THE BEIRUT PORT EXPLOSION - UNDERSTANDING ITS IMPACT AND HOW TO REDUCE RISKS FROM EXPLOSIVE PRECURSORS - UNIDIR
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THE BEIRUT PORT EXPLOSION
UNDERSTANDING ITS IMPACT AND HOW TO
REDUCE RISKS FROM EXPLOSIVE PRECURSORS
BOB SEDDON
HIMAYU SHIOTANI
THE BEIRUT PORT EXPLOSION 1
NOTE The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual authors. They do not necessary reflect the views or opinions of the United Nations, UNIDIR, its staff members or sponsors. CITATION Seddon. B & Shiotani. H. 2020 “The Beirut Port Explosion: Understanding Its Impact and How to Reduce Risks from Explosive Precursors”, Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR. ABOUT UNIDIR The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems. www.unidir.org | © UNIDIR 2020 Cover Photo by Fadel Itani/NurPhoto via Getty Images
CONTENTS
Executive Summary................................................................................................................................................................................ 1
1 Introduction......................................................................................................................................................................................... 3
1.1 Purpose and Audience............................................................................................................................................................. 3
1.2 Scope and Limitations............................................................................................................................................................. 3
2 Understanding the Risks from the Beirut Port Explosion............................................................................................... 4
2.1 Materials Involved in the Explosion..................................................................................................................................... 4
2.1.1 Ammonium Nitrate...................................................................................................................................................... 4
2.1.2 Other materials............................................................................................................................................................ 5
2.2 Key risks identified from the Beirut Explosion incident............................................................................................... 5
2.2.1 Oversight of Explosive Material.............................................................................................................................. 5
2.2.2 Risks Associated to Storage and Practices........................................................................................................ 5
2.2.3 Risks Associated to Initiation of Fire and Detonation...................................................................................... 6
3 Explosions in Urban and Built-up Areas: the Ripple Effect and Socio-Economic Risks....................................7
3.1 Blast and its Reverberating Effects in Populated Areas.................................................................................................7
3.2 Socio-Economic and Political Risks.....................................................................................................................................7
4 Policy and Governance Implications........................................................................................................................................ 9
4.1 Roles and Responsibilities...................................................................................................................................................... 9
4.2 Regulatory Frameworks.......................................................................................................................................................... 9
4.3 Supply Chain Safety and Security......................................................................................................................................10
4.3.1 Supply Chain Vulnerabilities....................................................................................................................................10
4.3.2 Safe Storage Practices.............................................................................................................................................10
4.4 Information Exchange and Sharing.....................................................................................................................................11
4.5 Awareness Raising and Sensitization.................................................................................................................................11
5 Technical Recommendations...................................................................................................................................................... 12
5.1 Dangerous Goods Classification of Ammonium Nitrate.............................................................................................. 12
5.2 Implications for Transport of Cargo and Handling of Ammonium Nitrate in Ports.............................................. 12
5.3 Safety Distances for Ammonium Nitrate......................................................................................................................... 12
Technical Annex A - Explosion Effects Overview....................................................................................................................14
Air Blast.........................................................................................................................................................................14
Blast Effects on People..............................................................................................................................................14
Effects on Structures..................................................................................................................................................15
Fragmentation..............................................................................................................................................................15
Primary Fragmentation..................................................................................................................................15
Secondary Fragmentation.............................................................................................................................15
Ground Shock and Cratering.....................................................................................................................................15
Thermal Effects............................................................................................................................................................16
Technical Annex B - Analysis of Beirut Port Explosion Effects........................................................................................ 17
Overview of Explosion Effects..................................................................................................................................17
Casualties......................................................................................................................................................................17
Structural Damage to Buildings.................................................................................................................................17
Damage Overview...........................................................................................................................................17
Analysis of Blast Damage to Buildings.........................................................................................................21
Extent of Window Glazing Damage..............................................................................................................21
Assessing the Explosive Magnitude of the Beirut Port Explosion.......................................................................21
FIGURES & TABLES
Figure 1. Beirut Port Explosives Quantity Distance Map for 2000 tonne Explosive Content.................................... 13
Figure 2. Blast Wave Pressure-Time Profile......................................................................................................................... 14
Figure 3. Satellite Imagery and Analysis of Post-Explosion Damage to Structures..................................................... 18
Figure 4. Aerial View of Silo Quay Before the Explosion.................................................................................................... 18
Figure 5. Aerial View of Blast Damage to the Port of Beirut............................................................................................. 19
Figure 6. Aerial View of the Seat of the Explosion at Silo Quay........................................................................................ 19
Figure 7. Blast Damage from Port of Beirut Towards Beirut City Centre........................................................................20
Figure 8. Structural Damage in Central Beirut.....................................................................................................................20
Table 1. Accidental Explosions Involving Ammonium Nitrate............................................................................................. 4
Table 2. Explosion Effects Scenarios.................................................................................................................................... 22
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
BOB SEDDON spent 27 years in the British Army in a variety of appointments related to
ammunition, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), weapons intelligence, special projects and
related policy. He commanded an EOD squadron in Great Britain and a regular regiment
in Northern Ireland and has served on operations all over the globe. In his final military
appointment, he was the Principal Ammunition Technical Officer and the British Army’s
competent authority and inspector for improvised explosive device (IED) disposal, weapons
intelligence and explosive safety. He now works principally in the areas of explosive threat
mitigation and capability development. He is a Chartered Engineer and has a first degree in
Command and Control, Communications and Information Systems and master’s degrees in
Design of Information Systems, Explosive Ordnance Engineering, and Defence Studies.
HIMAYU SHIOTANI is the Programme Head of the Conventional Arms Programme at the
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Since 2014 he has led the
Institute’s research on conventional weapons to promote knowledge on the regulation of the
global arms trade, armed violence reduction, explosive hazard risk mitigation, and weapon
and ammunition management in West and Central Africa, as well as in Iraq and Somalia. Prior
to his work with UNIDIR, he was a Researcher at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation
Studies (CNS) in Monterey, California. He holds a master’s degree in International Policy
Studies, with a Certificate in Nonproliferation Studies, from the Middlebury Institute of
International Studies.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AN Ammonium nitrate
COVID-19 Coronavirus 2019
IATG International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
IED Improvised explosive device
IMO International Maritime Organization
kt Kiloton
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration (of the United States)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On 4 August 2020, one of the biggest non-nuclear The single most important lesson from the Beirut
explosions in history – and the largest single explosion explosion is that the incident could have been prevented,
ever to occur in the Middle East – took place in the and so there is an urgent need for States and relevant
heavily populated city of Beirut, Lebanon. The explosion, private sector and industry actors to take action to
caused by detonation of 2,750 tonnes of high-density prevent similar future accidents. This report identifies a
ammonium nitrate (with an estimated TNT equivalent series of policy-relevant and technical recommendations
explosive effect of between 1.5 and 2 kilotons), had to tackle and further reduce safety risks from explosive
catastrophic consequences for the city of Beirut, its precursors and to strengthen oversight and governance
people and the urban ecosystem. One month after the to prevent accidental and unplanned explosions.
incident, the number of people killed had reached 190,
and over 6,500 were injured. It is estimated that a total Policy recommendations include:
of 200,000 domestic dwellings were affected in Beirut;
40,000 buildings were damaged; and 3,000 housing • Clarify roles and responsibilities and strengthen
structures received serious damage as a result of the national coordination and information exchange
explosion. It is further estimated that 300,000 people among and between national authorities and private
lost their homes, and over 15,000 establishments – sector and industry actors in the management of
approximately 50 per cent of Beirut’s business and explosive precursors.
service sectors – were damaged, the majority in the
• Assess gaps and, where necessary, revise national
wholesale, retail and hospitality sectors.
regulatory frameworks to strengthen oversight
and management of explosive precursors and the
The post-blast consequences and the associated
processes and capacities to enforce them.
socio-economic risks for Lebanon in the future are
considerable – the United Nations and the World Bank • Assess and identify safety and security risks and
estimate that the cost of reconstruction may be in the vulnerabilities in the supply chain of explosive
range of several billion dollars. The explosion occurred precursors and undertake mitigation measures
at a time of severe economic crisis in Lebanon, where throughout the life cycle of explosive precursors.
an estimated 1 million people live below the poverty • Institute regulation and procedures for safe
line. Social tensions and associated risks have grown and secure storage, including safety distances,
in Beirut and other parts of the country following the segregation, and removal or relocation of large
explosion, leading to the resignation of the Lebanese quantities of explosives from populated areas.
Government. Further compounding the recovery efforts
is an observed increase in transmission of coronavirus • Raise awareness among both political leaders and
2019 (COVID-19) following the blast in Beirut, which industry actors downstream in the supply chain on
is straining the country’s already fragile health-care the risks and potential impacts of poorly managed
system. Beyond other immediate risks, such as disruption explosive precursors.
to the supply chain of food, medical and other essential
supplies, the medium-to-long-term effects of the blast
Technical recommendations include:
and the COVID-19-related lockdown are likely to have
a significant impact on the psychological well-being of • For the purposes of storage and transport, high-
people in Beirut. density AN should be considered for reclassification
as a Class 1 explosive with a Hazard Division of 1.1,
The devastation caused by the Beirut explosion has that is, as a material capable of mass explosion.
renewed attention on the need for safe and secure • Review and, where necessary, update existing
through-life management – that is, production, recommendations regarding the safe transport
acquisition, transportation, storage, handling and end of dangerous cargo to reflect the mass explosion
use – of explosive precursors and other dangerous hazard associated with ammonium nitrate.
goods around the world. This incident also serves as an
important reminder of the critical need to ensure that • Ensure that risks are as low as reasonably practicable
large quantities of explosive precursors are not stored (ALARP), and appropriate safety distances are
and left unmanaged in built-up and populated areas, applied to the storage of ammonium nitrate based
where unplanned or accidental explosions can cause on quantity risk assessment.
catastrophic direct and indirect cumulative and long-
term harm to people, their livelihood and the urban
ecosystem.
THE BEIRUT PORT EXPLOSION 1
UNIDIR 2
1. INTRODUCTION
On 4 August 2020, the largest single explosion ever to This report is aimed at policy makers, researchers and
occur in the Middle East took place in the port of the practitioners engaged in the oversight and management
heavily populated city of Beirut, Lebanon. Recent open of explosives and ammunition. Key elements from this
source analysis of the blast effects indicate that it was report can help inform regional and national decision-
one of the largest non-nuclear explosions in history.1 making regarding legislation, policy and regulations
The explosion was caused by detonation of 2,750 tonnes relating to explosives and other dangerous goods. It
of high-density ammonium nitrate with an estimated may also support multilateral discussions on ways to
TNT equivalent explosive effect of between 1.5 and 2 further reduce safety risks from explosive precursors
kilotons (kt).2 It had catastrophic consequences for the and conventional ammunition.
city of Beirut, its people and the urban ecosystem.
This report is also designed to serve as a reference
The immediate-to-longer-term effects of an explosion document in aiding the prevention and preparedness
of this scale in a populated city such as Beirut are efforts of the United Nations against explosive hazard
significant. A month after the explosion, the Lebanese risks. This includes United Nations entities providing
Ministry of Public Health reported that the number of advisory and capacity-building support to United
people killed had reached 190 and over 6,500 had been Nations country teams and peace operations, as well as
injured. It is estimated that a total of 200,000 domestic to Member States in the safe and secure management
dwellings were affected in Beirut; 40,000 buildings of explosive precursors.
were damaged; and 3,000 housing structures received
serious damage as a result of the explosions. It is further SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
estimated that around 10,000 enterprises in the direct
vicinity of the blast site have been either destroyed or In this report the term ‘explosive precursors’ refers to
put out of business and that 300,000 people have lost the energetic substances used in the manufacture of
their homes.3 The medium-to-long-term impacts from explosive materials. Further terminology is explained in
the reverberating effects of the blast are expected to be Technical Appendix A.
significant, and efforts for recovery to be challenging.
This report does not constitute a formal investigation of
PURPOSE AND AUDIENCE the Beirut explosion incident. In particular, it does not
seek to examine or attribute responsibility.
The primary purpose of this report is to enhance
knowledge among policy makers and practitioners This report has sought information from the widest
of the risks posed by explosive precursors and of the possible variety of publicly accessible sources and
impact of explosive blast effects on civilians and the information available in the first two months following
urban ecosystem, and to identify ways to further reduce the incident. It is possible that some details may change
safety risks and to prevent accidental explosions from as new facts emerge.
occurring in the future. Preliminary risks and lessons
identified from the Beirut Port explosion serve as the
basis of this report.
Concretely, the report seeks to:
• Understand the explosive hazard risks surrounding
the Beirut Port explosion of 4 August 2020
• Assess and gain insight into the explosion effects and
their impact on civilians and the urban ecosystem,
including for future development objectives
• Offer policy and technical recommendations to
support global efforts to strengthen regulations,
guidelines and through-life management relating
to explosive precursor safety
1 J. Amos and P. Rincon, “Beirut Blast was ‘historically’ Powerful”, BBC News, 5 October 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/sci-
ence-environment-54420033. See also S.E. Rigby et al., “Preliminary Yield Estimation of the 2020 Beirut Explosion Using Video
Footage from Social Media”, Shock Waves, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00193-020-00970-z.
2 There have been a considerable range of published figures for the estimated TNT equivalence of the size of the explosion,
ranging from 0.4 to 3.4 kt. The estimate in this paper is based on an evaluation of the physical blast effects on the ground, partic-
ularly the level of damage to buildings and breakage of windows at known distances from the seat of the explosion (see Technical
Appendix B). Explosion effects evaluation and explosive quantity estimation is an imprecise science. While the maximum quantity of
AN stored in the Beirut Port warehouse prior to the explosion is known, the level of organic contamination of the material and the
effects that the packaging and the possible presence of other dangerous goods is not known.
3 For further information about the impact of the explosion effects, see section 3 and Technical Appendix B of this report.
THE BEIRUT PORT EXPLOSION 3
2. UNDERSTANDING THE RISKS FROM THE BEIRUT
PORT EXPLOSION
2.1. MATERIALS INVOLVED IN THE When mixed with almost any organic matter,
EXPLOSION hydrocarbons or certain metallic powders, AN becomes
a potential explosive. For this reason, AN has been
2.1.1. Ammonium nitrate misused by terrorists and extremists for many years in
From early in the 20th century, ammonium nitrate (AN) the manufacture of homemade explosives. AN was the
has been an important chemical used in the manufacture principal constituent in most of the large improvised
of explosives and as an agricultural fertilizer. As a explosive devices (IEDs) employed by groups such as
fertilizer, AN has increased agricultural productivity the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Fuerzas
and helped meet the growing global demand for food. Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the
As a component of explosives, AN has many positive Taliban in Afghanistan.
features. It is generally very stable and quite insensitive
to accidental detonation through impact and friction. AN in its pure form is not classified under the United
However, AN also poses explosive hazard risks and has Nation’s Globally Harmonized System of Classification
a long history of being involved in accidental explosions and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS) as an explosive, but
(see Table 1). it is classified as a Class 5.1 dangerous good (i.e. an
oxidizing substance).6 In its Revised Recommendations
The chemical formula of AN is NH4NO3. In its pure on the Safe Transport of Dangerous Cargoes and Related
form it is a white or colourless crystal. It has a melting Activities in Port Areas, the International Maritime
point of 169°C and starts to chemically decompose at Organization (IMO) recommends that:
this temperature. AN is very hygroscopic (i.e. it readily
absorbs water); for this reason, especially when used Dangerous cargo areas should have separate areas
in explosive formulations, AN prills (i.e. pellets) are with all necessary facilities appropriate to the hazards
treated with a surface coating to reduce water uptake emanating from the cargoes to be kept. Where
and to prevent caking (i.e. the prills adhering together).4 appropriate these facilities should include separate
AN has a high oxygen content and, as a result, fires ventilation, drainage, fire resisting walls, ceilings, etc.7
involving AN cannot be extinguished by smothering.
The fire hazards associated with AN are increased very
significantly when organic matter or hydrocarbons are
present and AN is stored in confined spaces.
Some of the most significant catastrophic incidents
involving AN are shown at Table 1.
TABLE 1. Accidental explosions involving ammonium nitrate
Serial Date Location Comment5
1 2 April 1916 Faversham, UK 700 t of AN; 115 killed
2 21 September 1921 Oppau, Germany 450 t of AN; 561 killed
3 29 April 1942 Tessenderlo, Belgium 150 t of AN; 189 killed
4 16 April 1947 Texas City, USA 2,000 t of AN; 581 killed
5 21 September 2001 Toulouse, France 200–300 t of AN; 30 killed
6 17 April 2013 West, Texas, USA 240 t of AN; 15 killed
7 12 August 2015 Tianjin Port, China 800 t of AN; 165 killed
4 R. Meyer, J. Köhler and A. Homburg, Explosives, 6th edition, 2007, http://doi.org/10.1002/9783527617043.
5 The quantity of AN and the number of casualties reported may vary across public sources.
6 On the GHS see United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), “About the GHS”, https://www.unece.org/trans/
danger/publi/ghs/ghs_welcome_e.html.
7 International Maritime Organization, Revised Recommendations on the Safe Transport of Dangerous Cargoes and Related activ-
ities in Port Areas, MSC.1/Circ.1216, 26 February 2007, Section 3.4.1.
UNIDIR 4
2.1.2. Other materials coordination at the national level among relevant
A review of possible materials stored at the site of national stakeholders, including Government and
the Beirut explosion highlights the risks associated non-Governmental private sector and industry
with polypropylene packaging and other incendiary actors responsible for the through-life management
materials. The entire consignment of AN involved in the of explosive materials; and 4) an established and
Beirut Port explosion was packaged in polypropylene well-understood process for risk identification and
textile sacks. Polypropylene is a hydrocarbon polymer mitigation at both strategic and operational levels
consisting of 85.7 per cent carbon and 14.3 per cent of governance, including adequate allocation of
hydrogen, formed by the polymerization of propylene. resources to implement them.
Polypropylene is a very versatile material and its fibres • High quantity of explosive materials stored in a
can be used in a textile form for the packaging of bulk populated area: When explosive blasts take place
materials. in built-up and populated areas, the harm to civilians
and civilian objects rises exponentially due to the
Polypropylene melts at around 163°C and will start to density and inherent vulnerability of the civilian
degrade at approximately 220°C; it will ignite when its population and its dependence on a web of critical
surface temperature reaches approximately 340°C.8 The and interconnected services. Oversight mechanisms
thermal degradation products of polypropylene have and processes should consider preventive
been studied widely.9 When the material is burned in air, measures, including prohibiting storage of a large
a complex mixture of hydrocarbons and other volatile quantity of explosive materials in populated areas,
gases is released.10 or relocating the items away from cities and towns.
They should also consider mitigation measures by
It has not been possible to confirm what other materials instituting quantity safety distances11 and putting in
stored in the Beirut Port warehouse contributed to the place physical barriers to minimize blast effects if
initiation of the explosion or exacerbated its impact. explosive materials cannot be relocated or divided
Analysis of video imagery showing later stages of the and segregated into smaller quantities.
fire indicates that other hazardous materials, possibly
fireworks or other pyrotechnics, had become involved in • Considerations on unloading dangerous goods
the fire. There is no evidence to suggest that any military from vessels: If a cargo containing explosive
munitions or other types of manufactured commercial materials is deemed too hazardous to be left on
explosive were involved in the explosion. board the vessel, it should also be regarded as too
hazardous to be unloaded and stored in a general
2.2. KEY RISKS IDENTIFIED FROM THE BEIRUT cargo warehouse in close proximity to civilian
EXPLOSION INCIDENT population and civilian objects. It should only be
unloaded in berths away from populated areas.
This section highlights key explosive hazard risks
identified from the Beirut explosion incident. A 2.2.2. Risks associated with storage and practices
preliminary analysis of the Beirut explosion effects is
presented in Technical Appendix B. • Inappropriate storage building and lack of
protective barriers for dangerous goods:
2.2.1. Oversight of explosive material The AN was stored in a light-skinned general
cargo warehouse. Given its location, build
• Lack of oversight of explosive materials stored standard, environmental protection and security
over an extended period of time: A large quantity arrangements, it was unsuitable for the storage of
of AN was stored with limited oversight over an dangerous goods. Dangerous goods that pose a fire
extended period of six years, contributing to an or explosion risk should be stored only in buildings
increase in the safety risks associated with the with the appropriate level of fire-protection
explosive material. This points to several oversight measures, including screened electrical systems,
considerations: 1) the need for dedicated or fire-detection and -monitoring systems, and fire-
related safety regulations for explosive materials, fighting equipment that is ready for immediate
including their enforcement; 2) a clear designation use. Where bulk AN is stored it is essential that
of lead national authorities responsible for the appropriate infrastructure measures are taken to
oversight and governance of explosive materials; 3)
8 T.J. Shields and J. Zhang, “Fire Hazard with Polypropylene”, in J. Karger-Kocsis (ed.), Polypropylene: An A-Z Reference, 1999,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4421-6_34.
9 V. Purohit and R.A. Orzel, “Polypropylene: A Literature Review of the Thermal Decomposition Products and Toxicity, Journal of
the American College of Toxicology, vol. 7, no. 2, 1988, https://doi.org/10.3109/10915818809014521.
10 P.J. Fardell, J.M. Murrell and J.V. Murrell, “Chemical ‘Fingerprint’ Studies of Fire Atmospheres”, Fire and Materials, vol. 10, 1986,
https://doi.org/10.1002/fam.810100105.
11 One of the most efficient means of protecting the public from the effects of an explosive event is by the use of separation
distances, which ensure that populations are always at a tolerably safe distance from the explosives during storage and handling.
Within the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG), tables of net explosive quantity and associated minimum recom-
mended distances, known as Quantity Distance Tables, form the foundation of the safe licensing and storage for sites containing
explosive materials.
THE BEIRUT PORT EXPLOSION 5
prevent, in the event of a fire, molten AN flowing in multiple dangerous goods classes significantly
into confined areas and drainage systems, which increases risks and drastically complicates the
then create the circumstances for local confinement response to incidents involving fire.
and allow AN to burn to detonation. • Precautions with hot work and use of electrical
• Lack of segregation: The entire AN consignment equipment at sites storing explosive materials13:
was stored in a single confined stack with no It is essential to have fire precautions in the conduct
segregation. Stacked bags or sacks create static of hot work in areas where dangerous goods are
pressure on the AN, which can contribute to changes stored. As IMO guidelines state, “The carrying out of
in the structure of the crystals thereby increasing hot work and the use of any equipment or activity
their chemical sensitivity. This approach would have which may lead to a fire or explosion hazard should
hindered firefighting even if the fire service had be prohibited in areas where certain dangerous
timely access to the storage site in the event of a cargoes are handled, unless authorized by the port
fire breaking out. The lack of separation would also authority” and “The port authority should require
have ensured that a detonation that occurred in any that it is notified of any person’s intention to carry
part of the stack would have propagated promptly out hot work or any other repair or maintenance
to the entire contents of the store. work, either on board a ship or ashore, which may
constitute a hazard because of the presence of
• Lack of cleanliness and exposure of explosive
dangerous cargoes, and such work is authorized
material to contamination: The AN was directly
only when it can be carried out without creating
exposed to the atmosphere during its storage.
such a hazard.”14
The AN would have become progressively more
contaminated with dust and other organic matter • Risk of explosive material deflagration to
and would have absorbed moisture from the humid detonation: Ordinarily, AN is a very insensitive
maritime atmosphere. The type of packaging used compound, but under certain circumstances it
to contain the AN prills – polypropylene textile will undergo a transition from deflagration to
weave bags – and the highly humid climate would detonation – that is, burn to detonation. Several
have caused the consignment of AN to absorb experiments have demonstrated that, when AN is
considerable quantities of water during its time in confined in a closed pipe and then heated to the
storage. Over time, these factors would have made point where a decomposition reaction begins, it
the AN more sensitive, unstable and less safe.12 will detonate.15 The sensitivity of AN to accidental
initiation is increased considerably at elevated
temperatures so that a small accidental explosion
2.2.3. Risks associated with initiation of fire and
in the presence of a larger heated sample may
detonation
initiate a transition from deflagration to detonation.
Analysis of previous accidental explosions16 and
While it has not so far been possible to ascertain
experiments17 has indicated that, when AN is mixed
definitively the initial cause of the fire that led to the
with even a small quantity of organic matter, the
explosion at Beirut Port, several risks can be highlighted
explosions have sometimes been more intense
to reduce the likelihood of similar incidents in the future.
and extensive and have on occasion transitioned
• Storage of fireworks or other dangerous goods from deflagration to detonation. In some incidents
with explosive materials: A fundamental principle whistling noises, increasing in pitch, were heard
of the storage and management of dangerous during AN fires. This indicates localized build-ups
goods is that goods in multiple classes should of pressure and that the thermal decomposition of
never be mixed. If bulk AN (an oxidizing substance the AN was accelerating. While pure AN is difficult
in dangerous goods Class 5) were stored in close to ignite, in the case of the Beirut Port explosion the
proximity to fireworks or pyrotechnics (explosives AN sacks were contaminated with organic matter
in dangerous goods Class 1), accidental ignition of and the polypropylene sacking material itself would
either material would have potentially devastating have presented an additional fire hazard.
consequences on the other. The mixing of materials
12 In explosive engineering terms, the increase in sensitivity of the AN would have resulted in a reduction in the Figure of Insen-
sitiveness (F of I) of the explosive. The likely extent of the reduction cannot be determined precisely but the authors have witnessed,
first-hand, explosive trials involving the evaluation of effects of added water on the sensitivity of AN-based explosive compositions
that demonstrate how the addition of extra water to AN explosive compositions can increase their sensitivity.
13 Hot work refers to any work that requires using open flames, applying heat or friction, or may generate sparks or heat. Hot
work includes welding, flame cutting, soldering, brazing, grinding and the use of other equipment incorporating a flame.
14 International Maritime Organization, Revised Recommendations on the Safe Transport of Dangerous Cargoes and Related
activities in Port Areas, MSC.1/Circ.1216, 26 February 2007, paras 7.1.5.2 and 7.1.9.1.
15 WG Sykes et al, “Ammonium Nitrate Explosion Hazards”, Chemical Engineering Progress, vol. 59, no. 1, Jan. 1963.
16 See Pittman, William & Han, Zhe & Harding, Brian & Rosas, Camilo & Jiang, Jiaojun & Pineda, Alba & Mannan, M. Sam. (2014).
Lessons to be learned from an analysis of ammonium nitrate disasters in the last 100 years. Journal of hazardous materials. 280C.
472-477. 10.1016/j.jhazmat.2014.08.037.
17 See Ammonium nitrate explosion hazards, WG Sykes, RJ Johnson & R M Hainer, Chemical Engineering Progress, Vol 59, No 1,
pp 66-71, January 1963.
UNIDIR 63. EXPLOSIONS IN URBAN AND BUILT-UP AREAS:
THE REVERBERATING EFFECT AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC RISKS
3.1. THE BLAST AND ITS REVERBERATING
EFFECTS IN POPULATED AREAS • Over 190 people had been reported killed and
over 6,500 injured due to the explosion, and 10–30
Explosive blasts have devastating consequences for people were still missing.19
people’s lives, their livelihood and, more broadly, socio- • Around 10,000 enterprises in the direct vicinity of
economic development that are felt long after the blast the blast had been destroyed or put out of business.
occurs. When explosive blasts take place in built-up Over 70,000 people were estimated to have been
and populated areas, as observed in Beirut, the harm to left unemployed and facing food insecurity.20
civilians and civilian objects is exponentially greater due
to the density and inherent vulnerability of the civilian • A total of 200,000 housing units had been affected
population and its dependence on a web of critical and in Beirut and up to 300,000 people may have lost
interconnected services that are equally vulnerable to their homes.21 An estimated 40,000 buildings were
the damaging effects of the explosive blast. damaged, including 3,000 severely damaged.22 The
affected sites include some of Beirut’s most historic
The knock-on and reinforcing effects and interactions neighbourhoods, major museums, galleries and
of an explosive blast are referred to as the reverberating religious buildings.23
effects of explosive force. In addition to killing and • Over 15,000 businesses – approximately 50 per cent
injuring people, explosive blasts can also destroy vital of Beirut’s establishments – are estimated to have
infrastructure and affect the delivery of essential services. been damaged, the majority in the wholesale, retail
The economic burden on reconstruction and recovery and hospitality sectors.
can be substantial. Damage to housing, workplaces,
utilities and health-care facilities can result in people
losing shelter and livelihoods, forcing them to live
without water or electricity, and can create difficulties
in accessing health-care and education services. These
effects can result in displacement of people, loss of
employment and interruption of utilities, all of which
can reduce productivity and set back development.
Explosive blasts can also affect food security and raise
concerns around environmental safety. They have a
damaging effect on social capital. The harm caused
by the blast’s ripple effects to vulnerable populations,
including migrants and refugee communities, are of
particular concern in Beirut, considering that Lebanon
has the highest number of refugees per capita in the
world.18
The scale of the damage and harm as of 27 August 2020
was as follows:
18 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Lebanon at a Glance”, https://www.unhcr.org/lb/at-a-glance.
19 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Lebanon: Beirut Port Explosions”, Situational Report no. 5,
17 August 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/lebanon_beirut_port_explosion_situation_report5_14_to_17_
aug_2020.pdf; and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Lebanon: Beirut Port Explosions”, Situational
Report no. 6, 21 August 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Beirut Port_SitRep No.6.pdf.
20 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Lebanon: Beirut Port Explosions”, Situational Report no. 5,
17 August 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/lebanon_beirut_port_explosion_situation_report5_14_to_17_
aug_2020.pdf; and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “UNDP to Focus on Inclusive Recovery as It Supports Lebanon
Following the Beirut Blast Catastrophe”, 14 August 2020, https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/news-centre/news/2020/
UNDP_to_focus_on_inclusive_recovery_as_it_supports_Lebanon_following_the_Beirut_blast_catastrophe.html.
21 ACAPS, “Lebanon: Explosion in Beirut”, Short note, 8 August 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resourc-
es/20200808_acaps_briefing_note_lebanon_beirut_explosion.pdf.
22 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Lebanon: Beirut Port Explosions”, Situational Report no. 5,
17 August 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/lebanon_beirut_port_explosion_situation_report5_14_to_17_
aug_2020.pdf.
23 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), “UNESCO Rallies International Community to
Safeguard Beirut’s Cultural Life and Heritage”, 13 August 2020, https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-rallies-international-communi-
ty-safeguard-beiruts-cultural-life-and-heritage.
THE BEIRUT PORT EXPLOSION 73.2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RISKS Further compounding the recovery efforts is an observed
post-blast increase in the transmission of COVID-19 in
The explosion came as Lebanon faced a multifaceted Beirut, which is straining the country’s already fragile
crisis. The socio-economic costs of this explosion are health-care system. Damage to and destruction of
significant – the World Bank Group and the United hospitals caused by the blast are likely to place further
Nations estimate that the cost of reconstruction may be limitations and constraints on the capabilities of the
in the range of several billion dollars.24 In the immediate health-care sector, including availability of intensive
humanitarian response alone, the United Nations Office care facilities.30 In turn, this may lead to reduced
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) social distancing in the remaining hospitals and their
appealed for $565 million, its assessment of the needs emergency departments among the affected population
of a targeted 300,000 people.25 and health-care personnel. Beyond other immediate
risks, such as disruption of the supply chain for medical
The consequences of the blast and the future socio- supplies, the medium-to-long-term effects of the blast
economic risks for Lebanon are considerable. The and the COVID-19-related lockdown are likely to have
explosion occurred during a severe economic crisis a significant impact on the psychological well-being of
in Lebanon, where an estimated 1 million people live people in Beirut.
below the poverty line.26 Prior to the blast, food prices
had surged by 190 per cent and clothing prices by The blast effects and associated socio-economic risks led
172 per cent between May 2019 and May 2020 due to the resignations of several cabinet ministers, followed
to hyperinflation and the loss in value of the local by the resignation of the Prime Minister, Hassan Diab,
currency.27 Post-blast, there is a risk that households on 10 August 2020.31 This left Lebanon with a political
may not be able to afford a range of services due to vacuum at a time when governance and oversight are
the ongoing economic crisis, ranging from food and needed to effectively respond to the consequences of
education fees to repair and reconstruction services, the blast, as well as to address the underlying socio-
which may exhaust savings of households. Access to economic challenges faced by the country.
cash may also pose a risk due to currency volatility and
banking restrictions. There are also real risks of higher
levels of unemployment as a result of reduced job
opportunities after the blast. The damage to Beirut Port
– which facilitated 80 per cent of the country’s imports28
– are also likely to place further strain on imports of
essential goods, which may increase the prices of food
and basic commodities.
Social tensions and associated risks have grown in Beirut
and other parts of the country following the explosion,
as already witnessed by outbreaks of anti-Government
protests, at times violent. According to the Lebanese
Red Cross, these protests and clashes between civilians
and security forces have resulted in 728 civilians being
injured, at least 150 of whom were taken to hospital for
treatment.29 Other risks include erosion of community
safety in Beirut following the destruction of social
support structures and properties. Lack of safe homes
and shelters may also increase the risk of sexual and
gender-based violence.
24 World Bank, Beirut Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, August 2020, http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/
en/650091598854062180/pdf/Beirut-Rapid-Damage-and-Needs-Assessment.pdf. See also “How Can the UN Help Prevent Another
Beirut Disaster?”, UN News, 20 August 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/08/1070582.
25 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Flash Appeal: Lebanon”, August 2020, https://www.uno-
cha.org/sites/unocha/files/Lebanon Flash Appeal FINAL 14 Aug 2020.pdf.
26 Ibid.
27 T. Arnold, “Lebanon Follows Venezuela into Hyperinflation Wilderness”, Reuters, 23 July 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-emerging-inflation-graphic/lebanon-follows-venezuela-into-hyperinflation-wilderness-idUSKCN24O20J.
28 C. Cornish, “Lebanon’s Crisis: ‘People Are Going to Suffer, People Are Hungry’”, Financial Times, 10 August 2020, https://www.
ft.com/content/83065c49-1cf0-4ce5-98cf-ca20df037e24.
29 Human Rights Watch, “Lebanon: Lethal Force Used Against Protesters”, 26 August 2020, https://www.hrw.org/
news/2020/08/26/lebanon-lethal-force-used-against-protesters.
30 “UN and Partners Launch $565 Million Appeal for Lebanon”, UN News, 14 August 2020, https://news.un.org/en/sto-
ry/2020/08/1070242.
31 “Beirut Explosion: Lebanon’s Government Resigns as Public Anger Mounts”, BBC News, 10 August 2020, https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-53722909.
UNIDIR 84. POLICY AND GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS
The devastation caused by the Beirut explosion on scale of private sector actors involved in the supply chain
4 August has renewed attention on the need for of explosive precursors – ranging from manufacturers,
responsible safe and secure through-life management via distributors and retailers to end users – there is a
– that is, the production, acquisition, transportation, need to establish clear roles and responsibilities among
storage, handling and end use – of dangerous these actors, as well as to effectively coordinate with
goods around the world. This incident also serves relevant national authorities to prevent accidents and
as an important reminder of the critical need for risk unplanned explosions.
management processes to ensure that large quantities of
explosive precursors are not stored and left unmanaged 4.2. REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS
in built-up and populated areas, where unplanned or
accidental explosions can cause catastrophic direct, Regulatory frameworks are essential to ensure proper
indirect cumulative and long-term harm to people, their governance and accountability over the safe and secure
livelihood and the urban ecosystem. Recovery from this management of explosive precursors. At the inter-
blast will be a challenging journey for Lebanon. But it national level, there are various agreed rules, regulations
also serves as a cautionary tale and a wake-up call for and guidelines concerning the transportation and
all States and relevant private sector and industry actors handling of dangerous goods, including but not limited
to strengthen preventative and preparedness measures to the International Air Transport Association (IATA)
to address explosive hazard risks. Dangerous Goods Regulations,33 the IMO Dangerous
Goods Code,34 the International Labour Organization
Prevention must be the most important lesson to be (ILO) Code of Practice on Safety and Health in Ports,35
learned from this incident. There is a pressing need to and the model regulations pertaining to United Nations
learn from this accident and to prevent similar future Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous
accidents. This section offers five elements that States as Goods.36 However, the domestication and application of
well as industry and private sector actors can undertake these regulations and guidelines at the national level
to strengthen preventative efforts. vary considerably.
4.1. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES Furthermore, there are notable differences in the
maturity of national regulations around the world.
Despite improvements in coordination and cooperation In some cases, regulations exist on paper yet are
among and between the national authorities and obsolete in practice; in other cases, regulations may
industry actors that govern and manage explosive not exist at all. These gaps substantially increase the
precursors, there at times remains a lack of clarity risk of accidental explosions. A review of good practices
on the appropriate roles and responsibilities in the reveals the need for a comprehensive approach to
through-life management of such explosive materials. strengthen regulatory frameworks at the national level.
Responsibilities of designated national authorities This may include activities that complement law-based
vary (e.g. authorization, oversight and safeguards, regulation, such as codes of conducts, codes of ethics
enforcement, etc.), which will require effective signed with customers, and effective risk-assessment
coordination at the domestic level among various procedures and practices, which may also be developed
national actors, ranging from policy makers, via by, or in cooperation with, relevant private sector and
licensing personnel and customs and port officials to industry actors.
law enforcement.32 Such coordination structures may
not exist in some countries, but they are essential to Ammonium nitrate (AN) is widely used in the
ensure effective governance over explosive materials. manufacture of commercial explosives. Its application
in military munitions is generally restricted to enhanced
At the operational level, such explosive precursors may blast compositions, such as amatols, used in aircraft
be managed by private sector and industry actors at bombs and some maritime munition warheads. For
various points in the supply chain. Given the variety and military munitions, the International Ammunition
32 For example, a review of the Beirut blast incident reveals initial oversight and inquiry by relevant Lebanese authorities in
2013–2014 on the status of the vessel and its cargo containing AN, but subsequent actions to ensure safe and secure storage of the
AN leading up to the incident remain unclear.
33 International Air Transport Association (IATA), “Dangerous Goods”, https://www.iata.org/en/programs/cargo/dgr/.
34 International Maritime Organization (IMO), “The International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code”, http://www.imo.org/
en/OurWork/Safety/Cargoes/DangerousGoods/Pages/default.aspx.
35 International Labour Organization (ILO), Safety and Health in Ports, 12 March 2018, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/pub-
lic/---ed_dialogue/---sector/documents/normativeinstrument/wcms_546257.pdf.
36 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), United Nations Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous
Goods: Model Regulations, 21st revised edition, 2019, https://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/unrec/rev21/21files_e.html.
THE BEIRUT PORT EXPLOSION 9Technical Guidelines (IATG) provide sufficient and explicit material necessary to support short-term agricultural
guidance on the classification37 and safe storage38 and industrial requirements should be stockpiled.
of munitions containing AN. The IATG also provides
technical guidance on the in-service inspection and Fourth, national authorities should ensure that large
surveillance of ammunition. quantities of explosive precursors are not stored in areas
heavily populated by civilians and civilian objects. They
4.3. SUPPLY CHAIN SAFETY AND SECURITY should take action to prevent this (e.g. by relocating
the items away from cities and towns) and to mitigate
4.3.1. Supply chain vulnerabilities the effects of explosive blasts from potential accidents
The supply chain of explosive precursors can be (e.g. by instituting quantity safety distances and putting
complex due to the multiplicity of actors involved in place physical barriers to minimize blast effects).
across Government and industry, functioning in various Encouraging such practices by States and industry
sectors. Safety and security of explosive materials apply actors can significantly reduce risks of unplanned and
to all stages in the supply chain. Throughout this chain, accidental explosions.
safety measures are necessary to prevent accidents
(and to mitigate damage in the case of an incident), 4.4. INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND SHARING
while security measures are needed to reduce the risks
of theft and diversion of material to illicit markets and Communication is key in preventative efforts. There is
unauthorized end users, who may use it to fabricate a need for regular information exchange among those
IEDs. involved in the safe and secure management of explosive
precursors in order to understand the condition of the
In meeting the necessary safety measures, it is essential explosive materials in question and the environment
that adequate technical knowledge and capabilities in which they are being moved, stored and handled
exist among those that manage explosive precursors, throughout the supply chain. This information exchange
including in, but not limited to, the areas of licensing, greatly informs policy makers and practitioners on risks
safeguards, accounting, storage, handling, transport associated with the explosive precursor chemical at any
and disposal. one time. In this regard, information-sharing among
relevant stakeholders can be considered one of the most
4.3.2. Safe storage practices critical components to reduce risks of an explosion.
Four particular lessons pertaining to safe storage merit
particular attention from the Beirut blast. There is scope for progress. Some governments do
not maintain regular contact with industry actors and
First, practical and immediate preventative storage tend to consult them sporadically on safety and security
practices should be undertaken to significantly reduce concerns. Some industry actors may not actively
the risk of a fire in the first place, and to possibly engage with national authorities to share information
prevent the transition from deflagration to detonation. pertaining to safety and security risks associated with
These practices include regular cleaning of warehouses, explosive precursors from a fear of interruption of
removal of other flammable organic materials, safe their commercial activities or, in some cases, penalties
stacking procedures and segregation of AN bags. for failing to adhere to relevant safety rules and
regulations. These gaps in information exchange need
Second, effective inventory management and record- to be addressed, and urgently.
keeping serve as a first line of defence in identifying risks
associated with the nature and condition of explosive 4.5. AWARENESS-RAISING AND SENSITIZATION
precursors.
Part of the challenge in prevention relates to the lack
Third, national authorities and private sector actors of awareness among national authorities and industry
responsible for storage and handling should be actors on the risks associated with explosive precursors.
adequately trained to conduct surveillance of explosive Another challenge, which is equally troubling, relates
precursors and inspection of the conditions in which to negligence despite the awareness of risks. Given the
they are stored in order to identify potential explosive wide range of governmental and non-governmental
risks that may arise from degradation of chemicals or entities involved in the safe and secure management
poor storage practices. AN is a substance which can of explosive precursors, awareness-raising on risks and
degrade very quickly after manufacture, particularly if vulnerabilities in every sector and at every level in the
stored in adverse conditions. For this reason, long term supply chain is critical.
storage of AN is not recommended and only sufficient
37 UN SaferGuard, “UN Explosive Hazard Classification System and Codes”, International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG)
01.50, 2nd edition, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1 February 2015, https://www.un.org/disarmament/un-safer-
guard/guide-lines/.
38 See International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) 02.10, “Introduction to Risk Management and Principles”, IATG 02.20,
“Quantity and Separation Distances”, IATG 02.30, “Licensing of Explosive Facilities”, and IATG 02.40, “Safeguarding of Explosive Facil-
ities”, in UN SaferGuard, “Risk Management”, IATG 02, 2nd edition, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1 February 2015,
https://www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/guide-lines/.
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