REGIONALISING THE JCPOA: THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR DEAL AS A GUIDELINE FOR A WMD FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

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P E A C E R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E F R A N K F U R T / L E I B N I Z- I N S T I T U T H E S S I S C H E S T I F T U N G F R I E D E N S - U N D KO N F L I K T F O R S C H U N G

                                                                                 MANUEL HERRER A ALMEL A //

                                                                                 REGIONALISING THE JCPOA: THE IRANIAN
                                                                                 NUCLEAR DEAL AS A GUIDELINE FOR A
                                                                                 WMD FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

PRIF Report 13/2022

REGIONALISING THE JCPOA: THE IRANIAN
NUCLEAR DEAL AS A GUIDELINE FOR A WMD
FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

MANUEL HERRER A ALMEL A //

Imprint

          LEIBNIZ-INSTITUT HESSISCHE STIFTUNG FRIEDENS- UND KONFLIKTFORSCHUNG (HSFK)
          PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE FRANKFURT (PRIF)

          Cover:
          Meeting of the Joint Commission on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in Vienna,
          Austria, December, 2021.
          © picture alliance / Xinhua News Agency | EU Delegation in Vienna.

          Text license:
          Creative Commons CC-BY-ND (Attribution/NoDerivatives/4.0 International).
          The images used are subject to their own licenses.

          Correspondence to:
          Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
          Baseler Straße 27–31
          D-60329 Frankfurt am Main
          Telephone: +49 69 95 91 04-0
          E-Mail: m.herrera@iai.it
          https://www.prif.org

          DOI : 10.48809/prifrep2213
          ISBN: 978-3-946459-82-8

Summary

The establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East has
recently re-emerged in international debates as a result of the United Nations (UN) holding a confer-
ence on the topic. How should the international community and states in the region address the issue
in order to make the Middle East a more secure place, and what lessons should be learned from past
initiatives in this area to avoid the collapse of the current UN process? These questions have taken
on a new urgency in global debates on arms control and disarmament.

   In light of this, the current report aims to present proposals derived from empirical experience of
non-proliferation in the Middle East region. The report focuses specifically on the Joint Comprehen-
sive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which has been the only successful attempt to address WMD in the re-
gion, as a means of supporting the creation of a WMDFZ. The failure of past initiatives on this matter
are largely due to the fact that the debate on the WMDFZ was limited exclusively to the WMD field.
Instead, we propose a process whereby WMD control and disarmament efforts are closely linked to
confidence-building measures (CBMs) and processes, thus, demonstrating that both dimensions are
equally relevant.

   Using this as a guide, we discuss the initiatives undertaken in recent decades to develop a
­WMDFZ in the Middle East. Such a comparison with past initiatives and the different approaches
used to address the WMDFZ enables us to identify both the challenges of this initiative and the steps
to be taken to achieve it. We then discuss the main regional and extra-regional obstacles to the cre-
ation of the zone, and finally analyse the JCPOA to ascertain whether or not it can serve as a model
for the creation of the WMDFZ.

   Based on this analysis, we concluded that the JCPOA provides states in the region and the inter-
national community with a solid toolbox of ideas and measures to prevent nuclear proliferation in the
Middle East. In this sense, the Iranian nuclear deal undoubtedly represents normative progress, as
it empirically and verifiably prevents Iran from developing nuclear weapons, while providing positive
incentives for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, we also conclude that the agreement itself
cannot be automatically translated into a WMDFZ due to reasons of scope and negotiation context.
That said, since its adoption the JCPOA has been heavily criticized by states both within and outside
the region and, as a consequence, its impact as an instrument for non-proliferation has been great-
ly underestimated. At the same time, Iran’s most recent breaches of the agreement, increasing the
chances of the Islamic Republic going nuclear, make it unclear whether the agreement will be able
to serve as a viable regulatory framework for the region’s nuclear activity in the near future. Howev-
er, this report does not seek to discuss whether the agreement will survive or not, but rather aims to
examine its provisions in a broader regional context. Thus, taking into consideration the content of
the JCPOA, we outline what CBMs should be conducted, with a particular focus on those linked to
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in order to pave the way for future WMDFZ negotiations.

Inhalt
                                                                                Contents

1. Introduction                                                             1

2. The Middle East WMDFZ proposal: A historical contextualisation           2

3. Current challenges for the creation of a WMDFZ in the Middle East       6

   3.1 Regional proliferation dynamics                                     6
   3.2 Regional states’ behaviour and positions                             7

4. The JCPOA: A guideline for moving towards a WMDFZ in the Middle East?   14

   4.1 The JCPOA negotiation process                                       14
   4.2 Provisions of the JCPOA                                             17
   4.3 Regionalising the JCPOA                                             18

5. Conclusions                                                             25

References                                                                 27

Acronyms                                                                   32

THE JCPOA AS A GUIDELINE FOR A WMD FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?                                          1

   1. Introduction

The Middle East is characterised by multiple overlapping rivalries, security challenges, and mistrust
between regional states. It is worth noting that the Middle East has been one of the few regions
where weapons of mass destruction have been used since 1945, and where there have been several
clandestine attempts to develop nuclear weapons programmes. This makes the WMDFZ a categor-
ical imperative.

   This was made evident by the comments made by Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif following
the adoption of the JCPOA in 2015, where an expansion of the agreement to the region as a whole
was proposed (Haghirian 2017). As this illustrates, the creation of a WMDFZ in the Middle East is
increasingly being advocated.

   This interest in the WMDFZ is driven by several recent developments and events, such as the use
of chemical weapons in the ongoing conflict in Syria, the threat of the collapse of the JCPOA in the
face of the US withdrawal and Iran’s violations, and the interest shown by several states in the region
in developing their own nuclear programmes.

   Most political and academic debates on the WMDFZ focus on the different approaches to achiev-
ing the goals set out and why those approaches were chosen. One frequently asked question is
whether the WMDFZ should be a precondition for a broader process of regional dialogue for security
and stabilisation in the region, or whether it should be the end result of such dialogue and progressive
confidence-building measures (Kubbig/Weidlich 2015). This report attempts to avoid this dialectical
trap by outlining a regional CBM initiative, emphasising the dilemma of and the link between regional
tensions and arms control.

   In our view, the vital debate on how to create a WMDFZ should not be limited to arguments in fa-
vour of disarming Israel first or of initiating a disarmament dialogue without addressing regional and
sub-regional tensions. Instead, this debate would be better grounded in clear empirical examples of
regional restrictions on WMD proliferation. In this regard, it is important to take into account the fact
that arms control and disarmament do not take place in a political vacuum, but in fact require an en-
vironment of predictability and trust between the parties involved, largely facilitated by institutions.

   In light of this, the current report reviews and analyses several issues with respect to the ­WMDFZ.
Firstly, we examine the initiatives carried out in recent decades to establish the WMDFZ. Such a
comparison with past initiatives and the different approaches used to address the WMDFZ enable us
to identify both the challenges of this initiative and the steps to be taken to achieve it. Indeed, most
arms control initiatives have not been particularly successful in addressing WMD in the region—with
one exception, that being the JCPOA. Consequently, we analysed this agreement to ascertain wheth-
er or not it can serve as a model for the creation of the WMDFZ. Based on this analysis, we conclude
that the JCPOA equips the states in the region and the international community with a robust toolbox
of ideas and measures to prevent nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. However, we also conclude
that the agreement itself cannot be automatically translated into a WMDFZ in the region due to rea-

2                                                                     MANUEL HERRERA ALMELA

sons of scope and negotiation context. Thus, taking into consideration the content of the JCPOA, we
outline what CBMs should be conducted, with a particular focus on those linked to peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, in order to pave the way for future WMDFZ negotiations.

     2. The Middle East WMDFZ proposal:
     	A historical contextualisation

The idea of establishing a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East was first proposed
by the Soviet Union in 1958 (Baklitskiy 2013). The issue was subsequently discussed in the region
over the next decade in the framework of the Committee for the Denuclearization of the Middle East,
a group of Israeli intellectuals who saw a nuclear Israel as endangering the country’s existence.

     At the same time, the 1968 Treaty of Tlatelolco established the world’s first NWFZ in Latin Ameri-
ca and advocated the same type of initiative being replicated by other regions of the world, including
the Middle East. However, unlike the Mexican-led initiative, the implementation of a NWFZ in the Mid-
dle East, which was formally proposed in 1974 by Egypt and Iran, sparked a diplomatic conflict that
has proven difficult to resolve ever since.

     In order to ascertain the views of the parties involved in this issue, in March 1975, the UN Secre-
tary-General sent a note verbale to the states of the region. Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Iraq and Syria indi-
cated that membership of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was mandatory if such a zone
were to become operational. However, countries such as Kuwait expressed reservations about this
because of Israel’s nuclear arsenal and the fact that it was not part of the NPT. Jordan took a similar
position, stating that a NWFZ in the Middle East would not be feasible without Israel’s ratification of
the NPT (UNSG 1975). For its part, Israel announced that it “wishes to state its support for the estab-
lishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East and considers that this would be a desir-
able further step towards a just and durable peace in the region” (UNSG 1975: 1), particularly given
the rapprochement with Egypt that was underway at the time, and even went so far as to propose the
possibility of holding a regional conference on the matter. However, Israel continued to refuse to sign
the NPT because of the remaining tensions with its regional neighbours (UNSG 1975). These early
reactions illustrate the political difficulties in establishing a NWFZ in the region, and positions have
remained virtually unchanged since then.

THE JCPOA AS A GUIDELINE FOR A WMD FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?                                            3

Proposed members of a Middle East Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone or Weapons of Mass
Destruction-Free Zone

                                        Tunisia               Lebanon Syria
                                                                  Israel                 Iran
                                                             West Bank       Iraq
                                                             Gaza Strip Jordan
                          Algeria                                            Kuwait
         Morocco                              Libya
                                                            Egypt                Bahrain
                                                                                   Qatar    UAE
                                                                              Saudi Arabia          Oman
     Mauritania
                                                               Sudan                        Yemen

                                                                                 Djibouti

                                                                                   Somalia

                                                                                   Comoros

Source: PRIF’s own compilation, based on https://www.mapchart.net/world.html, license: CC BY-SA 4.0.

As a result of the use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) and the confirma-
tion in 1991 that Iraq was secretly developing a nuclear programme, Egypt declared the need to pro-
mote the establishment of a WMDFZ (Moussa 1990; 1991).

    This new proposal was further developed during the Madrid Conference1 (Goldblat 2002), where
five multilateral groups were created. It was, however, during the Arms Control and Regional Security
(ACRS) in the Middle East talks between May 1992 and December 1994 that the idea of a NWFZ and
WMDFZ in the Middle East really began to take shape. Little in the way of tangible progress towards
establishing a zone emerged from these meetings, but the overall outcome of the ACRS is no less
significant. Peter Jones (2011: 2) stated that the “ACRS was a considerable success in many ways. It
accomplished a great deal, particularly in the elaboration of several far-reaching confidence-building
measures”. Moreover, it was the first time that Israel had sat at the same table as its regional partners
to discuss arms control issues.

1   The 1991 Madrid Peace Conference was an attempt by the international community to begin a peace process be-
    tween Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.

4                                                                                 MANUEL HERRERA ALMELA

     The issue of a Middle East WMDFZ also started to appear in other fora, such as the NPT Review
Conference (RevCon). The 1995 RevCon adopted the Middle East Resolution, which led to the reaffir-
mation of the will to create a WMDFZ in the region at subsequent RevCons2, notably in 2010 where
several steps towards the creation of such a zone were taken (Review Conference of the Parties to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 2010). The convening of a conference on the
WMDFZ by the UN Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution (US, UK and Russia)
in 2012, with the attendance of all the Middle Eastern states, was particularly interesting as it would
have allowed the different parties to meet under one roof and talk directly. However, the 2012 confer-
ence did not come to fruition.

     The reasons it did not take place are varied, and include factors that are both exogenous and en-
dogenous to the region itself. First, the Arab Spring and its impact on the stability of several states in
the region. Second, the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme and the outbreak of civil war in Syria. Third,
the growing tensions between Russia and the United States over potential violations of the Interme-
diate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Fourth, the US backtracking on its commitment to convene
the conference.3 Fifth, a facilitator and host government for the conference were not chosen until
October 2011, which gave them barely a year to make all the necessary arrangements (Lewis 2014).

     Nevertheless, consultations were held between 2013 and 2015, and two meetings were even or-
ganised in Switzerland in 2014, where several parties, including Israel, attended. Indeed, at the NPT
RevCon Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) of 2013, the Finnish ambassador introduced several
ideas regarding the operationalisation of the WMDFZ. However, disruptive events between the 2010
and 2015 RevCons (e.g., Egypt walking out of the 2013 PrepCom in protest) led to a fragmentation of
the Arab states’ position.

     The 2015 RevCon ended without consensus on an outcome document, partly as a result of dis-
putes over the organisation of a Middle East WMDFZ conference. The US blamed the Egyptians for
putting forward unworkable suggestions, and the US was blamed for acting on behalf of Israel (As-
sociated Press 2015). However, out of this failure a proposal emerged, made by the Arab League in
2017, in which the importance of achieving NPT universality and the need for WMDFZ conference to
begin before the 2020 NPT RevCon was emphasised (United Nations 2017).

2    It is important to point out that the Middle East Resolution was an essential bargain to achieve the extension of the
     NPT. The Resolution remains key to understanding subsequent and ongoing debates on the creation of the Middle
     East WMDFZ.
3    In its final statement at the 2010 RevCon, the US was quick to make clear that it did not fully support the language
     of the outcome document with regard to the Middle East, arguing that its “ability to deliver [the commitment to work
     towards a WMDFZ] has been seriously compromised because the outcome document singles out Israel in the Mid-
     dle East section, a fact that the United States deeply regrets” (Tauscher 2010). Only hours later, a statement by US
     national security adviser, General James Jones, cast further doubt on the impact of the 2010 outcome document on
     the establishment of the WMDFZ. This virtually ruled out the possibility and repeatedly emphasised America’s unwav-
     ering support for Israeli security and its condemnation of the language used in the outcome document (The White
     House. Office of the Press Secretary 2010).

THE JCPOA AS A GUIDELINE FOR A WMD FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?                                     5

   At the 2017 and 2018 PrepComs, states in the region continued to express dissatisfaction with the
lack of progress towards a Middle East WMDFZ conference. According to a 2018 working paper pro-
duced by the Arab Group of 12, “three states, two of which are sponsors and depositaries of the 1995
resolution on the Middle East, prevented the 2015 Review Conference from adopting an outcome
document to serve Israel’s interests” (Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 2018). Furthermore, the document
stated that “saying that nuclear weapon-free zones should be freely established by the States con-
cerned does not mean that the international community can abdicate its responsibilities” (Prepara-
tory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons 2018). Iran, for its part, complained that “in practice, some parties to the Treaty,
representing the Israeli regime at review conferences, oppose decisions on the realisation of this
zone” (Najafi 2018). For Egypt, the failure to implement past Middle East-related decisions “has erod-
ed the credibility of the NPT and can potentially represent another setback in the NPT review process”
(Amer 2017). At the same time, Cairo stressed the need for “new ideas and alternative approaches”
to implementing the 1995 resolution, suggesting that the co-sponsors had “a special duty to present
their ideas and chart the way forward” (Amer 2017).

   For its part, the United States noted that the recommendations on the Middle East contained in
the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, while well intentioned, can no longer be con-
sidered an appropriate basis for action on this issue (Ford 2018). The announcement was preceded
by a lengthy debate on the futility of promoting a WMDFZ while ignoring the fact that “states make
sovereign decisions about entering into arms control agreements according to their own security
perceptions and political concerns” (Ford 2018). According to the US, the “realities that continue to
impede progress in the region” are “the lack of trust among states in the region, ongoing conflicts and
non-compliance in the region, the horrific use of chemical weapons by Syria and non-state actors,
and the non-recognition of Israel by many states in the region” (Wood 2017). The US also criticised
regional advocates of a WMDFZ for their “misguided attempts to coerce an outcome, or to hold the
NPT review process hostage”, rather than engaging directly with their neighbours (Wood 2017). In ad-
dition, the US argued that such an approach had already proved detrimental to both the NPT review
process and the goal of a WMDFZ zone in the Middle East, and had forced the US and other countries
to break consensus at the 2015 Conference (Wood 2017).

   Regional supporters of the WMDFZ rejected the 2018 US position. According to Egypt, “a set
of issues that renders the NPT review cycle incapable of addressing the Middle East zone free of
weapons of mass destruction” and is “in total disagreement with [...] the US co-sponsorship of the
1995 resolution and the consensus agreed by all NPT states parties on the importance of this issue”.
Moreover, this approach could “jeopardise the success of the ongoing review cycle and risk further
failure” (Egypt’s statement at the 2018 PrepCom).

   Once again, the UN Secretary-General was requested to convene a conference on a WMDFZ.
However, this time the request came from sources outside the NPT. Egypt argued that the proposed
UN-facilitated process would “serve as a platform to address all regional disarmament and non-pro-
liferation challenges, and to establish a strong regional security framework for regional security lead-

6                                                                      MANUEL HERRERA ALMELA

ing to sustainable peace and collective security dialogue and diplomacy” (The Permanent Mission
of Egypt to the United Nations 2018). This has allowed for a new framework to be created, especially
with regard to the incorporation of Israel into the process, since any initiative taking place outside the
NPT will be seen positively by Israel and it might even intervene, directly or indirectly, or at least will
not impede the functioning of the conference (Finaud 2022). In this sense, this conference opens a
window of opportunity to re-engage with Israel on arms control as well as other contentious regional
issues outside the NPT framework through secondary tracks. Although there have not yet been any
tangible results, the attendees still have high expectations, especially with regard to the potential
presence of Israel and the resolution of tensions in the Persian Gulf between Iran and Saudi Arabia
(Finaud 2022).

     3. Current challenges for the creation of a WMDFZ
     	in the Middle East

Based on the review in the previous section, it could be argued that the main regional actors do not
perceive the threat of WMD use as an immediate security threat. While they all see the benefits of a
WMDZ, competing security priorities receive more attention than the zone itself. The growing security
challenges facing the region, however, may lead to a snowball effect of cascading proliferation. Due
to rivalries and the potential shift in the balance of power, many Arab states have shown an interest
in acquiring nuclear technology to enhance their prestige, bolster regime security, match Iran’s capa-
bilities and deter Israel or other potential adversaries. It is only a matter of time before countries in
the region use national security to justify their push for nuclear weapons. Thus, in this section we will
review the main regional WMD proliferation-related threats, as well as the perspectives and positions
of the key regional actors with regard to this threat, in order to understand the main impediments to
the creation of a WMDFZ in the Middle East.

     3.1 REGIONAL PROLIFERATION DYNAMICS

For decades, extra-regional powers have only paid lip service to the goal of disarming the Middle
East, and significantly altered the stability of the region. Efforts to promote guided democracy have
shifted the situation in the region from cooperative actions to defensive reactions. As a result, in-
stead of establishing a broad-based regional security framework in the Persian Gulf and creating the
necessary mechanisms for cooperation and collective security, countries in the region are seeking
security guarantees from major powers outside the region.

     Largely from the 1980s onwards, the US, in its attempt to contain Iran’s hegemonic ambitions in
the region, has strengthened a trilateral alliance with Israel and the Arab states, which has led to a
militarisation of the region. In fact, states in the region increasingly see weapons of mass destruction
as an attractive alternative, one that costs less, is easily accessible, will result in deterrence and will
increase the power asymmetry in the region.

THE JCPOA AS A GUIDELINE FOR A WMD FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?                                                    7

    Moreover, apart from regional states, there are other types of actors that should be considered
potential disruptors of any process that seeks to establish a WMDFZ in the Middle East. These in-
clude terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda extremists,
which would threaten non-proliferation. These radicals would not be subject to any constraints, they
would use weapons of mass destruction to unleash mayhem and terror on population centres. A
commentary supporting this thesis is the statement by Nasir bin Hamad al-Fahd, a Salafist scholar:
“If the unbelievers can be repelled […] only by using weapons of mass destruction, then their use is
permissible, even if you kill them without exception” (Cited in Mousavian/Kiyaei 2020: 96).

    The possibility of extremists in weakly governed states, such as Iraq, Syria and Libya, acquiring
access to fissile or other materials that can be used in the development of WMD shows the serious
risk to the region. An expanding network of illicit trade in nuclear or other radioactive material will
exacerbate this situation across international borders. It is plausible to assume that such illicit trade
will become a more prominent concern as Al-Qaeda or ISIS seek weapons of mass destruction. In
this respect, Israel’s nuclear arsenal becomes a highly desirable target for these groups, and rather
than ensuring Israel’s own security, it becomes a source of insecurity for the country and the entire
region should any of these groups manage to infiltrate Israeli facilities and steal nuclear components
and materials.4

    Moreover, non-state actors and terrorist groups expose Israel’s nuclear weapons arsenal and the
decades-old Dimona reactor, located within the larger Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Centre,
to the risk of a conventional weapons attack.5 Such an attack could result in a deadly release of ra-
dioactive material and cause widespread destruction, with a significant human cost and irreversible
environmental, economic and psychological impact. If current trends continue, there is a high risk of
WMD proliferation and possibility of weapons ending up in the hands of by terrorist groups that could
wreak havoc.

    3.2 REGIONAL STATES’ BEHAVIOUR AND POSITIONS

    3.2.1 Israel

Israel is the only country in the region that possesses nuclear weapons and maintains an official pol-
icy of ambiguity regarding its nuclear arsenal. It continues to neither sign nor ratify the NPT and is
excessively opaque with regard to its nuclear programme, which precludes any serious discussion on
the issue of a WMDFZ. The absence of reporting, inspections and verification of Israeli facilities puts
the region at risk from potential undeclared nuclear incidents or nuclear terrorism.

4   It is also possible that these actors could receive materials from new clandestine nuclear smuggling networks, or
    from states like Syria, Iraq or Libya, which all had WMD programmes in the past but which struggle with unstable
    governance today.
5   Let us recall that in October and November 2012, as well as in July 2014, Hamas fired several rockets at the Dimona
    reactor.

8                                                                                 MANUEL HERRERA ALMELA

     The international community has made various attempts to encourage Israel to accede to the
NPT. On several occasions, at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference,
member states expressed their concern over Israel’s nuclear arsenal and tabled a resolution detailing
some of the reasons for that concern: “Israeli nuclear capabilities and about the threat posed by the
proliferation of nuclear weapons to the security and stability of the Middle East ... [and] the States
directly affected by the issue of Israeli nuclear capabilities, either by their geographical position or
their influential role on the international scene” (Cited in Director General of the IAEA 2010: 10). Other
example would be the December 2009 IAEA General Conference where the Agency expressed “con-
cern about Israeli nuclear capabilities” and called “on Israel to accede to the NPT and place all its
nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards” (IAEA 2009). Israel rejected this, calling it “polit-
ically motivated” and “incompatible with the basic norms and principles of international law” (Cited
in Director General of the IAEA 2010: 35). Israel also rejected the invitation to the WMDFZ conference
scheduled for December 2012, and made its participation in the negotiations on the zone conditional
on the evolution of the conflict with Palestine and on its recognition by the other states in the region.

     As early as September 1975, the then Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, declared: “in case
there is a comprehensive agreement, that is, a peace agreement, we will sign all agreements on a
non-proliferation treaty” (Cited in Marom 1986: 46). These preconditions, especially intertwined with
a protracted conflict, have not only hindered any progress towards creating the WMDFZ, but have
also formed the basis for Israel’s maintenance of its nuclear arsenal.

     In this sense, the main reason Israel maintains its nuclear arsenal is deterrence, as this ensures
that it has a way to discourage regional aggression, especially since it has been at war with its Arab
neighbours on many occasions (Sanchez 2014). This justification was articulated by then Prime Min-
ister Shimon Peres: “We did not build this [nuclear] option to get to Hiroshima but to get to Oslo. We
thought that the reason Israel was attacked several times without any provocation was because
some of our neighbours thought they could overpower us, and we wanted to create a situation in
which this temptation would not exist” (Cited in Bahgat 2006: 1).

     So, as we can observe, Israel sees regional tensions and conflicts as an obstacle to its own dis-
armament. It believes that attempts to establish a WMDFZ in the region are premature and argues
that “genuine regional arms control measures can only be advanced through a gradual process” that
“begins with confidence-building measures and mutual recognition” and is “followed by the transfor-
mation of tensions, hostilities, latent conflicts and a state of war into lasting and peaceful relations”.
According to Israel, “the most significant threats to the non-proliferation regime and the NPT come
from countries in the Middle East that pursue or continue to pursue nuclear weapons under the cover
of NPT membership” (IAEA 2014).

     Despite the central role of Iran’s nuclear programme in Israel’s threat perception, this perception
does not seem to be affected by the JCPOA.6 The Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) noted

6    Now, with the change of government in Tel Aviv, Israel is reconsidering its rejection of the JCPOA and refraining from
     criticising its resumption, which may have positive implications for the ongoing UN process (Finaud 2022)

THE JCPOA AS A GUIDELINE FOR A WMD FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?                                     9

in 2016 that “despite the recent agreement, Iran remains a destabilising force in the Middle East”. It
cited “blatant concealment and duplicity, as demonstrated by Iran’s known weaponisation activities”,
and argued that “Iran’s commitment to the JCPOA must be assessed with a long-term perspective”
(Snir 2016). Nevertheless, Israel points out its willingness to engage in broader regional security
discussions: “any regional event should emerge from the region, based on direct dialogue among all
states... to address a broad regional security agenda, based on the indispensable principle of consen-
sus among regional parties” (IAEA 2014).

   Israel’s main fear with regard to the WMDFZ is that it does not have adequate verification mech-
anisms in place to ensure that all states in the region can disarm. Without a credible guarantee that
other regional states will not proliferate, Israel will never sign a legally binding agreement. In this
sense, any process that seeks to establish a WMDFZ, and wants Israel to be a signatory, will require
the question of recognition and normalisation of Israel as an actor in the region to be taken serious-
ly. However, at the same time, concerted diplomatic efforts, with incentives and repercussions, are
needed to change the Israeli position and advance the zone’s prospects of realisation.

   3.2.2 Iran

Iran, which like Egypt was one of the states that submitted the proposal to create an NWFZ in the
Middle East, has consistently maintained its position on this matter. However, its commitment has
declined as a result of accusations that it is trying to develop a nuclear programme for military pur-
poses.

   Iran’s nuclear effort was initially designed to enable the country to develop a civilian nuclear pro-
gramme, but the secretive nature of certain aspects of its nuclear programme, its economic ineffi-
ciency, and evidence of attitudes linked to weapons development have led to the conclusion that
Iran’s programme in fact seeks to develop nuclear weapons (Fitzpatrick 2015).

   One of the most controversial issues is that most of Iran’s acquisitions before 2003 were unde-
clared, tacitly violating its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (Director General of the IAEA 2003).
Moreover, Iran began enriching uranium in 2006, triggering UN sanctions that remained active until
2015. However, through the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) in 2013 and the JCPOA in 2015, Iran commit-
ted to suspend uranium enrichment.

   Until the signing of the JCPOA in 2015, the possible military dimension of Iran’s nuclear pro-
gramme was seen as one of the biggest obstacles to a WMDFZ in the Middle East. But hopes of the
JCPOA having a positive effect on progress in the Middle East quickly withered as Saudi Arabia and
Israel questioned Iran’s intention to adhere to the terms of the JCPOA. In theory, we would expect re-
solving the question of the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme to foster greater
trust between its neighbours, an essential element for negotiations. In reality, it angered Israel and
Saudi Arabia, both of which felt that the JCPOA should have included elements to limit what they see
as hostile regional behaviour by Iran (Amidror 2015). Nevertheless, Iran has expressed willingness to

10                                                                   MANUEL HERRERA ALMELA

address other issues outside the JCPOA (i.e. ballistic missiles), provided that the framework of the
agreement can be made to function properly again (Finaud 2022).

      The problem with Iran, especially following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, is that it
possesses all the technical equipment and scientific know-how necessary to produce weapons-us-
able enriched uranium. For example, the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz contains ad-
vanced centrifuges capable of efficiently producing enriched uranium. The PFEP can accommodate
984 centrifuges, and Iran uses the facility to test new centrifuge designs such as the IR-3 and IR-4
and to further enrich low-enriched uranium produced at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). Another ex-
ample would be the four research reactors at Esfahan and Tehran, as well as the heavy water reactor
at Arak, which can produce enough plutonium for military use.

      While before 2015, there were indications that Iran developing an atomic device was a more tangi-
ble possibility (Director General of the IAEA 2011b), since then, Iran has been behaving in compliance
with the agreement—at least until 2019. However, in the last three years, Iran has enriched uranium
above the limits allowed by the JCPOA, and prevented IAEA inspectors from carrying out inspections
of the facilities safeguarded by the agreement. Added to this is the latest episode of confrontation
between the IAEA and Iran with the shutdown in June 2022 of the Agency’s surveillance cameras at
Iranian facilities, leaving the IAEA and the international community unable to observe Iran’s nuclear
activities.

      3.2.3 Egypt

Egypt, despite being one of the countries that proposed the creation of the NWFZ, is also the country
that has failed to sign and ratify the largest number of agreements in this policy area. For example,
it has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) or the IAEA Additional Protocol, nor has
it ratified treaties such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (ANWFZ). Egypt argues that it keeps
these ratifications pending in order to exert leverage over Israel to sign the NPT (Esfandiary 2014).

      On the other hand, the official rationale for Egypt’s active support for the WMDFZ in the Middle
East is the elimination of the WMD threat in the region, but the realities on the ground and Egypt’s
behaviour throughout the process suggest that its motivations are not so simple. Previously, the de-
tection of WMDs in the region, or rather, the possibility of them being developed, might have justified
Egypt’s position. But now, with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the destruction of Syria’s chemical
arsenal in 2013, as well as the signing of the JCPOA, it seems increasingly clear that the sole purpose
of Egypt’s support for the WMDFZ is the disarmament of Israel. This has reinforced current Israeli
claims that the Middle East WMDFZ is aimed only at them (James Martin Center for Nonproliferation
Studies & Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation 2012).

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   3.2.4 Iraq

Iraq developed a clandestine nuclear programme in the past, which was finally dismantled in 1991.
This was the first case of clandestine regional proliferation detected in the region and it had signif-
icant impact on the NPT and how nuclear proliferation was prevented afterwards (i.e. it led to the
adoption of the Additional Protocol). Nowadays, most of the infrastructure of this programme has
disappeared and Iraq’s nuclear programme is now exclusively for civilian purposes.

   The risks of WMD proliferation from today’s unstable Iraq no longer centre on the government,
but on the possibility of non-state and extremist actors taking advantage of Baghdad’s fragility to
acquire, produce and use WMD.

   3.2.5 Libya

Libya began its weapons of mass destruction programmes when Muammar Gaddafi came to power
in the midst of the Cold War. Although Libya initially had no direct threats, it considered Israel and the
United States as symbols of colonialism and imperialism in the region (Puga Álvarez 2019). Libya’s
interest in acquiring this type of weaponry arose in the 1970s with a view to increasing its influence
on the African continent and in the Middle East, especially after reports during the Yom Kippur War
(1973) that Israel had nuclear weapons. By the early 1980s, Libya had already developed rudimentary
production capacity, which lacked autonomy, however, as it had no means of producing its own pre-
cursors and was dependent on imports (Pita/Domingo 2016). The ambiguity of Israel’s nuclear pro-
gramme prompted Gaddafi, in 1996, to argue for the need for Arab countries to arm themselves with
nuclear weapons (Puga Álvarez 2019). However, economic sanctions against Libya, the invasion of
Iraq in 2003, as well as poor access to nuclear material were incentive enough for Gaddafi to decide
to end all his WMD programmes in the mid-2000s.

   However, since the overthrow of Gaddafi in 2011, the Libya’s fragile governance has led to the
emergence of terrorist groups in the country and it becoming a safe haven for terrorists, who have
control over land, people, weapons and resources. In this sense, there is a high probability that ter-
rorists will use the country as a launching pad for attacks with more lethal means if they gain access
to WMD materials.

   3.2.6 Syria

Syria has been accused on several occasions of clandestinely attempting to develop a nuclear pro-
gramme for military purposes. Like Iraq, it had a nascent clandestine nuclear programme until Sep-
tember 2007, when Israel bombed the Deir ez-Zor reactor (Director General of the IAEA 2011a). This
led to the adoption of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution, but requests for further
clarification by Syria on the matter have led to inconclusive results. It has been speculated that the
reactor would have been capable of producing plutonium. However, the absence of a reprocessing

12                                                                     MANUEL HERRERA ALMELA

plant also makes this hypothesis somewhat dubious (Wright 2008). In any case, the secrecy both be-
fore and after the 2007 bombing suggests that the reactor was not being used for peaceful purposes.

      Currently, risk mitigation with regard to WMD in Syria is primarily focused on dismantling the Syri-
an regime’s chemical weapons stockpile, as well as on preventing non-state actors from getting hold
of this and other WMD materials.

      3.2.7 Gulf countries

There are also regional rivalries, which have grown as the region has become increasingly militarised.
Most states justify this course of action as being a response to Iran’s regional ambitions, especially
in the Persian Gulf. The major divergence between Iran and its Gulf neighbours results from their
approaches to the question of how to achieve security and stability in the Gulf itself. Iran argues that
this issue has been dominated by Western powers for the past four centuries, and stresses the need
for the region to assume a more prominent role in its own security and stability. On the other hand, the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) argues that the only way to preserve the region’s security is through
a political and security alliance with the United States.

      While we can discern an overall standpoint in the GCC, positions do vary between the Gulf mon-
archies, for example, the lifting of sanctions combined with the constructive diplomatic relations
between Iran and the international community has the potential to significantly empower Tehran at
Riyadh’s expense. Saudi Arabia’s fear of losing regional power has been exacerbated by the deteri-
oration of US-Saudi relations, which have become totally unstable and unpredictable. The expected
increase in Iranian liquidity and militarisation due to sanctions relief reinforces Saudi fears that Teh-
ran may use the JCPOA to increase its support for Shia actors in the region, thus allowing the Islamic
Republic to gain an advantage in Syria and Yemen. Another important consequence of the deal for
Saudi threat perceptions is the fear that the US re-entering the agreement may imply the resumption
of further US rapprochement with Iran, a fear which is exacerbated by the simultaneous reduction of
the US presence in the Gulf. In this sense, Saudi Arabia is deeply concerned that Tehran could once
again become the main pillar of the US order in the Middle East.

      In the nuclear domain, while Saudi Arabia shares the assumption that the JCPOA effectively pre-
vents Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons, the temporal limitation of the agreement is of great
concern to Riyadh. It believes that its neighbouring state’s uranium enrichment programme has sim-
ply been put on hold and will continue as soon as the restrictions expire. This fear is heightened by
the end of Tehran’s financial isolation. An increase in monetary assets would allow the Islamic Re-
public to modernise its nuclear infrastructure and conventional weaponry. Thus, despite the unprece-
dented scope of its restrictions, the JCPOA did not reduce the Saudi threat perception. Indeed, it may
even have increased Saudi security concerns, which will still need to be addressed in the context of
Riyadh’s own extraordinarily large military procurement programmes.

THE JCPOA AS A GUIDELINE FOR A WMD FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?                                        13

   In addition to the conventional military build-up, Saudi Arabia is likely to continue investing in
its civilian nuclear programme, keeping the option of a uranium enrichment programme on the ta-
ble. Moreover, improved security relations with Pakistan, a nuclear-weapon state, suggest that Saudi
Arabia might actively consider purchasing Pakistani nuclear warheads should Iran eventually seek
nuclear weapons capabilities (Bowen/Moran 2015).

   When it comes to Bahrain, while this Gulf country has generally supported Iran’s right to peaceful
uses of nuclear energy and formally welcomed the JCPOA, it shares Saudi fears of an empowered
neighbour. Bahrain’s main concern is that the JCPOA could jeopardise the stability of its Sunni minori-
ty regime. Consequently, Bahrain-Iran relations are extremely tense.

   Relations between Iran and Kuwait, however, have changed for the better, mainly due to the mu-
tual interest of the two countries in a stable and peaceful Iraq. However, sharing the concerns of its
fellow Gulf Arabs, Kuwait fears that Iran will seek regional supremacy (Althunayyan 2015). While Ku-
wait perceives several threats in relation to the Iranian nuclear deal, it also highlights the potential for
increased bilateral cooperation.

   Qatar, for its part, has not expressed any deep fears about Tehran’s policy at any point during the
negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue. It even voted against UNSC Resolution 1696, which called
on the Islamic Republic to end its uranium enrichment programme. Moreover, despite its own Shia
minority and its engagement in Syria and Yemen, Qatar maintained an inclusive perspective, seeing
Tehran as an important part of the solution to regional security dilemmas (Cafiero 2016). This stems
from its strong economic ties with Tehran: The two countries share the world’s largest natural gas
field and are equal partners in the Qatar-based Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF). Since its eco-
nomic prosperity depends heavily on natural gas exports, Qatar has a vested interest in avoiding any
conflict in the Gulf involving Iran.

   The United Arab Emirates (UAE), however, shares the Saudi position that Tehran poses a serious
security threat in the Gulf. The Emirates has the same concern as other Gulf countries that an influx
of financial assets could allow Iran to increase its support for militant proxies in regional conflicts.
Having already suffered heavy losses in Yemen, the UAE fears that sanctions relief will ultimately tip
the balance in favour of the Islamic Republic.

   Finally, Oman’s traditional approach to foreign policy is to foster alliances with all its neighbours
and to move cautiously between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Despite its GCC membership and close re-
lations with Riyadh, Muscat maintains its friendship with Tehran. These close ties are largely based
on mutual economic and security interests. To ease tensions over Iran’s nuclear programme, Oman
brokered and successfully facilitated the first secret meeting between the US and the Islamic Repub-
lic in the summer of 2012. Risking its position within the GCC, the sultanate hosted a number of both
clandestine and official meetings between the negotiating parties, contributing significantly to the
completion of the JCPOA four years later.

14                                                                    MANUEL HERRERA ALMELA

      4. The JCPOA: A guideline for moving towards a WMDFZ in the
      	Middle East?

Having reviewed the main proliferation challenges and regional positions on these issues, in this
section we will get to the crux of the matter and analyse whether the JCPOA can serve as a model
for the creation of the WMDFZ. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the JCPOA is the most com-
prehensive nuclear non-proliferation agreement ever drafted; it contains the most complete verifica-
tion and transparency mechanisms ever applied in the history of nuclear diplomacy; it eliminates the
ability of countries to produce and separate plutonium for constructing a nuclear weapon and limits
the level of enrichment to less than five percent; and it includes the possibility of sanctions in case
of non-compliance. In addition to innovative measures to keep proliferation activities in check, the
JCPOA has strengthened the IAEA safeguards, especially Iran’s commitment to implement the IAEA
Additional Protocol.

      This makes it attractive to hypothesise about the possible regionalisation of some of its contents
to close the gaps in non-proliferation and guarantee peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the Middle
East. On the other hand, the weakening of the JCPOA can also be seen as a wake-up call to ex-
plore possibilities for regional cooperation on non-proliferation, in which at least some aspects of the
agreement could be preserved. This could pave the way for regional restrictions on proliferation-sen-
sitive activities, as well as measures on spent fuel management and uranium enrichment.

      Although the JCPOA was specifically aimed at resolving the Iranian nuclear conflict, the composi-
tion of the final document may serve as a basis for parts of the final WMDFZ agreement. The sections
of the JCPOA dealing with improved monitoring and verification tools for nuclear activities and in-
frastructure, the conflict resolution mechanism, and the confidence-building measures derived from
both nuclear cooperation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy are particularly useful here. Ultimately,
the survival of this agreement and the process that will see the international community succeed or
fail in resolving the current impasse will have implications for the chances of creating a WMDFZ in
the Middle East.

      4.1 THE JCPOA NEGOTIATION PROCESS

In 2002, The National Council of Resistance of Iran, an Iranian opposition group in exile, presented
evidence that Iran had secretly built two nuclear facilities: one at Natanz, for uranium enrichment, and
the second at Arak, to produce heavy water that could be used to make plutonium. On the basis of
this information, and other IAEA investigations, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported
that Iran had failed to comply with its safeguards obligations.

      The foreign ministers of France, Germany and the UK decided to open negotiations with Iran by
offering technical cooperation in exchange for an agreement to suspend uranium enrichment and
implement the IAEA Additional Protocol. Negotiations continued for several years. However, after
the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president of Iran in 2005, Iranian negotiators rejected the

THE JCPOA AS A GUIDELINE FOR A WMD FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?                                                  15

talks and resumed uranium enrichment activities (Associated Press 2006). This led the IAEA Board
of Governors referring Iran to the UNSC in February 2006.

    On 23 December 2006, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1737, which imposed the first UN sanctions
on Iran’s nuclear programme (UNSC 2006). In the years that followed there were several attempts to
reach a compromise,7 all of which were unsuccessful, leading to the US and the EU imposing several
unilateral sanctions on the Iranian oil sector (UNSC 2010).

    On 14 June 2013, Hassan Rouhani was elected president of Iran. He ran on a platform of eco-
nomic reform, which called for the lifting of sanctions imposed on Iran, and was mandated by Iran’s
Supreme Leader to resolve the nuclear crisis. On the US side, there was renewed determination to
end the crisis during Barack Obama’s second term as president. As a result, the talks that followed in
September 2013 were quite constructive. Iran submitted a proposal containing a broad framework for
a comprehensive agreement and interim CBMs to be adopted in the short term, and on 24 November
2013, the JPOA was adopted as a roadmap to a final comprehensive agreement8 (U.S. Department
of the Treasury n.d.). In April 2015, negotiators concluded a ‘framework’ agreement, which outlined
the key parameters of a final agreement, and finally, in July 2015, the EU3+3 and Iran agreed on the
JCPOA, which outlined restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme and detailed verification and imple-
mentation measures in exchange for sanctions relief and the right to pursue a peaceful nuclear pro-
gramme (U.S. Department of the Treasury n.d.).

    The JCPOA negotiations provide a model for conducting multilateral negotiations and provide
an example of the concessions and political will required by all parties for such a major process to
move forward. Thus, a closer look at the process that resulted in the JCPOA, with details on the key
elements of the agreement, offers a realistic and plausible approach to achieving the broader ambi-
tion of ridding the region of all weapons of mass destruction. An examination of these efforts and the
key milestones detailed below can offer insight into the arduous process necessary to implement a
WMDFZ that requires the backing of the entire Middle East.

    The first prerequisite is flexibility. A successful process is not a set in stone, but allows for chang-
es of course and consultation between the negotiating parties, as well as between the negotiators
and their capitals. A process that includes dialogue with experts and officials on specific issues will
simultaneously ensure that progress in some areas is not held back by the lack thereof in more com-
plicated ones.

    Secondly, the availability and understanding demonstrated by participants in the negotiations
is important. The JCPOA negotiations were conducted over a relatively short period of time, during
which experts (scientific, technical and political) were available and in constant contact with each

7   These included the presentation of a negotiating platform by Iran in 2008; a fuel swap proposal between Russia and
    the US in 2009; and an attempt to negotiate a separate fuel swap deal with Brazil and Turkey in 2009.
8   The JPOA used a reciprocal approach whereby Iran would suspend various activities related to its programme and
    the EU3+3 would suspend certain sanctions, facilitate humanitarian trade, and cease efforts to reduce Iranian oil
    sales.

16                                                                     MANUEL HERRERA ALMELA

other. This will also be key for the negotiations on the Middle East WMDFZ. One of the problems,
however, is that several states in the region do not currently have the necessary expertise for such
high-level technical negotiations. It will be essential to develop this expertise and, above all, to listen
to these experts when they make recommendations to the political-level negotiators, who will have to
reach compromises. In addition, dialogue participants must show an understanding of the contexts
and constraints faced by their peers. The nuclear negotiations were successful because the US nego-
tiating team understood some of the difficulties faced by the Iranians at home. This did not mean that
they had to give in to Iranian demands, but that they were able to sympathise with those difficulties
and show flexibility in the negotiating process. It also meant that the Iranians found it less difficult to
explain the national context and constraints to their counterparts. This availability and understanding
creates a flexible environment for the participants in the talks, which fosters a greater willingness to
compromise, rather than a refusal to budge.

      Thirdly, the JCPOA process involved a mix of “carrots” and “sticks” to ensure that a compromise
was reached. Both were necessary to secure agreement from all parties. However, the use of “sticks”
will be more difficult in the WMDFZ process because states negotiating a zone must all be treated
equally. No party can force another to compromise. Rather, any compromise must be reached by of-
fering a compromise in return.

      Finally, constant interaction between each of the negotiators, especially once the initial formali-
ties were completed, was key to the success of the JCPOA negotiations. This will also be vital in the
WMDFZ talks. Individuals developed relationships with each other, which naturally lowered and, in
some cases, removed barriers to dialogue altogether. The fact that participants became acquain-
tances and then even friends meant that proposals and ideas were not automatically viewed with
suspicion. The additional obstacle to the WMDFZ talks is that some participants refuse to sit down
with each other and negotiate directly. This must be overcome because refusal to talk only makes the
security situation even less stable for all states.

      However, all this was only possible because there was a sense of urgency or crisis which was
conducive to resolving the Iranian nuclear agenda. The same cannot be said of the WMDFZ. There
is no impetus for the creation of the zone from the states involved. Reaching an agreement on Iran’s
nuclear programme thus differs from reaching an agreement on a WMDFZ. In the former, the inter-
national community was seeking an agreement on a state’s nuclear activities. In the latter, a number
of Middle Eastern states have to agree to a comprehensive ban on the existence, use and future pos-
session of WMD in their region. While the morality of the ban is not in question, the ability to reach
an agreement in a region fraught with deep-rooted historical distrust and animosity is. For this very
reason, it is essential to take some of the negotiation approaches from the nuclear agreement and try
to apply them to the dialogue on the zone. Above all, the flexibility of the process, the development of
mutual understanding on all sides and the human relations aspect proved to be the keys to success.

THE JCPOA AS A GUIDELINE FOR A WMD FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?                                   17

   4.2 PROVISIONS OF THE JCPOA

Through the JCPOA, the Iranians agreed to reduce the number of centrifuges to 6,104, but only 5,060
of the first-generation IR-1 models were approved to operate until 2025. The IR-2 and other advanced
models were to be dismantled and stored at Natanz under IAEA safeguards. The Fordow facility was
ordered to cease uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment research for 15 years. Once converted
into a nuclear physics and technology centre, Fordow could house no more than 1,044 IR-1 centrifug-
es in six cascades in one of its wings. Two of the cascades were to be modified to produce radio-
scopes for medical, agricultural, industrial and scientific use. The other four cascades were to remain
inactive. Iran could retain 300 kg of 3.67 percent enriched uranium and would reduce its stockpile of
10,000 kg low-enriched uranium (LEU) by either blending it or selling it abroad (Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action 2015).

   The conversion of the Arak heavy water research reactor was performed in order to support
peaceful nuclear research and production needs. The power of the redesigned reactor was not to
exceed 20 MW and was prevented from producing plutonium, in keeping with the ban on plutonium
production that the JCPOA imposed on Iran. Some of the heavy water plants (HWP) were to be used
to modernise the reactor and the rest were to be exported to international markets. The agreement
encouraged Iran to pursue the new technology, which favoured light water reactors and made it im-
possible to stockpile heavy water or build heavy water reactors for 15 years (Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action 2015).

   To prevent Iran from cheating on the JCPOA, the agreement provided a strict protocol of safe-
guards. In this sense, the deal includes a number of verification and monitoring activities that go be-
yond the requirements and scope of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and the Additional Pro-
tocol. These include continuous monitoring of certain nuclear sites, such as uranium mines, uranium
mills and centrifuge production centres, for a period of between 15 and 25 years; prior approval of
the import or export of certain dual-use materials for ten years; continuous monitoring of enrichment
levels; daily access for inspectors to Natanz and Fordow for 15 years; recourse for the JCPOA Joint
Commission to resolve access disputes between the IAEA and Iran within 24 days; and a ban on cer-
tain weapons-related activities without prior approval in perpetuity (Arms Control Association 2021).

   To implement these safeguards, IAEA uses a new generation of surveillance technology. Methods
include fibre-optic seals on equipment that electronically send information to the IAEA and infrared
satellite imagery to detect covert locations. In addition, environmental sensors that can detect min-
ute signs of nuclear particles, tamper-resistant and radiation-resistant cameras, accounting software
for information gathering, and anomaly detection using big data, which monitors Iran’s dual-use im-
ports, are particularly promising. Human oversight has also been increased, as the number of IAEA
inspectors has tripled from 50 to 150 (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 2015). In addition to the
IAEA, the national intelligence agencies of the United States, Israel and other countries also monitor
Iran’s programme unofficially (Ya’alon 2015).