Rethinking EU migration and asylum policies: Managing immigration jointly with countries of origin and transit - Stiftung Mercator
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
2019 MEDAM ASSESSMENT REPORT
ON ASYLUM AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN EUROPE
Rethinking EU migration and
asylum policies:
Managing immigration jointly with
countries of origin and transit
FUNDED BY© 2019 Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration (MEDAM) Kielline 66 | 24105 Kiel | Germany Telephone: +49 431 8814-329; Internet: www.ifw-kiel.de and www.medam-migration.eu This work is a product of the Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration (MEDAM). Rights and Permissions: This work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Attribution: MEDAM (Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration). 2019. 2019 MEDAM Assessment Report on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe, Kiel: IfW All queries on rights and licenses regarding the ‘2019 MEDAM Assessment Report on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe’ should be addressed to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration (MEDAM). Email: info@medam-migration.eu ISSN (Print): 2567-6083 Cover photo credit: Photo by Hello I’m Nik on Unsplash
2019 MEDAM ASSESSMENT REPORT ON ASYLUM AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN EUROPE Rethinking EU migration and asylum policies: Managing immigration jointly with countries of origin and transit
2019 MEDAM Assessment Report
on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe
Contents
Box, figures and tables 5
Preface 6
About the Authors 7
Executive summary 9
1 Introduction 13
2 Public attitudes to immigration and asylum policy preferences in the EU 14
3 Cooperation with non-EU countries to manage migration to the EU 22
3.1 The setting: Gaps in the global governance of refugee protection and diverging interests among
countries of origin and destination 22
3.2 Give and take: Areas of cooperation with countries of origin and transit, especially in Africa 24
4 Implementing flexible solidarity 30
4.1 Moving forward on the Common European Asylum System 30
4.2 An EU budget to support needed change 34
4.3 Monitoring implementation of flexible solidarity 38
5 Conclusions 41
Abbreviations 46
Bibliography 47
Box, figures and tables
Box 1 An example scoreboard for EU flexible solidarity on asylum and migration 40
Figure 1 Average attitudes in EU member states included in all ESS waves, 2002–17 15
Figure 2 Polarization within Hungary and Germany over time 16
Figure 3 Facebook comments on migration-related articles in German regional newspapers, 2012-2017 17
Figure 4 How are attitudes toward immigrants in Europe shaped by regional contexts? 18
Figure 5 Effects of changes in policy features on the probability of accepting the overall asylum
and refugee policy (percentage points) 21
Figure 6 Number of asylum applications per 1,000 inhabitants and their dispersion among
EU countries (coefficient of variation), 1999–2018 32
Table 1 Possible values (or ‘policy features’) of the six policy dimensions that make up
the overall asylum and refugee policy 21
Table 2 Budgetary changes in the MFF 2021–27 compared with the MFF 2014–20 34
Table 3 Financial compensation based on flexible solidarity 36
Table 4 Potential financial compensation in the MFF 2021–27 37
Table B1.1 Scoreboard for EU flexible solidarity in asylum and migration 40
52019 MEDAM Assessment Report 6
on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe
Preface
T
he arrival of more than one million asylum immigration, and the living conditions and prospects
seekers in Europe in 2015 exposed serious flaws of immigrants in countries of destination. Drawing
in the EU’s asylum system. While the inflow on our own research as well as the existing body of
of irregular migrants has long subsided, the political literature, we have explored the resulting opportuni-
landscape and public debate in Europe have been fun- ties, challenges, and trade-offs and have embarked on
damentally and permanently altered. Multiple efforts a dialogue with stakeholders at EU and member state
over the years to reform the European asylum system level on options for more effective internal and exter-
and to make it resilient to possible future surges in ref- nal policies.
ugee movements have reached an impasse. A recurring theme in our research is that migra-
Since early 2016, the EU has implemented far-reach- tion must be managed if it is to deliver benefits for
ing agreements with neighboring countries to curb migrants, countries of origin, and countries of desti-
irregular immigration, including the EU-Turkey un- nation. Furthermore, to manage migration to Europe
derstanding, the closure of the Western Balkans mi- effectively and share responsibility equitably for re-
gration route, and support for search and rescue op- fugee protection, the EU and its member states must
erations by the Libyan coast guard and the return to cooperate on equal terms with migrants’ countries of
Libya of individuals rescued at sea. However, the EU origin and transit.
and its member states have not used the respite offered The new European Commission has an opportunity
by fewer irregular migrants arriving in Europe to ad- to start afresh to address the persistent challenges in
dress important shortcomings: key provisions of the asylum and immigration policies. We explain in this
EU-Turkey agreement are not functional, especially report how allowing EU member states greater flexi-
for the return of migrants from the Greek islands to bility in how they contribute to the common asylum
Turkey; asylum systems in Western Balkan coun- system may be one way forward. Furthermore, non-EU
tries are underdeveloped and would be overwhelmed countries of origin and transit have an overwhelming
quickly if migrant flows were to resurge; and the hu- interest in expanding opportunities for their citizens
man rights of migrants in Libya are routinely violated. to work in Europe legally. Cooperation in other areas,
In 2016—just after the peak of the so-called migra- including containing irregular migration, would likely
tion crisis—the Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and benefit from EU member states permitting more legal
Migration (MEDAM) was established to pursue two labor migration from non-EU countries.
objectives: first, to improve our understanding of the As the first phase of MEDAM draws to a close, we
interrelated challenges facing the EU and its member thank Stiftung Mercator for making our work possi-
states in the areas of asylum, migration, and mobility; ble. We highly appreciate their continuing trust and
and second, to engage European policy makers and support as we embark on the second phase of MEDAM
civil society in a broad and open debate about compre- (2020 to 2022) where we will focus on migration from
hensive, implementable solutions to these challenges. Africa to Europe and on a more nuanced understan-
Since then, MEDAM researchers have analyzed im- ding of voter preferences regarding migration-related
portant features of the European migration system policies.
and mapped out their mutual interdependencies— We hope that this 2019 MEDAM Assessment Report
including the drivers of migration in countries of ori- will stimulate and inform the crucial debate on how to
gin, the decision making of migrants, popular atti- protect refugees effectively and harness labor migra-
tudes towards immigration and immigration policies, tion to benefit migrants, host societies, and countries
EU and member states policies for asylum and regular of origin.
Prof. Gabriel Felbermayr, PhD
President, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Senior Project Director, Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration (MEDAM)
72019 MEDAM Assessment Report 8
on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe
About the Authors
Mikkel Barslund is a research fellow and head of the Matthias coordinates the MEDAM project, guiding
Ageing Societies Programme at the Centre for Euro- the development of MEDAM’s research agenda and
pean Policy Studies (CEPS), a leading think tank in leading the project’s outreach to stakeholders. He has
Brussels. He is responsible for a range of projects on consulted widely for national governments and inter-
the economics of ageing societies, migration, and la- national organizations.
bor mobility at CEPS. Within the MEDAM project,
Mikkel is leading CEPS’ work on EU asylum and mi- Martin Ruhs is Chair in Migration Studies and
gration policy and has contributed to work on asylum Deputy Director of the Migration Policy Centre
and legal migration pathways, the situation in the (MPC) at the European University Institute (EUI)
Mediterranean and integration of refugees. Prior to in Florence. He is on long-term leave from the Uni-
joining CEPS, he worked as a senior economist at the versity of Oxford. Martin’s research focuses on the
Danish Economic Councils and as a Research Fellow economics and politics of international migration,
at KU Leuven. Besides his policy research, he manages with a strong international comparative dimension.
the European Network of Economic Policy Research In his role as one of the MEDAM’s academic co-
Institutes and is the CEPS editor of Intereconomics. directors, he is currently working on key questions
and dilemmas in public policy making, and the
Matthias Lücke is a senior researcher at the Kiel In- public opinion on asylum and migration policies
stitute for the World Economy, an adjunct professor in particular. Martin has provided policy analysis
at Kiel University, and a former senior economist at and advice for various national governments and
the International Monetary Fund. In his research and international institutions, published extensively in
teaching, he focuses on migration, development, in- his field, and has written for the New York Times,
ternational trade policy, and European integration. Financial Times, Guardian and Irish Times.
92019 MEDAM Assessment Report 10
on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe
Executive summary
T
he new European Commission will inherit an EU and countries of origin and transit can all bene-
impasse in efforts to reform the European asy- fit from cooperating on border management, refugee
lum system as well as concerns about practices protection, and expanding legal labor migration to the
in the management of the EU’s external border that EU (section 3). Finally, we consider the implications
contradict humanitarian standards and may even for cooperation among EU member states and the
be illegal. While the number of asylum seekers who long-standing plans for reform of the European asy-
manage to reach EU territory is now lower than in pre- lum system (section 4).
vious years, it may be low precisely because of those
problematic practices, including abuse of irregular What do the people want? Attitudes and
migrants along the Western Balkan route, limited
policy preferences (section 2)
search and rescue capacity in the Central Mediter-
ranean, and EU cooperation with the Libyan coast Insight #1: Attitudes to immigration have re-
guard even though migrants returned by it to Libya mained fairly stable across most European coun-
have been abused. tries, but the perceived importance of migration as
In this 2019 MEDAM Assessment Report, we pres- a public policy issue has increased.
ent insights from MEDAM research and policy dia-
logue since 2016 to explain how closer cooperation Insight #2: Attitudes to immigration tend to be
among EU member states and with countries of origin more positive in local areas with greater shares of
and transit can improve outcomes for all stakehold- migrants. However, this relationship is influenced
ers. Crucially, short of establishing a new Iron Curtain by the socioeconomic context: as the socioeconomic
on the EU’s external border or continuing to tolerate conditions of local areas worsen (e.g., with higher
abuses, there is no way that either individual member unemployment rates and lower incomes per capita),
states or the EU as a whole can insulate themselves the positive effects of the share of migrants on at-
from irregular migrants and asylum seekers. Yet, if titudes become smaller and they eventually disap-
crossing the EU border enabled all irregular migrants pear in the most deprived areas.
to remain in the EU for good, the integrity of EU visa
and asylum policies would be undermined. Insight #3: Europeans are generally committed
Thus, close cooperation with countries of origin for to policies that provide protection for asylum seek-
the return and readmission of their citizens who have ers and refugees, but they express support for more
no right to remain in the EU is crucial. Still, it is typi- policy controls, such as limits and conditions, in
cally not in the interest of countries of origin to limit asylum and refugee policies. There is no evidence
the mobility of their citizens. Cooperation between of widespread public support for highly restrictive
the EU and countries of origin must therefore cover a policies that eliminate protection and assistance.
wide enough range of policies to ensure that all parties
consistently benefit from the policy package and have A key implication of these insights is that, contrary
a strong incentive to meet their commitments. We to the impression created in public debates in many
emphasize more EU support for refugees hosted by European countries, it is possible to garner public
low- and middle-income countries and more legal em- support for asylum and refugee policies that provide
ployment opportunities for non-EU citizens in the EU. protection and assistance. To achieve this, policy mak-
Rethinking EU asylum and migration policies along ers need to think carefully about policy design (e.g.,
these lines requires extensive consultations and nego- when and how to use policy limits and conditions, and
tiations among stakeholders in Europe and in coun- how to distribute refugees across geographical areas)
tries of origin and transit. Our ‘insights’ are meant to and about how to communicate their policy ideas and
inform and stimulate such conversations. However, objectives to the public. The design of policy needs
sustainable reforms will come only as the result of to take into account what we know about the likely
stakeholders working out the details and developing a responses from the resident population to various
sense of ownership of the necessary reforms. different policy options. The communication of pub-
Our first set of insights relates to popular attitudes lic policies needs to relate to the reasons behind the
toward immigration and the structure of public pref- increasing salience of immigration as a policy issue,
erences for asylum and refugee protection policies including concerns about a perceived lack of state con-
(section 2 of this report). Next, we explain how the trol over immigration.
112019 MEDAM Assessment Report
Cooperation with countries of origin and opportunities, skill partnerships, study visas, etc.,
transit on border and migration manage can make support for involuntary returns politi-
ment, as well as legal labor migration cally sustainable in countries of origin and provide
(section 3) a viable alternative to individuals who might other-
wise contemplate irregular migration.
Insight #4: Limiting irregular immigration into
the EU while safeguarding refugees’ access to pro- Insight #9: Contrary to earlier studies, our empir-
tection (either in Europe or in regions of origin) re- ical research indicates that income growth in low-
quires close cooperation not only among EU mem- and middle-income countries of origin tends to
ber states, but also with countries of origin and reduce emigration, as does development assistance
transit. Yet, countries of origin, transit, and desti- for better public services and social infrastructure.
nation may have diverging interests with respect to Nevertheless, the reductions in emigration due to
border and migration management. Therefore, co- higher income or development assistance are too
operation needs to cover a sufficiently wide range of small to render development cooperation an effec-
policy areas so that all parties can be sure to benefit, tive tool to manage emigration.
and the underlying agreements become politically
sustainable and self-enforcing. Thus, the new European Commission faces the key
challenge of making a fresh start in its cooperation
Insight #5: If the EU wants to enforce its visa pol- with countries of origin and transit, with a focus on
icy and control the inflow of non-EU nationals into listening to stakeholders and taking their interests
the EU, it needs to work with neighboring coun- on board. This is the first step towards negotiating
tries toward limiting access to EU territory to those self-enforcing agreements with partner country gov-
non-EU citizens who have valid travel documents. ernments that lead to effective return and readmission
Otherwise, particularly if there are no restrictions of non-EU citizens, which remains a precondition for
on irregular travel along the informal Mediterra- effective and humane management of the EU’s exter-
nean migration routes and on subsequent entry nal border.
into the EU, large numbers of asylum seekers might
overwhelm reception capacity in EU member states. EU and member state policies and
Still, given the ongoing abuses at the EU’s external cooperation (section 4)
border, it must be emphasized that border and mi-
gration management must be in line with humani- Insight #10: The start of the new European Com-
tarian standards and migrants’ rights. mission’s mandate provides an opportunity to re-
consider the approach taken towards the reform
Insight #6: Low- and middle-income countries of the Common European Asylum System. The
host most of the world’s refugees. As a matter of hu- current package approach—whereby agreement
manitarian principle and to discourage secondary is sought on all legislative files simultaneously—
migration to the EU, the EU should share actively means that the contentious proposal for reforming
in the responsibility for protecting these refugees the Dublin Regulation is blocking any further pro-
through adequate long-term financial and technical gress. Pursuing a file-by-file approach and moving
support and by working with host countries to facil- forward on those individual legislative proposals
itate the refugees’ economic and social integration. where there is broad agreement among member
states can break the present deadlock.
Insight #7: Whatever the level of external finan-
cial support, small host countries may simply be Insight #11: Only a few small EU member states
overburdened by a large number of refugees. In are currently overburdened by a disproportionately
such cases, the EU should participate actively in re- high number of asylum applications (mainly Cy-
settlement schemes for vulnerable refugees. prus, Malta, and Greece). Given continuing disa-
greement over the feasibility and extent of a manda-
Insight #8: The integrity of the EU asylum system tory relocation scheme for asylum seekers, it should
depends on effective procedures for the return and now be a priority to establish working procedures
readmission by their countries of origin of non-EU for a coalition of willing countries to relocate asy-
citizens who have no right to remain in the EU. Yet, lum seekers rescued in the Central Mediterranean.
many countries of origin find it politically difficult Such procedures would go a long way to relieve the
to support the involuntary return of their citizens. few countries that are truly overburdened.
Despite many agreements on the books, cooper-
ation on return and readmission is often less than Insight #12: Negotiations on the EU’s 2021-2027
smooth in practice. The EU should explore with Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) offer an
countries of origin how additional legal migration important window for strengthening financial sol-
12on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe
idarity among member states with respect to asy- In sum, efforts to reform the EU asylum system have
lum and immigration. A dedicated budget line that been deadlocked since 2016. The new Commission
compensates member states for each asylum seeker can start afresh by adopting a new approach to asylum
received (possibly above a threshold) would be one and migration policy that emphasizes the common
effective tool to ensure more solidarity. The same interest of EU member states in managing the EU’s
mechanism could be used to support the voluntary external border effectively and humanely and helping
relocation of refugees among member states. to protect refugees world-wide as signatory states of
the 1951 Refugee Convention. At the same time, this
Insight #13: The next MFF should also increase approach would allow member states to contribute to
support for other important elements of European the common tasks in line with their capacities: Finan-
migration and asylum policies. The EU Asylum cial contributions would go through the EU budget
and Border and Coast Guard Agencies should be and member state shares would be the same as for the
put in a position to provide additional assistance to overall budget. More flexibility would be allowed par-
member states as needed. Likewise, the EU budget ticularly in the hosting of asylum seekers, recognized
should support programs aiding resettlement from refugees, or refugees resettled by UNHCR.
third countries (insight #7), humanitarian visas The proposed monitoring mechanism would en-
(when warranted), and labor migration schemes courage transparency and constructive debate among
(insight #8). Additional funding for refugees hosted member states on how responsibility for implementing
by non-EU countries is also warranted on humani- EU asylum and migration policies should be shared
tarian grounds and to discourage secondary migra- fairly; how member states should contribute to closer
tion to Europe (insight #6). cooperation with countries of origin and transit, in-
cluding by expanding opportunities for legal labor
Insight #14: To move the EU’s asylum and mi- migration; and how member states should contribute
gration policy forward towards more solidarity to refugee protection worldwide through humani-
among EU member states and with non-EU coun- tarian and development cooperation and by hosting
tries that host refugees, we recommend that the new refugees resettled by UNHCR. Well-designed and
Commission establish a monitoring mechanism (or carefully coordinated actions are required in these di-
scoreboard) to collect information on each member verse policy fields to overcome the current deficiencies
state’s exposure and contribution to all elements of in the management of the EU’s external border and
asylum and migration policy (irrespective of area build the capacity of the EU asylum system, both at
of competence). The scoreboard would support an- the EU and member state levels, so that the EU can
nual discussions on voluntary relocation and other respond a dequately to future refugee situations as they
instruments of solidarity. may arise.
132019 MEDAM Assessment Report 14
on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe
1 Introduction
T
he new European Commission, like its prede- ropean voters want? Specifically, does the rise of right-
cessor, faces interrelated challenges in the areas wing, anti-asylum, anti-immigration parties in several
of border management, irregular immigration EU countries indicate a broad shift by the EU popula-
to the EU, and asylum policy—all set within the larg- tion toward more skeptical attitudes on immigration
er context of EU relations with migrants’ countries of and asylum? We paint a more nuanced picture that
origin in the European neighborhood and beyond. indicates a broad popular desire for state authorities to
Although far fewer irregular immigrants are entering be able to control borders and the inflow of migrants,
EU territory now than in 2015, this is in part the result but also support for carefully regulated refugee protec-
of EU policies and practices in border management tion (section 2).
that may not be sustainable without significant addi- Second, we discuss how control over the external
tional effort (e.g., the EU-Turkey agreement) or may EU border and immigration can only be exercised in
even be incompatible with humanitarian standards close cooperation with countries of origin and transit
(e.g., the treatment of irregular migrants at some na- (section 3). At the same time, it is often not in the eco-
tional borders in the Western Balkans). nomic or political interest of countries of origin and
Hence, the challenge remains of designing policies transit to help the EU restrict irregular migration—
for border management and asylum that align with neither at the economy-wide and nor at the individual
humanitarian principles, enjoy the support of Euro- level. In the absence of legal migration opportunities,
pean voters, and lead to a fair sharing of responsibility irregular migration may be better than no migration
for refugee protection among EU member states and at all for migrants, the recipients of their remittances,
with host countries in the rest of the world. In this and countries of origin. To address this conundrum,
2019 MEDAM Assessment Report, we identify and we discuss possible elements of a comprehensive ap-
discuss key insights from our research and dialogue proach to cooperation, which would extend not only
with stakeholders since 2016 to inform the design of to border management and the return and readmis-
policies under the new Commission. We emphasize sion of non-EU citizens who have no right to remain
the interdependence of policies in areas as seemingly in Europe, but also to support for refugees in low- and
separate as border management and refugee integra- middle-income countries, development assistance,
tion in low- and middle-income countries. Above all, and legal employment opportunities in the EU. We
we explain how cooperation with migrants’ countries emphasize that effective cooperation must start by
of origin and transit in different policy areas is key to listening to the concerns of stakeholders in countries
effective and humane policies on asylum and immi- of origin and transit, and then jointly developing pol-
gration and on border management. icy packages that benefit all parties and are therefore
A process of rethinking asylum and migration ‘self-enforcing.’
policies in Europe must begin with conversations Third, attempts to impose cooperation among EU
on a wide range of migration-related policies among member states on asylum and other migration-related
stakeholders in Europe and, equally, in countries of policies by majority vote have failed in the past and,
origin and transit, especially in the European neigh- in our view, are unlikely to succeed in the future. Yet,
borhood and in Africa. The European Commission refugee protection is in important ways a public good
plays a key role in the design of many relevant pol- at the EU level and requires coordinated actions by the
icies and is therefore well placed to advance the de- Commission and member states to be effective. We
bate. The insights that we present in this Assessment discuss how the new European Commission can make
Report demonstrate how the current impasse in EU a fresh start on the long-standing legislative reforms of
asylum and migration policies can be overcome and the European asylum system; how common actions in
how politically sustainable, humane, and effective asylum and migration policy should be costed in the
policies can be developed. In this process, while our 2021–27 Multiannual Financial Framework; and how
‘insights’ suggest directions, actual policies will be a monitoring system for member states’ contributions
shaped by conversations and negotiations among to asylum policy can help to combine the necessary
stakeholders. flexibility for member states regarding their contri-
In this Assessment Report, we address three broad butions with the fundamental need for responsibility
topics. First, what asylum and refugee policies do Eu- sharing and solidarity (section 4).
152019 MEDAM Assessment Report
2 Public attitudes to
immigration and asylum policy
preferences in the EU Lead Author: Martin Ruhs
A
key goal of MEDAM is to identify the oppor- Many of the asylum and migration policy changes
tunities for, and obstacles to more effective and proposed or made in EU member states in recent years
sustainable common EU policy making in the have been explicitly based on the argument that these
area of asylum and migration. We argue that a better new policies are needed because ‘the public wants
understanding of Europeans’ public attitudes to im- them’ and ‘they are necessary to win back public trust
migration and asylum policies—how they vary across and confidence’ in national governments. For example,
individuals and countries, how they have changed over the Austrian-Danish vision paper published in 2018
time, and their causes and consequences—is of critical proposed to reduce radically opportunities to apply
importance to promoting more cooperative and effec- for asylum in Europe in order to restore public trust
tive policy approaches among EU member states. in government.1 It is an important task for research to
There are at least three interrelated reasons why it scrutinize these arguments made by politicians in dif-
is important, from a policy perspective, to study pub- ferent EU member states, and to provide greater clarity
lic attitudes to migrants and public policy preferences on what the available data on public attitudes do and
vis-à-vis asylum and migration policies. First, public do not say about public concerns related to migrants
attitudes and policy preferences can—and often do— and refugees.
play an important role in the politics of migration, One specific issue that remains poorly understood,
and in public policy making more generally. We know but which is particularly important for policy debates
from existing research that migration and other pub- and policy making, is what people think about asylum
lic policies are not only determined by ‘interests’ (such and migration policies. All asylum and migration pol-
as the economic interests of employers) and ‘institu- icies are multidimensional in the sense that they re-
tions’ (such as national parliamentary systems and quire multiple policy decisions, on different aspects of
welfare states), but also by ‘ideas,’ including people’s the overall policy package, at the same time. For exam-
fundamental normative beliefs, values, and public atti- ple, asylum and refugee policies are not only about ad-
tudes. Understanding public attitudes is thus essential mitting ‘fewer or more refugees’ but also about other
to help both explain current and past migration poli- matters:
cies, and identify realistic opportunities for achieving
more cooperative policies on migration across mem- • how to regulate the assessment of asylum applica-
ber states within the EU, and also between the EU and tions;
other countries. • what employment and welfare rights to grant to asy-
A second and related reason stems from the political lum seekers and recognized refugees;
legitimacy and sustainability of public policies in lib- • what to do with people whose applications for asy-
eral democracies. There can be many legal and moral lum are refused;
reasons—such as the requirements of existing interna- • whether and how to help first countries of asylum
tional laws or a perceived moral duty to offer protec- near conflict zones;
tion to people in need—why public policies should not • the admission of refugees who are resettled directly
always follow public attitudes. It is also clear, however, from conflict zones; and
that sustainable asylum and migration policies require • the role of the EU in all these processes and deci-
at least a degree of public support. Misunderstanding sions.
the characteristics and causes of the public’s support
or opposition to different types of migration and mi- Most existing research focuses on public attitudes
gration policies, especially of their (alleged or real) to migration rather than migration policies. As a con-
changes over time, can contribute to policy responses sequence, we know very little about people’s attitudes
that do not actually deal with the real issues driving to the various different components of asylum and
public views and that, therefore, may ultimately prove migration policies, which policy aspects generate the
unsustainable. most support or opposition, or about how they would
1
See Austrian Ministry of the Interior and Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration, “Vision for a Better Protection System in a Globalized World,” Vienna and
Copenhagen, October 2018, http://uim.dk/filer/nyheder2018/vision-for-a-better-protection-system-in-a-globalized-world.pdf.
16on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe
view trade-offs and prioritize between competing pol- and proposals by Austria and Denmark to limit se-
icy objectives. verely the right to apply for asylum in Europe). This
A third reason why a better understanding of public has further deepened divisions and raised profound
attitudes and policy preferences is critical to improved questions not only about the meaning of ‘solidarity’
policy making relates to the challenge of designing sus- in Europe but also about the future of the EU and its
tainable common migration policy approaches across ability to find common ground on a fundamental and,
the EU. Almost five years after the large inflows of asy- some would argue, existential policy challenge.
lum seekers and other migrants during the so-called To find an effective and sustainable new EU policy
refugee crisis in 2015–16, member states remain deeply approach to asylum and migration we need to un-
divided about how to reform and rebuild Europe’s asy- derstand how and why public attitudes to migration
lum, refugee, and migration policies. Some member and migration policies differ across individuals and
states see the solution to the immigration challenge as countries, and what role these differences play in
lying in ‘more Europe’ (e.g., through centralization of the politics of migration across EU member states.
the EU asylum system) and ‘greater solidarity’ among Cross-country differences in attitudes that are due to
member states (e.g., through redistribution of refugees underlying structural factors that cannot be changed
across countries). Other member states appear to have in the short run can have notable implications for how
given up waiting on EU policy reform and instead to design common EU policies on asylum and migra-
pursued national or transnational policy responses, tion. Arguably, policy debates in recent years have
involving just a few ‘like-minded’ EU member states not paid enough attention to these potential varia-
(e.g., joint measures by Austria and nine Balkan states tions across EU member states, or the implications for
in 2016 to help ‘close down’ the Western Balkan route, common policy making.
Figure 1 Average attitudes in EU member states included in all ESS waves, 2002–17
Weighted average Belgium Finland France
7
6
5
4
3
Germany Hungary Ireland Netherlands
7
6
5
4
3
Poland Portugal Slovenia Spain
7
6
5
4
3
9
9
1
1
06 5
06 5
5
5
04 3
04 3
3
3
08 7
08 7
7
7
/1
/1
/0
/0
/0
/0
/0
/0
/1
/1
/1
/1
/0
/0
/1
/1
10
10
16
16
14
14
12
12
02
02
Sweden United Kingdom
7
6 The country's cultural life
is undermined by immigrants
5
4 Immigrants make the country
3 a worse or better place to live
Immigration is bad or good
9
9
1
1
06 5
06 5
5
5
04 3
04 3
3
3
08 7
08 7
7
7
/1
/1
/0
/0
/0
/0
/0
/0
/1
/1
/1
/1
/0
/0
/1
/1
for the country's economy
10
10
16
16
14
14
12
12
02
02
Source: Ademmer and Stöhr 2018a.
Notes: The sample is restricted to those states that are EU members as of 2018 and have been surveyed in each European Social Survey (ESS) wave to prevent EU averages from being
skewed by the accession of new member states. Averages are calculated using ESS weights to control for the probability of being sampled for the survey within an individual country and
the population size of the country. The averages are thus representative of the population distribution within the country and the population of EU countries covered here. The answer
scale runs from 0 to 10, where 10 indicates the most positive assessment. Some EU countries are not covered in the graphs because the question has not been continuously asked in them.
172019 MEDAM Assessment Report
Insight #1: Attitudes to immigration have re- On average, people are rather agnostic about the
mained fairly stable across most European coun- overall impact of migrants on their economies and
tries, but the perceived importance of migration as societies.
a public policy issue has increased. While there has been no widespread turn against
immigration, in some EU countries public attitudes
There is a common perception in policy debates that have become more polarized. In other words, many
the large increase in the numbers of asylum seek- people now hold stronger views about immigration
ers and other migrants arriving in Europe during and its impacts than they did in 2002. This is the case,
2015 and 2016 has led to a marked change in public for example, in Germany and Hungary (see figure 2).
attitudes to immigration across EU member states, Another significant change in attitudes to immigra-
making them more negative. This alleged change in tion that has occurred over the past few years relates
public sentiments toward migrants and refugees has to the salience of immigration as a public policy issue.
frequently been used to justify changes to asylum and Salience is not about positive or negative views on a
refugee policies at both national and EU levels. particular issue, but about the relative importance of
There is no evidence to support the idea that Eu- the issue to respondents. Public opinion data suggest
ropeans have turned against immigration in recent a rapid increase in the salience of immigration during
years. Attitudes have been surprisingly stable and 2015–16 in many European countries and research
turned more positive toward migrants in many EU suggests that this surge has positively affected electoral
countries, with few exceptions. As shown in figure 1, support for populist right parties (Dennison 2019;
survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS) Dennison and Geddes 2018). The growing salience of
for 13 EU member states suggest that Europeans as- immigration suggested by data on public attitudes is
sess the impact of immigration on their country and confirmed by MEDAM analysis of how migrants and
its economy and culture in a more positive light than refugees are discussed in social media. Social media is
they did in 2002—even in the aftermath of the 2015 ever more used as a platform for immigration debates.
refugee inflow. Hungary is a prominent exception. The so-called refugee crisis dramatically multiplied
Public perceptions of the impacts of immigration the number of people discussing migration issues on-
vary relatively little across these EU member states. line (see figure 3).
Figure 2 Polarization within Hungary and Germany over time
Germany, 2002/2003 Germany, 2014/2015 Germany, 2016/2017
40 %
30 %
20 %
10 %
0%
Hungary, 2002/2003 Hungary, 2014/2015 Hungary, 2016/2017
40 %
30 %
20 %
10 %
0%
0 5 10 0 5 10 0 5 10
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live
Source: Ademmer and Stöhr 2018a.
Note: Respondents were asked whether immigrants make a country a better or worse place to live in. The answer 0 indicates “much worse,” 5 “neither worse nor
better,” and 10 “much better.” Survey responses adjusted for sampling probability.
18on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe
Figure 3 Facebook comments on migration-related articles in German regional newspapers,
2012-2017
a. Facebook user comments under articles on b. Number of unique Facebook commenters under
migration and asylum posted by German regional articles on migration and asylum posted by German
newspapers on Facebook regional newspapers on Facebook
New Year's Eve 2015 New Year's Eve 2015
Absolute number of
comments per month
Absolute number of
comments per month
Height of
the inflow Height of Terrorist attack
the inflow in Berlin
Foundation of
40,000 Terrorist attack 20 Pegida
in Berlin
First larger inflows
Foundation of of Syrian refugees
20,000 Pegida 10
First larger inflows
of Syrian refugees
0 0
Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source: Ademmer and Stöhr 2018b.
What are the implications of these changes for na- expectation and thus constitute a counterproductive
tional and EU policies on asylum and refugees? First, policy strategy).
although public attitudes to immigration have not
become more negative in recent years, the increasing Insight #2: Attitudes to immigration tend to be
salience of the issue and the polarization of attitudes more positive in local areas with greater shares of
in many countries have compounded the policy con- migrants. However, this relationship is influenced
straints for policy makers. A basic but key implication by the socioeconomic context: as the socioeconomic
is that, to respond effectively to changes in public atti- conditions of local areas worsen (e.g., with higher
tudes over the past few years, policy makers need to be unemployment rates and lower incomes per capita),
focused on the actual changes that have taken place, the positive effects of the share of migrants on
i.e., changes in degrees of polarization and salience attitudes become smaller and they eventually dis-
rather than in sentiments toward migrants. In par- appear in the most deprived areas.
ticular, there is an urgent need to consider the causes
of the increasing salience of immigration as a policy How are people’s attitudes to immigration linked to
issue, especially among those parts of the population the share of migrants in the local population of a par-
with negative views on immigration. The rising scale ticular area? Does an increase in the physical presence
of immigration is likely to be a factor, but so is the per- of migrants—on the streets, in the neighborhoods,
ceived loss of control over borders during 2015–16. It is at work, on the bus, at school—exert a positive or a
also important to reflect critically on various processes negative effect on how the majoritarian populations
of politicization of migrants and refugees in domestic perceive migrants? These are important questions not
policy debates. only for research but also for public policy debates
A second, related implication concerns political about, for example, whether and how asylum seekers
narratives and communication. Politicians who wish or refugees should be distributed across different local
to respond to the growing salience of immigration, in- areas within and across EU countries.
cluding among people with negative views of migrants, In theory, the impact of the presence of migrants on
need to use words and language that are relevant to the attitudes to immigration in a particular area may be
values and beliefs of people holding those views (see shaped by two potentially competing forces. On the
Dennison and Geddes 2018). Increases in the salience one hand, a higher share of migrants in the local pop-
of immigration often coincide with periods when there ulation may promote greater contact with pre-existing
is a perceived loss of control over immigration. Policy residents and thus encourage mutual understand-
narratives need to include the language of ‘control’, ing and more positive attitudes toward immigration
but without suggesting that all aspects of immigra- (‘contact theory’). On the other hand, a higher share of
tion can be controlled (which would be an unrealistic migrants may create feelings of increased threat asso-
192019 MEDAM Assessment Report
ciated with the development of different types of fears, To shed light on these crucial questions, MEDAM
such as intensified competition for jobs and more research (Hoxhaj and Zuccotti 2019) has investigated
pressures on public services (‘threat theory’). Given whether and how the relationship between the pres-
these potentially counteracting forces, the actual re- ence of migrants and individuals’ attitudes toward
lationship between the concentration of migrants and migrants is influenced by the socioeconomic charac-
attitudes to immigration is a central question for em- teristics of the area (as measured by local unemploy-
pirical research. ment rates and income per capita). In line with the ex-
Most existing studies have found that individuals isting research literature, this new research finds that
who reside in neighborhoods or small areas (i.e., prov- individuals who reside in areas with a higher share of
inces or small regions) with a higher migrant concen- migrants have, in general, a more positive attitude to-
tration have, in general, more positive views toward wards them (figure 4 illustrates the positive estimated
immigration compared with individuals who live in effect of the migrant share when unemployment is low
areas with a lower concentration. These findings are or per capita income high). However, this estimated ef-
typically explained with reference to contact theory. fect is conditioned by the socioeconomic context: The
Yet, with few exceptions, most of these studies have positive marginal effect of the migrant share on atti-
disregarded the complexities of the environment in tudes decreases as socioeconomic conditions worsen.
which individuals live, including the socioeconomic Nevertheless, even in areas where one would ex-
context in which contacts with migrants occur. pect threat mechanisms to occur to the greatest ex-
It is important to ask whether and how the socio- tent—i.e., areas with the poorest socioeconomic con-
economic characteristics of an area might affect the ditions, where competition for public services and jobs
relationship between the share of migrants and atti- is probably the highest—an increase in the migrant
tudes to immigration. In practice, contact and threat share does not significantly worsen individuals’ atti-
might coexist but the extent to which one of the two tudes towards migrants: When the unemployment rate
theories prevails is likely to be related to the conditions is above 12.5 percent (panel a) or log GDP per capita
under which such contact or exposure occurs. While below 9.5 (€13,360; panel b), the ‘zero line’ lies within
an increase of immigrants in poor areas does not nec- the boundaries of the confidence intervals around the
essarily mean that attitudes toward immigration will estimated effects, meaning that the estimated effects
worsen, poor socioeconomic conditions may discour- are not statistically different from zero.
age the development of positive attitudes. Conversely, These new research findings have implications for
contexts where social exchanges occur with less com- national and EU debates and for policy making on
petition for resources are more likely to enhance posi- migration, especially related to policies that aim to
tive attitudes to immigration. distribute asylum seekers and refugees across different
Figure 4 How are attitudes toward immigrants in Europe shaped by regional contexts?
a. b.
.01
.01
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Marginal effect of ShareMig
Marginal effect of ShareMig
-.005 -.0025 0 .0025 .005
-.005 -.0025 0 .0025 .005
% of observations
% of observations
0 .5
0 .5
-.01
-.01
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Unemployment rate Log GDP per capita
Source: Hoxhaj and Zuccotti 2019.
Notes: This figure shows how local socio-economic factors such as unemployment (Graph 1) and GDP per capita (Graph 2) influence the relationship between the share of
immigrants and attitudes to immigration. The negative (positive) inclination of the bold line in Graph 1 (Graph 2) indicates that the worst the socio-economic conditions of the
NUTS 3 area, the lower the positive effect of the immigrant’s share on attitudes to immigration. The effect of socio-economic conditions is relevant mostly in better off areas
(significance intervals presented by the dashed lines are both above the 0 line).
ShareMig = share of migrants in the local area population.
NUTS 3: Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS), are standardized geographies that are often used for the elaboration and presentation of cross-national
statistics in Europe The definition of NUTS3 includes areas with a size between 150.000 and 800.000 inhabitants.
20on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe
local areas within countries, or among EU countries. overall policy. The methodology facilitates analysis of
One basic but important implication is that any pol- how specific policy features affect both support and
icy promoting the spatial (re-)distribution of refugees opposition to the overall asylum and refugee policy.
should consider the socioeconomic characteristics of The new MEDAM study defined an asylum and ref-
the areas in which they will reside. MEDAM research ugee policy in terms of six underlying policy dimen-
suggests that placing refugees in areas with better so- sions that regulate the following aspects:
cioeconomic characteristics is more likely to promote
migrants’ acceptance by the local population than • the right to apply for asylum;
placing them in poorer areas (as many countries cur- • the resettlement of already recognized refugees to
rently do). the EU from non-EU countries;
• the return of asylum seekers whose applications for
Insight #3: Europeans are generally committed protection have been unsuccessful;
to policies that provide protection for asylum seek- • family reunification for recognized refugees;
ers and refugees but they express support for more • the role of the EU in the governance of asylum and
policy controls, such as limits and conditions, in refugee issues; and
asylum and refugee policies. There is no evidence • financial assistance to non-EU countries hosting
of widespread public support for highly restrictive refugees.
policies that eliminate protection and assistance.
Each of these six policy dimensions takes on two or
Despite the growing prominence of asylum and mi- three possible values, which are all listed in table 1 be-
gration in public policy debates in Europe, we know low.
surprisingly little about the types of asylum and refu- The aim of the research is to establish what types
gee policies that Europeans support or oppose. While of policy changes would generate the most public
there is a lot of research literature on public attitudes support or opposition. We concentrated on studying
to immigration and individual immigrants in Europe support and opposition to fundamental policy prin-
and other high-income countries (e.g., Hainmueller ciples rather than very specific policy options. So, for
and Hopkins 2014), there has been considerably less example, we asked about ‘annual limits’ to asylum ap-
research on attitudes to asylum seekers and refugees plications in order to explore support for moving away
(but see Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016), from the current status quo (‘no limits’), not because
and very limited work on asylum and refugee poli- we wanted to assess support for a very specific policy
cies (exceptions include Bansak, Hainmueller, and option. We used the idea of an annual limit as an ex-
Hangartner 2017). A notable limitation of the exist- ample of a control measure in this policy dimension.
ing studies that do deal with public preferences on The different values in the other dimensions should
asylum/refugee policies is that they focus on isolated be considered and interpreted in a similar way, e.g.,
policy questions rather than taking a comprehensive as illustrative examples of policy changes that would
approach that considers the inherent multidimension- imply a fundamental change in the underlying policy
ality of the policy issue. Consequently, we have a poor principles.
understanding of the policy features and changes that The key results of the study are shown in figure 5.
would generate the most public support or opposition The figure shows the effects of changes within policy
to the overall asylum and refugee policy. dimensions on the probability of accepting the over-
To address this gap in existing research, and to con- all ‘asylum and refugee policy’ relative to the reference
tribute to ongoing policy debates about how to reform category. In each policy dimension, the first value (i.e.,
national and common refugee policies in Europe, the policy feature listed first) serves as the reference
MEDAM researchers conducted a new study (Jeannet category. For example, introducing an annual limit on
et al. 2019) that involved ‘conjoint survey experiments’ the number of asylum applications increases the prob-
with 12,000 people across eight European countries, ability that an individual would support the overall
including Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, asylum and refugee policy by just over 5 percentage
Poland, Spain, and Sweden (1,500 online survey inter- points, while not allowing any family reunification for
views with a nationally representative sample in each recognized refugees reduces the probability of accept-
country). Conjoint experiments are particularly useful ance of the overall policy by just under 5 percentage
for studying public attitudes toward multidimensional points. In the context of a conjoint experiment, these
(policy) issues. effects are quite large.
Rather than asking respondents to assess and rate Figure 5 shows that, compared with the respective
certain policies independent of one another, conjoint reference categories within each policy dimension, in-
experiments require respondents to make a series of troducing an annual limit on the annual applications
constrained choices between pairs of policy options for asylum, having a resource requirement for family
that differ across several ‘dimensions’ making up the reunification, and conditioning financial assistance to
212019 MEDAM Assessment Report
Table 1 Possible values (or ‘policy features’) of the six policy dimensions
that make up the overall asylum and refugee policy
Policy dimension Randomly allocated values in experiment
Applications for asylum 1. Anyone can apply for asylum in [YOUR COUNTRY] with no annual limits.
2. Anyone can apply for asylum in [YOUR COUNTRY] until an annual limit is reached.
Resettlement of 1. No resettlement of United Nations-recognized refugees to [YOUR COUNTRY]
recognized refugees 2. Low resettlement of United Nations-recognized refugees to [YOUR COUNTRY]
(1 person per 10000 citizens per year, i.e. [ country-specific population]).
3. High resettlement of United Nations-recognized refugees to [YOUR COUNTRY]
(2 or more persons per 10,000 citizens per year, i.e. [country-specific population]).
[country-specific population]: For Italy (60 million) in 1b) “6,000”, in 2b) “more than
12,000”
Return to danger 1. Refused asylum seekers are never sent back to countries where they could face
serious harm
2. In some cases, refused asylum seekers can be sent back to countries where they
could face serious harm.
Family reunification for 1. A recognized refugee can always bring his/her spouse and children
recognized refugees 2. A recognized refugee can bring his/her spouse and children only if the refugee
can pay for their cost of living
3. A recognized refugee cannot bring his/her spouse and children
Decisions on asylum 1. Each EU country makes its own decisions on asylum applications within its
applications territory.
2. A centralised European Union agency decides applications for asylum for all EU
countries.
Financial solidarity 1. [YOUR COUNTRY] provides unconditional financial assistance to non-EU
countries that host refugees.
2. [YOUR COUNTRY] provides financial assistance to non-EU countries that host
refugees only if they help reduce asylum seekers coming to Europe.
3. [YOUR COUNTRY] provides no financial assistance to non-EU countries that host
refugees.
Source: Jeannet et al. 2019.
non-EU countries hosting refugees on their efforts to patterns of Europeans’ policy preferences are broadly
reduce migration to Europe would increase Europe- similar across different countries, although there are
ans’ support for asylum and refugee policies. cross-country differences when it comes to resettle-
On the other hand, public support would be reduced ment, the role of the EU, and financial assistance to
by a high rate of resettlement, sometimes sending non-EU countries hosting refugees. For example, in
failed asylum seekers (whose applications for protec- Hungary both ‘low’ and ‘high’ rates of resettlement
tion have been unsuccessful) back to dangerous places have negative impacts, while in Spain they both in-
(e.g., violating the principle of non-refoulement), never crease acceptance of the overall asylum and refugee
allowing family reunification for refugees, having an policy. Italy is the only country where having a central
EU agency rather than national governments assess EU agency assess and decide on asylum applications
and decide on applications for asylum in Europe, and does not decrease public support.
unconditional assistance to non-EU countries hosting Overall, this research suggests that Europeans sup-
large numbers of refugees. port additional controls and conditions on various
While there appears to be a widespread perception aspects of asylum and refugee policies. The results
that public attitudes to immigration and immigration also suggest, however, that highly restrictive meas-
policies differ considerably across European countries, ures that would imply moving away from funda-
the new MEDAM research finds that many of the key mental principles underlying current policies, such
features of the public’s preferred asylum and refugee as sending people back to dangerous places (non-
policies are remarkably similar across countries. The refoulment) and abolishing family reunification
22You can also read
