The Future of Weaponized Unmanned Systems: Challenges and Opportunities - Robert Bosch Stiftung
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The Future of
Weaponized Unmanned
Systems: Challenges and
Opportunities
Takaaki Asano
Abdulrahman El-Sayed
Krystle Kaul
Kevin Körner
Wei Liu
Swati Malik
Mio Nozoe
may 2015
Supported by GGF PartnersAcronyms
CCW United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
DN DefenseNet
GPS Global Positioning System
ICRAC International Committee for Robot Arms Control
ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba (Pakistan)
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
PLA People’s Liberation Army (China)
R&D Research and Development
RUWUST Restricted Use of Weaponized Unmanned Systems Treaty
SP-10 Security Power-10
UAVs Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UNSC United Nations Security Council
WUAVs Weaponized Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
WUS Weaponized Unmanned Systems
WUSVs Weaponized Unmanned Submerged Vehicles
Cover photo: US Air Force Photo / Lt. Col. Leslie Pratt
2 The Future of Weaponized Unmanned Systems: Challenges and OpportunitiesTable
of Contents
04 About the Program
06 Executive Summary
08 Introduction
12 cenario 1: Weaponized Unmanned
S
Systems in a Fractured World
17 cenario 2: Weaponized Unmanned
S
Systems in a New World Order
24 Policy Recommendations
27 ellows of the Global Arms Control
F
Working Group
30 Annex: Scenario-Planning
Methodology
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE futures 2025 3About the Program
About
the Program
The Global Governance Futures program (GGF) tively. Using instruments from the field of
brings together young professionals to look futures research, the working groups produced
ahead 10 years and to recommend ways to scenarios for their respective issue areas. These
address global challenges. scenarios are potential histories, not predic-
tions, of the future. Based on their findings, the
Building on the success of the first two rounds of fellows produced a range of publications –
the program (GGF 2020 and GGF 2022), GGF 2025 including this report – that present recommen-
assembled 25 GGF fellows from Germany, China, dations for steps to take on these issues towards
Japan, India and the United States (five from a more desirable future.
each country). Over the course of 2014 and 2015,
the fellows participated in four dialogue The greatest asset of the program is the diver-
sessions: in Berlin (8-12 June 2014), Tokyo and sity of the fellows and the collective energy they
Beijing (9-15 October 2014), New Delhi (18-22 develop when they discuss, debate and engage
January 2015) and Washington, DC (3-7 May with each other during the four intense work-
2015). ing sessions. This is why the fellows occupy the
center stage of the program, setting GGF apart
The GGF 2025 fellows – a diverse mix from the from many other young-leaders programs. The
public, private and non-profit sectors, and fellows play an active role in shaping the agenda
selected from a highly competitive field of appli- of their working groups. The working process
cants – formed three working groups that draws upon the GGF method and brings together
focused on Internet governance, geoengineer- the unique strengths, experiences and perspec-
ing governance and global arms control, respec- tives of each fellow in working towards a
4 The Future of Weaponized Unmanned Systems: Challenges and OpportunitiesAbout the Program
common goal. In addition, the fellows meet with responsibility for the design and implementa-
leading policymakers and experts from each tion of the program lies with the GGF program
participating country. The GGF team works team at GPPi. In addition, GGF relies on the
closely with the fellows to help them achieve advice and guidance of the GGF steering
their goals and, in the process, cultivates a committee, made up of senior policymakers and
community that will last well beyond the dura- academics. The program is generously
tion of the program, through a growing and supported by the Robert Bosch Stiftung.
active alumni network.
GGF is made possible by a broad array of dedi-
cated supporters. The program was initiated by
the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi), along
with the Robert Bosch Stiftung. The program
consortium is composed of academic institu-
tions, foundations and think tanks from across
the five participating countries. The GGF part-
ners are GPPi, the Hertie School of Governance,
Tsinghua University, Fudan University, Ashoka
University, the Centre for Policy Research, the
Tokyo Foundation, Keio University, the Wood-
row Wilson School of Public and International
Affairs, and the Brookings Institution. The core
The fellows of the global arms control working group would like
to thank the organizers of GGF 2025, the Robert Bosch Stiftung
and everyone else who contributed to making the program
possible – especially Thorsten Benner, Michelle Chang, Mirko
Hohmann, Johannes Gabriel and Joel Sandhu. We are also grate-
ful to Alex Fragstein for the design work, Oliver Read and Esther
Yi for editing and colleagues at GPPi for commenting on this
report.
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE futures 2025 5Executive Summary
Executive
Summary
In recent years, challenges concerning the use terrorism, with a growing degree of autonomy.
of weaponized unmanned systems (WUS) 1 – These technologies also feature prominently in
airborne, seaborne or on the ground – have important regional conflicts. Against this back-
taken the world stage in political and military drop, technical failures of WUS – such as hack-
planning efforts. This trend will continue over ing and spoofing by terrorists and rogue states
the next decade, as these weapon systems have – pose a significant threat to safety and security.
inevitable implications for security and defense There exist regional efforts to establish interna-
strategy among major international actors and tional legislation, but they are thwarted by
smaller actors alike. Addressing the challenges dominant powers that, in their expanded efforts
to global security and stability will require to combat terrorism on foreign soil, are reliant
determined action by national actors, non-gov- on WUS. In this scenario, an effective global
ernmental organizations and intergovernmen- legal regime on WUS is unlikely to come into
tal organizations. being by 2025.
This report presents two hypothetical scenarios In contrast, our second scenario features an
and argues that the state of international peace emerging international legal order. The driving
by the year 2025 will depend largely on whether force of this development is the perception of a
state and non-state actors are capable of design-common threat to major actors that possess WUS
ing an effective political and legal framework technology. Here, the threat of international
for regulating the use of WUS without infring- terrorism extends beyond the United States and
ing on their profound commercial capabilities. other Western countries, to Russia and China. In
this scenario, terrorist exploitation of weak-
In the first scenario, WUS exist as linchpins in nesses in these systems in Europe and Asia
both the expanded war on terror and conven- creates the political context for stricter regula-
tional interstate conflicts. The scenario high- tion. In addition, this scenario considers
lights that weaponized unmanned aerial private-sector interests. The dual-use aspect of
vehicles (WUAVs) are likely to continue playing unmanned systems, especially unmanned aerial
a role in military efforts against global jihadi vehicles (UAVs), is represented by a thriving
6 The Future of Weaponized Unmanned Systems: Challenges and OpportunitiesExecutive Summary
commercial UAV industry, transforming logis-
tics and transportation. Private-sector resis-
tance to regulation that could obstruct market
potential is counterbalanced by government
incentives to prevent the weaponization of
small-scale commercial UAVs. This scenario
concludes with the establishment of a workable
international regime on WUS, wherein govern-
ments agree to regulate the most-advanced
systems with the highest degree of autonomy,
which only a few countries possess as of 2025.
Several policy recommendations arise from
these scenarios:
›› Propose a legal framework to govern the pro-
duction, accumulation, distribution and use of
semi-autonomous WUS and to ban fully auton-
omous WUS;
›› Diversify the policy conversation across the
continuum of applications of unmanned vehi-
cles;
›› Create a policy forum to establish dialogue
about applicable standards;
›› Seek political-power balance, and seize oppor-
tunities for agreement;
››Address technical challenges posed by un-
manned systems.
1
Weaponized unmanned systems (WUS) include vehicles, robot-
ics and equipment that have the capability to inflict harm upon
individuals and/or damage to infrastructure (eg, weaponized
unmanned aerial vehicles [WUAVs]). These systems can be
either semi-autonomous or fully autonomous.
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE futures 2025 7Introduction
Introduction
The idea of launching a surprise strategic attackWhile technical research into autonomous WUS
on a moving vehicle from 10,000 miles away by is progressing, there has been little develop-
using a remote-controlled unmanned aerial ment regarding these ethico-legal implications,
vehicle (UAV) would have seemed far-fetched and no international agreement on how best to
two decades ago. But this concept has been fully approach the impending age of autonomy. As
realized today. The forms of weaponized recently as November 2014, states in the United
unmanned systems (WUS) and the degree of Nations Convention on Certain Conventional
their use in international conflicts have Weapons (CCW) discussed the need for deliber-
increased in the last decade. In tandem, a vari- ations on lethal autonomous weapon systems
ety of relevant logistical, ethical, legal and stra-
that raise critical issues of legal and ethical
tegic questions have arisen. consideration. As such, demands to ban the
development, production and use of autono-
Particularly concerning is the potential rise of mous weapon systems have become more reso-
autonomous WUS with the capacity to search lute. Representatives of many countries have
and destroy targets without requiring human made strong cases for a guarantee of “meaning-
control or authorization. While no such systems ful human control” to guide the use of such
exist today, technical research aimed at achiev- weapons, which suggests that support is grow-
ing autonomy has intensified. Furthermore, ing.
simple forms of autonomous weapon systems –
including active protection systems for ground Nevertheless, several challenges to this
vehicles – already exist, and several major approach remain. First, there are commercial
powers are actively funding the development of uses for many of the technologies that could be
systems, such as the US’s X-47B unmanned leveraged towards the development of autono-
combat air system, China’s Lijian (“Sharp mous WUS, making regulation a challenge.
Sword”) and Russia’s Mikoyan Skat. The US, the Second, heavy military investment in the devel-
world’s most dominant power and WUS user, opment of autonomous weapons technology has
has articulated its intention to increase the been, for the most part, driven by the fight
autonomous capacity of its systems. 2 against global jihadi terrorism, the threat of
which continues to grow. These challenges may
Autonomous WUS pose several challenges, limit the willingness of governments and corpo-
including the potential for hacking and spoof- rations to suppress their investments.
ing, increased casualties, faulty or unstable
machine learning that leads to erratic behavior, Through a rigorous process, we identified the
and the engagement of autonomous systems main drivers of WUS governance and developed
with human systems or other autonomous two complementary but contrasting scenarios
systems, resulting in unintended consequences. for the evolution of WUS and their governance
Furthermore, they pose important questions. over the next 10 years. Upon developing these
Who bears responsibility in the case that an
autonomous weapon causes casualties? How
susceptible are these weapons to hacking and 2 Lt. Gen. Dave Deptula, “Air Force Unmanned Aerial System
spoofing? How will governments react to provo- (UAS) Flight Plan 2009-2047” (Headquarters US Air Force, May
2009), available (accessed 16 March
2015).
8 The Future of Weaponized Unmanned Systems: Challenges and OpportunitiesTimeline of Events
scenarios, contrasting them and deducing oper-
ative opportunities and threats from each, we
isolated key policy recommendations for
promoting stability in the future.
Timeline of Events for
Scenarios 1 and 2
Years Scenario 1 Scenario 2
2015–2017 ›› China-Japan tensions rise, following the discovery ›› Starting 2015, the UAV market sees dramatic growth.
of oil in the East China Sea and increased political ›› In October 2016, a sea-pirate group hacks a Chinese
and economic pressures in both countries. Efforts WUSV and uses the systems to attack China’s offshore
to establish a bilateral crisis-management rig in the South China Sea.
mechanism fail. ›› In February 2017, an Islamist militant group spoofs a
›› North Korea is allegedly running a WUS research Russian WUAV and tries to sell it on the black market.
program, according to US intelligence. ›› In May 2017, a small-scale commercial UAV carrying
›› In 2016, a coalition of Peshmerga and Shiite forces, an explosive crashes into the French socialist party’s
coupled with US airstrikes, defeats the Islamic headquarters, injuring several people.
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), but its leader, Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi, manages to escape.
›› In 2016, US and EU begin development of DefenseNet,
a semi-autonomous unmanned weapon system
based on advanced machine learning.
2018–2019 ›› In 2018, Baghdadi founds a new global terror ›› In 2018, the UAV industry develops, and creates more
network, called al-Majma’a, following the demise of than 2 million jobs.
ISIS. ›› In September 2018, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) crashes a
›› In 2019, several serious terrorist attacks, including WUAV into the US embassy in Islamabad, killing
in London and Washington, DC, further strengthen several Pakistanis and Americans, including the US
the US/EU fight against al-Majma’a. ambassador.
›› Starting 2019, Japan and China inject substantial ›› In January 2019, at the World Economic Forum in
funding into the development and promotion of Davos, world leaders establish a working group under
drone technology and infrastructure, in response the Missile Technology Control Regime to discuss
to the East China Sea conflict. WUS issues and propose a definition of WUS.
›› In March 2019, the US-LeT conflict escalates. The US
assassinates LeT’s leader, and LeT commits to
retaliation.
›› Public pressure to regulate WUS rises in South Asia,
Europe and US.
›› Throughout 2019, business leaders and high-ranking
representatives from EU, US and Israel meet regularly
to negotiate the regulation of fully autonomous WUS.
›› In December 2019, the San Francisco Protocol is issued
to limit the use of commercial UAVs.
›› Due to rising pressure, US and other major WUS-
producing countries agree to two-year moratorium on
the production and use of fully autonomous WUS.
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE futures 2025 9Timeline of Events
Years Scenario 1 Scenario 2
2020–2021 ›› In April 2020, China’s People’s Liberation Army ›› Economies of China and Russia decline.
loses communication with one of its WUAVs on a ›› In May 2020, major states and non-state actors gather
surveillance mission. The WUAV, using in Geneva to discuss LeT attacks and how they might
topographical recognition memory, charts back to be prevented in the future.
China but intrudes on Japanese airspace along the ›› In August 2020, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India,
way. Israel, Japan, Russia, UK and US formally sign a two-
›› China-Japan relations hit rock bottom, and the year moratorium, banning the use of fully autonomous
countries come close to war. India, Australia and WUS.
South Korea mediate China-Japan tensions in ›› In fall 2021, France, UK and US table a draft resolution
consultation with US. about WUS control to the UN Security Council (UNSC).
›› In 2020, DefenseNet goes live (the next year, it China and Russia, still recovering from economic
becomes fully operational), significantly curtailing downturn, decide not to abstain.
the expansion of al-Majma’a.
›› Attempts to formalize an international treaty
regime on unmanned systems, led by India, fail due
to fierce opposition from US and UK, given their
counterterrorism operations.
2022–2023 ›› In 2023, a South Korean surveillance drone goes ›› In May 2022, the UNSC adopts a code of conduct to ban
missing. North Korea claims successful spoofing fully autonomous WUS for those who had disposed of
and landing of a drone in North Korean territory, these systems and to make them unavailable for those
but this is disputed by US intelligence. who sought to acquire it.
›› The counterterrorism success of DefenseNet is ›› In October 2022, US convenes a conference of all
clouded over by repeated erratic behavior and countries possessing sophisticated WUS technology to
faulty targeting in friendly airspace. discuss a possible international treaty on the
›› By 2023, al-Majma’a has expanded its influence and regulation of fully autonomous WUS.
acquired a global force of over 100,000 combatants.
2024–2025 ›› The unprecedented rise in drone-related incidents ›› In June 2024, states sign the Restricted Use of
leads to the establishment of the International Weaponized Unmanned Systems Treaty (RUWUST)
Weaponized Robotics Control Statement of Intent, and, based on the treaty, form the regulative body
led by China, Japan and India, and supported by Security Power-10.
many other nations. The statement draws ›› In December 2025, RUWUST officially takes effect.
substantial criticism from US and EU.
10 The Future of Weaponized Unmanned Systems: Challenges and OpportunitiesCRUCIAL FACTORS
Crucial Factor outcome Factor outcome
Factor in Scenario 1 in Scenario 2
Weapons technology Development and deployment of WUS with Maintenance of WUS with humans “on the
humans “out of the loop” loop”
Terrorism (state and Influence of terrorism increases Influence of terrorism declines
non-state actors)
Non-state actors Non-state actors grow in the political sphere of Non-state actors gain international
(nonviolent) influence recognition
Hacking and hijacking Capacity to hack/hijack WUS grows at pace Security mechanisms develop faster than the
with security mechanisms to protect WUS capacity to hack/hijack WUS, allowing
against misuse military forces to operate without outside
interference
Leadership Influence and power of rogue leaders increase Influence and power of rogue leaders decrease
Codification of ethics and Global fracture prevents the codification of Codification of emergent norms leads to the
norms norms and the formulation of enforceable formulation of enforceable treaties
treaties
Enforceability Enforceability is certain Enforceability is certain
Casualties, and errant use Geopolitcal influence of casualties and errant Geopolitcal influence of casualties and errant
of WUS use decrease use decrease
Distribution of WUS WUS are unevenly distributed among major WUS are evenly distributed among major
powers powers
Domestic security Social unrest, terrorism and crime increase; Social unrest, terrorism and crime remain at
trust in public and political institutions is low usual levels; trust in public and political
institutions is high
Foreign policy Global order is fractured, and states are more States prefer to achieve their foreign-policy
willing to act unilaterally objectives through consensus
Defense budget Defense budget for WUS R&D and production Defense budget for WUS R&D and production
increases increases
Commercial interests Semi- and fully autonomous WUS technologies Semi- and fully autonomous WUS technologies
are developed and not constrained are developed but constrained
Cost of war Cost of war continues to increase Cost of war continues to increase
Sovereignty Concept of Westphalian sovereignty, as Concept of Westphalian sovereignty, as
reflected by actions of states, declines reflected by actions of states, is strengthened
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE futures 2025 11Scenario 1: Weaponized Unmanned Systems in a Fractured World
Scenario 1:
Weaponized
Unmanned
Systems in a
Fractured World
By 2025, there has been a significant rise in the India, along with the international community,
development of unmanned vehicle systems. At tried hard to deescalate tensions and to facili-
the same time, China and India have emerged as tate negotiations to prevent the crisis from
major foci of global financial investment and worsening.
economic growth. China’s rapid rise is accompa-
nied by increasing regional instability, particu- Further agitating the region was North Korea’s
larly in the East China Sea. spoofing 3 of a South Korean drone in 2023. North
Korea claimed that it successfully landed the
The escalation of hostility between emergent drone in its territory. However, the Ministry of
China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Defense in Seoul and the United States intelli-
Islands, where oil has been found, brought the gence community claimed that the vehicle had
two countries to the brink of war. This occurred not successfully landed, but rather crashed in
after a drone of the Chinese People’s Liberation the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
Army (PLA) lost contact with ground control
during a routine flight over the islands. The PLA These events united the region against the
drone had been preprogrammed to chart the threat of weaponized unmanned systems (WUS).
shortest distance back to the mainland using China, Japan and India led the formulation of
topographical recognition memory, causing it to the International Weaponized Robotics State-
enter disputed airspace that was de facto under ment of Intent to limit the use of WUS, which
Japan’s control, in the East China Sea. The drone has been a major focus of the United Nations
was subsequently downed in the disputed
airspace by a Japanese scramble mission. The
Chinese government interpreted this as an act 3
Spoofing is when a person or program successfully masquer-
of aggression, heightening tension in the region. ades as another by broadcasting falsified data.
12 The Future of Weaponized Unmanned Systems: Challenges and OpportunitiesScenario 1: Weaponized Unmanned Systems in a Fractured World
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. and Syria have been able to rely on support from
The statement has drawn substantial criticism the EU and the US, which have propped up local
from the US and the European Union, which dictators in the region.
argue that it “empowers the terrorists” by limit-
ing the types of weapons that can be used against The war against al-Majma’a is driven by invest-
them. ments from Western powers (namely, EU
member states and the US), in the form of tradi-
The reason for this resistance is that by 2018, tional ground war as well as in the development
al-Majma’a (“the Coalition”) – a global terror of DefenseNet (DN), which began in 2016. DN is
network created following the demise of the an autonomous weapon system that relies on
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) – estab- advanced machine-learning technologies to
lished itself as the most powerful and influen- target, hunt and destroy al-Majma’a cells.
tial terrorist organization. It recruits heavily Although DN requires human authorization to
from disaffected young men in the Middle East, execute its attacks, it combines the use of human
South Asia and Europe, and has a global force of intelligence with advanced visual, audio and
over 100,000 combatants. In addition, it has infrared sensor technologies to deliver accurate
formed coalitions with like-minded groups in information regarding the likelihood that a
Nigeria, Pakistan and Afghanistan, helping to target – whether human or infrastructural –
create a global terror network. The stated aim of belongs to al-Majma’a forces. Weaponry ranges
al-Majma’a is to establish an Islamic caliphate from Predator-3 unmanned aerial vehicles to
under the strictest interpretation of Sharia law, larger bombers like the B-2020, which carry
to establish dominance in the Middle East and advanced warheads, such as the HypeWar, as
to “uproot the evils of Western imperialism.” well as smaller, 500-centimeter UAVs equipped
with precision bombs for surgical strikes.
In Iraq and Syria, it has seized control of pockets
of territory ranging from the Golan Heights to While these efforts have effectively curtailed
Mosul, and has conducted attacks in the US and the growth of al-Majma’a since 2023, the erratic
several European cities, including a major bomb behavior of several DN unmanned weapons is
attack on the Capitol building in Washington, concerning. A number of weapons have gone
DC, resulting in 37 deaths. Although belea- missing over the past two years.
guered and withering, the governments of Iraq
How We Got Here
The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China contracted Northrop Grumman, one of the
Sea have been a hot spot for the past several world’s largest UAV manufacturers, to produce
years. China has been claiming discovery and maritime versions of the Global Hawk (a UAV
ownership of the islands since the 14th century, surveillance aircraft) to identify and track
and Japan controlled the islands from 1895 to foreign ships and UAVs, with the goal of
1945. Both countries have invested in weapon- deterring the Chinese threat.
ized robotics throughout their territorial
disputes. Since 2019, China has built 11 drone Following several near-incidents in which
bases along its eastern coast and conducted Chinese drones, including weaponized
several flight tests near the islands with combat unmanned aerial vehicles (WUAVs), briefly
drones equipped with stealth technology. At the entered Japanese airspace around the Senkaku/
same time, Japan’s Ministry of Defense has Diaoyu Islands, Japan warned that it would
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE futures 2025 13Scenario 1: Weaponized Unmanned Systems in a Fractured World
down foreign vehicles violating what it consid- In 2023, a South Korean surveillance drone that
ers its airspace. In response, China declared had been deployed at the North Korean border
that any attack on its fleet would be considered went missing. There were conflicting reports
an act of aggression and be redressed. An unex- regarding its whereabouts. However, such a situ-
pectedly difficult economic recession and public ation was not unprecedented: three small UAVs
unrest in China led to a further rise in Chinese with digital cameras had been detected at the
nationalism as an instrument of social cohesion. Korean border by South Korea’s Ministry of
Domestic pressures also translated into a felt National Defense as early as 2014, and other
necessity for Chinese officials to stand strong in unmanned and unarmed aircrafts had also been
territorial disputes, while Japan’s foreign policy found in different locations in South Korea over
apparatus was dominated by the imperative to the previous nine years. Although North Korea
save face on the regional stage. Efforts to estab- never released any official comments about these
lish a maritime and aerial crisis-management incidents, US intelligence reports indicated that
mechanism between the two countries repeat- North Korea had been developing weaponized
edly failed as tension grew in the East China Sea. robotics and had contracted an Iranian expert for
research on weaponized robotics technology.
During a thunderstorm in April 2020, the PLA North Korea claimed that the drone had been
lost communication with one of its WUAVs on a spoofed and successfully landed in North Korean
surveillance mission around the islands. In territory, while the Ministry of Defense in Seoul
accordance with emergency protocol in the case and the US intelligence community claimed that
of lost connection to Global Positioning System the drone crashed in the Korean DMZ and never
(GPS) navigation, the WUAV used topographical landed successfully.
recognition memory to chart the shortest route
back to its Chinese coastal airbase, thereby Collectively, these events have had a profound
intruding into Japan-controlled airspace around impact on Asian geopolitics. The events have
the disputed islands. A Japanese scramble reoriented the region’s attention to rivalries
mission was deployed in response. After the between states that are now armed with WUAVs.
Japanese pilot’s failed attempts to communicate India, with the support of Australia and South
with and land the drone through radio contact Korea, led the mediation. Although India may
and signaling, the drone was shot down over the seem like an unusual partner, its growing
disputed territories as a display of will. With economic power and political influence – result-
communication between Beijing and Tokyo ing in part from growing discussions regarding
grinding to a halt, the situation escalated, andits potential as a new member of the UN Secu-
both sides deployed substantial navy and rity Council (UNSC) – has made its government
air-force contingents to the area. more confident about leading the mediation
process. And given that an all-out conflict would,
The unfolding crisis alerted the international on balance, have severe repercussions for the
community to the immediate possibility of war. economies of all three countries, China and
In talks mediated by India, Australia and South Japan were less hesitant to accept India’s role.
Korea, and with the US’s consultation, China This, along with back-door discussions facili-
and Japan were brought back to the negotiating tated by Australia between China, India and the
table, and further escalation of the situation US, convinced China to set aside its past differ-
was averted. Upon the urging of Indian, Austra- ences with India and to allow India to take on
lian and South Korean mediators, as well as the the role of arbitrator in the regional dispute.
US, both countries agreed upon the urgent need
to install standing mechanisms for crisis Empowered by this role, and in an effort to avoid
communication and management, as well as the similar challenges in the future, India led in 2025
need for a common understanding regarding the formulation of the International Weaponized
the use of unmanned vehicles in conflicts. Robotics Statement of Intent, with tacit support
from China and Japan. The statement, which has
14 The Future of Weaponized Unmanned Systems: Challenges and OpportunitiesScenario 1: Weaponized Unmanned Systems in a Fractured World
been a major focus of the UN Convention on troops to fight al-Majma’a forces. In addition, they
Certain Conventional Weapons, limits the use of launched a previously experimental program,
large weaponized systems and reinforces the DefenseNet. Designed by the same team that
need for direct human control of all aspects of created Israel’s Iron Dome missile-defense system,
these systems. The statement has drawn substan- DN employs a semi-autonomous weapon system
tial criticism from the US and the EU, which that combines on-the-ground human intelligence
argue that it “empowers the terrorists” by limit- with advanced visual, audio and infrared sensor
ing the types of weapons that can be used against technologies to identify and destroy al-Majma’a
them. Prior to the formulation of the Statement targets in Syria and Iraq, with DN bases through-
of Intent, there had been forceful attempts by out the Middle East, in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the
many nations – including India, Brazil and Russia United Arab Emirates and Kuwait.
– to advocate for a treaty regime on unmanned
systems that focuses on fully autonomous These Middle Eastern countries continue to
weapon systems that remove humans from direct commit to the fight by providing both troops
control of system actions. In fact, a draft speci- and financial support. In addition, Nouri al-Ma-
men of the legislation had been circulated among liki has resumed power of the ailing Iraqi
the experts present at a related meeting of the government, and North American and Euro-
CCW in 2020. However, all attempts to formalize pean support for the Bashar al-Assad regime in
such a legal structure were thwarted by the US Syria and the Maliki regime in Iraq persists,
and the United Kingdom, both of which aggres- although the value of these relationships
sively dismissed the regulation bid. remains unclear. While Assad and Maliki have
served as important alternative governments to
Meanwhile, in the Middle East, a coalition of ISIS (and now al-Majma’a) in their respective
Peshmerga and Shiite forces, coupled with US countries, their forces have been implicated in a
airstrikes, defeated ISIS in 2016, although its number of atrocities, causing over 500,000
leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, disappeared casualties across the region since 2015.
before he could be captured. In 2017, his name
began to reemerge in intelligence reports out of DN has effectively curtailed the growth of
Iraq. Within a year, his new organization, al-Majma’a since 2020. Al-Majma’a has sustained
al-Majma’a (“the Coalition”), cemented its role heavy casualties from DN attacks and has lost
as a marquee global terrorist organization, with several high-profile battles. However, DN has
former ISIS militants, Boko Haram, the Taliban, not been without its own challenges from the
al-Qaeda and others joining under its banner. beginning. After becoming fully operational in
Recruitment from the Middle East, North Africa, 2021, there were several reports of erratic
South Asia and particularly Europe continued behavior, with the system being forced to power
to intensify. By 2023, the size of the organiza- down on several occasions due to “faulty target-
tion’s global movement reached an estimated ing”: several DN drones were intercepted in
100,000 combatants, including men and women. friendly airspace while they were about to carry
out attacks. Despite these limitations, the US
In a spate of terrorist attacks between 2018 and and the EU assured their interlocutors that they
2020, al-Majma’a and its allies attacked a number had “fixed the bugs,” and that DN was safe, effec-
of targets in Germany, the UK and the US. tive and the greatest anti-terrorism weapon in
Although American and European forces had history. Furthermore, domestic support for
been conducting targeted strikes against key these programs continues in the US and the EU,
strongholds in Iraq and Syria, a coordinated following several al-Majma’a attacks on targets
attack on The Gherkin in London and the Capitol in both regions. For this reason, the US and the
building in Washington, DC, on 11 September 2019 EU have denounced the India-sponsored State-
killed 359 people combined and galvanized ment of Intent, arguing that it will empower the
anti-al-Majma’a sentiment. In 2020, the US and terrorists and that such regulation would
the EU committed several thousand ground further destabilize the Middle East.
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE futures 2025 15Scenario 1: Weaponized Unmanned Systems in a Fractured World
Opportunities and Threats
This scenario contains a number of threats and The third threat is that both non-state actors
opportunities that influence how the future and rogue states continue to hold power. While
plays out. First, the potential technical liabili- we recognize that the threat posed by these
ties of WUS are important threats that shape actors may not directly impact WUS governance,
two different incidents in the scenario. In the such actors play an important role in shaping
first incident, North Korea leverages technical the trajectory of the first scenario. Both al-
liabilities to spoof a weaponized drone: falsified Majma’a and North Korea are engaged in desta-
GPS data is fed into the drone’s system after its bilizing Asian geopolitics, as well as geopolitics
GPS connection has been jammed. In the second between the Middle East and the West. In that
incident, a Chinese People’s Liberation Army respect, they pose a uniquely important threat
weaponized drone loses contact with ground that can manipulate other threats like technical
control and subsequently follows an automated liabilities and global power inequities, such as
protocol, using topographical recognition those between the US and the UK, and between
memory to chart the shortest distance back to the Asian powers.
its origin. The drone flies into disputed airspace
and triggers a diplomatic crisis between China An important opportunity arising from our
and Japan. Hence, spoofing – and inadequate scenario is the codification of norms and the
technical protections or protocols in its after- creation of law regarding the regulation of WUS.
math – is an important threat that emerges from Although there remains global disagreement on
this scenario. the import of such regulation in our scenario
(and any meaningful regulation on WUS use
The second threat is the lack of consensus among may require time beyond 2025), the establish-
powerful state actors regarding the importance of ment of the International Weaponized Robotics
regulating WUS and the resulting global imbal- Statement of Intent in this scenario suggests
ance in global security influence. With the spoof- that regional agreement on the issue may be an
ing of drone technology and the subsequent loss of important step towards meaningful regulation.
contact between the drone and its command In particular, beyond the obvious regulatory
center, technical challenges have destabilized implications of limiting autonomous WUS, the
Asian geopolitics. Given what is at stake for Asian conversations required to establish such regu-
powers, China, India and Japan have been galva- lation have the potential to lead to an enhanced
nized to fight the threats posed by the errant use of global understanding of the opportunities and
WUS. As a result, they have come together to draft threats associated with these systems.
the International Weaponized Robotics Statement
of Intent, which reinforces the need for direct
human control of all aspects of these systems.
However, political realities differ substan tially
between the US and the EU, which are embroiled
in a decades-long war against terrorist networks
in the Middle East. For this reason, the US and the
UK have threatened to block any efforts to regu-
late the use of WUS, which, they argue, empower
terrorists. Moreover, given their position on the
UN Security Council, this opposition threatens
the viability of any regulation.
16 The Future of Weaponized Unmanned Systems: Challenges and OpportunitiesScenario 2: Weaponized Unmanned Systems in a New World Order
Scenario 2:
Weaponized
Unmanned
Systems in a
New World
Order
From 2015 to 2025, the world has witnessed a incidents that took place in China, Europe, Paki-
rapid development in unmanned vehicle tech- stan and Russia displayed similar characteris-
nology – such as unmanned aerial, sea and tics despite their geographic variation: the use
ground vehicles – in both civilian and military of weaponized unmanned aerial vehicles
sectors. A significant increase in computational (WUAVs) to commit acts of terrorism. Begin-
resources, combined with cloud computing and ning early 2015, terrorist perpetrators under-
breakthroughs in sensor technology, has led to a took a strategic shift towards the use of UAVs in
new generation of small-scale unmanned aerial order to disrupt domestic security at the highest
vehicles (UAVs) for commercial use in various possible levels. A series of terrorist attacks
industries. The same technological advances between 2015 and 2018 illustrated the global
have also spawned new types of large-scale significance of the threat of WUS falling into the
weaponized unmanned systems (WUS) for mili- wrong hands.
tary use, causing a paradigmatic shift in the
composition of armed forces worldwide, as well China: In October 2016, a sea-pirate group saw
as in military strategic thinking. an opportune moment and hacked into one of
China’s newly developed weaponized unmanned
During this same period, the threat of terrorism submerged vehicles (WUSVs), Haiyan, after
has dramatically escalated, with a series of news quickly spread that it was experiencing
attacks around the world targeting civilians, technical difficulties and that its security
state officials and critical infrastructure. Major system was vulnerable. The pirates then used
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE futures 2025 17Scenario 2: Weaponized Unmanned Systems in a New World Order
Haiyan to launch a small-scale attack on an was following its preprogrammed GPS coordi-
offshore Chinese rig in the South China Sea. The nates, when in reality it was following substi-
rig was constructed and jointly owned by Shell tuted coordinates. LeT crashed the WUAV into
and China’s third-largest national oil company, the US embassy in Islamabad, killing six Paki-
the China National Offshore Oil Corporation. stanis and 13 American officials, including the
The attack resulted in three casualties and three US ambassador. The group immediately claimed
missing persons, including a Dutch and an responsibility for the incident. Official reports
American, who were both engineers. China, the later confirmed that LeT was able not only to
Netherlands and the US condemned the terror- broadcast a fake GPS signal, but also to shut off
ist group and initiated a joint search for the the transponder and to program new GPS coor-
missing persons. This incident, along with the dinates, targeting the US embassy. In doing so,
extensive search, attracted widespread inter- LeT operatives were capable of taking the WUAV
national media coverage. off the radar and sending it to its target in a
short amount of time, leaving little time for the
Russia: In February 2017, Vilayat Dagestan, an Americans to react. As a direct consequence, the
Islamist militant group, took control of a Russian US dramatically escalated its drone strikes
WUAV that was being tested in the Dagestan throughout Pakistan’s Waziristan region and
province. The group gained control primarily the North-West Frontier Province in an effort to
by spoofing. Vilayat Dagestan managed to land wipe out LeT’s terrorist network and other simi-
the WUAV at a terrorist safe house in Chechnya. lar groups. The US managed to kill LeT’s leader
It then publicized the capture and offered to sell in March 2019. The next day, LeT’s new leader
the airframe and surveillance equipment to any threatened to target US interests in retaliation.
black-market buyer. Prior to this incident,
Russia had been trying to develop a national The political consequences of the September
drone program, partnering with the Chinese on 2018 attack dealt a severe blow to US-Pakistan
defense technology. relations and strengthened the US “war on
terror.” As a direct result of the hijacking of the
France: In May 2017, following a series of fully autonomous WUAV, there was global
events in which commercial UAVs violated the uproar about the use of such systems. A larger
airspace over nuclear power plants and govern- group of UN member states, human rights
ment buildings in France in late 2014 and early groups and other civil-society actors pointed
2015, a small-scale commercial UAV carrying an fingers at Israel and the US for producing
explosive crashed into the French socialist dangerous technology that could fall so easily
party’s headquarters. This incident occurred into the hands of terrorist hackers.
shortly after President François Hollande’s
re-election. Several people were severely
injured. A small French militant right-wing
group later claimed responsibility for the attack,
which was intended to protest the socialist
government’s stance on immigration.
US and Pakistan: In September 2018, Lash-
kar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Pakistani terrorist organi-
zation, took control of a fully autonomous
American WUAV patrolling Pakistani airspace
in North Waziristan and redirected its flight
course to Islamabad. The group gained control
of the WUAV and redirected it by jamming – that
is, crowding and then blocking – the GPS signal
so that the WUAV was made to believe that it
18 The Future of Weaponized Unmanned Systems: Challenges and OpportunitiesScenario 2: Weaponized Unmanned Systems in a New World Order
How We Got Here
In light of these incidents, governments around common definition of WUS as a basis for a more
the world began to invest heavily in anti-jam- regulatory approach, which incited concern
ming and anti-spoofing technologies to prevent from representatives of their respective
further attacks like those that occurred in commercial industries. As a result of the inces-
China, Pakistan and Russia. Larger jammers sant lobbying efforts in the capitals of major
were set up in the vicinity of critical infrastruc- stakeholders, the commercial WUS industry
ture around the world to cut off communication managed to limit government interference in its
between UAVs and their ground control, hence daily activities. Policymakers needed to strike a
making any UAV – even the smallest, commer- delicate balance between making the world
cially available types – non-operational within more resilient against the abuse of unmanned
a certain perimeter. systems, and avoiding the prevention of fledg-
ling industries from growing and creating jobs
In the aftermath of the incidents, there was and revenue. Throughout 2019, business leaders
heightened international debate on whether the and high-ranking representatives from the EU,
predominantly unregulated arena of WUS tech- Israel and the US met regularly to agree on a
nology should fall under tighter legal control. deal calling for greater oversight and control of
Given the urgency of the situation, world lead- the commercial use of WUS. Governments
ers present at the World Economic Forum in agreed to limit the technological development of
Davos, Switzerland in January 2019 decided to fully autonomous WUS. At the same time, they
set up a working group under the Missile Tech- asked for guarantees from companies to imple-
nology Control Regime (MTCR)4 to discuss WUS ment measures that increase security in all
issues. facilities and to provide regular reports about
the production of such weapons. After 10 months
In trying to determine the definition of WUS, of continuous negotiations, the EU, Israel and
the MTCR relied extensively on external exper- the US adopted a non-legally binding WUS
tise provided by the International Committee Memorandum of Understanding to increase
for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC), a non-govern- transparency about technological innovation,
mental organization comprised of international to allow greater government oversight and
experts on robotic arms. This special body restrictions on WUS production and to share
served as a critical link between the political-le- any concerns about the hackability of WUS.
gal and the technological dimensions of the This gentlemen’s agreement held significant
WUS issue. political importance for the players involved
and built a sense of trust.
Soon thereafter, however, the challenges of
creating legally binding regulations came to the Global public antagonism towards fully autono-
fore. The market volume for commercially used mous WUS was running high, with NGOs and
UAVs doubled per annum between 2015 and 2018, other civil-society groups fearing that fully
creating thriving new industries and services autonomous WUS would take a life of their own
in China, Europe and the US. It was estimated and move out of human control. States felt the
that more than 2 million jobs were created in need to respond to the growing resentment
this sector on a global scale between 2018 and
2019.
4
The MTCR is an informal and voluntary partnership between
more than 30 countries to prevent the proliferation of missile
At the 2019 World Economic Forum, govern- and UAV technology that is capable of carrying a 500-kilogram
ments announced their effort to agree on a payload for at least 300 kilometers.
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE futures 2025 19Scenario 2: Weaponized Unmanned Systems in a New World Order
against the technology. Finally, in December the Pakistan incident, anti-American protests
2019, the San Francisco Protocol emerged. Major in Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi intensified
commercial UAV companies accepted the due to the misuse of a fully autonomous WUAV,
request of international governments, wherein the GPS signal was jammed and then
expressed through the MTCR, that WUS tech- redirected to hit the US embassy in Pakistan.
nology develop simultaneously with the tech- Protests also spread across the Western world,
nology to control it. In addition, UAV companies resulting from the civilian perception and fear
made the guarantee that WUAVs would not of a future in which fully automated warfare is
operate close to critical infrastructure. Compa- inevitable. The question of how much autonomy
nies expressed their commitment to ensuring should be given to machines, especially in the
significant funding for research and develop- area of modern warfare, captured public atten-
ment (R&D) aimed at finding technological solu- tion in the West and gradually developed from a
tions, to prevent WUS from entering special mere technical issue into a crucial political
areas of concern (eg, power plants, the water question. Rising civilian pressure, along with
supply, telecommunications, government insti- the political ramifications of US President
tutions). Additionally, companies agreed to Hillary Clinton’s attempt to secure votes for
provide anti-WUS technology like anti-jam- re-election in the 2020 presidential race, trig-
mers to government institutions only. gered a dialogue with other major WUS-produc-
ing countries that led to consensus on a two-year
Governments felt more comfortable with the San moratorium on the production and use of fully
Francisco Protocol in place because they were autonomous WUS.
reassured that commercial companies building
unmanned systems would not have access to During this period, no fully autonomous WUS
technological know-how and critical infrastruc- was to be put into operation while new security
ture for possibly weaponizing their systems. mechanisms to protect such systems from
Hence, one of the greatest challenges faced by the outside interference (eg, hacking) were being
MTCR during the early stages of its work was to tested. The moratorium did not apply to other
draw a clear line between commercial and mili- types of WUS (where a human is involved in the
tary uses of unmanned systems. With the San machine’s decision-making) and civilian UAV
Francisco Protocol in place, the attention of world production (as it is already governed by the San
leaders shifted in subsequent years to addressing Francisco Protocol). Israel agreed to President
the growing concern of powerful interest groups Clinton’s initiative in return for unofficial US
about fully autonomous WUS. support for a new settlement plan in Palestine’s
West Bank.
In light of the incidents in Europe, China, Russia
and elsewhere – in particular the attack in Paki- China and Russia, each maintaining consider-
stan – all of the major powers that possessed able and costly research programs on WUS,
sophisticated WUS, along with the members of demonstrated little willingness to accept any
the UN Security Council, the state parties to the measure that would halt these programs. Yet, as
CCW, the International Atomic Energy Agency, a result of a downward economic spiral in both
the MTCR and key non-state actors like ICRAC, countries in the early 2020s, Beijing and Moscow
gathered for the first time in May 2020 in Geneva finally agreed to the moratorium as part of
to discuss the attacks and preventive measures cost-cutting efforts in their military sectors.
for the future. The outcome of the first Geneva Their rationale went as follows: if they were no
meeting was minimal. No document was drafted, longer able to invest in WUS programs as much
and no political declaration was published. as before, to reduce the technological gap with
However, relevant state actors decided to recon- the US, then their best option was to make sure
vene four times a year. that the US would not make any further techno-
logical advances in this particular field. In addi-
Meanwhile, throughout 2019, the year following tion, China’s and Russia’s WUS research was
20 The Future of Weaponized Unmanned Systems: Challenges and OpportunitiesScenario 2: Weaponized Unmanned Systems in a New World Order
primarily driven by state-owned companies, silence its critics, the US convened in October
whereas the US’s R&D of WUS was run entirely 2022 a conference of all countries possessing
by private-sector companies. Thus, a morato- sophisticated WUS technology to discuss a
rium could have had a significant effect on US possible international treaty on the regulation
industries in this market, which might have of fully autonomous WUS. After more than a
proved less resilient than their heavily subsi- year of intense negotiations, the countries
dized state-owned counterparts. drafted the Restricted Use of Weaponized
Unmanned Systems Treaty (RUWUST), an
In August 2020, Brazil, China, France, Germany, international legal framework banning fully
India, Israel, Japan, Russia, the UK and the US autonomous weapon systems. The RUWUST
signed a two-year standstill agreement banning also created a council called the Security Power-
the use of fully autonomous WUS. In conse- 10 (SP-10), composed of the major WUS-produc-
quence, the lead private defense contractors, ing states: Brazil, China, France, Germany,
such as Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grum- India, Israel, Japan, Russia, the UK and the US.
man, suffered great financial losses as the US
military decreased the number of private By 1 June 2024, the RUWUST signatory states
contracts to produce fully autonomous WUS reached an agreement that featured the follow-
(which, at that time, dominated the defense ing: (1) a standard for semi-autonomous weap-
market), given the US’s new policy to restrict onized unmanned vehicles and a ban on fully
the use of, and reduce spending on, fully auton- autonomous WUS were agreed upon for the first
omous WUS. However, the number of contracts time in history, (2) a RUWUST inspection and
to enhance firewalls increased because of a verification body was installed, and member
strong need to prevent the hacking and jamming states agreed to periodic inspections of all WUS
of GPS signals. In light of those business aspects, facilities, (3) countries agreed to share informa-
the standstill agreement brought about a short- tion about their WUS programs, and (4) coun-
lived reduction of public revolt against fully tries would work together to prevent the
autonomous WUS in Europe and the US. Wide- proliferation of fully autonomous WUS technol-
spread discontent soon resurfaced, as major ogy to third parties. The treaty banned the use
NGOs and interest groups sought a permanent of fully autonomous WUS, with a provision that
extension of the moratorium, beyond 2022. the ban could be lifted after the two-year mora-
torium period, so long as there was a unanimous
During the EU-US summit in fall 2021, both vote within the SP-10 Council to do so.
sides agreed to call for an international code of
conduct5 regulating the development, produc- Signatory countries agreed to meet regularly in
tion and deployment of fully autonomous WUS. order to follow up on the implementation of the
In a joint initiative, France, the UK and the US treaty and to stay up to date with changing tech-
tabled a draft resolution at the UNSC. China and nology and developments on the ground. Upon a
Russia, still recovering from an economic down- series of follow-up conferences, signatory states
turn, decided not to abstain. The two countries signed an agreement on 19 December 2025 to ban
also realized that the technology gap with the all fully autonomous WUS. The rationale behind
US could only be closed at a high cost. Therefore, the decision was the notion that militaries do
the second-best solution was to ban this tech- not want to relinquish control of weapons, and
nology for those who had disposed of it, and to
make it unavailable for those who sought to
acquire it. As such, the code of conduct was 5
This international code of conduct was an agreed-upon set of
adopted in May 2022. norms, according to which member states restrict their use of
WUS. Additionally, these states agreed to establish sophisti-
cated security systems to prevent violent non-state actors from
Seizing the opportunity to set aside decades of
acquiring WUS, and agreed to institute a protocol wherein the
skepticism towards international treaties state handles any WUS-hacking incidents with the help of
(including in the area of arms control) and to member states, the UNSC, the CCW and ICRAC.
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