International Corporate Taxation after Covid-19: Minimum Taxation as the New Normal - CEPII
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No 30 – April 2020
Policy Brief
International Corporate Taxation
after Covid-19: Minimum Taxation
as the New Normal
Sébastien Laffitte, Julien Martin, Mathieu Parenti,
Baptiste Souillard & Farid Toubal
Summary
There are lessons to be learned from the current Covid-19 pandemic. This exceptional situation requires
rethinking the provision of sound infrastructures and a functioning health system. National healthcare and
other public services, which are currently under increasing pressure, have been underfunded in many
countries, an issue that corporate tax avoidance has likely exacerbated. Some multinationals that have
been avoiding corporate taxes for years are about to be bailed out by national governments, thus arousing
a public sentiment of unfairness. In this Policy Brief, we argue that setting a minimum effective tax rate
on the global profit of multinational firms would tackle these concerns.International Corporate Taxation after Covid-19: Minimum Taxation as the New Normal
T h e o n g o in g Co v i d- 19 pandem i c and t he c onf i n e m e n t r e ce i ve fi n a n ci a l h e l p , a n d m i g h t e ve n b e b a i l e d out.
o f b illio n s o f peopl e ar e hav i ng a t r eme n d o u s Su ch a m b i g u i ty r a i se s l e g i ti m a te co n ce r n s a b o u t the
e c o n o mic imp ac t . S t at es s houl d pl ay a c ent r al r o l e i n so ci a l a cce p ta b i l i ty o f th e se r e scu e p l a n s.
th e r e s p o n s e to t he c r i s i s . I n addi t i on t o v i t al sa n i ta r y
me a s u r e s , g o v e r nm ent s ar e t ak i ng a s er i es of a cti o n s
to b a ttle th e e c onom i c f al l out due t o t he Co vi d - 1 9 1.1. Evidence from specific sectors
o u tb r e a k , fr o m t he “ baz ook a” m eas ur es depl o ye d i n
E u r o p e a n d th e U . S . t o v ar i ous s t i m ul us pac ka g e s o f The Covid-19 outbreak has hit many sectors, and
u n p r e c e d e n te d s i z e. T he i m m edi at e and m os t effe cti ve governments will have to step in through loans and
e c o n o mic me a s ur es w i l l c er t ai nl y be t hos e ai m e d a t g u a r a n t e e s t o s u p p o r t t h e e c o n o m y. T h e a i r l i n e
p r e s e r v in g b u s i nes s es and j obs , w hi l e m ai n ta i n i n g i n d u s t r y h a s b e e n g r e a t l y a ff e c t e d , w i t h t h e s h o c k
liq u id ity o n th e f i nanc i al m ar k et s ( I l z et z k i , 2020 ) . inevitably spreading across all companies operating
T h e c u r r e n t s itu at i on i n F r anc e, I t al y, S pai n, t h e U .S., along the value chain.2 The International Air
a n d e ls e wh e r e s heds l i ght on t he c r i t i c al i m po r ta n ce Tr a n s p o r t A s s o c i a t i o n e s t i m a t e s t h a t t h e i n d u s t r y
o f we ll- s ta ffe d and w el l - f unded publ i c s er vi ce s to will require a cash infusion of up to $200 billion, as
b u ffe r th e imp a c t of ex t r em e ev ent s l i k e pand e m i cs. well as loan guarantees to weather this economic
T h e e c o n o mic s i t uat i on br i ngs t o m i nd t he ta xa ti o n b u ff e t i n g . O t h e r i n d u s t r i e s s u c h a s t h e c r u i s e i n d u s t r y
o f mu ltin a tio n al c om pani es f or at l eas t t w o r e a so n s. have also been strongly impacted by the crisis. The
F ir s t, th e c r is i s r ev eal s t hat s om e es s ent i a l p u b l i c automotive industry will also be hit hard according to
g o o d s , s u c h a s t he pr ov i s i on of s ound i nf r as t r u ctu r e s the first projections.3
a n d a fu n c ti oni ng heal t h s y s t em , hav e b e e n U si n g d a ta fr o m C o m p u sta t, w e r e p o r t th e a ve rage
u n d e r fu n d e d in m any c ount r i es ( A r m oc i da et al ., 2 0 2 0 effective tax rate (ETR) for these 3 industries in Figure 1.
fo r in s ta n c e ) , an i s s ue t hat c or por at e The information is for publicly listed
ta x a v o id a n c e has l i k el y ex ac er bat ed. companies either incorporated in the U.S.
S e c o n d , s o me m ul t i nat i onal s t hat hav e we propose a minimum or in one of the E.U. countries. These firms
b e e n a v o id in g cor por at e t ax es f or y ear s effective tax rate on are large corporations, most of them being
a r e a b o u t to r e c ei v e m as s i v e f i nanc i al the global profit of multinational firms. The ETR has been shown
h e lp fr o m g o v e r nm ent s , w hi c h m any f i nd multinational firms to move closely with aggressive tax planning
u n a c c e p ta b le ( Tur ner, 2020) . I n t hi s strategies, a n d a l o w a ve r a g e ETR i s an
p o s t, we a r g u e t hat s et t i ng a m i ni m um i n d i ca ti o n o f ta x a vo i d a n ce ( D yr e n g et
e ffe c tiv e ta x r a t e on t he gl obal pr of i t of m ul t i n a ti o n a l a l ., 2 0 1 9 ) . Th e ETR i s co m p u te d a s th e su m o f cash
fir ms wo u ld ta ck l e bot h c onc er ns . ta x p a i d o ve r a l o n g ti m e p e r i o d o f 5 o r 1 0 years
d i vi d e d b y th e su m o f p r e - ta x i n co m e o ve r th e s ame
p e r i o d . L o n g - r u n ETR s r e d u ce th e vo l a ti l i ty o f a n nual
1 Economic policy, firms, ETR m e a su r e s ( D yr e n g e t a l ., 2 0 0 8 ) .
and profit shifting Th e fi g u r e cl e a r l y sh o w s th a t a i r tr a n sp o r ta t ion,
a u to m o ti ve m a n u fa ctu r i n g , a n d cr u i se l i n e s h a ve very
T h is c r is is s h ow s t hat r ar e ev ent s l i k e pand e m i cs, l o w e ffe cti ve ta x r a te s, b o th i n th e U .S. a n d th e E .U.,
n a tu r a l d is a s te r s , or t er r or i s m hi t i ndi v i dual s a n d w h i ch i n d i ca te s a m o d e st co n tr i b u ti o n to th e fu n d i ng of
b u s in e s s e s ir r es pec t i v e of t hei r f i nanc i al heal t h o r th e i r p u b l i c se r vi ce s. D e sp i te l o w e ffe cti ve ta x r a te s, these
c o n tr ib u tio n s to t he t ax s y s t em ( D e Vi t o and Go m e z, fi r m s w i l l r e ce i ve fi n a n ci a l h e l p fr o m g o ve r n m e n ts all
2 0 2 0 ; B lo o m e t al . , 2020) . I n F r anc e, E mm a n u e l o ve r th e w o r l d .
Ma c r o n h a s a nnounc ed t hat “ N o bus i nes s , wh a te ve r Th e d a ta sh o w th a t th e e ffe cti ve ta x r a te i n these
its s iz e , will b e l ef t at r i s k of bank r upt c y. ” ( 16 M a r ch i n d u str i e s i s fa r b e l o w w h a t th e sta tu to r y ta x rate
2 0 2 0 ) . Oth e r c ount r i es hav e adopt ed a si m i l a r
a p p r o a c h : ma n y w i l l pay a l ar ge s har e of f ur l o u g h e d (2) In the U.S., $50 billion of the $2 trillion stimulus package passed by the
Senate will help the airline sector, with a $17 billion aid given to Boeing alone.
e mp lo y e e s ’ wa ges , and pr ov i de t ax def er r al s o r sta te - Similar plans are on the table in Europe. The Italian government re-nationalized
g r a n te d c r e d it l i nes . 1 Alitalia with a €600 million cash injection, Denmark and Sweden have offered
$302 million credit guarantees to SAS, and the French government assured
These budgetary measures are essential but as a result, that it would support Air France-KLM. Airports Council International Europe,
large busines s e s t hat hav e i m pl em ent ed agg r e ssi ve a trade organization representing most European airports, sent a letter to the
European Commission to urge it to introduce “comprehensive, inclusive and
ta x p la n n in g s t r at egi es ov er t he l as t y ear s wi l l a l so non-discriminatory support to the entire aviation ecosystem.”
(3) According to the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association, at least
(1) The IMF policy tracker (https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/ 1.1 million European workers are being affected by factory shutdowns as a
Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19) illustrates the exceptional policy responses to result of the Covid-19 crisis. https://www.acea.be/press-releases/article/covid-
the crisis. 19-jobs-of-over-1.1-million-eu-automobile-workers-affected-so-far-dat.
2 CEPII – Policy Brief No 30 – April 2020Policy Brief
Figure 1 – Long-run cash effective tax rates (ETR) stu d i e s ( L a ffi tte e t a l ., 2 0 1 9 ; Tør sl øv e t a l ., 2 019,
by 4-digit SIC sector Vi ca r d , 2 0 1 9 ) . To p u t th e se fi g u r e s i n to p e r sp e ct ive,
th e Fr e n ch g o ve r n m e n t h a s p r o p o se d a n € 8 .5 b i llion
Air transportation - US
p l a n to e xte n d Fr e n ch u n e m p l o ym e n t b e n e fi ts as a
r e sp o n se to th e cu r r e n t cr i si s.
Automobile manufacturing - US
M a n y o f th e se fi r m s w i l l u n d o u b te d l y b e n e fi t from
Average all sectors - US
d i r e ct o r i n d i r e ct fi n a n ci a l h e l p fr o m g o ve r n m ents.
Air transportation - EU To e n su r e th e so ci a l a cce p ta b i l i ty o f th e e m e r g ency
Automobile manufacturingg - EU m e a su r e s fo r th e se fi r m s a n d to fo ste r ta x r e ve n u es in
Average all sectors - EU
n o r m a l ti m e s, w e b e l i e ve th e C o vi d - 1 9 cr i si s p r o vides
m o m e n tu m to i m p l e m e n t a m i n i m u m e ffe cti ve ta x rate
Cruise lines - US and EU combined
l e vi e d o n th e g l o b a l p r o fi ts o f m u l ti n a ti o n a l fi r m s.
0.00 7.50 15.00 22.50 30.00
Long-run cash ETR 2010-2019 (in %) Long-run cash ETR 2015-2019 (in %)
II.
2 Reform of the international
Notes: This figure shows the long-run cash effective tax rates for some
4-digit SIC sectors, defined as the ratio of cash income taxes paid to
tax system
pre-tax income. “Air transportation” refers to industry 4512, “automobile
manufacturing” refers to industry 3711, and “cruise lines” refers to industry
4400. The data used to calculate these ratios come from Compustat
North America and Compustat Global. “US” and “EU” refer to the state of
2.1. Current negotiations
incorporation. “EU” excludes Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, and Cyprus.
Source: Compustat North America and Compustat Global, calculations of
the authors. Si n ce 2 0 1 8 , th e OEC D h a s b e e n n e g o ti a ti n g a l a rge-
sca l e r e fo r m o f th e i n te r n a ti o n a l ta x syste m with
1 3 0 co u n tr i e s. Th e n e g o ti a ti o n s w e r e se t to e n d in
s h o u ld b e in th e E . U . ( 21. 7% on av er age i n 2019 ) o r i n D e ce m b e r 2 0 2 0 . D i ffe r e n t sce n a r i o s h a ve been
th e U.S. ( 3 5 % unt i l t he end of 2017, 21% t here a fte r ) . d i scu sse d , i n cl u d i n g m i n i m u m ta xa ti o n . H o w ever,
T h e s e in d u s tr ies hav e a l ow eff ec t i v e t ax r at e b u t a r e th i s i s n o t th e o n l y p o ssi b l e r e fo r m th a t i s cu r r ently
n o e x c e p tio n : t he av er age eff ec t i v e t ax r at e a cr o ss under discussion. Whereas most other reforms propose
in d u s tr ie s in th e U . S . and t he E . U . i s bel ow 25 % . to redistribute taxing rights (in the vein of the so-called
Pillar 1 under negotiation at the
OECD), they remain silent about
1.2. Global evidence the rate at which multinationals the principle of
should b e ta xe d . Sp e ci fi ca l l y, minimum taxation
W h ile th e s e o b ser v at i ons hol d f or t he s ec t or s th a t a r e th e y r e l y o n th e a r g u m e n t is a simple one
imme d ia te ly a t r i s k , t he phenom enon of t ax av o i d a n ce th a t a l l o ca ti n g ta xi n g r i g h ts
is wid e s p r e a d am ong s ec t or s . Lar ge c or por at i ons – a n d to d e sti n a ti o n m a r ke ts w i l l , d e
n o t o n ly d ig ita l f i r m s – us e v ar i ous s t r at egi es to a vo i d fa cto , r e d u ce ta x a vo i d a n ce . Be si d e s, th e co m p l exity
p a y in g ta x e s in c ount r i es w her e t hey do m uc h o f th e i r e n ta i l e d b y m o r e so p h i sti ca te d a l l o ca ti o n r ules,
b u s in e s s . A n e c dot al and s y s t em at i c ev i denc e sh o w s p a i r e d w i th th e n e e d fo r th e ta x a u th o r i ti e s to co llect
th a t mu ltin a tio nal c or por at i ons n e w i n fo r m a ti o n , i s l i ke l y to g i ve m o r e room
e x p lo it th e ir g l obal net w or k of fo r m u l ti n a ti o n a l s to ci r cu m ve n t co r p o rate
a ffilia te s to r el oc at e pr of i t s t o large corporations – and ta xa ti o n , e sp e ci a l l y i n l o w - i n co m e co u n tr i es.
fo r e ig n e n titie s w i t hi n t he gr oup not only digital firms – By co n tr a st, th e p r i n ci p l e o f m i n i m u m ta xation
in lo w- ta x ju r is di c t i ons ( s ee B eer use various strategies i s a si m p l e o n e . Th e l e g a l co n to u r s o f its
e t a l., 2 0 1 9 fo r a r ev i ew ) . T he to avoid paying taxes in i m p l e m e n ta ti o n a r e a l r e a d y kn o w n b y th e tax
g r o win g e c o n o m i c l i t er at ur e t hat countries where they do a u th o r i ti e s a n d i t h a s th e m e r i t o f ta ckling
e s tima te s r e v e nue l os s es f r om much of their business co r p o r a te ta x a vo i d a n ce d i r e ctl y. In d e e d, it
p r o fit s h iftin g poi nt s at s i z eabl e ca n b e vi e w e d a s a n e xte n si o n o f th e e xi sting
imp a c ts . In th e U . S . , C l aus i ng C o n tr o l l e d Fo r e i g n C o r p o r a ti o n ( C FC ) rules
( 2 0 1 9 ) fin d s that pr of i t s hi f t i ng w as l i k el y co sti n g a p p l i e d to a b r o a d e r ta x b a se . Fu r th e r m o r e , its
th e U.S . g o v e r n m ent bet w een €79 and €125 b i l l i o n i n p r i n ci p l e r e l i e s o n th e o b se r va ti o n th a t th e i n ce n tives
c o r p o r a te ta x r e v enue by 2017, and t hat t hes e r e ve n u e fo r p r o fi t sh i fti n g a r i se m o stl y fr o m ta x d i ffe r e n t ials
lo s s e s h a v e inc r eas ed s ubs t ant i al l y i n r ec ent ye a r s. a cr o ss j u r i sd i cti o n s. M i n i m u m ta xa ti o n i m p l i e s th at no
T h e c o r r e s p o n di ng l os s es i n F r anc e ar e bet w e e n € 5 fo r e i g n a ffi l i a te ca n e sca p e a m i n i m u m r a te o f ta xation
a n d € 1 0 b illio n eac h y ear ac c or di ng t o t hr ee r e ce n t b y d e cl a r i n g i ts o p e r a ti o n s i n a ta x h a ve n . Sh o u l d its
CEPII – Policy Brief No 30 – April 2020 3International Corporate Taxation after Covid-19: Minimum Taxation as the New Normal
e ffe c tiv e ta x r a t e f al l bel ow t hi s m i ni m um , t he c o u n tr i e s a cti vi ty. Th e y a r e a l so cr u ci a l to b u ffe r th e e co n omic
wh e r e th e r e a l ec onom i c ac t i v i t y t ak es pl ac e w o u l d co n se q u e n ce s o f fu tu r e l a r g e - sca l e d i sa ste r s.
h a v e th e r ig h t to t ax t he di ff er enc e. M i ni m um Under a minimum corporate
ta x a tio n th e r e b y el i m i nat es t he i nc ent i v e t o tax, the profits realized
c o n d u c t a g g r e ss i v e t ax pl anni ng.
minimum taxation implies that offshore end up taxed at a
Imp o r ta n tly e n o ugh, t hi s m i ni m um t ax r at e i s
no foreign affiliate can escape minimum effective rate. If
n o t a min imu m s t at ut or y c or por at e t ax r at e the profits are not taxed in
b u t a n e ffe c tiv e one: t he ac c um ul at i on of
a minimum rate of taxation by offshore jurisdictions, the
ta x b r e a k s in c ludi ng l oophol es , deduc t i ons , declaring its operations in a tax taxation is implemented
e x e mp tio n s , or c r edi t s i s per m i t t ed up haven. Should its effective tax by redistributing the taxing
to a ta x th r e s hol d at w hi c h a f i r m ’s t ax es rate fall below this minimum, the rights to the countries where
c o n tr ib u te to t he publ i c good s uff i c i ent l y. countries where the real economic the value was created
It a llo ws c o u nt r i es t o put a f l oor t o t ax activity takes place would have (but not reported). With
c o mp e titio n fo r r eal ec onom i c ac t i v i t i es , and the right to tax the difference minimum taxation, there is
g iv e s lo w- ta x c ount r i es a s t r ong i nc ent i v e t o no longer an incentive to
r a is e th e ir c o r por at e t ax r at es . set up an a ffi l i a te fo r tax
r e a so n s o n l y. In a r e ce n t p o l i cy n o te , Fu e st, Pa r enti,
a n d To u b a l ( 2 0 1 9 ) sh o w th a t th e i m p l e m e n ta ti o n of a
2.2. Momentum m i n i m u m e ffe cti ve ta x r a te r e d u ce s p r o fi t sh i fti n g and
for the minimum tax g e n e r a te s su b sta n ti a l g a i n s i n ta x r e ve n u e s.
The change to the minimum effective tax rate system
T h e min imu m eff ec t i v e t ax r at e ens ur es t hat th e fe w should minimize the room for both double taxation and
fir ms th a t ma d e pr of i t s dur i ng t he c r i s es do no t a vo i d non-taxation (for technical details, see Fuest, Parenti,
p a y in g ta x e s thi s y ear and i n f or t hc om i ng ye a r s, a & Toubal, 2019 and Becker and Englisch, 2019). If a
b o o n fo r g o v e r n m ent s . 4 T he s hor t - t er m benef i t o f th e consensus is not reached at the OECD, the reform could
min imu m ta x coul d be pai r ed w i t h an be implemented unilaterally. This has
e x c e p tio n a l c o nt r i but i on by c om pani es been the case of the U.S. since 2018.
wh ic h g e n e r a te ex c es s pr of i t s t hank s
not only is the minimum The U.S. impose a minimum tax on the
to th e c r is is , as pr opos ed by s ev er al income that U.S.-based multinationals
tax useful to strengthen
e x p e r ts ( Ama z o n, 3M , G i l ead, and Z oom earn in low-tax foreign countries, with
a r e o n ly a fe w of t he m any c or por at i ons
the social acceptability a credit for 80 percent of the foreign
th a t s ta n d to b enef i t f r om t he c r i s i s ; s ee of some pro-business income taxes they have paid. Because
T h e Ne w Yo r k Ti m es , 2020) . N ot onl y
5 reforms and to collect the Tax Cut and Jobs Act uses a global
is th e min imu m t ax us ef ul t o s t r engt hen corporate taxes in the minimum tax, tax obligations in higher-
th e s o c ia l a c cept abi l i t y of s om e pr o- short run, but this fiscal tax countries can offset the minimum
b u s in e s s r e fo r m s and t o c ol l ec t policy is also pertinent in tax due for the activity in low- or no-tax
c o r p o r a te ta x e s i n t he s hor t r un, but the medium to long run countries. Therefore, firms can blend
th is fis c a l p o licy i s al s o per t i nent i n t he their foreign income from low-tax and
me d iu m to lo n g r un. high-tax jurisdictions, reducing their
A s th e e c o nom i c s i t uat i on r ev er t s t o n o r m a l , payments of the U.S. minimum tax, and achieving a
mu ltin a tio n a l f i r m s w i l l c ont r i but e t o t he f i n a n ci n g lower tax rate than the U.S. rate. Thus, while the case
o f p u b lic ly a nd l oc al l y pr ov i ded goods . Th e se of the U.S. shows that a unilateral implementation is
g o o d s s e r v e a s i nput s t o pr oduc t i on and c r e a te th e possible, its design remains largely unsatisfactory and
b a s ic c o n d itio ns r equi r ed f or s uc c es s f ul c o r p o r a te a country-by-country minimum tax system should be
mostly preferred.
(4) The minimum tax will not harm firms that underwent losses during the crisis A cr u ci a l a sp e ct o f su ch a r e fo r m i s th e l e vel of
as the tax is only levied on firms running positive profits.
th e e ffe cti ve ta x r a te . Fo r i n sta n ce , th e U .S. g l obal
(5) In a recent post, Reuven Avi-Yonah (2020) proposes to revive the wartime
excess profits taxes that the U.S. instituted in World War I and World War II. m i n i m u m e ffe cti ve a ve r a g e ta x r a te i s b e tw e e n 10.5
Excess profits taxes are designed to tax the proportion of profits that derives a n d 1 3 .1 2 5 p e r ce n t o n a n a n n u a l b a si s. Wh i l e there
from some external event not of the company’s making. During Word War I,
for instance, both Britain and the U.S. imposed an 80% tax rate on excess i s n o e co n o m i c co n se n su s o n th e o p ti m a l l e ve l , it is
corporate profits (above an 8% annual return on tangible assets). A similar tax o u r p e r so n a l o p i n i o n th a t a 2 0 % m i n i m u m e ffe ctive
was set at 95% during World War II. Various methods may be used to calculate
the level of excess profits. One proposal by Avi-Yonah is of particular interest: ta x r a te sh o u l d b e i m p l e m e n te d . In d e e d , a rate
“The resulting tax (on exceptional profits) can be reduced by credits for wages
b e l o w 2 0 % m i g h t l e g i ti m i ze a g g r e ssi ve ta x p l a n ning,
of additional employees hired in 2020 to encourage the winners to hire and pay
well during the recession.” p o te n ti a l l y l e a d i n g e ve n m o r e co m p a n i e s to e n gage
4 CEPII – Policy Brief No 30 – April 2020Policy Brief
in ta x a v o id a n c e. S t i l l , a 20% eff ec t i v e av er a g e ta x A minimum tax of 20% on multinationals’ foreign profits
r a te ( EAT R) fo r m ul t i nat i onal s ’ f or ei gn pr of i t s i s ve r y would dampen fiscal competition across countries by
a mb itio u s a lr e ady. A s a benc hm ar k , i t i s w or t h n o ti n g reducing the incentive of low- or no-tax jurisdictions
th a t 2 5 OECD c ount r i es hav e an E AT R bel ow whose effective tax rate
2 0 % , wh ile h al f of al l c ount r i es w or l dw i de is below this rate. A 20%
h a v e a n E AT R bel ow 11% . 6 M or eov er, ev en while there is no economic minimum tax should also
with in c o u n tr ie s w i t h a hi gh E AT R , m any consensus on the optimal reduce the incentive of firms
mu ltin a tio n a ls r epor t an E AT R bel ow t he 20% level, it is our opinion that a to locate in these countries
th r e s h o ld : a r e cent s t udy f or F r anc e by t he I P P 20% minimum effective tax as long as profit shifting
( Ba c h e t a l., 2019) r epor t s an av er age E AT R rate should be implemented implies positive costs.
o f 1 7 .8 % fo r la r ge c om pani es , and w e f i nd an All in all, corporate taxes
a v e r a g e lo n g - r un c as h E T R of 18. 7% f or t he will not only reflect firms’
F r e n c h fir ms lis t ed i n C om pus t at . contributions to tax revenues where real economic
activity takes place but also help legitimate future
(6) These EATRs are computed for the year 2015 in Tørsløv et al. (2019). rescue plans.
CEPII – Policy Brief No 30 – April 2020 5International Corporate Taxation after Covid-19: Minimum Taxation as the New Normal
References
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The Lancet, Public Health, 25 March 2020.
Dyreng, S., Hanlon, M., Maydew, E. L., & Thornock, J.
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Tax”, The American Prospect, 27 March 2020. over the past 25 years,” Journal of Financial Economics,
Volume 124, Issue 3, 2017, Pages 441-463,
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des taux d’imposition implicites des profits en France : constats
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About the authors
Sébastien Laffitte : ENS Paris-Saclay, CREST, international trade, public economics, public finance
sebastien.laffitte@ens-cachan.fr
Julien Martin : ESG-UQAM, Chaire de recherche UQAM sur l’impact local des firmes multinationales, CIRANO and CEPR, international
economics, corporate taxation, and urban economics
martin.julien@uqam.ca
Mathieu Parenti : Université libre de Bruxelles, ECARES and CEPR, international trade, international corporate taxation, industrial
organization
mathieu.parenti@ulb.ac.be
Baptiste Souillard : Université libre de Bruxelles, ECARES and FRS-FNRS, International trade and corporate taxation
baptiste.souillard@ulb.ac.be
Farid Toubal : ENS Paris-Saclay, CEPII, CESifo and CEPR
farid.toubal@ens-paris-saclay.fr
Contact: farid.toubal@ens-paris-saclay.fr
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