Erdoğan's Comprehensive Religious Policy
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NO. 12 MARCH 2019 Introduction
Erdoğan’s Comprehensive
Religious Policy
Management of the Religious Realm in Turkey
Salim Çevik
Tayyip Erdoğan’s management of the religious realm in Turkey relies on three dif-
ferent but complementary components: i) using state institutions and resources to
define and control the religious discourse and life, ii) incorporating religious com-
munities and organisations into the party and state institutions, and iii) forming new
religious organisations and communities through family-controlled religious foun-
dations (vakıf).
Erdoğan never made a secret of his desire to gion over Turkish society by controlling
create a New Turkey founded on pious gen- religious institutions and limiting religious
erations. To achieve this, he has a multi- expression. On the other hand, the regime
layered strategy that demonstrates certain also aimed to create a modernised version
continuities but more ruptures with the of Islam that would be firmly under state
Republican policies on religion. control. The early Republican regime tried
this by replacing social religious organisa-
tions such as religious orders (tarikat) and
Historical Legacy and State religious communities (cemaat) with state-
Institutions controlled religious institutions. While
the former were severely repressed, as all
Republican policies on religion were more madrasas and dervish lodges were declared
ambiguous and complex than is often illegal, a newly formed state institution – a
assumed. Although an assertive secularism Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) –
remains one of the central pillars of the aimed to fill the void. Simultaneously dur-
Kemalist ideology, religion paradoxically ing the creation of the Diyanet, all mosques
maintained an important role in the forma- became state property, and some years
tion of the national identity and culture. later all prayer leaders became state offi-
Accordingly, on the one hand, despite its cials. Thus, despite its rhetoric on secular-
modernist and anti-religious inclinations, ism, Turkey has been a state in which reli-
the Kemalist regime could not resist the gion and the state are intertwined, to the
temptation of using the influence of reli- extent that all the mosques and all theirimams are controlled and owned by the became confident of its real power – it
state. This provides an excellent apparatus started to take steps to revitalise the IHLs.
for the state to control and shape religious To this end in 2011, the AKP once again
discourse, even at the grassroots level. changed the rules for university entrance
In 1948, state investment in the religious exams by removing the disadvantages posed
realm expanded with the formation of to IHL students. This change by itself was
vocational courses with the professed aim enough to revitalise the IHLs, pointing to
of training religious personnel. Three years a certain demand by the public for these
later, under the centre-right Democrat types of schools. However, in the following
Party, these courses were transformed into years, several technical changes followed
secondary schools (Imam Hatip Okulları, to ensure a growing student enrolment at
hereafter IHLs). The number of these schools IHLs, while several regular schools were
rapidly expanded under the more conserva- also converted to IHLs. As of 2018, IHL
tive governments of the 1970s and 1980s students comprised 12 per cent of the entire
and became major sites for religious train- secondary school population, demonstrat-
ing. Unlike the Diyanet, however, IHLs soon ing a considerable increase from the 8.6 per
became contentious entities. Fearing that cent in 1997 prior to the military’s inter-
these schools were out of control, the vention. However, this increase is more a
Kemalist establishment intervened against result of the deliberate efforts of the gov-
them starting in 1997. A technical change ernment rather than the popularity of IHLs.
in the rules for university entrance exams, During the initial round of student place-
which was ostensibly enforced by the secu- ments for secondary schools in 2017, IHLs
lar military, made it almost impossible for only reached a 52 per cent occupancy rate,
IHL graduates to enter university depart- compared to 95 per cent for regular high
ments other than theology. Thus, this was schools. While the government attempts to
a huge blow to IHLs, and student enrolment attract more students to IHLs by changing
as well as the number of schools rapidly the rules for student enrolment and regis-
declined to almost nothing. While IHLs tration, non-pro-government media outlets
dealt with this, compulsory religious edu- are routinely filled with complaints from
cation in other state schools, which was families whose children had to be regis-
introduced by the military regime in 1980, tered in IHLs against their will. Moreover,
remained untouched. Just like the Diyanet in the curriculum of regular schools, reli-
and unlike the IHLs, religious education gious classes have been expanded to in-
was perceived as still being in line with clude more courses such as “The Life of the
the original intention of promoting state- Prophet” and “Qur’an” in order to provide
friendly religious teaching. further religious training for the entire
student body.
The Diyanet’s growing importance in
The AKP and State Institutions public life can be observed through the con-
tinuous increase in the institution’s person-
Hence, when the Justice and Development nel and budget numbers. According to the
Party (AKP) makes extensive use of state 2019 proposed budget, the Diyanet’s cadres
resources for its declared goal of raising a exceed 140,000 employees, and its annual
pious generation, it is building on a histori- budget, according to the current exchange
cal and institutional legacy. The Diyanet rate, is approximately €1.7 billion, com-
and IHLs play a central role, which can be prising 1.2 per cent of the total budget. This
observed through the increased visibility of means that both the number of personnel
the Diyanet in public life and the increased as well as the Diyanet’s share in the total
importance of IHLs in the education system. budget has doubled since the AKP came
After the AKP’s ascension to government to power in 2002. The increased budget is
in 2002 – and more so after the party accompanied by increased levels of visibil-
SWP Comment 12
March 2019
2ity and prestige. In the new state protocol stead, the Diyanet is only one pillar of a
list, which was updated in 2012, the head more comprehensive effort to shape reli-
of the Diyanet was elevated from being gious life in the country; shaping relations
53rd in line to 10th. Even the uniform for with the social religious organisations con-
the head of the Diyanet was changed from stitutes the second aspect of these efforts.
a modest black cloak to an eye-catching and
lustrous white – one that attracts attention
for the head wherever he goes. Yet, the Incorporating Social Islam
increased importance of the Diyanet is not
limited to such items. The head of the “Social Islam” refers to all religious organi-
Diyanet is becoming increasingly visible, sations such as religious orders or founda-
and he often accompanies President Erdo- tions that are not created or controlled by
ğan at public events. Moreover, the duties the state’s bureaucratic apparatus. Despite
of the Diyanet have been re-organised to repression by the Kemalist regime of reli-
increase its influence in new areas, such gious orders and religious communities,
as education and social counselling. The these organisations survived and eventually
former director of the Diyanet, Mehmet became influential actors in social life.
Görmez, made this point when he declared Although they have differences with each
that the Diyanet will no longer be confined other, in their totality they constitute the
to the mosques. In line with this aim, the bulk of the religious scene in Turkey. Thus,
Diyanet is now working in cooperation while in theory they are still illegal, their
with other state institutions such as the existence and impact are known to every-
Ministry of Education, the Ministry of one, and they have been involved with po-
Health, the Ministry of Family, and the Min- litical actors for a long time as well. Aside
istry of Youth. As a result of such coopera- from these more traditional religious organi-
tion, the Diyanet is now active in various sations, several Islamic organisations – in
spheres of social life such as celebrating the form of foundations and associations –
religious nights at university dormitories, were founded throughout the Republican
solemnising marriages (which was exclu- period. Although these foundations and
sively regulated by the municipalities in associations rely on a better-educated con-
the past), providing educational support stituency, they form a much smaller por-
in elementary and high schools, providing tion of Turkey’s social Islam.
social and psychological counselling at Expectedly, the AKP maintains a special
hospitals, marriage counselling, etc. relationship with all types of religious or-
Thus, although the AKP’s instrumentali- ganisations. As the AKP’s hold over conser-
sation of the Diyanet to shape religious life vative votes became ever-more consolidated,
around the country is not unprecedented, its links with religious communities deep-
the scope and resources invested in this aim ened. The AKP’s relations with religious
present a novel situation. Moreover, this communities are based on a policy of car-
investment in the Diyanet becomes all the rots and sticks.
more interesting given that political Islam- Accordingly, the AKP makes state re-
ists in Turkey have a long history of distrust sources available to some religious commu-
towards the Diyanet, considering, with cer- nities in exchange for their electoral sup-
tain insight, that the institution was initially port. One typical aspect of such government
created to transform religion so that it support is providing land and direct finan-
would remain in line with Kemalist expec- cial support for formal institutions built
tations. up by religious organisations. These include
However, in a significant departure from a wide range of institutions, including
the Kemalist legacy, the AKP’s investment schools, universities, dormitories, Quran
in the Diyanet does not aim to replace reli- schools, and media organisations. A second
gious communities with the Diyanet. In- type of support involves opening up state
SWP Comment 12
March 2019
3cadres exclusively to certain religious or- accord with the AKP’s rule, the Beykoz
ganisations. Initially, the Gülen movement branch is trying to protect and preserve its
– with a better-educated constituency – autonomy without openly challenging the
made use of the bulk of these spaces. Par- AKP government. However, this attempt of
ticularly after the fallout with the Gülen preserving its distance comes with a cost,
movement, some of the cadres previously as was observed most symbolically in 2016,
filled by the Gülenists are also now open to when a Quran seminary built in Istanbul
other religious organisations. Also, some by the Marifet Association was abolished by
of the financial assets and institutions that the Istanbul Municipality without any court
had been confiscated from the followers decision. On the other hand, the Ismailağa
of the Gülen movement are distributed to Vakfı receives all the benefits of a full ac-
other religious organisations as a bounty. cord with the government, as state insti-
Thus, the government has lot of carrots to tutions and resources have all been opened
offer religious organisations in exchange up for the group in the last few years.
for their loyalty. If all these strategies do not work and a
If AKP fails to receive the support it community remains, as a whole, against
expects, then it resorts to divide the com- the AKP, then outright oppression starts.
munities. Selective use of carrots and sticks Although the fate of the once mighty Gülen
is once again the main instrument of this movement is well-known, the repression of
strategy. It is fair to say that, in the current the Furkan Vakfı remains an often unnoticed,
religious scene of Turkey, intra-group divi- yet revealing case. This is a small and highly
sions are almost as fundamental and impor- conservative religious group with Salafi
tant as inter-group rivalry. Several religious overtones. Moreover, as a movement that is
groups are divided on the axis of pro-Erdo- highly critical of the Gülenists, the Furkan
ğan and anti-Erdoğan. Vakfı partially sided with the government
In religious communities that detach during the feud between the AKP and the
themselves from the alliance, the AKP Gülen movement. As such, it is an unlikely
usually tries to forge alliances with dis- candidate for government repression, but
senting figures and supports them in order its leader, Alparslan Kuytul, is also a per-
to either take over the community or – if sistent critic of the AKP government. As a
that is impossible – at least limit its influ- result of his criticisms, the Furkan Vakfı
ence by creating an intracommunity fight. has been subject to increased pressure in
To this end, AKP governments supported the last few years. When Kuytul continued
figures in the past such as Mehmet Deniz- with his criticisms, he was eventually ar-
olgun of the Süleymancı community and rested on 30 January 2018 and remains in
Kemalettin Özdemir of the Gülen move- prison. All the activities of his community
ment. These individuals had their own have been banned, as his vakıf has also been
charisma and claims for the leadership of abolished.
these communities. By supporting them
and their leadership claims, the AKP aimed
to control these groups as well. Yet, the Novelty of the AKP’s Approach
most typical – and significant – divide is
the one between the Çarşamba and Beykoz Taken together, it is possible to claim that
branches of the Ismailağa Cemaati. An im- the AKP’s “cemaat policy” is built upon
portant branch of the Naqshbandiyya order, three strategies. The first and main strategy
this religious group is currently divided into is to create an alliance with religious com-
two communities, each taking their names munities. Only if that fails are the divide-
from the neighbourhoods of Istanbul where and-rule tactics or outright oppression en-
the vakıf centres (Ismailağa Association and forced. Forging alliances with religious
Marifet Association, respectively) are located. groups is certainly not a new phenomenon
Whereas the Çarşamba branch is in full in Turkish politics. Creating such clientelist
SWP Comment 12
March 2019
4relationships with religious communities several other critical junctures the AKP has
has a long tradition in Turkish political demanded such declarations of support.
history, particularly for the parties to the What is more interesting is that such dec-
right of the spectrum. However, the alliance larations have few short-term benefits for
between the AKP and religious organisations the AKP. Given that Erdoğan already enjoys
differs in significant aspects from previous a very large degree of support among the
alliances observed in Turkish politics. The members of these religious organisations,
AKP invests incomparably greater amounts these declarations have little electoral
of resources into these alliances. Moreover, impact. However, they are more crucial for
the resources that the AKP makes available assimilating these religious organisations
for religious communities are not limited to into the AKP government and making them
financial means – they go beyond opening subordinate to the political will. Such an
state resources to religious organisations alliance has long-term implications. The
and increasingly enable mergers between more such alliances become visible,
state institutions and religious organisations. the more that the lines separating the gov-
Introduction of a programme called ernment and religious organisations blur.
Values Education (Değerler Eğitimi) is a case
in point. Through this programme, the AKP
offers these religious organisations access Beyond Transactional Alliances
to state institutions and schools and gives
them a certain role in the governance of This is a fundamental change compared to
religious education. Religious organisations the former alliances between religious com-
also acquire a more prominent role in the munities and right-wing political parties.
activities of the Diyanet. Although in the The alliances built between centre-right
past the distinction between state and social parties and religious communities were
Islam was largely preserved – the former transactional. The political parties provided
being more Kemalist-oriented and repre- protection to the communities and patron-
senting the political centre, and the latter age in exchange for their voter support.
more in alliance with peripheral forces – Group identities remained distinctly sepa-
the AKP has created a fusion of these for- rate, and the support of the religious com-
merly separate religious organisations. munities was conditional upon the benefits
Although the benefit of such an alliance it accrued through this patronage relation-
with the AKP may be obvious for religious ship, but it was in no way guaranteed.
organisations, it is clear that the AKP holds Although certain alliances, such as the
the upper hand. The extent and terms of alliance between most Nurcu communities
the alliance are not always decided by the and former Prime Minister and President
religious organisations but sometimes Süleyman Demirel, had been quite stable
forced upon them. Official declarations of and long-term, the religious communities
support from several religious organisations often shifted their support among different
to a wavering AKP government in the wake parties, creating new alliances before each
of the elections on 24 June 2018 are a case election. This is the point in which the
in point. Several experts with insider knowl- AKP’s policy on religious communities dif-
edge of these religious communities pointed fers most significantly. The AKP is no longer
out that such declarations of support are satisfied with the passive support of reli-
quite unusual, and the impetus for this gious communities. Instead, it demands
initiative did not come from the organisa- active participation in the political frame-
tions but from the government. These work designed by Erdoğan. The distinctive
movements were not generally enthusiastic identities of the political party and the reli-
about declaring their support but were gious communities have been dissolved,
forced to make such declarations. More- and support for Erdoğan and the AKP forms
over, this is not an isolated event, and at the main identity.
SWP Comment 12
March 2019
5The desire to preserve their autonomy of these organisations could never be taken
and independent identities explains the for granted. Keeping these organisations
hesitance of many religious communities on track needs constant and delicate super-
to declare their support, even though they vision. Moreover, the fallout with the Gülen
benefit greatly through this alliance. In movement, which supported the AKP loyally
any case, at the end of the day, the majority for a decade, might have exacerbated the
of the groups have yielded to the demands, loyalty problems.
whereas only a small minority have resisted. Two institutions – TÜGVA (The Service
Furthermore, this also ties together the for Youth and Education Foundation of Tur-
futures and fates of religious organisations key) and TÜRGEV (Turkish Foundation to
with the AKP, leaving the religious organi- Serve the Youth and Education) – are two
sations no other option than to provide full typical and prominent examples of the
support for the party. Whereas in the past efforts to create new religious organisa-
these movements had been spared the tions. Although Erdoğan’s son Bilal played
wrath of the state and government – largely a crucial role during the expansion of
due to their civil and independent character TÜRGEV, today the Erdoğan family is
– this is now changing. Several of these represented by Esra Albayrak, Erdoğan’s
organisations even survived military inter- daughter, on the executive board of
ventions with little to no damage. However, TÜRGEV, whereas Bilal Erdoğan is on the
their newly formed organic relations with executive board of TÜGVA and other simi-
the AKP government mean that they will lar but smaller-scale organisations, such as
suffer a serious setback if the AKP govern- Yeni Türkiye Eğitim Vakfı, Kartal Eğitim
ment falls. This not only ties these move- Vakfı, İnsan ve İrfan Vakfı, and İlim Yayma
ments and their vote bank irrevocably to Vakfı. Erdoğan himself frequently appears
the AKP, it also eliminates the possibility at events organised by these foundations,
of a major form of opposition: religiously openly declaring his support for their activ-
inspired opposition. This is particularly true ities. For instance, in one of these events in
given that, in authoritarian contexts, where 2015, he stated that TÜRGEV and other
civil society and all forms of organisation similar foundations are central to his aim
are severely oppressed, as in contemporary to raise a pious generation.
Turkey, the religious realm becomes the only Similar to other religious organisations,
venue for the dissemination and organi- these two organisations focus on educa-
sation of dissent. The crucial importance tional institutions, particularly student dor-
of controlling and erasing the autonomy mitories, with the professed aim of raising a
of the religious realm is therefore obvious pious generation. TÜRGEV has 62 dormito-
to an authoritarian regime that aims to con- ries, of which 12 are for high school stu-
trol all spheres of life. dents and the rest for university students.
It also has six dormitories abroad. In total,
currently more than 10,000 students live in
New Religious Organisations TÜRGEV dormitories. There is a gendered
dimension, a division of labour among the
The expansion of state resources and the dormitories established by the two foun-
incorporation of social Islam with state dations: TÜRGEV exclusively focusses on
institutions and the party are complement- female students, whereas the 58 dormito-
ed by the formation of a group of entirely ries of TÜGVA are all for male students.
new religious organisations funded and Hence, Erdoğan’s daughter is in the execu-
ruled by Erdoğan’s immediate circle, who tive of the former, and his son is usually in
are often members of his own family. charge of all other organisations.
Although the AKP had largely succeeded in However, the activities of neither foun-
its attempts to incorporate religious organi- dation are limited to student dormitories.
sations into the party and state, the loyalty TÜRGEV also operates several kindergar-
SWP Comment 12
March 2019
6tens, primary and higher-level schools, as and separate the students and graduates of
well as a university. On its part, TÜGVA these religious organisations, they are all
holds a wide range of educational and defined by their personal loyalty to Erdoğan
cultural programmes organised all around and the AKP. Although the history of
the country through city and district rep- TÜRGEV dates back to Erdoğan’s mayorship
resentatives. These programmes point to of Istanbul in the mid-1990s, its resources
almost limitless financial resources. It is not and activities multiplied during the third
uncommon for TÜGVA programmes to end Erdoğan government, and from 2012 on-
with an international trip to Spain or Cen- wards it has become a nationwide organisa-
tral Asia or a visit to the holy cities in Saudi tion. TÜGVA was founded in 2013 and,
Arabia outside the month of pilgrimage. since then, several other small-scale organi-
Needless to say, all these programmes are sations have followed. Thus, it would be
free of charge. In both TÜRGEV and safe to say that since 2012, the third pillar
TÜGVA, all the lavish activities and the of Erdoğan’s policy in the religious realm
exponential growth of the foundations are has been activated. This also roughly cor-
financed by unidentified donors. Yet, responds to the dates when Erdoğan broke
TÜRGEV is known to have received a $100 with the Gülen movement, implying that
million donation between 2008 and 2012 loyalty issues had been the primary moti-
from Gulf countries through Bilal Erdoğan, vation in the attempts to create new loyal
and it made the news for the first time in religious movements. The impact of the
2013 during the corruption scandal that fallout with the Gülen movement during
involved the Iranian businessman Reza the sudden growth of these foundations
Zarrab, who pleaded guilty in New York is also acknowledged by the executives of
on charges of money laundering. these foundations. The lack of clear reli-
gious teachings or a clear ideology – other
than loyalty to Erdoğan – in the pro-
Distinctiveness of New Religious grammes of these organisations also con-
Organisations firms this hypothesis.
This is an unprecedented move in Turk-
Although the activities of these organisa- ish political history. Although religion and
tions all resemble the ones of social reli- politics interacted with each other in sev-
gious organisations, they differ from a eral different ways, no political leader in
typical religious organisation through their history ever attempted to create entirely
lack of a central religious leader and new religious organisations and move-
religious teachings. This is often compen- ments. Moreover, the enormous amount of
sated for with selective readings of the resources and efforts channelled into rais-
traditional texts and contemporary Turkish ing religious youth who are loyal to Erdo-
Islamist thinkers. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, ğan also implies the long-term power
who is known to be the man who influ- projections of Erdoğan. These efforts, which
enced Erdoğan the most and whose ideo- would come to fruition in no less than a
logical works are an inspiration to the con- decade, imply Erdoğan’s desire to be active
temporary political system, often appears as in politics for the foreseeable future – and
a central figure. However, none of these are even potentially to transfer this loyalty to
essential, or even particularly central, for his offspring. By creating new religious
defining and attributing an ideological core organisations, the AKP constitutes a global
to these organisations. In fact, the loose exception as well. Although several Islamic
ideological orientation enables these or- organisations around the world discuss the
ganisations to reach out to the widest pos- separation of religious organisations from
sible number of students. political parties – the most prominent ex-
Although there is no distinctive religious ample being the Tunisian Ennahda, which
ideology or religious text that will shape arguably announced this separation in its
SWP Comment 12
March 2019
7last party congress – Turkey’s AKP seems
to be going in the opposite direction.
Erdoğan, who ruled over the AKP with an
iron fist but did not have the religious back-
ground nor the religious organisation, now
intends to create a community by all means
necessary. However, this religious commu-
nity seems to be defined by personal alle-
giance to Erdoğan above anything else. To
this extent, this is more of a political move
© Stiftung Wissenschaft than a religious one.
und Politik, 2019
All rights reserved
A Comprehensive Policy
This Comment reflects
the author’s views.
When considered together, it is possible to
The online version of say that the three elements pointed out in
this publication contains this paper comprise a comprehensive and
functioning links to other multi-faceted policy for controlling and
SWP texts and other relevant
regulating the religious realm in Turkey.
sources.
Employing the Diyanet as the true repre-
SWP Comments are subject sentative of Islam and forging alliances
to internal peer review, fact- with religious communities have strong
checking and copy-editing. historical precedents. However, the AKP’s
For further information on policies during the last decade constitute a
our quality control pro-
certain rupture. First of all, the amount of
cedures, please visit the SWP
website: https://www.swp- resources being poured into it are signifi-
berlin.org/en/about-swp/ cantly greater. Second, these institutions
quality-management-for- are not being developed as alternatives to
swp-publications/ each other but as parts or layers of a more
complementary strategy. The Diyanet,
SWP
Stiftung Wissenschaft und
cemaats, and newly emerging religious
Politik organisations are not deployed as antago-
German Institute for nists to each other but as allies in the for-
International and mation of a new religious generation. Last,
Security Affairs but definitely not least, these various insti-
tutions and communities are merging with
Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4
10719 Berlin the AKP and losing their autonomy. By co-
Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 opting all these institutions and organisa-
Fax +49 30 880 07-100 tions, Erdoğan enjoys direct or indirect
www.swp-berlin.org control over most of the religious realm in
swp@swp-berlin.org
Turkey. As such, these policies seem to be
ISSN 1861-1761
less inspired by religious indoctrination
doi: 10.18449/2019C12 than a desire to control a crucial realm
of civil society, which – as several other
examples in the Middle East have demon-
strated – is crucial for sustaining an
authoritarian system.
Dr Salim Çevik is a Visiting Fellow at SWP.
SWP Comment 12
March 2019
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