Surprise Redux-Endowments Underperformed
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Surprise Redux—Endowments Underperformed the 60/40
Benchmark After All
Dennis R. Hammond
Veriti Management, LLC
Boston, MA
dhammond@veritimanagement.com
September 2020
Overview
Recently, a paper, “Surprise, Endowments Have Significantly Outperformed the 60/40
Benchmark” was written by Dr. Hossein Kazemi—a professor of finance at Isenberg School at the
University of Massachusetts Amherst and a senior advisor to the CAIA Association—and jointly
produced with CAIA. 1 In it, Dr. Kazemi attempts to assuage any concern endowment managers
and their advisors may have due to papers such as Hammond (2020a and 2020b) and Ennis (2020a
and 2020b). In so doing, he provides two false hopes—first, that endowments have “significantly
outperformed the 60/40 benchmark” as evidenced by their outperformance of a global 60/40 mix,
and second, that alternative investments have provided endowments with additional returns.
Unfortunately, relative to the average and smaller endowments, neither assertion is accurate. His
conclusion that “endowment managers deserve a raise”, suggests endowments should simply
continue their past practices. Nothing could be further from the truth.
What is the “60/40 mix”?
The 60/40 mix has been defined as 60% S&P 500 and 40% Lehman Agg bonds since the
late 1960’s. 2 Ryan (2013) states,
By the late 1960s, a majority of university endowments had adopted a model of investing
three-fifths of endowment funds in corporate stock and only two-fifths remained in
bonds. 3
1
Kazemi, Hossein, “Surprise, Endowments Have Significantly Outperformed the 60/40 Benchmark”, 2020
V7, See also, Segal, Julie, Institutional Investor, https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1n65gt8203xpm/All-
Those-Studies-Showing-Endowments-Lost-to-60-40-Cherry-Picked-Data-Academic-Says.
2
In 1960, Princeton had 66.6% and Harvard had 56% of their endowment investment in corporate securities.
Job, Jason R., The Down Market and University Endowments: How the Prudent Investor Standard in the Uniform
Management of Institutional Funds Act Does Not Yield Prudent Result, 66 Ohio St. L.J. note 19, at 574 (2005). See
also, Longstreth, Bevis, Modern Investment Management and the Prudent Man Rule, at 54, 56, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986); and Carey, William L, and Bright, Craig B., “The Law and the Lore of Endowment Funds”,
(New York, The Ford Foundation, 1969).
3
Ryan, Christopher J, “Trusting U.: Examining University Endowment Management”, Journal of College
and University Law, pg. 169, Vol 42, No. 1, 2013. See Job, supra note 14, citing Longstreth, supra at 53, 54. In 1884,
Harvard University invested 51.9% of their endowment in bonds versus 0% of their endowment funds in 1830.
Similarly, Princeton had 3.4% invested in bonds in 1830 and 91.4% in 1884. See Job, supra note 15, citing Longstreth,
1Ryan (2013) adds,
This allocation, or the “60/40” endowment allocation was the prevailing endowment
investment model at the turn of the Twenty-First Century. 4
The 60/40 mix thus represents a naive investable mix with weights like those for most
endowments since the late 1960s.
Since then however, a sustained and substantial shift away from this mix has evolved
among endowments, especially the largest. The National Association of College and University
Business Officers (NACUBO) reported in their FY2019 Study that the average endowment had
reduced its allocation to US equities to 28.1%, and its allocation to US bonds to 20.1%, while
increasing its allocation to non-US and global equities to 22.8%, its allocation to alternatives to
20.1%, and its allocation to real estate to 7.3%. 5 Endowments in the largest cohort, those with
assets over $1 Billion, allocated just 11.2% to US equities and 10.1% to US bonds, while allocating
20.1% to non-US and global equities, 43.2% to alternatives and 13.5% to real estate. 6
The question thus becomes, how have endowments fared as they diversified away from
the early mix? After all, the 60/40 mix is a static US-only benchmark comprised of just two
traditional asset classes. It is merely a crude and blunt instrument, worthy only to provide a
rudimentary notion of whether the sturm and drang of investment management has added value.
Have the allocation shifts, and the active managers employed, added value relative to the passively-
managed mix? Did this long-term orchestrated diversification help or hurt endowments and, if the
supra at 53, 54. In 1904, Harvard University had 33.1% of their endowment invested in mortgages and real estate and
8.2% in corporate stocks. See Job, supra note 16, citing Longstreth, supra at 53-56. In 1924, Harvard had 29.4% of
their endowment invested in real estate and mortgages and 12.9% in corporate stocks. In 1940, Harvard had only 6.3%
of their endowment invested in real estate and mortgages and 46.3% invested in corporate stock. Similarly, Princeton,
in 1924, had 2.7% invested in corporate stocks and 47.2% in 1940.” See supra note 2, Longstreth, at 54, 55 (showing
the asset allocation of Harvard and Princeton University’s endowments from 1830 to 1984), (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986).
4 See id.; Ryan, note 43.
5
For all purposes herein, the “average” endowment is the equal-weighted average of all endowments
participating in the annual NACUBO Studies, as opposed to the dollar-weighted average, to avoid a misleading
distortion from the high skew in dollar values to the largest endowments. “2019 NACUBO-TIAA Study of
Endowments,” Press Release, published 1/30/2020 by National Association of College and University Business
Officers and Teachers Insurance and Annuity Associate of America, Table: Asset Allocations for US College and
University Endowments and Affiliated Foundations, Fiscal Year 2019 (equal-weighted average). NACUBO defined
“alternatives” for these purposes to include marketable alternatives, private equity, and venture capital. NACUBO
defined “real estate” to include TIPS, REITS, commodities/futures, publicly traded natural resource equities, private
energy and mining, and private agriculture and timber.
6
See Id.; Table: Asset Allocations for US College and University Endowments and Affiliated Foundations.
2impacts were disparate across endowment cohorts, whom did it help, and whom did it hurt? 7 Of
course, at the end of the day, if the answer is negative, one can only ask, why not? 8
We bifurcate performance comparisons between those pertaining to external benchmarks,
such as the 60/40 mix, and those pertaining to internal needs and objectives, such as an institution’s
own annual return need (commonly, the sum of the institution’s spending amount and inflation,
typically measured as the Higher Education Price Index (HEPI), net of external management costs)
and long-term return objective (the institution’s annual return need plus an arbitrarily-assumed
amount for real growth, typically in the range of 50-100 bps annually). Performance relative to an
external benchmark is merely informational, while performance relative to the institution’s internal
needs and objectives is critical to the institution’s ability to maintain operations over the long-term.
Hammond (2020a) found that the average endowment underperformed the 60/40
benchmark by 100 bps annualized for the past 58 years since records were kept by NACUBO. In
addition, the average endowment underperformed the 60/40 mix by 80 bps for the past 50 years,
80 bps for the past 40 years, 80 bps for the past 30 years, and 210 bps for the past 10 years.
Fortunately, the average endowment outperformed the 60/40 mix by 50 bps over the past 20 years.
Hammond (2020a) further demonstrated the average endowment underperformed both its
annual return need and its long term return goal. These two measures are especially meaningful to
an institution, using, as they do, the institution’s own inputs for annual return need and long term
return objective. Over the 58 year period, the average endowment underperformed its annual return
need by 160 bps and its long-term return objective by 210 bps (assuming a factor of 50 bps for real
growth). The average endowment underperformed both internal measures over many of the
intervening sub-periods as well, calculated with and without end period dominance.
Underperformance of this magnitude compounded over a half-century is a substantive
indictment of the investment management of endowments. As a result, Kazemi’s paper, declaring,
“Surprise, endowments have significantly outperformed the 60/40 benchmark” is at best
disingenuous and, to the extend it obfuscates endowments’ dire need to make meaningful changes
in their investment management approach, potentially dangerous. 9
What is the global 60/40 benchmark?
Kazemi argues for a global 60/40 mix against which to compare endowments performance
and constructs one comprised of 60% MSCI World and 40% Bloomberg-Barclay Aggregate
7
“Investors have no chance of adding alpha by pursuing an “endowment” model.”. Swedroe, Larry, Advisor
Perspectives, “The Enduring Futility of the Endowment Model”, July 23, 2020.
https://www.advisorperspectives.com/articles/2020/07/23/the-enduring-futility-of-the-endowment-
model?bt_ee=sEjJ1fVuzPY3z%2BgnjqbXrJ%2BIsW1s4lTZ%2FzBoRwcyeIVYmUQmHg8Z%2FEEz17BgO6YX
&bt_ts=1595785006249&textlink=.
8
The 60/40 mix listens to no news nor does it read stock reports; it considers neither advice nor counsel and
maintains neither a top-quartile manager roster nor an investment committee. It simply rebalances monthly back to
60/40. In a real sense, it is as dumb as a brick.
9
Kazemi, supra, note 1, article title, pg. 1.
3Global Bonds. 10 Importantly, this mix is not, and never has been, a policy benchmark in common
use among endowments. Nonetheless, Kazemi asserts that,
Truly passive strategies should have considered global market-cap-weighted equity and
bond indices. An endowment manager is not fulfilling her fiduciary responsibilities by
ignoring the diversification benefits of global investing. Diversification is called the only
free lunch in financial markets for good reasons. Endowments have accepted these and
have always allocated to global bonds and equities. Even if they did not, the proper
benchmarks are always the most diversified publicly traded indices. 11
Exhibit 1 shows the resulting weightings among the four asset classes employed in this
benchmark, as well as the evolution in asset allocation among the four asset classes during the
period under consideration by Kazemi. For instance, the average endowment held 48% in US
stocks in FY1990 but reduced it to 14% by FY2019. Conversely, the average endowment increased
its FY1990 non-US stocks and bonds allocation from 2% and 1% respectively, to 15% and 2%,
respectively, by FY2019. 12
Exhibit 1: Allocations by Asset Class (%)
Average Average
Asset Class Traditional Endowment Endowment Global
60/40 Mix FY1990 FY2019 60/40 Mix
US stocks 60 48 14 39
Non-US stocks - 2 15 21
US bonds 40 33 12 15
Non-US bonds - 1 2 25
Source: NACUBO Studies FY 1990 and FY 2019, Kazemi.
However, some of the global 60/40 allocations are not close to what endowments have ever
used. For example, the global 60/40 benchmark maintains a 25% allocation to non-US bonds,
including both developed and emerging market issuers. The highest allocation endowments have
had to non-US bonds since records were kept by NACUBO is less than 3%. As a result, it is
somewhat more difficult to argue the relevance of such a benchmark as a performance
comparison. 13
10
The MSCI World index is comprised of 64.3% US equities, and 35.7% non-US developed market equities.
See https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/149ed7bc-316e-4b4c-8ea4-43fcb5bd6523. The Bloomberg Barclay’s
Aggregate Global Bond index is comprised of 37.3% US bonds and 62.7% non-US bonds, issued by both developed
and emerging market countries. See https://www.ssga.com/library-content/products/factsheets/etfs/emea/factsheet-
emea-en_gb-sybz-gy.pdf.
11
Kazemi, supra, note 1, at pg. 2.
12
Both the traditional 60/40 mix and the global 60/40 mix use static allocations which today bear little
resemblance to the average endowment’s asset mix. The traditional 60/40 mix, however, remains useful as a starting
point or perspective from which to measure the success of the intervening evolution in endowment asset allocation.
13
If one determined a “normal” or policy asset mix reflecting the average endowment’s actual asset mix in
each period and compared the results to the actual returns, one might gain insight to the over/under returns of active
management vs. the passive policy weight returns as well as the effectiveness or costs of any deviations from policy
asset mix (i.e., from rebalancing frequencies). However, such an analysis is beyond the scope of this review.
4Over the full thirty year period, the traditional 60/40 mix outperformed the average
endowment by 80 bps annualized (8.7% vs 7.9%). 14 Dissecting the performance into the three
decades selected by Kazemi, Exhibit 2 demonstrates the traditional 60/40 mix outperformed the
average endowment in the first and third periods and underperformed in the second. The global
60/40 mix managed to underperform the average endowment in all three periods, and
underperformed the traditional 60/40 mix in the first and third periods as well, outperforming in
the second period by a scant 10 bps annualized.
Exhibit 2: Compound Annualized Returns (%)
Traditional Global Average
Period 60/40 Mix 60/40 Mix Endowment
FY 1990-1999 14.6 10.8 12.9
FY 2000-2009 1.5 1.6 4.0
FY 2010-2019 10.5 7.7 8.4
Source: NACUBO Studies for FY 1990 through 2019, Kazemi.
Dr. Kazemi concedes,
The global index has underperformed the US index by about 30 bps each year since
1990. 15
Given this outcome, it is puzzling that an argument would be made that it was the
preferable, more prudent mix, and thus the benchmark Hammond should have used.
Did alternatives provide endowments returns in excess of the traditional 60/40 mix?
Phalippou (2011), Ennis (2020a and b), and Hammond (2020a and b) demonstrate the
inability of alternative investments to provide their touted performance to the average institution.16
Phalippou (2011) argues, for instance, that private equity returns such as Yale’s, when reported as
since-inception-IRRs, can be “dramatically misleading” and that presenting Yale as an investment
model is thereby “probably premature”. 17 Phalippou states,
It is evident that the 30% that is so often cited is unlikely to be anywhere close to the true
rate of return. That true rate of return could be anywhere from single digit to maybe 20%.
Hence making Yale Endowment a model based on what is in their annual report is rather
premature. 18
14
Hammond (2020a), Exhibit 20, pg. 16.
15
Kazemi, supra, note 1, at pg. 2.
16
It should be noted that Hammond does not suggest the reason for the average and small endowments
underperformance of their annual return need, their long term return goal, or the 60/40 mix is due to the inclusion of
alternatives in their portfolios. Rather, the worst relative underperformance comes from the smallest endowments
which do not use alternatives at all. At least for the smallest endowments, the source of underperformance is a blend
of asset mix, manager selection, and portfolio management fees, not the presence of alternatives in their portfolio.
17
Phalippou, Ludovic, “Is Yale a Model?”, University of Oxford business school and Oxford-Mann institute,
pg. 1, (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1950257.
18
Id., pg. 6.
5Ennis (2020a) concludes that “alternatives have ceased to be the diversifiers they once
were and have become a significant drag on institutional fund performance.” 19 Ennis (2020b)
concludes both that return dampening from alternatives is “absent” and that exposure to
alternatives detracts from performance. 20 In fact, he argues, the more alternatives a portfolio has,
the worse it will perform. 21 Ennis concludes his analysis with a simple message to trustees,
Liquidate your alternative investments and put the proceeds into index funds. Do it
now. 22
A recent paper by Ennis (2020c) finds that a heavy reliance on alternative investments has
reduced performance for large endowments for the past 11 years. 23
For the past 11 years, their heavy reliance on alternatives—currently nearly 60% of
assets—has been a major drag on performance. 24
Nevertheless, Kazemi reaches just the opposite conclusion. How?
First, Kazemi constructs a hypothetical alternatives portfolio comprised of equal, one-third
weights to the Cambridge Associates Private Equity index, Cambridge Associates VC index, and
the CISDM Equally Weighted Hedge Fund index. 25 Importantly, an alternatives portfolio such as
this is 100% equity or equity substitutes. In contrast, the 60/40 mix is 40% bonds. As odd as this
comparison is, Kazemi still has difficulties with it, as he acknowledges the 60/40 mix outperforms
the alternatives portfolio “on a few occasions”. 26 Indeed, Kazemi permits,
There was only one short period in 2004-2005 that the alpha estimated using a 5-year
window became negative. 27
This is another way of saying that in 2004-2005, over a 5-year backward-looking
estimation period, the traditional 60/40 mix outperformed the hypothetical alternatives portfolio.
A better comparison would be to the S&P 500 modified public market equivalent (S&P
500 mPME). Since both private equity (PE) and venture capital (VC) returns are reported as
internal rates of return (IRRs) and not time-weighted returns (TWRs), the returns from the S&P
500 must be converted to the public market equivalents to measure relative performance.
Cambridge Associates (CA) provides this conversion in their annual reports on private
19
Ennis, Richard M, (2020a), “Institutional Investment Strategy and Manager Choice: a Critique”, The
Journal of Portfolio Management Fund Manager Selection, 2020, 46 (5) 104-117.
20 Ennis, Richard M, (2020b), “Endowment Performance”, pg. 11 (July 24, 2020). Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3614875 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3614875.
21
Id.; pg. 11.
22
Id.; pg. 12.
23
Ennis, Richard M., (2020c), “Three Eras of Endowment Performance Between 1974 and 2019”, pg. 8.
Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3649634.
24
Id.; pg.8
25
Cambridge Associates publishes several private investment indices, including the CA Private Equity index,
the CA Venture Capital index, and the CA Real Estate index. The CISDM Equally Weighted Hedge Fund index is
constructed and maintained by Dr. Kazemi at the Isenberg School at the University of Massachusetts Amherst.
26
Kazemi, supra, note 1, at pg. 4.
27
Kazemi, supra, note 1, at pg. 5.
6investments. For example, looking at FY 2010-2019, CA reports a 15.1% return for the S&P 500
mPME, compared to the 10.9% return Kazemi reports for his hypothetical alternatives portfolio
for the same period. 28 That represents 420 bps a year of underperformance by the hypothetical
alternatives portfolio relative to the liquid S&P500 mPME.
Second, the average endowment at the beginning of Kazemi’s review period in FY1990
held precious little in alternatives. Exhibit 3 shows that, at FY1990, the average endowment held
less than 3% in total in the three alternatives classes employed in the hypothetical alternatives
portfolio. It is difficult to imagine that a 3% allocation to any portfolio of alternatives could
improve the composite portfolio’s returns in any meaningful way. By the beginning of the second
period, the total was 17.6%, and by the beginning of the third period, they totaled 35%.
Exhibit 3: Average Endowment’s Allocations to Alternative Investments
Venture
Period Private Equity Capital Hedge Funds
FY 1990 0.2 0.6 1.0
FY 2000 4.1 8.8 4.7
FY 2010 12 3 20
FY2018 10 6 18
Source: NACUBO Studies for FY 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2018.
Moreover, the CA indices are not investable benchmarks. Kazemi grants,
These indices are not investible, and their performance is sure to differ from the
performance of the alternative buckets of many endowments. 29
This is indeed accurate. Hammond (2020b) examined the returns for private equity and
venture capital across endowment cohorts for the last 15, 10, 5, 3, and 1 year period ending in FY
2019 in comparison to the CA PE and VC indices which Kazemi uses in the hypothetical
alternatives portfolio. He concludes the average and small endowments were unable to capture the
returns indicated by the CA indices and states,
Over the 15-year period (FY2005- FY2019), the average private equity allocation
underperformed the CA US Private Equity benchmark in every period reviewed, with
annualized underperformance ranging from 30 bps in FY 2019 to an annualized 400 bps
in each of the last 10- and 3- year periods. 30
The average endowment was unable to achieve the performance of the CA US Venture
Capital index in any period reviewed. Over the 15-year period, the average endowment
underperformed the CA Venture Capital index by 130 bps, while underperforming the
index by 250 bps over 10 years, 380 bps over 5- and 3- years, and 840 bps in FY 2019. 31
Kazemi recognizes not all endowments have the necessary resources to capture the returns
of his hypothetical alternatives portfolio, acknowledging,
28
Hammond (2020b), pg. 16; Kazemi, supra, note 1, at pg. 3.
29
Kazemi, supra, note 1, at pg. 6.
30
Hammond (2020b), pg. 16.
31
Id.; pg. 18.
7There is no argument some endowments lack the needed skills and connections to
construct an alts portfolio that, at the minimum, would deliver the “average” return
represented by these indices. 32
This too, is demonstrably correct. Hammond (2020a) examined returns for private
investments across endowment cohorts and found significant returns gaps across the cohorts,
especially among alternative investments,
Return gaps across cohorts are demonstrated most notably in the returns by cohort for private
equity, venture capital, private realty, energy, and, to a lesser extent, distressed debt…In
FY2018, for example, the large cohort earned 18.3% in venture capital and the average
endowment earned 13.4%, a 27% haircut from the returns earned by the large cohort…Or
consider private equity. In FY2018, private equity returns for the large, average, and small
cohorts were 16.15, 13.2%, and 4.9%, respectively…This wasn’t the only year returns
dispersion showed this wide a gap…These data suggest underperformance of the large cohort
by the average and small cohort may be structural, related to a lack of manager access and
possibly to higher management costs. 33
Rebalancing every 5 years?
Kazemi further argues that Hammond’s method of rebalancing the 60/40 mix monthly, a
practice commonly followed in index construction, is artificial. Instead, he suggests the 60/40 mix
should be rebalanced every 5 years. 34 He suggests,
Using the global benchmark and assuming 5-year rebalancing, endowments have
outperformed the benchmark by 2.2%-3.8% per year since 2010. 35
This is a rather startling suggestion, as it would not only be a highly uncommon practice,
but one which arguably is in violation of a fiduciary’s duty to manage a portfolio with prudence.
As time passes and the relative values of the components in a portfolio’s asset mix, such as the
stocks and bonds in a 60/40 mix, ebb and flow with the vagaries of the marketplace, the portfolio
will thereby reflect differing expected volatilities, sometimes less and sometimes more. The failure
to rebalance could thereby permit a 60/40 mix to float to 80/20 or 40/60, far afield from the asset
allocation characteristics expected or desired. For this reason, most portfolio managers choose to
calibrate their portfolio risk and maintain it as close to their original risk budget as possible through
time. Allowing a portfolio’s asset mix to simply float without rebalancing over a 5-year period
could expose a portfolio to significantly increased volatility relative to original expectations.
Uninvested cash?
Finally, Kazemi argues Hammond (2020a) ignored “uninvested cash” in endowment
portfolios: he posits endowment returns should be adjusted (increased) to remove the performance
drag caused by the presence of cash. This is neither a common practice nor one permitted by the
32
Kazemi, supra, note 1, at pg. 6.
33
Hammond (2020a), pgs. 20, 21.
34
Kazemi, supra, note 1, at pg. 4.
35
Id.; pg. 4.
8Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS). 36 Endowment managers do not hold cash
involuntarily. Holding cash is always an investment decision. Thus, if an endowment holds 4% or
40% in cash, that is their decision. They cannot back the cash out later to demonstrate what their
returns would have been if they had made a different decision. Cash usually, but not always,
reduces returns. Nevertheless, holding cash is a valid investment decision: the return of the
endowment inclusive of cash is the only return to use in calculating relative performance.
Should the average and smaller endowment continue to commit to private
investments?
Dr. Kazemi concludes his paper by asking rhetorically, “In the face of this evidence, why
would an endowment manager give up on alternatives?” Hammond (2020b) addresses that
question relative to the average and smaller endowments’ future commitments to private
investments, including private equity and venture capital. Key findings are:
• Over the last 15 years, returns for the average endowment in private investments
underperformed private market indices, large endowments, and the S&P 500 (adjusted
to a public market equivalent or mPME) in most periods reviewed.
• Private investments have not provided compensation for the illiquidity, delayed pricing,
and misleading performance accounting involved for the last 15 years for the average
endowment.
• Endowment fiduciaries are well advised to reconsider future commitments to private
equity, given the dry powder, debt multiples, and price multiples extant today. Fiduciaries
should carefully evaluate whether private investments are likely to provide adequate
compensation for the illiquidity and risk assumed.
Put differently, Hammond (2020b) reverses Kazemi’s question, and asks why, in the face
of the evidence, would the average endowment manager continue to commit to private
investments?
Conclusions
The average endowment has, indeed, underperformed the traditional 60/40 benchmark, its
annual return need, and its long-term return objective, over several extended periods, including the
last 58 years. In addition, the average endowment has not achieved results from the alternatives
managers to which they have access commensurate with those which large endowments have
enjoyed, nor have their alternatives provided returns superior to those available in liquid market
options, such as the S&P 500 mPME. The continuation of past practices is potentially dangerous,
as complacency may yield disappointing future results. Prudence demands endowments carefully
consider their allocations to active traditional and alternative managers now to avoid future
underperformance.
36
See Global Investment Performance Standards for Firms, 2020, prepared by the CFA Institute, Global
Investment Performance Standards, Rule 2.A.8 relating to requirement to use total returns, and may be found at
https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/media/documents/code/gips/2020-gips-standards-firms.ashx.
9References
Carey, William L, and Bright, Craig B., “The Law and the Lore of Endowment Funds”,
(New York, The Ford Foundation, 1969).
Hammond, Dennis R, 2020a, “A Better Approach to Systematic Outperformance? 58 Years
of Endowment Performance”, Journal of Investing, August 2020, 29 (5) 6-30.
Hammond, Dennis R, 2020b, “Should Endowments Continue to Commit to Private
Investments”, Journal of Investing, December 2020, forthcoming.
Ennis, Richard M, 2020a, “Institutional Investment Strategy and Manager Choice: a
Critique”, The Journal of Portfolio Management Fund Manager Selection, 2020, 46 (5) 104-117.
Ennis, Richard, Endowment Performance (July 24, 2020). Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3614875 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3614875
Ennis, Richard M., 2020c, “Three Eras of Endowment Performance Between 1974 and
2019”. Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3649634.
Job, Jason R., The Down Market and University Endowments: How the Prudent Investor
Standard in the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act Does Not Yield Prudent Result,
66 Ohio St. L.J. 569 (2005).
Longstreth, Bevis, Modern Investment Management and the Prudent Man Rule, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
Phalippou, Ludovic, “Is Yale a Model?”, University of Oxford business school and Oxford-
Mann institute, (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1950257.
Ryan Jr, Christopher J., “Trusting U.: Examining University Endowment Management”,
Journal of College and University Law, 2013, Vol 42, No. 1, pg. 169
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