North Korea in 2019 - UC Press Journals

JOHN DELURY

North Korea in 2019
A Year of Strategic Adjustment

ABSTRACT
This was a year of transition in North Korea, as leader Kim Jong Un held firm to
his strategic shift of putting “all efforts” into economic development in the face
of ongoing international sanctions. Kim’s summit diplomacy with the US and
South Korea stalled, while ties improved markedly with China and modestly
with Russia. The US and South Korea resumed downsized joint military
exercises and North Korea resumed short-range missile testing.
K E Y W O R D S : Kim Jong Un, North Korea, economic development, denu-
clearization, summit diplomacy, inter-Korean relations

IF THERE WAS ONE ICONIC IMAGE for North Korea in 2019, it was Kim Jong
Un riding a white horse atop a snow-dusted Paektu Mountain, mythic
birthplace of the Korean people and symbol of Kim family majesty. The
photo formed a striking contrast with the previous autumn, when Kim posed
at the same spot smiling for photographs with South Korean President Moon
Jae-in. Now, Kim rode the mountain slopes alone, with state media hinting
that the Supreme Leader had made a momentous decision, but remaining
vague on what exactly he had decided.
   Coming after the thunderstorms of 2017 and the rainbows of 2018, North
Korea in 2019 was characterized by overcast skies of adjustment, transition, and
uncertainty. The bold “peace and denuclearization” summitry that
Kim pursued with Moon at Panmunjom, Pyongyang, and Paektu, and with
Donald Trump at Singapore, had generated soaring hopes. But after the “no

JOHN DELURY is Associate Professor in the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei Uni-
versity, Seoul, South Korea. The author is grateful to Samuel Douglass and Kwan Woo Hahn for
research assistance. This work was supported by the Laboratory Program for Korean Studies through
the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the Korean Studies Promotion Service of the
Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2016-LAB-2250001). Email: .

Asian Survey, Vol. 60, Number 1, pp. 69–78. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2020 by
The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission
to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Reprints and
Permissions web page, https://www.ucpress.edu/journals/reprints-permissions. DOI: https://doi.org/
10.1525/AS.2020.60.1.69.

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deal” summit between Kim and Trump in Hanoi, great expectations gave way
to frustration, disappointment, and skepticism, all-too-familiar sentiments on
the Korean Peninsula. However, the stalemate with the US did not simply
cause Chairman Kim to retreat into his cave. In a show of spontaneity, Kim
accepted Trump’s Twitter invitation for an impromptu meeting in the DMZ
at the end of June. Meanwhile, he shored up relations with his great-power
neighbors by traveling to Vladivostok for a summit with Vladimir Putin in
April and hosting Xi Jinping in Pyongyang in June. Sino–North Korean rela-
tions in particular improved remarkably throughout the year.
   In 2018, Kim declared a revolutionary new strategic line of putting “all
efforts” into economic development. In 2019, he emphasized that the key to
realizing the new goal was “regeneration through one’s own strength”—
a traditional Sino-Korean socialist slogan. Despite Kim’s focus on the econ-
omy, there were no outward signs of significant growth; then again, there was
no evidence of fiscal crisis, either, despite the ongoing “maximum pressure”
policy of the US. The DPRK would carve out a new future, but on its own
terms and according to its own timeline. And the process of transformation
would continue to hinge largely on one man, the 35-year-old Chairman who
in August was constitutionally enshrined as head of state. This was a year of
strategic transition and adjustment: not everything went according to plan,
and it was unclear what came next.

THE ART OF NO DEAL

As always, Kim kicked off the year with a major address looking back at
accomplishments and laying out future priorities. Unsurprisingly, he reiter-
ated the new strategic line of “concentrating all efforts on economic con-
struction,” announced at the Korean Workers’ Party plenum in April 2018. At
the same time, Kim injected a strong dose of rhetoric about the need for
a “self-reliant and self-supporting economy,” inoculating his strategy against
pressure tactics by the US and lowering public expectations for immediate
growth. Kim changed the familiar trope of a “treasured sword,” which had
referred to the nuclear deterrent keeping the country safe, to “self-reliance as
the treasured sword of prosperity.”1 He called for an end to US–South Korea

   1. “New Year Address of Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un,” Korean Central News Agency
(KCNA), January 1, 2019.

DELURY / NORTH KOREA IN 2019  71

joint military exercises and deployment of strategic assets to the Korean
Peninsula, and, in a largely ignored overture, proposed convening multilat-
eral peace talks that could be read to include China.
   Kim’s New Year speech was upbeat on relations with South Korea, point-
ing to inter-Korean cooperation as a model for how US–DPRK ties could
improve. Kim offered to reopen the frozen inter-Korean projects of Kaesong
Industrial Park and the Mount Kumgang tourist resort “without any pre-
condition and in return for nothing.” However, unlike the previous year,
when Moon jumped at Kim’s offer to participate in the Winter Olympics,
this time Seoul did not bite. At their September 2018 summit in Pyongyang,
Kim had accepted Moon’s invitation to visit Seoul by year’s end. But the trip
south never happened—another bad sign for the fate of inter-Korean
rapprochement.
   Instead, tellingly, Kim’s first foreign trip of the year was to Beijing, where
he spent his 35th birthday in the company of Xi Jinping. It was Kim’s fourth
China sojourn in 12 months, breaking his father’s and grandfather’s records.
Kim and Xi agreed on plans for expanding ties, and true to their word, 2019
would witness a renaissance in Sino–Korean exchanges. Kim told Xi he was
committed to creating a “favorable external environment” for implementing
his new strategic line of focusing on the economy.2 Kim’s trip seemed to be
part of the preparation for his anticipated second summit with Donald
Trump, who, the following week, received Kim’s envoy at the White House
and agreed to meet in Vietnam at the end of February.
   In Hanoi, Kim and Trump failed to make a deal. When the discussions
reached an impasse Trump abruptly walked out, skipping lunch and going
straight into a solo press conference. The negotiations floundered over unre-
solved definitions, out-of-sync timelines, insufficient working-level prepara-
tion, and greediness on both sides. Kim asked Trump to lift the last two years’
worth of UN Security Council sanctions in return for partial and ill-defined
dismantlement of his nuclear production facilities. Trump asked Kim to give
up the entirety of his strategic deterrent now in return for the promise of
sanctions relief and foreign investment. Kim may have overestimated
Trump’s eagerness for a deal; Trump may have underestimated Kim’s will-
ingness to walk away from the table.

   2. “Xi, Kim Hold Talks, Reaching Important Consensus,” Xinhua, January 10, 2019, .

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   Hanoi marked a reversal in dynamics with the US and South Korea, sour-
ing, if not quite poisoning, relations just as they were on the cusp of trans-
formation. It must have been a long 60-hour train ride home to Pyongyang,
not just for Kim but also his retinue. South Korean media reports that Kim
executed his negotiating team on arrival would prove unfounded.3 But Kim
did change his senior envoy, working-level negotiator, and personal interpreter
for talks with the US. Kim had said forebodingly in his New Year address that
if diplomacy were to falter, and the US “attempts to unilaterally enforce
something upon us and persists in imposing sanctions and pressure,” then
he would have no choice but to pursue a “new way.”4 After Hanoi, Kim’s
“new way,” or BATNA (best alternative to negotiated agreement), began to
take shape, even as he left room to return to Plan A.5

STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENT

At the mid-April conclaves of the Supreme People’s Assembly and the Party
Central Committee, Kim came forward with the strategic adjustment game
plan. Marking the first anniversary of his new strategic line, Kim doubled down
on the economy-first approach, but placed even greater stress on “self-devel-
opment.” Kim affirmed his special relationship with Trump, but confessed that
Hanoi had left him questioning whether the Americans were serious about
ending their “hostile policy.” He demanded that Washington come up with
a “a new method of calculation” to use in the negotiations, imposing an end-of-
the-year deadline for a “courageous decision.” With Moon Jae-in visiting the
White House at the time, Kim chided “south Korean authorities” for posing
“as a meddlesome ‘mediator’ and ‘facilitator’ as they busy themselves with
foreign trips.”6 The inter-Korean political dialogue, cultural exchanges, and
military confidence-building activities of the preceding year ground to a halt.
   Apart from Kim’s policy speech, the April political sessions ratified impor-
tant personnel adjustments and constitutional revisions. The generational
transfer of power progressed as nonagenarian Kim Yong Nam was replaced

     3. Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Executed and Purged Top Nuclear Negotiators, South
Korean Report Says,” New York Times, May 30, 2019, .
    4. “New Year Address,” KCNA, January 1, 2019.
     5. On BATNA, see Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Paton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating
Agreement without Giving In (Penguin Books, 2011).
    6. “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un’s Policy Speech,” KCNA, April 14, 2019.

DELURY / NORTH KOREA IN 2019  73

as People’s Assembly president, elder technocrat Pak Pong Ju was replaced as
cabinet premier (in charge of the economy), and hard-line veteran Kim Yong
Chol was replaced as United Front Department director (in charge of inter-
Korean relations). The biggest winner was American affairs diplomat Choe
Son Hui, who was given a coveted seat on the 14-member State Affairs
Commission.7 Meanwhile, a major constitutional revision, finalized at the
Assembly’s August session, formally established Kim as head of state in his
capacity as State Affairs Commission chairman.8
   In late April, Chairman Kim made his third overseas trip of the year,
traveling by rail to meet Vladimir Putin in Vladivostok. Kim’s black fedora
and overcoat evoked his grandfather Kim Il Sung’s erstwhile visits to the
Soviet Union. Putin offered Russia’s support for a multilateral peace mech-
anism, saying of US–DPRK negotiations, “It’s unlikely that any agreements
between two countries will be enough.”9 In fact, multiparty peace talks had
been a key element in a Chinese, and then joint Sino–Russian, diplomatic
intervention back in 2017. The Chinese foreign minister had put forward
a two-phase plan, starting with a “dual freeze” wherein North Korea would
stop nuclear and missile testing and the US and South Korea would stop
large-scale joint military exercises. But by the time Putin reiterated a call for
them at the Vladivostok summit, with US–DPRK talks at an impasse, the
dual freeze was beginning to defrost—a key development in Korean Penin-
sula security for the remainder of year.
   The thawing of the dual freeze conformed to the classic pattern of a secu-
rity dilemma, in which adversaries blame each other for escalating tensions.
Having obeyed Trump’s surprise order at the Singapore Summit to suspend
joint exercises in 2018, the US and South Korean militaries announced soon
after the failed Hanoi summit that they were terminating the large-scale

     7. Other prominent elders relieved of duties included Choe Thae Bok, Choe Yong Rim, Kim
Yong Ju (brother of Kim Il Sung), and Yang Hyong Sop. For helpful analysis, see NK Leadership
Watch, .
     8. Rachel Minyoung Lee, “Ensuring Kim’s ‘Absolute Authority’: North Korea’s Latest Con-
stitutional Changes,” NK News, October 23, 2019, .
     9. Amie Ferris-Rotman and Simon Denyer, “Putin: Kim Jong Un Needs International Security
Guarantees to Give Up Nuclear Arsenal,” Washington Post, April 25, 2019, .

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spring exercises known as Key Resolve and Foal Eagle. Hours later, however,
the militaries announced a new exercise, called Dong Maeng (“Alliance”), to
take place in March. Meanwhile, South Korea received the first shipment of
F-35A stealth fighter jets purchased from Lockheed Martin, in the context of
increased defense spending by Seoul.10 Perhaps after a successful meeting in
Hanoi, Pyongyang could have focused on how the joint exercises were being
significantly downsized. But with negotiations stalled, North Korea state
media decried the resumption of war games and the arms build-up, warning
in April: “They can never conceal the aggressive, offensive and confronta-
tional nature of their hostile acts no matter how hard they may try to give
impression about ‘reduction in scope’ by replacing the codename. Wind
naturally brings wave.”11 After the announcement of joint exercises in August,
the director-general of the foreign ministry put it more crudely: “Shit, though
hard and dry, still stinks even if it is wrapped in a flowered cloth.”12
   With the resumption of US–South Korea exercises, the “dual freeze”
melted on the DPRK side as well. Having eschewed all missile testing for
18 months, Kim on May 4 inspected a test of “long-range multiple rocket
launchers and tactical guided weapons”—the first of over a dozen tests of
short-range projectiles (and one medium-range missile) that would take place
over the course of the year. Analysts debated the military and strategic sig-
nificance of these new weapons systems and especially progress in the
submarine-launched ballistic missile program.13 President Trump confused
matters by dismissing the missile tests, and even taking North Korea’s side on
the security dilemma. In August, Trump tweeted approvingly of a “long
letter” from Chairman Kim, “much of it complaining about the ridiculous
and expensive exercises.”14

    10. Josh Smith, “Buying a Big Stick: South Korea’s Military Spending Has North Korea Worried,”
Reuters, September 11, 2019, .
     11. “CPRC Spokesman Warns S. Korean Authorities against Acts of Perfidy,” KCNA, April
25, 2019.
    12. “Press Statement by Director-General of DPRK Foreign Ministry,” KCNA, August 11, 2019.
     13. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “North Korea Missile Tests, ‘Very Standard’ to
Trump, Show Signs of Advancing Arsenal,” New York Times, September 2, 2019, ; Vann H. Van Diepen
and Daniel R. DePetris, “Putting North Korea’s New Short-Range Missiles Into Perspective,”
38 North, September 5, 2019, .
    14. Donald Trump, Twitter post, August 10, 2019, .

DELURY / NORTH KOREA IN 2019  75

   As Kim resumed his practice of observing missile tests, he also remained
active in summit diplomacy. On June 20–22, he hosted Xi Jinping in Pyong-
yang, the first visit in 14 years by a sitting Chinese leader and the fruit of
Kim’s labor in making four trips to China. The men did not spend much
time in one-on-one discussion, but the summit consolidated plans for exten-
sive exchanges, which in the second half of the year would involve a wide
range of experts and institutes, propaganda organs and media outlets, courts,
public security agencies and legislative bodies, and even military delegations.
Officially reported trade numbers inched up, after the nearly 50% drop in
2018, and tourism boomed, with hundreds of thousands of Chinese visitors
thought to be streaming across the border by year’s end.15
   Belying these positive trends, when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi
made a three-day visit to Pyongyang in September, he was not given an
audience with Kim Jong Un. And despite “brilliant plans” that Kim made
with Xi to mark the 70th anniversary of establishment of relations on Octo-
ber 6, there was not much in the way of celebration other than an exchange of
friendly letters. Still, the full-spectrum improvement in relations with China
was a significant development of 2019. Kim’s efforts to forge stronger ties to
Xi and Putin also stood in marked contrast to the infighting within Northeast
Asia’s other security triangle: South Korea–Japan relations deteriorated
gravely, and their respective alliances with the US were greatly strained.

SELF-DEVELOPMENT

As “lips and teeth” relations with China warmed, negotiations with the US
and channels with South Korea remained mostly frozen. Kim and Trump
kept up their epistolary exchange, and Kim accepted Trump’s Twitter invi-
tation for a quick hello in the DMZ on June 30. Chatting with Trump and
Moon, as they stood surrounded by a scrum of jostling reporters, Kim once
again displayed his willingness to go outside the normal North Korean bounds
of tightly controlled interactions with outsiders. Afterward, Kim spoke of his
personal relationship with Trump as a “mysterious force overcoming manifold

    15. Lee Jeong-ho, “China-North Korea Trade Up 14.3 Per Cent in First Half to US$1.25 Billion,”
South China Morning Post, July 24, 2019, ; Chad O’Carroll, “As Chinese Tour-
ism to North Korea Soars, Local Operators Feel the Strain,” NK News, October 31, 2019, .

76  ASIAN SURVEY 60:1

difficulties and obstacles.”16 But when working-level talks between North
Korean and US officials finally took place in Sweden for two days in early
October, there was no outward sign of progress.
   After the Stockholm talks, Kim Jong Un—who had not made a reported
public appearance in over a month—came forward to raise the banner of
economic self-development, or as the slogan put it, “regeneration through
one’s own strength.” He started with a day trip to a military-run farm outside
Pyongyang, calling for innovations in agro-science and technology to solve
the chronic “food problem.” The rice-basket region around the capital suf-
fered low rainfall in spring and summer, only to be hit just before harvest by
Typhoon Lingling, damaging over 45,000 hectares and prompting the
United Nations to release emergency humanitarian relief.17 After presiding
over festivities in Pyongyang to mark the founding of the Workers’ Party on
October 10, Kim headed to the far north, with his image on a white horse
atop Mount Paektu appearing on the front page of Workers’ Newspaper and
social media platforms around the world. Hinting at a return to provoca-
tions, state media reported: “Having witnessed the great moments of his
thinking atop Mt. Paektu, all the officials accompanying him were convinced
with overflowing emotion and joy that there will be a great operation to
strike the world with wonder again and make a step forward in the Korean
revolution.”18
   Coming down from the summit, Kim inspected a favorite nearby site,
Samjiyon, to check on progress in constructing a “model mountainous
city.” He acknowledged economic hardship, felt more intensely out in the
provinces, and put the blame on sanctions. But it was a tough message,
raising little hope for relief anytime soon: “The situation of the country is
difficult owing to the ceaseless sanctions and pressure by the hostile forces
and there are many hardships and trials facing us, but our people grew
stronger through the trials and found their own way of development

    16. “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Has Historic Meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump,”
KCNA, July 1, 2019.
   17. Oliver Hotham, “Kim Jong Un Tours Military-Run Farm in First Appearance in Almost
a Month,” NK News, October 8, 2019, ; Kim Kwang-tae, “About 40 Pct of N.
Koreans Urgently Need Food Aid: FAO,” Yonhap, October 19, 2019, ; “DPRK Damaged by Typhoon-13,” KCNA, September 8, 2019.
    18. “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Climbs Up Mt Paektu,” KCNA, October 16, 2019.

DELURY / NORTH KOREA IN 2019  77

and learned how to always win in the face of trials.”19 Curiously, Kim
broke an unspoken rule when he referred to Kim Jong Il as his father:
“Saying that he missed showing Chairman Kim Jong Il the changes in the
northern tip of the country, he pointed out that he felt much easier with
the thought that he fulfilled the duty as a soldier and child even a bit,
though belatedly.”20
   Kim presumably flew from Samjiyon Airport to Kyongsong Military Air-
field on the east coast, where he again drew attention to the food problem by
visiting a military-run greenhouse. From there he headed down to Mount
Kumgang, abutting the DMZ, to inspect the abandoned tourist facilities that
at their peak in 2007 accommodated almost 350,000 South Korean tourists.21
Having offered to reopen Kumgang and Kaesong in his New Year address,
Kim now declared an end to the inter-Korean experiment in joint tourism.
North Korea would absorb Kumgang and transform it into a world-class
destination for international tourism—South Koreans included. It was a con-
crete example of the strategy of economic development through “relying on
our own strength”—not autarky, but autonomy.
   Chairman Kim’s activities through the winter months kept the domestic
focus on self-reliant economic development. He returned to Paektu for
another gallop atop the “sacred mountain of the revolution” and led
ribbon-cutting ceremonies at Samjiyon City, Kyongsong Greenhouse and
Yangdok Hot Spring Resort (his fifth visit to the ski-and-spa resort since
April).22 But Pyongyang’s external messaging was full of ominous warnings
about the “new path” it would follow should the US fail to offer concessions
by year’s end. These statements were punctuated a pair of engine tests at the
Sohae Satellite Launching Ground and a visit by Kim to front-line troops on
the tense West Sea border—unsubtle hints to Washington and Seoul not to
take the status quo for granted.23

    19. “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Gives Field Guidance to Construction Sites in Samjiyon
County,” KCNA, October 16, 2019.
   20. Ibid.
    21. Semoon Chang, “Economic Cooperation between the Two Koreas,” North Korea Review 8:2
(Fall 2012): 12.
   22. “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Looks Round Revolutionary Battle Sites in Mt Paektu Area,”
KCNA, December 4, 2019.
    23. Ankit Panda, “North Korea Announces ‘Crucial’ Test at Sohae, Says Will Benefit ‘Strategic
Nuclear Deterrent’,” The Diplomat, December 16, 2019, .

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   There was no last-minute deal with President Trump. Instead, Chairman
Kim ended 2019 by delivering a seven-hour speech to cap an extraordinary
four-day Party plenum. Lashing out at the US for breaking its promises and
clinging to hostility, Kim declared himself no longer bound by the dual freeze
and promised to unveil a “new strategic weapon” soon. Looking forward to
the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Korean Workers’ Party (and the
70th anniversary of the Korean War), he called on senior cadres to prepare to
go on the offensive and make a “frontal breakthrough.” While acknowledging
the “urgent need” for an external environment conducive to economic
growth, Kim stubbornly insisted that his people would have to a find a path
to prosperity that did not rely on sanctions relief, putting “objective elements
under our control” rather than waiting for the situation to change.24 A year
that began with soaring hopes of transformation and shifted toward sobering
realities of adjustment ended with uncertain prospects for peace and progress,
let alone denuclearization.

  24. “Report on 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C., WPK,” KCNA, January 1, 2020.