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JACK D. GORDON INSTITUTE
FOR PUBLIC POLICY
PICTURE FOR COVER
CAN BE DROPPED
INTO THE SHAPE
HERE
TUSSLE FOR
THE AMAZON
NEW FRONTIERS IN BRAZIL’S
ORGANIZED CRIME LANDSCAPE
AUTHOR
RYAN C. BERG
1
OCTOBER 2021
The Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy, part of FIU’s Steven J. Green
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1
The Tussle for the Amazon: New Frontiers in Brazil’s Organized Crime Landscape
TABLE OF CONTENTS
3 Executive Summary
4 Introduction
5 Brazilian Organized Crime Groups
- Primero Comando da Capital (PCC)
- Comando Vermelho (CV)
- Familia do Norte (FDN)
7 Criminal Expansion
- The Amazon is the New Frontier
10 The Tussle for the Amazon
- The lucrative Solimões route to the Atlantic
- Access to the triple border with Colombia and Peru: The largest coca
producers in the world
- The “Rota Caipira” of the south is increasingly consolidated and dominated
by the PCC
- Ungoverned spaces abound in the Amazon
- Market diversification: From drugs to illegal mining, deforestation, and
wildlife trafficking
15 Policy Recommendations
17 Endnotes
23 About the Author
2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1) The lucrative Solimões route to the Atlan-
tic
Brazil is witnessing a “tussle for the Amazon”—a The Solimões network of rivers provides
new and deadly phase in the history of its drug traffickers with an easy and poorly
organized crime groups and their operations. policed transport system between neigh-
While the country is no stranger to violent boring countries as well as an outlet for
criminal organizations, recent years have seen cross-continental distribution via the Atlan-
groups building increasingly sophisticated tic Ocean.
networks, both within and beyond Brazil’s
borders. In the strategic state of Amazonas, 2) Access to the triple border with Colombia
these developments have sparked a power and Peru: The largest coca producers in
struggle between several of the country’s largest the world
criminal organizations that has concerning
implications for the stability of Brazil as a whole. While Brazil produces neither cocaine nor
its precursors, Brazilian criminal organiza-
Three major groups currently vie for power. The tions are intimately involved in the move-
most known is the First Capital Command (Pri- ment of illicit narcotics, making access to
meiro Comando da Capital or PCC), which has coca suppliers essential.
experienced rapid growth and claims an esti-
mated 30,000 members nationwide. The PCC’s 3) The “Rota Caipira” of the south is in-
rise has provoked anxiety among the leadership creasingly consolidated and dominated
of the second most important player, Brazil’s by the PCC
Red Command (Comando Vermelho or CV). One From the PCC’s fortified home base in São
of Brazil’s oldest and most entrenched criminal Paulo, it has developed transnational aspi-
organizations, the CV has waged war on the PCC rations. As part of this strategy, the group
throughout the country, contributing to several has increased its cross-border presence in
notable upticks in homicide rates. A third group, Bolivia and Paraguay, where it has embed-
the Northern Family (Família Do Norte or FDN), ded itself in the supply chains of various il-
has asserted itself in its traditional sphere of in- licit economies and recruited new members
fluence, i.e., controlling illicit activity in Amazo- within foreign prison systems. This has led
nas state as an ally of the CV. With its erstwhile competing groups to look for similar traf-
alliance in tatters, the FDN is squeezed between ficking routes to dominate.
the CV and the PCC as they battle for control
of Amazonas state. The contest between rising 4) Ungoverned spaces abound in the Ama-
and established criminal organizations—and zon
the many local proxy groups they spawn—lies
at the root of the transformation of Brazil’s or- The physical features of the Amazon region,
ganized crime landscape. coupled with Brazil’s current capabilities,
frustrate any state efforts to assert control.
While this shift has been localized in Amazo- Thus, in several locations, criminal groups
nas state, its effects have not been confined compete to supplant the state as a guaran-
to that particular geographic area. Facing in- tor of security and governance.
tense pressure to grow and compete, Brazilian
criminal groups have expanded their operations 5) Market diversification: From drugs to il-
throughout Latin America and beyond, espe- legal mining, deforestation, and wildlife
cially in Lusophone Africa and Western Europe, trafficking
where lucrative drug markets help fund the The abundance of natural resources in
groups’ competition back home. the Amazon region affords criminal groups
Five main attributes contribute to the Amazon’s valuable and diverse new sources of reve-
strategic importance for criminal groups in Bra- nue, incentivizing Brazil’s criminal organiza-
zil, and all five also relate to the aforementioned tions to fight for the ability to monopolize
“internationalization” of Brazilian organized these illicit markets.
crime groups.
3The Tussle for the Amazon: New Frontiers in Brazil’s Organized Crime Landscape
The “tussle for the Amazon” is more than a mere In May 2018, an agreement with the FDN’s
clash between Brazil’s transnational organized erstwhile ally, the CV, broke down, and in July
crime groups. It is a threat to regional stabil- 2019, the FDN suffered further fractures with
ity and imperils neighboring Latin American an offshoot group and a chain of grisly pris-
countries. Appreciating the Amazon region’s on massacres. In the vacuum left by the FDN’s
current role in the dynamics of Brazil’s criminal rapid retreat, Brazil’s main criminal organiza-
underworld is the first step toward deliberate, tions have been fiercely contesting control of
informed action by the United States and Brazil Amazonas state in a “tussle for the Amazon.”
against a shifting criminal environment. While Brazil’s criminal organizations have long
operated in that region, the current moment of
expansion is unique owing to the intensity of
INTRODUCTION the conflict and shifting criminal dynamics be-
tween groups across Brazil.
The growth and internationalization of Brazil’s Amazonas state is an attractive territory for
organized crime groups are among the most Brazil’s criminal organizations because its
important developments in Latin America’s se- unique characteristics lend themselves to
curity and governance challenges of the past criminal expansion and access to important
decade. The emergence and dominance of segments of the illicit market. The region’s
Brazilian groups that operate well beyond the remoteness, combined with a lack of robust
country’s borders present a major cause for state institutions, presents an attractive milieu
concern in the region. This paper examines for criminal activity. Further, the geography
tectonic shifts in Brazil’s criminal underworld of Amazonas state offers a major advantage.
starting in 2016. That year represents a water- A sizeable network of unguarded rivers and
shed moment in Brazil’s criminal landscape be- tributaries in the Amazon River Basin provides
cause it saw the breakdown of a nearly 20-year, unfettered opportunities to transport cocaine
nationwide truce between the warring criminal produced in Colombia and Peru—the two larg-
factions First Capital Command (Primeiro Co- est coca producers in the world—to ports on
mando da Capital or PCC) and Red Command the Atlantic Ocean. In particular, the Solimões
(Comando Vermelho or CV). The resulting terri- River flows through the Brazil-Colombia-Peru
torial disputes between the PCC and CV con- tri-border area, connecting with the mouth of
tributed to the most murderous year on record the Atlantic Ocean in one uninterrupted stretch
in 2017, skyrocketing Brazil’s homicide figures of several thousand miles.
to more than 63,000 that year.1
Moreover, Amazonas state represents the op-
As Brazil’s criminal organizations continue to portunity for increased market diversification
expand their operations domestically and inter- because criminal organizations can take advan-
nationally, violence has increased in many af- tage of illicit activities beyond drug trafficking,
fected regions of the country—even amid the such as illegal mining, illegal logging, and the
COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.2 In particular, the illegal wildlife trade, to expand their illicit reve-
state of Amazonas is witnessing high levels of nue streams. In addition to the FDN’s implosion,
contestation between rival factions and has the manifold opportunities in Amazonas state
become the latest frontier in Brazil’s organized have pulled first the CV and now the PCC like a
crime landscape. The necessity to expand and magnet to the region, violently contesting con-
compete for territory, the geography of the re- trol and convulsing the criminal underworld.
gion, shifting alliances between criminal orga-
nizations, and unique opportunities for market Two main prongs of research emerge in the
diversification make the region the epicenter of context of these developments. First, what is
Brazil’s criminal contestation. the present status of criminal contestation in
Amazonas state? Second, given the intensity
While Amazonas state was previously domi- of past contestation, what possible scenarios
nated by Brazil’s third-largest criminal organi- might Brazil expect to experience in the coming
zation, the Northern Family (Família Do Norte years? The burgeoning capabilities of Brazil’s
or FDN), the faction has been severely weak- principal organized crime groups and the con-
ened by the arrival of the CV, and now the PCC. comitant internationalization of their operations
4make understanding the “tussle for the Ama- 800,000 prisoners, Brazil has the third-high-
zon” urgent for Brazil and the entire Western est prison population in the world.5 In a region
Hemisphere. known for poorly run prison systems, Brazil’s
stands out for its mismanagement, violence,
The paper will proceed in four parts. First, it overcrowded facilities, corruption, and lack
offers a synopsis of the main criminal orga- of health services. It should not be surpris-
nizations involved in the “tussle for the Ama- ing, therefore, that Brazil’s criminal groups are
zon” and explains their nexus to Brazil’s prison prison-based by nature, meaning that prisons
system. Second, the paper outlines the current and the prison experience remain central to the
criminal landscape, including recent trends in groups’ identities, and most of their top leaders
criminal expansion since the breakdown of the are incarcerated—even as they maintain an im-
truce between the CV and the PCC. Third, the pressive level of control over street-level mem-
paper focuses on the particulars of the “tussle bers. Brazil’s criminal groups manage to com-
for the Amazon.” Fourth, the report concludes mand street-level soldiers operating beyond the
by offering several policy recommendations prison gate because they have accrued enough
for the United States and Brazil to stymie this power within the country’s prisons to impact
breakneck criminal expansion. the daily lives of prisoners; showing loyalty on
the outside could be critical to receiving favor-
able treatment on the inside. Prisons are thus
BRAZILIAN ORGANIZED CRIME an important node in Brazil’s organized crime
GROUPS landscape. It is where the three most power-
ful criminal groups began, matured, and con-
tinue to operate their headquarters.6 The fight
With the exception of the CV, most of Brazil’s or- against transnational organized crime in Brazil
ganized crime groups were born in the country’s does not end with the act of incarceration. It
post-dictatorship period, when the government only begins there.
aimed to reform and modernize prisons but ul-
timately lacked the political support to do so. In this context, Brazil’s criminal groups have
Consequently, Brazil’s prison system relied on capitalized on the vulnerabilities of the coun-
antiquated practices throughout the 1980s try’s prisons and leveraged them into critical
and 1990s that included solitary confinement assets.7 Prisoners often rely on friends and
coupled with violent prison guards subject to family to provide essentials, but criminal groups
little accountability.3 Brazilian organized crime can step into the void and offer material goods
groups have increased their appeal by position- with the profits from illicit activity.8 They also
ing themselves against the state and purporting permit families the opportunity to visit incar-
to place the fight for better prison conditions at cerated members in far-away prisons and of-
the center of their operating ideologies. ten pay members’ legal fees. As Graham Denyer
Willis explains, in the neighborhoods where they
From the 1980s to the present, three groups operate, these groups also provide rudimentary
have distinguished themselves as some of the forms of security and governance that are not
largest, most organized, and most ambitious or- provided by the formal institutions of the state.
ganized crime groups in Brazil today: the PCC, He contends, “Police, forever seen as unreliable,
CV, and FDN. Militia groups whose ranks are unaccountable, violent, and/or corrupt, have
filled partly by former police officers (and mem- been replaced by a social order complete with
bers of dismantled criminal organizations) often its own norms, notions of justice, and modes of
contest the power of Brazil’s organized crime punishment.”9
groups by extorting locals and controlling terri-
tory. This paper, however, will focus its analysis The power of Brazil’s organized crime groups is
on the PCC, CV, and FDN. thus considerable and only growing. The three
best articulated criminal groups—the PCC, the CV,
Brazil’s criminal organizations have always and the FDN—have long histories in Brazil. Their
maintained an important nexus with the coun- current capabilities and areas of operation spring
try’s prisons and its criminal justice system, partly from these histories. What follows is a
with more than 80 prison-based groups known thumbnail sketch of each group and an estimation
to operate throughout the country.4 With nearly of its current capacity and area of operation.
5The Tussle for the Amazon: New Frontiers in Brazil’s Organized Crime Landscape
Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has benefitted from being the most organized
and efficient of Brazil’s criminal organizations in
Originating in São Paulo, the PCC was estab- terms of its internal governance.14
lished in the early 1990s, a product of eight
inmates in Taubaté prison. The group arose in Comando Vermelho (CV)
the aftermath of prison riots to offer internal
protection for inmates who suffered violence The CV is the oldest and, by most accounts,
at the hands of prison guards.10 By 2002, the the largest criminal group in Rio de Janeiro
PCC’s long-time leader, Marcos Willians Her- state. Like the PCC, it began from behind bars.
bas Camacho (alias “Marcola”), took over lead- The group traces its origins back to 1979 in
ership, despite having been imprisoned since the maximum-security prison on Ilha Grande,
1999. Marcola, a skilled bank robber in his day, Candido Mendes, off the southern coast of Rio
brought his criminal acumen to the group and de Janeiro. Outside of the prison walls, the CV
quickly turned it toward organized crime. operates mostly out of several large favelas in
Rio de Janeiro, such as the Alemão complex in
The PCC maintains the ability to operate from the northern zone of the city. Its membership
inside and outside Brazil’s prisons, which it has spread to favelas across Rio de Janeiro state
demonstrated time and again. For instance, in after the fall of Brazil’s dictatorship in 1985,
May 2006, after Marcola and other PCC lead- when the country released many CV prison-
ers were transferred to maximum-security fa- ers.15 Since then, the CV has been involved in
cilities, inmates rebelled in more than 70 state transnational drug trafficking, importing co-
prisons and coordinated attacks by street-level caine from Colombia and exporting it to Europe
operatives on police stations and urban infra- and Africa. The group was the target of a po-
structure, resulting in over 50 assassinations of lice pacification program in Rio de Janeiro, but
police officers.11 following the cessation of pacification efforts,
it expanded throughout Brazil and beyond. The
The rapid expansion of the PCC has caused CV’s main leaders, including the late Marcinho
tectonic shifts in South America’s organized VP, command the group from prison.16
crime scene. By 2017, the PCC had a country-
wide presence in Brazil—nearly all 26 states Even though the CV may count fewer members
and the Federal District—and a burgeoning in- than the PCC across Brazil, the group had near-
ternational position. Further, the PCC has per- ly 24,000 members as of 2017, with between
haps the most extensive reach of any criminal 3,000 and 8,000 in Rio de Janeiro state and
group in South America, and its considerable an additional 16,000 in the rest of Brazil.17 Its
scope means its drug trafficking operations growing presence across the country is due, in
stretch from Paraguay and Bolivia in the south part, to its increasingly consolidated position in
to Peru and Colombia in the north. This posi- Amazonas state in the last few years. The CV’s
tion has afforded the PCC the role of top co- alliance with the FDN from 2015 to 2018 helped
caine exporter from South America to Africa solidify its presence in Amazonas state. The
and Europe. CV’s presence was bolstered further by several
key defections, most importantly that of Gelson
With the help of its estimated 30,000 members, Carnaúba (alias “Mano G”), one of the founders
the PCC exercises significant control over Bra- of the FDN, who switched sides and now heads
zil’s porous borders. In rural, lightly-guarded the CV in Amazonas state.18
areas, it controls the flow of drugs and weap-
ons. After contraband enters Brazil, the PCC fer- By 2020, police estimates indicated that the CV
ries goods to one of the many ports it controls, controlled more than 80 percent of the neigh-
such as Fortaleza, Santos, or Suape. From there, borhoods in Manaus, the capital of Amazonas
drugs and weapons head to Africa or Europe.12 state.19 Current government reports estimate
This expansive network operates in a decen- that the CV has grown exponentially in numbers
tralized fashion, in which it can maximize prof- in both Amazonas state and neighboring Acre
its from its drug trafficking network by driving state.20 In contrast to the decentralized struc-
down overall cost through a process of compet- ture of the PCC, the CV employs a much more
itive bidding for individual street-level groups to rigid, hierarchical model of territorial control.21
gain the right to sell PCC products.13 The PCC
6Família do Norte (FDN) Attrition, internal fissures, and competition from
outside groups have eroded the FDN’s former
The FDN was created by José Roberto Fernan- potency. While it is less relevant than it once
des Barbosa (alias “Zé Roberto da Compensa”), was, at its height, the FDN was possibly the
and Carnaúba. Unlike the PCC and CV, created second largest criminal organization in Brazil,
in highly urban contexts after prison riots in the with as many as 13,000 members.27 The rem-
1980s and 1990s, the FDN was established in nants of the group seek to expand and consol-
Amazonas state in 2007 with the objective of idate control of drug-trafficking routes in Ama-
controlling the major tributaries of the Amazon zonas state; however, since February 2020, its
River. Despite its regional focus, the FDN gained stronghold in the state of Amazonas has mostly
countrywide notoriety after the Brazilian Feder- been taken over by the CV. The most concern-
al Police and Public Ministry discovered through ing clash in Amazonas state is now between the
Operation La Muralla, launched in 2015, that PCC and the CV. As this rivalry between old foes
the FDN had built similar organizational struc- intensifies, the FDN is likely to be permanently
tures as the PCC and the CV. After constructing vanquished.28
an internal bureaucracy capable of governing
the group’s activities both inside and outside
of prisons, Operation La Muralla found that the CRIMINAL EXPANSION
FDN had consolidated near-absolute control
over the prison system in Amazonas state.22
Since the unraveling of the two-decade, nation-
wide truce between the PCC and the CV in 2016,
In three weeks of intense violence, the FDN cat- Brazil’s criminal organizations have accelerated
apulted into the Brazilian public consciousness their criminal expansion throughout the coun-
in 2017 with a spate of gruesome prison mas- try, the rest of South America, and even beyond
sacres in Amazonas state that left nearly 100 the Western Hemisphere. As the largest crim-
prisoners dead.23 The FDN, together with its inal organization in Brazil, the PCC has been
former ally, the CV, carried out murders of PCC at the forefront of Brazil’s international crimi-
leaders when efforts by the state to broker a nal expansion. The PCC possesses the largest
truce failed.24 Beginning in 2015, with the PCC’s market for drug trafficking operations in South
advancement into the FDN’s stronghold in Am- America, extending well beyond the region into
azonas state, the FDN’s objectives were am- the United States, Africa, and Western Europe.
plified to include containment of the PCC’s ad- However, the PCC is not the only criminal or-
vances in the region. To bolster its effort against ganization expanding its global reach. Its main
the PCC in Amazonas state, the FDN enlisted the rival, the CV, has mobilized its efforts toward
partnership of the CV in an official alliance from controlling Amazonas state and has expanded
2015 to 2018, which broke down after internal its drug trafficking operations to include a major
disagreements between the groups’ founders.25 drug route connecting Brazil to Colombia and
Following the dissolution of the FDN’s alliance Peru, and eventually, the Atlantic Ocean.29
with the CV, the group suffered internal frac- Brazil’s criminal organizations continue to seek
tures. João Branco, a former senior member of control over drug routes that facilitate the illicit
FDN, founded the Pure Northern Family (Família trafficking of cocaine and marijuana, among other
Do Norte Pura or FDNP) after the FDN lost in- illicit goods, both within Brazil and internationally.
fluence within prisons and competition from The expansion of these drug trafficking opera-
rivals diminished its revenue from drug sales. tions and the ensuing turf wars have contributed
The FDNP became a splinter group with the sole to a large increase in armed conflict in Brazil. In
aim of eliminating the remnants of the FDN. their efforts to establish control over territory, ri-
From a federal prison in Paraná, southern Bra- val criminal factions ensconced in a complex eco-
zil, Branco corralled FDN members loyal to him system of shifting alliances contribute to an in-
in Amazonas state and urged them to eliminate crease in violent confrontations between groups.
the group’s leadership. This sparked an intense Due to the highly profitable nature of these drug
internecine conflict between the FDN and the routes, Brazil’s criminal organizations continue to
FDNP after the command leaked, leading to the strengthen their power in the country.30
death of more than 55 prisoners.26
7The Tussle for the Amazon: New Frontiers in Brazil’s Organized Crime Landscape
While Brazil does not produce cocaine or grow level of trust with Marcola will prove difficult to
its precursors, it has evolved into one of the replace. Nevertheless, the PCC has consolidat-
most important players in trafficking cocaine ed its international operations in Paraguay and
internationally from the epicenter of coca cul- Bolivia and likely has plans to continue building
tivation in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Brazil on Fuminho’s efforts for ambitious international
now serves as the principal thoroughfare for expansion.
the transit of cocaine and other drugs in South
America to markets in Africa and Western Eu- Similarly, the CV views international expansion
rope.31 According to data from the United Na- as crucial to its long-term survival as an orga-
tions Office on Drugs and Crime, in 2017, Brazil nization. Last year, the Brazilian government
had the fifth-largest cocaine and marijuana sei- reported that the CV hired African and Eastern
zures in the world by volume.32 European mercenaries with military experience
to come to Rio de Janeiro state and conduct
Since the termination of the 2016 truce, Brazil’s training exercises as the organization expands
criminal organizations have continued to ex- its violent tactics within Brazil and internation-
pand their drug trafficking operations through ally.37 With international assistance, the CV aims
increased recruitment efforts and violent tac- to establish control over domestic territory and
tics that cross the borders of neighboring coun- pursue expansion into international markets.
tries. The expansion of these criminal organi- For instance, increasing returns in the European
zations into other countries presents a notable cocaine market are fueling part of this desire3
transformation in the criminal landscape of the for criminal expansion on an international scale.
region, with Brazil’s criminal factions disrupting Europe recently became the top destination for
governance and security in much of the con- drug exports from Brazil, witnessing a 20 per-
tinent, stretching from Colombia to Paraguay. cent increase in seizures at European ports of
Through both corruption and coercion, crimi- entry in 2020.38 Brazilian criminal groups have
nal organizations such as the PCC and CV can come to understand market dynamics and re-
penetrate weak state institutions, even in for- alize that Europe is a much more lucrative
eign prison and criminal justice systems.33 Even and less competitive market than the United
the coronavirus pandemic has been unable to States, as evidenced by the price of one kilo-
impede criminal expansion in Brazil; in fact, in gram of cocaine being worth US$28,000 in the
many ways, the pandemic accelerated the cur- United States versus between US$40,000 and
rent expansionary trends.34 US$80,000 in the European market.39
The 2020 apprehension of Marcola’s top lieu- Much of the violence in Brazil over the last few
tenant, Gilberto Aparecido dos Santos (alias years has been fueled by the clashes between
“Fuminho”)—a man on Brazil’s “Most Wanted” Brazil’s organized crime groups in their pursuit
list who ran international drug trafficking op- of criminal expansion, driven by the logic of sur-
erations for the PCC—by the Brazilian Federal vival as well as market dynamics. The breakdown
Police and U.S. Drug Enforcement Administra- of the longstanding, 20-year truce between the
tion in Mozambique is further evidence of the PCC and CV has intensified the conflict between
PCC’s international expansion efforts.35 Fumin- Brazil’s largest criminal factions as they com-
ho’s presence in Lusophone Africa, 5,000 miles pete to control the same lucrative stretches of
away from the PCC’s stronghold, demonstrates territory. The major uptick in violence in Brazil
that the group has turned its attention to mar- that coincided with the end of this truce is re-
kets on other continents, given that it has al- lated to renewed and reinvigorated conflict be-
ready established itself as the most prominent tween these groups. While 2017 was the coun-
criminal organization in South America with a try’s most murderous year on record, wherein
burgeoning presence in nearly every country.36 Brazil registered more than 63,000 homicides,
However, Fuminho’s arrest will make the PCC’s violence has continued at alarming rates as
international criminal expansion much more criminal expansion throughout Brazil continues
challenging moving forward, even though it has unabated. Amazonas state represents only the
managed to maintain organizational cohesion. latest frontier in this long-running conflict, pro-
As the coordinator for drug trafficking opera- viding criminal groups with the most opportuni-
tions in Bolivia and the PCC member with the ty for growth.
most international experience, his expertise and
8The Amazon is the New Frontier areas. The gradual victories won by the CV in
Amazonas state have come at the expense of
Amazonas state has a tremendous potential for the PCC and its local partners, in addition to the
criminal expansion, and several timely factors FDN. For instance, the CV has worked to dis-
will intensify competition for control of the re- place Bonde dos 13 (B13), a local criminal group
gion in the coming years. The increasing futility and PCC ally, to secure control over drug routes
of former alliance structures between different from Peru.42
criminal groups along with the implosion of the
FDN in February 2020—historically the most Starting in mid-2019 and continuing into
dominant group in the Amazon—have trans- 2020—and even during the coronavirus pan-
formed the region into one of the central hubs demic—the CV’s efforts to wrest back control
of criminal expansion in Brazil. After the termi- made significant inroads in the region. Like the
nation of the 2016 truce between the PCC and PCC’s earlier gains, and in accordance with its
the CV, the FDN formed an alliance with the CV prison-based nature, a series of grisly pris-
in Amazonas state to contain the PCC’s growing on massacres presaged the CV’s advances,
strength. However, after internal disputes within not only in Amazonas but throughout Brazil’s
the FDN over its alliance structure and the best northern states. As the PCC advanced in Jan-
path forward for the organization’s continued uary 2017, 101 prisoners were killed in a week
survival in Amazonas state, the alliance with the of violent riots in three different prisons. The
CV came to a roaring halt in May 2018.40 Further, macabre history would repeat itself. As the CV
a weakened FDN also suffered from internal advanced in late May 2019, around 57 inmates
disputes and mutinies. FDN founder Carnaúba, were killed at four different prison facilities in
who was behind the original alliance with the Amazonas state over three days, most of them
CV, switched allegiances from the FDN to the CV in the capital of Manaus.43 What followed was
after the agreement he negotiated came to an just as harrowing. In late July 2019, 57 prison-
end.41 These events have forced the FDN to re- ers were executed—with some beheaded—in
treat under highly inauspicious conditions. the Altamira prison as the PCC and CV squared
off again.44
The implosion of the FDN has left a vacuum
of territory for other criminal organizations to The CV’s opening salvo in the Amazon also con-
vie for a stronghold in Amazonas state. Natu- tributed to an uptick in brutal murders and ex-
rally, contention between the CV and the PCC ecutions outside prison walls. At the height of
has increased significantly over this tantaliz- the CV’s campaign in January 2020, murders
ing prospect. In addition to the futility of erst- in Manaus increased 54 percent over the same
while alliance structures and the implosion of period the year before.45 The CV transplanted
the FDN, the Amazon region is primed for in- its trademark ruthlessness in its strategy to
tense competition because of its unique char- displace local groups, often issuing an ultima-
acteristics, which lend it considerable strate- tum—convert to the CV or join the clergy in the
gic importance. Amazonas state has access to evangelical church. The CV has managed to di-
important drug trafficking routes originating in rectly confront the FDN on its territory in Ama-
Colombia and Peru via its extensive network of zonas state, practically relegating it to obscu-
Amazon River tributaries. These areas present rity with its confrontational and violent tactics.
extremely challenging terrain for the Brazilian The addition of Carnaúba to the CV’s ranks has
state to guard in a region already characterized helped the group to take further control of Am-
by a paucity of resources. The combination of azonas state, while the FDN has imploded.
shifting dynamics between Brazil’s criminal or-
ganizations and the strategic importance of the In the city of Manaus, the largest urban area in
Amazon has contributed to a sizable increase in the Amazon region, the base of the FDN, and
violence and contestation. an important holdout in the CV’s concerted on-
slaught, entire neighborhoods have been vio-
Between 2017 and 2019, the PCC appeared lently wrested from the FDN’s control.46 Fire-
to have most of the momentum in the push works displays often mark the end of raucous
to consolidate territorial control in Amazonas gun battles and, thus, the acquisition of new
state. However, the CV has managed to catch territory by the CV. The most recent example of
up quickly and even surpass the PCC in many the CV’s violence occurred in June 2021, with
9The Tussle for the Amazon: New Frontiers in Brazil’s Organized Crime Landscape
dozens of explosive attacks on government curity.52 The broader Amazon region will remain
buildings and vehicles in Manaus. Because one the key battleground between rival factions in
of the CV’s leaders in the Amazon region, Erick Brazil’s complex criminal landscape.
Batista (alias “Dadinho”), was killed by police
on June 5, the group is thought to have been
behind the attack as retribution.47 As a conse- THE TUSSLE FOR THE AMAZON
quence of the CV’s concerted efforts, the FDN
lost approximately 80 percent of its territory in
Manaus. By the end of 2020, the CV had be- Complexity arises when competing criminal or-
come the dominant criminal organization in the ganizations in a defined social space look to
Amazon region.48 create illicit governance and operate in an illegal
economic market. In the case of Brazil’s Amazon
Competition between Brazil’s most prominent region, it is increasingly clear that the clash be-
criminal organizations has also bred lucrative tween factions owes to an overlapping set of
options for smaller groups to ally themselves economic and social interests for the control of
and contract their services. Ambitious groups a highly profitable drug trafficking route.53 Bra-
such as the B13 have prospered in the region zil’s leading criminal organizations in Amazonas
as a proxy operating on behalf of the PCC.49 state have tailored their governance strategies
Local and proxy groups have demonstrated a in a region where the state has difficulty main-
nascent capacity to project power into Amazo- taining authority because of its size, geography,
nas state, and more importantly, have served remoteness, and even outright negligence. As
to replicate and amplify the rivalries of larger the PCC and CV expand their domestic and in-
Brazilian groups in hitherto untouched corners ternational operations, the “tussle for the Ama-
of the region. zon” will continue to be an intense conflict for
lasting control. While the timing of this conflict
In the topsy-turvy environment that is the crim- owes mostly to the shifting dynamics between
inal underworld in Amazonas state, Zé Roberto Brazil’s criminal organizations, the strategic im-
da Compensa, the leader of the FDN, proposed portance of Amazonas state further explains the
forming an alliance with the PCC in 2020 to save intense clashes for control over this territory.
his faltering organization and rebuff the CV’s Specifically, the following five reasons explain
territorial gains more effectively. Owing to their why Amazonas state is such a coveted territory
historical rivalry, the PCC’s leadership is report- in the realm of Brazil’s criminal underworld:
edly divided over the offer, and any agreement
would require the FDN to eliminate the remain- 1) The lucrative Solimões route to the Atlan-
ing leaders involved in an earlier massacre of tic
PCC members in the Compaj prison in 2017.50 If
an alliance does come to fruition, it could pres- 2) Access to the triple border with Colombia
age another major uptick in criminal violence. and Peru: The largest coca producers in
the world
When the PCC’s setbacks are put into broader
context, the current trends appear to present 3) The “Rota Caipira” of the south is increas-
a turning point for the CV’s criminal empire and ingly consolidated and dominated by the
indeed the broader criminal landscape in Bra- PCC
zil. However, the PCC’s setbacks in Amazonas 4) Ungoverned spaces abound in the Ama-
state have been partly offset by gains in cor- zon
ruption networks throughout the country and
more effective money-laundering strategies.51 5) Market diversification: From drugs to il-
Competition in Amazonas state for control of legal mining, deforestation, and wildlife
the broader Amazon region will remain intense trafficking
amid the shifting dynamics of Brazil’s criminal
groups. In January 2020, there were 106 ho-
micides in Manaus, the capital of Amazonas, a
54 percent increase over the same period the
year before, according to official figures from
the Brazilian Ministry of Justice and Public Se-
101) The Lucrative Solimões Route companies hiring armed security to protect
to the Atlantic their boats.
In the last five years, Brazilian criminal organiza- In this context, criminal organizations such as
tions have dedicated themselves to controlling the PCC, CV, and FDN have been violently con-
the Solimões Route (Rota Solimões), a section testing control of the route. Although the PCC
of the Amazon River that forms an ideal trans- and the CV maintained a presence in the Bra-
portation network stemming from Peru and Co- zilian Amazon before 2016, both groups have
lombia to the Atlantic Ocean. This cocaine traf- now set their sights on the region because of its
ficking route, composed of a series of largely critical role in the illicit cocaine market via the
unguarded rivers originating in the Amazon, is Solimões Route. Due to the necessity of con-
one of the most important in the world for the trolling territory in an environment with shift-
illicit drug market. The Solimões Route consists ing alliances, the Solimões Route has intensi-
of thousands of small rivers and canals that fied clashes between these rival factions in the
wind their way through remote stretches of the Amazon. As domestic expansion becomes more
Amazon region that are practically undetectable difficult, Brazilian criminal groups seek to ex-
by the Brazilian state, providing a golden route pand their operations internationally, an objec-
for illicit drug shipment. The Solimões Route tive that can be met with greater control of this
provides drug trafficking organizations a nearly lucrative riverine. With an outlet to the Atlantic
uninterrupted path from the Pacific to the At- Ocean, the Amazon region provides a unique lo-
lantic—akin to a “Latin American Silk Road” for cation for drugs to pass on their way to Africa
drug trafficking. and eventually to Europe.
Nearly 90 percent of the cocaine cultivat- Law enforcement attempts to patrol the illicit
ed and manufactured worldwide originates in drug market on the Solimões Route have been
Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia and subsequently met by difficulties in tracking Brazil’s sundry
passes through the Solimões and Amazon riv- criminal organizations. Even though controlling
ers.54 The Solimões provides criminal organi- the vast network of rivers along the Solimões
zations not only direct access to the Atlantic is a challenging endeavor, the Brazilian govern-
but also links the Amazon region with the im- ment has noted the supply of illicit drug traf-
portant port cities of Brazil’s northeast region, ficking on the route and, in response, mobilized
such as Belém in Pará state and Fortaleza in the expansion of Program VIGIA (Programa Na-
Ceará state, from which drugs can continue cional de Segurança nas Fronteiras e Divisas).
to their final destination hidden aboard con- Program VIGIA is a 2019 initiative launched by
tainers on large cargo ships. Thus, by virtue of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security to
several tributary rivers, the Solimões serves as tackle illicit business activities on Brazil’s bor-
an essential drug trafficking route for Brazil’s ders by increasing collaboration between fed-
criminal groups seeking to exploit this lucra- eral and state law enforcement agencies. After
tive channel in the global market. growing awareness of the Solimões Route, the
program established a floating operational base
The remote and unguarded nature of the So- in the Solimões River in August 2020 with com-
limões River is particularly attractive, as it al- munication towers and water vehicles that work
lows for increased and mixed methods of illicit to disrupt drug trafficking routes throughout
drug trafficking in the Amazon. Criminal orga- the Amazon.56 Despite these efforts by the Bra-
nizations use unique methods to evade police zilian state, the Solimões will continue to retain
detection, although minimal law enforcement its importance and serve as a flashpoint in the
is present in the Amazon. For instance, cocaine increasing conflict between criminal organiza-
traffickers moving product from Colombia and tions in the Amazon region.
Peru to Brazil (and eventually to the Atlantic
Ocean) can use slower and larger boats at times 2) Access to the Triple Border with Colombia
to avoid being caught by the police, rather than and Peru: The Largest Coca Producers in the
relying on rapid motorboats to navigate the riv- World
ers.55 In addition to a lack of state security pres-
ence, contestation between criminal groups on Illicit market dynamics and local geographies
the Solimões River has resulted in many local rather than individual leaders have driven much
11The Tussle for the Amazon: New Frontiers in Brazil’s Organized Crime Landscape
of the expansionary push affecting the daily The triple border is hotly contested because
lives of millions of people living in the Amazon other border areas with similar geographic
region, as evidenced by the triple border with features and the potential for illicit economic
Colombia and Peru (as well as the lawlessness activity have been consolidated. Brazil’s oth-
in Venezuela, which is an important transship- er tri-border area, the southern portion of the
ment country with ready access to Caribbean country that meets Argentina and Paraguay,
trafficking routes). While the Solimões Route in has been soundly in the PCC’s possession for
and of itself is a lucrative aspect of the Amazon, years. Combined with its robust operations in
one of the main implications of control in this re- Paraguay and Bolivia—the “Rota Caipira” (Caip-
gion is access to the triple border between Bra- ira Route) for drug trafficking—the PCC’s es-
zil in the east, Colombia in the north, and Peru in tablishment of stable, consolidated operations
the west. Colombia and Peru are the two largest in the Amazon’s triple border area would be a
coca-cultivating countries in the world.57 More- potentially fatal blow to the CV’s ambitions.61 A
over, the coca produced in Colombia and Peru is northern route for drug export would increase
of higher quality than that produced in Bolivia, the PCC’s monopoly on drug trafficking opera-
the third-largest cultivator in the world. As such, tions throughout Brazil and decrease the risk of
Brazilian criminal groups are increasingly seek- enhanced law enforcement operations against
ing to capitalize on the attractive market that its southern route by providing it with a viable
control of the triple border would furnish. This and lucrative alternative.
region consists of highly porous borders and
poorly governed spaces that facilitate transna- Thus, it is no surprise that the CV has also
tional trafficking flows. These features inherent demonstrated its aspirations for gaining control
to the region’s geography increase the intensi- over the Amazonian triple border. For instance,
ty of the competition for ultimate control of a the CV’s objective in taking over the stronghold
trafficking route that allows criminal groups to in Acre state was to seize a drug route through
serve a much broader clientele, which includes Peru from the PCC and its local ally in the region,
Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. B13.62 Additionally, under Carnaúba, the FDN
was introduced by a former FARC member to a
The PCC’s early control of a position near the tri- leader of the Los Pelusos criminal group in Co-
ple border of Brazil, Colombia, and Peru served lombia. With Carnaúba now serving as the CV’s
as a crucial step in its expansion plan in 2017. leader in Amazonas state, the CV may be able
After the 2016 peace deal between the Colom- to capitalize on the pre-existing cross-border
bian state and the guerrilla group Fuerzas Ar- relationships developed by Carnaúba with his
madas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the former organization. Even during the coronavi-
PCC collaborated with dissident FARC groups to rus pandemic, this intense turf battle continues
better understand local trafficking routes and to play out, with each side using alliances with
to integrate into supply chains for coca produc- local factions. Both the PCC and the CV continue
tion in this northern region of Amazonas state.58 to make advances to consolidate control over
This alliance with FARC dissidents gave the PCC the triple border, a conflict that shows no signs
a competitive advantage in the “tussle for the of abating.
Amazon” over both the CV and the FDN. Fur-
ther, the FARC’s demobilization, together with 3) The “Rota Caipira” of the South is Increas-
the explosion of Colombia’s coca production ingly Consolidated and Dominated by the PCC
following the cessation of aerial fumigation While the triple border with Colombia and Peru
efforts, allowed the PCC to benefit immensely is becoming increasingly more competitive for
from the increasing amounts of cocaine pouring control of the Solimões Route and its nearly
across Brazil’s northern border.59 There are also unfettered access to the largest cocaine pro-
possibilities for Brazilian criminal groups to col- ducers in the world, the “Rota Caipira” has been
laborate with Colombian BACRIM (Bandas Crim- consolidated as a PCC stronghold in the south of
inales), another generation of drug trafficking Brazil with established connections for the co-
organizations, which highlights the increasing caine produced in Bolivia and the drug traffick-
competition for drug trafficking routes on mul- ing routes in Paraguay. This route crosses from
tiple sides of the triple border.60 Bolivia and Paraguay into the Brazilian state of
Mato Grosso do Sul and ultimately into the state
12of São Paulo, where it can be trafficked across Since the assassination of Jorge Rafaat in June
the Atlantic from the port of Santos, the largest 2016, the PCC has stepped in to further con-
in South America.63 The PCC’s dominance in this solidate the power vacuum left by the former
southern region, which abuts its home state of “King of the Border.”68 Similar to its operations in
São Paulo, has forced the CV to focus its ef- Bolivia, the PCC has sent many of its members
forts increasingly on the Solimões Route in the to lead a PCC contingency in Paraguay, leading
northern stretches of Amazonas state as one to the arrest and replacement of many in that
of the best remaining domestic opportunities country. Even though Paraguayan police recent-
to continue the criminal expansion of its drug ly arrested a top PCC leader, Giovanni Barbosa
trafficking enterprise.64 The consolidated na- da Silva (alias “Bonitão”) on January 9, 2021
ture of the PCC’s criminal empire in Bolivia and in Pedro Juan Caballero, the PCC continues to
Paraguay has significant transnational security operate across the Paraguayan border without
implications for the entire region, as it pushes much difficulty and has converted the country
Brazilian criminal groups away from the south to into one of its primary bases for the supply of
continue to vie for illicit markets in the northern marijuana.69 In both Bolivia and Paraguay, the
Amazonas state instead. PCC has become the dominant criminal orga-
nization by establishing dominance over the
Bolivia has served as one of the main expan- “Rota Caipira” and asserting its presence both
sion points for the PCC’s international campaign inside and outside of prisons.
along the “Rota Caipira” due to its status as a
cocaine production hub. The PCC has invested 4) Ungoverned Spaces Abound in the Amazon
considerable resources in the country, includ-
ing members of its leadership team that have The São Paulo-based PCC and Rio de Janei-
assisted in spearheading efforts on the ground. ro-based CV have found the ungoverned spac-
With an established presence in the country, es in Amazonas state much easier to navigate
the PCC has used Bolivian equipment and ex- given the weakness of state institutions and the
plosives to perform hundreds of bank heists lack of police forces along the region’s drug traf-
and ATM lootings in Brazil and Bolivia. Expan- ficking routes. Amazonas state’s ungoverned
sion efforts in Bolivia have been successful, as spaces allow Brazil’s criminal groups to exert
evidenced by the PCC’s control over the local authority over rural areas and provide an ide-
supply chain of coca production in Bolivia’s al location for criminal operations to go largely
Chapare region. Moreover, the PCC also oper- unseen in the depths of the Amazon rainforest.
ates cocaine-processing laboratories near the Groups are permitted to operate seamlessly
border with Brazil and continues to send op- without significant interference from Brazilian
eratives to Bolivia to protect the cultivation of law enforcement. While the Brazilian govern-
the coca crop. Its presence in Bolivia is unri- ment has attempted to ramp up its presence
valed by any other criminal organization, and all along the Solimões by standing up Program VI-
signs point to further dominance of the PCC in GIA, the river’s length at over 1,000 miles and
the country, which would be complemented by the sheer scale of Amazonas state of more than
establishing control of the lucrative drug traf- 600,000 square miles are sufficient to frustrate
ficking routes in the Amazon. even the best efforts.
The PCC’s stronghold in Paraguay has also been Because Amazonas and Acre states are more
consolidated along the “Rota Caipira” and pro- rural than the rest of Brazil, political and secu-
vides the group with access to Latin America’s rity institutions are typically weaker and less
largest marijuana producer and a consolidated consolidated throughout these less inhabited
route for the transit of Bolivian cocaine through states. Brazil’s criminal organizations prosper in
its territory and into Brazil.65 Paraguay alone these spaces and leverage the ability to play a
provides Brazil with at least 80 percent of its governing role by providing goods and services.
marijuana consumption, a market in which the For instance, local citizens may equate the CV
PCC has well-established control.66 This market with the state when the group exercises three
was first sought out by the CV in the 1980s, led main forms of institutional authority: a mo-
by Luiz Fernando da Costa, alias Fernandinho nopoly on violence, socioeconomic security in
Beira-Mar, but since his arrest in 2002, the PCC the form of providing goods and services, and
slowly began to wrest control of the region.67 sociological legitimacy.70 In largely uninhabited
13The Tussle for the Amazon: New Frontiers in Brazil’s Organized Crime Landscape
stretches of the Amazon, these three forms of as the Yanomami. Furthermore, the Bolsonaro
authority are likely easier to implement since administration continues to accelerate illegal
institutional fragility in the region provides an mining as an illicit market for Brazilian criminal
ideal platform for these groups to wrest author- expansion as it eases mining regulations. But
ity from the state. even with greater political will to combat this il-
licit market, the Brazilian state simply does not
Furthermore, in ungoverned areas like Amazo- have the capacity to regulate it. Brazil’s Nation-
nas state, Brazil’s criminal organizations have al Mining Agency (Agência Nacional de Miner-
exercised what one writer describes as the con- ação or ANM) employs a mere 250 inspectors
cept of “strategic magnanimity.”71 Lacking daily to monitor more than 35,000 mining sites in the
interaction with the state, citizens in these ar- country.74 The ANM is under-resourced and in-
eas recognize that criminal organizations act as dicates a poor state capacity to regulate, even
a governing body by providing strategic goods at some of Brazil’s most prominent and com-
and services to the community, developing a mercial mining sites.75
nascent form of tacit cooperation.72 In this ar-
rangement, communities desire an organized In a similar fashion to illegal mining, the ille-
form of governance that criminal organizations gal deforestation in Amazonas state presents
often furnish, and in exchange, citizens turn a another valuable opportunity for criminal ex-
blind eye to the group’s illicit drug trafficking pansion. The deforestation rate in the Brazil-
operations. Besides facilitating their operations, ian region of the Amazon hit a 12-year high in
the proliferation of ungoverned spaces allows 2020, with an estimated 11,088 km2, which is
Brazilian criminal groups to establish them- 182 percent higher than the 3,935 km2 target.76
selves as central arbiters over these rural re- Brazil’s criminal organizations contribute sig-
gions, yielding a social legitimacy that comple- nificantly to rising deforestation because the
ments the income derived from illicit economic logistical capacity these groups possess in the
activity. region can be easily transferred to new markets
such as the illegal sale and export of timber.77
5) Market Diversification: From Drugs to Il- Moreover, the Bolsonaro administration’s lack
legal Mining, Deforestation, and Wildlife of support for legislation to protect the Amazon
Trafficking rainforest facilitates the opportunities available
Another reason competition in Amazonas state for criminal groups to continue expanding into
has intensified is the opportunity for additional the illicit timber market.
criminal expansion due to the potential mar- Additionally, illegal wildlife trafficking in the Am-
ket diversification the Amazon offers. While the azon has accelerated as another illicit market in
“Rota Caipira” is a route used almost exclusively the latest moment of criminal expansion. Given
to ferry drugs, Amazonas state presents oppor- that the Amazon possesses over 13 percent of
tunities for market diversification as the region the world’s biodiversity, Brazil has become an
naturally possesses a variety of illicit markets important hub of wildlife trafficking.78 Criminal
for criminal organizations. In addition to drug organizations take advantage of the Solimões
trafficking, other unlawful activities include ille- route used for drug trafficking to smuggle wild-
gal mining, illegal deforestation and the market life in the region, including turtles, fish, jaguars,
for timber, and illegal wildlife trafficking. Togeth- bushmeat, and parrots. Along the triple border,
er with the ungoverned nature of the region, the illegal wildlife trafficking has seen a significant
resources for illicit economies encourage Bra- increase in the border towns of Tabatinga, Brazil
zil’s criminal groups to expand their operations. and Leticia, Colombia, specifically on the Purus,
Illegal mining continues to grow significantly in Negro, and Madeira Rivers.79 Official figures for
the Amazon region. It has been reported that illegal wildlife trafficking in Amazonas state are
the PCC has been suspected of being hired to difficult to assess with certainty; however, illegal
protect mining fields through violent attacks trading of parrots and other animals continues
on Indigenous populations occurring as late as to increase without meaningful pushback be-
June 2021.73 Specifically, in the northern state cause of the ungoverned nature of the Amazon
of Roraima, violence has risen between illegal rainforest.80 While Indigenous populations have
miners and Indigenous Amazonian tribes, such long hunted for bushmeat in Amazonas state
for the purpose of subsistence—a legal form of
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