Africans welcome China's influence but maintain democratic aspirations
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Dispatch No. 489 | 15 November 2021
Africans welcome China’s influence but
maintain democratic aspirations
Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 489 1 | Josephine Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny
and Edem Selormey
Summary
Home to some of the world’s fastest-growing economies (Mitchell, 2019), Africa has attracted
the attention of leaders and economic strategists everywhere, including China. Over the
past two decades, political and economic relations between China and Africa have grown
rapidly, with trade volumes increasing from about $11 billion in 2000 to $192 billion in 2019
(Amoah, Hodzi, & Castillo, 2020; China Africa Research Initiative, 2018;
Thomas, 2021). While the United States is still the continent’s largest
aid donor, China is the leading provider of financial support for
infrastructure development in Africa (Muchira, 2018; Shepherd &
Blanchard, 2018).
However, China’s investments and dealings with Africa have been a
topic of widespread scrutiny and debate. Because China’s financial
support for Africa is often in the form of long-term loans rather than
grants, it has been criticized as a “debt trap” that China may use to
gain strategic advantages on the continent (Green, 2019). Some argue that African
countries that borrow from China may lose key assets if they are unable to pay back their
loans (Brautigam, 2019; Brautigam & Kidane, 2020; Sun, 2014). Others are concerned that
China is using its influence to promote its political ideas on the continent (Scott, 2021).
How do ordinary Africans perceive China’s engagement with their countries and
economies?
Afrobarometer’s national surveys in 34 African countries in 2019/2021 show that Africans hold
positive views of China’s assistance and influence on the continent, though its perceived
level of influence on African economies has waned over the past five years. Positive views of
China’s influence do not appear to affect Africans’ attitudes toward democracy. China
remains second to the United States as the preferred development model for Africans. And
majorities of those who are aware of Chinese loans and development assistance to their
countries are concerned about being heavily indebted to China.
Afrobarometer surveys
Afrobarometer is a pan-African, nonpartisan survey research network that provides reliable
data on African experiences and evaluations of democracy, governance, and quality of life.
Eight rounds of surveys have been completed in up to 39 countries since 1999. Round 8
surveys (2019/2021) cover 34 countries. Afrobarometer conducts face-to-face interviews in
the language of the respondent’s choice.
1
An earlier version of this dispatch, based on data from 18 countries surveyed before the COVID-19 pandemic
forced a pause in Round 8 fieldwork, was published as Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 407.
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 1
Afrobarometer conducts face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent’s choice
with nationally representative samples that yield country-level results with margins of error of
+/-2 to +/-3 percentage points at a 95% confidence level.
This 34-country analysis is based on 48,084 interviews (see Appendix Table A.1 for a list of
countries and fieldwork dates). The data are weighted to ensure nationally representative
samples. When reporting multi-country averages, all countries are weighted equally (rather
than in proportion to population size). Due to rounding, reported totals may differ by 1
percentage point from the sum of sub-categories.
Key findings
On average across 34 countries, China trails the United States as Africans’ preferred
development model (33% vs. 22%), followed by South Africa (12%) and former
colonial powers (11%).
o The United States ranks at the top in 23 of 34 surveyed countries, while China is No.
1 in five countries: Benin, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Botswana.
o While the overall averages have changed little over the past five years, some
countries record substantial changes, including Benin (a 21-percentage-point
increase in preference for China) and Liberia (an 18-point increase in preference
for the United States).
Almost two-thirds (63%) of Africans say the economic and political influence of China
in their country is “somewhat positive” or “very positive,” while only about one in
seven (14%) consider it negative. Views on U.S. influence are almost identical (60% vs.
13%).
o On average across 30 countries surveyed in both 2014/2015 and 2019/2021,
positive views of China’s political and economic influence have not changed
significantly.
While a majority (59%) of Africans say China’s economic activities in their country
have “some” or “a lot” of influence on their economy, that proportion has declined
sharply over the past five years (from 71%).
o Perceptions of Chinese influence declined in 24 countries, including huge drops in
Sierra Leone (-37 percentage points), Zimbabwe (-29 points), Botswana (-24
points), Malawi (-21 points), Niger (-21 points), and Mali (-20 points).
Among the 47% of African citizens who are aware of Chinese loans or development
assistance to their country, a majority (57%) say their government has borrowed too
much money from China.
Views on whether China or the United States is preferable as a development model
do not appear to affect Africans’ support for democracy or democratic norms.
Seven in 10 Africans (69%) say English is the most important international language for
young people to learn. Only 3% prefer Chinese.
Best model for development
Afrobarometer asks Africans which country provides the best model for the future
development of their own country. As in the 2014/2015 survey (Lekorwe, Chingwete, Okuru, &
Samson, 2016), China ranks second across 34 countries in 2019/2021, trailing the United States
(22% vs. 33%) (Figure 1). About one in 10 respondents cite South Africa (12%) or their former
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 2colonial power (Britain, France, Portugal, or Germany) (11%), while 7% say they should follow
their own country’s model.
Figure 1: Best model for development | 34 countries | 2019/2021
United States 33
China 22
South Africa 12
Former colonial power 11
Ethiopia 2
Other countries 4
None of these/There is no role model 2
We should follow our own country’s
7
model
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Respondents were asked: In your opinion, which of the following countries, if any, would be the best
model for the future development of our country, or is there some other country in Africa or elsewhere
that should be our model?
In 23 of the 34 countries, citizens prefer the U.S. model to China’s, including large gaps in
Liberia (77 percentage points), Sierra Leone (40 points), Morocco (34 points), Angola (28
points), Cabo Verde (27 points), the Gambia (24 points), and Zimbabwe (20 points)
(Figure 2). China outstrips the United States in five of the 34 countries: Benin (by 23
percentage points), Mali (23 points), Burkina Faso (19 points), Niger (4 points), and Botswana
(4 points). Tanzania, Senegal, Tunisia, Eswatini, Malawi, and Mozambique show equal
preference for both models.
Given that China is the newcomer in this global competition, it is notable that younger
Africans are more likely than their elders to favor the U.S. model (36% of those aged 18-25 vs.
26% of those over age 55), while regard for the Chinese model is fairly steady across all age
groups (Figure 3). Men and women are equally likely to prefer the United States, but more
men than women prefer China (25% vs. 19%). Respondents’ education level and experience
with poverty 2 seem to make only a modest difference in their preferred development model.
2
Afrobarometer’s Lived Poverty Index (LPI) measures respondents’ levels of material deprivation by asking
how often they or their families went without basic necessities (enough food and water, medical care, enough
cooking fuel, and a cash income) during the preceding year. For more on lived poverty, see Mattes (2020).
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 3Figure 2: Best model for development: China vs. U.S. | 34 countries | 2019/2021
Benin 47
24
Burkina Faso 40
21
Mali 39
15
Tanzania 35
32
Ethiopia 31
45
Senegal 30
29
Nigeria 29
36
Côte d'Ivoire 29
33
Togo 26
39
Botswana 26
22
Guinea 26
34
Niger 25
21
Gabon 24
32
Sudan 24
35
Kenya 23
42
Cameroon 23
29
Zambia 22
31
34-country average 22
33
Uganda 22
41
Mozambique 22
24
Malawi 20
22
Lesotho 20
27
South Africa 20
37
Tunisia 19
19
Ghana 19
37
Mauritius 16
23
Morocco 16
50
Gambia 15
40
Cabo Verde 15
42
Sierra Leone 14
54
Namibia 11
18
Angola 10
38
Zimbabwe 9
29
Liberia 8
85
Eswatini 6
5
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
China United States
Respondents were asked: In your opinion, which of the following countries, if any, would be the best
model for the future development of our country, or is there some other country in Africa or elsewhere
that should be our model?
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 4Figure 3: Best model for development: China vs. U.S. | by socio-demographic group
| 34 countries | 2019/2021
Women 19
33
Men 25
33
Rural 22
31
Urban 23
34
18-25 years 22
36
26-35 years 23
34
36-45 years 23
32
46-55 years 21
31
56 years and above 21
26
No formal education 22
28
Primary 21
33
Secondary 22
35 China
Post-secondary 25
34 U.S
No lived poverty 20
33
Low lived poverty 23
33
Moderate lived poverty 23
32
High lived poverty 23
33
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Respondents were asked: In your opinion, which of the following countries, if any, would be the best
model for the future development of our country, or is there some other country in Africa or elsewhere
that should be our model?
On average across the 31 countries in which this question was asked in both 2014/2015 and
2019/2021, preferences for China and the United States as the best model for development
remain largely unchanged, though the U.S. advantage increased marginally from 6 to 9
percentage points. A few countries, however, recorded substantial changes. Benin and
Burkina Faso show increases of 21 and 20 percentage points, respectively, in preference for
China, while Cameroon, Eswatini, and Liberia record significant decreases (-25, -17, and -17
percentage points, respectively) (Figure 4).
As for the U.S. model, preference doubled in Lesotho (from 14% to 27%) and increased
sharply in Liberia (by 18 percentage points), Morocco (+16 points), and Sierra Leone (+11
points) while decreasing in nine other countries, including Eswatini (-15 points) and Cabo
Verde (-10 points) (Figure 5).
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 5Figure 4: China as the best model for development | 16 countries | 2014-2021
Benin 26
47
Burkina Faso 20
40
Mali 36
39
Tanzania 35
35
Senegal 28
30
Nigeria 25
29
Côte d'Ivoire 26
29
Togo 19
26
Botswana 24
26
Guinea 22
26
Niger 28
25
Gabon 29
24
Sudan 36
24
Kenya 24
23
Cameroon 48
23
31-country average 25
23
Zambia 32
22
Uganda 19
22
Mozambique 36
22
Malawi 17
20
18 2014/2015
Lesotho 20
South Africa 26 2019/2021
20
Tunisia 24
19
Ghana 15
19
Mauritius 13
16
Morocco 10
16
Cabo Verde 21
15
Sierra Leone 18
14
Namibia 22
11
Zimbabwe 20
9
Liberia 25
8
Eswatini 23
6
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Respondents were asked: In your opinion, which of the following countries, if any, would be the best
model for the future development of our country, or is there some other country in Africa or elsewhere
that should be our model? (% who say China)
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 6Figure 5: U.S. as the best model for development | 31 countries | 2014-2021
Liberia 67
85
Sierra Leone 43
54
Morocco 34
50
Cabo Verde 52
42
Kenya 49
42
Uganda 41
41
Togo 33
39
Ghana 37
37
South Africa 36
37
Nigeria 43
36
Sudan 26
35
Guinea 39
34
Côte d'Ivoire 33
33
Gabon 30
32
Tanzania 30
32
31-country average 31
32
Zambia 23
31
Cameroon 20
29
Senegal 33
29
Zimbabwe 25
29
Lesotho 14
27 2014/2015
Mozambique 15
24
Benin 18
24 2019/2021
Mauritius 22
23
Botswana 30
22
Malawi 24
22
Niger 24
21
Burkina Faso 28
21
Tunisia 21
19
Namibia 21
18
Mali 19
15
Eswatini 20
5
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Respondents were asked: In your opinion, which of the following countries, if any, would be the best
model for the future development of our country, or is there some other country in Africa or elsewhere
that should be our model? (% who say United States)
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 7External influences
China’s economic and political influence in Africa, like that of the United States, is far more
widely seen as a good than a bad thing. On average, almost two-thirds (63%) of Africans say
China’s influence in their country is “somewhat positive” or “very positive,” while only about
one in seven (14%) consider it negative. Views on U.S. influence are about the same (60% vs.
13%) (Figure 6).
Pluralities welcome the influence of their regional superpower (52%), their former colonial
power (46%), and Russia (35%).
Positive assessments also far outnumber negative views of the influence of United Nations
agencies (57% vs. 11%), regional organizations (57% vs. 12%), and the African Union (53% vs.
14%).
Figure 6: External influences: positive or negative? | 34 countries | 2019/2021
China 63 23 14
United States 60 28 13
Regional super power 52 31 17
Former colonial power 46 29 25
Russia 35 48 17
United Nations agencies 57 32 11
Regional alliance 57 31 12
African Union 53 33 14
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Somewhat positive/Very positive Refused/Don't know/Neither
Somewhat negative/Very negative
Respondents were asked: In general, do you think that the economic and political influence of each of
the following countries/organizations on [your country] is mostly positive, mostly negative, or haven’t
you heard enough to say?
Respondents who feel positively about the influence of China are more likely to hold positive
views of U.S. influence as well – i.e. the two views are strongly and positively correlated. This
suggests that for many Africans, U.S.-China “competition” may not be an either-or
proposition, but a win-win.
However, we see differences within countries. In 16 of the 34 countries, China’s influence is
more widely seen as positive than that of the U.S., including a 36-percentage-point gap in
Eswatini (82% positive for China, 46% for the U.S.), a 25-point gap in Mauritius (75% vs. 50%),
and a 19-point gap in Mali (81% vs. 62%) (Figure 7). The U.S. is more widely perceived as
having positive influence than China in 10 countries, but Zimbabwe is the only country with a
two-digit gap (48% for the U.S. vs. 38% for China).
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 8Figure 7: Positive influence: China vs. U.S. | 34 countries | 2019/2021
Benin 88
79
Cabo Verde 85
85
Eswatini 82
46
Mali 81
62
Burkina Faso 80
71
Morocco 80
85
Liberia 79
88
Guinea 79
74
Mauritius 75
50
Tanzania 75
63
Côte d'Ivoire 71
66
Mozambique 68
64
Niger 68
60
Sudan 66
56
Kenya 65
72
Cameroon 64
56
Togo 64
71
Nigeria 63
63
34-country average 63
60
Zambia 60
60
Senegal 59
53
Botswana 59
51
Ethiopia 59
63
Gabon 57
51
Lesotho 55
56
Uganda 54
58
Gambia 53
52
Malawi 51
52
Ghana 48
56
China
47 U.S.
Namibia 56
Angola 44
46
Sierra Leone 43
46
South Africa 40
48
Zimbabwe 38
48
Tunisia 30
23
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Respondents were asked: Do you think that the economic and political influence of each of the
following countries on [your country] is mostly positive, mostly negative, or haven’t you heard enough
to say? (% who say “somewhat positive” or “very positive”)
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 9On average across 30 countries in which this question was asked in both 2014/2015 and
2019/2021, the perceived positive influence of China has not changed significantly (66% vs.
63%). Seventeen countries record declines, including steep drops in Gabon (-21 percentage
points), Namibia (-19 points), Cameroon (-16 points), and Niger (-16 points). Only six countries
show significant increases in the proportion of citizens who see Chinese influence as positive:
Morocco (+45 percentage points), Benin (+18 points), Ghana (+14 points), Lesotho (+7
points), Cabo Verde (+4 points), and Tanzania (+4 points) (Figure 8).
Despite these declines, majorities in 27 of 34 countries surveyed in 2019/2021 hold positive
views of China’s economic and political influence, reaching 88% in Benin, 85% in Cabo
Verde, 82% in Eswatini, 81% in Mali, and 80% in Burkina Faso and Mali. Positive assessments of
China’s influence are in the minority in seven countries, most strikingly in Tunisia (30%).
Figure 8: Changes in perceived positive influence of China (percentage points)
| 30* countries | 2014-2021
45 Morocco
18 Benin
14 Ghana
7 Lesotho
7 Cabo Verde
4 Tanzania
3 Sudan
3 Mozambique
3 Mauritius
3 Guinea
2 Burkina Faso
1 Malawi
-2 Liberia
-3 30-country average
-4 Uganda
-4 Nigeria
-6 Senegal
-6 Côte d'Ivoire
-8 Togo
-10 Zimbabwe
-11 South Africa
-11 Mali
-11 Kenya
-12 Zambia
-12 Tunisia
-12 Sierra Leone
-15 Botswana
-16 Niger
-16 Cameroon
-19 Namibia
-21 Gabon
-40 -20 0 20 40 60
Figure shows the change, in percentage points, between 2014/2015 and 2019/2021 in the proportion of
respondents who say China’s economic and political influence on their country is “somewhat positive”
or “very positive.” *Question was not asked in Eswatini in 2014/2015.
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 10Positive perceptions of Chinese and U.S. influence follow similar patterns across key socio-
demographic groups. For both countries, men and highly educated citizens are somewhat
more likely than women and less educated citizens to see the influence as positive (Figure 9).
Figure 9: Perceived positive influence of China and U.S. | by socio-demographic
group | 34 countries | 2019/2021
Women 59
56
Men 66
63
Rural 62
58
Urban 64
61
No formal education 58
55
Primary 60
57
Secondary 64
62
Post-secondary 69
64
No lived poverty 66
62
Low lived poverty 65
61
Moderate lived poverty 61
59
High lived poverty 61
58
China
18-25 years 63 U.S.
61
26-35 years 63
61
36-45 years 63
61
46-55 years 63
58
56 years and above 59
53
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Respondents were asked: In general, do you think that the economic and political influence of each of
the following countries/organizations on [your country] is mostly positive, mostly negative, or haven’t
you heard enough to say? (% who say “somewhat positive” or “very positive”)
While views of China’s economic and political influence are largely favorable, assessments of
how much influence China’s economic activities have in African countries have dropped
sharply. On average across 34 countries, 59% say China’s economic activities in their country
have “some” or “a lot” of influence on their economy. But this reflects a major decrease over
the past five years, from 71% to 59% across 30 countries surveyed in both 2014/2015 and
2019/2021.
Perceptions of the influence of China’s economic activities declined in 24 of these 30
countries, including huge drops in Sierra Leone (-37 percentage points), Zimbabwe (-29
points), Botswana (-24 points), Malawi (-21 points), Niger (-21 points), and Mali (-20 points)
(Figure 10). Only Morocco and Mauritius record significant increases in China’s perceived
economic influence.
The proportions who see China’s economic activities as influential still exceed two-thirds in
Morocco (80%), Cabo Verde (77%), Mauritius (75%), Eswatini (74%), Benin (73%), Gabon
(73%), Kenya (72%), Cameroon (72%), Sudan (71%), and Mali (70%). But fewer than half of
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 11citizens agree in Ethiopia (47%), Uganda (44%), Zimbabwe (39%), Malawi (38%), and Sierra
Leone (21%).
Figure 10: Extent of China’s influence | 34 countries | 2014-2021
Morocco 49
80
Cabo Verde 78
77
Mauritius 69
75
Eswatini 74
Benin 70
73
Gabon 87
73
Kenya 75
72
Cameroon 81
72
Sudan 70
71
Mali 90
70
Tanzania 71
64
Guinea 72
62
Tunisia 74
61
Namibia 76
61
Zambia 75
61
Liberia 68
61
Senegal 73
60
Burkina Faso 77
60
30-country average 71
59
34-country average 59
Niger 80
59
South Africa 69
55
Nigeria 67
55
Togo 71
53
Côte d'Ivoire 70
53
Ghana 61
53
Botswana 76
52
Angola 52
Gambia 2014/2015
51
Lesotho 61 2019/2021
50
Mozambique 68
50
Ethiopia 47
Uganda 57
44
Zimbabwe 68
39
Malawi 59
38
Sierra Leone 58
21
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Respondents were asked: How much influence do you think China’s economic activities in [our
country] have on our economy, or haven’t you heard enough to say? (% who say “some” or “a lot”)
Question was not asked in Eswatini in 2014/2015.
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 12Views on development assistance from China
Between 2000 and 2019, China granted loans of about $153 billion to African countries
(Pairault, 2021). In spite of China’s increasing investments and support, fewer than half (47%)
of Africans are aware that China gives loans or development assistance to their countries
(Figure 11). Awareness of such funds varies from more than two-thirds in Kenya (74%),
Mauritius (70%), and Cabo Verde (68%) to fewer than one-third in Sierra Leone (30%),
Morocco (28%), Nigeria (28%), and Tunisia (24%).
Figure 11: Heard of Chinese loans/development assistance | 33* countries
| 2019/2021
Kenya 74 13
Mauritius 70 10
Cabo Verde 68 25
Ghana 60 23
Mali 59 25
Benin 58 37
Liberia 56 32
Guinea 55 36
Gabon 55 39
Zambia 54 17
Angola 53 24
Namibia 53 21
Gambia 51 24
Lesotho 51 15
Côte d'Ivoire 51 38
Cameroon 49 30
Sudan 48 29
Senegal 47 22
33-country average 47 27
Malawi 47 18
Ethiopia 46 25
Togo 43 31
Uganda 42 13
Burkina Faso 41 37
Botswana 38 17
Mozambique 36 47
South Africa 36 24
Niger 36 35
Zimbabwe 34 16
Tanzania 31 27
Sierra Leone 30 26
Morocco 28 46
Nigeria 28 33
Tunisia 24 28
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Aware of Chinese loans/aid Not aware of Chinese loans/aid
Respondents were asked: To your knowledge, does China give loans or development assistance to our
country’s government, or haven’t you had a chance to hear about this?
*Question was not asked in Eswatini.
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 13Among citizens who are aware that their countries receive loans or development assistance
from China, a plurality (41%) think China attaches “somewhat fewer” or “far fewer”
conditions to its assistance than other countries. A quarter (24%) think Chinese assistance
comes with more strings attached, while 35% say they “don’t know” or refused to answer the
question (Figure 12).
Figure 12: Conditionalities on loans/assistance | 33* countries | 2019/2021
100%
21
80%
24
60%
14
40%
69
20% 41
21
0%
Senegal
Benin
Niger
Lesotho
Mauritius
Burkina Faso
Uganda
Ethiopia
Zambia
Tunisia
Morocco
Sierra Leone
Mozambique
Zimbabwe
Côte d'Ivoire
Liberia
Angola
Gabon
Mali
Guinea
Kenya
Tanzania
Malawi
Cabo Verde
Namibia
Togo
Cameroon
Sudan
Botswana
Gambia
Nigeria
South Africa
Ghana
33-country average
Somewhat/Far fewer requirements About the same number of requirements
Somewhat/Many more requirements Don't know/Refused
Respondents who said they are aware of Chinese loans or development assistance were asked: When
the government of China gives loans or development assistance to [our country], do you think they put
more requirements or fewer requirements on our government compared to other donor countries, or
haven’t you heard enough to say?
(Note: Respondents who are not aware of Chinese loans or development assistance are excluded.)
*Question was not asked in Eswatini.
About three-quarters (75%) of those who are aware that their countries receive loans or
development assistance from China are also aware that their governments will likely be
required to repay loans (Figure 13). Except for Lesotho, majorities in all surveyed countries are
aware of this obligation, including about nine in 10 citizens in Kenya (92%), Guinea (89%),
Uganda (88%), Ghana (87%), and Zambia (87%).
And a majority (57%) of those aware of China’s assistance say their countries have borrowed
too much from China. Kenyans (87%), Namibians (79%), Zambians (77%), and Angolans (75%)
are particularly concerned about their government’s indebtedness to China, while only three
in 10 Tanzanians (29%), Sierra Leoneans (30%), and Batswana (32%) express such concerns.
This suggests that the U.S. government and other development partners may be meeting
with some success in their efforts to remind Africans that even if money from China and other
non-traditional development partners comes with fewer strings, they are in danger of being
lured into a deepening debt trap.
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 14Figure 13: Views on loans/development assistance from China | 33* countries
| 2019/2021
Kenya 92
87
Guinea 89
63
Uganda 88
67
Ghana 87
69
Zambia 87
77
Nigeria 84
57
Togo 83
56
Mali 82
43
Gabon 82
58
Angola 82
75
Mauritius 81
45
Côte d'Ivoire 80
47
Niger 79
59
Ethiopia 79
63
Morocco 78
55
Senegal 77
66
Namibia 77
79
Burkina Faso 77
38
South Africa 76
68
33-country average 75
57
Benin 74
50
Gambia 74
57
Cameroon 71
62
Malawi 71
56
Tanzania 71
29
Sudan 70 Government is
64
required to repay
Cabo Verde 67
56 China for loans
Sierra Leone 65
30
Mozambique 60
53 Government has
Tunisia 60 borrowed too
42
Zimbabwe 58 much money from
50
58
China
Botswana 32
Liberia 54
48
Lesotho 38
48
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Respondents who said they are aware of Chinese loans or development assistance were asked:
Do you think that our government is required to repay China for the loans and development
assistance it provides to [our country]?
Do you think our government has borrowed too much money from China?
(Note: Respondents who are not aware of Chinese loans or development assistance are excluded.)
*Question was not asked in Eswatini.
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 15Do views on China affect African attitudes toward democracy?
Views on whether China or the United States is preferable as a development model do not
appear to have any significant effect on Africans’ support for democracy or democratic
norms. Respondents who prefer China as a developmental model are just as likely as those
who prefer the U.S. model to favor democracy over other kinds of governance systems (70%
vs. 72%) (Figure 14).
They are also equally likely to reject one-party rule, endorse presidential term limits, support
elections as the best way to choose their country’s leaders, support multiparty competition,
and prioritize an accountable government over an efficient one.
Figure 14: Support for democratic norms and institutions | by preference for China or
U.S. as development model | 34 countries | 2019/2021
100%
79 80 78 79
80% 75 77
72
70
63 64 63
60
60%
40%
20%
0%
Reject one- Support Elections are Support Support Prefer
party rule presidential best way to democracy multiparty accountable
term limits choose competition governance
leaders
China as preferred model U.S. as preferred model
See question texts in the Appendix.
Contrary to concerns that China’s influence in Africa might weaken demand for democracy,
respondents who rate China’s influence as “very positive” are actually more likely than those
who rate it as “very negative” to say they prefer democracy over other forms of governance
(71% vs. 63%) and to support elections as the best way of choosing leaders (77% vs. 69%)
(Figure 15). There are no significant differences when it comes to views on other democratic
norms and institutions.
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 16Figure 15: Support for democratic norms and institutions | by perceptions of China’s
influence | 34 countries | 2019/2021
100%
78 76 77 76 76
80% 71
69
63 64 61 61 60
60%
40%
20%
0%
Reject one- Elections are Support Support Support Prefer
party rule best ways to presidential democracy multiparty accountable
choose term limits competition governance
leaders
China's influence very positive China's influence very negative
See question texts in the Appendix.
When it comes to how much democracy Africans are getting, we do see modest evidence
that when citizens admire China as a development model, they feel slightly better about
their own country’s democratic governance.
In evaluating the extent of democracy in their countries, citizens who prefer the China model
do not differ from those who prefer the U.S. model (Figure 16). But on measures of election
quality and presidential accountability to Parliament and to the courts, Africans who prefer
the China model evaluate democratic conditions in their own country a bit more positively.
Figure 16: Assessments of supply of democracy | by preference for China or U.S. as
development model | 34 countries | 2019/2021
100%
80%
65 62 62
57 60
60% 53 53 55
44 42
40%
20%
0%
Perceive country Satisfied with Elections President is President obeys
to be a democracy mostly/completely accountable to laws and courts
democracy free and fair Parliament
China model preferred U.S. model preferred
See question texts in the Appendix.
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 17Best international language for the future
China’s pursuit of cultural “soft power” (Nantulya, 2018), for example via an expanding
network of Confucius Institutes across the continent (BBC, 2019), appears to be making little
progress. Asked which international language they think is most important for young Africans
to learn, seven in 10 respondents (69%) cite English, while only 3% choose Chinese (Figure
17). English is particularly valued by Africans with at least a secondary education (77%-79%).
Figure 17: Most important international language to learn | 34 countries
| 2019/2021
English 69
French 14
Arabic 5
Kiswahili 3
Chinese 3
Portuguese 2
Other languages 1
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Respondents were asked: In thinking about the future of the next generation in our country, which of
these international languages, if any, do you think is most important for young people to learn?
Conclusion
Recent Afrobarometer surveys show that Africans generally hold positive views of both
Chinese and U.S. economic and political influence on the continent. Moreover, attitudes
toward the two countries are positively rather than negatively correlated, i.e. people who
feel positive toward China are also more likely to view the United States positively, and vice
versa. Importantly, Africans’ views on China do not appear to affect their support for
democracy and democratic norms.
China’s perceived influence has decreased over the past five years, and many citizens are
concerned about their government’s indebtedness to China. In the end, Africans still prefer
the United States over China as a development model for their country, and English remains
the international language of choice across much of the continent. But Africans appear to
welcome foreign engagement that meets their priorities, whether it originates in China or the
United States.
Do your own analysis of Afrobarometer data – on any question,
for any country and survey round. It’s easy and free at
www.afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis.
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 18References Amoah, P. A., Hodzi, O., & Castillo, R. (2020). Africans in China and Chinese in Africa: Inequalities, social identities, and wellbeing. Asian Ethnicity, 21(4), 457-463. BBC. (2019). Confucius Institutes: The growth of China’s controversial cultural branch. 6 September. Brautigam, D. (2019). A critical look at Chinese ‘debt-trap diplomacy’: The rise of a meme. Area Development and Policy, 5(1), 1-1430 October. Brautigam, D., & Kidane, W. (2020). China, Africa, and debt distress: Fact and fiction about asset seizures. China Africa Research Initiative. Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. China Africa Research Initiative. (2018). Data: China-Africa trade. Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Green, M. (2019). China’s debt diplomacy. Foreign Policy. 25 April. Lekorwe, M., Chingwete, A., Okuru, M., & Samson, R. (2016). China’s growing presence in Africa wins largely positive popular reviews. Afrobarometer dispatch. Mattes, R. (2020). Lived poverty on the rise: Decade of living-standard gains ends in Africa. Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 62. Mitchell, J. (2019). IMF: African economies are the world's fastest growing. FDI Intelligence. 17 October. Muchira, N. (2018). New $60b US fund to rival Chinese push into Africa. East African. 7 November. Nantulya, P. (2018). Grand strategy and China’s soft power push in Africa. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. 30 August. Pairault, T. (2021). China’s presence in Africa is at heart political. Diplomat. 11 August. Scott, C. D. (2021). Does China’s involvement in African elections and politics hurt democracy? Democracy in Africa. 27 September. Shepherd, C., & Blanchard, B. (2018). China's Xi offers another $60 billion to Africa, but says no to 'vanity' projects. Reuters. 3 September. Sun, Y. (2014). China’s aid to Africa: Monster or messiah? Brookings. 7 February. Thomas, D. (2021). What can Africa expect from FOCAC 2021? Africa Business. 6 October. Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 19
Appendix Table A.1: Afrobarometer Round 8 fieldwork dates and previous survey rounds Country Round 8 fieldwork Previous survey rounds Angola Nov.-Dec. 2019 N/A Benin Nov.-Dec. 2020 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017 Botswana July-August 2019 1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017 Burkina Faso Dec. 2019 2008, 2012, 2015, 2017 Cabo Verde Dec. 2019 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017 Cameroon Feb.-March 2021 2013, 2015, 2018 Côte d'Ivoire Nov. 2019 2013, 2014, 2017 Eswatini March-April 2021 2013, 2015, 2018 Ethiopia DDc. 2019-Jan. 2020 2013 Gabon Feb. 2020 2015, 2017 Gambia Feb. 2021 2018 Ghana Sept.-Oct. 2019 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017 Guinea Nov.-Dec. 2019 2013, 2015, 2017 Kenya August-Sept. 2019 2003, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2016 Lesotho Feb.-March 2020 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017 Liberia Oct.-Dec. 2020 2008, 2012, 2015, 2018 Malawi Nov.-Dec. 2019 1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017 Mali March-April 2020 2001, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2014, 2017 Mauritius Nov. 2020 2012, 2014, 2017 Morocco Feb. 2021 2013, 2015, 2018 Mozambique May-July 2021 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2018 Namibia August 2019 1999, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017 Niger Oct.-Nov. 2020 2013, 2015, 2018 Nigeria Jan.-Feb. 2020 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2015, 2017 Senegal Dec. 2020-Jan. 2021 2002, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2014, 2017 Sierra Leone March 2020 2012, 2015, 2018 South Africa May-June 2021 2000, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2018 Sudan Feb.-April 2021 2013, 2015, 2018 Tanzania Feb.-March 2021 2001, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017 Togo Dec. 2020-Jan. 2021 2012, 2014, 2017 Tunisia Feb.-March 2020 2013, 2015, 2018 Uganda Sept.-Oct. 2019 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2017 Zambia Nov.-Dec. 2020 1999, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2017 Zimbabwe April-May 2021 1999, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2017 Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 20
Question texts for Figure 14 and Figure 15 (support for democratic norms and institutions) Respondents were asked: Reject one-party rule There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives: Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office? (% who “disapprove” or “strongly disapprove”) Support presidential term limits Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Statement 1: The Constitution should limit the president to serving a maximum of two terms in office. Statement 2: There should be no constitutional limit on how long the president can serve. (% who “agree” or “agree very strongly” with Statement 1) Elections are best way to choose leaders Which of the following statements is closest to your own opinion? Statement 1: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open, and honest elections. Statement 2: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country’s leaders. (% who “agree” or “agree very strongly” with Statement 1) Support democracy Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have. (% who choose Statement 1) Support multiparty competition Which of the following statements is closest to your own opinion? Statement 1: Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in [country]. Statement 2: Many political parties are needed to make sure that [citizens] have real choices in who governs them. (% who “agree” or “agree very strongly” with Statement 2) Prefer accountable governance Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Statement 1: It is more important to have a government that can get things done, even if we have no influence over what it does. Statement 2: It is more important for citizens to be able to hold government accountable, even if that means it makes decisions more slowly. (% who “agree” or “agree very strongly” with Statement 2) Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 21
Question texts for Figure 16 (assessments of supply of democracy) Respondents were asked: Perceived country to be a democracy In your opinion, how much of a democracy is [country] today? (% who say “a full democracy” or “a democracy with minor problems”) Satisfied with democracy Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]? (% who say “fairly satisfied” or “very satisfied”) Elections mostly/completely free and fair On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last general election, held in [year]? (% who say “completely free and fair” or “free and fair with minor problems”) President is accountable to Parliament In your opinion, how often, in this country does the president ignore the [national legislature] and just do what s/he wants? (% who say “rarely” or “never”) President obeys laws and courts In your opinion, how often, in this country does the president ignore the courts and laws of this country? (% who say “rarely” or “never”) Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021 22
Josephine Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny is knowledge translation manager for Afrobarometer.
Email: jappiah@afrobarometer.org.
Edem Selormey is director of research at the Ghana Center for Democratic Development.
Email: edem@cddgh.org.
Afrobarometer, a nonprofit corporation with headquarters in Ghana, is a pan-African, non-
partisan research network. Regional coordination of national partners in about 35 countries is
provided by the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), the Institute for
Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) in South Africa, and the Institute for Development Studies
(IDS) at the University of Nairobi in Kenya. Michigan State University (MSU) and the University
of Cape Town (UCT) provide technical support to the network.
Financial support for Afrobarometer Round 8 has been provided by Sweden via the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the Open
Society Foundations, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) via the U.S. Institute of Peace.
Donations help Afrobarometer give voice to African citizens. Please consider making a
contribution (at www.afrobarometer.org) or contact Bruno van Dyk
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Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 489 | 15 November 2021
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