Critical Speech in Southeast Asian Grey Literature During the COVID-19 Pandemic
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Human Rights Law Review, 2021, 21, 233–251
doi: 10.1093/hrlr/ngaa052
Advance Access Publication Date: 8 January 2021
Article
Critical Speech in Southeast Asian
Grey Literature During the
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COVID-19 Pandemic
Stewart Manley∗
KEY WORDS: Civil society, COVID-19, Empirical research, Freedom of expression, Grey
literature, Human rights
1. INTRODUCTION
Little academic research has been conducted on critical speech in Southeast Asia during
the COVID-19 pandemic.1 This article aims to partially address this gap through an
empirical case study of op-eds published on the website of the civil society program
Strengthening Human Rights and Peace Research and Education in ASEAN/Southeast
Asia (SHAPE-SEA). Intended for ‘those who find it challenging to access more main-
stream media’, the op-eds provide a snapshot of how civil society groups, scholars and
students who otherwise might be marginalised from conventional academic discourse
are exercising their freedom of expression in grey literature during a time of global
crisis. The study asks, who authors these commentaries? What are they writing about?
Which countries are their focus? How far are they willing to go in criticising government
policies?
* Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (stewart.manley@um.edu.my).
1 For a rare example, see Seewald, ‘Shrinking Space for Free Expression in Cambodia during Covid-19: Oppor-
tunistic Repression or Proportionate Necessity?’ (2020) 4 Journal of Southeast Asian Human Rights 140. For
media pieces, see, for example, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Asia:
Bachelet Alarmed by Clampdown on Freedom of Expression during COVID-19’, 3 June 2020, available at:
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25920&LangID=E [last accessed 2
November 2020]; Hutt, ‘Southeast Asia’s Coronavirus-Driven Censorship’, The Diplomat, 17 April 2020,
available at: thediplomat.com/2020/04/southeast-asias-coronavirus-driven-censorship/ [last accessed 2
November 2020]; Dressel, ‘COVID-19 and Abusive Constitutionalism in Southeast Asia: Where Are the
Courts?’, New Mandala, 9 July 2020, available at: www.newmandala.org/covid-19-and-abusive-constituti
onalism/ [last accessed 2 November 2020]; PEN International, ‘Singapore: Government Uses Fake News
Law to Interfere with Critical Comments on Handling of COVID-19 Pandemic’, 10 July 2020, avail-
able at: pen-international.org/news/singapore-government-removal-comments-covid-19-pandemic [last
accessed 2 November 2020].
© The Author(s) [2021]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
• 233234 • Critical Speech in Southeast Asian Grey Literature
Each op-ed was assigned a ‘criticalness score’ based on the frequency of criticising
the government and the severity of the language used. The scores were then used to
test whether, for instance, the level of criticalness correlates with a country’s Global
Freedom Scores or a government’s handling of the epidemic. Although little to no
correlation was found, among other things, the criticalness scores nonetheless revealed
that male and female authors were equally critical, students were more critical on
average than lecturers or non-governmental organization (NGO) workers, and certain
themes—law and order, human rights and freedom of expression—elicited the most
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critical speech. The average overall criticalness of the 115 op-eds evaluated was 1.15 on
a scale up to 3, reflecting ‘slight criticism’. The study sheds light on the nature of freedom
of expression in a region well known for its restrictive laws, policies and practices
on speech, indicating that criticalness of government remains mild, even during the
pandemic.
2. SHAPE-SEA AND THE COVID-19 OP-EDS
In March 2020, SHAPE-SEA issued a call on its Facebook page and several listservs
for COVID-19 op-eds to ‘provide an online space for anyone, especially academics
and activists to analyse the situation of COVID-19 in their respective countries and
communities.’2 Op-eds could be submitted by anyone, provided they were related
to human rights and peace, written in English, between 300 and 700 words, cited
sources and included a list of references. Submitters could send as many opinion
pieces as they wished with uploading done on a rolling basis.3 The publishing oppor-
tunity was specifically intended to ‘tap those who find it challenging to access more
mainstream media—this is to give them that opportunity to be heard by a larger
audience.’4
Launched in 2015, SHAPE-SEA is the product of a collaboration between two
Southeast Asian academic networks—ASEAN University Network–Human Rights
Education and South East Asian Human Rights Studies Network. Hosted by the
Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies at Mahidol University, Thailand,
SHAPE-SEA receives funding from the Swedish International Development Agency
and the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. SHAPE-SEA aims to ‘contribute to
the improvement of the human rights and peace situation in ASEAN/Southeast
Asia through applied research and education.’5 Its work focuses on human rights
and peace education, research, publications, academic partnership and public
advocacy.6
In total, 115 op-eds were published between 26 March and 26 July on SHAPE-SEA’s
webpage ‘Southeast Asia in Crisis: Opinions on the State of Human Rights and Peace
in The Time of Covid-19.’ Op-eds were submitted by both seasoned and emerging
2 Interview with Joel Mark Baysa-Barredo, Programme Director, SHAPE-SEA Secretariat, Institute of Human
Rights and Peace Studies, Mahidol University, 20 July 2020 (on file with author).
3 shapesea.com/op-ed-southeast-asia-in-crisis-opinions-on-the-state-of-human-rights-and-peace-in-the-
time-of-covid-19/ [last accessed 2 November 2020].
4 Barredo, supra n 2.
5 About us, SHAPE-SEA Program, 25 February 2016, available at: shapesea.com/about-us/the-shape-sea-
program/ [last accessed 2 November 2020].
6 Ibid.Critical Speech in Southeast Asian Grey Literature • 235
academics and activists.7 In total, 99.9 per cent of the op-eds submitted were pub-
lished.8 The website sets a critical tone by mentioning concern for ‘the suspension of
rights and freedoms brought about by lockdowns and quarantines’, the ‘dismal progress
on mass testing’ and the possible aggravation of ‘inequalities, conflicts and human rights
violations’.9
3. GREY LITERATURE
The SHAPE-SEA op-eds are grey literature—‘the diverse and heterogeneous body
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of material available outside, and not subject to, traditional academic peer review
processes’.10 Characterised in part by the challenge in locating it due to a lack of
bibliographic control, grey literature includes materials from conference proceedings,
dissertations, government reports, blogs, tweets and Facebook posts.11 Although grey
literature is ‘difficult to define, awkward to deal with and difficult to find’, the increase
of material on the Internet and improved access to electronic information is making it
more easily accessible.12
Obvious concerns with grey literature include its sometimes questionable qual-
ity (considering it has usually not undergone peer review), its heterogeneity and its
increased risk of irrelevance, mistakes and fraudulent claims.13 Yet, grey literature
(particularly in the medical field) has the advantage of timeliness, it reflects information
in its earlier forms (sometimes prepublication) and it can reveal data that never make it
to commercial publication.14
The major disadvantages of grey literature do not adversely impact this op-ed study
because the study examines the characteristics of the grey literature itself, rather than
relying on the accuracy of its content. To illustrate, the lack of peer review is an
advantage here—not a disadvantage—because the study seeks to observe and assess the
unfiltered (yet still professional) manifestation of critical speech. As another example,
the risk of an op-ed author making an erroneous criticism is irrelevant because the
fact that the complaint is made (as a manifestation of critical speech), rather than its
correctness, is the point measured here.
7 Barredo, supra n 2.
8 Ibid.
9 shapesea.com/op-ed-southeast-asia-in-crisis-opinions-on-the-state-of-human-rights-and-peace-in-the-
time-of-covid-19/ [last accessed 2 November 2020].
10 Adams, Smart and Huff, ‘Shades of Grey: Guidelines for Working with the Grey Literature in Systematic
Reviews for Management and Organizational Studies’ (2017) 19 International Journal of Management Reviews
432 at 433.
11 Ibid. at 434.
12 Tillet and Newbold, ‘Grey Literature at The British Library: Revealing a Hidden Resource’ (2006) 34
Interlending & Document Supply 70 at 70–1; see also Luzi, ‘Trends and Evolution in the Development of
Grey Literature: A Review’ (2000) 1 International Journal of Grey Literature 106.
13 Adams, Smart and Huff, supra n 10 at 435; see also Pappas and Williams, ‘Grey Literature: Its Emerging
Importance’ (2011) 11 Journal of Hospital Librarianship 228 at 229.
14 Pappas and Williams, supra n 13 at 229; see also Benzies et al., ‘State-of-the-Evidence Reviews: Advantages
and Challenges of Including Grey Literature’ (2006) 3 Worldviews on Evidence-Based Nursing 55.236 • Critical Speech in Southeast Asian Grey Literature
4. HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Within the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the state of human rights and
freedom of expression in Southeast Asia, the SHAPE-SEA op-eds can be viewed as
courageous statements prompted by a global emergency. Over the past two decades or
so until a recent shift towards authoritarianism (in certain countries),15 Southeast Asia
had been transitioning to more democratic forms of governance with increased respect
for human rights.16 The passage of the 2007 Charter of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations embodied this shift as states appeared to be deprioritising the previously
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central guiding principle of non-interference.17
Diverse views across Southeast Asia of the substantive content of human rights and
even the reasons for adopting the Charter, however, have more recently led to discord,
disagreement and ‘the continuing adherence to non-interference in internal affairs’.18
This diversity of voices is reflected in Southeast Asian political systems, with 8 of 11
governments (as of 2014) characterised as ranging from ‘soft dictatorships to electoral
authoritarian regimes and illiberal democracies’.19 On human rights, Indonesia and the
Philippines are considered ‘progressive’ but Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand are (to
put it mildly) ‘cautious’, whereas Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam and Brunei are
‘recalcitrant’.20
The tension between the so-called ‘Asian value’ of non-interference and human
rights protections inevitably extends to freedom of expression.21 The strengthening of
freedom of the press that took place in the 1980s and 1990s, for instance, has eroded
in the name of stability.22 In its 2020 Report, Freedom House observed that in the
Asia-Pacific region, ‘[p]olitical rights and civil liberties declined overall’.23 In Reporters
Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index, all ASEAN countries fell into the bottom
15 See, for example, Morgenbesser, The Rise of Sophisticated Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia (2020); Einzen-
berger and Schaffar, “The Political Economy of New Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia” (2018) 11 Austrian
Journal of South-East Asian Studies 1.
16 Gomez and Ramcharan, ‘Democracy and Human Rights in Southeast Asia’ (2014) 33 Journal of Current
Southeast Asian Affairs 3 at 3.
17 Ibid. at 3–4.
18 Ibid. at 4. See also Robinson, ‘Human Rights in Southeast Asia: Rhetoric and Reality’ in Burton and Wurfel
(eds), Southeast Asia in the New World Order: The Political Economy of a Dynamic Region (1996) 74 at 74–5;
Mohamad, ‘Towards a Human Rights Regime in Southeast Asia: Charting the Course of State Commitment’
(2002) 24 Contemporary Southeast Asia 230; Christie, ‘Regime Security and Human Rights in Southeast
Asia’ (1995) XLIII Political Studies 204; Manan, ‘A Nation in Distress: Human Rights, Authoritarianism, and
Asian Values in Malaysia’ (1999) 14 Sojourn 359; Mauzy, ‘The Human Rights and “Asian Values” Debate in
Southeast Asia: Trying to Clarify the Key Issues’ (1997) 10 Pacific Review 210.
19 Peou, ‘The Limits and Potential of Liberal Democratisation in Southeast Asia’ (2014) 33 Journal of Current
Southeast Asian Affairs 19 at 19.
20 Davies, ‘An Agreement to Disagree: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the Absence of Regional
Identity in Southeast Asia’ (2014) 33 Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 107 at 112 (Timor-Leste was
presumably omitted because it is not a member of ASEAN).
21 Goodroad, ‘The Challenge of Free Speech: Asian Values v. Unfettered Free Speech, an Analysis of Singapore
and Malaysia in the New Global Order’ (1998) 9 Indiana International & Comparative Law Review 259.
22 Quackenbush et al., ‘Press Freedom Is Under Attack Across Southeast Asia. Meet the Journalists Fighting
Back’, Time, 21 June 2018, available at: time.com/longform/press-freedom-southeast-asia/ [last accessed 2
November 2020].
23 Repucci, Freedom in the World 2020: A Leaderless Struggle for Democracy, Freedom House (2020) at 22,
available at: freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/FIW_2020_REPORT_BOOKLET_Final.pdf
[last accessed 2 November 2020].Critical Speech in Southeast Asian Grey Literature • 237
half of the world, with most in the bottom third and three—Singapore, Laos and
Vietnam—in the bottom quarter.24 In Malaysia, as one example, any political speech
that seriously challenges the government is restricted, ostensibly because it threatens
national stability and racial harmony.25 Freedom of expression is not only curtailed by
laws26 but also commonly, in Southeast Asia, by defamation lawsuits against media,
political opponents and even everyday citizen bloggers.27
The Internet is increasingly becoming the battleground for testing the limits of
freedom of expression. In Malaysia, Indonesia, Laos, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam and
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Cambodia, governments have employed increasingly aggressive tactics to police the
Internet.28 In 2017, the Thai government issued a directive prohibiting anyone from
‘following, communicating with, or disseminating information online both directly and
indirectly’ from three outspoken critics of the government. The penalty includes up to
15 years of imprisonment.29 In 2018, Vietnamese authorities detained a well-known
pop star whose songs advocate free speech, democracy, women’s rights and LGBTQ
rights at the airport for eight hours and seized copies of her album.30 Even in Indonesia,
where the laws and structure of the judiciary reflect a gradual strengthening of freedom
of expression, key political actors continue to lean towards a tendency to censor.31
The development of civil society has been shown to pressure government restric-
tions and promote democratic values.32 Activist media, less influenced by commercial
concerns, may be more likely to criticise governments.33 In Southeast Asia, however,
24 Out of 180 ranked countries, ASEAN countries placed: Malaysia 101, Indonesia 119, Philippines 136,
Myanmar 139, Thailand 140, Cambodia 144, Brunei 152, Singapore 158, Laos 172, Vietnam 175. Reporters
Without Borders, ‘2020 World Press Freedom Index’ (2020), available at: rsf.org/en/ranking_table [last
accessed 2 November 2020].
25 Sani, ‘Freedom of Speech and Democracy in Malaysia’ (2008) 16 Asian Journal of Political Science 85 at 86.
Although the Pakatan Harapan government of Malaysia loosened its grip on the press from 2018 to 2020,
its ousting in February 2020 has arguably led to a ‘rapid deterioration of conditions for media freedom’.
Neugeboren, ‘Malaysiakini Trial Comes Amid Malaysia’s Press Freedom Decline’, Voice of America, 16 July
2020, available at: www.voanews.com/press-freedom/malaysiakini-trial-comes-amid-malaysias-press-free
dom-decline [last accessed 2 November 2020].
26 International Commission of Jurists, Dictating the Internet: Curtailing Free Expression, Opinion
and Information Online in Southeast Asia (2019), available at: www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/
Southeast-Asia-Dictating-the-Internet-Publications-Reports-Thematic-reports-2019-ENG.pdf [last
accessed 2 November 2020].
27 Han, ‘On Freedom of Expression and Civil Liberties in Singapore’, Heinrich Böll Stiftung (2019), available at:
th.boell.org/index.php/en/2019/04/22/freedom-expression-and-civil-liberties-singapore [last accessed
2 November 2020]; Anstis, ‘Using Law to Impair the Rights and Freedoms of Human Rights Defenders:
A Case Study of Cambodia’ (2012) 4 Journal of Human Rights Practice 312 at 317.
28 Barenberg, ‘In the Shadow of the Great Firewall: Art and Internet Censorship in East and Southeast Asia’
(2019) 40 Harvard International Review 32 at 33.
29 Sinpeng, ‘Digital Media, Political Authoritarianism, and Internet Controls in Southeast Asia’ (2019) 42
Media, Culture & Society 25 at 26.
30 Barenberg, supra n 28 at 32.
31 Staples, ‘Freedom of Speech in Indonesian Press: International Human Rights Perspective’ (2016) 3
Brawijaya Law Journal 41 at 57.
32 Majid, ‘Going through the Democratic Motions in Southeast Asia’ (2010) 47 International Politics 725;
Ciorciari, ‘Institutionalising Human Rights in Southeast Asia’ (2012) 34 Human Rights Quarterly 695 at 704.
33 Whitten-Woodring and James, ‘Fourth Estate or Mouthpiece? A Formal Model of Media, Protest, and
Government Repression’ (2012) 29 Political Communication 113 at 116.238 • Critical Speech in Southeast Asian Grey Literature
civil societies have been largely marginalised from policymaking.34 Suppression of
these organizations that began in the colonial era and continued in the Cold War
continues to influence their relationship with governments.35 As a result, their impact
in Southeast Asia remains a mixed bag. While high profile activism has been particularly
noticeable in the Philippines and Thailand,36 civil society organizations have been
more muted in Singapore and Malaysia.37 Civil society in Indonesia was weaker in the
1990s than in the 1950s and 1960s.38 In Cambodia, the 2015 Law on Associations
and Non-Governmental Organizations’ increase of reporting, financial and registration
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requirements has arguably been used to control political opponents and government
critics.39
Social media campaigns and online efforts like the SHAPE-SEA op-eds are a rel-
atively new and particularly potent threat to authoritarian regimes in that they can
mobilise opposition politics and increase electoral competition.40 The Internet has in
many instances created a novel and accessible platform such that those ‘[f]aced with
political repression but with recourse to web-based information and technical channels
of communication increasingly available [...] seek to address their grievances rather than
staying silent.’41 Yet the same technologies have been used by repressive governments
to identify dissidents, sow misinformation and stifle opposition.42 In Southeast Asia,
increased censorship in the region has been predicted to likely continue to hamper the
impact of online activism.43
The COVID-19 pandemic appears to have provided some governments an oppor-
tunity to crack down even further on critical speech and human rights more generally.44
Indeed, even when governments promise to apply—or actually do apply—emergency
laws without undermining human rights, the resulting chilling effect may nonetheless
impact the exercise of freedom of expression.45 Thailand, Cambodia and Singapore
have all promulgated new emergency laws affecting freedom of expression, with Thai
authorities seemingly ‘intent on shutting down critical opinions from the media and
general public about their response to the COVID-19 crisis’.46 To be fair though,
given the unprecedented nature of the pandemic, at least in recent history, it is unclear
whether those accusing governments in regions like Southeast Asia are unfairly rushing
34 Gomez and Ramcharan, ‘The Protection of Human Rights in Southeast Asia’ (2002) 13 Asia-Pacific Journal
of Human Rights & Law 27; Ciorciari, supra n 32 at 718.
35 Rodan, ‘Civil Society Activism and Political Parties in Malaysia: Differences over Local Representation’
(2014) 21 Democratization 824 at 825.
36 Peou, supra note 19 at 35.
37 Ibid. at 36.
38 Ibid.
39 Curley, ‘Governing Civil Society in Cambodia: Implications of the NGO Law for the “Rule of Law”’ (2018)
42 Asian Studies Review 247 at 247–8; Anstis, supra n 27.
40 See Sinpeng, supra n 29 at 27.
41 Peou, supra n 19 at 36.
42 Christensen and Groshek, ‘Emerging Media, Political Protests, and Government Repression in Autocracies
and Democracies from 1995 to 2012’ (2019) 82 International Communication Gazette 685.
43 Ibid.
44 Seewald, supra n 1 at 141–2.
45 Ibid. at 162.
46 Hutt, ‘Southeast Asia’s Coronavirus-Driven Censorship’, The Diplomat, 17 April 2020 (quoting the executive
director of the Asian division of Human Rights Watch).Critical Speech in Southeast Asian Grey Literature • 239
to judgement on restrictions that liberal democracies are also taking albeit with less
international scrutiny.47 Nevertheless, the consensus appears to be that freedom of
expression and civic space for civil society, at least in some Southeast Asian nations,
is diminishing during the pandemic.48
5. HYPOTHESES
COVID-19 has heightened the need for civil society voices by creating an environment
in which at least some governments have responded erratically to the virus (with deadly
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consequences), some enforcement agencies see an opportunity to crack down on the
disenfranchised and some legislatures quickly push through laws that aim, perhaps, to
enhance public safety but have the effect of sidelining human rights.49 Within this ever-
darkening space for critical speech in Southeast Asia, the SHAPE-SEA op-eds provide
a window onto the ongoing struggle for activists, students and academics to express
themselves in a professional yet highly accessible venue.
This study hypothesises that:
1. More men than women publish SHAPE-SEA op-eds (there is evidence that
women have been submitting less academic work for publishing than men
during the pandemic).50
2. The most critical authors are NGO workers, then students, then academics
(NGO workers tend to write more subjective, advocacy pieces, whereas
academics and, to a lesser extent, students take a more objective, academic
approach).51
47 Seewald, supra n 1 at 142.
48 Gomez and Ramcharan, ‘COVID-19 Shrinks Civic Space in Southeast Asia’, Jakarta Post, 25 Apr
2020, available at: www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2020/04/25/pandemic-shrinks-civic-space.html
[last accessed 2 November 2020]; CodeBlue, ‘UN Slams Malaysia over Censorship during Covid-19 Crisis’,
4 June 2020, available at: codeblue.galencentre.org/2020/06/04/un-slams-malaysia-over-censorship-duri
ng-covid-19-crisis/ [last accessed 2 November 2020]; Gomez and Ramcharan, ‘Covid Crisis Stifles Political
Criticism in SE Asia’, Bangkok Post, 27 May 2020, available at: www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opini
on/1924828/covid-crisis-stifles-political-criticism-in-se-asia [last accessed 2 November 2020]
49 See, for example, Gebrekidan, ‘Pandemic Tempts Leaders to Seize Sweeping Powers’, New York Times, 31
March 2020 at 1.
50 Viglione, ‘Are Women Publishing Less During the Pandemic? Here’s What the Data Say’, Nature, 20
May 2020, available at: www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01294-9 [last accessed 2 November
2020]; Zimmer, ‘Gender Gap in Research Output Widens During Pandemic’, The Scientist, 25 June
2020, available at: www.the-scientist.com/news-opinion/gender-gap-in-research-output-widens-duri
ng-pandemic-67665 [last accessed 2 November 2020]; Fazakerly, ‘Women’s Research Plummets During
Lockdown—but Articles from Men Increase’, The Guardian, 12 May 2020, available at: www.theguardian.
com/education/2020/may/12/womens-research-plummets-during-lockdown-but-articles-from-men-i
ncrease [last accessed 2 November 2020].
51 See Stahl and Shdaimah, ‘Collaboration Between Community Advocates and Academic Researchers: Scien-
tific Advocacy or Political Research’ (2008) 38 British Journal of Social Work 1610; Deshman and Hannah-
Moffat, ‘Advocacy and Academia: Considering Strategies of Cooperative Engagement’ (2015) 42 Social
Justice 91; Klugman, ‘The Role of NGOs as Agents for Change’ (2000) 1–2 Development Dialogue 95.240 • Critical Speech in Southeast Asian Grey Literature
3. More op-eds are published from countries with higher Global Freedom Scores
(people from freer countries should be less afraid to speak out about human
rights than people from less free countries).52
4. Op-eds from countries with lower Global Freedom Scores are less critical of
their governments (people from less free countries should be more afraid to
criticise their governments, leading to self-censorship).53
5. Authors from countries with lower satisfaction with their government’s han-
dling of COVID-19 are more critical of their governments (authors from coun-
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tries that have not managed the pandemic well should be more critical of their
governments).
6. CASE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY
The op-eds of the SHAPE-SEA website were selected as the subject of this study for
four reasons. First, the author was a volunteer editor for the op-eds and therefore was
aware of their existence (editing was for English language only, not content). Second,
the op-eds balance two qualities that make them particularly suitable for a study on
critical speech: they are subjective opinion (instead of objective academic research)
and they are evidence-based (in that they cite their sources). The first quality encour-
ages criticism, whereas the second encourages the criticism to be based on reliable
authorities. Third, as grey literature without conventional peer review, the op-eds allow
more and different voices to be heard than in traditional commercial media or academic
publishing. Students and human rights activists, for instance, who would often either be
ineligible, uninterested or at least less likely to publish in a peer-reviewed journal, were
able to contribute. Fourth, there were enough op-eds published to form the basis of a
study that could, at least in some instances, detect meaningful patterns about the nature
of the authors and op-eds.
Blogs54 and online op-eds55 have increasingly become the subject of academic
research. Research on freedom of expression may consider these newer types of com-
munications56 as it evaluates the right to any form of communication, from ‘talking to
52 Anderson, Regan and Ostergard, ‘Political Repression and Public Perceptions of Human Rights’ (2002) 55
Political Research Quarterly 439 at 440; Rose, ‘Going Public with Private Opinions: Are Post-Communist
Citizens Afraid to Say What They Think?’ (2007) 17 Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties 123 at
125, 127; Lee, ‘Press Self-Censorship and Political Transition in Hong Kong’ (1998) 3 Harvard International
Journal of Press/Politics 55.
53 Ibid.
54 Etling et al., ‘Mapping the Arabic Blogosphere: Politics and Dissent Online’ (2010) 12 New Media & Society
1225; Fathy, ‘Freedom of Expression in the Digital Age: Enhanced or Undermined? The Case of Egypt’
(2017) 3 Journal of Cyber Policy 96.
55 Parks and Takahashi, ‘From Apes to Whistleblowers: How Scientists Inform, Defend, and Excite in Newspa-
per Op-Eds’ (2016) 38 Science Communication 275; Peterson, ‘Making Global News: “Freedom of Speech”
and “Muslim Rage” in U.S. Journalism’ (2007) 1 Contemporary Islam 247.
56 Cheung, ‘Exercising Freedom of Speech behind the Great Firewall: A Study of Judges’ and Lawyers’ Blogs
in China’ (2011) 52 Harvard International Law Journal 250.Critical Speech in Southeast Asian Grey Literature • 241
tweeting to tree-sitting’.57 The case study is one method of studying this right and its
inhibition.58
The 115 op-eds assessed in this study were posted on the SHAPE-SEA website
during the four-month period between 26 March 2020 (when the first four were made
available online) and 26 July 2020 (when data collection ended). The following data
were extracted: (1) title of op-ed; (2) date of op-ed; (3) author name; (4) target
country of op-ed (the country (or countries) that is the subject of the op-ed); (5) origin
of author; (6) profession/position of author;59 (7) author institution type (university,
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NGO, etc.); (8) author gender; (9) primary and (if applicable) secondary theme of
op-ed; and (10) level of criticism against government.
The origin of author was initially collected but eventually abandoned because it was
often too difficult to discern. Author affiliations were not always listed and even when
they were, some authors—especially students—listed their university affiliation, but
their name (which does not necessarily reflect their country of origin) and the target
country of their op-ed seemed to indicate that they were from a different country than
their university.60 Indeed, in all cases, the information provided in the op-eds never
definitively indicated author origin. Due to this uncertainty, this article uses target
country as the equivalent of author origin. For instance, if an op-ed is about Indonesia,
the author is for the purposes of this article treated as either from Indonesia or employed
in Indonesia (in either instance, the relationship of the author to the government—in
the sense of having to abide by the country’s laws and norms on freedom of speech—are
approximately the same). Using a proxy to approximate origin is not uncommon.61 In
any event, target country appears to be a reasonably accurate reflection of author origin.
Author gender was usually collected from either the author name (when a name is
clearly male or female, such as ‘Stefano’ or ‘Anna’) or from the author biography in the
op-ed when it uses the pronoun ‘he’ or ‘she’. Like author origin, however, gender from
a name is not always easy to discern. With names that were not self-evident, the author
profile was checked on www.google.com.
The coding for the most subjective data category—level of criticism against
government—was divided into five categories: −1—slightly supportive of govern-
ment, 0—neutral, 1—slightly critical of government, 2—critical of government and
3—extremely critical of government.62 The term ‘government’ here refers to the
57 Fraleigh, ‘Freedom of Expression’ in Allen (ed.), SAGE Encyclopedia of Communication Research Methods, Vol
1 (2017) 589 at 589.
58 Ibid. at 591–2.
59 With multiple positions, the first position was selected except in the case of student and academic, in which
case academic (the higher position) was selected.
60 Some Southeast Asian countries have names unique from other countries, but even then, it is impossible to
know where the author was born or raised.
61 See, for example, Weiler, ‘The EJIL Foreword: 10 Good Reads; Vital Statistics; EJIL’s Assistant Editors;
With Gratitude—Shirley Wayne; In this Issue’ (2016) 27 European Journal of International Law 1 at 5 (using
country of submission to represent country of origin); Nouwen and Weiler, ‘Editorial: COVID-19 and EJIL;
The Self-Asphyxiation of Democracy; Publishers, Academics and the Battles over Copyright and Your Rights
I; Festschrift? “That Which Is Hateful to You, Do Not Do to Your Fellow! That is the Whole Torah; The
Rest is Interpretation” (from the Elder Hillel in Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 31a); Vital Statistics; A Less
Exclusive Submission Process; In this Issue’ (2020) 31 European Journal of International Law 1 at 11 (using
country of submission to indicate linguistic origin of authors).
62 There were no op-eds that were more than slightly supportive of the government.242 • Critical Speech in Southeast Asian Grey Literature
government of the target country of the op-ed. The coding was based on the language
used in the op-ed. When the op-ed complimented the government (unusual, but there
were four instances), it was coded ‘−1’. For example, an op-ed about Timor-Leste
praised the government’s efforts to provide information for the hearing impaired.63 A
‘neutral’ code ‘0’ was given to 33 op-eds that either did not discuss government policies
or actions, or discussed them in a purely neutral tone, without criticism or praise.
When the author criticised the government but just a few times and quite mildly, it
was coded ‘1’ (29 were coded ‘1’). For example, one Malaysian author writing about
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education mentioned that ‘the related ministries have not been taking these matters
seriously, leading to poor planning and implementation’.64 If this type of criticism had
been repeated more often, it would have been raised to a ‘2’. There were 37 op-eds that
received a ‘2’, reflecting a more sustained criticism yet avoiding extremely emotional
or passionate language. An author from Timor-Leste, for instance, noted how an Army
general ordered police to ‘beat and slap’ people who violated the COVID-19 restrictions
and how the government’s actions were inconsistent with human rights laws and the
country’s constitution.65 The final category, ‘3’, reflects a heightened level of criticism
condemning the government in the strongest of terms. Eleven op-eds received this
grade. For instance, in an op-ed about the Philippine government’s response to the
pandemic, the author writes, ‘Atop the heap callously stands the government, devoid
of any compassion in its policy implementations.’66 One op-ed that compared the
COVID-19 responses of Thailand and Indonesia received both a ‘−1’ (for Thailand)
and a ‘2’ (for Indonesia).
The ‘criticalness score’ was not measured mechanically, such as by counting a certain
number of critical words or by an algorithm that could detect particular phrases.
Instead, the author of this article read each op-ed and comparatively gauged the overall
criticalness in a holistic manner, taking into consideration all of the op-ed author’s
words. The line between each op-ed’s score was naturally, in a few instances, not easily
discernible.
7. LIMITATIONS
In addition to the difficulties in identifying author origin and the subjective nature of the
criticalness score, the number of op-eds (115) and their distinct nature limit the data’s
usefulness. To explain, patterns or characteristics identified among these op-eds cannot
be generalised to the larger population of human rights-centred COVID-19 op-eds on
the Internet because the population of these other op-eds is difficult to identify and they
63 da Fonseca, ‘Is Everyone On-Board? Achieving Inclusive Communication in Timor-Leste amid COVID-19’,
SHAPE-SEA, 2 May 2020, available at: shapesea.com/op-ed/covid-19/is-everyone-on-board-achieving-i
nclusive-communication-in-timor-leste-amid-covid-19/ [last accessed 2 November 2020].
64 Ating, ‘Challenges to Learning and Teaching in Malaysia in the Time of Covid-19’, SHAPE-SEA, 30
June 2020, available at: shapesea.com/op-ed/covid-19/challenges-to-learning-and-teaching-in-malaysia-i
n-the-time-of-covid-19/ [last accessed 2 November 2020].
65 Alves, ‘Emergency Declaration for COVID-19 in Timor-Leste: Inefficiency, Reasons and Resolution,’
SHAPE-SEA, 24 April 2020, available at shapesea.com/op-ed/covid-19/emergency-declaration-for-covi
d-19-in-timor-leste-inefficiency-reasons-and-resolution/ [last accessed 2 November 2020].
66 Sebastian, ‘Top-down Violence in the Face of a Pandemic: An Argument for a Social Protection Floor’,
SHAPE-SEA, 10 April 2020, available at shapesea.com/op-ed/covid-19/top-down-violence-in-the-face-
of-a-pandemic-an-argument-for-a-social-protection-floor/ [last accessed 2 November 2020].Critical Speech in Southeast Asian Grey Literature • 243
necessarily have different requirements and characteristics. Moreover, narrowing the
data to subsets of the op-eds—for instance, the number of op-eds about Cambodia—
reduces the quantity of op-eds even further, making any conclusions speculative at best
(at the same time though, the fact that there were so few op-eds about Cambodia in itself
may be insightful). Another limitation of the study is that the amount and criticalness of
op-eds may be impacted by a seemingly infinite number of factors (to name just a few:
the irregular effectiveness of advertising the call for op-eds across Southeast Asia, the
different busyness of authors across countries, genders, etc. who might consider writing
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op-eds, the different impact of COVID-19 on each country and each author and the
different personal life experiences of authors that may cause them to be more or less
critical).
Limitations to research, however, should be expected given the unprecedented
‘global nature, rapidity, diversity and severity’ of COVID-19’s impact.67 The SHAPE-
SEA op-eds are necessarily limited in number, scope and generalizability because the
pandemic is ongoing and continues to impact how we communicate. Additionally, iden-
tifying correlations among data during this pandemic is particularly fraught because of
the entanglement with data that may have existed without the pandemic.68 Recognising
the increased importance of addressing the stability of research findings at this time, Fell
et al. suggest reporting contextual data that may not otherwise have been relevant (such
as new pandemic restrictions), taking particular care of pandemic-related variables
when looking for correlations among data, recognising the increased difficulty in cross-
country comparisons due to different regional impacts and restrictions, incorporating
longitudinal elements into research design that allow for replication, using multiple
methods to address research questions, recording potential limitations on data collec-
tion, paying particular attention to ethical considerations and maximising transparency
in explanations and justifications.69
As many as possible of the Fell et al. suggestions have been incorporated into this
study. Contextual data on the impact of COVID-19 among Southeast Asian coun-
tries during the four-month period of the study has been taken into consideration;
pandemic-related variables, such as data on how people view their government’s perfor-
mance during the pandemic, have been assessed; the difficulty in comparing the op-eds
across countries is not only acknowledged but is highlighted as a potential factor that
impacts the nature of the op-eds; and limitations to the study and the data collection
have been explained in detail and with full transparency.
8. DATA ON AUTHORS AND OP-EDS
A. Authors
Ninety-three authors published op-eds on the SHAPE-SEA COVID-19 website during
the four-month period. Seventy-four authored only one piece, whereas 19 authored
multiple op-eds (students were the most likely to submit multiple pieces—three stu-
dents even authored four pieces each). Forty authors were female; 53 were male.
67 Fell et al., ‘Validity of Energy Social Research during and after COVID-19: Challenges, Considerations, and
Responses’ (2020) 68 Energy Research & Social Science 101, 646 at 2.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid. at 3–5.244 • Critical Speech in Southeast Asian Grey Literature
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Figure 1. Country populations and amounts of op-eds.70
The largest groups of authors were academics (28), NGO workers (27) and students
(20) (other professions included journalists and unaffiliated activists).
In sum, the data collected about authors indicates that SHAPE-SEA’s aim to attract
submissions from activists and academics was satisfied in about equal portions. Stu-
dents appear to be keenly interested in writing evidence-based op-eds about human
rights and may find grey literature a particularly welcoming venue, with many of
them motivated enough to write multiple pieces. The hypothesis that males would
outnumber female authors was correct to a ratio of slightly above 5:4.
B. Op-eds
The SHAPE-SEA op-eds addressed Southeast Asian countries individually and South-
east Asia, ASEAN, Asia and the global situation more generally. The amounts in
descending order were: Indonesia (27); Philippines (21); Malaysia (12); Timor-Leste
(9); Southeast Asia (9); Myanmar (6); Asia (1); ASEAN (4); Singapore (4); Thailand
(4); Vietnam (4); Cambodia (3); the world (2); Brunei (1); Laos (1); India (1) and
the South China Sea (1). Five op-eds addressed multiple countries simultaneously:
Bangladesh and Thailand (1); Indonesia and India (1); Indonesia and Thailand (1);
Myanmar and Bangladesh (1) and the Philippines, Cambodia and Vietnam (1).
When placed within the context of their populations, Indonesia and the Philippines
were first and second in both population and in the number of op-eds published.
Figure 1 above compares the region’s populations with the amounts of SHAPE-SEA
op-eds.
70 In Figure 1, op-eds addressing multiple Southeast Asian countries (other than ASEAN and Southeast Asia
generally) are included in the data.
71 Population statistics were collected from Our World in Data, a project of the Global Change Data Lab,
compiled by the Oxford Martin Programme on Global Development of Oxford University, available at: ou
rworldindata.org/coronavirus-source-data [last accessed 2 November 2020].Critical Speech in Southeast Asian Grey Literature • 245
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Figure 2. Population and #op-eds.
There are some slight surprises. Only five op-eds were produced about Vietnam, the
country with the third-largest population. Also, the fourth-highest country in number
of op-eds, Timor-Leste, is the second least populated. Malaysia, with a little less than
five per cent of the region’s population, was the subject of 12 per cent of the country-
specific op-eds. Figure 2 illustrates, in declining order, the population of Southeast
Asian countries denoted by the blue line and the y-axis on the left, whereas the number
of op-eds is depicted by the orange line and the y-axis on the right.
The population of a country does not, of course, determine (or would even necessar-
ily be expected to correlate with) the number of op-eds about that country. Nonetheless,
the close association between the two—with, for instance, Indonesia and the Philip-
pines at the top and Laos, Singapore, Timor-Leste and Brunei at the low end—indicates
that size of a country’s population may be a factor that impacts the number of op-eds.
The most common themes of the op-eds were migrants and migrant workers (8),
education (7), human rights (7), conditions of the marginalised (6), access to infor-
mation (6), freedom of expression (5), law and order (5) and refugees (5). Other
issues that attracted several op-eds were women, girls and gender-related issues (4),
healthcare workers (4) and communications (4). The op-ed themes were generally
diverse across the different types of authors and target countries, with some interesting
points to note. NGO workers authored the only op-eds about LGBTIQ (2), women
and girls (2) and discrimination (2).72 The op-eds about freedom of expression (5)
were all written by men (one was co-authored by a man and woman). The themes that
attracted the most writing indicate that those in the Southeast Asian human rights-
centred community during the pandemic are to a large extent concerned about the
vulnerable: migrants, students, the marginalised, refugees, women, girls and healthcare
workers. While there were op-eds about the military, economic policy, elections, the
environment, geopolitics, social policies and others, these topics did not receive as
72 A closely-related op-ed about stigma was authored by a student.246 • Critical Speech in Southeast Asian Grey Literature
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Figure 3. Number of op-eds and criticalness scores.
much attention as those that dealt with the marginalization, suffering and health risks
of the people who would be most seriously impacted by the pandemic.
9. DATA ON CRITICAL SPEECH
A primary aim of this article is to explore any correlations between, on one hand, the
level of criticalness of the op-eds and, on the other hand, the nature of the authors
(profession, gender), the op-eds (themes) and countries (ranked by freedom scores and
the governments’ handling of the pandemic).
A. Criticalness Scores
Each op-ed was assigned a ‘criticalness score’ that attempts to measure how critical
an author is of the government of the country that the op-ed addresses. Criticalness
scores were assigned to every op-ed, including those that addressed regions like ASEAN
or Southeast Asia generally, in which case the criticism of the governments of the
region was measured. As mentioned previously, of the 115 op-eds, four received a
‘−1’ (slightly supportive of government), 33 received a ‘0’ (neutral), 29 received a ‘1’
(slightly critical), 37 received a ‘2’ (critical) and 11 received a ‘3’ (extremely critical).
One received both a ‘−1’ and a ‘2’ because it was complimentary of Thailand and critical
of the Philippines. The overall criticalness of all the op-eds (counting the final one as
two separate scores) was 1.15, indicating that on average the op-eds were slightly critical
of their governments. Figure 3 depicts the distribution of criticalness scores.
Viewing criticalness scores by popular theme, illustrated in Figure 4 below, demon-
strates that, at least for these 115 op-eds, conceptual themes like law and order, human
rights and freedom of expression garnered higher criticism scores than the op-eds
highlighting vulnerable populations. It is unclear why these broader, more abstract
themes would attract greater criticism. Perhaps authors believed governments are more
directly responsible for the state of law and order, human rights and freedom of expres-Critical Speech in Southeast Asian Grey Literature • 247
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Figure 4. Criticalness by popular theme.
sion than for the conditions of the marginalised and vulnerable during the pandemic.
The conditions of law and order, for example, are a direct product of government
action or inaction. Figure 4 shows the criticalness scores of the most popular themes
in descending order.
The average criticalness by gender of author was for males 1.15 and for females
1.12—virtually indistinguishable. The average criticalness among the three major pro-
fessions was for academics 1.11, for students 1.17 and for NGO workers 1.07. The
hypothesis that NGO workers would be the most critical was unsupported. In fact, stu-
dents were the boldest of these three professions, with academics only slightly behind
and with NGO workers in third. Maybe the young really are more courageous—or
rash?73
Freedom House’s ‘Freedom of the World’ index is one of the most established and
well-known freedom indices.74 Its Global Freedom Scores measure political rights
(electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of govern-
ment) and civil liberties (freedom of expression and belief, associational and organi-
zational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights).75 Figure 5(a)
depicts Southeast Asian countries ranked in descending order by 2019 Global Freedom
Score and notes, in the right-most column, the freedom status assigned by Freedom
House. The highest scores in the world were given to Sweden, Finland and Norway
(100) and the lowest to South Sudan (−2).
The hypothesis advanced is that a lower Global Freedom Score corresponds to
lower criticalness of government due to self-censorship, fear and being unaccustomed
73 Simon and Moghaddam, ‘Neural Processing of Reward in Adolescent Rodents’ (2015) 11 Developmental
Cognitive Neuroscience 145; Bonem, Ellsworth and Gonzalez, ‘Age Differences in Risk: Perceptions, Inten-
tions and Domains’ (2015) 28 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 317 (observing that age differences in
risk preferences may vary across domains).
74 Burgess, ‘Evaluating the Evaluators: Media Freedom Indexes and What They Measure’ (2010) at 6,
available at: repository.upenn.edu/cgcs_monitoringandeval_videos/1/?utm_source=repository.upenn.e
du%2Fcgcs_monitoringandeval_videos%2F1&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages
[last accessed 2 November 2020].
75 Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World Research Methodology’ (2020), available at: freedomhouse.org/re
ports/freedom-world/freedom-world-research-methodology [last accessed 2 November 2020].248 • Critical Speech in Southeast Asian Grey Literature
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Figure 5. (a) 2019 Global Freedom Scores.76
to expressing strong criticism on a public Internet forum. According to this hypothesis,
op-ed authors writing about countries like Timor-Leste, Indonesia, the Philippines and
Malaysia should be more critical of their governments than countries like Cambodia,
Brunei, Vietnam and Laos. In the same vein, one might expect fewer op-eds from these
lower-ranked countries (the data in this chart include op-eds that addressed multiple
countries).
Figure 5(b) to a large extent undermines the hypothesis that a higher Global Free-
dom Score correlates with higher criticalness. The most critical op-eds (on average)
were about Vietnam, which has the second-lowest Global Freedom Score. Similarly
contradicting the hypothesis, Timor-Leste, with the highest Global Freedom Score, has
the fourth-lowest criticalness score.
The low number of op-eds published about most individual Southeast Asian coun-
tries—particularly countries like Cambodia, Vietnam and Brunei—undermines the
reliability of any correlations with criticalness scores. This same lack of op-eds, however,
seems to indicate perhaps a reluctance from people of these countries to author op-
eds for venues like SHAPE-SEA. Indeed, the number of op-eds, indicated by the right-
most column in Figure 5(b), traces the Global Freedom Scores more closely than the
Criticalness Scores. Timor-Leste, with an unusually high number of op-eds for its pop-
ulation, also has the highest Global Freedom Score. Countries with the lowest Global
Freedom Scores also have markedly low numbers of op-eds. Indonesia, the Philippines
and Malaysia, near the top of Global Freedom Ranking, attracted the highest amount
of op-eds. At least to a limited extent, these figures (given all the limitations previously
noted) may indicate that freedom impacts people’s willingness to express themselves
but may not impact the level of their criticalness of government.
76 Freedom House, ‘Countries and Territories’ (2019), available at: freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-
world/scores [last accessed 2 November 2020].Critical Speech in Southeast Asian Grey Literature • 249
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Figure 5. (b) Global Freedom Rankings, Criticalness Scores and amounts of op-eds.
Figure 6. Global Freedom and Criticalness.
Figure 6 depicts Global Freedom Scores with criticalness scores, demonstrating the
incongruities. The Global Freedom Scores are measured by the y-axis on the left,
whereas the Criticalness Scores are measured by the y-axis on the right.
Another hypothesis advances that a lower level of criticalness will be observed in
op-eds about countries that have managed the coronavirus better. This hypothesis is
motivated by the idea that countries that are handling the pandemic better will have
less dissatisfied citizens who will thus be less critical of their governments. To test this
hypothesis, data were used from a survey published by the organization YouGov, an
international research data and analytics group founded in 2000 and headquartered250 • Critical Speech in Southeast Asian Grey Literature
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Figure 7. Satisfaction with government handling of pandemic and Criticalness Scores.
in London.77 The survey asked people whether they thought their government was
‘handling the issue of coronavirus “very” or “somewhat” well’.78 Only five Southeast
Asian countries—Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia—were
included in the survey; data were collected nine times between May 8 and July 20.
Figure 7 compares the average percentage of people who thought their governments
were handling the coronavirus situation very or somewhat well with the Criticalness
Scores.
Figure 7 indicates that the hypothesis is not supported. The highest criticalness
should accompany the lowest average satisfaction of respondents. In fact, Vietnam’s
good performance in handling COVID-19 prompted highly critical pieces. Indone-
sia’s lower approval of government handling received just a mild Criticalness Score.
More promisingly (for the hypothesis), Malaysia’s, Singapore’s and the Philippines’
Criticalness Scores were in reverse order of their YouGov rankings.
10. CONCLUSION
The SHAPE-SEA op-eds present a unique opportunity to gauge critical speech in
Southeast Asia. As freely accessible online grey literature with an acceptance rate of
99.9 per cent and open for submissions by anyone, by their very nature they impose
few barriers to access and participation. More importantly, they revolve around an issue
that has profoundly affected all of us—the impact of COVID-19. Yet despite wide
appraisal of the Internet and social media as a space for increased critical speech, the
analysis in this article supports the view that criticism of government in Southeast
Asia—even at a time of widespread government failure and increased suppression of
human rights—remains somewhat muted.
At the time of this writing in mid-August 2020, the pandemic is ongoing and,
in several countries, appears to be entering a second wave. Critical speech is never
static. Conditions on the ground can change quickly with corresponding reactions from
activists. The SHAPE-SEA op-eds reflect these unstable times and publishing venues
77 YouGov, ‘Timeline’, available at: corporate.yougov.com/about/timeline/ [last accessed 2 November 2020];
YouGov, ‘About YouGov’, available at: yougov.co.uk/about/ [last accessed 2 November 2020].
78 Smith, ‘International COVID-19 Tracker Update: 8 June’, YouGov, 8 June 2020, available at: yougov.co.u
k/topics/international/articles-reports/2020/06/08/international-covid-19-tracker-update-8-june?u
tm_source=twitter&utm_medium=website_article&utm_campaign=covid_tracker_article_8_june [last
accessed 2 November 2020].You can also read
