Review into the Maritime Safety Information Requirements for the Export of Livestock by Sea - 15 October 2020 - MPI
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Review into the Maritime Safety Information
Requirements for the Export of Livestock by Sea
15 October 2020
Michael Heron QC
Rear Admiral (ret) Tony Parr ONZM, MVO
Charlotte Agnew-Harington
Contents
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................. 3
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 6
Terms of Reference ................................................................................................................................. 6
Process .................................................................................................................................................... 6
Background ............................................................................................................................................. 8
The broader context of this review..................................................................................................... 8
Working group paper ...................................................................................................................... 8
2019 Discussion Document ............................................................................................................. 9
Discussion ............................................................................................................................................... 9
Recommendations for immediate implementation ............................................................................. 11
Focused maritime inspection ............................................................................................................ 11
Stocking density ................................................................................................................................ 12
Improving the quality of voyage reports .......................................................................................... 13
Requiring additional information in relation to animal welfare ....................................................... 14
Requiring additional information as to the voyage itself ................................................................. 14
Longer-term recommendations ............................................................................................................ 17
Documentation required in support of AWECs ................................................................................ 17
Ongoing review of rules, guidance, and regulations ........................................................................ 19
Australian rules and standards ..................................................................................................... 19
OIE Standards ................................................................................................................................ 22
Upskilling personnel .......................................................................................................................... 22
Collecting more information earlier ................................................................................................. 23
Exporter information .................................................................................................................... 23
Ship information ........................................................................................................................... 24
Establishing a new working group .................................................................................................... 26
Appendix 1 – Terms of Reference
Appendix 2 – Deloitte Report
Appendix 3 – background to the trade and regulatory framework
Appendix 4 – Working Group recommendations
2Executive Summary
A. The Gulf Livestock 1 tragedy provides a pivotal moment for those involved in the New Zealand
livestock export industry to reflect on the process for approval of such exports. We are tasked
with reviewing the sufficiency of the information the Director-General receives as part of the
Animal Welfare Export Certificate (AWEC) process, which in turn is designed to protect the
welfare of animals being exported from New Zealand and to protect New Zealand’s reputation
as a responsible exporter of animals.
B. The maritime tragedy is being investigated by the authorities of the vessel’s flag state (Panama).
In addition, the Government is currently undertaking a broader review of the livestock export
system. MPI sought public feedback on options to improve that system in a November 2019
discussion paper and thousands of submissions have been received. An outcome of that
broader review will come in due course. It is appropriate, however, to reflect immediately as
to what, if anything, more could be done in terms of sufficiency of information provided in the
AWEC process.
C. In our view, the current AWEC process is robust and ensures careful consideration of the
statutory criteria by experienced and professional personnel, including senior MPI staff with
first-hand experience. The reliance on the maritime regulatory process is appropriate and
provides reasonable assurance. A focussed interim PSC inspection campaign for livestock
carriers may enable more information to be collected by MNZ, which could then be provided to
MPI.
D. Transport of livestock by sea over long periods is a complex and challenging exercise requiring
thorough planning and diligent execution at all stages to ensure adequate animal welfare
results. The trade is difficult to regulate, given it spans jurisdictions and the high seas and
involves a myriad of international agencies, regulators, and commercial players. It involves
many participants, including veterinarians, maritime surveyors, stock handlers, ship’s crew, ship
owners and their agents, exporters, and various regulators. In such a context, there are no
simple solutions and there is no single body or agency with ultimate control. In addition, we
note the obvious: rules and regulations themselves cannot necessarily prevent tragedies and
accidents.
E. The potential hazards involved in the sea transport phase and the risks which arise from them
are such that systems of risk control must be comprehensive and effective. It appears likely
(and has been widely reported) that the tragedy involving the Gulf Livestock 1 was caused by a
combination of factors (including at least mechanical, meteorological and human factors). We
note that that ship was compliant with New Zealand’s standards, had a valid ACCL, and
appeared to be operated by experienced people. It should, on paper, have been able to make
a safe and successful voyage.
F. Pending the outcome of the broader policy review, we suggest more could be done to provide
assurance to MPI’s Director-General in certain areas of concern. There are opportunities to
3strengthen New Zealand’s regime. That regime is largely aligned with the Australian regime
though there is potential, in terms of both design and effect, to make changes to the New
Zealand system to enhance that alignment. We emphasise that it is by no means certain that a
strengthened New Zealand system would have prevented this tragedy. For example, the vessel
would apparently have complied with the Australian regime and the exporter considered itself
subject to that regime.
G. As outlined in the body of this report, we suggest MPI, MNZ and relevant industry bodies
continue to collaborate to improve the standard of assurance received for livestock exports.
Specifically, whilst awaiting the outcome of the broader policy review, we recommend
additional measures be considered. Measures that we recommend be implemented
immediately, in response to the tragedy, include:
1) Focused maritime inspection campaign: Implementing an interim PSC focussed
maritime inspection campaign for livestock carrier ships coming to New Zealand to
export livestock, to be conducted by MNZ and reported on to MPI. The inspections
would focus on safety aspects such as voyage planning systems (taking into account
weather routing and contingency plans) and safety management systems and would
collect additional information regarding the ship, its crew, and its intended voyage.
This should continue at least until the Panama investigation is complete.
2) Stocking Density: Consideration of a temporary restriction on stocking density to give
an additional safety margin (for example 90% of the current limits, on a risk-based
criteria).
3) Improving the quality of voyage reports: Adding additional improvements to the
existing reporting mechanisms, including with respect to post voyage reporting, 30-
day reporting, and reporting on voyage issues and the use of and compliance with
voyage and contingency plans. We suggest MPI consider additional consequences
which ought to follow a failure to report on time or in sufficient detail. The voyage
reports should emulate those already supplied to the exporter and be verified by the
Master, veterinarian and/or stock handler, in accordance with their relevant areas of
expertise.
H. We understand and expect that MPI will also be implementing the recommendations of the
Livestock Export Working Group as submitted to this review (including the requirement for
more comprehensive AWEC information and voyage reporting from exporters, in particular as
to voyage planning, contingencies, and broader animal welfare indicators during and after the
voyage).
I. Longer-term improvements should be considered (potentially as part of the broader policy
choices or changes), including:
4) Documentation required in support of AWECs: MPI should consider requiring more
robust and fulsome information to be provided as part of the AWEC application
process. This will help MPI ensure it has collected all relevant information and,
overtime, build its institutional knowledge regarding the risks and range of outcomes
that flow from the current livestock export process.
5) Ongoing review of rules, guidance, and regulations: In time, the complex regime for
livestock exports should be considered and potentially reviewed with a focus on
ensuring best practice, clarity, and interagency cooperation. In the meantime, a
4review of the MPI Guidance Material for the Transport of Cattle by Sea (Version 1 26
June 2013) ought be undertaken to ensure that it remains up to date in light of the
new Australian Standards for Export of Livestock (ASEL 3) in force from 1 November
2020. Such review should expressly seek input from animal welfare scientists. MPI
should consider interim adoption of the ASEL 3 standards where the current guidance
material provides less or no assurance. In addition, the Guidance Material should
become mandatory rather than recommendatory so far as possible (to provide useful
alignment with Australian regulation and provide clarity for inter-Tasman operators).
This broad review should also encompass an ongoing review of the quality of voyage
reporting, focusing on full and transparent reporting on animal welfare measures
following the improvements suggested above, with a view to considering whether an
independent observer model is required if improved reporting does not result.
6) Upskilling personnel: Consideration should be given to requiring that at least one
stock handler have relevant qualifications specific to livestock export. In addition, all
crew embarked for livestock care ought to receive basic ship safety training as a
component of the accreditation process.
7) Collecting more information earlier: MPI ought to consider whether it can collect
more information about an exporter at the registration stage, and that process should
be more rigorous. MPI should also consider whether it might seek more information
about potential exports at an earlier stage in the export process so that there is less
pressure on decision makers and less risk to operators when the decision is made.
8) Establishing a new working group: We recommend establishing an advisory group,
akin to the Live Export Working Group established after the disaster, to work with MPI
to develop and advise on a continuous improvement framework for the live export
industry, and to undertake the work required to improve, on an ongoing basis, the
Guidance Material and its implementation into the AWEC process. We suggest that
the group include a balance of representatives from industry, MPI, and animal welfare
scientists and experts.
5Introduction
1. The Gulf Livestock 1 was tragically lost in the early hours of 2 September (New Zealand time)
2020. The vessel was carrying 43 crew members (including two New Zealand stockmen) and
nearly 6,000 Friesian heifers. Two people are known to have survived. All cattle perished. Under
international convention, Panama is responsible for investigating the disaster and a report is
awaited. The New Zealand Transport Accident Investigation Commission is assisting Panama in
the investigation.
2. The ship sailed from Napier, having received the necessary approvals from New Zealand
regulators. MPI issued the exporter an AWEC under s 44 of the Animal Welfare Act 1999 (AWA).
3. Following the disaster, MPI (and then Cabinet, by regulation) suspended the issue of further
AWECs. The Director-General of MPI commissioned this inquiry to examine what, if anything,
more MPI could do as part of the AWEC process to assure itself that a vessel, its crew and cargo
can make a safe and successful voyage.
Terms of Reference
4. The Terms of Reference (TOR) for this review are included at Appendix 1. The TOR essentially
mandate a review of the sufficiency of the assurances that MPI receives in relation to:
a. Carriage by sea as a mode of transport, and
b. Susceptibility of livestock to harm and distress on the journey when exported by ship.
5. We are tasked with reporting to the Director-General on any additional information that might
be required to give a high level of confidence that issuing an AWEC for a proposed export of
livestock by sea is consistent with:
a. the protection of welfare of animals being exported from New Zealand, and
b. New Zealand’s reputation as a responsible exporter of animals.
6. The review was required to consider:
a. the documentation required in support of applications for AWECs for export by sea,
relating to loading of the vessel and the voyage to the final destination;
b. the voyage reports provided (or to be provided) by exporters in respect of exports of
livestock by sea over the last two years;
c. conventions, laws and rules relating to international shipping safety, the primary
responsibility of Flag States and owners of vessels for the safety and operation of
livestock carrying ships, and the Port State Control system that supports the safety of
shipping;
d. information that is available about the risk profiles of specific vessels, and the history
of their Flag states, owners, operators and the exporters that use them; and
e. any other information or matters considered relevant.
Process
7. This review was required to be completed within a short timeframe (about a month). The
requirement for speed arose because exporters have livestock in quarantine awaiting shipment as
part of shipments which were already scheduled. Understandably, the Director-General and MPI
6required prompt assurance as to the AWEC process in light of the tragedy. We are grateful for the
support the review received from MPI and from all those involved.
8. The review process was designed to ensure that we received all relevant material and heard
from relevant stakeholders. The process began with an initial review of fundamental documents,
including the AWA, MPI’s guidance for the export of cattle by sea (MPI Guidance), and the AWEC
application and decision document for the Gulf Livestock 1. Although the review was not charged
with reviewing that specific decision, that application served as a useful entry point. A separate
review by Deloitte of the decision process followed for Gulf Livestock 1 found that existing process
was followed appropriately. That report is attached as Appendix 2.
9. We then worked with MPI to determine what other materials and resources should be
considered. A list of interviewees was compiled and a variety of stakeholders were interviewed.
Each generously shared expertise and insights into the live export and AWEC regimes.
10. Interviewees included representatives and individuals from:
a. MPI, including senior leadership team members, staff of the Animal Health and
Welfare Directorate, and a veterinary technical supervisor;
b. Maritime New Zealand (MNZ);
c. a maritime insurance provider;
d. those directly experienced in livestock exports by sea (including a vet and two senior
stockmen from recent voyages);
e. industry, including from Beef + Lamb New Zealand, Federated Farmers, Genetic
Development NZ, SAILS, AUSTREX, FAFRE, Sinomarine Livestock Carriers, Livestock
Shipping Services, and AGE (the exporter for the Gulf Livestock 1 shipment);
f. advisory bodies, including the National Animal Welfare Advisory Committee (NAWAC)
and the Animal Trade Advisory Council (ATAC);
g. a maritime surveyor for the AWEC process (a qualified harbour master with many
years’ experience of surveying and approving ships for live export);
h. the New Zealand Veterinary Association;
i. SAFE and the SPCA; and
j. Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA).
11. As well as numerous interviews, this review, its findings and conclusions were informed by a
wide range of materials. Certain of those materials relate specifically to the AWEC regime, others
relate to maritime regulations; many provided insights on the broader policy question of whether
the trade should continue. That question is not within our remit but is part of an ongoing policy
review by MPI (discussed below).
12. Materials were provided to us by MPI, our interviewees, and various other stakeholders. We
are grateful for those that provided additional material and for the wealth of knowledge and
expertise we were able to access. The materials provided to us were, without exception, helpful
in coming to our conclusions. Certain were provided in confidence and/or subject to privilege.
For those reasons and to keep this report succinct, we are not able to reflect the content of all
those materials here.
713. We provided a draft for consultation to MPI and MNZ for their response. Where appropriate,
this final report reflects the feedback received.
Background
14. The Background to this industry is complex from a trade and regulatory perspective. Details
regarding the trade from New Zealand and the legislative and regulatory framework are set out
in Appendix 3 to this report.
15. Since April 2015 there have been 55 cattle shipments from New Zealand, involving
approximately 218,872 cattle. There have been 22 ships used, half of which are purpose built for
the carriage of livestock, the other half of which were converted to that use. The average length
of voyage has been around 17 days with most of the shipments going to China.
16. To date, mortality has been used as the primary indicator of a voyage’s success. Since 2015,
mortality rates have remained low, peaking in 2015 at an annual total of 0.23%. In many years,
the annual rate has been less than 0.10% (it currently sits at that level for 2020). Although
mortality is not necessarily the best or sole indicator of a positive outcome (discussed further
below), it should be noted that mortality rates for New Zealand exports are generally low. 1
The broader context of this review
Working group paper
17. Following the sinking of the Gulf Livestock 1, MPI commissioned this review and also convened
a working group of members from MPI’s Agriculture & Investment Services Business Unit, the
Animal Germplasm Trade Association, veterinarians experienced in live cattle exports by sea, and
other industry stakeholders to consider and design additional assurances that might be able to be
provided to MPI as an additional layer of assurance in its AWEC process.
18. The Working Group’s report (dated 28 September 2020) was provided to us for the purposes
of the review. The Working Group proposed 11 “priority actions” that might be taken to provide
MPI with greater confidence, in the immediate future, as to the live export process. We have read
those recommendations; they are sensible and appropriate. We incorporate them in our
recommendations and they are attached as Appendix 4.
19. It is important to note that the New Zealand live export trade is different than that from
Australia. Since approximately 2008 the New Zealand export trade has been for breeding only. 2
Conditional prohibition of export for slaughter has been in place since December 2007 through
Export Prohibition orders, which have been renewed in 2010, 2013 and 2016. 3 Australia allows
exports for slaughter.
20. The Gulf Livestock 1 disaster involved the shipment of breeding cattle and it is the shipment
of live sheep and cattle which appears to generate the greatest controversy here and in Australia.
1 Voyage summaries, including mortality rates, are available on MPI’s website. See
https://www.mpi.govt.nz/exporting/animals/live-animals/requirement-documents-for-exporting-live-animals/animal-
welfare-export-certificates/live-sheep-and-cattle-export-voyage-reports/, accessed 12 October 2020.
2 Livestock Export Review discussion paper, at p 22.
3 Initially by regulations under the Customs and Excise Act) and then in December 2016 under the Animal Welfare (Export
of Livestock for Slaughter) Regulations 2016, effective 21 December 2016.
8The focus of our consideration therefore has almost exclusively been on the process for export of
live cattle for breeding purposes. Other live animal exports (such as crayfish or domestic animals
for relocation) are not the focus.
2019 Discussion Document
21. In November 2019 MPI released a discussion paper entitled “Livestock Export Review”. It said
“[t]he aim of the review is to improve the welfare of livestock being exported, and protect New
Zealand’s reputation” and gave four options for strengthening New Zealand’s livestock export
system. 4 The objective of that review is to consider changes to the regime while also protecting
New Zealand’s reputation as a responsible exporter of animals and animal products, complying
with international obligations, and ensuring New Zealand’s rural communities can be vibrant,
resilient, and sustainable. Options are to be evaluated for effectiveness and efficiency.
22. The discussion paper refers to the Ministerial advisory committees with “an important role in
helping set those policies and laws while representing society's views on animal welfare.” Those
committees are the National Animal Welfare Advisory Committee (NAWAC) and the National
Animal Ethics Advisory Committee (NAEAC).
23. The questions raised in that discussion document go to the wider policy issue of whether New
Zealand should continue to permit the exportation of livestock (and, if so, how). There are many
views on that issue, some of which have been conveyed to us in the course of this review. It is
not, however, within our remit to investigate or comment on whether the live export trade should
continue. The recommendations in this review are not designed to comment on which of those
options are preferable. Any recommendations made here are necessarily interim, pending the
implementation of the outcome of that review.
Discussion
24. The sinking of the Gulf Livestock 1 was a human and animal welfare disaster. Whatever the
causes of the disaster, it is timely to reflect on the effectiveness of the New Zealand regulatory
process for the export of livestock by sea. In our view, more can be done to provide assurance to
MPI that transport by sea is appropriate and consistent with animal welfare requirements.
25. The primary risk to animal welfare in the livestock export journey lies in the international sea
transport from New Zealand to the final destination.
26. Pending the result of the Panamanian inquiry into the loss of the Gulf Livestock 1, there is no
immediate and obvious concern as to the overall seaworthiness of livestock carrying ships visiting
New Zealand, as long as they are:
a. registered to reputable Flag States;
b. in class to equally reputable Classification Societies or Recognised Organisations; and
c. certified appropriately to Flag State requirements.
Confirmation of this may be found on the Tokyo MoU website, which provides ranked lists of
Flag States and Classification Societies, and the Asia Pacific Computerised Information System
4Those options are (i) a total ban; (ii) a conditional ban; (iii) new regulations to enhance the system; and (iv) continuous
improvement (without significant rule change).
9(APCIS), which provides detailed information on the certification status of merchant ships. 5
27. The survey requirements of Australian Maritime Order 43 and provision of an Australian
Certificate for the Carriage of Livestock (ACCL), together with a ship Classification Certificate and
Cargo Ship Safety construction certificate give confidence that a livestock carrier proposed for a
shipment of livestock from New Zealand is compliant with requirements for the carriage of
livestock, as presented.
28. Notwithstanding the above, conditions on board a ship at sea can create issues for animal
welfare. Those conditions may include:
a. extremes of temperature and humidity;
b. wind and sea states;
c. mechanical defects in ship systems (e.g. propulsion plant, electricity generators,
steering gear, seawater desalination plants, air conditioning and ventilation); and
d. defects in ship systems fitted for the carriage of livestock (e.g. ventilation, lighting,
fodder and water provision, and draining arrangements).
29. Some we spoke to advised that the animals exported from New Zealand had good welfare
experiences at sea; others thought the animals’ experiences on board were unacceptable. During
the course of a voyage animals may face a range of welfare outcomes; from death, disease and
injury, to successful and healthy results. 6 Much depends on the experience and practice of the
stock people, veterinarian and crew on board, and the circumstances of the voyage, including
weather conditions and the reliability of ship systems, including those systems associated with the
provision of services for livestock.
30. It will always be a challenge to ensure satisfactory animal welfare outcomes during a sea
voyage of two to three weeks, so we recommend MPI takes an approach of continuous
improvement to all aspects of animal welfare in the context of live exports by sea. For reasons
we expand upon here, and as the Working Group recognises, more could be done in a range of
areas.
31. Our impression is that the Australian system for exporting livestock is comprehensive; New
Zealand has adopted certain aspects of the Australian system (such as ACCL requirements) but not
others (such as daily reporting). Both systems are robust and set high standards for exporters.
Considered in its entirety, the Australian approval and certification process appears more
prescriptive and unified in approach, with greater scrutiny of the maritime aspects and more
thorough voyage reporting and consequential feedback. We consider that the similarities
between the Australian and New Zealand markets, and the fact that both have high expectations
for maritime and animal safety, justify an aligned “trans-Tasman” approach, particularly given that
many exporters operating out of New Zealand ports also operate out of Australia. Given the
overlap of exporters, export markets, ships, and trade rules, the New Zealand requirements should
5 See http://www.tokyo-mou.org/, accessed 12 October 2020.
6 A recent Australian departmental review (discussed below) noted the approach of regulating for outcomes rather than
inputs (i.e., the focus and aim of the regulations ought to be on the end of the process, rather than just what goes into it).
That seems to be a sensible approach, so that the benefits of the live export trade can be balanced against the effective
protection of animal welfare.
10align with Australian ones and equal or better the Australian Standards for the Export of Livestock
(ASEL), absent good reasons for specific difference.
32. We consider that the Director-General should adopt interim measures to respond to the Gulf
Livestock 1 tragedy and this review. Those measures should be directed to lifting the level of
assurance provided to him as to the mode of transport and the welfare of animals involved. Our
key recommendations, which we suggest should be implemented immediately, are set out below.
Recommendations for immediate implementation
Focused maritime inspection
33. At this stage it appears the sinking of the Gulf Livestock 1 was a maritime disaster likely caused
by a combination of factors. Without suggesting that increased maritime regulation would have
prevented it, it seems to us that MPI and the AWEC process could and should take advantage of
MNZ’s expertise to require increased maritime supervision and receive further assurances as to
the maritime fitness and compliance of these ships and their safety management systems.
34. Sections 54 and 55 of the Maritime Transport Act 1994 (MTA) give New Zealand the power
to inspect and detain vessels in our ports. 7 We suggest that, in light of the tragedy, MPI might
consider working with MNZ to ensure that intended livestock carriers are subject to increased
maritime scrutiny in New Zealand. Additional maritime inspections and reporting could be built
into the AWEC approval process and could be achieved by way of a focused maritime inspection
by MNZ. A further, more nuanced inspection could be carried out if there are clear grounds to
believe that the condition of the ship does not substantially comply with the requirements of the
international conventions, or that the Master or crew are not familiar with essential shipboard
procedures relating to the safety of the ship.
35. A focused inspection campaign is a separate but complementary exercise to the mandatory
survey requirements already in play (such as Maritime Rule 24C, discussed below). Given the
unique nature of livestock cargo and the fact that intensive management and continuous
availability of shipboard services is required to ensure animal welfare during the course of a
voyage, we consider in this interim period that a focused inspection should be implemented for
livestock vessels visiting New Zealand. The inspection should ensure compliance with SOLAS
Chapter V, Regulation 34 which covers voyage planning, by ensuring that the vessel’s safe ship
management system adequately and appropriately addresses processes for passage planning,
weather routing and contingency planning. IMO Resolution A.893(21) provides guidelines for
voyage planning should be used as the reference planning document.
36. A mandatory element of the passage plan should include the availability of services for
weather routing such as that contained in Volume D of the World Meteorological Organization’s
Publication No.9. The conduct of the passage plan is the responsibility of the Master and the
vessel’s bridge watchkeeping officers. MNZ has no mandate or remit to monitor ships in
international waters. It is to be expected that a passage plan changes as a voyage proceeds if the
circumstances make this appropriate. A focus on how the ship’s crew undertakes contingency
7Detention is achieved under the provisions of the MTA and only in circumstances where the criteria of section 55 of the
Act are meant.
11planning supports assurances that the passage plan will be updated to meet changing
circumstances.
37. We suggest that MNZ could consider implementing an interim focussed inspection campaign,
in response to the Gulf Livestock 1 tragedy, subjecting livestock vessels to focussed inspections.
Inspection reports can be included as information gathered by MPI and (as necessary) conditions
of the AWEC process. Our understanding is that such a process is part of the Australian regime.
Stocking density
38. Given the concerns that have arisen in Australia and from our interviews, MPI should, in the
short term at least, consider placing greater limits on stocking density numbers so as to give a
margin of safety and assurance (for example a maximum of 90% of the permissible stocking
numbers). 8
39. The concern about stocking density was emphasised to us by a number of experienced stock
handlers and evidenced in a recent voyage report by a very experienced veterinarian. The
Australian Technical Advisory Report said this about stocking density: 9
It is universally accepted that the amount of space provided to animals during periods of
confinement is critically important for their health and welfare. Stocking density governs important
elements of body posture and behaviour, including social interaction. It also affects access to
fodder and water, influences susceptibility to disease and has a strong influence on heat load
experienced by confined animals.”
“There is widespread agreement—from the literature and in virtually all submissions received by
the committee—that the appropriate science–based approach to determining space allowances
for confined livestock is through the application of allometry. Allometry is the study of the
relationship between body size to animal shape and behaviour, and applied here involves
understanding how the use of space by animals may differ with body shape and weight.
40. The Committee concluded by finding that the current space allowances ought to be adjusted
in line with the weight of submissions to it. This resulted in a suggested approximately 7.9%
minimum space allowance increase for 400kg cattle to the previous space allowance under ASEL
v2.3 (the former Australian standards). Although our inquiry is brief and limited on this subject,
we have concerns that our minimum shipboard space allowances may not be adequate and that
stocking densities could be permitted when they are too high for optimal animal welfare.
41. We suggest consideration be given to an interim adjustment whilst the further work is done,
as already discussed. A limit of 90% of the current maximum of stocking density could be
considered based on the evidence we were supplied and the suggestions of the Technical
Committee. This could be implemented on a risk basis depending on the length of the journey,
the record of the exporter and the nature of the ship (as discussed below).
8 We were advised this was a material source of animal welfare issues by a number of interviewees and this theme was
also reflected in the Final report of the Technical Advisory Committee Review of the Australian Standards for the Export of
Livestock: Sea Transport – see p 26 (referred to further below).
9 At paragraph 3.2.4.
12Improving the quality of voyage reports
42. The ToR require us to consider the voyage reports provided by exporters in respect of exports
of livestock by sea over the last two years. A key part of our review involved reviewing those
voyage reports and discussing them with stakeholders. We were impressed with the
professionalism and co-operation provided by exporters to this review and note there seemed no
reluctance to provide more detailed reports to MPI.
43. Section 45(1)(1a) of the AWA gives MPI the ability to require post-arrival reporting as a
condition to the grant of an AWEC. A template for a voyage report is provided at Appendix 7 of
the MPI Guidance. Exporters must complete and return a report to MPI within 20 working days
of arrival.
44. Section 45(1)(lb) similarly allows for a condition requiring that an exporter provides a report
on the welfare of the animals in the 30-days following their arrival in the importing country. Those
reports are received by MPI’s livestock exports team and are referred to when the exporter makes
a subsequent application for an AWEC.
45. The practice on board a livestock carrier at sea includes a daily midday meeting of the Master,
Chief Officer, stock person and veterinarian to discuss progress of the voyage over the previous
24 hours. Such meetings are reported to the vessel owner and exporter.
46. We reviewed 25 post voyage reports received by MPI from 2018-2020. Many of those reports
were only two pages long, some were one page. They covered topics including basic details of the
voyage (exporter, date of departure, destination, date of arrival, the number and type of animals
loaded, etc), as well as details regarding the conditions of the voyage (e.g., weather and the
conditions at sea), animal mortality and, in some cases, the cause of death, and records on animal
health. Some listed the names of the stock people that travelled on board the vessel. Voyage
reports may be signed by a stockperson or vet, or an agent of the exporter; the practice appears
to vary. Information regarding food and water supply, conditions (ventilation, temperature,
bedding, etc) was provided by some but not many.
47. The voyage reports are notably inconsistent in their breadth and quality. Some are fulsome
and provide useful, explanatory prose sufficient to give MPI a thorough understanding of the
voyage. Others provide a bare minimum of information and the mortality rate – i.e. minimal
descriptors (e.g., “good” conditions) and bald numbers (e.g., 2 deaths). Clearly this is insufficient
to judge the welfare of the animals during and after the voyage.
48. Along with post-voyage reports, MPI also commonly requires exporters to provide a report on
the welfare of the animals during the 30 days after their arrival in the importing country. 10 We
understand that these reports are limited in their scope due to the limitations on MPI’s jurisdiction
and its inability to require extensive reporting for periods longer than 30 days (noting that most
livestock exported from New Zealand are sent to China, where they will be required to spend 45
days in quarantine post-arrival).
10 See s45(1)(Ib)(i) AWA.
1349. We reviewed 17 30-day reports. The content and quality of those reports varied. All were
completed while the animals were still in quarantine in the destination country, so could not
reflect the conditions in which they would live going forward. Some gave descriptions of the
medical treatments administered post-arrival, along with explanations of any mortalities (e.g.
cause of death, date, animal number). Some reports covered injuries and illnesses as well as
mortalities, others only record mortalities, and one simply stated “all cattle are fine”. Again, that
would hardly seem to be a sufficient report to satisfy MPI (although we note there are limits to
the ability for MPI to get further detail from within the quarantine process of the destination
country).
50. Where animals have died, the reports do not show whether the animals died naturally or were
euthanised. Even where the reports recorded injuries, illnesses and mortalities, the reporting is
generally binary: dead or alive, well or unwell. Only one report gave a full veterinary report
indicating the level of suffering and the prognoses for those who were sick or injured. In our view,
the vast majority of the reports were insufficient to allow MPI to gather any real information other
than mortality rates.
Requiring additional information in relation to animal welfare
51. To date, animal mortality has been the key welfare indicator reported. However, from our
interviews with stakeholders it appears that information on other indicators would help MPI to
have a better understanding of voyage conditions and an exporter’s performance.
52. Many interviewees were concerned about how limited a welfare indicator mortality was.
Some suggested additional measures that would enable MPI and exporters to have a better
understanding of animal welfare throughout a voyage. Those other indicators included:
a. changes in the weight and condition of the animals during the voyage;
b. the extent and type of medical treatment administered on the voyage;
c. the types and amounts of medicines that were administered;
d. frequency of changing the deck ‘pad’; and
e. other animal welfare indicators such as thermal comfort, palatability of fodder and
water, resting time per day, noise levels, air quality and comfort, and the ability to
experience positive social bonds.
53. We understand that animal welfare can be difficult to assess. Unlike mortality, it is not easily
measured; it cannot be determined with precision and an animal’s level of distress might be
measured differently by different people.
54. In our view, optimal practice would require that those specifically able to comment on animal
welfare comment thoroughly on each consignment of cattle exported from New Zealand. This is
not necessarily the primary skill of the veterinarian or the stock handlers, although they may be
best placed to up-skill in this area. We discuss below the Australian approach of requiring
independent observers on certain livestock exports and suggest this is a matter to be kept under
review, particularly if the quality of voyage reporting is not seen to improve.
Requiring additional information as to the voyage itself
55. As part of the review we requested and received voyage reports from two other livestock
export vessels that were travelling at the same time as the Gulf Livestock 1. One such voyage
14report advised that the environmental conditions for the voyage were “good” and that the
weather conditions included overcast skies, moderate breeze, and moderate sea. The other
(which was much more comprehensive than any of the other reports we have seen) noted that
conditions were rough and provided considerably more information (on all fronts).
56. We understand from MPI that both vessels were travelling at the time of significant typhoons.
While one discussed rough seas and difficult conditions, the other reported moderate conditions.
Neither expressly discussed the measures that were required to be taken to avoid dangerous
weather, nor how such decisions were made following consideration of animal welfare. We would
have thought it would be useful if the exporter was required to report on aspects such as:
a. whether the voyage followed the expected course;
b. if not, why not;
c. whether any deviations or changes were able to be made in accordance with the
vessel’s contingencies plans;
d. if not, why not; and
e. whether the vessel was prepared, from both a maritime and safety plan perspective,
to adjust the journey in the way it did. Again, if it were not, MPI should be told why
not.
57. MPI should be told whether issues arising were within the contemplation of the exporter prior
to departure, and if the exporter (and its agents) were able to deal with those issues appropriately,
either according to a contingency plan or by making decisions on-board as and when required.
58. We expect that over time such reporting would allow MPI to track themes in the types of
obstacles and issues arising (for instance, consistent issues with weather at certain times of the
year) that increase the risks of a voyage, and to track an exporter’s record of being able to
appropriately plan for and handle issues that arise on the journey. This in turn could be used to
inform a more risk-based reporting and approval regime.
59. In our view, MPI should require more thorough reporting and use the information acquired to
assist with continuous improvement of the process. Where a post voyage or 30-day report is
returned without sufficient information, it should be sent back to the exporter and it should be
made clear that submission of an insufficient report is a breach of the exporter’s AWEC.
60. From our perspective, the reporting process requires material improvement. The Australian
Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) requires daily reporting in the case of exports from Australia;
exporters receive daily reporting from the ship, as one would expect. We are cautious not to over-
prescribe the flow of information, but urge MPI to collect the information as a means of building
its knowledge base and holding exporters to account. This information is being provided to
exporters and we think it ought be provided to MPI as well. The following measures could be
considered:
a. Daily reporting (at least by way of exception where there are material changes) on:
i. vessel position, course and speed;
ii. current weather conditions, including wind speed and direction and sea state
by Beaufort scale;
iii. weather conditions over the previous 24 hours and forecast conditions for the
next 24 hours;
15iv. maximum and minimum temperatures and humidity in cargo spaces over the
previous 24 hours;
v. any animal health or welfare issues over the previous 24 hours and action
taken, if any;
vi. weight of fodder consumed over past 24 hours;
vii. the amount of fodder remaining;
viii. whether the vessel was in compliance with ship’s stability criteria over the
past 24 hours;
ix. the health of the ship’s crew;
x. the status of ventilation, lighting and draining arrangements; normal
operation, casualty mode or defective;
xi. the status of vessel’s machinery plant: main engine, generators, steering gear
and seawater desalination plants: normal operation, casualty mode or
defective; and
xii. the Master’s intentions for the ship for the following 24 hours, including any
change to expected time of arrival at destination.
b. Specialist reporting: we recommend that each of the Master (or delegate), the
veterinarian and the lead stock handler should have input into the voyage reports
relevant to their area(s) of expertise (maritime or animal). In particular, each should
attest to the accuracy of the report. Consideration could be given to whether filing a
deliberately inaccurate report may be made an offence under Animal Welfare
regulations.
c. Current 30-day reporting templates should be updated to capture more fulsome
information. Although certain of this information will have been provided in the daily
reports, in our view it would be sensible for MPI to also collect the information in an
aggregated format at the end of the voyage to capture both overall trends and short
term anomalies. Relevant information would include:
i. The voyage, including amounts of fodder and water produced, consumed, and
left over at the end of the voyage; daily temperature and humidity levels
(measured across various points in the ship and in a range from the lowest-
to-highest every 24 hours); ventilation and air quality; mechanical issues
(including any breakdowns, repairs, and maintenance work); when and how
often the decks were cleaned and the adequacy of the drainage; any
deviations from the planned route, the reasons behind the changes, the
options considered and the outcomes;
ii. Animal welfare issues, including: the number of mortalities (including dates,
times, conditions at time of death, whether found dead or euthanised, causes
of death, treatments administered prior to death), measures of animal
welfare including instances of heat stress, panting, shy feeding, dehydration,
cleanliness, injuries (including types, causes, treatments administered,
prognoses); and
iii. Any other matters considered relevant. We recommend that MPI consults
fully on other aspects that could be reported, including with experienced vets,
stock people, and independent animal welfare scientists.
61. These recommendations broadly align with those already proposed by the Working Group,
which advised that MPI should consider what additional information could be gathered using the
16reporting process, and that voyage report templates should be updated. The Working Group
suggested that information could be reported after the voyage that covers the crew competence
(safe ship management and animal husbandry), and Captain/Master/1st Officer/Boson
responsiveness to requests made by the vet or stockperson. That seems sensible. Further, the
Working Group also suggested that the post voyage report could include information on whether
the vessel operated according to contingency plans discussed in the pre-load briefing.
62. There is, also, a technical issue relevant to post-trip reporting and its being a condition on the
grant of the AWEC. There is, at least at face value, an issue as to enforceability. Once MPI has
granted the AWEC, it is reliant on the exporter to comply with the requirements to report once
the journey is over. There may be little incentive for exporters to do so (or to do so with great
diligence).
63. We understand that, in practice, an exporter who has failed to provide a post voyage or 30
day report in accordance with a condition of their AWEC will not be able to receive a further AWEC
until those reports are provided. That is an enforcement mechanism but, in our view, risks the
receipt of late or ineffectual reports and calls into question the enforcement regime. MPI should
consider whether this practice ought to continue, or whether there are other measures it might
adopt to ensure receipt of timely, fulsome reports. For our part, we suggest MPI consider whether
it might be able to impose greater consequences or penalties for failures to report on time and
with appropriate detail. Consideration could be given to whether these requirements are
implemented by Regulation and an offence created for failures.
64. Australian authorities require daily reports from exporters, and the exporters we spoke to all
advised that they require and receive daily reports from their livestock carriers. In most instances,
it appears that the reports the exporters receive are much more fulsome than those required by
MPI. As such, requiring additional reports to be delivered to MPI is unlikely to impose a significant
burden on exporters – particularly if MPI were to require daily reports similar to those required
by the Australian authorities.
Longer-term recommendations
Documentation required in support of AWECs
65. The AWEC process is, overall, reasonably robust and thorough. It is a serious process,
examined thoroughly and with the expertise of experienced and senior decision-makers within
MPI (whom we note have had first-hand experience of the ships involved). It has been designed
to carefully consider relevant factors within the bounds of the relevant legislation and it is
administered by MPI staff experienced with the process.
66. However, in our view, the AWEC process should be improved. Confirmed by our interviews,
there are steps that could be taken to collect additional information requiring applicants to
provide information as to: 11
a. The vessel’s age. A vessel over 30 years of age could be considered old,
notwithstanding an otherwise correct certification status. An old ship should raise
11Some of this information may best be collected by MNZ (perhaps as part of the focused inspection regime proposed); it
could then be provided to MPI as part of the AWEC process. We suggest MPI work with MNZ to determine how best to
collect and utilize it.
17concerns within MPI and questions should be asked regarding quality and frequency
of maintenance. Additional reassurance may be required.
b. The length of the voyage. A proposed voyage of greater than 20 days should be
viewed with more caution, given shorter passage time means less chance of exposure
to animal welfare risk. The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) guidelines on
transport of animals by sea have a primary requirement that the amount of time
animals spend on a journey should be kept to the minimum. 12
c. The experience of the master and seafarers. MPI should seek further assurances
regarding the vessel’s crew, particularly those in key positions like Master, Chief
Officer and Marine Engineer Officer. Details of qualifications should be provided by
the exporter and (where necessary) provided to MNZ for checking and confirmation
that those involved are suitable, keeping in mind the sensitive nature of the cargo.
d. The experience, skills and competency of the ship’s vet and head stock handler,
including information as to the animal welfare training and experience of each. Ideally
these should have completed the Shipboard Stockperson Training Course offered by
LiveCorp Australia, 13 and training in basic ship safety. 14
e. Verification of the ship’s certification history and status from the Tokyo MoU APCIS
database (discussed further below).
f. Whether the vessel is purpose built or converted. A converted ship is likely to be older
and slower.
g. Whether a vessel has open or closed cargo spaces. An open vessel may leave cattle
susceptible to temperature extremes during the voyage in equatorial and/or tropical
conditions.
h. Contingency planning. Planning for contingencies that may arise during the voyage is
the responsibility of the ship’s Master. Such plans are vital in the voyage planning
process, where most would form part of the passage plan. The AWEC application
should provide detail as to what these plans are. Some of these plans are available in
a ship’s Safety Management System, which should also be presented as part of the
AWEC process.
67. The recommendations set out above indicate our view that MPI should ask for more
information relevant to the vessel, the expertise of the crew (those borne for crewing the ship and
for animal welfare) and the voyage itself. We also recommend that MPI or MNZ collect more
information regarding voyage planning (potentially as part of our suggested focused inspection
campaign and any other engagements that MNZ may be undertaking with the Master of the ship
before departure).
68. The purpose of providing more information is twofold. First, it allows MPI to gain a complete
and accurate picture of what the exporter is seeking permission to do. We think more information
would be useful. Second, the provision of more information gives MPI the capacity to build its
institutional knowledge of exporters, vessels, and the conduct and outcomes of export voyages.
12 OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code chapter 7.2, dated 28 June 2019.
13 See https://livecorp.com.au/programsAndServices#Training, accessed 6 October 2020.
14 See https://nmit.ac.nz/study/courses/sbt311-stcw-basic-safety-training-2, accessed 6 October 2020.
1869. Over time that will mean MPI is able to foresee issues, identify trends, and track the levels of
experience of the exporters and their agents and crew more accurately. It would also serve to
inform a process of continuous improvement of the MPI Guidance and the AWEC granting process.
Ongoing review of rules, guidance, and regulations
70. We have set out the underlying Animal Welfare and Maritime rules in Appendix 3, and have
referred to the MPI Guidance throughout. We are not mandated to undertake a legislative review
or to suggest legislative change. That said, certain observations can be made about the legislative
and other rules that govern the AWEC and export process, and some of our longer-term
recommendations go to regime design and, in particular, the MPI Guidance.
71. It needs to be noted that the animal welfare and maritime settings applicable to live exports
are complicated. If the live export trade is to continue long term, it may be useful for the overall
legislative regime to be reviewed to ensure it is comprehensive, accessible, and allows the various
regulators involved to have appropriate oversight (including inter-organisational) to ensure that
the practice is safe and reputable from both an animal welfare and maritime perspective.
Australian rules and standards
72. The New Zealand live export industry is largely driven by Australian exporters (such as the
exporter in charge of the Gulf Livestock 1) and MPI places significant reliance on the ship having
an ACCL to satisfy them that the ship meets local requirements for the transport of cattle by sea.
73. We discussed above how, in practice, many livestock carriers will be compliant with New
Zealand rules if they can show that they have a current ACCL. The ACCL is a uniquely Australian
instrument issued under Australian Maritime Order 43 (MO43) by AMSA. It certifies that a vessel
meets Australia’s prescribed requirements for livestock carriers. We understand from discussion
with AMSA, MNZ, exporters and industry that the ACCL is regarded as the most onerous
certification of fitness to carry livestock available in the global market (the “gold standard”). By
default, that standard also generally applies in New Zealand.
74. MO43 requires, amongst other things, that a vessel permanently equipped for the carriage of
livestock must have an ACCL or interim ACCL. 15 Clause 25(1) provides that an ACCL will only be
issued if, amongst other things, the ACCL survey shows that the “vessel’s livestock structures,
livestock equipment and arrangements for the carriage of livestock comply with this Order for the
species to be carried.” 16
75. Unlike New Zealand’s Maritime Rule for livestock carriers, being Maritime Rule 24C, MO43
has a livestock welfare component. MO43’s cl 35 provides that “A vessel that is permanently
equipped for the carriage of livestock must be fitted with systems and equipment that ensure the
maintenance of livestock services at a level necessary for the welfare of the livestock.”
Compliance will be established where the vessel complies with Schedule 2 to the Order. Schedule
2 provides mandatory requirements for aspects such as power sources, ventilation, lighting,
drainage, and fodder and water arrangements.
15 Cl 23(1).
16 Cl 26(3)(e)(i).
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