Energy in Japan -A Brighter Tomorrow?- Hisanori Nei Professor, National Graduate Institute For Policy Studies, Japan - National Association of ...
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Energy in Japan
-A Brighter Tomorrow?-
Hisanori Nei
Professor,
National Graduate Institute
For Policy Studies, Japan
2015.2.17 JASP
1.The Accident of Fukushima Daiichi 2.Change of Nuclear Regulatory System 3. Energy In Japan 4.Electricity System Reform 5.Nuclear 6.Conclusion
1,The Accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS
• The accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS was caused by long
lasting complete power loss due to common cause failure
(CCF) of electrical equipment following tsunami, and
insufficient provision against severe accident.
• It is rated at INES Level 7, and people where lived in the
specific area including those within 20 km radius from the
site are still not able to return home.
The moment when tsunami attacked Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS (source: TEPCO)
3
Assumed Height and Actual Height of 〔Onagawa NPS〕 Not flooded
Actual
Assumed （unit: m）
Tsunami in Each NPS Sea Water height of
height of
Building Pump tsunami
tsunami
13
Site
Level 14.8 13.6
Point of normal
3.5 water level
震度 5 境界線
The boundary of the 女川原子力
seismic intensity of 5 Onagawa NPS Sea water Level
発電所 〔Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS〕 Destructive flood In front of NPS
D/G on a basement submerged.
13
震央
Epicenter
10 6.1
4 Onahama
Port
福島第一
Fukushima 〔Fukushima Dai-ni NPS〕 Sea water pumps flooded. Damage of
Dai-ichi NPS buildings were slight.
発電所
福島第二
Fukushima 9
Dai-ni NPS
発電所
12
5.2
東海第二 4 Onahama
Tokai Dai-ni Port
発電所
NPS
〔Tokai Dai-ni NPS〕 Sea water pumps did not flood due
to breakwater wall
breakwater wall
JMA 1st report during the
4.6
Seismic 気象庁（第１報）
main shock 8 5.7
intensity 5- 5+ 6- 6+ 3.3
Reference: JMA “Tohoku District-Off the Pacific Coast Earthquake in 2011(1st Tokyo Bay
4
Report),” http;//www.jma.go.jp/jma/index.html, partially modified by JNES
Progression of Accident (Outline of Accident Progression Common to Units 1-3)
Automatic reactor shutdown due to
earthquake, loss of off-site power supply Soaking depletion of battery, depletion of compressed
air, etc.
Dependency on emergency power was Many on-site works were necessary due to difficulty of
inevitable. measurement / control / communication.
●Emergency diesel generator started up and Shutdown of core cooling system
power supply was secured.
●Reactor was cooled by core cooling system. Unit 1 has lost its function at an early phase. Due to
this reason, there was only short time to address the
Start-up / Shutdown operations for IC・RCIC situation.
were going on. Fuels were exposed and melt down while cooling was
not conducted.
Most of electric systems including emergency
diesel generators and switchboards were Serious degradation of confinement led to the release
unavailable due to tsunami. of radioactive materials into environment.
(Only one of emergency air cooling DGs in Unit 6 maintained its function)
Water injection from fire protection system (Alternative
Cooling sea water pumps installed along the water injection)
coast were also unavailable. (Loss of ultimate
heat sink) The exposure time of fuels is considered to be prolonged
due to insufficient reactor depressurization (reactor
depressurization operation for containment, reactor
containment depressurization [vent]) to the pressure
Station Blackout lower than the fire extinguishing pump head.
(On March 13, Unit 5 received power supply from Unit 6 on emergency basis. )
Hydrogen generated through zirconium – water reaction.
Motor operated pumps etc. were unavailable. Explosions that seemed to be hydrogen explosion occurred
(Emergency cooling was carried out by
emergency condenser IC in Unit 1, reactor in reactor buildings at Units 1, 3 and 4. (Pressure in the
core isolation cooling system [RCIC] in Unit 2, pressure suppression chamber in Unit 2 dropped
and RCIC and high pressure core injection simultaneously with the Unit 4 explosion.)
system HPCI in Unit 3.)
The explosions deteriorated work performance in
the surrounding areas.
Water leakage from containments / buildings were
observed.
5
Max. Acceleration Values Observed in Reactor Buildings of each Unit
Record Max. response
Loc. of seismometer acceleration to the
(bottom floor of Max. acceleration design basis ground
reactor bld.) (Gal※2) motion Ss (Gal※2)
NS EW UD NS EW UD
Unit 1 460※１ 447※１ 258※１ 487 489 412
Unit 2 348※１ 550※１ 302※１ 441 438 420
Fukushima Unit 3 322※１ 507※１ 231※１ 449 441 429
Dai-ichi Unit 4 281※１ 319※１ 200※１ 447 445 422
Unit 5 311※１ 548※１ 256※１ 452 452 427
Unit 6 298※１ 444※１ 244 445 448 415
※１：Each recording was interrupted at around 130-150(s) from recording start time
※２：1Gal=0.01m/s2 , 981Gal=1G
6
Impact of Tsunami on On-site Power Supply and Cooling Systems
Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 Unit 6
△
× × 6A: R/B basement
Emergency × 2A × 4A × 6B: DG building
Diesel 1A, 1B (T/B basement) 3A, 3B (T/B basement) 5A, 5B 1F
Generator (T/B basement) 2B (T/B basement) 4B (T/B basement) (Usable)
(Common pool 1F) (Common pool 1F) HPCS: R/B
basement
high-voltage × ×
× × × △
switch T/B basement, T/B basement,
T/B 1F T/B basement, etc. T/B basement, etc. R/B 2F basement
boards etc. etc.
× △
Power center × △ △ △
T/B basement, R/B 2F basement,
(note) T/B 1F etc. T/B 1F etc. T/B 1F, etc. T/B 2F, etc.
etc. etc.
× ○ ○ ○
DC power × ×
C/B basement, T/B mezzanine T/B mezzanine T/B mezzanine
(battery) C/B basement, etc. C/B basement, etc.
etc. basement basement basement
Emergency △
△
core However, IC △
(RCIC and HPC － － －
cooling required (RCIC usable)
usable)
equipment inspection
×: Unusable due to flooding or water damage △: Partially unusable ○: Usable T/B: Turbine building C/B: Control building R/B: Reactor building
(Note) Air circuit breaker (ACB), guard relay and peripheral equipment stored in a compact manner using a motive power panel that uses low-voltage
circuits within the plant
7
Impact on Loss of Function of Confinement Systems
• Radioactive material leakage presumably occurred when the
pressure of the PCV was increased before the venting because the
radioactive dose had increased after increasing of the pressure of
the PCV of the Unit 1. Possible location of leakage was top flange,
penetration of the containment vessel and/or equipment hatches.
• It is highly possible that the leakages were caused by deterioration
of the organic sealing as a result of high temperatures by thermal
radiation directly from the pressure vessel.
• When venting was conducted, the standby gas treatment systems
(SGTS) was not properly isolated, thus hydrogen gas back flew into
the reactor building. (in particular, Unit 4)
8
Technical Knowledge acquired from the Accident
In order to address root causes in a practical manner, we
has closely investigated accident in the areas of:
– External power supply systems
– On-site power supply systems
– Cooling systems
– Confinement systems
– Communication, instrumentation and control systems,
and emergency response arrangements
9
NRC Members coming to Japan at the time of the Accident
2.Change of Nuclear Regulatory System
Reform of Nuclear Regulatory Organization
/Independence
Separate the functions for nuclear regulation and nuclear promotion
Establish the Nuclear Regulation Authority(NRA) as an independent commission body
Amendments to the Nuclear Regulation Act
/New regulation on severe accidents
/Regulation based on the state-of-the art information (backfiting)
/40-years operational limit for NPPs (exceptional less-than-20 years extension)
New Regulatory Requirement Principle of Regulation
/Strengthening of Design Basis /Place emphasis of Defense-in-Depth
/Severe Accident Measures /Eliminate common cause failure
/Enhanced Measures for Earthquake/Tsunami /Protective measures against extreme
natural hazardsStrengthening of Design Basis /Comprehensive consideration of natural hazards including volcano, tornado and forest fire in addition to earthquake and tsunami, etc /Reinforcement of fire protection measures /Enhanced reliability of SSCs important to safety (e.g. Redundancy of piping) /Reinforcement of off-site power supply (connection to different substations through multiple lines) /Protection of systems for Ultimate Heat Sink
Strengthen Requirement of Counter Measures for Severe Accident (SA) Prevention of Core Damage (ATWS, Loss of RCF・RDF・RCF・UHF etc.) Prevention of Containment Failure (CV spray, Filtered venting etc.) Prevention of hydrogen explosion at reactor building etc. Cooling at SFP Prevention of fuel damages during shutdown Emergency Response Center
Enhanced Measures for Earthquake/Tsunami
Tsunami
More Stringent /Define “Design Basis Tsunami” – Exceeds the
Standards on Tsunami largest in the historical records
Enlarged Application of /SSCs for Tsunami protective measures such
Higher Seismic Resistance as Tsunami Gate are classified as Class S
equivalent to RPV etc.
Earthquake
/Active faults with activities later than the Late Pleistocene
More Stringent Criteria be considered for seismic design
for active faults /Active in the Middle Pleistocene be investigated if needed
More Precise methods to /3D observation of geological structure on the site
define seismic ground motion
Class S buildings should not be constructed on the
Displacement and Deformation exposure of active faults3．Energy in Japan After the Great East Japan Earthquake and the TEPCO’s Fukushima nuclear accident, the circumstance of energy in Japan has changed drastically as follows: /No NPS operation・・・288Gkwh(2010） Lost /LNG import increase・・・73.3Mt(2010) 85.9Mt(2011),90.1Mt(2013) /Energy Consumption Down・・15.0EJ(2010) 14.5EJ(2011),14.2(2013) /Electricity Tariff Increase 20 to 30% /Increase Fuel Cost・・・3.6Trillion Yen (30 billion US$)/year （2013)
LNG is major energy source cover the loss of NPS
Mt LNG Import by Country (Japan) Mt Long Term Import 2011 Import 2010
90.0
UAE 4.3 5.6 5.1
80.0
Burnei 6.0 6.2 5.9
70.0
60.0 Malaysia 15.4 15.1 14.6
50.0 Indonesia 5.8 7.9 12.9
40.0 Quatar 6.0 14.3 7.7
30.0
Oman 3.0 4.2 2.7
20.0
Australia 13.3 13.6 13.2
10.0
Russia 4.9 7.8 6.0
0.0
70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
U.S.A 0.2 0.6
US Burnei UAE
Indonesia Malaysia Australia Others 9.0 1.5
Quatar Oman Equatorial Guinea
Total 58.8 83.2 70.6
Russia OthersDiversification of Energy Supply after Oil Crisis mainly by Nuclear
Primary Energy Supply in Japan
25000
PJ
Primary Energy Supply in Japan
100%
20000 90%
80%
70%
15000
60%
50%
10000
40%
30%
5000
20%
10%
0 0%
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Coal Oil Gas Renewable Hydro Nuclear
Coal Oil Gas Renewable Hydro NuclearIncrease Nuclear Energy Supply for last 4 Decades
Primary Energy Supply in Japan
Primary Energy Supply in Japan
100%
350
90%
300 80%
70%
250
60%
200
50%
150 40%
30%
100
20%
50
10%
0 0%
1972 1975 1977 1980 1982 1986 1989 1990 1992 1996 1999 2000 2005 1972 1975 1977 1980 1982 1986 1989 1990 1992 1996 1999 2000 2005
Oil Coal Natural Gas Nuclear Hydro Geothermal Renewable
Oil Coal Natural Gas Nuclear Hydro Geothermal RenewableAfter Fukushima, Energy Figure in Japan goes back to almost 4 decades ago
PRIMARY ENERGY SUPPLY IN 1990 PRIMARY ENERGY SUPPLY IN 2010
Nuclear Nuclear
Coal 11%
Hydro 9% Coal
17% Hydro
4% 23%
Renewable 3%
Renewable
3% 4%
Gas
11%
Gas
19%
Oil Oil
56% 40%
PRIMARY ENERGY SUPPLY IN 2012 PRIMARY ENERGY SUPPLY IN 2013
Nuclear
Renewable Hydro Nuclear Renewable Hydro
3% 1% 3% 1%
4% Coal 4%
Coal
23% 25%
Gas Gas
25% 24%
Oil Oil
44% 43%Maintain High Energy Efficiency
Energy Efficiency
0.9 Energy Efficiency Trend
0.8 1.600
0.7 1.400
0.6 1.200
toe/kUS$
1.000
toe/kUS$
0.5
0.800
0.4
0.600
0.3
0.400
0.2
0.200
0.1 0.000
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
0
Japan World OECD Russia China India
Souce:IEA Energy Efficiency Trend
0.300
EJ Energy Demand & GDP TYen
0.250
18.00 600
16.00 0.200
toe/kUS$
500
14.00
0.150
12.00 400
10.00 0.100
300
8.00
0.050
6.00 200
4.00 0.000
100
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2.00
0.00 0
Japan US Germany UK France EU27 OECD
1965
1968
1971
1974
1977
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007
2010
Industry Residencial Business Transport GDPDecline of Coal consumption in 2011,2012 links with Total energy demand.
Changes of Power Supply Sources in Japan
NaturalGas
Coal
OIl
Hydro
Nuclear
Renewable4.History of Electricity System Reform in Japan No competition in the electricity market before 1995. 10 vertically integrated GEUs(General Electricity Utilities) dominated and controlled the market 1995 ・Open the IPP (Independent Power Producer) market 2000 ・Introduce partial retail competition (>2000kw) ・Accounting separation of Transmission/Distribution sector 2005 ・Expand retail competition(>50kw) ・Establish the whole sale power exchange(JEPX) (2008) ・Modify the rule of wheeling rates
Current electricity system ・Partial liberalization : retail competition for over 50kw Negative aspects of regional monopoly were revealed customers by 3.11 ・Retail players : 10 big GEUs(vertically integrated, regional 1.Lack of system to transmit electricity beyond monopoly), PPS, etc regions. ・Situation is… 2.Little competition and strong price control ・Share of non-GEU power producer and supplier : 3.6% 3. Limit in digesting the change in energy mix (cf. ・0.6% of the total retail market sales is transacted at JEPX renewables)
Decision on Electricity System Reform in 2013 ・The Cabinet decided to execute the Policy on Electricity System Reform on April 2, 2013 Objectives: /Securing the stable supply /Suppressing electricity rates to the maximum extent possible /Expanding choices for consumers and business opportunities Process: A bold reform will be steadily carried out step by step focusing on the 3 agendas: /Cross-regional Coordination of Transmission Operators(by 2015) /Full Retail Competition in around 2016 (regulated tariff expired by 2020) /Unbundle the transmission/distribution sector by 2020
5.Nuclear Power Plants in Japan Tomari
BWR
Higashidori
PWR
Tsuruga
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
NRA
Mihama Onagawa
Takahama 40years
Shika
Fukushima-Daiichi Decom.
Ooi
Fukushima-Daini
Shimane
Tokai-Daini
Genkai
Hamaoka
Ikata
SendaiSendai2
Kashiwazaki
Hamaoka2
kariwa1
Fukushima-
Takahama1 Mihama3 Tokai-Daini Ooi2 Sendai1 Hamaoka3
Daini3
Fukuhima- Fukushima- Fukushima- Fukushima- Fukushima- Fukushima-
Mihama1 Takahama2 Onagawa1 Takahama4 Tomari1
Daiichi2 daiichi3 Daiichi4 Daiichi6 Daini1 Daini4
Fukushima- Fukushima- Fukushima-
Tokai Tsuruga1 Mihama2 Shimane1 Genkai1 Hamaoka1 Ikata1 Ooi1 Genkai2 Ikata2 Takahama3 Tsuruga2 Shimane2
Daiichi1 Daiichi5 Daini2
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25
Hamaoka4
Kashiwazaki
Ikata3
kariwa3
Kashiwazaki Kashiwazaki
Ooi3 Shika1 Genkai4 Higashidori1
kariwa2 kariwa４
Kashiwazaki Kashiwazaki Kashiwazaki
Tomari2 Ooi4 Genkai3 Onagawa2 Onagawa3 Hamaoka5 Shika2 Tomari3
kariwa5 kariwa6 kariwa7
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1Process of Resuming Nuclear Power Plant in Japan
Reactor Installation Construction Tech-Spec Construction
NRA
Permission Approval Approval Inspection
Submit Permit Submit Approve Submit Approve Approve
Licensee Assessment of Change Change of Construction Change of Operation
in Reactor Installation Plan Tech-Spec
Request Approval
Local Safety Agreement
Government with LicenseePoll for Nuclear (Necessity of NPS)
100% 1.8 1.2 1.8 1.3 1.3
2.4 2.6
3.8
4.6 1.5
3.4 13.1 13.7
90%
16.7
19.9
80% 23.1 12.1 10.9
70%
28.3
60%
31.4 35.9 38.1
30.3
50%
40%
30%
22
49.1 23.4
20% 40.5
37.7
10%
15.7
12.6
0%
2007 Yes
2008 Probably Yes Yes or NO2010Probably No No Others
2011 2012Nuclear Capacity
NPS total Capacity at the Accident 48.96Mkw 48.96
Fukushima-Daiich 4.696Mkw Decommission Process 44.264
39.864
Fukushima-Daini 4.4Mkw Too Difficult to resume
Tsuruga Unit2 1.16Mkw Fault line Issue 38.704
5 first generation NPS difficult to fit 40years rule 36.488 Max
(Tsuruga1, Mihama 1,2, Shimane1, Genkai1) 2.216Mkw
Twenty NPS submit TA report to NRA 20.10Mkw
Hamaoka Longer Construction 1.137Mkw
Sendai Unit1, 2 Approved by NRA 1.78Mkw
Simane, Onagawa,Ikata Midst of the Review 2.535Mkw
Takahama Unit3, 4 Just Approved 1.74Mkw
Ikata Unit 3 Close to finish soon 0.89Mkw Kashiwazakikariwa, Tokai Daini Difficulty to get
Ooi Unit3,4 Close to finish soon 2.36Mkw agreement with Local Government 3.812Mkw
Genkai Unit 3,4 Close to finish soon 2.36Mkw
Tomari,Higashidori,Shika Fault line issue 4.375MkwNot Submit Yet NPSs 18Unit 16.388Mkw Onagawa 1,3 1.349Mkw Fault Issue only Kashiwazakikariwa 1-5 5.5Mkw Unit2-4 never operated since 2007 Hamaoka 3,5 2.48Mkw Longer Construction Takahama 1,2 1.652Mkw Challenge 40years Qualify Mihama3, Ooi 1,2 3.176Mkw Consider 40years challenge Shika1, Ikata 1,2 Genkai 2 2.231Mkw 40 years challenge soon , Already changed RV New Plant Shimane Unit3 1.373Mkw 93.6%complete Ohma 1.383Mkw 37.6%complete Submit to NRA
NPR Total Capacity in Japan Utilization Rate of NPS in Japan
10kMW
80
6000
70
5000
60
4000
50
3000
40
2000
30
1000
20
0
10
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014
0
GCR BWR PWR 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
NPS Capacity under 40years Rule Capacity 40 year Challenge Case
for Submited NPSs Only 4000
2000 3500
1800
3000
1600
1400 2500
1200
2000
1000
800 1500
600
1000
400
200 500
0
0
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037Conclusion [Issues to be discussed] /How many NPS resume / Appropriate Size and Level of Tariff in FIT for Renewable /How to improve energy efficiency /Power System Reform /Gas System Reform /Global Warming Issues related with the Usage of Coal /Political Turmoil in MENA
0
40
60
80
100
140
160
20
120
Apr-1983
32500
33500
34000
34500
35000
35500
36000
36500
37500
33000
37000
Aug-1984
Dec-1985
Apr-1987
Aug-1988
Dec-1989
Apr-1991
Aug-1992
2009
Dec-1993
OPEC
Apr-1995
Aug-1996
Dec-1997
2010
WTI
Apr-1999
Iran
Aug-2000
Dec-2001
2011
Apr-2003
Iraq
Aug-2004
Political Turmoin in MENA Dec-2005
Apr-2007
2012
Aug-2008
Libya
Dec-2009
Apr-2011
Aug-2012
2013
Dec-2013
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
0
20
60
80
100
120
140
160
40
1997.11
1998.07
1999.03
1999.11
2000.07
2001.03
2001.11
2002.07
Dubai
2003.03
2003.11
2004.07
2005.03
2005.11
Brent
2006.07
2007.03
2007.11
2008.07
WTI
2009.03
2009.11
2010.07
2011.03
Crude Oil Price & Import by China
China
2011.11
2012.07
2013.03
2013.11
0
5000
10000
15000
25000
30000
200002003/5～8
Order of the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority De-Baathification of Iraqi Society May 16, 2003 On April 16, 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority disestablished the Baath Party of Iraq. This order implements that declaration by eliminating the party’s structures and removing its leadership from positions of authority and responsibility in Iraqi society. By this means, the Coalition Provisional Authority will ensure that representative government in Iraq is not threatened by Baathist elements returning to power and that those in positions of authority in the future are acceptable to the people of Iraq. Full members of the Baath Party holding the ranks of ‘Udw Qutriyya (Regional Command Member), ‘Udw Far‘ (Branch Member), ‘Udw Shu’bah (Section Member), and ‘Udw Firqah (Group Member) (together, “Senior Party Members”) are hereby removed from their positions and banned from future employment in the public sector. These Senior Party Members shall be evaluated for criminal conduct or threat to the security of the Coalition. Those suspected of criminal conduct shall be investigated and, if deemed a threat to security or a flight risk, detained or placed under house arrest. Individuals holding positions in the top three layers of management in every national government ministry, affiliated corporations and other government institutions (e.g., universities and hospitals) shall be interviewed for possible affiliation with the Baath Party, and subject to investigation for criminal conduct and risk to security. Any such persons determined to be full members of the Baath Party shall be removed from their employment. This includes those holding the more junior ranks of ‘Udw ( rse information. the same manner upon ppropriate, detained, interned placed under house arrest,Member) and ‘Udw ‘Amil (Active Member), as well as those determined to be Senior Party Members. Displays in government buildings or public spaces of the image or likeness of Saddam Hussein or other readily identifiable members of the former regime or of symbols of the Baath Party or the former regime are hereby prohibited. Rewards shall be made available for information leading to the capture of senior members of the Baath party and individuals complicit in the crimes of the former regime. The Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority or his designees may grant exceptions to the above guidance on a case-by-case basis. By order of: L. Paul Bremer, III Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority ________________________
CPA
• Military Civil
• Cooperation with Iraqi Officials
• Too many personal changesCooperation with Executives
2003 at Bagdad 2013 at Tokyo
2015 at Tokyo6.Conclusion(Cont.) /Japanese Government has not determined the quantitative target of energy supply by sources yet. /It will be published after the Unified Local Election in the spring of 2015. /The share of nuclear would be put between 15 to 25 % of power supply . /It could be possible to achieve but it takes at least 4 to 5 years. /It reduce tentative demand for LNG to some extent but the loss of power demand would be compensate by increase demand in the field of cogeneration. /LNG should compete with Coal by any means. /FIT system for renewable energy will be redesigned soon and electricity market reform will be conducted by 2020.
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