THREAT ASSESSMENT 2019 - PST
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THREAT ASSESSMENT 2019
PST's THREAT ASSESSMENT 2019 3
The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST)
is Norway’s national domestic intelligence and
The National Security Authority
is the Norwegian expert body on
INTRODUCTION
security service. PST’s main task is to prevent information and object security and
and investigate serious offences related to the national centre of expertise on IT
national security. PST’s annual threat assess- security. The Authority publishes an annual In this annual open threat assessment, we The present threat situation is characterised
ment is an analysis of expected developments assessment on security matters within the present the most likely developments of the by stable and relatively lasting trends and
within PST’s areas of responsibility. scope of application of security legislation. threat picture. We hope the readers of this developments. We know, however, that an
It includes an assessment of the risk that assessment evaluate to which extent its con- unexpected incident or episode could have a
“Threat Assessment 2019” is one of four individuals, critical national functions and tent could have implications on their own significant and often unpredictable influence
threat assessments and risk analyses and is infrastructure, or sensitive and classified infor- activities and business, in view of the values on society. An assessment of the future will
published annually. The other three are pub- mation will be subject to espionage, sabotage, they administer. By this threat assessment, therefore always be uncertain.
lished by the Intelligence Service, the National acts of terrorism or other serious incidents. which has become an essential part of our
Security A uthority and the Directorate for Civil The assessment has a time frame of one year. public communication, we aim at improving
Protection and Emergency Planning. the understanding of the threats we are facing
The Directorate for Civil Protection and at reducing existing vulnerabilities.
The main task of the Intelligence and Emergency Planning maintains
Service is to notify about external an overview of risk and vulnerability factors
threats and supply information and in Norwegian society. The Directorate has
assessments on foreign, security and p ublished scenario analyses since 2011 1.
defence policy matters. The Service publishes The analyses are concerned with the risk of
an annual assessment on conditions in other disasters that could affect Norwegian society
countries that could threaten Norway and to make the emergency preparedness and
Norwegian interests. This year’s assessment, response systems equipped to meet them.
“Focus 2019”, provides an overview of situa- The scenarios include natural disasters, major
tions and security threats in different coun- accidents and deliberate acts. These analyses
tries and regions. The assessment has a time have a longer time frame than the annual
frame of one year and is published in the first assessments of the other three agencies.
quarter of the year.
1 Up to and including 2015, the scenario analyses were called “National risk assessments”. As from 2016, their new
designation is “Crisis scenario (year) – analysis of serious incidents that could affect Norway”. AN UNEXPECTED INCIDENT MAY OCCUR AND HAVE A HUGE IMPACT ON SOCIETY
PST's THREAT ASSESSMENT 2019 5
SUMMARY
consider it possible that extreme Islamists will
STATE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY
try to carry out a terrorist attack in Norway.
READ MORE ON PAGES 6-13
However, the number of new individuals who
The work aimed at recruiting and running become radicalised and join these groups will
secret sources in Norwegian enterprises is a continue to be small.
prioritised task for several foreign intelligence
services. This work will be pursued in 2019. Norwegian right-wing extremists are unlike-
ly to try to carry out a terrorist attack in 2019,
Government-run computer network as they remain focused on radicalisation and
perations represent a persistent threat to
o organisation building. The fact that certain
Norwegian values. Such operations are cheap, anti-immigration and anti-Islamic groups seem
efficient and constantly evolving, and the to increase their presence on the Norwegian
attackers incessantly find new vulnerabilities right-wing extremist scene, will nevertheless
to exploit. represent a particular challenge this year.
In addition to actors within the Norwegian Norwegian left-wing extremists are con-
defence and emergency preparedness s ector, sidered highly unlikely to try to carry out
enterprises within Norwegian politics and terrorist acts in 2019. We do expect, however,
government administration are particularly the s ignificant increase in politically motivated
exposed to collection operations and foreign violence against those they define as oppo-
intelligence services’ and other attempts of nents to continue.
exerting influence.
THREATS AGAINST DIGNITARIES
POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE READ MORE ON PAGES 24-25
READ MORE ON PAGES 14-23
Even if dignitaries are frequently exposed to
Extreme Islamist groups will still represent threats, we expect the threshold for attacking
THE PRESENT THREAT PICTURE IS CHARACTERISED BY STABLE AND RELATIVELY LASTING TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS the most serious terrorist threat in 2019. We dignitaries to remain high.
STATE PST's THREAT ASSESSMENT 2019 7
INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITY
In 2019, foreign intelligence services will try to recruit sources and identify
individuals and enterprises in Norway. They will also try to obtain illegal
access to Norwegian companies’ computer networks. Their aim is to
acquire sensitive information and to influence decisions. The operations
of these services will be aimed at individuals and enterprises within
Norwegian government administration, critical infrastructure, defence
and preparedness and at research and development.
The Russian security and intelligence s ervices The most usual way of getting on the inside
represent the major challenges. However, of a network, is to send malware via targeted
services from other countries, such as C hina, e-mails. These messages are often tailored to
will also carry out intelligence operations the recipient. By appealing to a professional
against targets and activities in Norway. If these or personal interest and being linked to known
operations succeed, they may inflict serious senders, the messages appear legitimate to the
damage on Norway and Norwegian interests. recipient. We have also experienced that threat
actors have broken into computer networks by
making employees or guests introduce malware,
NETWORK OPERATIONS
deliberately or not, for instance via memory
Government-run network operations2 repre- sticks. Threat actors also use servers connected
sent a persistent threat to Norwegian values. to Internet as a gate of entry. These are exposed
The methods are cheap, efficient and con- to exploitation. Threat actors have for instance
stantly evolving, and the attackers incessantly on several occasions gained access to a network
find new vulnerabilities to exploit. via the systems in use to publish information on
the company’s web page.
2 By network operation, we understand a process whereby a threat actor tries to get illegal access to the computer network
of a specific company. Network operations may have different purposes, such as collection of intelligence, preparations of
possible sabotage or manipulation of data. By network attack, we understand a process whereby a threat actor tries to get
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WILL CARRY OUT OPERATIONS AGAINST NORWEGIAN TARGETS ALSO IN 2019 illegal access to the computer network of a specific company, for the purpose of sabotaging or manipulating data.
8 STATE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY PST's THREAT ASSESSMENT 2019 9
In many cases, quite simple measures such also have to take into account that they will be contact the person they want to recruit. Then Norwegian citizens living in countries with an
as regular change of passwords, two-factor targeted by advanced network operations in they gradually try to establish a professional authoritarian form of government may also in
authentication and updated software would be 2019. and friendly relation and identify the poten- 2019 be attempted lured or pressured by the
sufficient to prevent attempts of penetration. tial source’s access and which network he/- intelligence services of these countries into
It is also important for all companies to have a she is part of. In the longer term they want to carrying out tasks for them. This also applies to
good overview of which servers that are end- establish a dependent rela- foreign citizens who have a
RECRUITMENT OF INDIVIDUALS
points towards Internet, to make sure they are tionship where the source legal residence and work
updated and to log the activity in the network Certain foreign intelligence services aim is rewarded or feels pres- permit in Norway. The in-
well enough to detect irregularities. at recruiting and running secret sources in sured or obliged to carry telligence services often
Norway. This work will be pursued in 2019. out assignments for the act far more directly and
Quite a few of the attempts of penetrating Individuals with both direct and indirect access intelligence officer. threatening when trying
Norwegian networks are made to reconnoitre to sensitive information will be subject to such to recruit citizens of their
and identify vulnerabilities and to collect infor- recruitment attempts. This means that intelli- In addition to making con- own country than when at-
mation. We also see sophisticated operations gence officers operating in Norway contact tact at open events, we also tempting to recruit Norwe-
against enterprises that are not actual targets individuals who do not have access to the expect to see intelligence gian citizens. Some of the
but merely act as bridgeheads for further access information the officers are looking for, but services approaching services have for instance
to other targets. who are part of a network of relevant indi- potential sources through threatened their own citi-
viduals. We also see that they contact young social media. For an intelli- zens both directly and in-
Enterprises within Norwegian government people whom they assume will gain influence gence officer, under cover directly with repercussions
administration, critical infrastructure, Norwegian and access to information in the future. of another position, it is a on their relatives at home,
trade and industry, and Norwegian technolo- normal procedure to make if they refuse to cooperate.
MAKING CONTACT AND ESTABLIS
gy companies are exposed intelligence targets Foreign states use considerable resources contact and establish a HING RELATIONS ON SOCIAL MEDIA
and have to protect their data and have a good on this type of cultivation. The intelligence relation via a professional IS AN EFFICIENT METHOD FOR
COLLECTING INFORMATION INFLUENCE
overview of their own network structure. This operations are methodical and the cultivation online forum. The relation
especially applies to the Ministry of Defence and of potential sources can go on for many years. ship will develop over time. Many public and private
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their partners The target may be invited to meetings and actors in Norway make decisions that have
within foreign aid and research. Within other Various kinds of open seminars and confe seminars and be asked to prepare written re- consequences for the interests of other coun-
areas of the research sector, defence and space rences on politics and trade and industry are ports, articles or chronicles against payment. tries. Several of the services operating in Norway
technology enterprises, maritime technology, important arenas used to identify and sub- The cooperation will, however, be monitored are tasked to influence such decisions, and this
renewable energy and medical research are sequently make contact with potential sour by the foreign intelligence service, either to is likely to continue in 2019.
particularly exposed to attempts of penetration. ces. Under cover of working at an embassy or influence Norwegian opinions and decisions
Actors within the petroleum and energy sector trade institution, the intelligence personnel or to get access to sensitive information.
10 STATE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY PST's THREAT ASSESSMENT 2019 11
In certain Western countries, foreign intelli- Within these fields, political assessments will e-mail addresses, user pro- see that the services use
gence services have worked systematically be more exposed to other countries’ influence files on social media and civilians with no apparent
and in a long term perspective to weaken the operations. Norwegian policy in the High their role and function in affiliation with the country
inhabitants’ confidence in their own demo- North is one example. Here we have con- these companies. the service represents, for
cratic institutions and processes. Intelligence flicting interests with certain countries that certain identification pur-
services have been involved in spreading could influence the intelligence threat aimed Moreover, foreign intelli- poses.
disinformation, initiating smearing campaigns at Norway and Norwegian interests. This is gence services will con-
via social media, and in spreading rumours or also true for Norwegian authorities’ handling tinue their identification Several authoritarian
half-truths. This activity can also be aimed of questions of adherence to various sanction operations to reveal func- regimes use their intelli-
at concrete enterprises or individuals, to regimes, and the debate on our relation to tions and vulnerabilities gence services to identify
influence the outcome of individual cases. other countries and our potential criticism of within Norwegian criti- and conduct surveillance
these countries. cal infrastructure, crisis of refugees and dissidents
It is often difficult to prove who is responsible management and security staying in Norway. In most
for information operations, or even to prove and preparedness. Some cases, the surveillance is
IDENTIFICATION AND SURVEILLANCE
that there is or has been an information ope intelligence services seem a passive registration of
ration at all. So far, we have not seen any clear Foreign intelligence services will carry out to have a continuous need the activity of p olitical
FOREIGN STATES MAY TRY TO
indications of covert information operations perations to identify Norwegian targets
o for updated information INFLUENCE THE PUBLIC AND o
pponents. Some will
in or against Norway. We should, nevertheless, also in 2019. Such identification serves dif- about military installations, THE POLITICAL DISCUSSION OF nevertheless experience
be prepared that foreign states may try to ferent purposes. It could be aimed at indi- material, departments and INDIVIDUAL CASES IN NORWAY that the domestic regime
influence the general public and the political viduals to prepare for subsequent cultivation infrastructure. threatens either them or
agenda in individual cases and possible recruitment. their family in the home country, if they do
”
even in Norway. Identification of individuals Much of the identification of defence and emer- not cease their political activity.
could also be made to pre- gency preparedness t argets in Norway will be
Within most political pare for computer network carried out by use of technical surveillance. At When foreign intelligence services identify
areas we have the same Within most political operations. Many of the the same time, the services will still use intel- regime opponents in Norway, they often use
interests and objectives as areas, Norway has the network attacks t argeting ligence personnel to observe and document agents to infiltrate the diaspora. Others recruit
many other countries. This same interests and Norwegian companies circumstances in and near military installations sources among the opponents of the regime.
makes us less vulnerable objectives as many are carried out to reveal etc. The intelligence personnel will carry out Intelligence services that a ctively approach
to external influence. In other countries. This the infrastructure and such assignments u nder cover of various po- refugee milieus in Norway, will also try to es-
some areas, however, cer- makes us less vulnerable vulnerabilities of the net- sitions, but are mostly able to travel freely in tablish contact with individuals working in the
tain countries do not share to external influence works. These operations Norway, without having to provide any other immigration administration to get access to
our views and priorities. also include the employees’ explanation than that they are tourists. We also relevant registers and databases.
12 STATE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY PST's THREAT ASSESSMENT 2019 13
influence Norwegian society, trade and industry Actors from several foreign countries will present
ECONOMIC MEASURES ILLEGAL PROCUREMENT
and political decisions. Such use of power can a challenge in 2019. This applies especially to
Norway has a small and open economy and have many effects. Norwegian bureaucrats and In Norway we have goods, technology and states with an active missile and nuclear weapon
much of the business activity is influenced by politicians, centrally or locally, could restrain knowledge that other states can use in their programme. We also see that the present
foreign conditions and actors. Foreign actors their own decisions and statements for fear production of weapons of mass destruction. technological development creates grey zones
invest in Norwegian enterprises, enter into of negative consequences for cooperation The export regulations are destined to prevent between what is and what is not subject to
financing or licensing agreements or long-term agreements and for the trade and industry. Norwegian suppliers from being subjected to licence under the export control regulations.
agreements about production and cooperation. Social commentators or researchers could illegal procurements. However, there have been Several newly developed goods can be used to
Such foreign engagement is usually both wanted also feel compelled to reduce their criticism many attempts to violate or circumvent these produce weapons, in addition to the purpose for
and legal in Norway. It is also unproblematic in a following direct or indirect threats to withdraw regulations, and new attempts will be made this which they were originally produced. This applies
security perspective, as long as the enterprises the financing of certain projects. year. Technology which can be used to develop especially to industrial goods with very advanced
solely intend to conduct business. and produce missiles will be particularly exposed. specifications.
In other cases, the purpose is not necessarily Norwegian civilian suppliers and research
At the same time, experience from other to exert influence, but to obtain a position that milieus working with underwater technology, We consider countries we are concerned
Western countries shows that certain states enables collection of sensitive information. By composite material, steering about in terms of possible
also use economic measures for other purposes purchasing shares in certain Norwegian en- technology and advanced development of weapons
than business. Several states use investments terprises, foreign actors could get insight into testing and measuring of mass destruction, to be
and purchases as a means to influence political decision processes, preparedness plans or equipment, should be likely to place students and
decisions, collect sensitive information and get critical infrastructure. Foreign actors may also particularly vigilant. researchers in Norwegian
access to technology or natural resources of want to purchase strategically placed properties, educational institutions in
strategic significance. We have registered such which can be used for covert intelligence activi- Actors involved in illegal pro- 2019. Furthermore, these
use of economic measures in Norway in the past ty against Norwegian and allied military activity. curement use a long range countries may try to recruit
and expect it to occur also in 2019. of intermediaries in several individuals who are already
Economic measures can also be efficient when countries to conceal them- connected to institutions
To identify and counter unwanted activity, it the aim is to get access to sensitive informa- selves from the suppliers. that have the knowledge
is essential to see a country’s total economic tion or technology, which has been difficult for Certain actors use very com- they need. These individuals
engagement in Norway over time. Every a state to acquire by means of regular intelli- plicated company structures could either freely accept to
single investment, purchase or financing of gence operations. Companies that develop high and supplier chains and send become recruited or they,
research and development projects is often technology for use in weapon programmes or in the goods via unusual routes. their family or friends could
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES USE
unproblematic in itself. However, the overall other industries of strategic importance are par- This makes the work of iden- be pressured or threatened
THEIR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
scale of it could make states with which we have ticularly exposed, and we expect foreign actors tifying and revealing this ac- TO IDENTIFY REFUGEES LIVING into becoming recruited.
no security policy cooperation, gain power to to make attempts to purchase such companies. tivity extremely challenging. IN NORWAY
POLITICALLY PST's THREAT ASSESSMENT 2019 15
MOTIVATED
VIOLENCE
Extreme Islamist groups will still represent the most serious terrorist threat
in 2019. We consider it possible that extreme Islamists will try to carry out
a terrorist attack in Norway. However, the number of new individuals who
become radicalised and join these groups will continue to be small.
EXTREME ISLAMISM ISIL’S ABILITY TO INSPIRE HAS WEAKENED
The deterioration of the Islamic state (ISIL) ISIL’s power of influence on sympathisers
has resulted in reduced radicalisation3 activity in Europe in 2019 is likely to be strongly
and support of extreme Islamism in Norway. reduced compared to 2014-2017. One reason
Nevertheless, certain extreme Islamists will is ISIL’s loss of territories in Syria and Iraq.
regard Norway as a legitimate target for ISIL’s «caliphate», now dissolved, had a
terrorist acts. We therefore consider it pos- strong symbolic power and was decisive for
sible that extreme Islamists will try to carry the appeal of the terrorist organisation. In
out a terrorist attack, and this is assessed to 2018, there was a significant reduction in the
represent the most serious terrorist threat to number of ISIL-inspired terrorist attacks in
Norway this year. Europe compared to the precedent year.
Extreme Islamism is strongly influenced by ISIL’s military defeat will still weaken the
international incidents, and radicalisation and terrorist organisation’s ability to produce
potential attack planning could increase as a propaganda aimed at radicalising and insti-
result of incidents inside or outside of Norway. gating terrorist attacks. Existing propaganda
will however still be available, especially via
3 By radicalisation, we understand «a process whereby an individual gradually accepts or develops a will to actively
THOSE WHO BECOME RADICALISED ARE OFTEN DEPRIVED AND VULNERABLE YOUNG MEN support or take part in violent acts as a means of achieving political, religious or ideological aims».
16 POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE PST's THREAT ASSESSMENT 2019 17
ncrypted channels on Internet. The pro
e enemy image, but this year the organisation There are also extreme Islamists in Norway Uniformed police and military personnel will
paganda was most effective combined with is likely to prioritise attacks in areas where it who support terrorist organisations abroad be regarded as legitimate targets also in 2019.
ISIL’s progress in Syria and Iraq, but is expec is already present. and have a more national or regional focus. Possible attackers will probably intend to kill
ted to remain a factor which could influence They are generally not very concerned about themselves in the terrorist attack.
radicalisation and potential terrorist planning. Norway and Norwegian conditions. Some of
THE TERRORIST THREAT POSED BY
them have the capacity to use violence and can The most relevant means of attack for extreme
EXTREME ISLAMISTS IN NORWAY PERSISTS
Despite ISIL’s weakened ability to inspire, thus pose a terrorist threat to foreign interests, Islamists trying to commit a terrorist act would
certain European countries still experience Norway is included in the enemy image first and foremost in countries outside Norway. be vehicles, pointed weapons, improvised
a considerable terrorist threat and a certain of both ISIL and AQ. There are however explosive devices (IEDs) or firearms. Com-
increase in the number several other European There are around 30 Norway-related foreign binations of these means of attack may also
”
of radicalised individuals. countries that have a more fighters left in Syria. Several of them have occur. Use of chemical or biological means in
This particularly applies prominent position in this probably been killed, and very few are expec an attempted attack in Norway is considered
to countries which have a image. Norway is thus not ted to return to Norway this year. The primary less likely than attacks by use of other means.
history of large extreme Very few Norwegian expected to be a prioritised threat these individuals represent is their po-
Islamist milieus, where old Muslims are extreme target in the terrorist tential to encourage sympathisers in Norway
LOW SUPPORT OF EXTREME ISLAMISM
milieus and networks are Islamists, and the organisation’s propaganda to carry out terrorist attacks in our country.
IN NORWAY
still active. In 2019, many number of new or in potential plans for an
foreign fighters and other radicalised individuals attack commissioned by Despite a distinct decrease in the number of Very few Norwegian Muslims are extreme
terrorist convicts will be is expected to remain ISIL. extreme Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe in Islamists, and the number of new individuals
released from prison in small in 2019 2018 compared to 2017, the way in which the who become radicalised is expected to
Europe. Several of them Nevertheless, most ex- attacks were carried out or were planned to remain low in 2019. An important reason is
have operational experi- treme Islamists in N orway be carried out, has not changed much. If ex- the absence of a mobilising cause, and the
ence from conflict areas, sympathise with the treme Islamists should carry out a terrorist act fact that there are few active radicalisers
and many will still be radicalised. They are thus ideology of ISIL and AQ. They define all who in Norway, it is unlikely to deviate much from in Norway at present. Those who become
expected to have a negative impact on the deviate politically, ideologically or r eligiously the type of attacks we see elsewhere in Europe. radicalised are first and foremost deprived
threat picture in Europe in the coming years. from their interpretation of Islam as infidels and vulnerable young men.
and enemies. Some are filled with a strong A potential attempt of an extreme Islamist
Al-Qaida (AQ) still works towards the long- h atred towards Norwegian society and terrorist attack in Norway will most likely be The milieus are small and will probably remain
term objective of establishing an Islamist perceive N orway as a legitimate target for a made by one or two individuals. Places with badly organised and not very visible. We
caliphate and uniting the global militant terrorist attack. It will therefore be a prioritised few or no security measures and where many therefore expect few demonstrations, gathe
jihad movement. The terrorist organisation task for PST to uncover the activity of extreme civilians gather, are most exposed. The aim rings or other types of activism from extreme
continues to include Western countries in its Islamists preparing terrorist acts in Norway. will be to kill and injure as many as possible. Islamists in the public sphere in 2019. The lack
18 POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE PST's THREAT ASSESSMENT 2019 19
of well organised milieus Their intention is to send Western immigration and Islam, but also Jews
RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM
has a positive impact on the collected money both and the LGBTs4, represent an existential threat
the threat situation, be- to Norway-related foreign Norwegian right-wing extremists are unlikely to Norwegian society. Various conspiracy
cause such milieus in the fighters and to transna- to try to carry out any terrorist attack in theories form the basis of this enemy image.
past have turned out to be tional terrorist organisa- 2019. Even if extensive spreading of anti-
important driving forces tions. immigration and anti-Islamic propaganda on The right-wing extremist attitudes are
for radicalisation, recruit- Internet continues, the threshold for carrying expressed by a combination of hateful
ment and development of Few, if any, are expected to out terrorist acts will be high. Right-wing statements, threats and instigation to violence.
a will to carry out terrorist join transnational terrorist extremism in Norway is primarily characterised A lot of propaganda that could contribute to
acts. organisations as foreign by radicalisation and new recruitments and to
”
fighters this year. The last organisation building. strengthen existing views is
There will still be certain time PST registered an produced and distributed
radicalisers who operate attempt of joining ISIL was The extent of radicalisation on the Internet.
FOREIGN RADICALISERS ARE
independently, without EXPECTED TO CONTRIBUTE TO in autumn 2017. and the likelihood of right- In Europe 2017-2018,
any affiliation to an orga RADICALISING CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS wing extremist violence eight right-wing Several right-wing extre
nised milieu. They will visit IN NORWAY THIS YEAR The radicalisation activity and terrorist acts could, terrorist attacks were mists in and around anti-im-
and take advantage of a is stable and the likelihood however, increase as a carried out and eleven migration and anti-Islamic
number of arenas, including religious meeting of someone planning an extreme Islamist result of spontaneous and were prevented milieus as well as neo-Nazi
places, asylum centres, prisons and Internet, terrorist attack has remained unchanged unpredictable incidents in milieus in Norway, have
to radicalise individuals into extreme Islamism. this last year. The terrorist threat could Norway. the capacity to carry out
nevertheless increase. However, this terrorist acts. In the present
Foreign radicalisers are expected to contribute presupposes main issues with sufficient situation they are, howev-
A LASTING HATRED
to radicalising certain individuals in Norway also strength to mobilise the milieu. Such issues er, unlikely to develop any
TOWARDS NORWEGIAN AUTHORITIES
this year. This can be done in different ways. could start with international conflicts intention of committing terrorist acts in 2019.
AND MINORITY GROUPS
Firstly, there are radicalisers abroad who preach or incidents perceived as insults of Islam. This is among other things due to low immigra-
extreme messages and offer instruction via In- Moreover, the radicalisers must have the Norwegian authorities have a key position in tion to Norway and a relatively open political
ternet. Secondly, some foreign preachers will be ability to utilize single incidents and cases to the enemy image of the right-wing extremists. debate about challenges in relation to immigra-
invited to events in Norway to preach Islamist mobilise the milieu. For those who become They accuse the authorities of letting various tion. Known right-wing extremists are mainly
ideology containing certain extreme views. radicalised, a combination of the above factors minority groups destroy Norwegian way of life expected to be involved in radicalisation and
and their personal situation and motivation is and culture. They believe that especially non- organisation building.
Some extreme Islamists in Norway are likely usually what makes them become extremists.
to organise fundraising campaigns this year. 4 A lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender person20 POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE PST's THREAT ASSESSMENT 2019 21
In 2017-2018, there were eight completed and in Norwegian media these last years. Their a higher potential than the be individuals who in many
eleven prevented right-wing terrorist attacks in long term objective is to do away with de- neo-Nazi milieu to organise respects are living on the
Europe. Most of them were aimed at Muslims, mocracy and establish a Nordic neo-Nazi the non- organised right- edge of society. Those who
non-Western immigrants and politicians. The state. This objective has very little support in wing extremists in Norway. become radicalised are of-
perpetrators behind many of the attacks were Norwegian society. NRM is therefore not ex- ten men with little educa-
partly motivated by a desire pected to grow in 2019. Internet will continue to tion, a loose affiliation with
”
to take vengeance for extreme The organisation will be be the main arena for working life and a criminal
Islamist terrorism. able to recruit a few in- and source of spreading background. Many of them
dividuals through their right-wing extremist have experienced difficul-
A potential right-wing extre NRM’s aim of abolish- activities, but some are propaganda. Certain web ties in adjusting and many
mist terrorist attack in N
orway ing democracy and also believed to with- pages reach out to several are struggling with mental
will most likely be aimed at establishing a new neo- draw from the milieu in thousand individuals, who problems. Drug abuse is
symbolic targets, such as Nazi state receives little the course of this year. are exposed to a right-wing also widespread among
meeting places for Muslims support from Norwegian extremist conspiratorial right-wing extremists in
and immigrants, or at political society. NRM is thus not Right-wing extremism ideology, glorification Norway. Both younger and
parties or politicians. The most expected to grow this year in Norway also con- of violence and hateful older individuals become
relevant means of attack for sists of a few smaller statements. Such content radicalised. The average
right-wing extremist terrorism neo-Nazi milieus and can often be found among age of right-wing extre
are IEDs, firearms and pointed milieus that are hostile regular news, humorous mists in Norway is higher
weapons. The purpose of a potential attack to immigration and Islam. These milieus are postings and other than for extreme Islamists.
would be to cause fear and spread a political characterised by a weak organisation and uncontroversial content.
message, not necessarily to kill and injure as little cooperation. Their activity mainly takes A number of circumstances
RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IS LARGELY
many as possible. The perpetrators will most place on open and closed websites. NRM’s activity and poten- CHARACTERISED BY UNEMPLOYED could potentially increase
likely not have any intention of killing them- tial new anti-immigration YOUNG MEN WITH LITTLE EDUCA- the scale of radicalisation
selves in the attack. Certain anti-immigration and anti-Islamic and anti-Islamic initiatives TION AND A CRIMINAL BACKGROUND and the likelihood of
milieus are, however, expected to take the will also include radicalisa- right-wing extremist acts
initiative to become better organised in 2019. tion activity at closed events, demonstrations in of violence or terrorism. One trigger factor
BREEDING GROUND FOR GROWTH
Right-wing extremist organisations in Europe, the p ublic sphere and spreading of leaflets with could for instance be terrorist acts and other
WITHIN ANTI-IMMIGRATION AND ANTI-
which have grown these last years, could thus an underlying right-wing extremist message. particularly violent crimes carried out by
ISLAMIC MILIEUS
provide a source of inspiration. Having full fo- individuals with a non-Western background.
The Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) is cus on the alleged threat posed by immigration Most of those who become radicalised into A considerable growth in the number of
the most exposed right-wing extremist milieu and Islam, these milieus are assessed to have right-wing extremism in 2019 are expected to refugees and asylum applicants arriving in22 POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE PST's THREAT ASSESSMENT 2019 23
Norway could also have an impact on the and organisations they define as right-wing
threat posed by right-wing extremists. We xtremist. Left-wing extremists are likely
e
also expect that increased resistance and to continue to identify, harass and commit
use of violence from left-wing extremists violent acts against right-wing extremists this
could increase the will of certain right-wing year. Other issues that preoccupy left-wing
extremists to use violence in 2019. extremists are anti-c apitalism, resistance
towards NATO, the Palestine conflict and the
asylum and immigration policy. Controversial
LEFT-WING EXTREMISM
incidents linked to these cases could lead to
MORE ACTIVE AND VIOLENT LEFT-WING demonstrations that may take a violent turn.
EXTREMIST GROUPS
Norwegian left-wing extremists are considered Norwegian left-wing extremists are in contact
highly unlikely to try to carry out any terroristwith their counterparts in other European
acts in 2019. There are still few left-wing countries. This will represent a challenge in
extremist groups in Norway. 2019. This contact makes
There has, however, been an Nor wegian lef t-wing
increased recruitment to extremists get affiliated
some of these groups this with milieus that have a
last year. The groups have far lower threshold for
also become more active using violence against
and violent, causing a their opponents than we
significant increase in their have seen in Norwegian
execution of politically milieus these last years.
motivated violence aimed The contact with left-
at opponents. These trends wing extremists in other
are expected to continue Euro p e a n co untries
in 2019. could also serve as a
source of inspiration for
The most unifying issue use of violence against
LEFT-WING EXTREMISTS WILL
that mobilise left-wing opponents in Norway.
CONTINUE TO HARASS RIGHT-WING
extremists is their op-
EXTREMISTS AND TRY TO COMMIT VEHICLES, POINTED WEAPONS, IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AND FIREARMS ARE THE MOST RELEVANT
position to individuals ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THEM MEANS OF ATTACK IN ATTEMPTS TO COMMIT EXTREME ISLAMIST TERRORISMTHREATS PST's THREAT ASSESSMENT 2019 25
AGAINST
DIGNITARIES
Even if dignitaries are frequently exposed to threats, we expect the
threshold for attacking dignitaries to remain high. Such activity could
nevertheless have a negative impact on the political work. Investigations
reveal that several dignitaries have refrained from expressing controversial
points of view for fear of being exposed to threats.
carrying out attacks against
UNCHANGED THREAT
dignitaries is still expected
PICTURE
to remain high. Such acti
Also in 2019, individuals vity could nevertheless
expressing themselves have a negative impact on
on social media will make the political work.
threats, hateful statements
and instigate the use of Investigations reveal that
violence against dignitaries. several dignitaries have
Such statements are refrained from expressing
often made by frustrated controversial points of view
individuals who are in a for fear of being exposed
difficult life situation, but to threats. Some have
threats can also be made also considered quitting
on the basis of ideological, politics. This demonstrates
political or religious that the threat activity is
motives. Such statements not only detrimental to the
are often punishable. dignitary in question, but
also represents a threat to
THREATS CAN BE MADE ON THE
Even if threats are frequent- BASIS OF IDEOLOGICAL, POLITICAL vital parts of Norwegian
THREAT ACTIVITY AFFECTS THE INDIVIDUAL BUT ALSO THE DEMOCRACY AS SUCH ly made, the threshold for OR RELIGIOUS VIEWS democracy.PST’S CATEGORISATION OF
AND ARCHIVAL FOOTAGE FROM PST (S.24 OG 25)
DESIGN: CRETALUX AS. PHOTO: GEIR ANDERS RYBAKKEN ØRSLIEN
PROBABILITY LEVELS
In our assessment of politically motivated reduce as much as possible any lack of clarity
violence and threats against dignitaries we and the risk of misunderstandings.
have devised a set of standardised terms to The following terms and definitions have
indicate estimated probability. The aim is to been developed in a cooperation between the
achieve a more uniform description of the police, PST and the Norwegian Intelligence
probability level in each case and thereby Service.
VERY LIKELY
There is very good reason to believe
LIKELY
There is reason to believe
POSSIBLE
About as likely as not
UNLIKELY
There is little reason to believe
VERY UNLIKELY
There is very little reason to believe
A NATIONAL STANDARD FOR PROBABILITY LEVELS REDUCES THE LACK OF CLARITY AND RISK OF MISUNDERSTANDINGTHE NORWEGIAN POLICE SECURITY SERVICE
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