RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS - BASED ON REPRESENTATIVE RESEARCH ON THE LITHUANIAN PUBLIC OPINION
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MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA
RESEARCH ON THE
ASSESSMENT OF THE
GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION
AND PERCEPTION OF
THREATS
BASED ON REPRESENTATIVE RESEARCH ON
THE LITHUANIAN PUBLIC OPINION
EASTERN EUROPE STUDIES CENTRE
Vilnius
July 2020RESEARCH PREPARED BY: Linas Kojala, Eastern Europe Studies Centre (Ed.) Justinas Kulys, Eastern Europe Studies Centre Andrius Prochorenko, Eastern Europe Studies Centre Adam Roževič, Eastern Europe Studies Centre Scientific Ed. Dr Mažvydas Jastramskis Language Ed.: UAB Lingvobalt © Cover picture: Capt. John Farmer
Table of Contents
SUMMARY OF THE KEY FINDINGS 5
INTRODUCTION 7
I. FINDINGS FROM THE PREVIOUS EESC RESEARCH STUDIES 9
Monograph Russian Propaganda: Analysis, Evaluation, Recommendations
(Lith. Rusijos propaganda: analizė, įvertinimas, rekomendacijos) (research
conducted in 2016, monograph published in 2017) 9
Analytical study: Impact of Disinformation on Lithuanian Society
(Lith. Dezinformacijos poveikis Lietuvos visuomenei) (2018) 11
II. THE 2020 RESEARCH AND ITS FINDINGS 13
Methodology 13
Assessment of Lithuania’s democracy and economy 13
EU, NATO and globalisation 18
Evaluation of the former Soviet times 21
National defence and its financing 23
Attitude towards Russia 27
Opinion on a larger (military) conflict with Russia 28
Knowledge of the Russian language 30
Evaluation of China 32
Evaluation of foreign states and their leaders’ friendliness toward Lithuania 32
Media consumption habits 37
FURTHER RESEARCH 43
ENDNOTES 44RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
5
Summary of
the key findings
The third research study conducted by the Eastern Europe Studies
Centre allows us to state that the Lithuanian population is sceptical
towards the functioning of democracy in the country, and the ability
of ordinary people in the country to influence the decision-making
process. Younger people are more positive about the possibilities
to influence state politics; however, the general tendency has not
significantly changed throughout recent years.
The share of people who remain positive about the Soviet times is
stabilising: in 2018, as well as in 2020, approximately one-fifth of the
respondents were of this opinion, which is almost two times less
than 8 years ago.
Lithuanian population remains supportive of the country’s NATO and
EU membership. In the case of the Alliance, 53% think that if Lithua-
nia were under threat, the countries would come to the country’s res-
cue. However, only 26% totally agreed or agreed with the statement
that the EU has handled the pandemic properly.
62% of those surveyed are proud to be Lithuanian citizens. 58% of
the respondents, if unable to resist through the use of weapons,
would contribute to the defence of the country in another way. An-
other 52% of the respondents believe that Europe should strive for
closer integration of its defence policy, even if this means a smaller
role for the United States in the European security policy.
Russia continues to be considered the most unfriendly country to-
ward Lithuania. The majority (64%) of those surveyed believe that the
Russian foreign policy is a threat to Lithuania. 54% of the respond-
ents believe that the Astravets Nuclear Power Plant project in Bela-
rus poses a threat to Lithuania. More than half of the respondents
believe that Lithuanian-Russian bilateral relations are mostly being
damaged by Russia. More than a half (53%) of the respondents be-
lieve that a larger (military) conflict between the West and Russia is
possible, while 29% are of the opposite opinion. Russia’s behaviour
was named as the main reason why such a conflict is possible.6 RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
Latvia is considered as the friendliest country toward Lithuania (93%).
Germany was considered to be a friendly state by 87% of the respond-
ents, Estonia – by 85%, Sweden – by 84%, Ukraine – by 81%, Poland –
by 74% and the USA – by 74%. However, in the period of four years, the
number of those evaluating the USA as friendly has dropped by a tenth.
This could be attributed to the personality of the US President, Donald
Trump. Unlike his predecessor Barack Obama, he is viewed more nega-
tively than positively in Lithuania. In addition, a minority of the Lithuani-
an population agrees with the statement that Lithuania saw an increase
in security during the Trump term.
Among foreign leaders, Angel Merkel was rated most favourably by the
survey participants. The respondents were most negative about Alexan-
der Lukashenko, whose negative evaluation is increasing, and Vladimir
Putin, whose critical evaluation remains stable.
68% of the respondents believe they are faced with fake news. More
than half (52%) of them believe that Lithuania is successfully fighting
against hostile propaganda. In the search for measures to fight against
disinformation, 60% of the respondents would support the initiative to
create more entertainment and artistic productions that promote pat-
riotism. Another 52% would support a one-sided restriction of Russian
television channels. One-third of the respondents (33%) would agree
that Russian productions (films and TV series) on Lithuanian TV chan-
nels should be restricted.
The majority of the survey participants (66%) use television (including
TV on the Internet) daily / almost daily to find out news about the polit-
ical, economic issues in Lithuania and the world. In second place they
use news portals (58%), and in third place they use social networking
sites on the Internet (Facebook, etc.) (48%). Although radio is used
less frequently compared to social networks (37%), the scale of its use
is generally larger. 67% of the survey participants, in order to find out
about a current Russian political event, would choose the Lithuanian
media first (newspapers, TV, Internet portals).
Western social networking sites are used by 68% of the respondents to
find out political news. 46% of the respondents use global online news
sites. 48% of the respondents watch Internet TV.RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
7
Introduction
Disinformation is considered to be one of the key challenges facing Eu-
ropean and Lithuanian security. The evaluation of the European Exter-
nal Action Service (EEAS) strategic communication experts EUvsDisin-
fo of June 2020 noted that “foreign actors and certain third countries,
in particular Russia and China, have engaged in targeted influence op-
erations and disinformation campaigns in the EU, its neighbourhood
and globally, seeking to undermine democratic debate and exacerbate
social polarisation, and to improve their own image in the context of
the pandemic.”1
The Lithuanian public also recognises the scope of this issue. Socio-
logical research into media preferences, assessments of the geopolit-
ical situation and the attitudes towards threats prepared by the order
of the Ministry of National Defence and the EESC in 2018 showed that
74% of the Lithuanian population agrees that propaganda and the in-
fluences of hostile external information are a threat to Lithuania’s na-
tional security.2 This threat is fuelled by targeted attempts by external
actors to influence the country’s society and its attitudes towards stra-
tegically important issues, to weaken democracy, and to promote the
fragmentation of society.3
Various measures have been taken to achieve the aforesaid aims. The
National Threat Assessment 2020, prepared by the State Security De-
partment of the Republic of Lithuania and the Second Investigation
Department under the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of
Lithuania, states: “In the information domain, events that underpin Lith-
uania’s statehood and testify to its resistance to Soviet occupation are
the main targets of Russian propaganda and its historic policy.” 4 This
is also illustrated by the recurring cyber-attacks on NATO soldiers de-
ployed in Lithuania, attempts to use false information to discredit state
institutions or officials, and Lithuania’s readiness to defend itself.5
The EESC regularly conducts Lithuanian public opinion surveys on the
most important issues concerning the development of Lithuanian de-
mocracy, international politics and media usage habits, to assess the
scope of the disinformation challenges facing Lithuania, their effect
on individual social groups, as well as possible countermeasures and
the effectiveness thereof. The aim of these methodologically compa-8 RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
rable surveys conducted in 2017, 2018 and 2020 is to carry out con-
sistent observations and assess the trends in public opinion, analyse
and present them to the public and the responsible authorities, as well
as to provide decision-makers with threat assessments and potential
countermeasures.
This analytical publication consists of two main parts. The first part
discusses the EESC studies published in 2017 and 2018 and their
main conclusions, while the second part examines the findings of the
2020 research, as well as possible interpretations of the results based
on the work of other authors. The research questionnaire and analysis
were prepared by the EESC. The project partners are the Ministry of
National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania and the Konrad Adenau-
er Foundation. The EESC is grateful for their involvement and efforts
to deepen the understanding of Lithuanian society in the context of
geopolitics, international politics and threats. The survey was com-
missioned by the EESC and conducted by Spinter Research.RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
9
1. Findings from the previous
EESC research studies
Monograph Russian Propaganda: The aforesaid monograph concludes that:
Analysis, Evaluation, Recommen- two main directions of Russian propa-
dations (Lith. Rusijos propaganda: ganda can be distinguished: the first is
analizė, įvertinimas, rekomendacijos) West-oriented; and the second is focussed
(research conducted in 2016, mono- on the Russian-speaking population (this
general group can be further divided into
graph published in 2017)
the Russian diaspora, the population of the
One of the most detailed research studies countries under Russia’s influence and the
on the effect of disinformation on the Lith- Russian population). By researching the
uanian public was conducted in 2016 and target audiences in Lithuania that are more
published in 2017. The collective mono- often characterised by propaganda-related
graph Russian Propaganda: Analysis, Eval- attitudes, the monograph, based on a sta-
uation, Recommendations6 set the aim of tistical analysis of the surveys, identified
researching the reasoning behind Russian the following groups: national minorities,
propaganda and disinformation and, based people who feel Soviet nostalgia (are pos-
on systematic research, providing practical itive about the former Soviet times), and
recommendations on how to reduce the people who are disappointed in the demo-
impact of propaganda, while developing a cratic functioning in Lithuania;
methodology adapted to Lithuania which although the main source of Russian
would allow the threats posed by propagan- propaganda, as noted by the authors of
da to be identified and analysed. the monograph, is television, in terms of
The term “propaganda” itself, in the mono- soft power, it is also maintained and dis-
graph as well as in the present research, is seminated through other possible media
defined based on G. Jowett and V. O’Don- and organised actions, and is therefore
nell’s concept of propaganda, which com- not easily recognisable;
bines previous academic discussions and an analysis of the stance on Russia re-
defines propaganda as deliberate, systemat- vealed that attitudes towards Russia
ic attempts to shape attitudes, manipulate fall into three main general categories:
knowledge and direct behaviour in a way that pro-Russian attitudes, critical attitudes
contributes to the goals of the propagandist.7 and a lack of opinion. Those who do not
Propaganda measures can thus be used to have an opinion were treated as a cate-
divide a society and incite discord. gory of people who do not have a clear10 RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS position and who are more indifferent to observed during the 2008–2012 econom- information received through the media; ic crisis. It appears that Lithuania was a link between the information, cultural en- potentially most affected by propaganda vironment and personal attitude was dis- during this time. The timing of Russia’s ag- covered. For example, the people who do gression against Ukraine coincided with a not see Russia as a threat are more likely weakening of the positive attitude towards to choose to watch Russian films and read the former Soviet times; Russian newspapers, as well as to attend a crucial factor is the level of satisfaction popular Russian music concerts more fre- with democracy. People who are dissatis- quently. Moreover, more pro-Russian atti- fied with democracy, despite their attitude tudes (for example, the belief that Russia to the former Soviet times, are more favour- is friendly and does not pose a threat to able toward Russia. Given the low level of Lithuania) are typical of the groups that of- trust in political institutions and politicians, ten watch Russian TV channels and point as well as the low level of electoral activity to the Russian media as their main source in Lithuania, it can be stated that the dis- of information about Russia; satisfaction with democracy is unlikely to nevertheless, it should be noted that decrease significantly in the near future. As watching Russian TV channels does not in a result, this may be one of the factors that itself mean that a pro-Russian attitude is will contribute to the spread of propaganda; attained. In addition, although almost half in addition to its value, the analysis also of the Lithuanian public still speaks good showed the importance of the information Russian, this is not the key factor when it space. Although the causal link is not ob- comes to the aforesaid attitudes; vious (perhaps people with pro-Russian at- the attitude towards Russia was also titudes simply choose relevant sources of strongly related to the person’s attitude information), the overlap in the statistical towards the former Soviet times and their analysis showed that frequent watching of relationship with present-day Lithuania. Russian channels is related to a pro-Rus- For example, those who agreed that life sian attitude, especially if the person is flu- was better in the Soviet times were more ent in Russian, and such channels are one inclined to treat Russia as friendly, to fa- of the main sources of information about vour Vladimir Putin, to believe in the objec- Russia (and the world); tivity of the Russian media, and to support ethnic communities tend to regard Rus- narratives in the country’s favour. Although sia, its leader, and the relationship with in general the latter attitudes are not pop- this state more favourably than the rest of ular in the Lithuanian society, they can be the Lithuanian population. Assessing me- strengthened by nostalgia toward the So- dia usage habits and ethnic communities viet times. In this respect, Lithuania has that are in the Russian media information experienced the worst situation in the re- space: At the time of the research, more cent past – after assessing the change in than half of Russian- and Polish-speakers pro-Soviet attitudes over the last 12 years, watched Russian channels daily or several an increase in Soviet nostalgia could be times a week, while there was a similar sit-
RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
11
uation with regard to the radio and online 10, the average response rate was only 3.5).
publications. However, national minorities Compared to 2016, the assessment of de-
should not be treated as a completely ho- mocracy remained the same: a significant
mogeneous group when assessing their part of Lithuanians is dissatisfied with the
attitudes towards Russia. For example, state of democracy in the country (42% in
representatives of ethnic communities 2016 and 40% in 2018). This fact leaves a
who have a lower income and do not live in lot of room for the influence of propaganda
Vilnius, regardless of their nationality, were on a large share of the Lithuanian society.
more often in favour of Russia. What is par- Young people believe that they can influ-
ticularly interesting is that these two fac- ence more decisions made in Lithuania, but
tors (location and income) were not signif- are less inclined to participate in elections;
icant in the overall survey of the country’s in the case of the assessment of the for-
population and did not differentiate the mer Soviet times, the number of those who
respondents according to their attitudes disagreed with the statement that life was
towards Russia. better in Soviet times increased (from 42
to 48%). The fact that this change is insig-
Analytical study: Impact of Disinfor- nificant can be explained by the relatively
short period of time between the studies,
mation on Lithuanian Society (Lith.
i.e. two years. Slightly more than 60% of
Dezinformacijos poveikis Lietuvos
the respondents disagreed with the state-
visuomenei) (2018) ment that the collapse of the Soviet Union
In 2018, the Eastern European Studies Cen- was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe
tre together with the Ministry of National De- of the 20th century, as Vladimir Putin bold-
fence of the Republic of Lithuania published ly stated in Munich a few years ago;
an analytical study titled the Impact of Dis- a new dimension included in this re-
information on Lithuanian Society.8 Based on search was the respondents’ evaluation of
research focussed on Russian propaganda heavy-handed politics and state institutions
conducted in Lithuania in 2016 (followed by a such as the parliament, government, politi-
monograph in 2017), the 2018 research aims cal parties, the Office of the President and
to update the key data and assess changes in others. Almost a third of the respondents
whether Russian disinformation has affected assessed a strong leader who disregard-
Lithuania over a two-year period. ed the rules as a possible response to the
problems faced by Lithuania at that time.
The 2018 research found that:
Such attitudes reveal that a significant pro-
Lithuanians are still reluctant to trust the portion of the country’s population still re-
democratic process, which is also influenc- gards this type of leadership as a positive
ing the assessment of democratic institu- aspect of politics. Lithuanians have also
tions. In addition, the majority of respond- become more negative about most political
ents believe that ordinary people cannot institutions. Based on the research data, it
influence the important decision-making is obvious that the frustration of the Lithua-
processes in the country (on a scale of 0 to nian population is mainly directed towards12 RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS the parliamentary element of democracy - mer USSR or Warsaw Pact-occupied) coun- the Seimas and the political parties. At the tries, so the media itself plays a key role and same time, the country’s citizens appreciate it is recommended to provide high-quality the presidential institution. This can also be content that can increase trust; attributed to the fact that the presidency is finally, in terms of the measures to deter considered to be more personalised (repre- propaganda, differences can be seen in sented by one person); the different age groups: the respondents it is well known that Russia has always pre- under the age of 25 agreed on both the pro- ferred personal diplomacy and a personal- motion of patriotic media production and ised decision-making approach. Institution- the restriction of Russian media produc- al mechanisms, meanwhile, are becoming a tion; whereas middle-aged and older re- common obstacle to Russia’s influence, be- spondents, while supporting the proposal cause it is much more difficult to influence to increase patriotic production, were not institutions. It is therefore clear that the optimistic about the possibility of restrict- Lithuanian citizens’ frustration with demo- ing Russian production. General support cratic institutions, such as the Seimas and for the development of patriotic content the political parties, in which decisions are has been welcomed and can be formulat- made on the basis of majority consent, may ed as a specific task for the relevant insti- work in Russia’s favour; tutions (especially the Ministry of Culture). media consumption patterns remain an With regard to reducing the consumption important factor in the fight against prop- of Russian entertainment and cultural aganda and false news. Thus, it is impor- products, two directions were recommend- tant to strengthen media literacy programs ed: (1) raising public awareness of the neg- and adapt them to different audiences (by ative effects of so-called soft power; and nationality, due to different media use pat- (2) at the same time, developing positive terns, and by age). The confidence in the initiatives for re-broadcasters (especially Lithuanian media roughly corresponds to commercial ones) to gradually reduce the the trends in Western democracies, where it Russian content that could be associated is lower than in many post-communist (for- with the aims of soft power.
RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
13
2. The 2020 research
and its findings Gender
Man 47
Woman 53
Age
18–25 y.o. 13
26–35 y.o. 21
Methodology Assessment of Lithuania’s 36–45 y.o. 18
The study was conducted from 22 April to democracy and economy 46–55 y.o. 20
6 May 2020. The survey was conducted by As is seen in Figure56 y.o. and2, in the28EESC research,
more
Spinter Research, according to a question- among theEducation
political institutions (excluding the
naire compiled by the EESC. The survey is courts), the
Higherpublic had
/ Unfinished the most
higher 28 trust in the
representative, and it surveyed 1,012 re- Lithuanian Government (43% of 65
Secondary / Special secondary those who
spondents (aged 18–75) living in Lithuania. trusted and strongly trusted) and in the Pres-
Unfinished secondary 7
In order to see the trends, the study repeated ident’s officeIncome
(40%). Importantly, as many as
the questions from the 2016 and 2018 anal- 35% of the respondents said they
Up to 300 Eur 27 neither trust
yses, as well as including new aspects that nor distrust the President’s
301–500 Eur office;
45 this was the
might determine the country’s geopolitics highest such indicator among the five evaluat-
501–700 Eur 17
and security.9 ed institutions, Morecomparable
than 700 Eur 11to the indicator of
Gender Place of residence
Man 47
Big cities 45
Woman 53
Other cities, 26
regional centres
Age Rural areas 29
18–25 y.o. 13
26–35 y.o. 21
Nationality
36–45 y.o. 18 Lithuanian 83
46–55 y.o. 20 Russian 6
56 y.o. and more 28
Polish 7
Education Other 4
Higher / Unfinished higher 28
Russian language
Secondary / Special secondary 65 proficiency level
Yes, very well 22
Unfinished secondary 7
Yes, well 24
Income
Up to 300 Eur 27 Yes, fair-to-middling 33
301–500 Eur 45 No, I do not speak
21
or speak badly
501–700 Eur 17
More than 700 Eur 11
Place of residence
Fig. 1 Socio-demographic characteristics
Big cities 45
Other cities, 26
regional centres
Rural areas 2914 RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
the political parties in terms of the margins of population are very large: ranging from 80.6%
error.10 Compared to the 2018 EESC research, of those who trust the police to only 13.8% of
the assessment of the Government of the Re- those who trust the political parties. Lithua-
public of Lithuania remained practically un- nians clearly trust political institutions much
changed – in 2018, 41% of the respondents less than public administration institutions.”11
expressed confidence in the Government of In addition, a relatively large share of the pop-
the Republic of Lithuania. However, trust in ulation is more dissatisfied (58.5%) than satis-
the President’s office has dropped significant- fied with the democratic functioning in Lithu-
ly – from 51% in 2018 to 40% in 2020. ania. Lithuania can be characterised by three
main tendencies of trust in institutions, the
Lithuanians continue to have the least trust
first one being the dichotomy between a low
in the Seimas and the political parties – the
level of trust in political parties and a relatively
share of those who said they fully trusted and
high level of trust in public administration insti-
trusted these entities was 8 and 24%, respec-
tutions; the second tendency is much greater
tively. 37% of the respondents said they trust-
trust in international EU and NATO institutions
ed the courts.
than in national institutions; and the third ten-
In a study published in 2017, Irmina Matonytė, dency is questioning democracy as the most
Vaidas Morkevičius, Ainius Lašas and Vaida appropriate form of governance, with a certain
Jankauskaitė examined the public confidence longing for a firmer hand.12 These results were
in institutions. According to the authors, “varia- also confirmed in the EESC research studies
tions in the institutional trust of the Lithuanian from 2016, 2018 and 2020.
Please evaluate the functioning of Lithuanian democratic institutions.
N = 1 012
Strongly trusted Trusted Neither trusted nor distrusted
Distrusted Totally distrusted I have no opinion
Government of the 3 40 15 20 21 1
Republic of Lithuania
President's office 5 35 35 15 8 2
Courts 4 33 26 15 21 1
Parliament of the
Republic of Lithuania 2 22 19 26 30 1
(Seimas)
Political parties 1 7 34 36 21 1
Fig. 2 Evaluation of Lithuanian institutions (%)RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
15
In terms of the satisfaction with the In general, how satisfied are you with the functioning
democratic functioning (Figure 3), of democracy in Lithuania?
there were no major changes. Com-
2020 04 2018 08 2016 04
pared to 2016, there was a statisti-
cally significant growth in the share
3 4 4
of those who are very satisfied or Very satisfied
satisfied (from 28 to 36%), and the
comparison with 2018 did not exceed
the margin of error. It should be not- Satisfied 33 29 24
ed that between 2018 and 2020, the
share of the population that is dis-
satisfied with democracy and com- Neither satisfied
nor dissatisfied
32 26 28
pletely dissatisfied with democracy
fell by 9 percentage points to 31%.
It is also important to note that in
2020, the number of those who were Dissatisfied 21 32 28
neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with
democracy increased by 6%.
Completely
10 8 14
Those who were satisfied with the dissatisfied
functioning of democracy in Lithua-
nia more often were the representa-
tives of the highest education group. I have no opinion 1 1 2
It is also noteworthy that the evalua-
tion of democracy remains the same
in practically all age groups. N = 1 012 N = 1 007 N = 1 007
Other research has confirmed that
Fig. 3. Satisfaction with the functioning of democra-
the rate of satisfaction with democra-
cy in Lithuania (%)
cy is rising. For example, in a regular-
ly-conducted European Social Survey,
the respondents are asked to rate
their satisfaction with the functioning in making important decisions for the country. When
of democracy with a specific score asked to assess the impact that ordinary citizens
from 0 to 10, where 0 means they are have on important decisions (ranging from 0 points
very dissatisfied and 10 means they meaning no influence to 10 points meaning a very
are very satisfied. Lithuania’s indica- high influence), the average assessment was 3.59
tor reached its lowest point in 2009, out of a possible 10. The opinion that they have an
and after that started rising.13 influence was more often held by the respondents of
the youngest age group (18-25 years) and by repre-
The relatively low confidence in de- sentatives with a higher education. The results for
mocracy is also due to the fact that 2020 coincided with the average indicator for the
citizens feel they have little influence 2018 survey (3.51).16 RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
In your opinion, how much do ordinary people of Lithuania influence in making
decisions that are important for the country?
N = 1 012
Average
3 , 59
19
16
13
11
10
9
8
7
4
2
1
0 – No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 –
influence Very high
influence
Fig. 4. Evaluation of the citizen’s influence on democratic processes (ten-point grading scale),
2020
In the context of the perception of democracy, tion elected the President of interwar Lithua-
the evaluation of “a strong leader who would nia, Antanas Smetona, as one of the “People
circumvent the rules in order to achieve his/ of the Century.” Prof. Ainė Ramonaitė called
her goals” was also relevant. Compared to such a public opinion the “longing for a mas-
2018, the need for such a strong leader re- ter”16). Second, preferring a firm hand is relat-
mained unchanged (31–32%), and the change ed to dissatisfaction with the way post-So-
in the number of respondents who did not viet democratisation has taken place, and a
support a strong leader was also insignificant strong belief that the systemic economic and
(from 36 to 41%). At the time of conducting political changes have primarily benefited a
the survey, there were fewer supporters of narrow group of the population rather than
the idea of a strong leader than, for example, the state as a whole17. Third, there are also
there were in 2005. A similar survey conduct- links with low confidence in the functioning
ed at that time showed that approximately of key democratic institutions, such as the
46% of the respondents would support the Seimas or the political parties18 (confidence
presence of a strong leader, unfettered by the in parties is consistently lower than, for ex-
parliament or elections.14 ample, the presidential institution19).
The support for the idea of a strong leader The Lithuanian population’s attitude towards
is related to several factors. First, important firm-hand leadership is also confirmed by the
historical circumstances, such as the expe- evaluation of the opposition parties and the
rience of the interwar authoritarian system15 Seimas elections. Asked whether they believe
(for example, in 2018, the Lithuanian popula- that the new government, formed by partiesRESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
17
In your opinion, how much do ordinary people of Lithuania influence in making
decisions that are important for the country?
Average
3.59
18
15
13 14
12
8 8
6
4
0,4
1
0 – No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 –
influence Very high
influence
Fig. 5. Evaluation of the citizen’s influence on democratic processes (ten-point grading scale),
2018
currently in opposition, could improve the sit- Meanwhile, looking at the future economic
uation in the country, only 19% of the respond- prospects of the country, as many as 79% of
ents agreed (compared to 24% in 2018). 24% of the respondents said that the country’s econ-
the respondents supported the idea of a new omy will deteriorate slightly (37%) or great-
government formed by non-party movements ly (42%) in the next 12 months. Lithuanians
(compared to 27% in 2018). In general, howev- have also been pessimistic in the past, but
er, the changes to the government proposed in the current figures are particularly high: for ex-
the survey were rated mostly negatively, with ample, the 2012 and 2016 post-election polls
the latter two ideas being opposed by 42% and showed that 31% and 26% of the population,
36% of the respondents, respectively. respectively, thought the Lithuanian economy
would deteriorate in the future20. This could
The evaluation of the country’s economic sit-
be related to the consequences of the COV-
uation in the past twelve months has singled
ID-19 pandemic and public forecasts that the
out those respondents who said it had greatly
country’s economy will deteriorate in the near
or slightly improved (32%) and those who felt
future (a survey conducted by the Internation-
there was a slight or great deterioration (41%).
al Monetary Fund predicted that Lithuania’s
A quarter of the respondents did not notice
gross domestic product (GDP) could decline
any changes. Respondents representing the
by 8.1% in 2020)21. The group of respondents
middle age (26-35 years old), higher-educat-
with the highest education and higher income
ed, higher-income (more than EUR 500) group
(EUR 501-700) more often indicated that the
more often indicated that the economic situ-
economic situation will deteriorate slightly.
ation had improved slightly.18 RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
In your opinion, the state of the How do you think the state of the
Lithuanian economy in the last 12 Lithuanian economy will change in
months ...? the next 12 months?
N = 1 012 N = 1 012
Greatly improved 3 It will improve greatly 1
Slightly improved 29 It will improve slightly 8
Has not It will hardly change
25 11
changed much
Slightly deteriorated 26 It will deteriorate sligthly 37
Greatly deteriorated 15 It will deteriorate greatly 42
Do not know 2 Do not know 1
Fig. 6. Forecast and evaluation of the Lithuanian economic situation (%)
This survey also looked at the public opin- of the respondents said that terminating the
ion regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. When EU or NATO membership could improve the
asked about the Lithuanian population’s fo- situation in the country. According to the Eu-
cus on overcoming the crisis during the pan- robarometer data from Spring 2019, Lithuania
demic, 47% of the respondents said that the was the country that had the most confidence
country was focussed on overcoming the in the EU (72%).
crisis, while 18% opposed this view. Almost
Compared to the neighbouring countries, ac-
half of the respondents neither agreed nor cording to the EU evaluation, Lithuania was
disagreed with the statement that the pan- significantly ahead of them: In Estonia, con-
demic has harmed the geopolitical situation fidence in the EU was 60%, in Poland it was
in Lithuania, 23% agreed with this statement, 54%, and in Latvia it was 51%. The average
and 24% opposed it. level of confidence across the community
was 44%22. Public dissatisfaction with some
EU policies is relatively low; for example, in
EU, NATO and globalisation the EESC survey, 18% of the respondents
Lithuanians continue to strongly support the totally agreed or agreed with the statement
country’s NATO and EU membership. Only 9% that the EU is destroying traditional Lithuani-RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
19
N = 1 012
Totally agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree Totally disagree I have no opinion
Lithuanian population focused
on overcoming the crisis 10 37 32 14 4 3
during the pandemic
The pandemic has harmed the
geopolitical security situation 4 19 48 18 6 5
in Lithuania
Fig. 7. Community mobilisation and the geopolitical situation during the pandemic (%)
an values23. On the other hand, when it came The NATO evaluation also confirmed the
to the EU response to the COVID-19 pandem- findings of other research studies. A survey
ic, a minority of the responses were positive, published by Pew Research in February 2020
with only a quarter of the respondents in the revealed that Lithuanians are one of NATO’s
EESC survey commending the EU’s response biggest optimists – 77% of the respondents
to the pandemic. said they have a positive attitude towards the
Which of these solutions, in your opinion, would help to improve the situation
in Lithuania?
N = 1 012
Totally agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree Totally disagree I have no opinion
We would now like to ask you about a number of aspects relating to international
politics, national defence and energy. Do you agree with these statements?
Leaving the EU 3 6 17 23 47 4
Leaving NATO 4 5 16 23 48 4
The EU institutions have
responded appropriately 4 22 43 21 7 3
to manage pandemic
The EU destroys traditional
5 13 27 35 18 2
Lithuania values
EU membership
harmed Lithuania 2 5 24 34 32 3
Fig. 8. Evaluation of EU and NATO membership (%)20 RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
We would now like to ask you about a number of aspects relating to international
politics, national defence and energy. Do you agree with these statements?
N = 1 012
Totally agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree Totally disagree I have no opinion
If Lithuania were threatened
by a military threat NATO countries 13 40 26 8 10 3
would come to the rescue
Fig. 9. Evaluation of NATO assistance to Lithuania in the case of aggression (%)
alliance. Only the Poles were more positive, a NATO ally was under attack, Lithuania
with 82% of the Polish respondents saying should use its armed forces to help25. Finally,
they had a positive attitude towards NATO24. the respondents believe that Europe should
work for closer integration of the European
The Lithuanian population is positive about
defence policy, even if this means a smaller
the NATO commitments: 53% of the respond-
role for the US in the continent’s security pol-
ents said that if Lithuania were threatened
icy. 52% of the respondents supported this
with a military situation, the NATO countries
statement. However, it should be noted that
would come to the rescue, with approximate-
a third of them neither agreed nor disagreed
ly one-fifth of the respondents opposing
with the statement.
such a statement. It is important to note that,
according to a study published by Pew Re- It can be noted that almost half of the coun-
search in February 2020, Lithuanians are not try’s population (approximately 45%) did not
only positive about the commitments of the have an opinion on the consequences of glo-
other members of the alliance but also take balisation for Lithuania, but a larger share
Lithuania’s commitment seriously – 51% of (38%) of those who have an opinion believed
the respondents said that in a case where that it has brought more benefits than harm.
We would now like to ask you about a number of aspects relating to international
politics, national defence and energy. Do you agree with these statements?
N = 1 012
Totally agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree Totally disagree I have no opinion
In general, globalization
has brought more benefits 8 30 45 9 4 4
to Lithuania tham harm
Fig. 10. Evaluation of globalisation (%)RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
21
We would now like to ask you about a number of aspects relating to international
politics, national defence and energy. Do you agree with these statements?
N = 1 012
Totally agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree Totally disagree I have no opinion
Liquified natural gas
terminal Independence is 11 29 27 13 8 12
too expensive for Lithuania
Fig. 11. Evaluation of the liquified natural gas terminal (%)
Lithuanians are still of the opinion that the disagreed or totally disagreed, and almost a
liquefied natural gas terminal Independence quarter (23%) replied “neither yes nor no”26.
is too expensive for the state. 40% of the
In the 2020 survey, a disagreement with the
respondents were of this opinion. Howev-
statement was more often indicated by the
er, compared to 2018, this indicator has de-
group of respondents with a higher level of
creased by 13 percentage points. The num-
education and a higher income (EUR 501–
ber of those who opposed the statement also
700). The group of representatives who total-
slightly increased – from 15% in 2018 to 21%
ly disagreed with the statement was that with
in 2020.
the highest level of education and the highest
income (more than EUR 700). In addition, the
Evaluation of the former people who expressed a negative attitude to-
wards the Soviet times more often had a neu-
Soviet times tral or positive opinion about the functioning
The last three surveys on the Lithuanian of democracy in Lithuania. Attitudes towards
attitude towards the former Soviet times the Soviet times also correlated with a pos-
conducted by the EESC have shown a sta- itive evaluation of Russia’s foreign policy.
bilisation of the attitude towards the Soviet Similar trends were observed in the 2016 and
times. The respondents were asked the fol- 2018 research studies.
lowing question: “Lithuania’s Soviet past is
frequently discussed in public. Do you agree The nostalgia for Soviet times is characteris-
or disagree with the following statement: life tic of the so-called losers of the post-commu-
in Soviet times was better than now?” 21% nist transformation – the people of Lithuania
of the respondents totally agreed or agreed who subjectively assess their social status
with this statement. By comparison, a survey as the deterioration of the social status of
conducted by the National Electoral Study other people, after the collapse of the Soviet
at the end of 2012 showed that 37% of the regime27. Thus, the evaluation of the former
population totally agreed or agreed with the Soviet times is not directly related to a per-
statement that “life in Soviet times was bet- son’s current financial situation or social sta-
ter than in today’s Lithuania”, while only 17% tus. This is primarily a function of evaluating22 RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
Do you agree or disagree with the statement: life in Soviet times was
better than now?
2020 04 2018 08 2016 04
Totally agree 8 7 9
Agree 13 15 17
Neither agree nor disagree 18 18 23
Disagree 32 33 25
Totally disagree 23 15 17
Do not answer 4
Do not know 6 8 9
N = 1 012 N = 1 007 N = 1 007
Fig. 12. 2016–2020 evaluation of the former Soviet times (%)
the changes in social status as they move The population’s attitude towards Russian
from one system to another. President Vladimir Putin’s famous statement
that the collapse of the Soviet Union is the
Finally, according to Prof. A. Ramonaitė, the
greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th
situation from the perspective of the actions
century has hardly changed. Only 9% totally
of the occupying power is often not taken into
agreed or agreed with the statement, while
consideration when evaluating the former So-
66% of the respondents disagreed or totally
viet times. The respondents evaluate their
disagreed. In the past two years, compared
own actions, and their involvement in the pro-
to 2018, the number of those who disagreed
cess of building Soviet Lithuania. “To them,
with the statement did not change.
writing it all off as one big historical mistake
means their lives meant nothing.”28RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
23
Russian President Vladimir Putin once said, the collapse of the Soviet Union is
the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. Do you agree with
this statement?
With the statement more often
N = 1 012
disagree 46 y.o. and older aged
respondents, survey participants
with higher income (501-700 Eur).
Totally disagree - 26-35 years study
Totally agree 3 participants, representatives of the
highest income group (more than
9% 700 Eur).
Agree 6
Neither agree nor disagree 21
Disagree 33
66 %
Totally disagree 33
I have no opinion 4
Fig. 13. Evaluation of the Russian President’s opinion about the collapse of the Soviet Union (%)
National defence and they would contribute to the country’s de-
fence with a weapon if needed: compared to
its financing 2018, the change in these numbers were not
More than half of the EESC survey respond- statistically significant. This is also related
ents (62%) totally agreed or agreed with the to another question: 62% of the respondents
statement that they are proud to be Lith- agreed with the statement that they are proud
uanian citizens; in addition, 58% of the re- to be Lithuanian citizens; compared to 2018,
spondents said that in the face of a threat, this figure has slightly increased (from 58%
they would contribute to the national de- to 62%). The number of those who disagreed
fence in other ways if they could not resist with this statement also did not change sig-
with weapons (the 2018 results revealed the nificantly (it went from 19% to 17%).
same figures). 32% of the respondents said24 RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
We would now like to ask you about a number of aspects relating to international
politics, national defence and energy. Do you agree with these statements?
N = 1 012
Totally agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree Totally disagree I have no opinion
I am proud to be a
Lithuanian citizen 24 38 20 15 21
Unable to resist the weapon,
I would contribute to the defense 21 37 17 8 14 3
of the country in another way
Fig. 14. Lithuanian citizens’ pride in the state and determination to defend it without weapons (%)
Prof. A. Ramonaitė and other authors conduct especially during the critical period. Given that
a detailed analysis of the Lithuanian citizens the generations and people are changing, the
determination to defend their country in their similarity in the large numbers of people ready
book “Who would defend Lithuania? Assump- to defend Lithuania is a particularly positive
tions and possibilities of civic resistance” indicator. It should be noted that 11% of the re-
(Lith. Kas eitų ginti Lietuvos? Pilietinio pasip- spondents said that they would not contribute
riešinimo prielaidos ir galimybės). The results to the national defence at all, and 6% would
of their study showed that many people in the support any form of resistance (from guerril-
country would not be inclined to move abroad. la warfare to assistance to the soldiers), so
64% of the respondents stated that in the case about 90% of respondents would contribute
of aggression, they would be determined to to the national defence in various forms30.
stay in Lithuania. It can therefore be assumed
Regarding the financial commitments of the
that there would not be a mass evacuation. It
country’s defence and the commitment of
is important to note that the above study did
NATO members to devote 2% of the GDP to
not find a correlation between the fact that
the country’s defence, 44% of the respond-
a person has relatives/friends abroad and
ents totally agreed or agreed that Lithuania
whether a person would flee the country in
should comply with this provision, while 29%
the case of war. This can be interpreted as a
did not agree (Fig. 15). In 2018, when Lithu-
separation of values and an expression of pat-
ania was only actually approaching the 2%
riotism29. In addition, when asked “would you
of the GDP defence threshold, the survey
personally contribute to defending Lithuania
showed that 37% of the respondents op-
with a weapon,” 42% of the respondents in the
posed the increase in the country’s defence
authors’ survey said that they would. A. Ra-
spending and only a quarter of the country’s
monaitė notes that during the Sąjūdis (the Re-
population supported it.
form Movement of Lithuania), no more than
40% of Lithuanian citizens contributed to the The attitude towards increasing the defence
state-building and defence of the statehood, funding to 2.5% of the GDP was more nega-RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
25
tive. Although the majority of Lithuanian par- can be interpreted as an assessment that
liamentary parties have signed an agreement the Lithuanian Armed Forces still needs to
to reach this level of funding in the next dec- be strengthened, as in recent years there has
ade, in 2020, just almost a fifth of the respond- been an emphasis on the need to increase the
ents supported the allocation of 2.5% of the defence funding (the 2% of the GDP level of
GDP to defence funding (although this was a funding tends to be supported by the majority
higher figure than in 2018, when the support- of the population, see Fig. 15) to compensate
ive responses stood at 14%31), while 44% of for the gaps created by the low allocation of
the respondents opposed this amount. funds after joining NATO in 2004.
The Lithuanian population is quite critical of In addition, the answers to the question
the readiness of the country’s armed forces concerning the readiness of the armed forc-
to properly defend Lithuania. In 2020, only a es should not be equated with confidence
fifth of the respondents agreed with the state- in the Lithuanian army. The last ten years,
ment that the country’s armed forces are ad- there has been an increase in confidence in
equately prepared for the country’s defence; the armed forces, from around 50% in 2010
however, the indicator was 6% higher than to an indicator balancing at 60% in the most
two years ago. recent research. For example, a public opin-
ion poll conducted in the summer of 2019
This may be related to Russia’s military ca- revealed that confidence in the Lithuanian
pabilities in the region (for example, in 2018, Armed Forces had reached its highest level
it was reported that Russia has more than in 14 years. At that time, 61% of the respond-
300,000 troops in the Western Military District ents expressed confidence in the Lithuanian
alone32) and to widespread international stud- Armed Forces34. In February 2020, the indi-
ies that have estimated that Russia could hy- cator was essentially the same and stood at
pothetically occupy the Baltic States in just a 62%35. These interpretations could be refined
few days33. On the other hand, these answers through further qualitative studies.
We would now like to ask you about a number of aspects relating to international
politics, national defence and energy. Do you agree with these statements?
N = 1 012
Totally agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree Totally disagree I have no opinion
Lithuania's defense budget
must be at least 2% of GDP
as recommended by NATO 17 27 22 14 15 5
Lithuania’s defense budget must
be consistently increased 10 14 27 21 23 5
to 2.5% of GDP
Fig. 15. Amount of the defence expenditure (%)26 RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
We would now like to ask you about a number of aspects relating to international
politics, national defence and energy. Do you agree with these statements?
N = 1 012
Totally agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree Totally disagree I have no opinion
Lithuanian armed forces
are ready to properly 4 16 36 25 13 6
defend Lithuania
Fig. 16. Readiness of the Lithuanian armed forces to defend the country (%)
N = 1 007
Totally agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree Totally disagree I have no opinion
42 % 24 %
11 31 28 17 7 6 2016
35 % 36 %
Lithuania’s foreign
policy towards 7 28 24 28 8 4 2018
Russia is too strict
32 % 38 %
5 27 27 26 12 3 2020
We would now like to ask you about a number of aspects relating to international
politics, national defence and energy. Do you agree with these statements?
N = 1 012
Totally agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree Totally disagree I have no opinion
Russian policy poses a
direct threat to Eastern 12 33 24 22 6 3
European states
Fig. 17. Evaluation of Lithuania’s foreign policy towards Russia in 2016–2020 (%)RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
27
Attitude towards Russia tions on Russia should be lifted, 29% of the
respondents said yes and 34% opposed it. In
Lithuania’s foreign policy towards Russia can
2020, the support for lifting the sanctions did
be evaluated in general terms by the respond-
not change significantly (to 26%), but there
ents’ attitudes towards the statement “Lith-
was an increase in the number of those who
uania’s foreign policy towards Russia is too
opposed it (to 43%).
strict.” Over the last four years, the number of
those who agreed that Lithuania’s policy is On the other hand, potential benefits of im-
too strict has decreased (from 42% in 2016 proving relations with Russia are perceived.
to 32% in 2020), and the number of those who 40% of the respondents said that it would be
disagreed with the statement grew (from 24% beneficial for Lithuania to improve its politi-
in 2016 to 38% in 2020). cal relations with this neighbour. This was
almost a tenth less than in 2018. In the past
In addition, 45% of the respondents stated two years, the share of the population oppos-
that Russia’s foreign policy poses a direct ing such a statement did not changed signifi-
threat to Eastern European countries (com- cantly (15% in 2018, compared to 19% in this
pared to 43% in 2018), while 28% of the re- year’s survey).
spondents did not agree with this statement
(26% in 2018). Respondents were also sceptical about Rus-
sia’s assistance to foreign countries during
The respondents also tended to support the COVID-19 pandemic, with only 17% re-
maintaining EU sanctions on Russia until it garding medical equipment and goods as be-
changes its actions towards Ukraine, even if nevolent assistance without political goals,
the sanctions would mean additional costs and 45% opposing this statement. The re-
for Lithuania. 41% agreed, while 30% opposed spondents also supported NATO’s decision
this view. In 2018, when asked whether sanc- to deploy troops in the Baltic States; only 17%
We would now like to ask you about a number of aspects relating to international
politics, national defence and energy. Do you agree with these statements?
N = 1 012
Totally agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree Totally disagree I have no opinion
Lithuanian should strive for the
economic and political sanctions
imposed on Rusia by the EU to remain
in place until Russia's actions towards 12 29 26 15 15 3
Ukraine change, even if the sanctions
mean costs to the Lithuanian economy
Economic and political sanctions
on Russia should be lifted 6 20 26 28 15 5
Fig. 18. Support for the sanctions on Russia (%)28 RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
We would now like to ask you about a number of aspects relating to international
politics, national defence and energy. Do you agree with these statements?
N = 1 012
Totally agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree Totally disagree I have no opinion
It would be beneficial for
Lithuania to improve its political 14 36 28 10 9 3
relations with Russia
Fig. 19. Improvement of political relations with Russia (%)
We would now like to ask you about a number of aspects relating to international
politics, national defence and energy. Do you agree with these statements?
N = 1 012
Totally agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree Totally disagree I have no opinion
Medical equipment and goods sent by
Russia to European countries are
benevolent aid without pursuing 4 13 33 21 24 5
political goals
The deployment of NATO troops in Lithuania
and other Baltic states is an Unnecessary 5 12 33 28 19 3
Russia provocation
Fig. 20. Evaluation of Russia’s assistance to other countries in the context of the pandemic
and the deployment of forces in the Baltic States (%)
of the respondents agreed with the statement Opinion on a larger (military) conflict
that this is an unnecessary provocation of
with Russia
Russia, and almost half of the respondents
More than half of the respondents believe
opposed such a statement.
that a larger (military) conflict between the
The respondents (Fig. 23) still see Russia as Western countries and Russia is possible.
the key actor that has a negative impact on The view that such a conflict is possible was
Lithuanian-Russian bilateral relations (54% of more often supported by the 26-35-year-old
the respondents thought so). 41% of the re- respondents, as well as representatives of the
spondents believe that Lithuania has a nega- highest income group (EUR 700 and more)
tive impact on Russian-Lithuanian relations. and residents of the biggest cities.RESEARCH ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PERCEPTION OF THREATS
29
What impact do you think each of these countries and international organizations
has on Lithuanian-Russian relations?
2020 04 2018 08 2016 04
Russia 13 41 18 2 26 10 43 20 6 20 20 48 12 1 20
NATO 9 40 26 5 20 3 25 38 11 23 4 26 43 5 22
EU 6 42 24 7 21 2 21 44 13 19 3 24 44 7 22
Lithuania 8 33 31 6 22 6 35 29 11 20 4 32 38 5 21
USA 8 30 32 4 26 3 27 40 9 21 3 29 42 7 19
China 6 23 27 2 42You can also read
