THE RESCUE OF EUROPEAN JEWRY AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION TO PALESTINE IN 1940-PROSPECTS AND REALITY: BERTHOLD STORFER AND THE MOSSAD LE'ALIYAH BET
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Dalia Ofer
THE RESCUE OF EUROPEAN JEWRY AND
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION TO PALESTINE
IN 1940-PROSPECTS AND REALITY:
BERTHOLD STORFER AND
THE MOSSAD LE'ALIYAH BET
GENERAL BACKGROUND
Illegal immigration to Palestine was an escape route for thousands of
Jewish refugees from the Third Reich, and should be viewed in the
context of the mass exodus of Jews from the Third Reich to all corners of
the world. Palestine was not one of the major destinations sought by
these refugees; but relative to its size and absorption capacity, Palestine
took in a disproportionate share of displaced Jews: of the half million
Jews who fled the Greater Reich from 1933 until the war broke out, about
100,000 came to Palestine, some of them illegally.
This pattern of escape, very untypical of the law-abiding Central
European Jewish middle class, demonstrated the gap between the number
of people in need of immigration and those who were admitted by the
countries to which the Jews sought entry. A combination of economic
depression, an inability to grasp the nature and the danger of the Nazi
Jewish policy, and the influence of Nazi anti-Semitism, decreased con-
siderably the number of immigration permits issued by the immigrating
countries—mainly the United States.
From 1937 on the British restricted Jewish immigration to Palestine.
This was due to a retreat in British policy from the commitment to the
Jewish National Home. The White Paper of May 1939 limited Jewish
immigration to a maximum of 75,000 in the next five years. This number
was far below the individual applications and the request of the Jew-
ish agency.
When the Nazi policy of encouraging emigration changed to forced
emigration and expulsion, illegal immigration became a mass movement
Distinguished and honored citizens, young and old, participated in this
movement The organizers of illegal immigration were few. The two
major factors were: 1) the Revisionist (New Zionist Organization) organi-
159160 Dalia Ofer
zation, through its youth movement—"Betar"—and its military under-
ground force—"Irgun"; and 2) the "He-chalutz"—Labor Zionist Young
People's Movement —which prepared its members for immigration to
Palestine. Other Zionist parties participated in the illegal immigration,
but they used either the Revisionist or the He-chalutz organizations to
operate.
Both groups created special bodies which were in charge of illegal
immigration strategy and operation. Labor Zionism generated the "Mos-
sad Le'Aliyah Bet" —the organization of immigration B. The Revisionists
created the"Mercaz Le-Aliyah"—Center for Immigration. Both had their
operation headquarters in Paris.
The Mossad was part of the Hagana—the underground military
force of the Jewish community in Palestine, which was under the authority
of the Jewish Agency. The Mercaz operation was supported in Europe by
Betar members, and it was guided on the seas and in clandestine landings
by the Irgun. The two organizations had envoys (Schlichim) in the Jewish
communities who organized the immigrating groups, selected the candi-
dates, prepared the needed documents (exit permits and transit visas),
and supplied the boats, crews, and food for the voyage.
A third important factor in illegal immigration was the role of private
organizers. Some were motivated by the possibility of economic gain,
others were motivated by Jewish solidarity, and common fate. Some of
these organizers were connected to the Zionist movement, like Dr.
B. Confino of Bulgaria, or to the Revisionists like W. Perl and W. Faltin
from Vienna. These private organizers played a very important role in
promoting the movement of illegal immigrants and between a fourth to a
third of the traffic was due to their efforts (6000-7000 people).
The Nazis' attitude towards illegal immigration derived from their
approach towards Jewish emigration from all the territories under their
control. Their major goal was a "Judenrein" Reich, and migration was
(at first, at least) regarded as a means towards this end. And although the
question of where the Jews should go did concern the Nazis, it was only a
secondary consideration to the issue of the Jews' willingness to emigrate
at all. Therefore, the main test of illegal immigration from the Nazis'
viewpoint was its degree of success in evicting the Jews from the Reich.
True, Nazi anti-Semitic ideology would probably have preferred
dispersing the Jews in small numbers all over the world and creating
numerous small and destitute Jewish clusters to instigate further anti-
Semitism; whereas the gathering of large numbers of Jews in Palestine
could well have raised the spectre of a "Jewish Vatican."1 But immigration
to Palestine did not depend entirely on the Nazis, nor did the immi-
grants arrive only from the Reich. This convinced the SS leaders to
adopt a pragmatic approach whereby the Reich's Jews were ordered to
emigrate, as a means of 'cleansing1 Germany of its Jews. This policy wasRescue of European Jewry and Illegal Immigration to Palestine 161
stated explicitly by Heydrich in January 1939, at the inter-ministerial
meeting that established the Jewish Emigration Center in Berlin.2 Hey-
drich was a staunch advocate of illegal immigration to Palestine as one of
the ways of evicting German Jews from the Reich. At the same meeting,
H. Wohlthat (who replaced H. Schacht in the negotiations with G. Rublee
on Jewish migration affairs)23 announced that he had been told in London
that Palestine could absorb another million or so Jews. If these were the
numbers envisaged by Nazi policy makers, Jewish emigration to Palestine
must surely have been taken very seriously indeed.
The Germans therefore supported the organizers of illegal immigra-
tion. According to the resolutions of the above-mentioned meeting, such
support was to be extended covertly, as the German State could hardly
sanction illegal operations overtly. The operational scene was thus set
for all emigration efforts from the Reich in this period.
The "illegality" of these efforts was purely a British concern, as it was
British policy that restricted (or barred) entry of Jews to Palestine in ac-
cordance with the White Paper policy. In 1939 Britain stepped up its
struggle against illegal immigration and persisted in these measures for
the first two years of the war. The coast-line of Palestine was guarded
against penetration and clandestine landings; immigrants who were
caught were placed under arrest and threatened with deportation to
their countries of origin; captured vessels were confiscated and their
crews imprisoned. Britain also exerted strong diplomatic pressures on
countries with Black Sea and Mediterranean ports, to prevent the de-
parture of immigrants for Palestine and providing them with supplies.3
In spite of all these measures, illegal immigration accounted for 63 per-
cent of total immigration to Palestine in 1939 (of around 27,000 immi-
grants, some 17,000 were 'illegal').
CONDITIONS AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR
When war broke out the difficulties of organizing illegal immigration in-
creased. At the same time, the direct need for actual rescue operations
became all the more critical: in the early months of the war Jews were
already being deported from the Reich to Poland. The problems entailed
in purchasing and sailing ships, acquiring foreign currency and other
finances, all increased immeasurably. Shipping costs soared by hundreds
of percentage points as available vessels became scarce. Countries pro-
hibited the transfer of ships' ownership to foreign citizens, planning to
use these vessels in their own war effort. No one knew how much longer
immigrant ships would be able to make their way to Palestine. The Jew-
ish institutions in the Reich were concerned about their contacts with the
outside, while similar institutions in the free world were worried about162 Delia Ofer
maintaining communications with the Reich. Envoys from Palestine,
being 'enemy aliens,' had to leave the Reich and the territories it occupied,
and Jewish residents of the Reich were declared 'enemy aliens' by a
British government concerned about spies and fifth columnists, although
they had long since been deprived of their German citizenship. British
anti-espionage precautions took on panic proportions especially after the
Germans occupied Belgium and the Netherlands.4 Jews in the Reich at
first entertained hopes that the outbreak of war would create a need for a
rational German policy regarding the Jews, and perhaps shift the au-
thority for handling Jewish affairs from the SS to the army5—these hopes
were dispelled. They still wished to emigrate, while at the same time
German pressures for emigration ^and illegal immigration) did not
let up.
In September 1939 there were still quite a few active local emigration
operatives in the Reich: Ehud Avriel of the He-chalutz movement (pre-
viously an assistant to Moshe Agami, a member of Kibbutz Kfar Giladi,
who was also an envoy of the Mossad, and had to leave by Eichmann's
order in the Spring of 1939); Y. Dorfman, another leading He-chalutz
member, who returned to Vienna from Geneva six weeks after the war
broke out; W. Perl, a young Viennese lawyer and member of the Re-
visionist movement; and Emerich Faltin, also of the Revisionists. Both
Perl and Faltin worked for the 'Immigration Center' run by the Re-
visionists, and in a private capacity. Berthold Storfer, a well-known
Viennese businessman, and a person well-versed in migration affairs
through the Zentrum Travel Agency in Vienna, was also involved. All
these operatives were in touch with groups of emigrants in various stages
of preparedness for travel, some of whom were just about to depart for
the Black Sea. These groups comprised the complements that boarded
the "Atlantic," the "Noamy Julia," and the "Rodanitzar," ships that
reached Palestine in September-October 1939, and the "Hilda" and the
"Sakariya" that arrived in the beginning of 1940. Other groups were
either en route or in the final stages of preparation.
The restrictions on the shipping market once hostilities broke out
led to the cancellation of agreements, postponements, and various delays
that called for improvisation, circumstances that affected all Aliyah oper-
atives. The Mossad was in the process of organizing the extrication of
some 10,000 Jews from Germany in collaboration with the German
HAPAG Company6 and groups of He-chalutz pioneers in Bratislava and
Vienna were also ready to move out. The Revisionists had planned to
take several groups out of the Protectorate (a plan that was partly ac-
complished several months later on board the "Pencho"), and further
plans were under way under the auspices of individuals who had par-
ticipated in the illegal organization since its inception, such as Dr.
B. Confino of Bulgaria, W. Perl, R. Mandler, and Berthold Storfer.Rescue of European Jewry and Illegal Immigration to Palestine 163
The Mossad was hard hit by the loss of direct communications with
local Jewish communities. Its agents and He-chalutz envoys left the Reich
for various other countries. The independent operation of the Palestine
offices—the legal immigration offices of the Zionist Movement—also
came to a halt and a German government official was placed in charge of
Jewish emigration. This had an especially severe impact on Mossad
operations, mainly because it affected the selection of candidates for
illegal immigration according to their suitability for life in Palestine.
To British claims that the Germans were liable to plant spies among
Jewish emigrants or use them as a fifth column by holding their families
hostage in the Reich7 —the Mossad responded by promising to maintain
control over who would emigrate on their ships and by giving assurances
that there would be no cause for fears about hostile elements. But their
control over thie selection of candidates for emigration was diminished
when their agents had to leave the Reich. The tightening ship market
and the loss of vessels through fraud only worsened the Mossad's financial
problems. All these factors combined to make the operations of Mossad
agents remaining in Europe extremely difficult
In addition, considerable embarrassment was caused by the renewed
reservations expressed by the Zionist leadership concerning illegal im-
migration. The wartime conditions led these Zionist leaders to devise a
new political strategy: collaboration in the British war effort in order to
claim a share in the fruits of victory. From the Zionist movement's view-
point, these fruits were expected to be plentiful: the strengthening of the
Yishuv's defense capability as a consequence of fighting against Hitler (a
prime national objective), and maneuvering Britain into changing its
White Paper policy. Any attempt at undermining coordination with the
British was therefore considered undesirable. Thus, although illegal im-
migration was conceived as a useful means of fighting against the White
Paper, how could one ensure that this struggle would not damage the
aspired-for collaboration in the British war effort? Illegal immigration
was also a means to rescue Jews from the Reich and the areas it had
occupied, a need that had intensified since the outbreak of the war. How
could one reconcile these two sometimes conflicting aspects of illegal
immigration?
The Mossad suffered acutely from the ambivalent Zionist policy
after the war broke out and from the other changes that have been cited.
Could it somehow continue and expand immigration operations in these
years? Reconstructing the historical reality of 1940, one realizes that the
necessary external preconditions for illegal immigration existed. The
Germans did not waver from their support of illegal immigration. The
Mediterranean was still open to the sailing of boats, and the Balkan
States, mainly Rumania, allowed illegal immigrants through their ports.
The necessary internal (Jewish) preconditions changed, in part. Jews164 Datia Ofer
were ready to embark on illegal boats and to risk their lives on illegal
voyages. But the organizations that provided the human and financial
resources were ambivalent. They were reconsidering the inevitable need
to cooperate with Nazi authorities in organizing illegal immigration after
the war began. It became more difficult politically and morally to co-
ordinate with the Nazis even on an illegal basis. They lost the direct in-
volvement and control over the immigration activities, since their envoys
(Schlichim) had to leave German territories. They had to rely on a middle
man, Berthold Storfer, who was appointed by the Nazis, and who was
assumed by many to be a Nazi agent
Under these circumstances the disadvantages of illegal immigration
seemed larger than the advantages. After realizing that they could not
replace Berthold Storfer, nor control him as they wished, they practically
gave up the efforts to emigrate people from the Reich. This was a tragic
error for reconstructing the situation of 1940 from an objective distance
one can see that a unique chance to provide for the possibility of immigra-
tion was not used. This assertion, of course, requires proof and to provide
the necessary evidence we now turn to a description of Storfer's per-
sonality, his methods of operation, and his relations with the Mossad.
BERTHOLD STORFER: HIS BACKGROUND AND STATUS
Berthold Storfer was a commercial consultant who was born in 1882 in
Bukovina. For many years he was in the timber trade in Rumania and
Hungary, and during the First World War he was engaged in trans-
porting supplies to the Kaiser's Army on die Russo-Rumanian front
(where he was decorated twice). After the war he was appointed financial
advisor to the Czech and Austrian governments and also served several
large commercial firms. His fields of expertise were banking credit and
overseas exports.8
What part did Storfer play in Jewish public life? He was not a central
figure in the Jewish community, nor one of the party activists and he is
not known to have held public office before the Anschluss. His first known
public endeavor was at the Evian Conference of July 1938, in which he
appeared with Professor Neumann and Dr. Lowenherz on behalf of
Austria's Jewish community to present their requests on matters related
to emigration. Aldiough die delegation appeared in Evian under German
auspices and was convened under German initiative, Storfer himself was
nominated to it by Lowenherz, die head of die Jewish community in
Vienna.9 Why did Lowenherz nominate Storfer? No doubt Storfer's eco-
nomic contacts could be helpful in organizing emigration, but there must
have been odier Jews with similar qualifications among the more promi-
nent members of die Jewish community. Possibly the very fact diat StorferRescue of European Jewry and Illegal Immigration to Palestine 165
was not a prominent figure acted in his favor, and Lowenherz may have
chosen him for tactical reasons—being aware of his unique contacts with
the Germans. This, however, is pure speculation. Storfer did place his
experience and international economic contacts at the disposal of the
Evian delegation, alongside Neumann's reputation and Lowenherz's of-
ficial status in the community.
Storfer's status and operations in the field of emigration and illegal
immigration to Palestine gained ground during 1938. He became a
familiar figure in German official circles and in 1939 was commended by
Eichmann in connection with the activities of the Zentrum emigration
offices.10 Zentrum was one of the major offices engaged in Jewish emi-
gration. Among its other activities it sent people out of the Reich with
tourist visas to conceal their true intentions. After this tactic was un-
covered, groups organized by Zentrum were no longer allowed into the
countries of destination, causing great indignation, criticism, and debate
in the local and international press. The Germans, though not averse to
Jewish emigration even by such 'devious' means (provided it was carried
out covertly and successfully), opposed any method whose disclosure was
liable to create adverse propaganda. Zentrum was penalized several times,
and even shut down for different periods. Storfer seems to have been
appointed to head Zentrum in March 1939. We do not know whether this
appointment resulted from German intervention or pressure, but Eich-
mann's commendation concerning the future operations of this office
under Storfer's direction may indicate that Eichmann knew Storfer and
trusted him.
From August 1939 on, and certainly after the outbreak of the war,
Storfer was in control of emigration plans initiated by other organiza-
tions. He was empowered to cancel plans or halt groups of emigrants
either before their departure or en route. One illustration of his power
can be found in the irate comments of Alivah officials of the He-chalutz
and the Revisionist movements,11 and Ehud Avriel's letter to Storfer,
dated December 1, 1939, is particularly revealing.12 Avriel tried to or-
ganize a group of emigrants independently, without Storfer's permission,
taking advantage of Storfer's absence from Vienna. (Storfer was in Lublin,
on behalf of the Jewish community, inquiring after the condition of Jews
who had been deported there in November 1939.) Avriel ran into financial
difficulties as his group numbered 200 more persons than he had planned.
He needed help, and the only way he could get it was from the Jewish
community in Vienna and the Emigration Center. But this required
Storfer's approval. He wrote a flattering and pleading letter to Storfer
praising his work and dedication. In later evidence, and in his book,
Avriel makes no attempt to disguise his contempt for Storfer, considering
him an opportunist who exploited the Jewish plight to further his per-
sonal aims. By March 1940 Storfer was in sole charge of organizing emi-
gration from all parts of the Reich.13166 Delia Ofer
We have dealt at length with this point in order to emphasize the
facts of Storfer's official status and to underline the suspicions aroused
when his authority in emigration affairs grew stronger. This issue con-
stantly clouded relations between the Jewish organizations that sought to
work with Storfer, both within and outside the Reich, the Mossad, the
Joint, the He-chaJutz, and the Revisionists. Community leaders in Vienna
and leaders of the Reichsvereinigung (the central body of the German
Jewish community, created in June 1939 under Nazi order) were not
always hostile to Storfer. The Vienna archives also include many letters
of gratitude to Storfer, praising his efforts and accomplishments in the
emigration cause.
STORFER'S OPERATIONS-CONSTRAINTS AND ADVANTAGES
Organizing emigration from Vienna in 1939 was a very complex under-
taking. Emigration offices sprouted up all over, competing fiercely for
the few available visas; it was a virtual battlefield between greedy
swindling adventurers over the hopes and despair of Jews who des-
perately sought any means of escape and who were prepared to consider
any offer, serious or otherwise, provided it was channelled through the
Jewish community. It was this community's job—through Storfer's office
— to weed out the spurious bids and warn prospective emigrants. But it
was difficult to maintain control over the situation, especially in view of
the constant pressure exerted by Eichmann to increase the flow of emi-
gration. LOwenherz came under constant fire from the Germans who
complained that the Jews were not leaving rapidly enough, while at the
same time he had to try and head off proposals which he considered
fraudulent. It is therefore not surprising that LOwenherz had to lean
heavily on Storfer, as the freedom of operation enjoyed by other bodies
diminished: the Palestine Office was shut down in July 1939, Jewish
organizations were forbidden to collect funds for emigration purposes
unless through the Jewish Emigration Center, and it is possible that at
some stage Ldwenherz found himself totally dependent on Storfer's help.
Storfer operated with a Greek travel agent named Socrates Avgerinos
who was responsible for obtaining ships, establishing contacts with other
travel agents, and hiring crews. He also handled the ships' provisioning,
registration, ownership documents, and technical arrangements. Storfer
also had 'representatives' in various countries: his brother, Joseph, in
Bucharest, helped him organize the crucial Rumanian leg of the voyage;
his brother-in-law, Goldner, acted as "ambassador-at-large" in Slovakia,
Hungary, Rumania, and Austria, and also served as liaison officer be-
tween Storfer and Aliyah agents in other countries such as B. Confino (in
Bulgaria), and R. Mandler (of the Perl organization in Bratislava andRescue of European Jewry and Illegal Immigration to Palestine 167
Budapest). All financial matters—even those requiring travel abroad
— were handled by Storfer personally, as were contacts with the Jewish
Emigration Center and the Jewish community in Vienna. Storfer was
also personally responsible for negotiations with local travel agencies
such as the "German Danube Company" that transported emigrants from
the Reich to the Black Sea. For the sake of efficiency, Storfer needed the
support of both the Germans and the Jewish organizations, especially the
Joint Without the latter's allotment of foreign currency Storfer would
not have been able to operate at all.
What were the considerations that guided these Jewish organizations
in formulating their attitude towards Storfer? Naturally enough, one of
the more important considerations would be his reputation with other
Jewish organizations within the Reich itself. The fact that Lowenherz
relied on Storfer must have weighed heavily in his favor. But the fact
that Aliyah organizers for the He-chalutz and Revisionist movements
regarded Storfer as a power-hungry German lackey made a distinctly
bad impression. Another factor influencing the attitude of the Joint
leaders to Storfer was the question of his freedom to determine his own
actions. Could he impose his own scale of priorities? Could he ac-
commodate Joint requests pertaining to emigrant lists? Or was he totally
subjected to the demands made by Eichmann and the Nazis? What su-
pervisory measures could they impose on Storfer to ensure that his
methods were compatible with at least a minimum degree of safety for
his charges? How could one guarantee that he would not use funds en-
trusted to him for personal gain or that he would not subject his pas-
sengers to inflated travel costs?
Dealing with all these problems, with Germany almost completely
cut off from the rest of the world, called for no small measure of mutual
trust and for full agreement on the aims and means of the operation.
Storfer was not as free an agent as he would have wished —or as the
Jewish organizations would have wished. He was completely under Nazi
control. The Nazis were quite capable of suddenly deciding to restrict
Storfer's operations exclusively to Jews from the Reich itself, whereupon
any group leaving the Reich that got stranded (such as the Kladovo
group) would be out of reach of his help.14 The Nazis could also decide to
release certain persons from their concentration camps and deport them
from the Reich within seven days.15 They nurtured constant fears of im-
minent inspections, 'visiting' Storfer's offices unannounced to examine
his correspondence with foreign countries, the Jewish community, and
with individuals. They would confiscate the company's books to compare
their entries with their own sources of information.16 All this must have
made it quite clear to Storfer that his freedom was severely curtailed.
Eichmann and his henchmen also interfered in security matters: when
Aliyah operations were shaken by Italy's entry into the war and doubts168 DaHaOfer
were raised over the freedom of navigation in the Mediterranean, the
Germans announced that none of this was relevant to the issue of emigra-
tion, and that they expected it to proceed regardless.17
All this demonstrates how constrained Storfer was in conducting his
operations because of the Germans' policy with regard to "The Jewish
Question." Were there any spheres in which Storfer did enjoy a free
hand? Lists of emigrant candidates, subject to the overall restriction to
residents of the Reich, were compiled by the Jewish community's Selec-
tion Committee, of which Storfer was a member. The Germans did not
interfere with these lists and the number of camp internees they released
was, quantity-wise, negligible. It seems plausible to assume that personal
pressures and bribes could be employed to secure German intervention
and favor, but there is no evidence of this having happened. From the
Germans' viewpoint, the main object was to organize efficient emigration,
so that the imposed quota of Austrian Jews would indeed depart from the
country, thus achieving a "Judenrein" Austria (the deadline set for ac-
complishing this was at first February 1940, postponed to February 1941,
and again to the end of 1941).18
We have several reports of the Selection Committee's sessions. Storfer
took part in these meetings and could have proposed candidates and
pressed for the inclusion or exclusion of persons on the lists. The evidence
of those emigrants who reached Palestine on board his ships indicates
that some people paid Storder hundreds of dollars which he pocketed.
Given the conditions prevailing in Austria after the war broke out, the
deportation to Lublin, the eviction from apartments, and routine confis-
cation of property, it should come as no surprise that attempts were made
to bribe Storfer or that would-be emigrants thought it was possible to try.
Is it true that Storfer abused his authority for personal gain? We do not
know. We should certainly not rely on the evidence of those who told
their tale after reaching a safe haven. However, neither can we dismiss
the evidence out of hand.
Anyone responsible for emigration from the Reich had to work in
close coordination with the German authorities or accomplish nothing.
The question is not: was Storfer free of German control, but whether he
was able to convey to the Germans that for the emigration effort to
succeed it would have to be conducted with the full support of the Jewish
community. This would have called for subtle maneuvering between
antithetical elements striving for the same aim—the Germans wanted
emigration to proceed apace, but it also depended on action taken by
Jews outside their sphere of influence. The German Jewish community
had to make it clear to the German authorities that the non-Reich Jewish
communities also had to be considered, otherwise no support for emigra-
tion would be forthcoming. The position taken by these non-Reich Jews
depended, among other things, on their faith in the leaders of the GermanRescue of European Jewry and Illegal Immigration Co Palatine 169
Jewish community, and therefore it was in the German interest to foster
such trust There was not much room for maneuver, as we know today,
but the Jews in the Reich were aware of the scenario and managed to
maintain contact with the Joint, the British Zionist movement, and others.
Jewish leaders like Epstein, from Berlin, Edelstein, from Prague, Lowen-
herz, and others, left the Reich for Trieste and Geneva with the Germans'
blessing, to meet Jewish leaders from abroad. Storfer tried to employ the
same tactics.
Storfer also tried to hold his own in other spheres: he did not hesitate
to complain to Eichmann about the German Danube Company, with
which he was ordered to work, when they exploited their monopoly and
raised their prices, created difficulties in arranging schedules, etc.19 He
also managed to get help from the German Foreign Office in extending
the validity of passports and the transfer of funds.20 He trod a wary path
between German policy vis-a-vis the Jewish question and the status of the
Jewish community. Nonetheless, one cannot say that his own status gave
him much advantage over other organizers of emigration. He sought
ships in the same narrow Greek market, he had to bribe foreign councils
to obtain proper registration, and he depended upon outside Jewish as-
sistance for funds.
STORFER'S RELATIONS WITH JEWISH
ORGANIZATIONS OUTSIDE THE REICH
What did the Jewish organization abroad know of all this? What did they
glean from the information they received about the conditions prevailing
in the Reich's Jewish community? The Joint's attitude to Storfer in the
middle of 1940 can illustrate these and associated problems. In December
1939 Storfer suffered a heavy loss when a ship he chartered, the "Astria,"
sank with nine crewmen on the Black Sea during a severe storm. This
ship was to have taken on 600 emigrants waiting in Bratislava.21 Storfer
was faced with a three-pronged problem: first, the funds he had invested
in the "Astria" had been lost, and the insurance settlement would take
time; second, the emigrants left stranded had to be provisioned, and
Storfer did not have the necessary funds to do so; third, the River Danube
froze early that year. Storfer had to postpone this group's departure to
the Spring of. 1940. In the meantine he considered purchasing a larger
vessel, then docked in Greece, to carry some 1,400-1,600 passengers
— adding to the Bratislava group emigrants from Vienna whom the
Germans were anxious to move out22 Implementation of this plan de-
pended on the transfer of $55,000 via the Joint in order to purchase the
vessel.
Lttwenherz met with representatives of the Joint in Geneva and in170 Dalia Ofer
Budapest in January 1940, and obtained their general consent to finance
the project.23 Storfer planned his moves accordingly: he took out an
option to purchase the vessel by the end of March and started recruiting
a captain and crew and planning the details of the voyage down the
Danube to the Black Sea and then to Palestine. He did all this with the
help of Avgerinos, his Greek agent (or partner).** By the end of March
the funds from the Joint had not yet arrived. Storfer feared the entire
project might be cancelled if the money was not forthcoming immediately
and sent a stream of letters calling for help, advising caution, and gen-
erally seeking attention.25 "Funds should be wired . . . situation extremely
delicate and unless caution and resolution are exercised we may lose the
ship . . . what will become of the voyage? Contact Brussels urgently to
find the reason for the delay . . . prices are soaring daily . . . we are
already in an untenable position and it is becoming worse . . . we need
help and support." Storfer's pleas remained unanswered. The money
never arrived. The Joint never sent it. Avgerinos' option lapsed. No
Storfer ship sailed with the Vienna and Bratislava emigrants that April.
What or who stopped the Joint from forwarding the funds? Several
factors combined to support the suspicion, already growing in the minds
of the Joint officials, that Storfer was unreliable and no more than a Nazi
puppet. In January 1940 representatives of the Joint were berated by the
British Foreign Office for supporting illegal immigration. The Foreign
Office had tracked down a cable sent by H. Katzki (a Joint operative in
Europe) to M. Troper, the Joint's European representative, requesting
aid for the "Lowenherz refugees" whose ship had sunk,26 probably re-
ferring to Storfer's Bratislava group destined for the "Astria."
At that time about 3,000 Jewish refugees in Rumania were awaiting
transport to Palestine—comprised of groups that had arrived on the
"Sakariya" and the "Hilda" in January and February of 1940. They had
spent a harsh winter on riverboats and their case had raised a furor in the
international press. The Joint was asked to assist, while the British were
on guard against their planned illegal immigration to Palestine. At the
same time a group of 1,000 persons was caught in the small Yugoslav
port of Kladovo, also on riverboats and in harsh winter conditions. They,
too, received aid from the Joint and were placed under British observa-
tion lest they continue on their way to Palestine illegally. The Joint came
under strong British pressure and had to take notice, especially since
they were receiving reiterations of British concern about spies, this time
from Mossad operatives as well.
While Storfer was busy planning his group's Spring move, the Mossad
was also trying to help its emigrants. Mossad agents sought vessels to
transport groups already prepared for departure and awaiting transporta-
tion. Both Storfer and the Mossad were thinking in terms of a large
vessel, capable of taking on several groups at once. Both concentratedRacue of European Jewry and Illegal Immigration to Palestine 171
their search in the same dwindling Greek shipping market. The Mossad
was also short of funds, a shortage that grew more acute in the winter of
1940. It considered Storfer a harmful and unreliable competitor. Should
he receive Joint funds, they believed, their own chances of obtaining
funds would diminish. The Mossad was warned —on behalf of the British
— by Zionist leadership about the possibility that German spies could be
planted among the emigrants. The Mossad dismissed this contention,
but could give no firm guarantee that spies could not possibly be planted
among the refugees in the absence of strict supervision over the composi-
tion of emigrant lists. The Jewish Agency was ready to help the British in
security checks of illegal immigrants arriving in Palestine. All this the
Mossad communicated quite clearly to the representatives of the Joint,
who did not wish to appear as supporters of illegal actions, or of a so-
called Nazi agent
The Mossad and Weizmann urged the Joint to withold support from
Storfer unless a way was found to exercise control over his operations.
Such control would ensure that the Germans would not be able to use
emigration as cover for espionage activities. How could it be exercised?
Storfer could be obliged to clear his operations through Mossad opera-
tives or representatives of the He-chalutz movement whom they trusted.
The Joint consented, and advised Storfer that he would have to counter-
sign Shmaryahu Tzameret—the Mossad's man in Athens—in order to
release the funds earmarked for him and deposited in an Athens bank.
Tzameret asked to inspect Storfer's lease contracts and travel arrange-
ments before signing the transfer order. Storfer refused.
The Joint had acted in good faith. They were wary about transferring
funds to Storfer and were being subjected to increasing pressure. They
therefore obliged Storfer to clear the transfer through Tzameret whose
task was to ensure that the money would be used for the right purpose.
But Tzameret, as the representative of the Mossad, did not restrict himself
to Joint directives; as a Mossad man he had an account to settle with
Storfer (see below). Storfer, for his part, could not consent to Tzameret's
supervision, and the end result was that the transfer of funds was delayed.
The Joint had become embroiled in a dispute in which it really had no
part (between Storfer and the Mossad) at the cost of postponing the de-
parture of emigrants' ships. This, as the operatives on the spot were fully
aware, could mean cancellation of the voyage.27
STORFER AND THE MOSSAD LE-ALIYAH B E T -
RELATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
Why did the Mossad want Storfer to fail? Would not such failure imply
the failure of Aliyah in a wider sense? The answer to the second question172 Dalia Ofer
is a definite "No"; and its explanation derives from the answer to the
first. Mossad operatives received their information on Storfer from two
sources: one was their own or other Eretz Israel envoys to Germany and
Vienna operating since before the war, who had met with Storfer and
were acquainted with him (for example, Pino Ginsburg, a kibbutz member
in Palestine who emigrated from Germany in January 1934 and went
back as an envoy of the He-chalutz in 1939, and Moshe Agami). The
second source was He-chalutz and Zionist movement leaders who re-
mained in the Reich (Erich Frank, a leader of He-chalutz in Germany;
Georg Israel, a major figure in the Reichsvereinigung; Jacob Edelstein,
from Prague; and others).
P. Ginsburg and M. Agami were familiar with the situation that pre-
vailed before Storfer took sole charge of emigration from the Reich.
They were also familiar with the internal power structure and with the
fact that the division of labor between the Gestapo and the Jewish Emigra-
tion Center was not yet quite clear-cut. Agami, recalling his attempts to
weave his way through the various Nazi authorities, ascribes the success
of illegal immigration to these delicate maneuvers.28
Surprisingly, He-chalutz and community leaders inside the Reich
also failed to correctly assess Storfer's power and status after the war
broke out, and provided the Mossad with misleading information.29
In January 1940 the Reichsvereinigung tried to carry on with illegal
immigration operations started by Ginsburg and the Mossad in the Spring
and Summer of 1939. They hoped to do so with their German contact,
"von Haffner," who had access to the SS and had worked with Ginsburg,
and to implement their "Grand Plan" of emigrating 10,000 German Jews
out of Italian ports.30 If they could collaborate with the Mossad in this
project, they could shake off their dependence on Storfer and on the
Danube-Black Sea route. In this way they could handle the immigration
according to their wishes.
The stand taken by these leaders in Geneva concerning the Mossad
operatives—in January 1940 —maintained that the key to successful
Aliyah was in its actual implementation. The Germans did not care who
carried out emigration as long as it was going on efficiently. In the be-
ginning of 1940, Storfer's status was as if declining—his ship had sunk,
and the scandal surrounding Reich emigrants awaiting transport in
Rumania in harsh winter conditions did nothing to improve his image
(people asked themselves how these emigrants could have been allowed
to leave the Reich when no ships were at hand, and this was Storfer's
responsibility).31 Storfer's (justified) excuse, that these groups had exploited
his absence and left Vienna while he was away in Lublin, did not ease the
tension. German He-chalutz members and leaders of the Reichsvereinigung
believed that if the Mossad had extricated their emigrants, Storfer would
have been in no position to interfere.'2 Jacob Edelstein, who arrived inRescue of European Jewry and Illegal Immigration to Palestine 173
Geneva at that time, held the same belief. He criticized all the leaders of
the Jewish community in Vienna —not only Storfer—believing that their
attitude towards the Germans was too submissive and virtually invited
extreme German measures (such as deportation to Lublin). Edelstein
further believed that taking a firm stand against German policy could
prevent additional extreme steps, that neither Storfer nor Lowenherz
was qualified to cope with the situation, and that neither of them should
be given support He thought Aliyah operations should be carried out
independently and was prepared to turn over the funds still held by the
Prague Palestine office to the Mossad for this purpose. Successful Mossad
activities would also serve to strengthen the weakening position of that
office due to the lack of immigrants.
Given this approach, which reinforced the Mossad's dim view of
Storfer, the opposition of Z. Yehieli, the head of the Mossad in Europe
operating from Geneva to collaboration with Storfer, intensified. Storfer
and Yehieli met in Bucharest in February 1940s3 and Storfer tried to
convince Yehieli that collaboration would be to the Mossad's advantage,
suggesting that he, Storfer, should continue organizing the groups of
emigrants in accordance with German directives but would at the same
time consider the Mossad's interests and requests in selecting candidates
for emigration and giving priority to He-chalutz groups from Germany
and Prague. The Mossad was, however, expected to understand that the
Germans also obliged Storfer to take care of the old and infirm in Vienna
as well as released camp internees. The Mossad, Storfer continued, would
handle the sea voyage part of the operation. Storfer sharply criticized
operations conducted behind his back that had led to scandals and harmed
the emigration cause (e.g., the "Sakariya" and "Kladovo" affairs), as well
as individual efforts such as those of Edelstein in Prague.
Why did Storfer seek collaboration with the Mossad? He himself
gave no explanation, but there is no doubt that he needed the Mossad's
help mainly in order to bolster his status in the Reich's Jewish community
(the Reichsvereinigung, the Palestine office in Prague), and with the Joint,
thereby clearing away some of the obstacles in his fundraising efforts. He
also needed the Mossad's help in everything related to sailing the Medi-
terranean and clandestine landings on Palestinian shores. This would
both improve his own reputation as an Aliyah organizer and promote
emigration operations as approved rescue policy.
But instead of being a working discussion, the meeting between
Yehieli and Storfer turned into a violent argument. Storfer vilified Avriel
and Edelstein —which made Yehieli furious and led him to warn Storfer
against taking measures against He-chalutz groups. Storfer, for his part,
declared that no one could emigrate from the Reich without his consent.
Yehieli was anxious, but refused to divulge Mossad plans or to promise
cooperation.174 DaUa Ofer
What would the Mossad gain from such collaboration, at the end of
February 1940? Given hindsight, and knowing that the Mossad was
shortly to find itself virtually helpless, collaboration with Storfer would
seem to have been a sensible move. But this was not the way things
seemed in February 1940. The Mossad had taken an option on a large
Turkish vessel, the "Watan," and had reached an agreement with Edel-
stein whereby the funds held in Prague would be used to lease it. It was
hoped that some 3,000 passengers from the Protectorate and Kladovo
could board this ship. In a telephone conversation Edelstein confirmed
that the Prague Palestine office had a free hand in this matter. Storfer
was not in a position to interfere should the "Watan" proceed as planned.
Considering all this, Yehieli had no incentive to enter into a dubious
collaboration with Storfer.
But events took a different turn from the one anticipated by Yehieli
and his friends. The option on the "Watan" was not as secure as they had
believed, the transfer of funds from Prague was delayed, and Storfer was
believed to have had a hand in it In the meantime, the Turkish govern-
ment prohibited the transfer of ownership over Turkish vessels to for-
eigners ostensibly because of the war and their own military needs. (This
move may have been instigated by pressures from the British Foreign
Office following the voyage of the "SakariyaJ1 which was also a Turkish
ship.)
The loss of the "Watan" was a severe blow to the Mossad. They con-
ceded that the plan had been ill-conceived from the outset, but were par-
ticularly incensed at Storfer. What role did Storfer's alleged delaying
tactics play in holding up the transfer of funds and the cancellation of the
lease? Had the funds arrived in time and the deal closed, would it have
been possible to effect the transfer of ownership? Storfer's tactics reminded
Yehieli of the meeting in Bucharest and of Storfer's attitudes at that time.
Just how much did Storfer have to do with the cancellation of the "Watan"
scheme? There was no clear cut answer to this question, but suspicion
ensued. The Mossad's opinion of Storfer, as expressed to the Joint during
these very weeks, was naturally tainted by this affair. Thus, the Joint's
stipulation that Tzameret would have to countersign Storfer's expendi-
tures was, in a sense, their answer to his part in the "Watan" affair—and
in kind.
What we have described here is the failure of two Aliyah operations:
one Storfer's and the other the Mossad's. In both cases, tactics and opera-
tional procedures were of the utmost importance. Tactics depended on a
broad set of considerations whose fundamental premise was the need to
promote Aliyah, and that were related to Zionist concepts of Jewish
mutual responsibility. But given the complex situation of the Jews in the
Reich, these considerations failed to appreciate the urgency of the matter
and revealed a certain measure of inflexibility in adjusting to rapidlyRetcue of European Jewry and Illegal Immigration to Palatine 175
changing circumstances. Furthermore, both failures resulted in bitter
grudges and a desire to settle accounts on either side.
Nor were all the misunderstandings and recriminations resolved
several months later, at another meeting between Storfer and Yehieli in
May 1940.34 This time Yehieli's position was weaker than it had been the
preceding February. It was Spring, and the Mossad ship had not yet
sailed. In fact, the prospects for its imminent departure were extremely
slim. Reports from the Reich were becoming more and more alarming,
and the messages to coordinate efforts with Storfer were coming from
Jewish leaders. The American Zionist movement criticized the Mossad
for failing to do its job and wasting funds (the "Watan" affair). The
Zionist leadership was growing increasingly hesitant towards illegal im-
migration, and sometimes even hostile, and opponents to such immigra-
tion drew support from these failures. Insufficient support was, of course,
one of the causes of these failures to begin with. Even so, no collaboration
between Storfer and the Mossad was in sight
The second meeting between Storfer and Yehieli, in May 1940, took
place only a few days after fighting started on the western front. Storfer
outlined his plan to extricate 3,500 Jews from the Reich (on board the
future "Milos," the "Pacific," and the "Atlantic"), requesting aid and col-
laboration, especially in organizing the landing operation. His condition
was the release of funds held in Greece. The passenger list that was of
such great concern to the Mossad had been approved by the Reichs-
vereinigung officials. Yehieli contended that the lists did not include
1,000 Prague halutzim to whom the Mossad had promised passage back in
January of that year, nor did it include the Kladovo group. Storfer
replied that the Prague contingent had refused to work with him and
that they had therefore been replaced with other passengers (namely,
Mandler's Revisionists), while the Kladovo people were not "in his juris-
diction." He did agree, however, that future lists would include the
Prague group and that he would try to help the Kladovo people if he
could. From Yehieli's viewpoint, this amounted to rejection.35
What could have convinced Yehieli to work alongside Storfer? Storfer
sought open Mossad support primarily to bolster his position vis-a-vis
the Joint Could the Mossad gain from extending such support? In May
1940 it seemed not The Mossad preferred not to participate in Aliyah
operations in which the German authorities were directly involved, and
Storfer was left to transport his emigrants without Mossad assistance.
THE FATE OF STORFER'S "THREE SHIPS"
Storfer's "Three Ships" succeeded in reaching the shores of Palestine. In
spite of enormous difficulties and frequent delays, the Reich refugees176 Dalia Ofer
boarded the German Danube Company vessels in August and September
1940, reaching the Rumanian port of Tulcea where the "Milos," "Pacific,"
and "Atlantic" were awaiting them. The "Milos" brought 700 passengers
to Palestine, the "Pacific"-1,000 and the "Atlantic"-1,800. Storfer sent
unreliable reports to the Joint on the condition of these ships and his
preparations: the vessels were described as seaworthy passenger and
cargo ships, but the emigrants found ill-equipped freighters and dis-
organized crews. Tulcea is a small port on the Danube's estuary on the
Black Sea, and the sudden influx of 3,500 refugees had an immediate
effect on its demographic composition. Food, water, fuel, and shipping
material became scarce, leading to the development of a black market in
everything required for the voyage. This, in turn, increased the tension
between the emigrants and their leaders on the one hand, and Storfer
and his agents (his brother Joseph, and his brother-in-law, Goldner) on
the other. The passengers joined in the preparation efforts and the job
was completed in three weeks. The "Milos" and the "Pacific" were better
ships than the "Atlantic" and their complements better regimented. Each
of these two first vessels contained a socially cohesive group of youngsters:
German He-chalutz members on the "Pacific" and Betar members from
the Protectorate on the "Milos." The "Atlantic" —largest but least sea-
worthy of the three ships—was also the most crowded and its complement
lacked a sufficiently large, well-organized cadre of leaders. The "Atlantic"
passengers wanted to move some of their number to a fourth ship that
had arrived in Tulcea in the meantime, the "Rosita," to ease the over-
crowding and tensions, but Storfer refused. The emigrants then tried to
contact the Rumanian authorities, seeking their intervention on the
grounds that they, the Rumanians, bore part of the responsibility for the
refugees' welfare according to international law. Storfer was furious,
rightly fearing that the Rumanians might unexpectedly cancel the voyage.
The "Atlantic" sailed before completing all the necessary preparations,
with insufficient fuel and other provisions.
The sea voyage was not easy. Here, too, the "Atlantic" suffered most.
Storfer did not keep his promise to maintain contact in case problems
should arise; and he failed to provide the promised provisions en route.
Were it not for the aid of the Jewish community in Athens the passengers
would not have been able to continue on their way from the Aegean to
Palestine. The voyage had not been properly organized. Letters written
by emigrants from Tulcea, Varna, and Athens,36 evidence given after
landing in Palestine,37 and the report submitted by the Jewish community
in Athens,38 all bear witness to general negligence. It was only thanks to
the passengers' own resourcefulness, the calm weather, the assistance
rendered by Jewish communities en route, and a great deal of luck that
the voyage was completed safely. The British officer who sailed the
"Atlantic" from Cyprus to Haifa after it was caught confirms the im-
portance of the element of luck in this enterprise.39Rescue of European Jewry and Illegal Immigration to Palatine 177
Nonetheless, all this must be viewed in the proper context All immi-
grant ships were overcrowded, and all their voyages perilous; many of
them suffered from short provisions and bad communications. The tragic
end of these three ships' passengers exceeds the bounds of the present
study, and will therefore be related in brief: the British decided to deport
the refugees to Mauritius. They assembled on board the "Patria" —all the
passengers from the "Pacific," and the "Milos," and a few from the "At-
lantic." The "Patria" was a French cargo vessel also caught by the British.
The Jewish political leaders in Palestine failed in their efforts to have the
deportation order rescinded, whereupon the Haganah decided to disable
the "Patria" so as to prevent it from sailing to Mauritius. The operation
was coordinated with the He-chalutz leaders Erich Frank and Hans
Raubel. But the quantity of explosives required was overestimated; the
vessel was old and rusted through, and started sinking rapidly shortly
after the explosion, drowning 202 souls. It was a disaster. The survivors
received special permission to remain ashore in Palestine, but those of
the "Atlantic" passengers who had not been on the " Patria" were deported
to Mauritius where they remained for the duration of the war.
These three ships were Storfer's last operation. Why? He did have
another ship, the "Rosita," and started planning its voyage in March
1941. The answer must therefore be sought in the change that occurred in
German policy regarding emigration in general, and to Palestine in
particular. This was related to the "Final Solution" and the closer ties
established by the Germans with the Mufti of Jerusalem — Haj Amin
el-Husseini. This issue, too, exceeds the scope of our present discussion.
CONCLUSION
Can we evaluate Storfer's operations both in historical perspective and
by the yardsticks of his time? Looking back, he clearly did rescue 3,500
Jews from the Nazis. The question of how he did it seems rather im-
material nowadays. The crucial point to bear in mind is that Storfer did
not rescue these people by sacrificing any other group of would-be immi-
grants. He is the object of harsh criticism today by people who worked
with him, under similar conditions. Their main criticism lies in his rela-
tions with the Germans and what might be called his "style." To his
critics, Storfer was a weak man, a coward and a sycophant, and his bar-
gaining with the Nazis was a source of both anger and revulsion. But we
must ask ourselves how these critics could discern, in Storfer's mannerisms
and his obstinate stand against the German authorities, either pride in
being Jewish, or an attitude of servility and cowardice? How can one
distinguish between collaboration with the authorities—a necessity—and
attempts at self-serving ingratiation? And at what stage do the dynamics
of working alongside the Germans tend to obscure the unequivocal reali-178 Dalia Ofer
zation that one is dealing with the enemy? Who can determine the "bare
minimum" of cooperation necessary? Did the protagonists at that time
have strict criteria for resolving these dilemma? They did not. Edelstein,
Frank, and Avriel all felt that Storfer had exceeded the bounds, but they
too, could only rely on their personal feelings. The accusations that
Storfer used to set up his lists of emigrants by standards that were not
necessarily Zionistic were not relevant. The claim that he abused his
authority for personal gain was never proven. Storfer's ultimate fate was
the same as that of those Jews who failed to leave the Reich in time. I
therefore believe that his rescue operations had best be evaluated, first,
by what they accomplished, and secondly by his integrity in relation with
other organizations dealing with Aliyah. Yet another way of looking at it
is according to Storfer's own self-determined norms of behavior.
We have described Storfer's achievements and found them consider-
able. What about the other elements—his integrity in relation to other
Aliyah organizations? His attitude towards other Aliyah organizations
was scathing: he never let up on the shortcomings of, and constantly
reviled, other Aliyah operatives—Dr. Confino, the Mossad, and the Re-
visionists—in his reports to the Joint, to the local community, and to the
Nazis. He fiercely attacked anyone else concerned with Aliyah. This was
expressed in his reaction to the "Sakariya" affair or to Dr. Confino's
efforts after the "Iiber-tand" was caught (in the summer of 1940) and the
"Salvador" was sunk (in December 1940). He virtually exulted over the
Mossad's failure with the Kladovo affair. He had harsh words for the
Greek Assistance Committee in Athens that had helped his own ships—
simply because the fact that his vessels had required help at all reflected
badly on his own image. Thus he failed to appreciate that the Greek
committee had performed an act of Jewish solidarity and "love of Israel."
Storfer did not inquire after the fate of groups that had been held up en
route and needed assistance, such as the "Pencho" passengers.40
What were his own norms for judging himself? Storfer never thought
of himself as a leader responsible for the Jewish community's welfare. In
his letters he introduced himself as a businessman, stressing the fact that
he was an honest one. He took great pains to preserve his reputation and
prevent slander against him. The available material does not reveal
whether he drew any satisfaction or comfort from the fact that his diffi-
culties and injured pride were incurred in the course of helping his
fellow man. He asked Lowenherz in hurt pride and astonishment: "How
did I ever get mixed up in this company?"41 —i.e., the company of those
leaders responsible for the fate of the Jewish community.
Storfer started out on his way as a public official in the capacity of a
businessman summoned by Lowenherz to participate in a specific mission,
and he never ceased being a businessman. The task with which he was
entrusted did not increase his stature, and he, for his part, did not growYou can also read
