich
   sein, Gehälter von Spielern zu deckeln’. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
   https://www.faz.net/-gtn-9yx4z.
Hunter, A. (2020, April 6). Liverpool Reverse Decision to Furlough Staff After
   Fierce Criticism. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/football/
   2020/apr/06/liverpool-reverse-decision-to-furlough-staff-after-fierce-critic
   ism-coronavirus.
Ingle, S. (2020, June 16). Government Warns of Neutral Grounds in Premier
   League If Fans Go to Matches. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.
   com/football/2020/jun/16/government-warns-of-neutral-grounds-in-pre
   mier-league-if-fans-go-to-matches.
Kicker. (2020a, June 21). Sky bleibt wichtigster DFL-Partner - Samstagabend-
   Spiele der 2. Liga im Free-TV. https://www.kicker.de/778014/artikel.
Kicker. (2020b, June 17). Regionalliga Nord plant Aufteilung in zwei Staffeln.
   Kicker. https://www.kicker.de/777717/artikel/.
Kicker. (2020c, January 13). Neuer TV-Vertrag: Die Bundesliga braucht 5,2
   Milliarden Euro. Kicker. https://www.kicker.de/767041/artikel.
MDR. (2020a, April 13). 3. Liga tief zerstritten—Sollen Vereine in die Insolvenz
   gezwungen werden? MDR. https://www.mdr.de/sport/fussball_3l/grosser-
POSTSCRIPT: THE END OF FOOTBALL, OR: FOOTBALL …          297

   streit-in-der-dritten-liga-sollen-vereine-in-die-insolvenz-gertrieben-werden-
   100.html.
MDR. (2020b, June 5). NOFV: Tag der Entscheidung für die Regionalliga
   Nordost. MDR. https://www.mdr.de/sport/fussball_rl/regionalliga-nofv-ent
   scheidung-100.html.
Reid, N. (2020, April 7). Chesterfield FC Puts All Players and Staff on Furlough
   Due to Coronavirus. Derby Telegraph. https://www.derbytelegraph.co.uk/
   news/local-news/chesterfield-fc-puts-players-furlough-4027337.
Roan, D., Stone, S., & Scott, L. (2020, May 11). Premier League Clubs Facing
   £340m TV Refund Even If Season Resumes. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/
   sport/football/52579299.
Ruf, C. (2020, 17 June). 1. FC Kaiserslautern in der Insolvenz: Goldener
   Rettungsring. Der Spiegel. https://www.spiegel.de/sport/fussball/1-fc-kaiser
   slautern-beantragt-in-der-3-liga-insolvenz-pfaelzer-sauplan-a-69b7ee5a-5cc8-
   4f8c-9f67-c5f455a3ec9f.
Schneider, P. (2020, May 11). Zu früh oder überfällig? Wie die Deutschen zur
   Fortsetzung der Bundesliga stehen. YouGov. https://yougov.de/news/2020/
   05/11/zu-fruh-oder-uberfallig-wie-die-deutschen-zur-fort/.
Wilson, J. (2020, May 10). Dynamo Dresden Positive Tests ’Not a Setback’
   to Bundesliga Restart. The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/foo
   tball/2020/05/10/dynamo-dresden-positive-tests-not-setback-bundesliga-
   restart/.
Wozniak, K. (2020, April 24). Keine Drittliga-Lizenz für den SC Verl. Revier-
   sport. https://www.reviersport.de/artikel/keine-drittliga-lizenz-fuer-den-sc-
   verl/.
Index

A                                        C
Academy, football, 251                   Civil society, 27, 36, 46, 47, 49, 56,
Administration, 10, 50, 98, 99, 101,          60, 155, 157, 168, 261, 263,
     103–108, 110, 159, 180, 183,             272, 285
     185, 191, 199, 200, 204, 210,       Coalition government, 163
     211, 231, 262, 263, 280, 292        Collective identity, 13, 18, 53–55,
Against Modern Football (AMF)                 131, 220, 241, 242, 278, 280
     (movement), 6, 60, 125, 226,        Commercialisation, 4, 9, 98, 117,
     242, 268, 269, 272, 280, 286             122, 124, 134, 146, 220, 224,
All-Party Parliamentary Football              269, 270, 285
     Group (APPFG), 125, 154–156         Commodification, 4, 9, 58, 117, 124,
Annual general meeting (AGM), 35,             269
     188, 189, 191, 205–207, 211,        Communitisation, 17, 62–64, 67,
     223, 225, 265                            120, 123, 170, 240, 256, 272,
                                              278, 280, 282
                                         Community engagement, 153, 160
                                         Community programme (CP), 17, 18,
                                              153, 165, 168, 169, 171, 181,
                                              207, 221, 250, 252–258, 263,
B                                             267, 274
Big society, 155, 163                    Company club, 35, 37, 38, 41, 56,
Branding, 15, 191, 221, 264, 265              106, 110, 164, 165, 169, 180,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive         299
license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
D. Ziesche, Lower League Football in Crisis,
Football Research in an Enlarged Europe,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53747-0
300   INDEX

    182, 184, 201, 220, 264, 266,        I
    273, 285                             Institutionalism, 13
CSR, 165, 166, 168, 257, 262             (Institutional) mimicry/mimicking,
Cultural capital, 49–51, 58, 59, 86,          12, 15, 64, 128, 208, 278
    106, 159, 185                        Intervention, 99, 124, 155, 162, 266,
Cultural resistance, 266, 272, 273,           280
    280, 281                             Isomorphism
                                           coercive, 12, 208, 262
                                           mimetic, 12, 262, 264, 271, 273
D                                          normative, 12, 208, 262, 273
Democracy, 189, 215, 224, 226, 266,
    285
                                         L
Do-It-Yourself (DIY), 233, 245
                                         Labour Party, 37, 156
                                         Ladies football club (LFC), 168, 205,
                                             258
E
                                         Legitimisation, 11, 12, 17, 170, 193,
English football league (EFL), 27, 32,       220, 221, 263, 273, 278, 281
    33, 38, 41, 83, 94, 99, 163, 209,    Liberal market, 128, 285
    221, 250, 263
Established traditional football clubs
    (ETFC), 9, 179, 200, 253, 262,       M
    267, 273                             Members, 35–38, 40–42, 45–47, 50,
Etzioni, A., 2                              52, 55–57, 61, 65, 66, 81, 82,
                                            91, 98, 107, 118, 119, 127,
                                            128, 169, 180, 185–191, 200,
F                                           204, 205, 207, 212, 215, 220,
Foreign Investment, 86, 87, 89, 90          223–226, 231, 232, 234, 236,
                                            239, 241, 244, 249, 256, 266,
                                            268, 270, 272, 274, 279, 283
G
Globalisation, 6, 13, 14, 19, 36, 46,
                                         N
    54, 222
                                         National League (NL), 27, 29, 33,
Glocalisation, 11, 13, 18, 19, 222,
                                             60, 94, 163, 291, 293, 294
    278, 279
                                         Neo-liberalism, 60
Governance, 6–8, 27, 202, 275, 284,
                                         Network(s), 60, 251, 263, 282
    286
Ground moves, 137–138
                                         O
                                         Ownership, 7, 8, 27, 38, 40, 41,
H                                           85–88, 90, 106, 109, 118,
Human capital, 14, 211, 212                 127, 141–143, 155–157, 180,
Hybrid organisations, 274, 283, 287         182, 188, 227, 231, 234, 241,
INDEX    301

    266–268, 274, 279, 280, 283,        Societisation, 17, 58, 62–64, 67, 120,
    286                                     122, 170, 240, 256, 272, 273,
                                            278, 280, 282
                                        Society club, 35, 40, 47, 56, 164,
P                                           165, 169, 187, 188, 236, 256,
Player wages, 98, 220, 295                  280
Political and protest football clubs    Stakeholders, 56, 165, 170, 240, 272,
     (PPFC), 10, 18, 179, 180, 187,         278
     200, 205, 212, 220, 226, 233,      Supporter ownership, 6, 8, 155, 156,
     236, 238, 240, 245, 253, 266,          169, 180, 183, 203–205, 215
     267, 269, 270, 272, 273, 279,      Supporter Trust (ST), 4, 40, 50, 125,
     280, 284, 286, 287                     183, 188, 268
Politicisation, 57–60, 125, 153, 161,
     268, 272, 278
Premier League (PL), 6, 27–29, 33,      T
     36, 38, 41, 66, 82–86, 88, 89,     Taylor Report, 66, 139, 158
     91, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99, 103–105,   Third sector, 46, 47, 274
     109, 110, 125, 139, 140, 142,      Third way, 18, 162
     147, 160, 162, 163, 168, 170,      TV rights (revenues), 82, 91, 93, 95,
     187, 206, 215, 221, 235, 241,          98, 105, 109, 110, 291
     273, 287, 289, 291, 295
Protest, 86, 157, 179, 188, 242, 269,
     270, 272                           V
Punk football, 233                      Values, 2, 8, 12, 48, 52, 56, 61, 63,
                                            81, 88, 89, 91–93, 95, 120,
                                            122–125, 128, 133, 135, 136,
R                                           142, 145, 154, 155, 212, 225,
Resilience, 11, 168, 280, 289               239, 240, 273, 278, 280, 281,
                                            286
                                        Volunteers, 42, 47, 81, 213, 249, 264
S
Sense of place, 132, 134, 230, 262,
     268                                Y
Separation of structures, 180           Young talent, 169, 204, 207, 208,
Social capital, 49                          211, 214, 215
You can also read