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INDO-PACIFIC
INSIGHT SERIES
Roadmap to Quad success:
Practical recommendations
for action and sustainability
In 2021, the Quad gained momentum with the inaugural
Leaders’ Summit, raising regional expectations of the
framework. With the Quad having announced initiatives
in ten distinct areas, the region is eager to see tangible
progress that avoids increasing strategic tensions. In the lead
up to the next Leaders’ Summit, the Quad should refine its
efforts to better signal intentions, build credibility and deliver
regional public goods. These should include consolidating
and prioritising its existing areas for cooperation, and
announcing new flagship projects in key fields – critical
technology, infrastructure, and supply chains.
Hayley Channer, Perth USAsia Centre
Volume 16, September 2021
2 Executive Summary
4 Introduction
5 From maritime to strategic grouping
8 The expanding Quad agenda
10 Consolidating and prioritising
12 Identifying Quad projects
15 The Quad's future as
a strategic grouping
16 About the author
16 Acknowledgements and
About the Perth USAsia Centre
17 Disclaimer
18 Endnotes
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The strategic purpose of the Quad grouping is widely
misunderstood. While the conventional wisdom is the Quad
is designed as military counterweight to China, its goals are
in fact much broader. It now aims to support open, liberal
and rules-based approaches to regional affairs across the
defence, economic and diplomatic spheres.
Since upgrading to a Leaders’-level Summit in 2021, the
functional remit of the Quad has dramatically expanded.
Including recent commitments around COVID-19 vaccines,
climate change, and critical and emerging technology,
the Quad has now publicly declared ten priority areas for
cooperation.
As the Quad agenda expands beyond the traditional security
sphere, there is a pressing need to provide coherence and
structure to its work. In the absence of a formal Secretariat,
the Quad now requires a coordination mechanism to manage
its work programs, track progress on implementation, and
communicate its achievements to the world.
Developing thematic priorities would help focus the Quad’s
expanding agenda. Its ten priority areas should be organised
into three themes – regional public goods, technology
and security cooperation – which would provide structure,
prioritisation and resourcing to key initiatives.
To telegraph its commitment to regional public goods, the
Quad should focus its next efforts in the ‘beyond security’
space. Its initiatives should be in domains with strong political
convergence for action, complementary Quad member
strengths, and have a sense of regional urgency and tangible
benefit to countries.
Three domains – critical technologies, quality infrastructure and
supply chain security – provide opportunities for the Quad to
successfully expand its remit. Alongside the COVID-19 vaccine
commitment, developing joint projects in these three areas
could deliver concrete results and demonstrate the broader
utility of the Quad as a provider of regional public goods.
Roadmap to Quad success
1 INTRODUCTION
The ‘Quad’ grouping – comprised of Australia, At the same time, the Quad must demonstrate its
the US, Japan and India – is one of the most utility to its members and their regional partners.
controversial additions to the diplomatic Quad statements consistently demonstrate that its
architecture of the Indo-Pacific. Proponents laud interests lie in a stable, secure and prosperous Indo-
the Quad as a potential response to China’s Pacific. However, its patchy history of meetings,
aggressive military turn, viewing is as a quasi- repeated shifts in focus, and ambiguities over its
defence coalition. Detractors view the Quad as formality have all diminished confidence in the
an inherently flawed grouping of countries with no framework2. Compounding matters, deteriorating
common strategic objective, which is unlikely to act relations among its members and China have
collectively on matters of strategic importance1. called into question whether the Quad harbours
More balanced assessments see the Quad as an ambitions to confront China, diplomatically or
evolving strategic grouping, reacting in an ad otherwise. A sense of lacking openness and
hoc manner to rapidly shifting regional strategic transparency – founding principles of the Quad
dynamics, with ambitions to secure the shared – has been growing within the region.
interests of its members.
With its second Leaders’ Summit planned for late
2021, the Quad must now seize the initiative and
The debate over – and broader better define its purpose, signal its intentions,
lack of clarity around – the build credibility, and deliver on its promises – a
Quad’s purpose and intent daunting list! This report argues the most effective
path forward for the Quad in the short term lies
has allowed speculation to in its recently “expanded” agenda, focused
flourish, adding confusion and on non-traditional security challenges and
anxiety to an already unstable delivering regional public goods and technology.
A declaration of its specific intent in these areas
strategic environment. and the announcement of concrete projects would
greatly aid in clarifying the Quad’s value proposition
It is in the best interests of the Quad, and the Indo- for both its members and their regional partners.
Pacific more broadly, to reduce this ambiguity as
a priority.
The United States, Japan, India and Australia participate in the virtual Quad Summit, 12 March 2021.
Credit: Official White House Photo by Adam Schultz
PAGE 4
2 FROM MARITIME TO STRATEGIC GROUPING
The Quad has a long, and at times convoluted, genesis. Originally formed in 2004 to coordinate
humanitarian responses to the Indian Ocean Tsunami, the Quad brought together like-minded countries
for ad hoc cooperation on maritime security. Subsequent attempts to cohere the four countries into
a formal grouping were launched in 2007 but then fell into abeyance following Chinese diplomatic
protests and Australian withdrawal in 20083. However, following ongoing advocacy – most prominently
by then-Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo – the grouping was re-established in 2017. In subsequent
years its meetings have grown in seniority and frequency, culminating in the first Quad Leaders’
Summit in March 2021. The resulting Leaders’ Joint Statement, which included a commitment to deliver
COVID-19 vaccines to the region, represented a high-water mark in the history of the framework4.
Indo-Pacific Insight Series, Volume 16, September 2021 PAGE 5
Roadmap to Quad success
FIGURE 1 TIMELINE OF THE QUADRILATERAL DIALOGUE AND SIGNIFICANT RELATED DEVELOPMENTS
US, India, Japan and Australia US Vice President signals Japanese PM Abe
establish ‘Tsunami Core Group’ American interest for a speech to Indian Resignation
to coordinate relief during Indian Quad dialogue, during a parliament on bilateral of Japanese
Ocean tsunami visit to Australia maritime security PM Abe
DEC-2004 DEC-2006 MAR-2006 FEB-2007 MAY-2007 AUG-2007 SEP-2007
Japanese PM Abe Australian PM John Inaugural meeting Exercise Malabar Naval
Shinzo first proposes the Howard visits India, of the ‘Quadrilateral activity includes Australia
idea of the Quad, with Indo-US nuclear Dialogue’ on the and Singapore, sparking
endorsement from US deal signed sidelines of ARF Chinese diplomatic
Vice President Summit protests
Australian PM Kevin Re-election Australia overturned uranium
Rudd announces of Abe as export ban to India, which had Australia requests to NINE YEAR GAP
withdrawal from further Japanese previously weakened relations attend Exercise Malabar BETWEEN FORMAL
Quad military exercises PM in the Quad but is blocked by India QUAD MEETINGS
FEB-2008 APR-2008 SEP-2012 DEC-2012 SEP-2014 FEB-2015 APR-2017 OCT-2017
Australian FM announces PM Abe proposes concept of a Japan becomes formal Japanese FM announces
departure from the Quad ‘democratic security diamond’ member of previously Japan will propose a
of Quad countries bilateral US-India Exercise dialogue with the US,
Malabar India and Australia
Japan-India Joint US President Trump signs
Statement – Japan’s the Asia Reassurance Quad considers new Japan included in
Free and Open Seas Initiative Act, affirming global infrastructure bilateral Australia-US
policy and India’s Act commitment to scheme to rival China’s Third Senior Officials’ Exercise Talisman
East policy ‘Quad 2.0’ Belt and Road Initiative Meeting, Singapore Sabre
SEP-2017 NOV-2017 DEC-2017 JAN-2018 MAR-2018 JUN-2018 NOV-2018 MAY-2019 JUN-2019
Inaugural Navy chiefs from Second Senior Forth Senior
Senior Officials’ Australia, India, Japan, Officials’ Officials’
Meeting, the US, and Indonesia Meeting, Meeting,
Manila meet at Raisina Dialogue Singapore Bangkok
Inaugural Quad Foreign Fifth Senior Officials’ US President Donald
Ministers’ meeting Meeting Bangkok, Trump announces Inaugural Quad Leaders’
in New York, Senior India hosts a Quad efforts to “revitalise” Summit, virtual, leaders issue
officials’ meeting, counterterrorism table- Quad initiative during landmark Joint Statement
Bangkok top exercise trip to India and joint op-ed
SEP-2019 OCT-2019 NOV-2019 DEC-2019 FEB-2020 NOV-2020 MAR-2021 LATE 2021
US Secretary of State Quad countries’ cyber Quad countries participate in Second Quad
Mike Pompeo telegraphs experts meet on the Exercise Malabar, criticised by Leaders’
the Quad as vehicle for sidelines of a summit China as a risk to Summit is
China-containment regional stability scheduled
PAGE 6
The uptick in Quad activity since 2017 is largely a
response to hostile Chinese actions across several The Quad cannot achieve its
domains – military, political, economic and social.
aims solely through the threat or
Chinese aggression has been felt by each Quad
member individually, including in territorial disputes application of military force.
(in the East China Sea and along the China-India
land border), malicious cyber-attacks5, and/ By transcending the notion of the Quad as
or economic coercion. As bilateral diplomatic solely military framework and instead addressing
representations have failed on each of these issues, increasingly harmful non-traditional security
the Quad countries increasingly see the utility of a challenges, the Quad stands a better chance of
strategic partnership that can buttress rules-based achieving its aims.
rather than coercive behaviour in the region. The
Quad’s reboot as a Senior Officials’ meeting in Indeed, the utility of an expanded Quad
November 2017 to a full Leaders’ Summit by March agenda has already been recognised by
2021 reflects the urgency of this agenda. Quad governments. In 2021, the Quad has
adopted a more decisively constructive agenda
Since the Quad’s inception, many defence encompassing health, climate change, and
strategists have evaluated the Quad principally critical technology. The group has recognised its
in terms of its potential to counter military threats contribution to regional security will be maximised
posed by China. As a group initially established if it delivers across a broader set of foreign policy
around maritime security, the expectation is domains. Cooperation centred on non-traditional
the Quad would evolve further in this direction. security cooperation will also assuage regional
For example, the four countries might execute partners that are reticent about engaging with
combined naval and air operations to respond a defence-focused institution and provide
collectively to offensive Chinese manoeuvres in it with long-term relevance in the Indo-Pacific
the South or East China Seas. There is a foundation regional architecture.
to support the development of a Quad defence
coalition, with each country engaged in trilateral With the Quad now redefining itself as a full-
defence dialogue configurations covering all spectrum strategic grouping, in what new areas
four, and all four navies participating in Exercise has it decide to invest and why? And, given the
Malabar. Moreover, the Quad is seen as the most unique resources and outlooks of its four members,
feasible and only sufficient military and economic how can these new efforts be calibrated to deliver
counterweight in the region to a serious military the best results? Answering these questions will
contest involving China. prove critical for the success of the second Quad
Leaders’ Summit, scheduled for late 2021, and the
However, imagining the Quad in purely military longer-term pathway that this Summit will map out.
terms fails to recognise its potential beyond the
security space6. Ultimately, Quad countries are
not only trying to offset the military threat posed by
China; they are seeking to compete with China’s
share of regional influence and secure a liberal
regional order characterised by freedom from
coercion, freedom of movement and free trade.
Indo-Pacific Insight Series, Volume 16, September 2021 PAGE 7
Roadmap to Quad success
3 THE EXPANDING QUAD AGENDA
At the March 2021 Leaders’ Summit, the Quad The expanding domain of Quad initiatives is a
greatly expanded the number of domains in which major accomplishment given Quad members’
it operates (Box 1). The group made commitments different interests, capabilities and priorities for
for a number of new, beyond defence, issues each topic. But the very large number of issues on
including: cooperating on COVID-19 vaccine the agenda also poses the risk that the Quad may
production and distribution, World Health lose focus. With so many diverse issues now being
Organisation (WHO) reform, action on climate discussed, it will become difficult to demonstrate
change, critical technologies, and maritime progress publicly, as government resources are
security7. Of these, particular emphasis was placed spread more thinly across multiple areas. It also
on vaccine distribution, critical technologies and risks over-committing the Quad at an early stage
climate change, with an expert group or working of its move towards becoming a broad strategic
group established for each8. These outcomes built grouping, when the focus should be on a smaller
on three previous Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meetings number of issues where members can concentrate
which resulted in mandates to establish working effort and deliver immediate results.
groups on maritime security, quality infrastructure,
supply chain resilience, counterterrorism, The sheer volume of publicly announced initiatives
humanitarian and disaster relief response (HADR), – now totalling ten – illustrates the challenge. Due
cyber, and countering disinformation9. to their complex nature, each has a working group,
and in some cases there are multiple sub-working
BOX 1 QUAD WORKING GROUPS FOLLOWING THE MARCH groups. For instance, the critical and emerging
2021 LEADERS’ SUMMIT technology group has sub-groups on the Open
Radio Access Network, technology standards,
horizon scanning, and supply chains10. Not only is
the breadth of Quad cooperation a large body of
work to resource, the challenges of the COVID-19
pandemic mean that policymakers are already
COVID-19 vaccine
very strained.
Critical and emerging
production and distribution technology
How to effectively deliver an
expanded agenda is now
the critical question for the
Quad’s future.
Climate change Maritime security HADR
Some have argued a permanent Quad Secretariat
could assist officials in managing this increasingly
complex workload11. Creating a Secretariat might
also further politically commit Quad members
to the framework. However, the prospect of a
Secretariat is controversial within and outside the
group. Some Quad government officials fear it may
Quality Supply chain add bureaucracy to an already burdened process,
Cyber
infrastructure resilience while some Southeast Asian countries feel it would
undermine the principle of ASEAN Centrality in
the regional architecture12. Regarding the former,
Feigenbaum and Schwemlein have pithily argued:
“more form can mean less function”13.
Counterterrorism Countering disinformation
PAGE 8
In the absence of consensus behind a Secretariat,
the Quad could still work on better communicating The COVID-19 vaccine pledge
its work programs and achievements therein. At
illustrates the results which
present, the Quad countries publish information
individually through national channels. can be achieved with focused
efforts.
A dedicated and consolidated
Quad web presence – similar The level of commitment signalled strong
to those of APEC or ASEAN – political convergence between members and a
fundamental shift in the Quad, from dialogue to
could help brand the framework action17. The division of labour rationalised why the
and provide a record of past cooperation should take place under the Quad
meetings, joint statements, umbrella. The focus on an immediate and pressing
challenge for regional governments meant the
working groups, and initiative offered benefits for countries beyond the
existing commitments. grouping. The commitment was also applauded
by countries that not only stood to benefit from a
vaccine but appreciated that Quad cooperation
Down the track, the virtual interface could help
in this area would be less provocative to China
facilitate partnership opportunities with private
than other types of security cooperation18. Taken
industry, academia, or civil society groups.
together, the COVID-19 vaccine pledge:
Beyond communications, the Quad also needs
to improve its capacity to prioritise and resource
initiatives. This is partly happening organically. Æ Reflects strong political convergence for action
While some working groups have greater Æ Leverages Quad member attributes, justifying
urgency, such as those on COVID-19 vaccines the cooperation
and critical technology, other working groups Æ Seeks to resolve an urgent, regional problem
have yet to be stood-up more than six months
after their announcement. The COVID-19 vaccine Æ Provides a tangible benefit to regional countries
commitment is clearly the Quad’s number Æ As much as possible, avoids negative reactions
one priority and promises to deliver one billion
vaccines to the Indo-Pacific by the end of 202214.
This deliverable is the most collaborative thus As a result of the vaccine commitment, the Quad
far, with the US providing finance and technical has received a more positive regional reception.
expertise, Japan offering concessional loans, Now, regional countries are eager to see evidence
India undertaking the manufacture, and Australia of progress and receive additional detail in relation
carrying out regional delivery15. to the Quad’s other commitments.
BOX 2 DIVISION OF LABOUR IN THE QUAD COVID-19 VACCINES INITIATIVE
UNITED STATES JAPAN INDIA AUSTRALIA
Finance Indian Provide concessional Expand manufacturing Contribute US$77
biopharmaceutical loans to the Indian of safe and effective million to vaccines
company, Biological Government to expand COVID-19 vaccines and “last-mile”
E, to produce one manufacturing of at facilities in India, delivery support
billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines producing one billion by with a focus on
COVID-19 vaccines for export the end of 2022 Southeast Asia16
Indo-Pacific Insight Series, Volume 16, September 2021 PAGE 9
Roadmap to Quad success
4 CONSOLIDATING AND PRIORITISING
With the Quad now elevated to the Leaders’-level, better articulate its priorities, and provide scope
expectations of the grouping are rising to match. to reduce resourcing loads. If implemented, all
It is uncertain the initiatives launched in March future Quad cooperation could fall into one of
will, as presently organised and resourced, be these three categories and, over time, this could
able to deliver outcomes that match increased serve to better define the Quad itself.
expectations. A way to promptly and effectively
raise supply to meet demand is to establish ‘pillars’ Streamlining into pillars would also enable sharper
that will provide structure and coherence for prioritisation between initiatives. The underlying
existing and future Quad initiatives. driver of prioritisation should be increasing
collaboration among the Quad and reassuring
partners in the broader Indo-Pacific. Regional
The ten Quad working groups support is key to the Quad achieving its end
should be organised into three goal of shaping regional behaviour, norms and
pillars: regional public goods, standards. The same metrics associated with the
region’s positive response to the COVID-19 vaccine
technology, and security commitment have been employed, namely: strong
cooperation. political convergence for action; Quad member
strengths are leveraged; the challenge is urgent
and regionally focused; and cooperation provides
‘Regional public goods’ would include the a tangible regional benefit and avoids provocation.
COVID-19 vaccine delivery, climate change action,
quality infrastructure and HADR. Within ‘technology’ Table 1 illustrates how priority could be triaged for
would be the critical and emerging technology, the Quad’s existing commitments. It assesses how
supply chain resilience, and cyber working groups. the ten committed areas of Quad cooperation
The ‘security’ pillar would include maritime security, (x-axis) align to five prioritisation criteria (y-axis).
counterterrorism, and countering disinformation. The coding is based on insights from relevant
Rather than ten lines of effort competing for officials, analysts and academics from across the
resources, there would be three priority areas, with four Quad countries, who contributed personal
individual working groups representing sub-topics. views via interviews.
This would give structure to Quad cooperation,
PAGE 10Table 1 – Existing Quad commitments and common metrics♦
Strong Tangible
Leverages Shared sense Limits
Quad political benefit for
member of regional negative
commitment convergence regional
attributes urgency reception
for action countries
COVID
vaccine delivery
PUBLIC GOODS
REGIONAL
Climate change
Quality
infrastructure
HADR
Critical and
emerging
TECHNOLOGY
technology
Cyber ?
Supply chain
resilience
Maritime security
SECURITY
?
Countering
disinformation
Counterterrorism
♦NOTE: DETAIL FOR INDIVIDUAL METRICS KEY:
Information required to make an
Strong political convergence for action: All four Quad governments
are strongly committed to undertaking action beyond existing national ? assessment was not available or no
consensus emerged from consultations.
efforts to address the challenge.
Leverages member attributes: Quad members possess complementary
skills or attributes and the challenge has the potential to be more
effectively addressed through Quad cooperation than through
unilateral or bilateral action.
Sense of regional urgency: The majority of countries in the Indo-Pacific
feel a sense of immediacy in addressing this challenge.
Tangible benefit for regional countries: Cooperation is likely to have a
felt benefit for countries in the region beyond the Quad members.
Limits negative reception: Cooperation is broadly seen as positive and
not specifically targeted at any one country, such as China
Indo-Pacific Insight Series, Volume 16, September 2021 PAGE 11Roadmap to Quad success
5 IDENTIFYING QUAD PROJECTS
The pledge to deliver one billion COVID-19 A commitment to roll-out 5G communications
vaccines was a clear, bold policy announcement networks to the Indo-Pacific would constitute a
that commits to delivering a tangible good. If significant announcement. However, it would also
the Quad is going to remain at the leader- and be a complicated and expensive undertaking
ministerial-level, it needs more of this style of high- that the Quad framework is not currently mature
level commitment going forward. If the Quad were or robust enough to tackle. Instead, there is one
to make bold announcements around critical critical technology that underpins the development
technology, quality infrastructure and supply chains of all emerging technologies – digital connectivity.
that satisfy the aforementioned criteria, what could
these be?
While digital connectivity is not
Critical and emerging technology typically categorised as critical
The critical and emerging technology field to all Quad countries, improved
is vast. Technologies commonly considered digital communications will
within this field include Fifth Generation (5G)
technologies19, quantum, artificial intelligence,
underpin future communications
hypersonics, space, and biotech20,21. Additional networks, including 5G.
technologies can become critical if their supply
chain is disrupted, such as during the COVID-19
Digital technology is, itself, expansive. It can refer
pandemic or if geopolitical factors restrict access.
to any electronic tools or systems that generate,
The Quad critical and emerging technology
store and process data, but the key to digital
working group has pledged to develop a
connectivity is high-quality internet access.
statement of principles; coordinate on standards
Internet relies on hard infrastructure such as
development; cooperate on telecommunications
satellites, undersea fibre-optic cables, landing
deployment and diversification of equipment
stations to receive the cables, as well as affordable
suppliers; monitor developments in the field,
and reliable electricity grids. Therefore, digital
including in biotechnology; and hold dialogue
connectivity in the form of telecommunications
on supply chains22.
networks supported by undersea cables, landing
Quad members have not created a list of common stations and electricity grids is ripe for a keystone
critical and emerging technologies as each differs critical technology project.
in how they assess technologies23. Even within
individual countries it can be challenging to
establish a list of critical technologies because,
as technologies evolve, they can transition to the
critical category. Pinpointing that moment is not
always clear or unanimously agreed. The closest
the Quad is likely to come is a common mapping
framework showing where each country stands in
relation to the other24.
PAGE 12The Ile de Brehat, off the coast of Guadalcanal, laying the Coral Sea internet cable connecting Port Moresby, Honiara and Sydney.
Credit: Mici Tsang/DFAT
Quality infrastructure opposition to China’s Belt and Road Initiative
than a helpful alternative and a coordination
In recent years, the announcement of new mini- or
agency may communicate a prolonged period of
multilateral infrastructure partnerships involving the
discussions. Unless the Quad can show it is serious
Quad countries has flourished. In 2017, Japan and
about infrastructure development in the near term,
India published their vision for an Asia-Africa Growth
regional countries will not consider the framework
Corridor25. In early 2018, India, Japan and the US
a credible alternative to other financiers.
met under their Trilateral Infrastructure Working
Group26. In late 2018 Australia, the US and Japan
launched the Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership As part of other collaborative
(TIP)27. And in mid-2021, the Group of 7 launched infrastructure partnerships,
its ‘Build Back Better World’ (B3W) initiative. The
Quad countries are already spoiled for choice in Quad countries have already
vehicles for advancing infrastructure diplomacy. informally recognised
While the Quad has flagged an interest in building
digital connectivity as their
infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific (the US has infrastructure priority.
indicated infrastructure will be a focus of the
next Leaders’ Summit28) the Quad countries must
For example, the first and only project under the TIP
first reconcile this with their existing infrastructure
is an undersea, fibre-optic cable that will provide
initiatives. For instance, should India be included in
the Pacific Island country of Palau with reliable,
an existing framework such as the TIP and its parallel
secure digital communications33. In addition, the
‘Blue Dot Network’ certification scheme, or should
Trilateral Partnership countries and New Zealand
Quad countries work more globally with the G7?
have launched the Papua New Guinea (PNG)
As the Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership is still in an Electrification Partnership to connect 70 per
early phase and the B3W has only recently been cent of PNG’s population to electricity by 203034.
announced, the Quad could get in on the ground Japan and India, bilaterally, have also focused
of both initiatives. However, narrowing down a on enhancing digital connectivity infrastructure
single Quad project is challenging. Beyond reports via their Asia-Africa Growth Corridor partnership35.
Quad senior officials have discussed transparent, Timor-Leste, Vanuatu and Nauru have already
principles-based investment29 and so-called ‘green- expressed interest in working with Australia to
infrastructure’ such as solar plants,30 no specific design and build undersea fibre-optic cables and,
project has been announced. Previously, there undoubtedly, there are opportunities in Southeast
have been useful recommendations the Quad Asia to upgrade existing sub-sea communications
establish a critical infrastructure funding scheme for systems. Considering existing interest and current
small states31 or an Indo-Pacific Infrastructure and efforts by Australia, the US, Japan and India in
Development Coordination agency32. However, digital connectivity infrastructure, synergies may
a funding scheme may be seen more as in direct be achieved via Quad cooperation.
Indo-Pacific Insight Series, Volume 16, September 2021 PAGE 13Roadmap to Quad success
Supply chain resilience compellingly for the group to protect this supply
chain44,45. Scholars have also highlighted the large
Outside a secure COVID-19 vaccine production
complementarities that exist across Quad countries
line, a Quad-specific supply chain activity is
in relation to securing the battery supply chain46.
unknown. Like the challenge of identifying a
These supply chains are ripe for a Quad project
specific technology for cooperation, each Quad
because they highlight the value of an integrated,
country imparts different value to various supply
global supply chain supported by free trade47.
chains. However, there appears to be both a
clear frontrunner in terms of national priority – For semiconductors, the complementary strengths
the semiconductor supply chain – as well as of each include the US’ dominant chip design
a frontrunner in terms of Quad-value-add – and US owned production companies, as well as
battery storage. a recent $52 billion investment in the industry48;
India’s design engineering talent49; Japan’s
In June 2021, the White House released a national
advanced manufacturing and skilled workforce;
report into supply chain disruption. The first supply
and Australia’s raw materials and research and
chain vulnerability identified was semiconductors
development50. However, Quad country attributes
and the second was large capacity batteries36.
alone cannot fully secure the supply chain and,
The Japanese Government has also identified the
therefore, other trusted regional partners will need
semiconductor supply chain as a national interest37
to be brought on board. The benefit to regional
and Prime Minister Suga’s first economic policy
countries could be for the Quad to out-source
and growth strategy includes a plan to secure the
assembly, packaging and testing to Southeast Asia,
battery market and strengthen supply38. India and
supporting job creation and further diversifying the
Australia have similarly identified semiconductor
supply chain. The Quad could also look to expand
and battery supply as critical. The Indian
production sites and sources of supply for some
Government has encouraged semiconductor
critical materials to other countries in the region.
companies to set up shop in India39 and released
a national battery storage strategy in 2019. In
Australia, the Supply Chain Resilience Office has
identified the semiconductor supply chain as a key RECOMMENDATIONS
vulnerability40 and Australia’s 2019 Critical Minerals
Æ Create a Quad public presence via
Strategy outlined an integrated national policy to
an online portal to brand the initiative
develop the battery industry. The above reflects a
and provide a single, joined up source
shared interest across the Quad nations to shore-up
of information
their semiconductor and battery storage supplies.
Æ Consolidate existing commitments
through condensing working groups into
In a similar manner to three ‘pillars’: regional public goods,
how digital technology technology and security cooperation
underpins other technology, Æ Prioritise areas for cooperation within the
semiconductors and batteries three pillars to provide more structure
are critical intermediary goods, to Quad engagement and focus
official resources
feeding multiple industry
Æ Establish Quad projects for critical
value chains41,42. technology, quality infrastructure and
supply chain resilience
Semiconductors and batteries are ubiquitous in Æ Specific projects could include enhancing
electrical devices and the digitisation of goods, regional digital communications, new
vehicles and services across industries43. Due undersea fibre-optic cable infrastructure,
to the value of semiconductors across fields and securing the semiconductor and
and the vulnerability of this supply chain to all battery supply chains
Quad countries, many scholars have argued
PAGE 146 THE QUAD’S FUTURE AS A STRATEGIC GROUPING
The Quad is a fledgling group and has only Should the Quad prove to be an effective
very recently made moves beyond the sphere framework, it could spur greater confidence in
of traditional security. To succeed, it needs to the benefits of minilateral instruments for the Indo-
focus and prioritise its activities and then deliver Pacific. This is particularly important in an era
concrete outcomes to demonstrate its utility to of waning confidence in global multilateralism,
the region. The Quad can go some way towards especially given crises within the UN, WHO and
building credibility through consolidating its existing WTO. A successful Quad could reduce the current
commitments into three pillars, such as regional reliance on bilateral mechanisms in regional
public goods, technology and security, and diplomacy, particularly as many of these rely
making flagship announcements in key areas. on US leadership through its hub-and-spoke
alliance system. Networked diplomacy through
As Quad members consolidate this agenda, their minilateralism such as the Quad could improve
progress must be demonstrated to the world. responses to new challenges, fairly share the
An outward expression of progress is essential if burden of responses, and help generate regional
regional partners are to be reassured regarding resilience. These are the regional public goods
the positive benefits the group brings to the Indo- that are sorely needed in a period of economic,
Pacific. At future Quad meetings and summits, the social and political upheaval.
group should focus on demonstrating progress
against its existing commitments rather than adding
more initiatives to an already over-burdened
agenda. Articulating specific Quad goals in
relation to critical technology, infrastructure and
supply chains could help provide a sustainable
approach to demonstrating Quad progress over
several years.
Indo-Pacific Insight Series, Volume 16, September 2021 PAGE 15Roadmap to Quad success
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Hayley Channer is the Senior Policy Fellow at the Perth USAsia
Centre. Based in Canberra, Hayley produces analysis on foreign
and defence policy in the Indo-Pacific, engages with key Australian
Government agencies and other policy stakeholders, and builds
and sustains the Centre’s domestic and international network.
Hayley has led a diverse career across government, think tanks and
the not-for-profit sector. She previously worked for the Department
of Defence producing strategic policy guidance on defence
cooperation and international engagement with the United States
and Japan.
hayley.channer@perthusasia.edu.au
twitter.com/hayleychanner
perthusasia.edu.au/about-us/our-people/staff/hayley-channer
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Perth USAsia Centre would like to thank the wide range of individuals who
supported the production of this report. The author conducted more than 30 interviews
with Australian and foreign government officials from the senior to working level, think
tank analysts, and academics. The author would like to thank the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Department of
Defence, Department of Home Affairs, Office of National Intelligence and Strategic
and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University for contributing
insights and providing feedback. Many other individuals kindly offered insights,
information and feedback that have enriched the report. Nonetheless, the author is
responsible for all content and arguments contained herein.
ABOUT PERTH USASIA CENTRE
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ENDNOTES
1 Kishore Mahbubani, 2021. ‘Why attempts to build a new anti- Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
China alliance will fail’, Foreign Policy Magazine. Available at: statements-releases/2021/03/12/fact-sheet-quad-summit/
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/27/anti-china-alliance-quad- 15 Ibid.
australia-india-japan-u-s/
16 Department of Health, 2021. ‘Australia’s vaccine
2 Author’s discussions with Southeast Asian officials. agreements’. Available at: https://www.health.gov.au/
3 Kiran Stacey and Jamie Smyth, 2017. ‘Diplomatic initiative initiatives-and-programs/covid-19-vaccines/covid-19-vaccine-
revived to counter China’s growing influence’. Available at: government-response/australias-vaccine-agreements
https://www.ft.com/content/5355ee2a-c869-11e7-ab18- 17 Author’s discussions with Southeast Asian officials.
7a9fb7d6163e
18 Ivy Kwek, 2021. ‘The Quad’s uneasy place in Southeast Asia’,
4 Greg Jennett, 2021. ‘Australia joins US, India and Japan in The Lowy Institute. Available at: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/
‘unprecedented’ deal for coronavirus vaccines after historic the-interpreter/quad-s-uneasy-place-southeast-asia
Quad meeting’. Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/
news/2021-03-13/quad-australia-us-india-japan-in-massive-covid- 19 The Economic Times, 2020. ‘Quad countries deliberating on
vaccine-deal/13245198 common approach on 5G technology’. Available at: https://
economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/telecom/telecom-news/
5 Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister for Women, 2021. ‘Australia quad-countries-deliberating-on-common-approach-on-5g-
joins international partners in attribution of malicious cyber technology/articleshow/78337824.cms?from=mdr
activity to China’. Available at: https://www.foreignminister.
gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/australia-joins- 20 Aakriti Bachhawat, Danielle Cave, Jocelinn Kang, Dr
international-partners-attribution-malicious-cyber-activity-china Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, and Trisha Ray, 2020. ‘Critical
technologies and the Indo-Pacific: A new India-Australia
6 Evan A. Feigenbaum and James Schwemlein, 2021. ‘How partnership’. Available at: https://www.orfonline.org/wp-
Biden can make the Quad endure’, Carnegie endowment for content/uploads/2020/10/ASPI-new.pdf
International Peace. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.
org/2021/03/11/how-biden-can-make-quad-endure-pub-84046 21 US Government, 2020. ‘National Strategy for Critical
and Emerging Technologies’. Available at: https://www.hsdl.
7 Prime Minister of Australia, 2021. ‘Quad Leaders’ Joint org/?view&did=845571
Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad’. Available at: https://www.
pm.gov.au/media/quad-leaders-joint-statement-spirit-quad 22 See endnote #8.
8 Prime Minister of Australia, 2021. ‘Quad Summit Fact Sheet’. 23 Author’s discussions with government officials.
Available at: https://www.pm.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/ 24 Ibid
quad-summit-fact%20Sheet.pdf 25 Jagannath Panda, 2017. ‘The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor:
9 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2021. ‘Quad’. An India-Japan Arch in the Making?’. Available at: https://isdp.
Available at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/ eu/content/uploads/2017/08/2017-focus-asia-jagannath-panda.
regional-architecture/quad pdf
10 Author’s discussions with Prime Minister and Cabinet officials. 26 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 2018. ‘India-Japan-US
11 Patrick Gerard Buchan and Benjamin Rimland, 2020. Trilateral Meeting’. Available at: https://mea.gov.in/press-
‘Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present and Future of the releases.htm?dtl/29744/IndiaJapanUS+Trilateral+Meeting
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue’. Available at: https://www. 27Prime Minister of Australia, 2018. ‘Joint Statement of The
csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-present-and-future- Governments of Australia, Japan and the United States of
quadrilateral-security-dialogue America on the Trilateral Partnership for infrastructure investment
12 Author’s discussions with government officials. in the Indo-Pacific’. Available at: https://www.pm.gov.au/
media/joint-statement-governments-australia-japan-and-united-
13 See endnote #11. states
14 The White House, 2021. ‘Fact Sheet: Quad Summit’.
PAGE 1828 Sebastian Strangio 2021, ‘US Official Flags Future Quad 38 Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), 2020.
Infrastructure Push’, The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat. ‘Press Conference by Minister Kajiyama on 2050 Carbon-Neutral
com/2021/05/us-official-flags-future-quad-infrastructure-push/ Green Growth Policy’. Available at: https://www.meti.go.jp/english/
29Outlook India, 2019. ‘India, US, Japan, Australia consult leveraging speeches/press_conferences/2020/1026001.html
private sector power in infrastructure’. Available at: https:// 39 Sankalp Phartiyal and Aditi Shah, 2021. ‘Exclusive: A billion
www.outlookindia.com/newsscroll/india-us-japan-australia- for every chip-maker who ‘makes in India,’ sources say’, Reuters.
consult-leveraging-private-sector-power-in-infrastructure-news- Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/india-semiconductor-
analysis/1546216 idUSKBN2BN12H
30 Author’s discussions with government officials. 40 Author’s discussions with Australian Government officials.
31 Lavina Lee, 2020. ‘Assessing the Quad: Prospects and Limitations 41 New South Wales Government, Chief Scientist & Engineer,
of Quadrilateral Cooperation for Advancing Australia’s Interests’, 2020. ‘Australian Semiconductor Sector study’. Available at: https://
The Lowy Institute. Available at: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/ www.chiefscientist.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/339647/
publications/assessing-quad-prospects-and-limitations-quadrilateral- Australian-Semiconductor-Sector-Study.pdf
cooperation-advancing-australia 42 Jeffrey Wilson, 2021. ‘A Quad Partnership to Secure Battery
32 See endnote #11. Value Chains’, Quad Tech Network Series, National Security College,
33 Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific, 2020. Australian National University. Available at: https://nsc.crawford.
‘Australia partnering with Japan and the United States to finance anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/nsc_crawford_anu_edu_
Palau undersea cable’. Available at: https://www.aiffp.gov.au/ au/2021-08/nsc_qtnseries_jeffreywilson_web.pdf
news/australia-partnering-japan-and-united-states-finance-palau- 43 See endnote #35
undersea-cable 44 Pranay Kotasthane, 2021. ‘Siliconpolitik: The Case for a Quad
34 Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific, 2020. Semiconductor Partnership’, Institute of South Asian Studies.
‘Papua New Guinea electrification partnership’. Available at: Available at: https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/siliconpolitik-the-
https://www.aiffp.gov.au/news/papua-new-guinea-electrification- case-for-a-quad-semiconductor-partnership/
partnership 45 Pranay Kotasthane and Rohan Seth, 2020. ‘The next step for
35 Research and Information System for Developing Countries, Quad: A dialogue on high tech’, Hindustan Times. Available at:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, Institute https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/the-next-step-for-quad-a-
of Development Economies Japan External Tarde Organization, dialogue-on-high-tech/story-zuVC4Xv9axbCKSdRbsFqJL.html
2017. ‘Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Partnership for Sustainable and 46 See endnote #36.
Innovative Development (A Vision Document)’. Available at: https://
www.eria.org/Asia-Africa-Growth-Corridor-Document.pdf 47 Boston Consulting Group and Semiconductor Industry
Association, 2021. ‘Strengthening the Global Semiconductor
36 The White House, 2021. ‘FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era’. Available at: https://www.
Announces Supply Chain Disruptions Task Force to Address Short- semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/BCG-x-SIA-
Term Supply Chain Discontinuities’. Available at: https://www. Strengthening-the-Global-Semiconductor-Value-Chain-April-2021_1.
whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/08/ pdf
fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-supply-chain-
disruptions-task-force-to-address-short-term-supply-chain- 48 Tony Romm, 2021. ‘Senate approves sprawling $250 billion
discontinuities/ bill to curtail China’s economic and military ambitions’, The
Washington Post. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/
37 Isabel Reynolds, 2021. ‘Japan lays out ‘national project’ for us-policy/2021/06/08/senate-china-science-technology/
chips after lost decades’, Japan Times. Available at: https://www.
japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/06/04/business/japan-chip-strategy/ 49 See endnote #39.
50 See endnote #35.
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