Assessment of the terrorist threA t to DenmArk - march 2021 - PET
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A s s e s s m e n t o f t h e t e r r o r i s t t h r e at to D e n m a r k
March 2021
Page 2 DANISH SECURIT Y AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 3
PREFACE
The assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark is the overall assessment of
the terrorist threat to Denmark and Danish interests abroad by the Centre for
Terror Analysis (CTA)1. It is based on a number of underlying CTA analyses, rang-
ing from assessments of the threat against specific individuals, locations and
events to broader trend analyses and assessments of phenomena with an im-
pact on the terrorist threat to Denmark and Danish interests abroad.
Compared with previous assessments of the terrorist threat to Denmark, CTA
has decided to adjust the term of the lowest level on the scale from “none” to
“minimal” so the term corresponds with the definition of the threat level. Addi-
tionally, the aim is to be able to reflect a threat potential in areas where there
is no identified capability or intent. Due to this precision, the threat levels for
Greenland and the Faroe Islands are assessed as “minimal” rather than “limited”
without this reflecting a change in the nature of the threat.
The preparation of the 2021 assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark has
been overshadowed by an ongoing pandemic, which affects many parts of so-
ciety. The pandemic and its derived consequences also affect the assessment of
the current threat picture, which remains uncertain in terms of the pandemic’s
impact on future trends.
The assessment describes the terrorist threat from militant Islamism, right-wing
extremism, left-wing extremism and other threats which may be characterized
as terrorism. Section 6 focuses on the terrorist threat to Greenland and the Faroe
Islands.
The assessment is based on intelligence processed before 15 March 2021.
Sincerely,
Michael Hamann
Head of CTA
Photo: Astrid Maria Rasmussen, Ritzau Scanpix
1. CTA is a fusion centre comprising staff from five Danish authorities (the Danish Security and Intelligence Service, the Danish Defence Intelli-
gence Service, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Emergency Management Agency and the National Centre of Investigation).
3 PREFACE
6 SELECTED TERMS AND SCALES USED IN THE ASSESSMENT
1
8 GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK
8 Militant Islamists
10 Right-wing extremists
10 Left-wing extremists
10 Other factors
11 Impact of covid-19 on the terrorist threat to Denmark
2
14 THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK FROM MILITANT ISLAMISTS
Content
15 Impact of perceived insults on the terrorist threat
17 Trends in the global militant Islamist threat picture
20 Militant Islamist terrorist targets and modus operandi in Denmark
22 Focus areas concerning the threat from militant Islamism
28 The terrorist threat from militant Islamists to Danes and Danish interests abroad
3
31 THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK FROM RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS
31 Trends in relation to the threat and narratives
36 Right-wing extremist terrorist targets and modus operandi in Denmark
4
38 THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK FROM LEFT-WING EXTREMISTS
5
40 OTHER THREATS THAT COULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS TERRORISM
41 Conspiracy theories
42 Incels
42 Climate extremists
42 Sovereignty movements
43 People suffering from mental disorders
6
44 THE TERRORIST THREAT TO GREENLAND AND THE FAROE ISLANDS
44 Specifically on the terrorist threat to Greenland
44 Specifically on the terrorist threat to the Faroe Islands
45 Appendix: Modus operandi for terrorist attacks in Denmark
Page 6 DANISH SECURIT Y AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
SELECTED TERMS AND SCALES USED IN THE ASSESSMENT
CTA uses the following degrees of probability (written in italics in the text):
Unlikely Less likely Possible Likely Highly likely
= 85%
Terrorist threat Definition
level
Very significant There is a specific threat. There is capability, intent, planning and possibly initiation.
Significant There is a known threat. There is capability, intent and planning.
General There is a general threat. There is capability and/or intent and possibly planning.
Limited There is a potential threat. There is limited capability and/or intent.
Minimal There are no indications of any threat. There is no known capability or intent.
Term Definition
Terrorism CTA defines terrorism pursuant to Section 114 of the Danish Criminal Code.
North America, Australia, New Zealand and Europe, not including Russia, Belarus, Turkey, Moldo-
The West va and the Caucasus.
A private person who has travelled to a conflict zone to support one of the parties in the conflict
Traveller without necessarily engaging in combat.
Intent The will to employ a certain capability against a certain target or target group.
Agreement between a person’s accessible means and their ability (training, skills, logistics etc.) to
Capability use these in a terrorist attack.
Extremism The will to use violence or commit other illegal acts in order to change existing social conditions.
A dynamic process in which a person increasingly accepts the use of violence to achieve political,
Radicalization religious or ideological ends.
A person who commits a solo terrorist attack, while planning, training etc. may involve other
Lone actor people.
The perpetrator is inspired by militant Islamism or political extremism and plans the attack on
Inspired attack their own.
The perpetrator is in direct contact with one or more people who provide guidance or in other
Supported attack ways support the attack plans.
An attack is sanctioned by and/or planned under a mandate from the senior leadership of a ter-
Directed attack rorist group.
Photo: Amager Torv, Strøget i Københvan, Rune Johansen, Scanpix
Page 8 DANISH SECURIT Y AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 9
1. GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK
CTA assesses that the terrorist threat to Denmark re- the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo reprinted
mains significant. According to PET’s definitions, this the Muhammad cartoons on September 2, 2020.
means that there is a known threat. There is capability,
intent and planning2. The most likely militant Islamist terrorist attack in Den-
mark is an attack carried out with easily accessible
PET regularly launches operations to uncover and pre- means, firearms or improvised explosive devices by a
vent potential terrorist threats to targets in Denmark. small group or a lone actor inspired by militant Islamist
Since 2019, PET has made arrests in five separate ter- propaganda. CTA assesses that the threat comes from
ror-related cases in collaboration with the relevant po- individuals within Danish militant Islamist environ-
lice districts. Most recently, PET in co-operation with ments and from other radicalized individuals in Den-
relevant police districts arrested 13 people in Denmark mark and abroad. International virtual communities
on February 6 and 8, 2021, and another person was ar- in which propaganda is disseminated and extremist
rested by German police. The individuals in question views are exchanged across national borders often play
are suspected of planning a terrorist attack in Denmark a role in the radicalization process.
or another country using firearms and improvised ex-
plosive devices. The most likely targets of a militant Islamist terrorist at-
tack in Denmark are symbolic targets or unprotected
Terrorist attacks may occur with no prior intelligence civilian targets, such as associated with perceived in-
indications, even when the perpetrators have previous- sults to Islam. Other potential symbolic targets include
ly been known to sympathize with militant Islamism Jewish targets as well as the police and the armed forc-
or political extremism. A source of particular concern es – particularly in connection with guarding duties.
in this regard are people who go through a relatively Finally, other public officials and certain members of
short radicalization process as well people who are ex- political parties may be potential targets.
cluded or rejected from extremist environments, for
example due to unusually extreme views or behaviour. The leaderships of the militant Islamist groups IS and
Photo: Københavns Byret,
Ida Guldbæk, Ritzau Scanpix
AQ have been weakened, and the groups’ capability to
1.1 Militant Islamists carry out complex, directed attacks in the West is still
Militant Islamists remain the primary terrorist threat reduced. However, their intent remains the same, and
to Denmark, and CTA assesses this threat to be at the both IS and AQ call on their supporters to carry out at-
level of significant. According to PET’s definitions, this ist attack in Denmark or another country using firearms an Peninsula (AQAP) has called for attacks on named tacks against targets in the West.
means that there is a known threat. There is capability, and improvised explosive devices. Both cases showed Danish “offenders”. An added focus on cases of insults
intent and planning indications that the suspects had been inspired by mil- in general may increase the terrorist threat to Denmark Currently, nearly half of the 160 adults who have left
itant Islamist propaganda. and Danish interests abroad. Possible reactions may Denmark for the conflict zone in Syria/Iraq have either
There are people in Denmark and abroad with militant occur in the short term, but can also appear at a much returned to Denmark or taken up residence in another
Islamist sympathies who pose a terrorist threat to Den- In 2020, incidents in Denmark and abroad which were later stage. country in or outside Europe, while roughly one third
mark. CTA assesses that the threat emanates from peo- perceived as insults to Islam showed that cases of in- are presumed to have died in the conflict zone. The re-
ple sympathizing with and inspired by foreign militant sults still have considerable potential as a motivating There were no militant Islamist attacks in Denmark in maining 32 travellers are presumably still in the conflict
Islamist terrorist groups, particularly Islamic State (IS) factor for militant Islamists. Reactions to cases of in- 2020, but 12 militant Islamist attacks were committed zone in Syria/Iraq or in neighbouring countries.
and al-Qaida (AQ). This is for instance illustrated by the sults abroad, particularly in France, have added to the in other countries in the West, while eight attacks were
arrest on April 30, 2020 of a Danish citizen suspected of increased focus on past and current cases of insults in foiled. The number of terrorist attacks in the West was CTA assesses that the threat to Danish interests abroad
planning a solo terrorist attack involving one or more Denmark. In the past year, both AQ and IS have men- significantly lower in 2020 than in the years 2015-2017, generally does not differ from the threat to interests
firearms and the arrests on February 6, 2021 of two Syr- tioned Denmark in their publications, while propagan- although the number of attacks carried out in the West of other Western countries. Danes, like other Western-
ian citizens in Denmark suspected of planning a terror- da from the AQ-affiliated group al-Qaida in the Arabi- has been on the rise, and particularly in France, since ers, are at risk of becoming random victims of attacks
2. The threat to Denmark may be kept at “significant” with no planning in progress, as Denmark has previously been the target of attacks, at-
tempted attacks or attack planning.
Page 10 DANISH SECURIT Y AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 11
directed at Western interests or if they are near local A left-wing extremist terrorist attack in
terrorist targets, such as crowded places, churches and Denmark is most likely to be carried out
particular official buildings. with easily accessible means by a small
group of people who are members of
1.2 Right-wing extremists or in contact with a Danish left-wing
CTA assesses the terrorist threat to Denmark from right- extremist group.
wing extremists to be at the level of general. According
to PET’s definitions, this means that there is a general The most likely targets of a left-wing
threat. There is capability and/or intent and possibly extremist terrorist attack are right-wing
planning. extremist activities and representatives
of the authorities, mainly the police.
A right-wing extremist terrorist attack in Denmark Other potential targets include indi-
is most likely to be carried out with easily accessible viduals perceived to sympathize with
means or firearms by a lone actor or a small group. CTA right-wing extremism and, to a lesser
assesses that the right-wing extremist threat primarily degree, certain politicians and public
emanates from individuals and small groups who typ- figures perceived as political oppo-
ically meet, become radicalized and find inspiration nents, including artists and debaters.
in virtual right-wing extremist communities and net-
works. 1.4 Other factors
A number of other factors may affect
The most likely targets of a right-wing extremist ter- the terrorist threat to Denmark. For
rorist attack in Denmark are Muslim targets, immigrant example, certain conspiracy theories
targets, Jewish targets, and people of non-Danish eth- and movements may contain violent
nicity as well as locations where these groups are seen threat potential, which may evolve into
to gather. Other potential targets include political op- actions that, subject to a legal assess-
ponents, especially left-wing extremists and certain ment, may be characterized as terror-
politicians with views opposing right-wing extremism. ism.
Finally, some authorities and LGBTQ+ figures are also
potential targets. In addition, threatening comments on
social media and elsewhere may cause
In 2020, two successful and seven foiled right-wing ex- people who are mentally unstable or Photo: Unsplash.com
tremist terrorist attacks were seen in the West. This is a easily influenced, to commit violence
significant drop compared with 2019, where especially that could constitute acts of terrorism.
the March 2019 attack in Christchurch, New Zealand, If a perpetrator suffers from a mental
inspired other right-wing extremist attacks. Thus, the disorder, it may be difficult for the authorities to assess
number of successful attacks in 2019 was 12, while whether violent actions committed by that person con- reactions, including violent protests, may for instance changed the intent and capability of militant Islamists
seven attacks were foiled. stitute acts of terrorism. target politicians, public officials, random citizens or or political extremists to commit terrorist attacks in
foreign diplomatic representations in Denmark. Denmark. However, it is likely that the covid-19 pan-
1.3 Left-wing extremists Finally, political, ethnic and religious conflicts abroad demic has contributed to strengthening existing an-
CTA assesses the terrorist threat to Denmark from left- may spark reactions from individuals or groups in 1.5 Impact of covid-19 on the terrorist threat to ti-state narratives among right-wing extremists in Den-
wing extremists to be at the level of limited. According Denmark with links to the affected groups, which may Denmark mark. CTA assesses that the increased anti-state focus
to PET’s definitions this means that there is a potential develop into acts that could be characterized as terror- CTA assesses that the covid-19 pandemic is not an may impact on the target selection of Danish right-
threat. There is limited capability and/or intent. ism. Such acts may involve state actors. The concrete essential driver of terrorism in Denmark and that the wing extremists. CTA further assesses that opposition
pandemic, and the way it is handled, has not in itself to the restrictions or vaccination programmes may lead
Page 12 DANISH SECURIT Y AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 13
to threats of violence, civil disobedience, arson, vandal- arson, vandalism and acts of violence which, subject to
ism and acts of violence which, subject to a legal as- a legal assessment, could be characterized as terrorism.
sessment, could be characterized as terrorism.
The assessment of the threat posed by covid-19 scep-
Virtual activities often play a role in a radicalization pro- tics and opponents of covid-19 restrictions is charac-
cess, and it is possible that the lockdown imposed dur- terized by a large degree of uncertainty. The threat em-
ing the covid-19 pandemic in some cases has increased anates to a large degree from individuals and groups
the use of online propaganda. that do not have a well-known and long-standing his-
tory of engaging in violent protests or other actions
Restrictions on social activity in response to covid-19 aimed at politicians or authorities, and the available
reduce the availability of unprotected targets such as data is therefore limited.
large crowds in public places. As a result, perpetrators
may adjust their attack plans and target selection. CTA assesses that the amount of threatening or hostile
statements in virtual forums and at demonstrations
CTA assesses that covid-19 conspiracy theories may ap- which draw major public attention may increase the
Militant Islamism
peal to and radicalize individuals with no, or only insig- risk of inspiring some mentally unstable individuals to
nificant, prior extremist views or contact with extremist carry out acts of violence which, subject to a legal as-
environments. A number of conspiracy theories that sessment, could be characterized as terrorism.
have emerged or been expanded in relation to covid-
19 are included in an ecosystem of online conspiracy It is possible that, in the long term, terrorist groups
theories that may further radicalize individuals who al- abroad may benefit from the pandemic and its con-
ready resort to violence and in some cases legitimize sequent effects and that the general terrorist threat to is an Islamist ideology which legitimizes the
or encourage acts of violence. This especially regards Western interests in the affected countries and regions
conspiracy theories furthering distrust in the authori- therefore will increase. use of violence to achieve political, religious
ties, spreading a simplistic black and white view of the
world, referring to politicians and public officials as en- or ideological ends.
emies and legitimizing acts of violence out of consider-
ation for “the people”.
In general, the covid-19 restrictions and vaccination
programmes have met resistance from loosely organ-
ized groups of covid-19 sceptics and opponents of
covid-19 restrictions. This resistance has led to harsh,
anti-state rhetoric on social media, including threats to
certain politicians and representatives of the authori-
ties and health service. Vaccine-related matters may
also be used by extremists and conspiracy theorists for
misinformation and propaganda purposes. In addition,
acts of violence have been seen in connection with
protests against the covid-19 restrictions, for example
during protest marches in Aalborg and Copenhagen in
the winter of 2020/2021. CTA further assesses that op-
position to the restrictions or vaccination programmes
may lead to threats to violence, civil disobedience,
Page 14 DANISH SECURIT Y AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 15
2. THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK FROM MILITANT ISLAMISTS
The most likely militant 2.1 Impact of perceived insults on the terrorist
Photo: Liselotte Sabroe, Ritzau Scanpix Islamist terrorist attack in threat
Denmark is an attack car- Cases of perceived insults to Islam (hereafter “cases of
ried out with easily acces- insults”), sometimes relating to the debate on freedom
sible means, firearms or im- of speech, have been a factor in the terrorist threat to
provised explosive devices Denmark since the cartoon case in 2005. In 2020, inci-
by a small group or a lone dents in Denmark and abroad which were perceived as
actor inspired by militant insults to Islam showed that cases of insults still have
Islamist propaganda. At- considerable potential as a motivating factor for mili-
tacks with easily accessible tant Islamists. Response to cases of insults abroad, par-
means can be carried out ticularly in France, have added to increased focus on
spontaneously or follow- past and current cases of perceived insults in Denmark.
ing a very short planning
phase. CTA assesses that In 2020, the political party Stram Kurs continued dese-
the threat comes from indi- crating the Quran during a number of demonstrations
viduals within Danish mili- in Denmark and a few demonstrations abroad. The in-
tant Islamist environments ternational media coverage of Stram Kurs and its lead-
and from other radicalized er increased after the party burned a Quran in Malmö,
individuals in Denmark and Sweden, on August 28, 2020.
abroad. International vir-
tual communities in which During a Stram Kurs demonstration near the residen-
propaganda is disseminat- tial area Gellerupparken in Aarhus on June 5, 2020, a
ed and extremist views are person broke through the police cordon and pulled a
exchanged across national knife. There are indications that the person is mental-
borders often play a role in ly unstable. In February 2021, the city court found the
the radicalization process. perpetrator and a co-defendant guilty of attempted
grievous bodily harm, sentencing one to imprisonment
CTA assesses that the for one year and three months and the other to indefi-
covid-19 pandemic is not nite placement and deportation from Denmark.
an obvious motive for mil-
itant Islamists in Denmark, On September, 2020, the French satirical magazine
who traditionally focus on Charlie Hebdo reprinted its own cartoon of a crying
perceived insults to Islam, Muhammad from a 2006 magazine cover and all 12
perceived oppression of Danish Muhammad cartoons from 2005. The cartoons
This chapter describes the trends within various key the impact of terrorist financing from Denmark and the
Muslims and Western military intervention in Muslim were reprinted to mark the start of a trial in France that
areas that CTA assesses will impact the terrorist threat terrorist threat that militant Islamists pose to Danes
countries. It is possible that individuals in Denmark who same day against 14 suspected accomplices in the Jan-
to Denmark from militant Islamists in the coming year. and Danish interests abroad.
sympathize with militant Islamism have spent more uary 2015 terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo.
Particular focus is given to the impact of perceived in-
time on the internet since the outbreak of the covid-19
sults to Islam, the global threat picture, virtual commu- CTA assesses the terrorist threat to Denmark from mili-
pandemic and the introduction of restrictions on social The reprinting prompted negative reactions in parts
nities, militant Islamist environments, connections to tant Islamists to be at the level of significant. According
activity. Thus, these individuals may also have been ex- of the Muslim world, and a number of militant Islamist
criminal gangs, radicalized ex-prisoners, travellers to to PET’s definitions, this means that there is a known
posed to more extremist and pro-violence militant Isla- propaganda media focused primarily on vengeance
and returnees from conflict zones, the asylum and mi- threat. There is capability, intent and planning.
mist propaganda and may have increased their partic- against France. In the weeks following the reprinting,
gration area as well as people who may travel to Den-
ipation in militant Islamist virtual online communities. Denmark or Danes were mentioned explicitly four times
mark to commit acts of terrorism. Finally, CTA assesses
in the official propaganda of militant Islamist groups.
Page 16 DANISH SECURIT Y AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 17
The reprinting and especially the killing of the 2.2 Trends in the global militant Islamist threat spans several years. In 2020, AQ continued to encour-
French school teacher also sparked a debate in picture3 age its sympathizers to carry out solo attacks in their
Denmark on the limits of freedom of speech. The leaderships of the militant Islamist groups IS and home countries, including in the West.
As in many other countries, the number of inci- AQ have been weakened, and their capability to carry
dents during this period also caused deep con- out complex, directed attacks in the West has been Regional AQ sub-groups play a central role in the
cern in Danish society. reduced in recent years. However, the intent of these group’s organization and global presence. The sub-
groups remains the same, and both IS and AQ encour- groups are currently present in large parts of Africa,
The extent of negative reactions to cases of in- age their supporters to carry out attacks against West- the Middle East and Asia. Their primary focus is on
sults in the West varies from case to case. Some ern targets. This is especially emphasized by the efforts their own, local interests, but they often follow instruc-
cases never receive any attention, while others of IS to build attack structures outside Syria/Iraq which tions from the senior leadership. CTA assesses that IS
– as was the case in France in the autumn of can act locally and also strike against targets in the and AQ sympathizers may become inspired by the
2020 – lead to considerable negative attention, West. In 2020, both IS and AQ highlighted perceived in- groups’ propaganda to carry out attacks in Denmark or
including planning and execution of militant Is- sults to Islam and the covid-19 pandemic in their prop- against Danish targets abroad. The quantity as well as
lamist terrorist attacks. aganda. the quality of the official IS and AQ propaganda remain
highly reduced compared with a few years ago, when
CTA assesses that, since the cartoon case in Since March 2019, when IS lost control of its last terri- especially IS had a large-scale propaganda production.
2005, Denmark has had a reputation for of- tories in Syria/Iraq, the group has established itself as a However, a large amount of propaganda still exists on-
fending Islam among militant Islamists. When local terrorist and rebel group in the two countries. It is line, including extremely violent IS propaganda, which
Denmark or Danes are mentioned or singled likely that IS in Syria/Iraq is mainly focused on attacking may have an effect in terms of radicalization and target
out in militant Islamist propaganda, Denmark’s local targets. selection and may offer specific guidance in connec-
reputation as a “nation of offenders” may regain tion with attack planning.
momentum. IS regards the West as its enemy and, along with IS-af-
filiated groups and sympathizers, the group still poses IS, AQ and their affiliated groups and sympathizers
It is CTA’s overall assessment that considerable a terrorist threat to Denmark and Danish interests have mentioned covid-19 in their propaganda a num-
militant Islamist attention to circumstances and abroad. It is likely that the overall strategy of IS remains ber of times. IS has, for instance, focused on how the
Photo: Hizb-ut-Tahrir demo,
Liselotte Sabroe, Ritzau Scanpix events in Denmark may affect the terrorist threat the same and that the long-term goal is still to create a pandemic is weakening the economies of Western
to individuals in Denmark, Denmark in general so-called caliphate. In 2020, IS continued to encourage countries and making Western societies more vulner-
and Danish interests abroad. CTA assesses that its sympathizers to carry out solo attacks in their home able to militant Islamist attacks. However, the focus
Denmark was mainly used as historical reference to the the impact on the terrorist threat is highly dependent countries, including in the West. on covid-19 was most notable at the beginning of the
punishment and sanctions that had previously been on the exposure of the individual cases in national and pandemic and has decreased with the global spread of
imposed on countries perceived as offensive to Islam. international editorial media, social media and militant AQ believes that Islam is under attack from the West, the virus.
Islamist propaganda as well as on the response to these militarily, financially, socially and culturally. AQ and
In the months following the reprinting, militant Is- cases in militant Islamist environments in Denmark and AQ-affiliated groups pose a threat, although the Since September 2020, IS has started focusing on per-
lamists in France carried out three separate terrorist abroad. Possible reactions may occur in the short term, group’s capability to direct complex attacks in the West ceived insults to Islam in its official propaganda. Sever-
attacks against random people at Charlie Hebdo’s for- but can also appear at a much later stage. remains limited. A number of leading members of AQ al times during the autumn and winter of 2020, IS, AQ
mer premises (September 25 in Paris), against a French died in 2020, and it is likely that these losses will delay, and their affiliated groups and sympathizers called for
school teacher (October 16 in Paris) and against ran- Finally, CTA notes that militant Islamist terrorist attacks but not directly prevent, the group’s plans to carry out revenge on perceived insults to Islam and the boycott
dom people in a church (October 29 in Nice). A total of motivated by cases of perceived insults to Islam may terrorist attacks against Western targets. of goods.
four people were killed in the attacks, while two were also trigger violent counter-reactions from individuals
seriously injured. It is highly likely that all three attacks and groups motivated by a right-wing extremist, an- It is likely that the main AQ threat to the West comes
were motivated by the reprinting of the cartoons in the ti-Muslim agenda. from small AQ networks operating independently. The
French satirical magazine. CTA notes that militant Isla- networks are typically connected with the AQ senior
mists already focused on France before Charlie Hebdo leadership or regional sub-groups. The networks aim to
reprinted the cartoons. attack symbolic targets, and the planning phase often
3. For further details, see the 2020 Intelligence Risk Assessment by the Danish Defence Intelligence Service.
Page 18 DANISH SECURIT Y AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 19
Figure 1: Foiled and successful militant Islamist terrorist attacks in the West from 2014 to 20204
100
Definitions of types of militant Islamist
90 It is CTA’s assessment that militant Islamist targets can be divided into
symbolic targets and civilian targets.
80
70
60
50
Symbolic targets
40
Public authority targets: Authorities, including certain ministries, police,
military, emergency response services, other public institutions as well
30
as representatives of such authorities. Public authority targets may also
20 include diplomatic representations.
10 Political representatives: Elected politicians, ministers and other people,
0 events and locations affiliated with political parties and movements.
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Targets related to perceived insults: Groups, individuals, locations and
Foiled attacks events which have been selected on the basis of statements, actions or
Successful attacks
themes which the perpetrator perceives as offensive to Islam.
Total
Jewish targets: Synagogues, Jewish meeting places and institutions, such
as schools, and other targets whose association with Judaism is identifi-
Figure 2: People wounded or killed in militant Islamist terrorist attacks in the West from 2014 to 2020
able. Jewish targets also include Israeli interests in Denmark, including
800
diplomatic representations, companies and tourists.
700
Other religious targets: Christian symbolic targets, such as churches and
600 Christian schools, Muslim symbolic targets, such as Shia mosques, and
other religions.
500
400
300
Civilian targets
People who do not constitute symbolic targets. For example random
200
people gathered in public squares, at events or in other crowded places.
100
0
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
People killed
People wounded
4. Data on the number of foiled and successful militant Islamist terrorist attacks in the West may vary depending on the method used for as-
sessing the data and the available information.Page 20 DANISH SECURIT Y AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 21
2.3 Militant Islamist terrorist targets and mo- threat against symbolic targets is primarily aimed at Jewish people, events and locations continue to play cure weapons. In a Danish context, easily accessible
dus operandi in Denmark individuals, institutions and events that may be seen an important role in militant Islamist propaganda, and means are mainly knives, bludgeons/assault weapons,
as offensive to Islam. Other potential symbolic targets militant Islamists regard such targets as legitimate ter- incendiary devices or vehicles.
2.3.1 Targets include Jewish targets as well as the police and mili- rorist targets. The most recent militant Islamist attack
Militant Islamist target selection does not follow a con- tary – particularly in connection with guarding duties. on a Jewish target in Europe was committed in January The arrests in Denmark on December 11, 2019, April 30,
sistent and predictable pattern and may change during There may also be a threat to other public authorities 2016 in France. 2020 and February 6, 2021 underline the continued in-
the course of the planning phase. Target selection may and certain political representatives5. Militant Islamists terest in carrying out attacks with firearms in Denmark.
be influenced by militant Islamist propaganda, current still wish to attack transport infrastructure. 2.3.2 Modus operandi6 The suspects were allegedly all planning to carry out
agendas, personal networks and preferences as well as CTA assesses that the most likely militant Islamist at- a terrorist attack on their own using one or more fire-
the capability of the attack planner. Furthermore, suc- In general, other religious targets are rarely selected tack form in Denmark to be a terrorist attack with use arms, among other means.
cessful terrorist attacks in the West may serve as inspi- as militant Islamist targets. However, IS propaganda of easily accessible means, firearms or improvised ex-
ration for others – a so-called copycat effect. has called for attacks on religious targets a number of plosive devices. Attacks with easily accessible means The types of weapons most often used in militant Isla-
times. In October 2020, a militant Islamist terrorist at- can be carried out spontaneously or following a very mist attacks in the West since 2014 are bludgeons/as-
The most likely targets of a militant Islamist terrorist tack targeted visitors to a church in France. short planning phase, whereas attacks with firearms sault weapons and bladed weapons, which have been
attack in Denmark are symbolic targets or unprotect- are mainly reserved for people with legal access to used in 50 per cent of the attacks and caused 11 per
ed civilian targets, such as public crowded places. The weapons or criminal contacts who can help them pro- cent of all deaths in terrorist attacks since 2014.
Figure 3: Types of targets of successful militant Islamist attacks in the West from 2014 to 2020 (one attack may have multiple targets) Figure 4: Weapons used in successful militan Islamist attacks in the West from 2014 to 2020 (one attack may involve multiple weapon types)
40 40
35 35
30 30
25 25
20 20
15 15
10 10
5 5
0 0
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Targets related to perceived insults Improvised explosive devices or arson
Other religious targets Firearms
Jewish targets Vehicle
Public authority targets Bludgeons/assault weapons
Civilian targets Other easily accessible means
5. The target type “political representatives” was previously included under “public authority targets”. The category has now been listed as a 6. For further elaboration of the capability for terrorism in Denmark, see appendix.
separate target type. This allows a more detailed description of the target and does not in itself indicate any changes to the threat.Page 22 DANISH SECURIT Y AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
Terrorist attacks with improvised explosive devices quick and relatively easy way to disseminate militant
are regularly emphasized in militant Islamist prop- Islamist messages and propaganda to a large interna-
aganda. The most recent attack was carried out in tional audience.
2019 in Lyon, France. In December 2019 and Feb-
ruary 2021 respectively, a number of people were 2.4.2 Militant Islamist environments in Denmark
arrested by PET, in cooperation with relevant police Many militant Islamists move in and out of various en-
districts, and charged with making preparations for vironments and group constellations, where extremist
manufacturing one or more explosive devices to be material and propaganda is shared and where poten-
used in an act of terrorism. tially radicalizing activities of a social and religious
nature take place. Closed or semi-closed groups may
Attacks using drones or chemical, biological and ra- serve particularly well as echo chambers for partici-
diological agents are regularly mentioned in militant pants to build up and reaffirm one another in a mili-
Islamist propaganda, and the risk of such attacks tant Islamist view of the world without being contra-
is also occasionally mentioned in open media. It is dicted. Aside from religious matters, militant Islamists
CTA’s assessment that attacks using such means are especially focus on Danish cases which they perceive
less likely. as offensive.
2.4 Focus areas concerning the threat from The level of security awareness is quite high in Danish
militant Islamism militant Islamist groups. Statements expressing ap-
proval of acts of violence or terrorism or support for
2.4.1 Militant Islamist virtual communities and groups such as IS and AQ are usually made in more
use of the internet closed groups or indirectly by means of inside refer-
Militant Islamists in Denmark and abroad use var- ences.
ious virtual communities for communication with
like-minded people, dissemination of propaganda, The physical militant Islamist environments are main-
radicalization, recruitment and exchange of infor- ly found in and around Copenhagen, Aarhus, Aalborg
mation about weapons and the like, including bomb and on Funen. They are typically multi-ethnic Sunni en-
and attack manuals, which may serve as mutual in- vironments consisting of small groups of men in their
spiration and contribute to building capability. twenties, most of them with roots in Arabic-speaking
countries.
The level of security awareness is quite high in Dan-
ish militant Islamist virtual communities. CTA is 2.4.3 Connections between militant Islamists and
aware that militant Islamist propaganda produced organized criminal environments
by IS and AQ is still being shared in Danish online CTA assesses that persons in Danish gang environments
networks on social media. On the major social media are primarily motivated by money and personal status.
platforms, this propaganda is often shared in a more However, there are several examples of links between
subtle form, where logos and other features associ- militant Islamists and individuals from criminal environ-
ated with the terrorist groups have been removed, ments. These links are in most cases the result of geo-
allowing only those familiar with the groups’ sym- graphical and social overlap within the environments
bols and figures of importance to know the source of that gang members and militant Islamist sympathizers
the propaganda and to understand its true meaning. move in. There are also examples of people from militant
Islamist environments carrying out Islamic missionary
It is likely that, over the next year, militant Islamists activities (dawa) in criminal environments, just as imams
in Denmark and abroad will continue, and increase, and prominent figures in Islamist circles have often been
their use of virtual communities, as these offer a used to negotiate peace between rival gangs.Page 24 DANISH SECURIT Y AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 25
CTA assesses that there are individuals within Danish primarily, but not exclusively, from individuals located
Photo: Storstrøm Fængsel,
gang environments who sympathize with militant Is- in countries bordering Denmark.
Asger Ladefogde, Ritzau Scanpix
lamism, including individuals who have been to Syria/
Iraq. CTA assesses that individuals who are influenced However, the fact that a person travels to a conflict
by militant Islamist propaganda and also linked to crim- zone to support a militant Islamist agenda does not
inal environments prone to use violence and access to necessarily mean that this person poses a terrorist
weapons may pose a terrorist threat to Denmark. In threat to Denmark or Danish interests abroad. The ter-
addition, ongoing relations between people from the rorist threat is determined on the basis of a specific as-
gang environments and militant Islamist environments sessment of the intent and capability of the individual
may increase the capability of militant Islamists to carry to attack Danish targets. Relevant factors to consider
out terrorist attacks in Denmark with firearms and ex- include the person’s continued sympathy for militant
plosives. Islamism and affiliation with militant Islamist groups
along with weapons training and combat experience.
2.4.4 Radicalized ex-prisoners According to CTA’s information, seven per cent of all
CTA assesses that radicalized prison inmates may pose successful and foiled attacks in the West since 2014
a terrorist threat during their incarceration and upon have involved perpetrators who have been to Syria/
their release. This threat may come from people con- Iraq.
victed or suspected of terror-related offences and from
others prone to use violence who start or continue a CTA assesses that at least 160 people have travelled
radicalization process while remanded in custody or from Denmark to Syria/Iraq to join militant Islamist
serving a sentence. Prison radicalization also manifests groups since the summer of 2012. Currently, almost
itself as the spread of extremist networks and the exer- half of them have returned to Denmark or taken up res-
tion of ideological influence on others. idence in mainly other European countries.
CTA is aware of seven perpetrators who have commit- According to PET’s information, nearly one third of
ted terrorist attacks in Europe since 2015 while on leave the total number of travellers have died in the conflict
from prison or within the first six months of their re- zone. 32 adult travellers from Denmark remain in Syria/
lease. One of them was the Danish citizen Omar Abdel Iraq or in neighbouring countries. Slightly less than half
Hamid El-Hussein, who committed a terrorist attack are women. Of the 32 adults who remain in the conflict
in Copenhagen in February 2015 approximately three zone, 11 have only held Danish residence permits, and
weeks after his release. Most recently, a twenty-year- CTA is aware of a few cases where individuals convicted been to the conflict zone in Syria/Iraq may pose a threat these have all been revoked. In addition, ten have had
old male with asylum status committed a terrorist of militant Islamist terror-related offences have inter- to Denmark or Danish interests abroad. This applies to their Danish citizenship revoked by an administrative
attack in Dresden, Germany, on October 4, 2020, less acted during their incarceration and have attempted both men and women and regardless of whether they order. The remaining 11 adults are Danish citizens. Ac-
than two weeks after his release. This is one of three at- to influence other inmates. are still located in the conflict zone, have returned to cording to PET’s information, five of these 11 citizens
tacks in 2020 that took place within two weeks of the Denmark or are located in another country in or out- are currently imprisoned or detained, mainly in camps
perpetrator’s release. CTA assesses that radicalized inmates may pose a ter- side Europe. The potential threat is not limited to attack under Kurdish control in north-eastern Syria, while the
rorist threat to prison staff. CTA has knowledge of three planning, but may also take the form of radicalization remaining six citizens are presumably not detained and
CTA regularly receives reports about concern over radi- terrorist attacks motivated by militant Islamism that or propaganda activities, logistical support, terrorist fi- located in or near the conflict zone or in neighbouring
calization and potential threats among inmates in Dan- have been committed against prison staff in other Eu- nancing and other terror-related activities. countries.
ish prisons. CTA assesses that the threat from radicali- ropean countries since 2014.
zation among inmates in Danish prisons may increase Travellers from countries other than Denmark, includ- According to PET’s information, no one has succeeded
if more travellers to Syria/Iraq return to Denmark and 2.4.5 The threat posed by travellers to and return- ing other European countries, may also pose a terrorist in travelling from Denmark to the conflict zone in Syria/
face prosecution. This applies to both male and female ees from the conflict zone in Syria/Iraq threat to Denmark and Danish interests abroad. The Iraq to join militant Islamist groups since 2016. Three
travellers. CTA assesses that individuals from Denmark who have threat posed by travellers from other countries comes adult travellers have been ex-tradited to DenmarkPage 26 DANISH SECURIT Y AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 27
Children of travellers Europe or from people who start or continue a radical-
Photo: Unsplash.com Several of the travellers from Denmark have brought ization process after they arrive in Denmark. Howev-
their children with them to the conflict zone, while er, CTA assesses that only a very small percentage of
some have had their children during their stay in the those arriving in Europe and Denmark as refugees and
conflict zone. According to PET’s information, approxi- migrants sympathize with militant Islamism and may
mately 45 children whose parents were Danish citizens pose a terrorist threat.
at the time of the child’s birth are located in or near the
conflict zone. In addition, PET has information that ap- It is still possible that militant Islamist groups will try to
proximately ten children of former Danish residents are exploit refugee and migrant routes to commit terrorist
also located in the conflict zone. Of the approximately attacks in Europe, including Denmark. CTA is not aware
60 children of travellers from Denmark, at least 25 are of any terrorist attacks in Europe committed by individ-
located in north-eastern Syria, mainly in the al-Roj and uals sent by a militant Islamist terrorist group through
al-Hawl camps. According to PET’s information, the the flow of refugees within the last year.
remaining children are located in north-western Syria
and Turkey, among other places. CTA assesses that asylum seekers, rejected asylum
seekers and migrants may be particularly susceptible
CTA assesses that it is unlikely that children of travel- to radicalization and influence from militant Islamist
lers from Denmark to the conflict zone currently pose agendas. This is particularly younger persons travel-
a terrorist threat. This is primarily due to the current ling alone. High susceptibility may be ascribed to such
young age of the children. It is the general assessment factors as frustration over one’s situation, a sense of
of CTA that older children who travel to Denmark from exclusion, the absence of family members and mental
the conflict zone or from camps may pose a terrorist instability.
threat due to indoctrination or other types of influ-
ence asserted in the conflict zone. Further to this, CTA Since November 2015, asylum seekers, rejected asylum
also assesses that the risk of indoctrination and other seekers, accepted refugees and/or migrants have been
types of influence increases the longer the children involved in several successful and foiled attacks in Eu-
stay in a radicalized environment such as the camps in rope. Four of the successful attacks were committed
since 2016, two of them in 2020. All three are currently In 2020, a growing number of women, especially from north-eastern Syria. within the past year, with the most recent example on
imprisoned. CTA has no knowledge of other travellers European countries, managed to escape from camps in October 29, 2020 in France. The attack was committed
having returned to Denmark since 2016. All of the 32 north-eastern Syria – some of them accompanied by The threat from travellers, including children of travel- by a 21-year-old Tunisian citizen, who had applied for
adult travellers from Denmark who remain in the con- children. CTA assesses that there may also in the future lers, who come to Denmark, may be affected by how asylum in Italy less than a month before the attack. In
flict zone have been there for over four years. be women, with or without children, who manage to they are received by the Danish authorities, including addition, CTA notes that the arrests made in Denmark
escape from camps in north-eastern Syria, potentially whether they are offered any support for the purpose in February 2021 include individuals with an asylum
CTA assesses that only a few of those who have left also women with links to Denmark. of potential de-radicalization and reintegration. background.
Denmark for Syria/Iraq and remain in the conflict zone
will be able to return to Denmark in the short term There have been several reports of prison riots in the 2.4.6 The threat from asylum seekers, refugees, CTA assesses that foreigners with militant Islamist sym-
without assistance from Danish or foreign authorities. overcrowded Kurdish-controlled prisons in north-east- migrants and people on exceptional leave to pathies on exceptional leave to remain in Denmark
The majority of the adult travellers from Denmark who ern Syria, where around 2,000 male travellers with af- remain may pose a terrorist threat. It is likely that some terror
remain in the conflict zone will face prosecution if they filiation to IS are being detained, and the past year has CTA assesses that asylum seekers, rejected asylum convicts on exceptional leave to remain will estab-
return to Denmark. seen examples of IS-affiliated inmates who have man- seekers, accepted refugees and migrants who live or lish new networks or strengthen existing networks of
aged to escape. It is likely that there will also be men arrive in Denmark may pose a terrorist threat if they like-minded people with militant Islamist sympathies.
CTA assesses that the conditions in the camps and who manage to escape from prisons in north-eastern have been radicalized. This threat may come from
prisons in north-eastern Syria may add to the radical- Syria during the next year. However, CTA assesses that people who have entered the country with the flow of
ization of the detainees, including detained travellers it will remain more difficult to escape from prisons than refugees with the intent to commit acts of terrorism in
from Denmark. from camps.Page 28 DANISH SECURIT Y AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 29
2.4.7 Militant Islamists based in other countries in Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Pal- The terrorist threat is aimed at protected targets such tionally, in which case the threat to Danes and Danish
Denmark also faces a terrorist threat from radicalized estine. as diplomatic representations as well as unprotected interests abroad may increase. In the autumn of 2020,
individuals and small groups based in other countries, targets such as companies, NGOs and tourists. Danes, the Quran burnings carried out by the Danish political
mainly those neighbouring Denmark. Attacks planned CTA assesses that the intent of individuals in Denmark like other Westerners, are at risk of becoming random party Stram Kurs in Sweden and other countries at-
by individuals in one country against targets in another to provide funds for militant Islamist groups has not di- victims to attacks directed at Western interests. In ad- tracted some international attention. The international
country may be particularly difficult for the authorities minished. Furthermore, knowledge on how to acquire dition, Danes located abroad risk becoming victims of focus on perceived insults to Islam rose sharply when
to uncover and prevent. money by way of financial crime and how to transfer an attack if they are in near vicinity of local terrorist tar- Charlie Hebdo reprinted its own and Danish Muham-
money or other assets to terrorist groups remains wide- gets, including crowded places, churches and certain mad cartoons in September 2020. The majority of the
CTA assesses that people with or without links to Den- spread among certain Islamist networks in Denmark. official buildings. attention was directed at France.
mark who have travelled to the conflict zone in Syria/ The ramified nature of these networks will most likely
Iraq and returned to countries other than Denmark increase the degree of terrorist financing in the future. CTA generally assesses that Danish diplomatic rep- The events in Sweden and particularly France also re-
may pose a threat, as may radicalized ex-prisoners from resentations and other Danish presence abroad, in- sulted in some mention of Denmark in militant Islamist
other countries. In the coming years, a large number In 2020, the Danish High Court sentenced in the so- cluding employees of Danish companies, may be per- propaganda. CTA assesses that the reference to Den-
of terrorist convicts will be released in other European called drone case the three defendants to imprison- ceived as symbolic targets providing an opportunity mark in militant Islamist propaganda may cause local
countries, and these will be able to travel to Denmark ment for eight years, four years and six months, and to target Denmark without carrying out an attack in militant Islamist groups to intensify their focus on Den-
after their release. CTA assesses that the most impor- three years, respectively. In the case of one of the de- Denmark. Danish diplomatic representations may be- mark as a legitimate target, which in turn may increase
tant factor for attack planning against targets in Den- fendants, the High Court found that purchasing and come targets of terrorist attacks if they are perceived as the threat to Danes and Danish interests in certain
mark by persons based in other countries is the ex- facilitating thermal cameras to IS constituted accessory less secure than the representations of other Western countries and regions.
posure of current and past Danish cases of perceived to terrorism. The case is not a typical terrorist financing countries.
insults to Islam, and especially when such cases are case, but it illustrates the fact that not only money but CTA assesses that the covid-19 pandemic has had no
given major attention in militant Islamist propaganda also procurement, facilitation and transfer of other as- CTA assesses that the general terrorist threat level is effect on the intent and capability of militant Islamists
and in militant Islamist virtual communities. sets may be used by sympathizers to support terrorist most high in countries and regions where AQ and IS to commit terrorist attacks against Danish interests
groups abroad. have branches and networks and are able to train and abroad. CTA assesses that the covid-19 pandemic most
CTA has knowledge of five cases within the last ten plan attacks. This is especially the case in Syria, Iraq and likely has made it more difficult for militant Islamist
years – most recently in 2016 – where individuals based 2.5 The terrorist threat from militant Islamists to Afghanistan, but also in West and East African coun- groups to attack Danes and Danish interests abroad.
in the West have travelled to Denmark to prepare and Danes and Danish interests abroad tries, where militant Islamist groups have attacked the
commit terrorist attacks. In four of these cases, the per- CTA generally assesses that it is still the intent of mili- local population and authorities frequently through- CTA assesses that, in the long term, some terrorist
petrators intended to hit targets connected with the tant Islamist groups in a number of countries to attack out 2020. In 2020, there have also been indications that groups abroad may benefit from the pandemic and its
Danish cartoon case, while the target of the so-called Westerners and Western targets in non-Western loca- support for militant Islamism in South and Southeast financial and social effects and that the general terrorist
Matchstick case in 2016 remains unknown. These types tions. Asia continues to rise. CTA assesses that increased sup- threat to Western interests may therefore increase. The
of cases are more frequent in Denmark than in other port to IS in South and Southeast Asia could extend the covid-19 pandemic may for example lead to a weaken-
European countries, which, according to CTA’s assess- CTA has no knowledge of successful or attempted focus of local militant Islamist groups in the region to ing and destabilization of countries in the Middle East,
ment, is mainly due to the cartoon case and the fact terrorist attacks against Danes or Danish interests in include attacks on Westerners and Western interests. Africa and Asia, which may then lead to a less priority to
that Denmark is home to targets that have played a non-Western countries in 2020. CTA has knowledge of counter-terrorism efforts.
central role in the case. at least four successful militant Islamist terrorist attacks CTA assesses that the threat of militant Islamist kid-
on Western civilians or interests in non-Western coun- napping is most significant in conflict zones and their
2.4.8 Financing from Denmark to militant Islamist tries in 2020. neighbouring areas. CTA also assesses that Danes are
terrorist groups abroad generally no more exposed to kidnapping than other
Terrorist financing maintains terrorist groups and pro- Westerners and Western targets are generally well pro- Westerners7.
mote their activities. Funding improves the ability of tected and therefore hard to reach in countries with a
terrorist groups to carry out operations and to recruit high terrorist threat level. Also, the relatively low num- The cartoon case is not forgotten within militant Isla-
and retain members. ber of attacks against Westerners in 2020 may be relat- mist environments, and Denmark’s reputation as a na-
ed to the reduced global travel activity and thus West- tion of offenders can quickly become an issue interna-
CTA assesses that funding from persons in Denmark to ern presence in non-Western countries as a result of the
militant Islamist terrorist groups mainly goes to groups covid-19 pandemic. 7. Information on country-specific risks is provided via the travel advice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark on www.um.dk.You can also read
