ISSUE BRIEF COUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: Lessons Learned for Tackling Far-Right Terrorism
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
ISSUE BRIEF
COUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES
& STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS:
Lessons Learned for Tackling
Far-Right Terrorism
JUNE 2021
thesoufancenter.org
KEY FINDINGS
• A l - Q a e d a a n d I S I S l eve ra ge d n ew • Successful counter-narra ve ini a ves and
communications technologies and invested those u lizing strategic communica ons
more resources in media capabilities to tools to challenge violent extremism and
recruit, finance, and sow psychological fear terrorism have relied on a contextualized
on an unprecedented level, recognizing the understanding of the target audience, and
importance of strategic communications in on ensuring credible and resonant
tandem with kinetic efforts. Far-right interlocutors that o er interven ons
terrorists are now doing the same. tailored to speci c groups and places.
• While Sala -jihadist groups and violent far- • While interna onal ini a ves to counter
right extremist groups certainly di er in terrorist narra ves have largely targeted
ideology and organiza on, important those of al-Qaeda, ISIS, and their a liates,
similari es remain in their narra ves. Both they o er some important lessons learned
premise their e orts on a quest for a for interna onal ac on to counter far-right
racially or religiously pure community; use terrorist narra ves.
of violence to achieve end goals; an -
government sen ment; and espousal of • Recommenda ons include: adapt and
intolerant and misogynis c narra ves. expand relevant UN ac vi es and
measures to integrate responses to violent
• Tradi onal stereotypes about men’s and far-right groups; ensure mul -stakeholder
women’s roles shape the outreach of both responses that integrate gendered
Sala st-jihadist and violent far-right groups dimensions; focus on proac ve posi ve
to men and women; the same narra ves messaging; address some factors crea ng
used to incen vize their support are also an enabling environment; respond early to
o en ones that closely circumscribe their acts of violence; and strengthen public-
roles in the organiza ons. private partnerships.
1
ft
fi
ti
ff
ti
ti
fi
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
fi
ff
ti
ti
ti
ff
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ffi
ff
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
COUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS:
LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM
INTRODUCTION
In the two decades following the terrorist nancial resources into media capabili es to
attacks of September 11, 2001, the international recruit, nance, and terrorize on an
community has largely focused on countering unprecedented level,5 recognizing their
the terrorist threat posed by groups like al- importance alongside ba le eld opera ons.
Qaeda and later, the so-called Islamic State In April 2016, the o cial ISIS propaganda
(ISIS), and their respec ve a liates around channel on the social media pla orm,
the world.1 In addi on to e orts to degrade Telegram, shared a document called, "Media
the groups and deny them control over Opera ve, You are a Mujahid, Too.” In it,
territory and resources, policymakers and followers were instructed that pushing
prac oners also turned to understanding propaganda is the same as gh ng and that
the strategic communica ons of such groups media opera ons can be “more potent than
and the narra ves they used to successfully atomic bombs.”6 The document lays out the
radicalize and mobilize supporters.2 three elements of ISIS’s strategic narra ve: a
posi ve narra ve on the group’s successes,7
The phenomenon itself is not new. Margaret counter-speech against cri cs and enemies,
Thatcher famously spoke of terrorists’ need and weaponizing propaganda.
for the “oxygen of publicity.”3 But al-Qaeda4
and ISIS leveraged new communica ons However, in recent years, there has also been
technologies and invested human and increasing concern in many states about the
1This Issue Brief is part of a project examining the lessons learned from UN and interna onal counterterrorism
e orts over the past two decades and their implica ons for interna onal e orts to address violent far right
extremism and terrorism, with a par cular focus on strategic communica ons and narra ves, and terrorism
nancing. The Soufan Center is grateful to the German Mission to the United Na ons for suppor ng this project.
2 “Countering Terrorist Narra ves,” European Parliament’s Policy Department for Ci zens’ Rights and Cons tu onal
A airs, November 2017. h ps://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596829/
IPOL_STU(2017)596829_EN.pdf.
3Thatcher, Margaret. “Speech to the American Bar Associa on,” Margaret Thatcher Founda on, July 15, 1985.
h ps://www.margare hatcher.org/document/106096.
4Burke, Jason. “How the changing media is changing terrorism.” The Guardian, February 25, 2016. h ps://
www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/25/how-changing-media-changing-terrorism.
5 Clarke, Colin and Charlie Winter. “The Islamic State May Be Failing, But Its Strategic Communica ons Legacy Is
Here To Stay.” War on the Rocks, August 17, 2017. h ps://warontherocks.com/2017/08/the-islamic-state-may-be-
failing-but-its-strategic-communica ons-legacy-is-here-to-stay/.
6Winter, Charlie. “What I Learned from Reading the Islamic State’s Propaganda Instruc on Manual.” Lawfare, April
2, 2017. h ps://www.lawfareblog.com/what-i-learned-reading-islamic-states-propaganda-instruc on-manual.
7Koerner, Brendan. “Why ISIS is Winning the Social Media War.” Wired, April 2016. h ps://www.wired.com/
2016/03/isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat/.
2
fi
fi
ff
tt
ff
ti
ti
ti
ti
tt
fi
ti
ti
ti
tt
ti
tt
ffi
ti
ti
ti
tt
ti
ff
fi
fi
ti
ffi
ti
ti
ti
tf
ti
ti
ti
ti
tt
ti
ti
ti
ff
ti
ti
tt
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tt
ti
tiCOUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS:
LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM
rise of violent far-right extremist groups, For many states and international organizations
many of which have similarly espoused the grappling with the complex challenges of
use of terrorist tac cs. While a number of countering terrorist narra ves, both online
groups have been recognized as domes c and o ine, an important objec ve has been
threats, some are also forging transna onal to ensure that measures taken to counter
linkages with likeminded groups and terrorist narra ves and prevent incitement
individuals.8 As a result, a more internationalized do not themselves violate human rights
violent far-right milieu is emerging, with obligations and curtail freedom of expression.
individuals traveling to collaborate and train A common denominator in mobilizing
together, including an ou low of ghters individuals to support terrorist groups has
traveling to con ict zones like eastern been the experience, or percep on, of
Ukraine to gain valuable combat experience.9 human rights viola ons at the hands of the
state.11 Moreover, responses that constrain
While these Sala -jihadist and violent far- freedom of expression can be seen as
right extremist groups certainly di er in the furthering the very same goals that many
specifics of their ideologies and organizational terrorist groups pursue, as well as reinforcing
structures, signi cant similari es remain. their recruitment narra ves.
Both premise their e orts on a quest for a
racially or religiously pure community; a In his recent report on the implementa on of
focus on the use of violence to achieve that the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy,
end goal; an -government sen ment; and Secretary-General Antonio Guterres reminded
the espousal of misogynist, intolerant us that Member States have pledged to
narra ves that deny individuals’ human counter “terrorism in all its forms and
rights.10 For some within these groups, the manifesta ons.” He highlighted that “in the
use of violence is not just a means to an end, face of a growing threat from racially,
but an end in itself, ushering in widespread ethnically and ideologically mo vated right-
con ict that will destroy progressive, wing and white supremacist groups that
mul cultural socie es and lead to more resort to terrorist tac cs, it is cri cal that
racially or religiously segregated ethno- Member States continue to strongly condemn
states. acts of terrorism targe ng individuals on the
basis of or in the name of race, ethnicity,
religion or belief.”12 While the UN Global
8 “White Supremacy Extremism: The Transna onal Rise of the Violent White Supremacist Movement.” The Soufan
Center, September 2019. h ps://thesoufancenter.org/research/white-supremacy-extremism-the-transna onal-
rise-of-the-violent-white-supremacist-movement/.
9 Ibid.
10See for example: Miller-Idriss, Cynthia. Hate in the Homeland: The New Global Far Right. 2020;
“White Supremacy Extremism: The Transna onal Rise of the Violent White Supremacist Movement.” The Soufan
Center.
11“Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incen ves and the Tipping Point for Recruitment.” United Na ons
Development Programme (UNDP), 2017. h ps://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/en.
12“Ac vi es of the United Na ons system in implemen ng the United Na ons Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy:
Report of the Secretary-General.” United Na ons: O ce of the Secretary-General, January 29, 2021. h ps://
digitallibrary.un.org/record/3902203?ln=en.
3
ti
fl
ti
ti
ffl
ti
ti
ti
ti
fi
fi
fl
ti
ti
ti
ff
tt
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tf
ti
ti
ti
ti
ff
tt
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
fi
ti
ti
ti
ffi
ti
ti
ti
tt
ti
tiCOUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS:
LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM
Counter-Terrorism Strategy is notable for
being a consensus document re ec ng a AL-QAEDA
collec ve view of all states as represented in
the United Na ons – an unusually unifying
document that serves an important role in Al-Qaeda’s media produc on was ini ally
se ng out the norma ve direc on for many considered sophis cated, both aesthe cally
UN en es and states – the UN can and and historically. Several leaders have set the
should do more. tone for this priori za on of strategic
communica ons. Osama bin Laden was
Beyond condemna on, the UN also has the considered by many as far more inspira onal,
poten al to inform the legal and policy consistent in the themes he sought to
responses of states on issues like preven ng convey, and overall more “on-message” than
terrorist nancing, developing the legal and al-Qaeda’s current leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri,
criminal jus ce framework necessary to who is frequently characterized as long-
address terrorism, and sharing lessons winded and pedan c. In his book, The
learned and providing capacity-building Management of Savagery, al-Qaeda strategist
assistance, all of which can be cri cal in and ideologue Abu Bakr Naji stressed the
ensuring a role for the UN in addressing importance of the media in destroying the
evolving terrorist threats.13 Moreover, a United States’ image while also building the
mul -pronged e ort can have cascading self-con dence of Muslims worldwide.14
e ects that a enuate terrorist groups and However, over me its messages have been
accordingly, dilute the power of terrorist seen as increasingly wide-ranging and
narra ves. unfocused.
This Issue Brief will examine the strategic Al-Qaeda’s narra ves addressed myriad
communica ons of terrorist and violent issues that many in the Arab and Muslim
extremist groups, looking at some of the worlds were passionate about, including the
speci c developments regarding al-Qaeda libera on of Pales ne, the U.S. occupa on of
and ISIS and the evolving narra ves and Iraq, and the corrup on of governments and
communica ons tac cs of far-right terrorists. regimes throughout the Middle East and
The brief will conclude by offering some South Asia that al-Qaeda labeled as
lessons learned and experiences from both apostates. This also included violence
state and UN responses. perpetrated on the ummah, or community of
Muslims, including against women and girls
in con ict zones. In many ways, al-Qaeda’s
ideology re ects its self-percep on as a
defender and vanguard of the global ummah.
13See for example the work of UN Counter-Terrorism Commi ee Execu ve Directorate (CTED) and UN O ce of
Counter-Terrorism (OCT).
14 Naji, Abu Bakr. “The Management of Savagery.” Transla on accessed via John M. Olin Ins tute for Strategic
Studies at Harvard University. h ps://www.narra vespace.net/uploads/1/1/7/9/117904861/
management_of_savagery.pdf
4
ff
tti
ti
fi
ti
ti
ti
ti
fl
ti
fi
ti
fi
ti
ti
ti
fl
ti
tt
ti
ti
ff
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tt
ti
ti
ti
ti
fl
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tt
ti
ti
ffiCOUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS:
LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM
In declaring jihad, bin Laden argued that the
West – and par cularly the United States – ISLAMIC STATE
was hos le to Islam and that the only way to
respond to this aggression was with force or
violence. In essence, the core of al-Qaeda’s Islamic State, or ISIS,16 took advantage of
narra ve is individual jihad fused with social media to disseminate its narra ves and
collec ve revenge.15 messaging far beyond what al-Qaeda was
ever able to achieve. Despite the a en on
Al-Qaeda has always maintained an a orded to its execu on videos, ISIS actually
impressive awareness of the targets and produced much more material, and on a
audiences it seeks to in uence with its broader range of topics, than what is covered
messaging. Understanding that terrorism is in the mainstream media. ISIS propaganda is
poli cally and/or ideologically mo vated centered on three major themes:
violence, the raison d’etre of al-Qaeda’s
violence is not, as some have suggested, • ISIS restored the caliphate, which makes
simply hatred for American values and the it the only authen c Islamic state in the
American way of life – although, to be sure, world and thus worthy of poli cal
Western values are certainly inimical to the legi macy.
Sala -jihadist pla orm. Rather, al-Qaeda • Any exis ng Islamic en ty (state or
a acks the West to change policies and set in nonstate) that does not recognize the
mo on social and poli cal responses that group’s authority quali es as an apostate
advance their strategic objec ves. As such, and must be vanquished.
al-Qaeda consistently sought to warn, • ISIS is more capable than al-Qaeda ever
in midate, and cajole Western publics, was and con nues to grow as an
viewed by al-Qaeda as “neutrals,” that the organiza on and an ideology.
ac ons of their governments were the reason
they were being targeted. ISIS revolu onized terrorists’ use of social
media for a variety of purposes – such as
solici ng nancing, recrui ng ghters,
establishing the poli cal legi macy of its
proto-state, and ins lling fear in its
adversaries.17 The group also used social
media to amplify the impact of and fear
15Bin Laden, Osama. ”Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” World Islamic Front Statement, February 23, 1998.
h ps://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm.
16There is wide varia on in how states and interna onal actors reference this group, including ISIS, ISIL, Da’esh,
and IS; the formal UN designa on is ISIL/Da’esh.
17Clarke, Colin and Charlie Winter. “The Islamic State May Be Failing, But Its Strategic Communica ons Legacy Is
Here To Stay.” War on the Rocks.
5
tt
tt
ff
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
fi
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
fi
ti
ti
ti
ti
tf
ti
ti
fi
ti
ti
ti
ti
fl
ti
ti
ti
ti
fi
ti
tt
ti
ti
ti
tiCOUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS:
LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM
from its acts of violence – such as through apostate regimes in the Middle East or
distribu on of propaganda images of morally bankrupt socie es in Western
destruction of a temple in Palmyra18 and a 22- na ons, Muslims who join ISIS are told that
minute video of a Jordanian pilot burning they can enjoy an ideal Islamic community,
alive in a cage.19 and those who resist this call will be
eliminated. This vision is furthered by videos
Of all the narra ves propagated by ISIS, the that focus on the caliphate as a benevolent
establishment and implementa on of the state commi ed to public works and Islamic
caliphate was a unique selling point, as it welfare, which extends a lifeline to
retains historical and religious resonance for vulnerable individuals who feel marginalized
the broader Muslim ummah and harkens or under-resourced by their governing
back to Islam’s Golden Age. Where al- authori es.
Qaeda’s narra ve focused on individual jihad,
global policy changes, and the crea on of a The image of the Islamic State as a
specialized “Delta Force” of terrorist ghters, benevolent and inclusive society was boosted
ISIS narra ves focused on its state-building by the presence of women who traveled to
project. ISIS therefore adopted a broader and the con ict zones in the Levant and
more inclusive approach, deliberately encouraged others to, as well. In successive
targe ng women, youth, and individuals who waves of foreign terrorist ghters (FTFs)
could contribute to this new endeavor in traveling to support ISIS, unprecedented in its
myriad ways, besides gh ng. 20 ISIS scale and scope, nearly 20% of those who
a empted to communicate to all its poten al traveled were women – some going
recruits the core narra ve that its caliphate is voluntarily, others under duress, and some
a triumphant, model society. for a complex mix of reasons. Unlike al-
Qaeda, ISIS recognized the importance of
In addi on to the extraordinary achievement including women in its state-building
of ISIS in establishing territorial control on an enterprise and created an invi ng narra ve
unprecedented scale, the group was also for a wide range of people to contribute to
notable for mobilizing a historic ou low of this endeavor. The presence of gures, like a
individuals and even families – approximately Bri sh woman who traveled to Syria and
40,000 people from more than 110 countries went by the name Umm Layth (mother of
– to join the group.21 The group’s slogan is lions), was associated with persuading and
Baqiya wa Tatamaddad (Remaining and mobilizing young women to leave the West
Expanding). Rather than living under
18 Curry, Andrew. “Here Are the Ancient Sites ISIS Has Damaged and Destroyed.” Na onal Geographic, September
1, 2015. h ps://www.na onalgeographic.com/history/ar cle/150901-isis-destruc on-loo ng-ancient-sites-iraq-
syria-archaeology.
“Jordan pilot hostage Moaz al-Kasasbeh 'burned alive'” BBC, February 3, 2015. h ps://www.bbc.com/news/
19
world-middle-east-31121160.
20Fink, Naureen Chowdhury and Benjamin Sugg. “A Tale of Two Jihads: Comparing the al-Qaeda and ISIS
Narra ves.” Interna onal Peace Ins tute: The Global Observatory, February 9, 2015. h ps://
theglobalobservatory.org/2015/02/jihad-al-qaeda-isis-counternarra ve/.
21“Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees.” The Soufan Center, October 2017. h ps://
thesoufancenter.org/research/beyond-caliphate/.
6
tt
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tt
ti
fl
ti
tt
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
fi
ti
fi
ti
fi
ti
ti
ti
tf
fi
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tt
ti
tt
ti
ttCOUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS:
LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM
and join ISIS.22 This messaging was cri cal to
compete with the informa on widely VIOLENT FAR-RIGHT
available about ISIS’s treatment of women
and girls, par cularly those belonging to the
EXTREMIST GROUPS
Yazidi community, and their horri c prac ces
of sexual slavery and brutal gender-based Violent far-right extremist groups, and
violence.23 par cularly white supremacy extremists,
espouse narra ves similar in many ways to
Although ISIS sought to appeal to women, those propagated by al-Qaeda and ISIS. Both
the appeal was centered fundamentally on sets of groups advocate the use of extreme
gendered stereotypes. Women were violence and create a worldview of “them”
encouraged to assume roles centered on versus “us” to jus fy it. While ISIS ghts for a
family or acceptable professional roles which religiously pure caliphate, several white
might be required to provide educa onal or supremacy extremist and neo-Nazi groups
medical services in the so-called caliphate. espouse the idea of a separate ethno-state
Beyond the roles of women in the domes c for whites, a “utopian” community based on
sphere, the gendered narra ves adopted by racial and ethnic purity and adapta ons of
ISIS included an appeal to young men based Nordic or Northern European myths, folklore,
on no ons of masculinity associated with and histories.25
tradi onal roles as ghters, patriarchs, and
poli cal and public leaders. Incen vizing There is also a common element of violence
foreign ghters with the appeal of sex slaves driven by misogyny and intolerance, together
– many minors and children – further with a concep on of gendered roles along
reinforced toxic no ons of masculinity within the lines of tradi onal stereotypes, with
ISIS outreach.24 women’s ideal roles portrayed as being
within the domes c sphere.26 Just as groups
like ISIS and al-Qaeda see gender equality as
represen ng the oppression of women, far-
right terrorists view themselves as vic ms of
organized state feminism. A acks on women
and girls perceived as members of the pure
“in-group” have also been important stories
22Hoyle, Carolyn, Alexandra Bradford, and Ross Frene . “Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to ISIS.”
Ins tute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015. h ps://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/
ISDJ2969_Becoming_Mulan_01.15_WEB.pdf.
Callimachi, Rukmini. “ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape.” New York Times, August 13, 2015. h ps://
23
www.ny mes.com/2015/08/14/world/middleeast/isis-enshrines-a-theology-of-rape.html.
24 Taylor, Lin. “From Boko Haram to Islamic State, sex slavery and tra cking fund extremism: report.” Reuters,
October 9, 2017. h ps://www.reuters.com/ar cle/us-global-slavery-extremists/from-boko-haram-to-islamic-state-
sex-slavery-and-tra cking-fund-extremism-report-idUSKBN1CE1I3.
25“White Na onalist.” Southern Poverty Law Center. h ps://www.splcenter.org/ gh ng-hate/extremist- les/
ideology/white-na onalist.
26Darby, Seyward. “The Rise of the Valkyries.” Harper’s Magazine, September 2017. h ps://harpers.org/archive/
2017/09/the-rise-of-the-valkyries/.
7
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
fi
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tt
ffi
ti
ti
ti
ti
fi
tt
ti
ti
tt
fi
fi
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tt
tt
ffi
fi
ti
tt
tt
fiCOUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS:
LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM
for the narra ves of violent extremist groups; For violent far-right groups, the use of
in the a ermath of the January 6 insurrec on violence is o en portrayed as a means to an
at the U.S. Capitol, for example, the death of end, namely accelera ng an apocalyp c
Ashli Babbi was used by white supremacy societal breakdown and allowing for a more
extremists as a rallying cry to others.27 racially and ethnically pure society to emerge
from its ashes. It is, however, some mes also
An element common to the communica ons the end in itself: a violent society that can
of both kinds of groups is “propaganda of the impose segrega on and protect a pure elite
deed,” with the message conveyed by ac ons group. Just as ISIS and al-Qaeda drew on the
making up an important component of Management of Savagery and used violence
strategic communica ons. For al-Qaeda, this to communicate, terrorize, and create a state
was the a acks of September 11, 2001, of constant insecurity that they could exploit,
whereas for ISIS it was the claim to revive the so too have many violent right-wing groups
caliphate. Both groups exploited the glori ed violence.
communica ve power of destruc on,
whether it was the imagery of the burning
World Trade Center or the destruc on of
cultural heritage sites like Palmyra. POLICY RESPONSES
Meanwhile, far-right terrorists within the
United States and in other countries pointed
to the storming of the Capitol as an Governments and interna onal organiza ons
achievement that could be later replicated. In have mounted an extensive e ort to counter
Germany, for example, in late August 2020, terrorist narratives, including the development
hundreds of far-right ac vists in Berlin of counter-narra ve libraries,29 regional
a empted, but failed, to overrun police and hubs,30 and dedicated ini a ves via the
storm the Reichstag (German parliament). United Na ons, the Global Counter-Terrorism
While that a empt in Germany was a failure, Forum, and the Global Coali on Against
the successful storming of the Capitol in the Daesh. However, the e ec veness of such
United States appears to have provided a ini a ves has been di cult to measure
boost and inspira on to a range of far-right empirically, and long-term success remains
groups in Europe.28 elusive. While these have been largely
targeted at the narra ves of al-Qaeda, ISIS,
and their a liates, they o er some
27 Bergengruen, Vera. “'Our First Martyr.' How Ashli Babbi Is Being Turned Into a Far-Right Recrui ng Tool.” TIME,
January 10, 2021. h ps:// me.com/5928249/ashli-babbi -capitol-extremism/.
28Bennhold, Katrin and Michael Schwirtz. “Capitol Riot Puts Spotlight on ‘Apocalyp cally Minded’ Global Far Right.”
New York Times, January 24, 2021. h ps://www.ny mes.com/2021/01/24/world/europe/capitol-far-right-
global.html.
29 “Dounter Narra ve Library.” Hedayah.
30“UAE & US Launch Sawab Center – New Digital Communica ons Hub to Counter Extremist Propaganda.” United
Arab Emirates and United States: Sawab Center. h ps://www.uae-embassy.org/news-media/uae-us-launch-sawab-
center-%E2%80%93-new-digital-communica ons-hub-counter-extremist-propaganda.
8
tt
ti
fi
ti
ft
ti
tt
tt
tt
ft
ti
ti
ffi
ti
ti
tt
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ff
ffi
ti
ti
ti
ti
ff
tt
ti
ti
ff
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tt
ti
ti
ti
tt
tt
ti
ti
tiCOUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS:
LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM
important lessons learned for countering far- extremism in all its manifestations, with a
right terrorist narra ves. focus on early prevention and cross-sectoral
cooperation.33 For example, Norway's current
Within the UN, Security Council Resolution action plan against radicalization involves nine
1624 (2005), co-penned by the United government industries and several civil society
Kingdom and Russia,31 called on states to organizations. They have developed the same
prohibit incitement to terrorism and the broad approach in their current effort to
glorification of terrorist acts. This resolution is develop a national counterterrorism strategy.
applicable to all types of extremism and not Although their policies are directed at all
limited to al-Qaeda or ISIS, and as such, it forms of extremism, they continuously assess
should be employed to combat far-right whether new measures are needed to address
violence, as well. Furthermore, UN Security developing challenges, such as differences in
Council Resolution 2354 (2017) emphasizes terrorist financing between far-right and
the importance of credible interlocutors and a jihadist extremism. Norway has also grappled
whole-of-society approach, while also with the challenge of balancing between
highligh ng the right to freedom of expression illegal content online and freedom of speech;
in Article 19 of the International Covenant on hate speech is prohibited and punishable by
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) adopted by law, but it continues to be a challenge to draw
the General Assembly in 1966. It calls for any a line between illegal hate speech and
restrictions on the freedom of expression to protected political speech.
be those provided by law and necessary on
the grounds set out in paragraph 3 of Article In Belgium, meanwhile, the Central Unit for
19 of the ICCPR. Moreover, the resolution Threat Analysis (CUTA) examines the influence
highlights the UN Comprehensive Framework, of conspiracy theories on individuals or
which compiles good practices and groups likely to commit extremist or terrorist
recommendations for ensuring a multi- acts. In addi on to violent-far right and
stakeholder response that is at once credible radical Islamic extremism, CUTA has followed
and sustainable. 32 the emergence of more broadly an -
government movements without a poli cal
Several national governments have also or ideological a lia on, such as violent
adopted domestic measures to counter protests against COVID-19 restric ons or
terrorist narratives. Ten years after the far- threats against virologists. Belgium has also
right terrorist attacks in Oslo and Utøya that focused on the role of conspiracy theories and
killed seventy-seven people, mostly youth, misinformation, par cularly during mes of
Norway has developed a whole-of-society crisis. The Belgian government has further
approach to combat all forms of violent noted the importance of clear communica on
31“UN Security Council Resolu on 1624.” United Na ons Security Council, 2005. h ps://undocs.org/S/RES/
1624(2005).
32“UN Security Council Resolu on 2354.” United Na ons Security Council, 2017. h ps://undocs.org/S/RES/
2354(2017).
33“22 July Breivik Commission Report,” Norwegian Parliament, August 13, 2012. h ps://www.regjeringen.no/
contentassets/bb3dc76229c64735b4f6eb4dbfcdbfe8/en-gb/pdfs/nou2012_14_eng.pdf;
Remarks by Kris n Hemmer Morkestol, Director of the Sec on for Na onal Security for the Norwegian Ministry of
Jus ce, in The Soufan Center webinar, April 28, 2021.
9
ti
ti
ti
ti
ffi
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tt
tt
ttCOUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS:
LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM
from authori es, the removal of hate speech This range of approaches o ers a glimpse
and extremist content online, and counter into the array of policy and programma c
narratives that offer an alternative to extremist solu ons available to counter terrorist
propaganda.34 narra ves in order to tackle a range of
ideological threats.
Nor is it only governments genera ng policy
responses; public-private partnerships play
an important role. Moonshot CVE – recently
rebranded as Moonshot with an expanded RECOMMENDATIONS
remit – is an organiza on based in London
and Washington, D.C. that works with
governments, tech companies, and the 1. Strengthen the evidence base: Within the
interna onal community to respond to UN system, ensure that en es like the
violent extremism and a range of other Counter-Terrorism Commi ee Execu ve
online harms. Moonshot has experimented Directorate (CTED), O ce of Counter-
with non-ideological interven ons and has Terrorism (UNOCT), and O ce on Drugs
found that extremist audiences are more and Crime (UNODC) are taking into
recep ve to these than explicit counter account the threats posed by all terrorist
narra ves that a empt to undermine and violent extremist groups in terms of
extremist ideologies. For instance, it found in their assessment and capacity-building
two related tests that white supremacist and partnerships with states. Increase
Islamist extremist audiences were 48% and a en on to the threats posed by far-right
47% more likely, respec vely, to engage with terrorists, including racially and ethnically
self-help or mental health content compared mo vated violent extremists.
to the general public.35 Their messaging
centered around feelings of loneliness, A. UN en es should increase focus on
thereby mimicking the tac cs of extremist supporting states to advance implementation
groups that a empt to reach individuals who of resolu ons 1624 and 2354, including
feel alienated from wider society and the Comprehensive Framework, and
marginalized or discriminated against. encourage states to report on these
Moonshot has pioneered various types of measures in their brie ngs to the
non-ideological messaging, including de- Counter-Terrorism Commi ee following
escala on and psychosocial messaging, such assessment visits.
as the “redirect” method that diverts
individuals searching for extremist content B. The UN O ce of Counter-Terrorism
online. These have encountered early success (UNOCT) and the UN Counter-Terrorism
and suggest new paths forward for Center (UNCCT) should expand the
governmental and intergovernmental scope of programs rela ng to PVE and
bodies.36 strategic communica ons to include
violent far-right groups, and support
34Remarks by Karl Dhaene, Director Counterterrorism for the Ministry of Foreign A airs of Belgium, in The Soufan
Center webinar, April 28, 2021.
35 Remarks by Vidhya Ramalingam, Founder of Moonshot CVE, in The Soufan Center webinar, April 28, 2021.
36 Moonshot. “The Redirect Method.” h ps://moonsho eam.com/redirect-method/.
10
tt
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ffi
ti
tt
tt
ti
ti
ti
ti
ffi
tt
fi
tt
ffi
ti
ti
ff
ti
ti
tt
ti
ti
ti
tt
ffCOUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS:
LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM
states in developing responses that credible messaging and reliable information.
focus on mul ple forms of terrorism. Consider di eren al impacts and analyses
and ensure inclusive policy development
C. More resources should be allo ed to and implementa on, taking into account
measurement, assessment, and evaluation, the o en under-addressed roles and needs
so UN en es can have a be er of women and girls. Many civil society
understanding of the impact of counter organiza ons oriented toward women and
narra ves and whether they are youth may have less opportunity to inform
achieving their intended objec ves. and engage in policy development and
implementa on; proac ve outreach will
2. Deliver targeted responses: Projects be necessary, though not su cient, and
focused on counterterrorism and countering must be considered in conjunc on with a
violent extremism need to be tailored to comprehensive strategy.
context and not broadly generalized.
Moreover, they should focus on o ering 4. Pay attention to acts of violence and
posi ve and alterna ve narratives statements of intent: Take early ac on to
presented by credible interlocutors. Counter- note trends in inten ons of commi ng
narra ves should stress posi ve aspects violence or a willingness to perpetrate acts
and be centered on achievements, of violence or encourage others to do so.
opportunities, and work, rather than Groups that have declared inten ons to
adopting the traditional approach of merely commit violence, already commi ed
questioning or challenging ISIS’s claims violence, or explicitly incited supporters to
without providing an alterna ve. commit violence will need to be iden ed
and addressed at early stages; countering
A. Violent right-wing groups have u lized their narratives early on will be key.
spor ng events, such as mixed mar al Governments and communi es should be
arts (MMA) tournaments and concerts prepared to intervene proac vely to
to reach out to supporters and new counter narra ves from extremist groups
recruits; counter-narratives and prevention that glorify violence and incite terrorist
e orts should increase focus on the use acts.
of sport, arts, and culture37 to create
more inclusive opportuni es to bring 5. Address crises and enabling environments:
together communi es, especially youth, Successful strategic communica ons need
to create posi ve alterna ves. to close the “say-do” gap; there needs to
be visible and tangible e orts to match the
3. Ensure the par cipa on of relevant rhetoric with ac on. Governments and
stakeholders: Local communi es, women, interna onal actors need to work to tackle
youth, civil society organiza ons, local the enabling environment that contributes
government, and the private sector should to and fosters extremism, including the
all be involved in project development COVID-19 pandemic, related public health
from the beginning stages to ensure measures, and shor alls in alloca ons of
37Fink, Naureen Chowdhury, Ra a Bhulai, Wedad Alhassen, and Sara Zeiger. “Thinking Outside the Box Exploring
the Cri cal Roles of Sports, Arts, and Culture in Preven ng Violent Extremism.” Global Center on Coopera ve
Security, February 2015. h ps://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/02/15Feb17_SAC_Brief_Hedayah_GlobalCenter.pdf
11
ff
ti
ti
ft
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ff
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tf
tt
ti
ti
ti
ff
ti
ti
fi
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ffi
ti
ti
ti
tt
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ff
tt
ti
ti
tti
tt
fi
ti
tiCOUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS:
LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM
public services. In addi on, greater ins tu ons and payment pla orms,
emphasis must be placed on resolving organizations like Moonshot, local businesses,
con icts that both drive and provide and civil society organiza ons can all
opportuni es for extremism, as well as on contribute to countering narra ves and
addressing the threats of disinforma on ac ons from extremist groups; examples
and conspiracy theories that create an include communi es u lizing the private
enabling environment for and normalization sector to limit violent right-wing groups’
of extremist narratives. Proactive messaging access to venues, proper es, or services
about the posi ve work being supported needed to promote their violent objectives.
by states and others to address these It will be important to work with bodies
issues, whether via the UN, development like the Global Internet Forum to Counter
assistance, or diplomacy, should be Terrorism (GIFCT) and technology companies to
increased.38 increase cooperation between the public and
private sectors. Informal intergovernmental
6. Enhance public-private partnerships (PPPs): groups like the Christchurch Call also provide an
This collabora on is key to connec ng important platform for collective international
communi es, businesses, and local and action to research and engage on preventing
na onal level governments in order to far-right terrorism.
most e ciently align resources, exper se,
and access toward shared objec ves.
Social media and tech companies, nancial
Related Event
On April 28, 2021, The Soufan Center,
in partnership with the Permanent
Missions of Germany, Belgium,
Norway, and Tunisia to the United
Na ons, hosted a webinar en tled,
“Countering Terrorist Narra ves &
Strategic Communica ons: Comparing
the Violent Far-Right with ISIL/Da’esh
and Al-Qaida.” The discussions therein
directly informed the further research
The Soufan Center thanks developed in this Issue Brief.
the German Mission to the
United Na ons for their support
and partnership on this project. Watch the Event
38See for example: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury and Jack Barclay. “Mastering the Narra ve: Counterterrorism
Strategic Communica on and the United Na ons.” Center on Global Counterterrorism Coopera on, 2013. h ps://
www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Feb2013_CT_StratComm.pdf.
12
ti
ti
ti
ti
fl
ffi
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
fi
tf
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ttCOUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS:
LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM
ABOUT TSC:
The Soufan Center (TSC) is an independent non-profit center offering research,
analysis, and strategic dialogue on global security challenges and foreign policy issues,
with a particular focus on counterterrorism, violent extremism, armed conflict, and the
rule of law. Our work is underpinned by a recognition that human rights and human
security perspectives are critical to developing credible, effective, and sustainable
solutions. TSC fills a niche role by producing objective and innovative reports and
analyses, and fostering dynamic dialogue and exchanges, to effectively equip
governments, international organizations, the private sector, and civil society with key
resources to inform policies and practice.
www.thesoufancenter.org
13You can also read
