RUSSIA'S ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA'S INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT - CASE STUDIES: MALI AND CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
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978-9934-564-96-3 RUSSIA’S ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA’S INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT CASE STUDIES: MALI AND CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Published by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence
978-9934-564-96-3 Russia’s Activities in Africa’s Information Environment Contributors: Karel Svoboda, Charles University, Prague, Institute of International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences (Russia and Africa), Paula-Charlotte Matlach (Russian Narratives in the Context of Peacekeeping Missions in Mali and the Central African Republic) and Zack Baddorf (Russia’s Activities in the Information Space of the Central African Republic) Editors: Tomass Pildegovičs, Kristina VanSant, Monika Hanley 2 �����������������������������������������������������������������������������
CONTENTS
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������4
1. Russia’s Narratives in the Information Environment����������������������������������������������������������6
2. Russian Narratives in the Context of Peacekeeping Missions in Mali
and the Central African Republic��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9
3. Russia’s Activities in the Information Space of the Central African Republic ��������������19
Conclusions����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������27
���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3
INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on Russia’s strategies ation has changed dramatically. Russia is a
in Africa. minor player in Africa compared to other
powers, such as the US, China, India and
The first ever Russia-Africa summit,
several EU countries.2 Russia also faces
co-hosted in October 2019 by Russian
competition from other important global
President Vladimir Putin and Egyptian
players, such as Brazil and Turkey, as well
President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi in Sochi,
as emerging regional actors, such as Nige-
was presented by both Russian and inter-
ria and South Africa.
national media as a milestone in Russia’s
return to the African continent. Leaders In addition to this new reality of com-
and delegations of the vast majority of petition between external actors, the
African states met with Russian President continent underwent and is undergoing
Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergey important internal changes. First and fore-
Lavrov, and other Russian representatives most, African countries are increasingly
to discuss possible projects of coopera- becoming the subjects of internation-
tion between their respective countries. al politics and are poised to play a more
The summit ranked among the largest of significant role in world politics in the fu-
recent Africa-partner summits (EU-Africa, ture. Secondly, the African middle class is
China-Africa, US-Africa, and Japan-Africa). growing. After several years of economic
For example, Russia was able to welcome growth, it is estimated that the population
more state delegations than the US at of the African middle class swelled to be-
their summit. The declared initiatives of tween 170 million and 300 million people,
cooperation appeared impressive, ranging and is expected to grow even further. As
from nuclear energy, oil and gas, to auto- a result, the middle class is increasing its
mobile production and financial loans for political demands, as they occupy a larger
various fields.1 This meeting sparked nu- share of political decision-making through
merous claims by both Western and Rus- elections and civil control.3 Recent pop-
sian media that Russia is a key player in ular uprisings in Sudan or Zimbabwe are
the region. There are plans for organizing evidence of this. Russia, traditionally
another summit in 2022. supporting ‘stability’ in the form of local
dictators, suffered reputational losses in
Nevertheless, contemporary Russia’s role
these countries. Although there are ten-
in Africa cannot be compared to that of
dencies toward authoritarianism in some
the former Soviet Union. Indeed, the situ-
countries, such as Tanzania, Guinea, and
4 �����������������������������������������������������������������������������
Burkina Faso, the general trend indicates lic (EUTM RCA), the United Nations
that political participation among African Multidimensional Integrated Stabili-
populations is increasing.4 zation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA),
the European Union Training mission
This paper consists of three parts:
in Mali (EUTM Mali) and Operation
1. Based on open sources, first part Barkhane. A total of 561 articles were
analyzes Russia’s goals and how the sampled from Kremlin-sponsored
country attempts to reach them in online news websites RT France and
four main fields: diplomacy, political Sputnik France. These two outlets
communication, the military, and were selected due to their status as
the economy. This analysis addresses “key public diplomacy tools” of the
two main questions – what Russia’s Russian government, their popularity
policies are and what implications in France, which is one of the major
they may have on the region. The troop contributing countries in the
paper discusses the whole of Africa, Sahel, as well as their popularity
while simultaneously acknowledging in some of the countries that host
the broad nature of the topic and the peacekeeping missions (Mali and the
political, cultural, and economic dif- Central African Republic). The study
ferences between individual African followed a general inductive ap-
countries. Two cases of particular proach for qualitative data analysis,
interest, Mali and the Central Afri- during which narratives were manu-
can Republic, are analyzed in greater ally detected.
detail, revealing the complexity of
3. Third chapter is based on social
Russian strategy in specific countries.
media analysis of pro-Russian con-
Based on these findings, the paper
tent on Facebook pages, Facebook
concludes with recommendations for
profiles, Facebook groups, Telegram
addressing Russian interference in
channels, Telegram profiles, Twitter
Africa.
feeds, and websites. Working with
2. Second chapter analyses Krem- a programmer, all posts from several
lin-sponsored media narratives pub- Facebook pages with pro-Russian nar-
lished in the context of five ongoing ratives were scraped. CrowdTangle
peacekeeping and counter-insurgen- was used to discover other Facebook
cy missions in Africa - United Nations pages and groups sharing similar ma-
Multidimensional Integrated Stabili- terial. The study followed a general
zation Mission in Central Africa (MI- inductive approach for qualitative
NUSCA), the European Union Training data analysis, during which narratives
Mission in the Central African Repub- were manually detected.
���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 5
1. RUSSIA’S NARRATIVES IN THE
INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Russia builds its communication strategy oranda of understanding are presented
towards Africa on several pillars. as concluded projects. Anton Kobyakov,
Vladimir Putin’s advisor, announced that
First and foremost, the absence of a Rus-
contracts in the volume of USD 12.5 billion
sian colonial past in Africa forms a key-
were signed during the Sochi meeting, but
stone of Russia’s information strategy. For
he did not disclose any details. An oil re-
example, during his interview with the
finery project in Morocco and a pipeline
TASS press agency a day before the Sochi
project in Congo have been discussed for
meeting, Vladimir Putin pointed out that,
the last 10 years, but a conclusion has not
“we can see that some Western countries
yet been reached.7 In another case, Rosa-
put pressure, frighten or blackmail gov-
tom, the Russian builder of nuclear power
ernments of sovereign African countries.
stations, presents eight projects in Africa
Through these means, they try to regain
(South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Zam-
their lost influence and dominance in for-
bia, Tanzania, Namibia, and Uganda) in
mer colonies. Now in the new form, they
‘different stages of their fulfilment.’8 This
try to overprofit, exploit the continent
is not to say that Russia did not succeed in
with no regard to the people living here,
the economic field, but their true value re-
ecology and other facts. Probably, in or-
mains unclear due to a lack of government
der to prevent that anybody would block
transparency.
these policies, they try to block closer Rus-
sia-Africa relations.”5 The purpose of the In recent years, Russia has portrayed itself
‘colonial past’ argument is to subvert the as a key player in the fight against Ebola.9
positions of European countries in Africa, Similarly, the Covid-19 pandemic has pro-
namely France, the United Kingdom, Bel- vided Russia with another opportunity to
gium, and Germany.6 provide humanitarian assistance to other
countries, including those in Africa. Rus-
Kremlin is extremely skilled at inflating in-
sia has capitalized upon this situation in
formation about its successes. Tied loans,
its communication strategy by utilizing
where the customer receives a loan for the
‘covid-diplomacy’, which includes the
purchase of Russian goods, are presented
delivery of supplies of personal protec-
as investments or even aid, and mem-
6 �����������������������������������������������������������������������������
tion goods to target countries in the con- enced a political failure during the 2019
tinent.10 Russia, despite its own struggle elections in Madagascar. Political tech-
with Covid-19, sent aid to Algeria, Egypt, nologists campaigned for candidate Erie
Morocco and Tunisia in North Africa, as Rajaonarimampianina, but failed to se-
well as Ethiopia and Djibouti in Eastern cure him the necessary support to win the
Africa. In southern Africa, the beneficia- election. Even more strikingly, they later
ries of Russian aid included the Demo- provided assistance to other candidates,
cratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, but reached similar results. In this case, it
South Africa, and Zimbabwe.11 The supply can be assumed that Russian officials had
shipments were not particularly large or underestimated the conditions prevailing
significant, but their delivery was heav- in the country. Counsellors entered the
ily publicized. For instance, Russia sent highly monetized elections with relative-
eight tons of personal protective equip- ly modest means. Their strategy included
ment (PPE) to Zimbabwe in September deploying internet trolls which, in a coun-
2020, which was widely reported as an try with only 9.8 percent internet cover-
act of humanitarian aid by the Zimba- age, proved to be a costly mistake.14
bwean President, who stated, “the Rus-
Russian communication specialists were
sian Federation has been a great friend in
active in Sudan during the protests in Jan-
the mobilization of financial resources to
uary 2019. Under their surveillance, offi-
fight the Covid-19 pandemic.” He clearly
cial channels spread fake news linking pro-
linked this case with Alrosa’s investment
testers to foreign powers, such as Israel.
in the diamond industry and Russia’s in-
This went hand in hand with Russian offi-
volvement in platinum mining.12
cial media presenting the protests as a re-
Russia uses political counsellors, or ‘politi- sult of foreign influence, warning against
cal technologists’ according to the Russian ‘external intervention’ and the destabiliza-
expression, to help its allies achieve their tion of the country. Such a confluence was
political aims. In Zimbabwe, for instance, hardly a coincidence.15
Russia provided Emmerson Mnangagwa,
Education plays an important role in nur-
who was sworn in as president after the
turing and increasing the soft power of
2017 coup against Robert Mugabe, with
any country. In a document prepared for
electoral assistance during the election in
the Valdai economic forum, which is the
2018. As a result, Mnangagwa signed con-
key arena for discussions about Russia’s
tracts with the Russians for platinum min-
strategic orientation, it was asserted that,
ing and with the Russian diamond compa-
“instead of the old elites educated in the
ny Alrosa.13
universities of the Soviet Union, new state
Russia has not always been successful in officials, educated in the US, the EU or Chi-
supporting local dictators. Russia experi- na are emerging. We must act now.”16
���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7To this end, Russia revived some of the state, where democratic control is limited
old Soviet programs aimed at African stu- and the sale of Russian arms – which are
dents, including scholarships. According both relatively modern and cheap – is en-
to Rosstat, the Russian chief statistical bu- couraged, allows for this area of coopera-
reau, around 16,700 students from Africa tion to develop. In 2014, when the scandal
receive their tertiary education in Russia. over atrocities committed by the Nigerian
17
The Peoples’ Friendship University of army against Boko Haram rebels emerged,
Russia, the most prominent of Russia’s the United States stopped supplying the
higher education institutions that tradi- army with attack helicopters. Russia, on
tionally hosted African students during the other hand, was ready to fill this gap
the Soviet era, currently has around 1,200 and supply Nigeria with its Mi-35.21
students from the African continent.18
Africa, especially its sub-Saharan region,
Institutionally, Rossotrudnichestvo is re- does not feature prominently in Russia’s
sponsible for spreading Russia’s soft pow- security considerations. Russia’s army op-
er through the representation of Russian erations in Africa are modest, excluding
cultural and scientific centers. 19 It current- their anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of
ly operates in Egypt, Zambia, the Republic Aden that have taken place since 2008.
of Congo, Morocco, Tanzania, Tunisia and Russia limits its official army presence to
Ethiopia , and concentrates on increasing participation in missions led by interna-
the quota of African students in Russian tional organizations and to sending in-
universities.20 Furthermore, associations structors to countries that request such
of African alumni of Russian universities assistance. The participation of Russian of-
are organized. Nevertheless, their size ficers in UN missions and the presence of
and impact are relatively small, although Russian instructors are limited compared
Russia strives to increase their visibility to the contributions of Western countries
through broadcasting their activities. or China. However, Russia demonstrates
its determination to change this situation.
Military services and the sale of Russian ar-
According to a leaked German Ministry
maments play an essential role in Russia’s
of Defence document from 2015, Russia
future programs in Africa. In this field, Rus-
established military agreements with 21
sia has meaningful advantages over West-
African states with various depths and de-
ern countries. The nature of the Russian
grees of cooperation.22
8 �����������������������������������������������������������������������������2. RUSSIAN NARRATIVES IN THE CONTEXT
OF PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN MALI
AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
This chapter analyses Kremlin-sponsored missions (Mali and the Central African
media narratives published in the context Republic). The study followed a general
of five ongoing peacekeeping and count- inductive approach for qualitative data
er-insurgency missions in Africa - United analysis, during which narratives were
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Sta- manually detected.
bilization Mission in Central Africa (MI-
While the geopolitical contest with the
NUSCA), the European Union Training Mis-
West was previously concentrated in East-
sion in the Central African Republic (EUTM
ern Europe, the Western Balkans, and the
RCA), the United Nations Multidimension-
Middle East, the expansion of the scope of
al Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
Russian military, economic, and diplomat-
(MINUSMA), the European Union Training
ic activities signals that the geopolitical
mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) and Opera-
rivalry between Russia and the West has
tion Barkhane. A total of 561 articles were
now expanded to the African continent.23
sampled from Kremlin-sponsored online
Commenting on the growth of Russian
news websites RT France and Sputnik
influence in Africa, former US national
France. These two outlets were selected
security adviser John Bolton warned that
due to their status as “key public diploma-
Russia would “interfere with U.S. military
cy tools” of the Russian government, their
operations and pose a significant threat
popularity in France, which is one of the
to U.S. national security interests”24, an
major troop contributing countries in the
assessment which was later supported by
Sahel, as well as their popularity in some
two high-ranking US security officials.25
of the countries that host peacekeeping
���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9A report by the French Policy Planning plomacy tools of the Russian government
Staff (CAP) and the Institute of Strate- and their popularity amongst the French
gic Research (IRSEM) further affirms this population as well as French-speaking Af-
claim by outlining how Russian “informa- rican audiences”. 31
tion manipulation” has the potential to
This study adopts the definition of nar-
undermine Western operations and “cre-
ratives provided by the ‘Improving NATO
ate a hostile environment for an external
Strategic Communications Terminology’
military operation”.26
project, which defines narratives as “mor-
A recent report commissioned by the als drawn from stories,” arguing that nar-
French government suggests that Krem- ratives are “formed and maintained in hu-
lin-sponsored media, in particular RT and man memory and stories are the way of
Sputnik, are rising in popularity across the conveying narrative to others”.32 The study
African continent. This is evidenced by a followed a general inductive approach for
significant increase in subscribers to the qualitative data analysis, wherein narra-
RT France Facebook page (from 50,000 tives were manually detected during the
to 850,000); the vast majority of which course of analysis rather than pre-defined
were from countries of the Maghreb and and deducted.33 Individual articles (and
Sub-Saharan Africa, and the discovery that sometimes even sentences) were consid-
African online news websites are relaying ered capable of portraying multiple sto-
content from Kremlin-sponsored media ries, therefore, multiple narratives were
on a large scale. 27 In fact, the report found often derived from single articles. Relevant
that both channels “have succeeded in narratives were later grouped into ‘me-
their aim to obtain the ‘normalisation’ and ta-narratives’ in order to ensure compa-
institutionalisation of their position as part rability, the most prevalent of which were
of the media landscape of French-speak- included in the analysis. Additionally, the
ing Africa”. 28 analysis noted the context in which each
of the articles was published and whether
This study aims to provide an overview of
they included positive or negative quotes
narratives prevalent in Russian-sponsored
toward either of the missions, recognising
media outlets, given the demonstrated
that “a well-placed quote [...] will convey
potential of news and media narratives
a construction of an issue that could ulti-
to influence attitudes, perceptions and
mately benefit a particular interest”.34
public opinion29 as well as the Russian
governments’ previous efforts to leverage The articles featured in this study were
such influence.30 The study will focus on obtained directly from RT France (fran-
Kremlin-sponsored French-language on- cais.rt.com) and Sputnik France (fr.
line news outlets RT France and Sputnik sputniknews.com) and included articles
France, given their status as “key public di- published over a timeframe of six years
10 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������(01.01.2015 - 31.08.2020). The sample digital communication channels has am-
was collected using each website’s built- plified the reach and potential impact of
in search tool and mission-specific acro- such practices, “as the flow of information
nyms (MINUSCA, EUTM RCA; MINUSMA, and the ability of states to convey mes-
BARKHANE, EUTM). The total sample in- sages directly to foreign publics has be-
cluded 561 articles. Embedded tweets, come easier and more cost-effective than
images, and videos were not part of the ever”.38
analysis. Several articles mentioned multi-
The Kremlin has capitalised on this by
ple missions and were therefore included
successfully adapting to the digital age
in multiple datasets.
and rapidly developing its instruments
A 2019 US government White Paper ex- and practices of information warfare.39 In
amining the Russian government’s stra- addition to utilising state-sponsored TV
tegic intentions concluded that Russia “is networks, the Russian government has
indeed adhering to a global grand strat- in recent years broadened its operations
egy”, aiming to regain recognition as a to include online news websites, such as
‘great power’, reclaim and consolidate its Sputnik and RT in several languages.40
influence over former Soviet nations, gain
influence over other nations worldwide,
and finally, “refine the liberalist rules and Narrative Analysis
norms that currently govern the world
MINUSCA. In total, 81 articles using the of-
order” by portraying itself as a “reliable
ficial mission acronym MINUSCA were an-
actor, a key regional powerbroker and a
alysed. As shown in Figure 1, the number
successful mediator”.35
of articles referring to the mission peaked
In order to achieve these strategic aims, in 2016, when numerous articles were
the Kremlin has employed a range of overt published in the context of allegations of
and covert influence techniques, blurring sexual misconduct perpetrated by French
the line between public diplomacy and so- soldiers and UN peacekeepers (26). Other
called ‘active measures’ – a Soviet term for topical contexts in which the mission ac-
techniques, such as the spread of disinfor- ronym was mentioned include the Central
mation and military threats.36 The Krem- African Republic’s domestic affairs (4), ad-
lin’s apparent control of the media, which ministrative mission changes, such as the
is widely attributed to the democratic end of Operation Sangaris (4), the deaths
de-consolidation witnessed under the rule of three Russian journalists in the Central
of Russian president Vladimir Putin37, has African Republic (3) and the 2019 peace
played a significant role in the efforts to agreement (4). More recent avenues of in-
manipulate audience perception and ex- terest include bilateral relations between
ert influence. In fact, the emergence of the Central African Republic and Russia
��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11(6) as well as tensions between France, NUSCA is failing were consistently detect-
the US, and Russia (3). Over the past five ed throughout the examined timeframe
years, the mission has also consistently of nearly six years, with an uptick in 2019
been referenced in the context of the on- as reporting on the allegations of sexual
going violence in the Central African Re- misconduct decreased. In recent years, an
public (19). increasing number of articles promoted
narratives labelling the mission as a point.
In total, four meta-narratives were iden-
tified (Figure 2). The most prevalent nar- EUTM RCA. The only news agency in-
ratives portrayed MINUSCA as ineffective cluded in this study to report on the
and incapable of curbing the ongoing vi- EU Training mission using its offi-
olence (20). Narratives claiming that MI- cial mission tag was Sputnik France.
12 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������The news service reported on the mission MINUSMA. The United Nations Multidi-
only six times since its establishment, five mensional Integrated Stabilization Mis-
of which discussed the mission in the con- sion in Mali was established in April 2013,
text of relations between Russia, France, shortly after the French-led Operation
and the CAR. The only other time the mis- Serval recaptured the northern half of the
sion was mentioned was in the context country, with the objective of “supporting
of the killing of three Russian journalists the transitional authorities of Mali in the
in 2018. There were no identified use of stabilisation of the country and imple-
direct quotes regarding the mission. Three mentation of the transitional roadmap”.41
main narratives were identified in the arti- MINUSMA provides operational and logis-
cles, all of which highlight the relevance of tical support to the G5 Sahel joint force,
foreign military missions as an instrument which is aimed at combating “terrorism,
of diplomacy and international relations, cross-border organised crime and human
claiming, for instance, that ‘the Central trafficking in the G5 Sahel zone” and con-
African Republic has become a battle- sists of forces from Burkina Faso, Chad,
ground of influence between major pow- Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.42 The mission
ers’. However, due to the fact that only six is widely considered to be vital to stabili-
articles were found to directly refer to the ty in the country, even as it is hampered
mission over a period of six years, the key by serious challenges and threats, such
takeaway is that editorial interest in the as increasing jihadist violence and the
mission is low. volatile political environment in Mali.43
��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13As of June 2020, the mission is the “most protests. The mission was further found
dangerous” UN mission to date, with 209 to have increasingly been mentioned in
casualties among MINUSMA personnel.44 the context of French involvement in the
There are currently just over 11,500 troops Sahel in general (12), UN politics and in-
deployed to the mission, with the mission ternational relations (12), and Russian in-
mandate set to expire in June 2021.45 volvement in Mali (5).
In total, 152 articles were found to refer EUTM MALI. The European Union Training
to MINUSMA. Figure 3 shows a growing Mission Mali was established in January
editorial interest in the mission, with the 2013 to train the Malian Armed Forces. 46
number of published articles rising from The mission mandate has been renewed
just 6 in 2015 to 51 in 2019. Most (51) ar- four times and is currently set to last until
ticles referenced the mission in the con- May 2024.47 Following the military coup in
text of ongoing conflict and violence in August 2020, the mission was suspended
Mali or elsewhere in the Sahel as well as for three months but has since resumed.48
casualties among troops (25). Since 2016,
The EU Training Mission in Mali was men-
a growing number of articles (20) referred
tioned only 12 times across both RT France
to the mission in the context of Mali’s do-
and Sputnik France in the five year period
mestic politics, such as the 2020 coup or
from 2015 to 2020. Five articles reported
14 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������on the mission in the context of general up- However, we were unable to identify a
dates, three in the context of Malian poli- pattern in media coverage because the
tics and ongoing conflicts respectively, and mission was rarely mentioned throughout
one on the alleged misconduct of forces. the timeframe surveyed in this study. The
only narratives which were mentioned
Two articles cited a quote referring to the
more than once asserted that the 2013 in-
mission negatively, whereas one quote
tervention was initially successful (2) and
was cited referring to the mission posi-
that significant areas of Mali are still be-
tively. In total, thirteen distinct narratives
yond control of the state (2).
were identified among the articles, ten of
which were critical of the mission or the Operation Barkhane. The French-led
forces involved, for example, claiming that Operation Barkhane is a counterterror-
‘the EU and France are wasting billions on ism force, which succeeded Operation
ineffective missions in the Sahel’ or that Serval in August 2014 and actively op-
‘EUTM action in the context of the 2020 erates in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and
coup was questionable’. Chad.49 There are currently 5100 sol-
diers deployed to Operation Barkhane.50
��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1516 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������
The operation – which was initially All three of these narratives were found
planned with a short-term operational repeatedly throughout the six-year peri-
scope –faces continued obstacles, such as od surveyed in this study. Since 2015, we
“huge logistical challenges in hostile ter- have observed articles highlighting the
rain” and issues in reliance on the cooper- high human toll and financial burden of
ation of the civilian population.51 Barkhane the operation (25) as well as claims that
is France’s largest overseas operation and the Operation was failing or following a
operates on a budget of nearly 600m EUR flawed strategy (32), but these were de-
per year.52 tected more frequently among the articles
published in 2019 and 2020.
The total sample of articles mentioning
Operation Barkhane consisted of 310 ar- Assertions that the operation depends on
ticles, making Operation Barkhane the US armed forces in the region for intelli-
most referred-to initiative out of the five gence and logistics (7) as well as the claim
missions included in this study. that the situation in the Sahel is similar
to that in Afghanistan, (11) have surfaced
Figure 5 shows that editorial interest
more recently.
among Kremlin-sponsored media in Op-
eration Barkhane has steadily increased. The second set of narratives identified in
Throughout the years, the operation has the context of Operation Barkhane is shown
consistently been referred to in reporting in Figure 10, including six narratives regard-
on casualties and injuries among troops ing France’s role in the Sahel. The most
(54) as well as the ongoing conflict in the prevalent narrative is that of existing or
Sahel region (64), French domestic politics rising hostility toward the French presence
and foreign-security policy (24) and UN/EU in the Sahel (52), followed by the narrative
politics or other international affairs (31). that France is committed to Barkhane and
Mali (22) and that France is calling for help
More topical avenues of interest include
from its allies (18). Additionally, 17 articles
mission-related articles discussing the fu-
were found to include narratives, which
ture of Barkhane as well as the newly-es-
accuse the French government of ulterior
tablished Takuba Task Force (41), Malian
motives, such as exploiting the resourc-
domestic politics and events, such as the
es of countries in the Sahel, and generally
2020 coup (14) and discussion around
question the normative basis of France’s
French involvement in the Sahel as well as
agenda in the region. A total of 12 articles
French bilateral relations in the region (54).
claimed that France was perpetrating (neo-
A total of 13 articles cited a quote refer- ) colonialism, whereas 13 articles included
ring to the operation negatively, whereas narratives claiming the opposite (France is
12 cited a quote referring to the operation not present in the Sahel for neo-colonial
positively (Figure 5). objectives or economic reasons).
��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 17Two narratives were found regarding the which ranked African countries on a scale
Russian Federation. A total of 11 articles from 1-5 according to Russian interest and
claimed that Russia is returning to the Af- cooperation, only listed Mali as a ‘poten-
rican continent or may increase its pres- tial partner’ whereas the Central African
ence in the region, whereas a further 11 Republic was mapped as a level 5 country
articles claimed that populations or politi- at the highest degree of cooperation.53
cians in the Sahel are calling for increased
Negative bias regarding the missions and
cooperation or involvement with the Rus-
toward the role of France in particular was
sian government. Finally, 14 articles con-
not only affirmed by the use of mostly neg-
cluded that European forces are present
ative quotes, but also by the abundance
in the Sahel to control migration flows to
of hostile narratives among the surveyed
Europe and that insecurity in the Sahel re-
articles, especially in the context of Oper-
sults in migration to Europe.
ation Barkhane. In fact, whereas criticism
Inferring from the number of published of MINUSMA and MINUSCA was mostly
articles that referenced the respec- aimed at their lack of success, articles in
tive missions, the editorial interest of the context of Barkhane often served as a
French-speaking Kremlin-sponsored me- platform for conspiracy theories and criti-
dia in the EU Training Missions in the Cen- cism against France. The general theme of
tral African Republic and Mali appears to anti-Western narratives is a continuation
be relatively low, while there is greater of mass communication narratives utilised
interest in both UN missions and high in- in the Soviet era, which were also found
terest in Operation Barkhane. Further- to be prevalent in other recent studies54
more, the number of articles referring and are considered to resonate with local
to MINUSCA was found to have peaked populations due to the fact that Russia,
in 2016, whereas the number of articles unlike many Western nations, was never a
referring to MINUSMA and Operation colonial power in Africa.55 In addition, the
Barkhane was found to have steadily in- narrative landscape has become more in-
creased, especially in 2019 and 2020. This tricate and saturated in recent years, with
shifting level of interest is surprising as a greater variety of narratives present.
Kremlin-linked documents leaked in 2019,
18 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������3. RUSSIA’S ACTIVITIES IN THE
INFORMATION SPACE OF THE CENTRAL
AFRICAN REPUBLIC
This chapter is based on social media The CAR’s traditional Western support-
analysis of pro-Russian content on Face- ers, mostly France and the United States,
book pages, Facebook profiles, Facebook have been reticent to provide lethal aid,
groups, Telegram channels, Telegram pro- concerned that the weapons will end up in
files, Twitter feeds, and websites. Working rebel hands and further fuel the ongoing
with a programmer, all posts from several conflict.
Facebook pages with pro-Russian narra-
As with much of sub-Saharan Africa, radio
tives were scraped. CrowdTangle was used
is the most popular and widely-accessible
to discover other Facebook pages and
medium in the Central African Republic.57
groups sharing similar material. The study
The EU-funded radio station, Radio Ndeke
followed a general inductive approach for
Luka, is widely regarded as one of the most
qualitative data analysis, during which
objective outlets. MINUSCA also funds its
narratives were manually detected.
own radio station, called Guira FM. Aside
Capitalising on a small, underfunded and from a state-run radio station, there are
underdeveloped media environment56, another two dozen privately-owned radio
Russia has created or co-opted a constella- stations.
tion of social media and web publications,
International state-funded broadcasters
as well as a terrestrial broadcast outlet, to
Radio France International (RFI), Voice
transmit its narratives regarding the Cen-
of America (VOA), Deutsche Welle (DW),
tral African Republic (CAR).
and the British Broadcasting Corporation
Russia has backed up its communication (BBC) also broadcast primarily in French
with action. After a 2017 meeting between on radio airwaves in the country.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and
Newspapers are not widely distributed.
CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadéra,
The World Bank estimates that roughly
Russia started providing weapons and se-
4.3 percent of Central Africans have ac-
curity training to the CAR with approval
cess to the internet — amongst the low-
from the UN Security Council.
est internet penetration in the world.58
��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19The narrow market, however, makes this Extensive investigative reporting has
medium especially powerful for orches- shown that Russian oligarch Yevgeny Pri-
trated information campaigns targeting gozhin is affiliated with various companies
‘the wealthy, the educated and the elite’.59 in the CAR and is leading Russia’s covert
operations in Africa.70 A close confidant
Russia’s involvement in the country
of Putin, Prigozhin, was indicted in the
dramatically escalated after President
United States for financing the Internet
Touadéra met with Russia’s foreign min-
Research Agency’s ‘information warfare’
ister in October 2017. A Russian govern-
during the 2016 American election.71
ment communique noted that the two
countries plan to ‘build up practical co-
operation in the political, trade, econom-
ic, and cultural areas and pointed to the Narrative 1:
considerable potential for partnership in Russia Empowers the CAR
mineral resources exploration’.60
In October 2020, Russia opened an office
in Bangui representing its defence min- ‘No one came to our aid except the Rus-
istry.61 Russia has also provided military sian Federation,’ said Albert Yaloke Mok-
training for the FACA, police, gendarme, peme, the spokesman for Touadéra, while
and presidential guard.62 About 40 Rus- the EU invests about $15 million annu-
sians also augment Touadéra’s personal ally for the EUTM. MINUSCA has its own
security detail.63 Thirty Russian soldiers training mission of CAR security forces.72
have joined the ranks of MINUSCA.64 The MINUSCA budget is roughly $1 billion
per year.73 Collectively, the United States,
Former Russian intelligence official Valery Germany, the United Kingdom, France
Zakharov was installed as Touadéra’s na- and Italy — which are all NATO members
tional security advisor.65 — pay for about 48.7 percent of the UN’s
peacekeeping budget; meanwhile, Russia
Multiple reports allege the Russians in the
contributes about 3 percent.74
CAR are either Russian special forces or
members of the Kremlin-linked private mil- Russia promoted a street protest with
itary company, Wagner Group.67 Zakharov 20,000 people in Bangui condemning the
claims they are merely reservists.67 Armed arms embargo on a variety of pro-Rus-
Russian citizens are providing armed secu- sia social media and websites, including
rity services for a Moscow-linked company Sputnik.75 As a reporter in the CAR, the
operating in the CAR.68 researcher learned from multiple reliable
sources that CAR politicians routinely pay
Estimates of the total number of Russians
people to attend such events to achieve
in the CAR vary from 250 to 1,000.69
political ends.
20 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������A FACEBOOK PAGE CALLED “THE
GREAT RETURN OF RUSSIA IN THE
CAR” CREATED A GRAPHIC CON-
DEMNING THE ARMS EMBARGO.
(SOURCE: FACEBOOK)
Russia succeeded in empowering the CAR Russia has worked to present itself as
by providing long-sought weapons and coming to the aid of the CAR. An animat-
challenging the weapons embargo. Mes- ed short film distributed online by a Rus-
saging surrounding the weapons provision sian-language account on YouTube shows
and ‘strengthening’ of FACA was repeat- the bear of Russia coming to the rescue of
edly amplified in pro-Russia publications a lion representing the CAR that is being
in the CAR.76 Other articles noted how attacked by a pack of rebellious hyenas,
Russia was returning national pride and i.e. the armed groups. The bear restores
dignity to the country.77 order and they all live happily ever after.
��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21SHIRTS SAYING “WE
LOVE RUSSIA” IN SAN-
GO HAVE BEEN DIS-
TRIBUTED IN THE CAR.
(SOURCE: FACEBOOK)
country weak and subservient.79 Various
Narrative 2: stories alleged numerous planned and
Russia Brings Peace failed coup d’états against Touadéra.80 In
to the CAR article by a pro-Russian non-profit organ-
isation alleged that France paid Chad $44
million ‘to kill poor innocent people, to
While Russia benefits from stability with- end a democratic elected power, whose
in the CAR and an empowered Touadéra, president [of the CAR] refuses the French
the security situation for Central Africans dictatorship’.81
has not demonstrably improved thanks to Another pro-Russia outlet alleged French
Russian involvement. The peace deal ulti- intelligence services sponsored a coup
mately ‘fuelled a war economy, increased by a political opponent of Touadéra with
the financial and political power of armed funding and material support and coordi-
group leaders, and deepened the crisis’.78 nation with Muslim militias in Bangui. The
outlet’s source for this information: ‘sev-
eral thousand Bangui residents’.82
Narrative 3: The West
The disinformation also targeted
Destabilises the CAR MINUCSA.83 Local media reports alleged
the peacekeeping force was ‘plotting’
against the CAR government by ‘funding
A critical element in Russia’s information
armed groups, supporting terrorism or
campaign in the CAR is the portrayal of
deliberately allowing violent attacks to
the West, mostly France and the United
occur’. MINUSCA condemned the ‘inflam-
States, as actively working to create in-
matory disinformation’.84
stability in the CAR in order to keep the
22 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������A CARTOON SHOWS MACRON
WHIPPING CENTRAL AFRICANS
TO EXTRACT DIAMONDS. UNDER
FRENCH COLONIAL RULE, FOR-
EIGN COMPANIES EXPLOITED DIA-
MONDS, GOLD, COTTON, TIMBER,
RUBBER AND OTHER NATURAL RE-
SOURCES FROM THE CAR.
(SOURCE: FACEBOOK)
Narrative 4: Narrative 5: Russia Supports
The West is a Coloniser Pan-Africanism
The Western destabilisation narrative is In sharp contrast, Russia has presented
interconnected with the theme that the itself as a supporter of the people of Af-
West wants to continue dominating and rica by embracing Pan-Africanism — a
looting the CAR as a coloniser.85 social-political movement and worldview
that seeks to ‘unify and uplift blacks on
In examining social media and web posts
the African continent’.88 The Soviet Union
over the past two years, the research found
supported Pan-Africanism as early as the
consistent references to France’s colonial
1920s.89
history in the CAR, with assertions that the
West wants to ‘keep the CAR in a new form A Sputnik article noted how the United
of slavery’.86 Pro-Russian media also regu- States and United Kingdom are ‘in the
larly recalled the sexual violence perpetrat- sights’ of Pan-Africanists, but France is the
ed by MINUSCA and French forces.87 top target because of its military strength
in Africa.90 A variety of Pan-African social
media accounts have called for France to
withdraw from the CAR.91
In the CAR, at least one pro-Russian Face-
book page was set up specifically to pro-
mote Pan-Africanism.92
��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23ZAKHAROV PRESENTS A TRAMPOLINE TO A LOCAL ORGANISATION IN BANGUI.
(SOURCE: FONTANKA)
ness contests, Tae Kwon Do contests, and
Narrative 6: a drawing and poetry contest with a beach
Russia Develops the CAR vacation in Crimea awarded to the winner.94
In February 2019, the Russians travelled
in a ‘humanitarian convoy’ from Sudan
Through traditional public relations activi-
into the CAR. Armed rebels escorted the
ties in person and online, Russia has pro-
Russians.95 Prigozhin’s company promoted
moted its presence in the CAR and its de-
the convoy through a short documenta-
velopment activities. The Prighozin-linked
ry-style film from a Russian filmmaker who
company, Lobaye Invest, sponsored the
previously created disinformation about
country’s first Miss Central Africa Republic
Syria for a Russian state news agency. 96
beauty pageant, which was presided over
by Zakharov.93 Russia has organised soccer One of the most prominent overt commu-
matches, film screenings for children, fit- nication tools used by Russia is their own
24 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������A BILLBOARD IN BANGUI PROCLAIMS IN THE LOCAL SANGO LANGUAGE THAT THE
CAR IS “HAND IN HAND” WITH RUSSIA. (SOURCE: FACEBOOK)
FM and shortwave radio station, Lengo social media channels, the next logical
Songo, which means ‘Let’s Create Solidar- step for Russia was to dismiss the compe-
ity’ in the local Sango language.97 The sta- tition — Western media. RFI and France
tion broadcasts farther than state radio and 24, a French-government funded TV sta-
is projected to broadcast nationwide with tion, are by far the most popular outlets
the installation of 17 additional antennas.98 and are commonly called ‘propaganda’ by
pro-Russian media.99
Narrative 7: In the past two years, multiple French re-
Don’t Trust Western Media porters have been accused in local media
of writing fake news and of being spies —
With Russia paying for its own media dis- a charge that can be deadly in volatile con-
tribution channels on the terrestrial air- flict environments like the CAR.100
waves, as well as its network on web and
��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 25Russian outlets and Russia’s foreign minis-
try also work to discredit critical reporting
Tactics
on the CAR.101 The following quantitative analysis exam-
ines three types of data for a select set
In an unusual episode, the director of Rus-
of pro-Russian Facebook pages, Telegram
sia’s Lengo Songo radio station alleged
channels and websites: quantity of con-
that he was attacked in June 2019 by five
tent, themes of the content, and word fre-
armed ‘thugs’ sent by political opponents
quency within the content.
of Touadéra. The assailants allegedly in-
sisted Lengo Songo change its editorial The Russian information war in the Central
stance.102 The director claims the American African Republic uses a constantly growing
non-profit organisation, Search for Com- and evolving constellation of media publi-
mon Ground, also attempted to bribe him cations and non-governmental organisa-
with about $450 to alter news coverage.103 tions to spread its narratives throughout
the Central African Republic, across Africa,
Russian officials have offered training,
and worldwide. Russia has a dominating
cash and equipment to local journalists
presence for a minimal budget.
then threatened those who refused.104
The Russian information campaign de-
ployed in the CAR uses a variety of tactics
to spread its narratives. These techniques
Narrative 8: are consistent with those used by Prigo-
zhin’s Internet Research Agency during
The West Neglects the CAR the 2016 US presidential elections.106
They include:
A less prominent piece of the Russian nar-
rative is that the West has not been doing • Repeated Sharing of Russian Narra-
enough to support the CAR. Similar mes- tives Across Platforms
saging about Western inaction existed pri- • Incorporating Relevant Social and Cul-
or to the recent Russian efforts in the CAR, tural Issues
specifically about MINUSCA troops.105
• Using Local Voices
• Creating Division and Amplifying Con-
spiracies
• Sponsoring Non-Governmental Or-
ganisations
26 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������CONCLUSIONS
Despite the highly publicized achieve- Russia’s ability to publicize its successes
ments of the Sochi summit, Russia is still is enormous. Even though many of their
a minor player in Africa. This must be contracts are declarations or memoranda
acknowledged when analyzing Russia’s of understanding, they are often broad-
operations on the continent. Due to its cast as concluded deals. Despite this pub-
current economic and military situation, lic image, Russia’s operations have not al-
Russia is incapable of devoting substan- ways been successful, often because they
tial resources to Africa. Although Russia lack expertise and experience with the
has an interest in building closer relations, environment. Moscow has proven to be a
such as through arms exports, Africa does weaker player in various clashes with the
not feature among to its top priorities. US and China, as well as the civil socieies
of Sudan, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, and
As in other regions, Russia’s policies in
South Africa.
Africa are elite-oriented rather than pop-
ulation-oriented. Russia relies upon and
seeks the favor of local rulers, including
dictators, which often fosters corrup-
tion.107 This pragmatic policy focuses on
short-term gains and consequently does
not provide long-term stability to the con-
tinent. This policy is based on Kremlins’s
current leadership’s perception of the very
word ‘stability.’ Stability can mean both
the peaceful transition of power from one
party to another or the prevention of a
transition of power altogether.
��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 27ENDNOTES
1. The whole list of agreements and memoranda can be found here: Outcomes of the first Russia–Africa
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28 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������13. Marten, K. (2019). Russia’s Back in Africa: Is the Cold War Returning? The Washington Quarterly, 42(4),
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41. United Nations Peacekeeping. (2020c). MINUSMA Fact Sheet. Accessed 14.09.20.
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44. Ibid.
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50. Ministère de la Défense. (2020). Opération Barkhane. Accessed 15.10.2020.
30 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������You can also read
