Climate Security in Cities - AN EVIDENCE SUMMARY - Arup
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Climate Security
in Cities
AN EVIDENCE SUMMARY
About the Author Spencer Robinson is a researcher in Arup’s International Development team. His work focuses on urban resilience and explosive violence. He has growing interests in armed conflict, insurgency and terrorism. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank the Arup Research and Arup University teams (in particular, Alessandro Liuti and Ben Kidd) for generously funding and supporting this research. The author is grateful to several individuals who helped shape this research and who provided comments on earlier versions of this paper. These include Arabella Fraser (Open University) and Vera Bukachi (Kounkuey Design Initiative) of the Climate Change and Urban Violence Network; and Felicitas zu Dohna, Sara Candiracci, Kaitlin Shilling and Kieran Birtill of Arup. The author is indebted to Daniel Imade (Arup), who sourced all images, and Roman Svidran (Resilience Rising), who designed the report. Any errors and oversights are those of the author alone. Disclaimer The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Arup or its members. Cover Image: Mogadishu, Somalia (© Monja Šebela) 2 Climate Security in Cities: A Summary
Contents 4 Executive Summary 6 Introduction 10 Climate Change and ‘Conflict’ 11 Progress 17 Problems 19 Pathways 22 Climate Security in Cities 24 Heating 29 Flooding 33 Food and Water Scarcities 38 Rural-urban Migration 42 Climate Adaptation 45 Conclusion 46 References Climate Security in Cities: A Summary 3
Executive Summary
What is going on? What is the gap?
Climate change is a conflict threat multiplier. Climate events The climate security field has undergone a remarkable
can destabilise food and water supplies, accelerate or trigger transformation, from a nascent academic focus to a thriving
human displacement, damage infrastructure, and disrupt topic which traverses various disciplines and forums.
livelihoods – all potential risk factors for human violence. As Diplomats around the world are increasingly focused on
such, a growing body of work – academic and diplomatic – climate change and human security. And in December 2021,
examines the relationship between a changing climate and the UN Security Council – the global body responsible for
‘conflict’. peace – negotiated a draft resolution on climate security.
Though unsuccessful, the draft received widespread support.
This body of work looks at different ‘conflict’ outcomes
– including crime, protests and riots, civil war, interstate Amidst an enormous - and growing - body of work, certain
violence, and terrorism. It considers different climate events, biases and gaps emerge. A large percentage of the climate
including temperature variation, changes in rainfall, drought, security literature focuses on rural settings, and especially
and disastrous events like extreme flooding. And it covers on access to land and water. This is unsurprising: rural
broad geographical (from grid cells to entire regions) and economies depend more on natural resources. They are
temporal (from changes in seasonal temperature to decade- less diverse, meaning a decline in one sector can adversely
long sea-level rise) scales. impact community stability. Together with various non-
climate stressors, this can make rural settings more
The relationship between climate events and ‘conflict’ vulnerable to climate-conflict risks.
remains complex and contested. Academics and
practitioners alike continually disagree on the causal Far less evidence looks at cities, or it fails to differentiate
mechanisms between a climate event and any ensuing between rural and urban areas. This a critical gap. Cities
conflict. And debates and policies frequently advance ahead produce around 80% of global GDP and they house an
of conclusive evidence – leading to overhyped statements increasingly large proportion of the global population. At
that wrongly ascribe blame to climate events with limited real the same time, cities and urban areas are becoming more
influence on conflict outcomes. vulnerable to climate shifts – whether due to rural-urban
migration, rising seas, the urban heat island effect, and more.
The reasons for this are manifold. Researchers use different Over time, changes in climate will be felt more severely in
methodologies across different geographic and temporal urban areas – with wide-ranging ripple effects throughout
scales. Though important to examine how climate-conflict non-urban areas, too. Without a good understanding of how
risks unfold under certain conditions, this can complicate climate and violence could intersect, city leaders and urban
efforts to build consensus. Similarly, the distinct economic, practitioners cannot develop effective policies that increase
political and social conditions across countries (and the resilience of economic, political and social systems.
localities) makes it difficult to conduct robust studies that
isolate the impact of a climate event on a conflict outcome. It’s against this backdrop that urban climate security risks
are gaining traction. In 2021, the Climate Change and Urban
Nonetheless, some consensus points have emerged over Violence Network (CCUVN) published a flagship resource
time. Chief among them is that there is rarely a direct causal guide – the first of its kind, and an excellent resource for
relationship between a climate event and any conflict all evidence on climate-urban violence risks. Furthermore,
outcome. Rather, climate events can aggravate and interact a 2021 issue of the Journal of Peace Research featured
with other risk factors for violence. And hence, climate- several contributions from urban contexts – a focus “beyond
conflict risks are more pronounced in areas experiencing the state of the art”.1 These interventions – and others – are
such factors (e.g., bad governance, resource shortages, and significant, and they pave the way for more work on climate
fragile livelihoods). security in cities.
Over time, changes in climate will be felt more severely in urban areas – with
wide-ranging ripple effects throughout non-urban areas, too.
4 Climate Security in Cities: A Summary
What does this paper do? The paper has two main findings:
This paper builds upon and adds to the work of CCUVN and
others. It summarises the evidence on climate security in
1 Any relationship between climate events and disorder,
unrest or violence in cities is conditioned by a
cities. In doing so, it’s split into two parts. The first section confluence of variables – including economic, political
paints a broad picture of how climate security as a field and social. While climate events can certainly lay the
has evolved – from early beginnings in the 1990s to the ground for ‘conflict’ risks (by, for instance, eroding
latest climate debates at the UN Security Council. It then resources or causing displacement), whether or not this
lays out the key challenges which blur the climate-conflict risk manifests in insecurity is strongly determined by
relationship and sow disagreement among researchers. After non-climate factors (among them: alcohol consumption,
this, it briefly describes some of the main pathways that have government responses and ethnic relations). This is
been identified between climate events and violent conflict. consistent with broader work on climate security.
In the second section, the evidence summary, the report
takes five key climate ‘events’. In five separate sub-
chapters, it summarises the evidence on each event and 2 Where climate events do contribute to insecurity and/or
violence, this risk can disproportionately impact certain
its relationship to disorder, unrest or violence in cities.
Overall, the evidence is nascent. It’s characterised by various groups. Across some of the climate events, women
‘conflict’ outcomes (mainly interpersonal violence, protesting are exposed to more severe risks – including domestic
and riots) and methodologies, insubstantial pathways and sexual violence. Again, this usually results from
between climate events and insecurity, and some preliminary non-climate factors, including discriminatory gender
factors which might shape these pathways. Far more work norms, household responsibilities, and the aggression
is needed to understand the security implications of climate of male partners. For some events, especially climate-
events in cities. related resource scarcities, groups with less negotiating
power and previous exposure to violence may be more
vulnerable because they lack reliable strategies for
dealing with climate impacts.
Mexico City © Alexis Tostado/Unsplash
Climate Security in Cities: A Summary 5
Introduction Miami, USA (© Faith Crabtree)
Since the 1990s, academics, policy-makers and practitioners blur the climate-conflict relationship and sow disagreement
have studied the relationship between a changing climate among researchers. After this, it briefly describes some of
and ‘conflict’. A wealth of meta-analyses,2 donor reports,3 the main pathways that have been identified between climate
and case studies4 address one fundamental question: events and violent conflict.
do changes in our climate (including changes in rainfall
and temperatures, and rapid- and slow-onset events like In the second section, the evidence summary, the report
droughts or flooding) increase the frequency, intensity and/or examines five key climate ‘events’. In five separate sub-
likelihood of insecurity and violence? chapters, it summarises the evidence on the impact of each
event, and its relationship to disorder, unrest, or violence in
People have studied different types of ‘conflict’ and climate cities. Overall, the evidence is nascent. It’s characterised by
events. Early research focused on climate change and civil various ‘conflict’ outcomes and methodologies, insubstantial
war5 (and more recently in countries including Syria).6 But pathways between climate events and insecurity, and some
interpersonal,7 collective,8 and gender-based violence9 also preliminary factors which might shape these pathways. Far
receive attention. In response to global security trends, the more work is needed to understand the security implications
links between climate events and terrorism are studied as of climate change in cities.
well.10 Equally, researchers have explored the influence of
temperature variation,11 precipitation and rainfall,12 drought,13 The climate events studied in this paper rarely have a direct
and disastrous events like extreme flooding,14 in the context impact on disorder, unrest or violence in cities. Rather,
of instability and violence. Their findings are encapsulated in these events can aggravate (e.g., alcohol consumption)
notions of climate conflict,15 climate war,16 climate security,17 or interact with (e.g., bad governance) other risk factors
and the climate-conflict nexus,18 to name only some. The for violence. This is consistent with findings from the rural
overriding idea is this: where communities and governments literature. Another key finding is that, where climate events
fail to absorb or manage the shocks of a changing climate, do contribute to insecurity, this risk can disproportionately
the risk of instability can increase.19 affect certain groups.
The relationship between climate and conflict is well-
recognised in policy, too. As early as 2007, the UN Security
Council (UNSC) convened its first debate on climate security.
Council Chair, Margaret Beckett, said of the climate-conflict
relationship, “What makes wars start? Fights over water.
Changing patterns of rainfall. Fights over food production,
land use”.20 Two years later, President Barack Obama argued
that “the threat from climate changes is serious” because
droughts and crop failures “breed hunger and conflict”.21 By
2014, Human Security was dedicated an entire chapter in
the 4th IPCC Assessment Report. And in 2021, the UNSC
considered a draft resolution on climate security, which,
whilst unsuccessful, received widespread support.22 What’s
clear is that climate change is far from an environmental
issue alone. Rather, it has the potential to redefine global
security, with implications for militaries, peacebuilders and,
above all, ordinary people.
Amidst an enormous – and growing – body of work, certain
biases and gaps emerge. Much of the literature focuses on
rural settings, in particular on conflict over access to land
and water. Considerably less evidence looks at cities, despite
the fact that climate and ‘conflict’ risks are urbanising.
As cities bear the brunt of climate shifts, this is a critical
gap in our understanding of climate impacts and how to
build resilience to them. Without a good understanding of
how climate and violence intersect, city leaders and urban
practitioners cannot develop effective policies that increase
the resilience of economic, political and social systems.
This report summarises the evidence on climate security in
cities. It is split in two parts. The first paints a broad picture
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United
of how climate security as a field has evolved – from early
Kingdom, Margaret Beckett, addresses the ministerial-level Security Council
beginnings in the 1990s to the latest climate debates at the meeting to discuss the situation in the Middle East. Taken one year prior to the
UN Security Council. It then lays out the key challenges which first UNSC debate on climate security (21 September, 2006). © United Nations
Climate Security in Cities: A Summary 7
Findings specific to each climate event are summarised below:
Heating Flooding
Temperature change is relatively well-studied, especially Flood risk is lesser studied in the literature on urban climate
in regard to urban crime and other forms of localised security. The basic assumption behind anticipated flooding-
interpersonal violence. Much of this research is grounded violence risks is multifaceted. First, flood damage can reduce
in the heat hypothesis – the idea that aggressive behaviour resources, causing competition and breeding tension among
increases in warmer weather. In cities, it’s tied to urban groups. Second, flood-affected communities may direct
heat island warming which could be half that of regular their frustration towards others following an event; whether
climate-related warming. A clear or guaranteed relationship a city government, an agency or institution, or each other.
between increased temperature and urban violence is far And third, households affected by flooding may become
from conclusive. In some studies, temperature is one among displaced or homeless, potentially exposing them to various
many factors that could predict increased rates of violence. dangers and security threats. The evidence summarised is
And this is because it can exacerbate or interact with other too little to draw a sensible conclusion. Some factors – like
risk factors for violence – rather than causing it directly. The a government’s response, and the characteristics of the
distribution of temperature-violence risks is also disputed. affected neighbourhoods – may cause a flood event to
While some studies find that lower-income neighbourhoods lead to disorder or unrest. But this requires far more work
are disproportionately exposed to temperature-violence risks, to verify. As shown elsewhere in this paper, flood events
others suggest that the impacts are felt city-wide. could have disproportionate impacts on the safety of certain
groups, especially women.
Almost empty water reservoir outside of Cape Town during 2017/2018 water crisis. © Shutterstock
8 Climate Security in Cities: A Summary
Food and water scarcities Over time, these challenges can influence groups to protest
or engage in other forms of (predominantly) disorder,
not violence per say. The evidence in support of this is
Any relationship between resource scarcity and ‘conflict’ in
ambiguous and contradictory. Whilst some work suggests
cities is conditioned by multiple non-climate factors. Most
that migrants are more likely to participate in social unrest
work focuses on protesting. The general assumption is
(peacefully) or are more likely to experience violence, other
that climate events – typically, increased temperatures or
work finds weak relationships between environmental
declining rainfall – cause water scarcities and, subsequently,
migration and either disorder or violence. This relationship
food shortages and price shocks. In turn, this can brew
is complicated by the difficulty of defining ‘environmental’
frustration, competition and, possibly, disorder and unrest.
migrants.
In the evidence, whether this actually occurs is context-
specific. And if it does occur, a range of non-climate factors
are usually at play – as opposed to climate events alone.
In some studies, regime type determines levels of unrest
Climate adaptation
following resource scarcity. In others, the influence of civil
A smaller but growing body of work explores how climate
society groups is a determining factor. Crucially, food or
adaptation measures can either represent or breed ‘violence’.
water scarcities can be caused by things other than climate
Much of this literature centres on eviction schemes in
extremes, or they can be co-produced by climate and non-
informal settlements prone to climate impacts. Often, less
climate factors. This is an important distinction that makes
formal residents have no choice but to locate on land that is
it difficult to clearly associate a climate event with any
climate-exposed. And in many cases, they should not reside
resource-related insecurity.
there. Though not explicitly violent, eviction is considered
by some as a form of ‘state violence’ – controversial and
Rural-urban migration well-resourced programmes of removal that serve city
governments’ ‘clearance’ mandates, whilst masquerading
as climate-resilient urban restructuring. Confronted with
Rural-urban migration is one of the most popular ‘pathways’
eviction orders, some studies find that lower-income city
for studying climate-violence relationships in cities. It’s
dwellers adopt innovative strategies to protect their rights.
gathered momentum as the number of ‘environmental
In this regard, adaptive measures can engender cooperation
migrants’ in urban areas has overtaken that in non-urban
among affected groups. However, other studies illustrate the
areas. A more established body of literature considers the
destabilising effects of certain climate adaptation measures.
security implications of urbanisation more broadly (caused
The worst affected may face increased insecurity and
by multiple drivers) – albeit with little consensus. The basic
marginalisation. There remains a large evidence gap on how
assumption is that urban environments impose an array
policy responses to climate events affect conflict risk; it’s
of challenges on recently arrived migrants and their hosts.
crucial that this topic is explored further.
A note on definitions and methodology
Navigating the climate security field is difficult. One Studies summarised in this paper were collected in 5
can get instantly stuck with definitions, methodologies, main ways: (1) key word searches on Google Scholar
pathways and conflict outcomes. Grappling with these and in relevant journals (e.g., the Journal of Peace
is tricky, albeit necessary. This paper is deliberately wide Research); (2) following the bibliographies of particularly
in scope. It’s concerned less with technicalities than relevant papers;I (3) identifying key individuals and
with capturing a broad range of work. The paper neither screening their work for relevance; (4) scanning websites
attempts nor claims to define causality between climate of organisations in the climate security space; and
events and urban disorder, unrest or violence. Similarly, (5) drawing on the resource guide developed by the
it does not allege to capture all relevant literature, nor Climate Change and Urban Violence Network (CCUVN).
does it appraise each paper’s methodology. Instead, it Studies with an explicit focus on ‘urban’ or ‘peri-urban’
brings together a selection of existing work – with a view environments were prioritised in the evidence search.
to starting a conversation and setting a foundation for On terminology, the author acknowledges competing
future research. understandings of ‘climate change’, ‘climate security’ and
‘conflict’. Where possible, the author has specified the
conflict ‘outcome’ or the climate ‘event’.
(I) The author acknowledges the potential biases inherent to this approach.
Climate Security in Cities: A Summary 9
Climate Change and ‘Conflict’
Refugee camp in Aleppo, Syria, February 2013 (© IHH
Humanitarian Relief Foundation)This chapter considers the broader literature on climate change and ‘conflict’. It includes three sub-
chapters. The first, Progress, traces the evolution of climate security from its early beginnings in
the 1990s to the latest debates at the UN Security Council. The second, Problems, outlines some of
the main challenges that complicate consensus on the ways in which climate events and ‘conflict’
interact. The third, Pathways, briefly describes the key pathways between climate events and violent
conflict that have gained popularity among academics and policy-makers.
Progress
Early stages In parallel, discussions about the climate and sustainability
gained momentum. In a landmark testimony before the U.S.
That climate events and conflict are somehow related Senate and Natural Resources Committee in 1988, Dr James
is “intuitively obvious”.23 Climate change can destabilise Hansen of NASA’s Institute for Space Studies challenged
food and water supply, accelerate or trigger displacement, ambiguity surrounding global warming. He stated, “we can
inundate critical infrastructure, and disrupt livelihoods – ascribe with a high degree of confidence a cause-and-effect
all potential risk factors for conflict. Equally, populations relationship between the greenhouse effect and observed
experiencing conflict often struggle to adapt to the impacts warming… In my opinion, the greenhouse effect has been
of a changing climate, due mainly to fewer resources, detected, and it’s changing our climate now”.29
dilapidated basic services, and the challenges associated
with forced migration.24 Hansen’s remarks preceded a decade of action and
discussion about climate change. This included the first IPCC
Overall, however, the evidence on climate-conflict risks is Assessment Report in 1990, the Rio Earth Summit in 1992,
young and clear relationships are elusive. For a long-time, the establishment of UNFCCC in 1994, the first Conference
criminologists and political scientists explored whether of Parties in Berlin in 1995, and the adoption of the Kyoto
climate factors influence levels of violence and instability.25 Protocol in 1997. The message became abundantly clear:
Yet, this research focused on individual climate variables a changing climate has global ramifications that need
like warmer weather, usually in the context of local patterns. international responses.
The number of studies explicitly focusing on the relationship
between a changing climate and conflict began to increase in
the 1990s. This occurred at a critical juncture.
After the Cold War, discourses of security broadened to
include non-traditional security threats.26 While narratives
on security historically centred on ‘conventional’ two-sided
conflict (like that between the Allies and the Axis powers
during WWII), there was growing recognition that modern
security threats would be more complex and difficult to
associate with one-dimensional, militarised conflict.
This is owed, in part, to high-profile delegations like the
1987 Brundtland Commission. Through the 70s and 80s,
these groups challenged the “traditional focus on inter-state
military security issues” in framings of global security.27
They argued that non-military factors, like social well-being
and environmental integrity, were important constituents of
secure societies.
This birthed a range of closely-related concepts including
‘common security’, ‘human security’, and ‘environmental
security’, as new paradigms for understanding global
vulnerability. Included in environmental security were ‘non-
conventional’ threats like resource scarcity, degradation of
soils, biodiversity loss, and depletion of the ozone.28 This
Mrs. Gro Harlem Brundtland, Prime Minister of Norway, addressing the UN
saw certain environmental issues elevated to discussions of General Assembly on Environment and Development (19 October, 1987). ©
safety and security, albeit in a preliminary way. United Nations
Climate Security in Cities: A Summary 11United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (3 June, 1992). © United Nations
1990-2007 80s, on the ‘new threats’ posed by climate shifts and their
incongruity with more traditional security discourse.
Despite some concern that environmental factors may
undermine peace and security, only a handful of academic It wasn’t until 2007 that the first “milestone” moment
studies were published each year between 1990 and the occurred – the IPCC’s 4th Assessment Report (AR4). AR4
early 2000s. A bibliometric review identified 74 papers includes references to possible climate-conflict links,
on the climate-conflict topic between 1990 and 2007: an mainly in the Africa chapter. The idea that competition for
average of just more than 4 per year.30 The authors show water resources can evolve into ‘conflict’ is raised. Most
that ‘war’, ‘migration’ and ‘risk’ were common themes in this notably, the authors suggest that “human security will be
literature, and case studies included African countries and progressively threatened as the climate changes”.36 But the
the South-West Pacific.31 Some studies from this period cited evidence provides little to no support for any robust
were particularly popular,II for example Homer-Dixon’s (1994) connections between climate events and conflict.37
international research summary32 and Barnett’s (2003)
analysis of the connections between climate and security AR4 coincided with several other prominent reports. These
issues.33 include A Climate of Conflict by International Alert,38 The
Age of Consequences by the Center for Strategic and
Though academic work was nascent, diplomats were International Studies,39 and the widely-referenced National
becoming more vigilant. In 2002, for instance, the U.S. Security and the Threat of Climate Change by the US Center
National Research Council published a report that traced for Naval Analyses (CNA).40 In the last one, we first see
“abrupt” and “extreme” changes in historic climate climate change referred to as a “conflict threat multiplier”
conditions. The authors called for an “abrupt change – i.e., something that exacerbates other, pre-existing risk
early warning system” to mitigate similar future threats.34 factors for conflict, rather than something which causes it
The seeming urgency of the climate issue depicted in directly.
that report led Andrew Marshall, director of the Office of
Net Assessment at the U.S. Department of Defense, to It was also in 2007 that the UN Security Council (UNSC) held
commission a U.S. Pentagon report on the same topic. its first debate on climate security. While a promising step,
the day-long session was mired in disagreement. On one
Published the following year, An Abrupt Climate Change hand were the likes of Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, who
Scenario considered it “undeniable” that “severe” argued that the relationship between the climate and security
environmental problems will “escalate the degree of global required long-term responses. On the other hand, were China
conflict”. The authors predicted that climate events would and the ‘Group of 77’ countriesIII who believed that climate
destabilise the geo-political environment, “leading to matters exceeded the council’s remit of maintaining peaceIV.
skirmishes, battles, and even war”. Crucially, they suggested Somewhere in the middle fell the Pacific Islands Forum,
that this type of violence posed a “different type of threat which likened the impact of climate events in Pacific Island
to national security than we are accustomed to today”.35 In countries to that of bombs and guns in larger nations.41
many ways, this echoed the Brundtland Commission in the
12 Climate Security in Cities: A SummaryUN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon shows the participants of the IPCC a copy of the fourth IPCC assessment report on the mounting risks of climate change (17 November, 2007). © United Nations/Eskinder Debebe These early debates crystallised around the civil war in “immature” and “yet to establish a definitive body of Darfur, Sudan – the so-called “first climate war”V.42 Soon after evidence”.50 In some cases, “battles” broke out among the UNSC debate, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon published researchers, especially between those conducting qualitative an editorial claiming that the conflict had its roots in an versus quantitative analysis.51 ecological crisis, specifically droughts that provoked fighting over water. Around the same time, an 18-month investigation A good example of disagreement is debate around the Syrian into the war by the UN’s Environment Programme (UNEP) civil war (2011-ongoing). One widely-referencedVII study in declared that peace in Darfur was “inextricably linked to the 2015 argues that a three-year drought between 2007-2010 environmental challenge”.43 UNEP predicted that the conflict (among other factors including a corrupt regime and a held “grim lessons for other countries at risk”.44 Whilst other declining economy) contributed to violence.52 risk factors – including ethnic hatred, a history of violence, and elite exploitation – also were at play, there is broad consensus that environmental factors shaped the violence in Darfur in significant ways.45 2007-2015 Between 2007-2015 the number of academic studies on climate-conflict links increased more than fivefold compared to between 1990-2007.46 In this period, ‘conflict’ and ‘civil war’ entered the mainframe – replacing ‘migration’ and ‘war’ as major themes. An emphasis on civil war reflects the increase in civil conflicts since the early 2000sVI.47 Similarly, the use of the broader ‘conflict’ illustrates the different conflict outcomes being studied – although much work still focused on armed conflict. Many studies of civil war sought a direct link between its outbreak and certain climate impacts, mainly changes in rainfall and temperature.48 For the most part, however, any direct link was weak.49 It was in this period that the effects of divergent approaches (in geographic scale, methodology, and conflict outcome) to measuring climate-conflict links become clear. Ambiguous, contradictory and otherwise “disparate” findings emerged in places, as the climate security field was still considered Buildings damaged by civil war in Homs, Syria. (© Lens Young Homsi) Climate Security in Cities: A Summary 13
Sahrawi refugees live in the desert, in a remote and isolated area, with limited opportunities for economic activity or employment. The climate is extremely harsh,
with temperatures reaching 50 degrees Celsius during the summer months. © EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid, Flickr
This supported the findings from two other papers in 201253 2015-2020
and 2014.54 Such arguments were echoed in statements
by former U.S. President Barack Obama55 and the United Like its predecessor, 2015-onwards saw a sharp rise in
Kingdom’s Prince Charles.56 They also featured in reports the number of academic papers on climate-conflict links.
by the World Bank57 and certain military thinktanks.58 By Sharifi shows that between 2015 and 2020, 869 papers were
contrast, later research found “no convincing evidence” that published – more than double that from the eight-year period
climate events started the war.59 This type of ambiguity and before. He attributes this to a second “milestone” moment:
disagreement persists today, despite efforts to “reconcile” the release of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
differences.60 SDG 13 (Climate Action) and SDG 16 (Peace & Justice), in
particular, underline the significance of climate action and
During this time, we also see concerted efforts to find truth. peace in achieving sustainable development.70
When Buhaug61 criticised Burke62 for over-emphasising the
connections between increased temperatures and civil war, Arguably, a publication of greater significance was the 5th
Burke et al. revised their modelling and re-published.63 In IPCC Assessment Report (AR5), published in late 2014. For
2012, the Journal of Peace Research launched a special the first time, AR5 dedicated an entire chapter to ‘Human
issue on climate and conflict – the largest collection of peer- Security’, including a sub-chapter on armed conflict. Conflict
reviewed studies on the theme.64 This period saw several is discussed elsewhere in AR5, too, including Chapter 18
major evidence reviews – focusing mainly on quantitative on Detection and attribution of impacts, Chapter 19 on
work.65 Though subject to criticism,66 this work did an Emergent Risks, and Chapter 22 on Africa. This was a
important job of consolidating the evidence and identifying watershed moment for proponents of a climate-conflict link,
trends for future research. Lastly, between 2010 and 2015 in that a uniquely climate-focused institution – and one as
came new datasets that allowed researchers to consider esteemed as IPCC – acknowledged that the intersection
a broader range of conflict outcomes in relation to climate of climate events and conflict “is an emergent risk”.71
events (e.g., ACLED,67 the Social Conflict Analysis Database,68 Furthermore, the authors consider violence “of all kinds”,
and new datasets from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program).69 thus recognising the growing evidence on more diverse
outcomes than armed conflict alone.VIII
14 Climate Security in Cities: A SummaryThe authors summarise that key risk factors for conflict – In 2018, 2019 and 2020, the UN Security Council convened a
including economic shocks and poverty – are vulnerable further three debates on climate-related issues. And in 2021,
to climate events.72 The logic follows that where these the Council negotiated a draft resolution on climate security.
risk factors are “extremely low” – for instance, where per Tabled by Irish and Nigerien delegates, the resolution aimed
capita incomes are high, and government is consistent to anchor climate debates in council procedures – by
and effective – the impact of changes in climate on armed improving its analysis of the links between climate events
conflict is “negligible”.73 This resonates with the likes of and instability and requiring that the Secretary-General
CNA (2007) and the ‘conflict threat multiplier’ theory, which produce a report by December 2023. Despite great support
was becoming widely-accepted.74 Similar for localized among the UN membership – the draft had 113 co-sponsors,
violence, the IPCC authors find that conflict risk is mediated the second highest number for any draft resolution in
where conflict-resolution systems exist – reiterating the the Council’s history –87 Russia used its veto to block the
idea that intervening factors are king in any climate-conflict resolution, China abstained, and India opposed.
relationship.
In a press release, Russia accused the penholders of
Ultimately, AR5 authors showed that there is no strong “coercing” the Council to take “a one-dimensional approach”
positive relationship between warming and armed conflict, that neglects “all other aspects” which raise the risks of
and that increasing rivalry among countries over resources conflict.88 Citing its own draft resolution on security in the
is “unlikely” to lead to warfare.75 A big improvement Sahel region – submitted in December jointly with China
notwithstanding, AR5 was beset by familiar problems. These and India – the Mission called for a more “comprehensive”
include inconsistencies across chapters, some “not-too- understanding of conflict risks, to include issues of poverty
well-grounded statements” about pathways between climate and poor local governance, as well as the impact of climate
events and conflict, and “a lot of loose language” when events. Whilst a logical rebuttal, it’s clear that the Kremlin’s
differentiating between the likes of ‘may’ and ‘is capable of’.76 resistance is shaped somewhat by its broader critique of the
West:
In the period between 2015-2020, ‘civil war’ remains popular
in the academic literature – animated by the crisis in Syria. “…we see an attempt both to shift the blame towards the
Research on ‘natural disasters’ emerges; this focuses on developing countries…and to gain leverage in the Council to
the linkages between disasters and conflict77 as well as the impose a particular vision … the Russian Federation along
impact of conflict on disaster risk reduction.78 Furthermore, with India and China do not share such an approach imposed
there’s growing interest in adaptation and resilience by the western nations”.
measures to manage conflicts arising from resource use.
Of note is a continued emergence of ‘politics’ as a “motor Russia’s veto was inevitable. Together with Chinese and
theme” – in sync with arguments that climate events Indian delegates, the Russians have long made it clear
interact with pre-existing conditions and mediating factors, that they oppose any broadening of the Security Council’s
rather than influencing conflict outcomes directly. Lastly, agenda. Yet, the Ireland-Niger resolution – and the strong
‘urbanization’ surfaces as a sub-theme, indicating “concerns support it garnered – highlights the relevance of climate
about the security implications of rapid urbanisation in risks to international peace and security, and their growing
certain regional contexts”.79 As presented in Chapter 3, recognition in the international arena. The penholders can
however, work on urban climate-conflict links remains return to the drawing board, then, having taken a “major step
nascent. forward”.89 Already, diplomats suggest that climate risks be
tabled at the UN General Assembly, where supporters could
The period 2015-2020 saw several diplomatic steps to pursue a “broader survey” of climate security risks beyond
integrate climate concerns in security thinking.IX The the countries and regions of the Security Council.90 Various
European Union’s 2016 Global Strategy on Foreign and other mechanisms – such as the Informal Expert Group on
Security Policy recognised climate shifts as something that Climate Security in the Security Council, and the UN Climate
“endanger[s] our people and territory”.80 In a keynote speech Security Mechanism (CM) – offer similar entry points.91
at the Bao Forum for Asia in 2015, Chinese President Xi
Jinping acknowledged climate change as a non-traditional In the meantime, the climate security field faces several
security threat.81 In 2015 and 2016, both the U.S. White other challenges. One is the slow uptake of security talks at
House82 and the U.S. National Intelligence Council83 released the Conference of Parties (COP). At COP26 in Glasgow, for
reports about the security implications of a changing example, discussions of climate and security were limited to
climate. At a 2015 UN Security Council debate on small side-events and high-level roundtables.92 Experts predict that
island development states, UK Ambassador Matthew Rycroft getting climate security on future schedules (e.g., at COP27
said that climate change could be “one of the gravest threats in Cairo, Egypt) will be a “hard lift” because “introducing
to international peace and security for generations”.84 questions of peace and war is difficult where you can
Rycroft reiterated these thoughts at a June 2017 debate on only achieve minimal agreement on emissions”.X This is
transboundary water.85 Lastly, the African Union increasingly problematic in several respects.
recognised the security threats associated with climate
events in its natural resources and peace work.86
Climate Security in Cities: A Summary 15Mohamed Bazoum, President of Niger and President of the Security Council for the month of December, chairs the Security Council meeting on maintenance of
international peace and security, with a focus on security in the context of terrorism and climate change (12 September, 2021). © United Nations
As developed countries prepare to mobilise billions of (V) This quote, in different iterations, is attributed to former United Nations
Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon. However, the source from which it’s
dollars in climate finance, it’s critical that investments avoid referenced does not use this language.
exacerbating inequality or tension, and that they are conflict-
(VI) Civil wars and battle deaths declined between the early 1990s and early
sensitive. In fragile states where de jure governments are 2000s. And major civil wars declined by 72% between 1990-2003. However,
embroiled in myriad abuses and violations (e.g., in Myanmar from 2005-2015 this trend reversed. The number of major civil wars rose
from four in 2003 to eleven in 2015 (Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria (x2), Pakistan,
and Syria), allocating large sums of financial support via Somalia, Sudan, Syria (x2), Ukraine and Yemen). This was the highest number
conventional routes is unlikely to foster peace and security. of such wars since 1992. For more, see von Einsiedel, 2017.
Rather, it could empower conflict actors whilst ignoring the (VII) According to Google Scholar, Kelley’s paper is cited by 1,306 other papers.
de facto groups and individuals on whom citizens really rely.
(VIII) There’s growing recognition that adverse climate conditions are more
Even in non-fragile states, poorly-planned climate adaptation likely to contribute to localised, interpersonal violence, rather than major
can have unintended peace and conflict consequences.93 armed conflicts at the international scale. Yet, much of the earlier evidence
focused on the latter. See Buhaug & von Uexkull, 2021.
(IX) For a good overview of policies and statements made by permanent
member states of the UN Security Council, see Zhou, J. (2017) National
(II) According to Google Scholar, Homer-Dixon’s and Barnett’s papers have Climate-Related Security Policies of the Permanent Member States of the
been cited by 2,871 and 829 other studies, respectively. United Nations Security Council. SIPRI Working Paper, December.
(III) The Group of 77 (G77) at the United Nations is a coalition of 134 (X) Global Warming: How Climate Change Drives Risks of Conflict (Online
developing countries, responsible for promoting its constituents’ collective Event, 16th November 2021).
economic interests. See https://www.g77.org/doc/ for more.
(IV) Similar criticisms continue today. At the UN Security Council Open Debate
in January 2019, the Indian delegate remarked that while “securitizing” climate
change can “heighten public awareness” and “increase the resources devoted
to addressing it”, it “brings the wrong actors to the table” and engenders
an “overly militarized solution” characterised by competition, rather than
cooperation (Indian delegate’s intervention at the UNSC 4th official open
debate held on 25 January 2019, UNSC S/PV.8451, quoted in Maertens, L.
(2021) Climatizing the UN Security Council. International Politics 58).
16 Climate Security in Cities: A SummaryProblems
The relationship between climate factors and ‘conflict’ changes in the climate (e.g., in temperatures, rainfall, and
remains complex and contested. As described earlier, disastrous events) to predict trends.102 Critics argue that
successive waves of research have sought to understand this analysis can explain only climate variability, with little
how changes in the climate can increase the risk of conflict. relevance for how long-term climate impacts may influence
There is now a strong body of work that sketches anticipated conflict outcomes.103 In other words, the transferability of
pathways between a changing climate and an increasingly findings from, say, a hot summer to a 2°C warmer world, is
wide range of conflict outcomes.XI This reflects a remarkable contested.
transformation in the climate security field – from a “nascent
area of academic inquiry” to a thriving topic which traverses Temporally, researchers use different timelines to assess (1)
various disciplines.94 the duration and timing of a climate event, and (2) the time-
lag between that event and a conflict outcome.104 Temporal
Notwithstanding this great progress, ambiguity and units can range from annual or monthly changes in things
disagreement remain. And debates and policies frequently like precipitation and temperature,105 to rapid-onset disaster
advance ahead of conclusive evidence – leading to events,106 to longer-term or prolonged climate extremes like
“overhyped”95 statements that wrongly ascribe blame to droughts and sea-level riseXII.107
certain climate events with “limited” real influence on
conflict outcomes.96 Accurately identifying relationships Generalising climate impacts on conflict across diverse
and achieving consensus is difficult, and will remain so, for timeframes (e.g., assuming that a 5-year drought could
multiple reasons. have similar impacts as a season of heavy rainfall) will
generate unreliable results. Further, the distinct temporal
vulnerability of certain groups or places to climate risks
Methodological challenge
can go unexamined – for example, while pastoralists are
To accurately isolate the impact of a climate event on particularly vulnerable to resource scarcity during the
a conflict outcome, researchers ideally would identify dry season, farmers are more vulnerable during the rainy
homogenous populations (one control, one treatment) on season.108 These vulnerabilities can give rise to different risks
which the impact of climate events can be compared.97 at different times.
This is difficult given the distinct economic, political and
social conditions across countries (and localities) – and Geography challenge
the different nature of climate events and impacts between
them. Such difficulties have seen comparative studies A related issue is that many researchers measure climate-
criticised for homogenising vastly different environments,98 conflict links at different geographic scales. This is critical
and more robust meta-analyses called out for over- to understand the specific circumstances and conditions
generalising results.99 in which climate-conflict links could occur. However, it can
hamper efforts to compare results and build consensus.
One response is a shift from cross-sectional studies
(comparing plausibly homogenous populations and the Researchers have studied climate impacts from the level of
impact of climate events on them) to time-series studies grid cells109 to administrative units,110 countries111 and entire
(whereby one population is measured before and after a regions.112 This is a welcome development to understand
climate event). In the latter, the assumptions necessary climate-conflict connections at more specific scales.113
for causal interference are easier to meet because the However, applying findings from a localised study to an inter-
comparison populations are closely similar.100 However, state dispute is problematic, as is aggregating statistics at
for longer-term climate events (i.e., over decades), “human a country level and, potentially, masking local outcomes.114
populations can change dramatically”, compromising the Similarly, statistical results can range depending on the
assumption that the population before and following the choice of geographical unit.115
event are similar enough to draw accurate results.101 This
remains a contentious issue in isolating the specific impact Definitional challenge
of climate events on conflict outcomes.
Many climate-conflict researchers adopt different
interpretations of ‘conflict’. This is important because
Time challenge
findings from a study on political violence cannot reliably
While climate projections are long-term (generally over 30- be transferred to one on homicide or armed conflict – each
year periods), many conflict researchers focus on short-term have unique risk factors which may react differently to
Climate Security in Cities: A Summary 17Water scarcity can lead to both drought and desertification as well as instigate conflict in communities and between countries. © United Nations
climate events. And just because a climate event influences climate-conflict relationship, they lack the methodological
levels of interpersonal violence does not guarantee it will robustness of the tighter quantitative studies.
influence levels of inter-state warfare. Activities falling under
‘conflict’ have ranged from aggression in baseball games116 In any case, de-contextualised analysis severs climate-
to crime,117 political repression,118 protests and riots,119 related conflict from its local, political and social roots.126 It
civil conflict120 and civil war,121 and interstate conflict.122 ignores the complex and interrelated ways in which humans
Furthermore, much of the evidence continually focuses on become violent.127 Furthermore, it neglects the diverse
armed or violent conflict. interactions that climate events have with other risk factors
for conflict. In this way, it’s encouraging to see more recent
studies that consider climate effects in interaction with
Need for multifaceted analysis
other such factors, including ethnic diversity,128 agricultural
Ultimately, despite growing recognition that contextual dependence,129 and changes in population.130
factors – e.g., economic stability, inter-group cohesion,
agricultural dependence – influence any climate-conflict
links, most early research sought to define a direct causal (XI) However, armed conflict – especially war and violent conflict – remains
the most common outcome studied. For example, Sharifi’s bibliometric review
pattern between climate events and conflict.123 And concludes, “the focus has mainly been on war and violent conflicts and other
whilst good progress has been made, calls for measuring events are not well addressed”.
conditional relationships and considering actor- and location- (XII) In 2021, the United Nations convened an Arria-Formula meeting on sea-
specific factors remain prominent.124 level rise and its implications for international peace and security. See more,
here: https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1i/k1im1x4i6t.
Some distinctions can be drawn here between qualitative
and quantitative methodologies. The former can generate
“rich conceptual models” and “a long chain of intermediate
factors and impacts”. By contrast, the latter can get bogged
down with exploring direct correlations, “thus relegating
issues of causal mechanisms to mere speculation”.125
Indeed, whilst the rich conceptual models produced by
qualitative research better illustrate the complexity of any
18 Climate Security in Cities: A SummaryPathways
While disagreement is frequent, and many challenges exist, havoc on agricultural output.138 And, in severe cases, the
some consensus points have emerged over time. Chief worst affected must adopt certain coping strategies – such
among them is that there is rarely a direct causal relationship as liquidating crucial productive assets or reducing food
between climate change and ‘conflict’. In other words, one intake – with destabilising and pernicious effects.139 This
cannot say – with any general validity – that an increase is a form of ‘maladaptation’, the negative consequences of
in temperatures will always increase the risk of violence. which are fairly well-studied.140 In parallel, climate events
Nor can one say that the onset of a disastrous event (e.g., can heighten competition over land, water and other income-
flooding) will always increase abusive tendencies or sow generating resources.
friction among groups.
Confronted with declining economic output and increasing
Rather, what one can say is that, in certain contexts, under resource scarcity, the argument goes, individuals have less to
certain circumstances, and in certain ways, climate variation lose from using violence than they did beforehand. In other
can increase the risk of conflict. How? By aggravating, words, when economic output is sufficient and resources are
exposing or interacting with its other and far more influential available, the consequences of behaving violently are largely
risk factors. Thus, the logic follows that climate-conflict risks negative. On the flip side, resorting to violence becomes
are more pronounced in fragile areas already experiencing a more rational and feasible option when “expectations or
such factors.131 This ‘indirect’ pattern is why many now refer prospects for a better life worsen”.141 Compounding this,
to climate variation as a ‘conflict threat multiplier’. And this is dwindling resources can reduce the capacity of fragile
why interpretations of conflict as ‘climate-driven’ or ‘climate- governments to provide goods and services, possibly
induced’ can only partly explain how and why it occurs. breeding resentment that can manifest in conflict or, at
least, grievances.142 This is especially so where economic
To articulate the ways in which climate events aggravate inequalities are exacerbated.
conflict risks, researchers increasingly use ‘pathways’:132
explanations which connect multiple “phenomena” through
Increasing migration and changing mobility patterns
a “contiguous” and “continuous” chain of links.133 An
antidote to “oversimplified” explanations for climate-conflict The extent to which migration breeds ‘conflict’ is disputed.
links, a pathways approach can illustrate how contextual And the extent to which environmental migration breeds
factors – the strength of political and social institutions, conflict is even more uncertain. Environmental migration
the resilience of a population, the conflict-sensitivity of is difficult to quantify, and most evidence comes from
adaptation programmes, and more – shape any climate- qualitative case studies, with little comparative work.143
conflict relationship.134 And, rather than just an assessment Furthermore, climate events are one among many drivers of
tool, thinking of climate-conflict links as pathways also can migration – including violence, human rights violations and
help “identify and navigate the political space for mitigating economic opportunity. So even if migration contributes to
violent conflict”.135 ‘conflict’, we must be cautious in ascribing that simply to a
climate event.
Based on evidence reviews in East and West Africa, and
South and Southeast Asia, researchers at the Stockholm The SIPRI authors suggest that climate-related migration can
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) identify four increase risks of community-based violence or conflict when
pathways linking climate events with violent conflictXIII.136 “economic, political or social factors” bring migrants into
Generally, they resonate with those pathways identified confrontation with others. Reuveny (2007) proposes some
in other studies.137 Whilst identifying distinct or separate migration-conflict “channels” that elaborate this. The first,
pathways is useful from a conceptual standpoint, it’s Competition, involves arriving migrants over-burdening the
clear that, in practice, they are complex, contingent, and, economic and resource base at their destination, “promoting
sometimes, concurrent. native-migrant contest over resources”.144
Worsening livelihood conditions This is a popular thesis, especially in regard to farmer-herder
violence.145 In East and West Africa, climate events drive
Climate change can adversely impact livelihoods. This is pastoralists into new and unfamiliar locations to find food
especially so in communities that rely upon agriculture and for livestock. Often, this brings them into contact with other
livestock production. Through environmental degradation, groups, especially farmers. The ensuing competition for
changing agro-ecological conditions, and increasingly resources can precipitate violence. An acute example is
unpredictable growing seasons, climate shifts can wreak Nigeria, where once-spontaneous confrontations between
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