Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS Disinformation Campaign

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Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS
Disinformation Campaign
Thomas Boghardt

                                           The practice of intelligence dif-             weaken the USSR’s opponents—
                                           fered considerably between East               first and foremost the “main
                                           and West during the Cold War.                 enemy” (glavny protivnik), the
                                           Western intelligence services were            United States—and to create a
                                           most commonly tasked with gath-               favorable environment for
                                           ering information, but their                  advancing Moscow’s views and
                                                                                         international objectives

               “
                                           Soviet bloc counterparts placed
                                           much greater emphasis on decep-               worldwide.
                                           tion operations to influence
 Our friends in Moscow                     opinions or actions of individu-              This is the story of one such mea-
call it ‘dezinformatsiya.’                 als and governments. 2                        sure—a campaign to implicate
Our enemies in America                                                                   the United States in the emer-
call it ‘active measures,’                 These “active measures” (aktiv-               gence of the AIDS pandemic that
                                           inyye meropriatia, as the Soviets             appeared in the early 1980s. The
and I, dear friends, call it
                                           called them) included manipula-               story both illustrates the nature of
 ‘my favorite pastime.’                                                                  Soviet and communist bloc disin-
                                           tion and media control, written
                                           and oral disinformation, use of               formation programs and

               ”
          —Col. Rolf Wagenbreth,
    director of Department X (dis-
     information) of East German
                                           foreign communist parties and
                                           front organizations, clandestine
                                           radio broadcasting, manipula-
                                           tion of the economy, kidnappings,
                                           paramilitary operations, and sup-
                                                                                         demonstrates the potential long-
                                                                                         term consequences.

                                                                                         Editor’s Note: This article was the
                                                                                         recipient of an Annual Studies in
               foreign intelligence 1      port of guerrilla groups and                  Intelligence Award in 2009. The
                                           terrorist organizations. Under                references to end notes seen in
                                           Joseph Stalin, active measures                this text are included only in the
                                           also included political                       article’s .PDF versions posted in
                                           assassinations. 3 The basic goal of           the Studies in Intelligence collec-
                                           Soviet active measures was to                 tion in www.cia.gov.

                                           Organizational Basics                         Directorate (foreign intelli-
                                                                                         gence) was expected to spend 25
                                             The KGB’s Service A was the                 percent of his time conceiving
                                           unit tasked with conducting                   and implementing them. 4 But
                                           active measures, and numerous                 active measures were well inte-
                                           KGB residencies abroad were                   grated into Soviet policy and
                                           assigned officers dealing exclu-              involved virtually every ele-
                                           sively with them. Moreover,                   ment of the Soviet party and
                                           each officer of the First Chief

                                           All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the
                                           authors. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US gov-
                                           ernment endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)                                                                           1
The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth

Deteriorating East-West relations formed the backdrop to Mos-
cow’s decision to embark on an aggressive active measures                         of Germany was merely an
campaign.                                                                         incarnation of the Third Reich. 8

                                                                                    In conducting disinformation
state structure, not only the                Moscow’s “total” approach to         campaigns, Soviet bloc intelli-
KGB.                                       influence and deception opera-         gence had to be mindful of the
                                           tions contrasted starkly with          concerns, fears, and expecta-
  Active measures specialists              the American concept of covert         tions of their target audience.
used newspapers, radio sta-                action, which was carried out          As Ladislav Bittman, deputy
tions, embassies, and other offi-          by a single agency—the CIA—            chief of the Czechoslovak intel-
cial institutions for                      whose budget for such opera-           ligence service’s disinformation
implementation and diffusion.              tions made up a fraction of its        department from 1964 to 1966,
Services allied to the Soviets,            overall expenditure and paled          pointed out: in order to succeed
such as East Germany’s Minis-              in comparison to what the Sovi-        “every disinformation message
try for State Security (MfS),              ets spent on active measures. 7        must at least partially corre-
were frequently enlisted as                                                       spond to reality or generally
well. In 1980, a conservative                Disinformation (dezinfor-            accepted views.” 9
CIA estimate put the annual                matsiya) was a particularly
cost of Soviet active measures             effective weapon in the armory
at $3 billion. 6                           of Soviet bloc active measures.        The AIDS Campaign’s
                                           The term dezinformatsiya               Backdrop and Origins
                                           denoted a variety of techniques
    A Note about Intelligence              and activities to purvey false or        Deteriorating East-West rela-
    Sources                                misleading information that            tions formed the backdrop to
                                           Soviet bloc active measures spe-       Moscow’s decision to embark on
    With the end of the Cold War,                                                 an aggressive active measures
                                           cialists sought to leak into the
    former Soviet and East German                                                 campaign in the 1980s. The
    intelligence officers confirmed
                                           foreign media. From the West-
                                           ern perspective, disinformation        Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
    their services’ sponsorship of the
                                           was a politically motivated lie,       in 1979 ended what was left of
    AIDS disinformation campaign.
    In 1990, the German TV news            but Soviet bloc propagandists          détente, and the newly elected
    magazine Panorama featured an          believed their disinformation          US president, Ronald Reagan,
    anonymous former intelligence          campaigns merely highlighted           adopted a hard line against the
    officer—probably Günter                greater truths by exposing the         USSR. At his first press confer-
    Bohnsack—who revealed his                                                     ence, Reagan declared: “They
    department’s participation in the
                                           real nature of capitalism.
                                                                                  [the Soviets] reserve unto them-
    campaign. Later that year,
                                             For example, the KGB began           selves the right to commit any
    Bohnsack and a fellow retired
    intelligence officer published more    spreading rumors about FBI             crime, to lie, to cheat in order to
    details of their department’s activ-   and CIA involvement in the             attain [world revolution].”
    ities against the West, including      assassination of President John
    the AIDS disinformation                F. Kennedy because the Soviets           In short order, the new presi-
    campaign. 5 And in 1992, SVR           earnestly believed the US mili-        dent increased the defense bud-
    (Russian foreign intelligence)
                                           tary-industrial complex was            get by 10 percent, suspended
    director Yevgeny Primakov con-                                                arms reduction talks, and rein-
    firmed the KGB’s participation.
                                           involved in Kennedy’s murder.
                                           Likewise, East German intelli-         stated work on MX missiles and
    Over the next years, the European
                                           gence routinely floated disinfor-      B-1 bombers. The Reagan
    and the North American media
    repeatedly reported on Soviet bloc     mation depicting West German           administration’s hawkish
    intelligence sponsorship of the        politicians as former Nazis,           stance, in turn, stoked Soviet
    AIDS conspiracy theory. Archival       because, from East Berlin’s per-       paranoia, especially after Yuri
    sources, interviews, and other         spective, the Federal Republic         Andropov’s election as general
    material were used in this article                                            secretary of the Communist
    as well.

2                                                                  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)
The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth

Party of the Soviet Union in
                                             The Soviet Active Measures Process
1982. A former KGB chairman,
Andropov was intelligent and                 Center gives strategic go-ahead for a disinformation campaign.
well-versed in foreign affairs,              Ideas would be generated by residency officers assigned to read local press,
but he was also a hardliner                  books, and magazines for material that could be used for disinformation
with a proclivity for conspiracy             purposes. 12
theories, a trait perhaps exacer-            Center would evaluate the ideas. According to a senior East European intel-
bated by his terminal illness.               ligence officer who defected in 1968,

  During his short reign,                      Individual suggestions for special operations [active measures] which
                                               came from stations abroad were submitted for preliminary assess-
Andropov became convinced                      ment.…the majority of the suggestions were discarded in the first stage
that the United States planned                 of the selection process, leaving only those whose conception corre-
                                               sponded with our long-range plans and whose projected consequences
for nuclear war, and KGB resi-                 suggested positive results. The suggestions were then transmitted to a
dencies in Western capitals                    panel…where the author of the proposal faced many questions and
were instructed to look for signs              much criticism in an attempt to uncover any weakness. The composition
                                               of the critical board varied from case to case although several Depart-
of a first strike. In keeping with             ment D employees and experts on particular regions were permanent
Andropov’s hostility toward the                members. Further supplemented and polished, the proposal was then
                                               submitted to the intelligence chief for approval. 13
Reagan administration, the
KGB’s First Chief Directorate                Still at the Center, preparation involved disinformation specialists writing
on 30 September 1982                         in their native language, approvals by managers, and translation.
instructed its residencies in the            Targeting followed. The Center typically sought to launch a story outside
United States to counterattack               the Soviet bloc-controlled press to conceal Moscow’s hand. This was done
Washington’s aggressive stance               frequently through anonymous letters and newspaper articles in the
with active measures. 10                     Third World. 14
                                             Once published abroad, the Soviet media might pick up and further prop-
  Soviet active measures                     agate the item by referring to its non-Soviet source.
worked best when pre-existing
plans fit neatly into political-             Types of Active Measures
cultural environments and spe-               According to the defector, two types of active measures existed:
cific events. 11 In this case, Mos-
                                               The first category includes operations initiated and designed within
cow had long realized that                     KGB ranks and usually employs such traditional disinformation tech-
chemical and biological war-                   niques as forgeries or agents of influence. The KGB conducts hundreds
                                               of these categories every year even though their impact is rather
fare was of great concern to                   limited. 15
Western publics and could be
exploited for disinformation                 Such single pieces of disinformation were not reinforced by additional prop-
                                             agation efforts.
purposes. During the Korean
War, the Chinese and North                   The second type was the result of a strategic decision at the top of the Soviet
Koreans had broadcast “confes-               active measures pyramid and directly approved by the Politburo. Campaigns
sions” of captured American                  were usually planned to last several years and encompassed many elements
pilots about the alleged US use              of the Soviet state, including the International Information Department
                                             (IID), which directed official press organs, such as TASS, Novosti, and Radio
of germ warfare. 17 During the               Moscow; and the International Department (ID), responsible for liaison with
Vietnam War, the KGB circu-                  foreign communist parties, international communist front organizations,
lated a forged letter purporting             and clandestine radios.
to come from Gordon Goldstein
                                             The KGB, ID, and IID would cooperate closely in executing a particular cam-
of the US Office of Naval                    paign with the means available to each—the KGB’s Service A, responsible
Research. First published in the             for forgeries and spreading rumors (“black propaganda”), the IID’s press
Bombay Free Press Journal in                 organs for official stories (“white propaganda”), the ID for clandestine radio
1968, the letter “revealed” the              broadcasts and the use of international front organizations (“gray
existence of American bacterio-              propaganda”). 16

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)                                                                         3
The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth

In their conspiracy-driven world view, it was plausible to as-
sume that AIDS was indeed the result of US biological warfare               was indeed the result of US bio-
experiments.                                                                logical warfare experiments.
                                                                            But ultimately, the true origins
                                                                            of AIDS were of secondary
logical warfare weapons in Viet-    response to the discoveries             importance. 23 According to
nam and Thailand. 18                opened the door to rumors. 20           Yevgeny Primakov, at the time
                                    The emergence of the mysteri-           the first deputy chairman of the
  Moreover, Americans had           ous illness so soon after revela-       Soviet Peace Committee, a for-
shown themselves politically        tions about US biological               eign propaganda front organi-
sensitive to the behavior of        warfare experiments therefore           zation, the KGB conducted the
their own government. In the        provided Soviet active mea-             AIDS disinformation campaign
1970s, a spate of press and con-    sures specialists an opening to         to expose the “perfidious” work
gressional investigations publi-    exploit.                                of US military scientists. 24
cized several actual instances of
US biological warfare research        In addition, the Soviets were
early in the Cold War. One          extremely sensitive to charges          The Campaign Opens
example was the secret Special      against them concerning biolog-
Operations Division (SOD) at        ical weapons. A US State                  The opening salvo of the AIDS
the premier US chemical and         Department report released on           disinformation campaign was
biological warfare research         22 March 1982 accused Mos-              fired on 17 July 1983, when an
facility at Fort Detrick, Mary-     cow of using chemical toxin             obscure newspaper in India, the
land, which had created a num-      weapons (“yellow rain”) in              Patriot, printed an anonymous
ber of germ weapons for the         Southeast Asia. This allegation         letter headlined “AIDS may
CIA (codename MKNAOMI).             may have provided an impetus            invade India: Mystery disease
Later, an SOD report surfaced,      for the KGB to respond in               caused by US experiments.”
detailing a simulated biological    kind. 21                                The letter, allegedly written by
warfare attack in New York in                                               a “well-known American scien-
the summer of 1966—Army               All Moscow had to do was add          tist and anthropologist” in New
personnel had released aerosol      a twist to its time-tested biolog-      York, claimed that “AIDS…is
clouds of a “harmless simulant      ical warfare disinformation             believed to be the result of the
agent” into subway stations         theme by introducing the idea           Pentagon’s experiments to
along the 7th and 8th Avenue        that US government scientists           develop new and dangerous bio-
lines to assess the vulnerabil-     had created the AIDS virus. In          logical weapons.” It went on to
ity of subway systems to covert     the words of two former Soviet          state that the United States
biological attacks and to explore   bloc disinformation officers, the       was about to transfer these
“methods of delivery that could     AIDS disinformation campaign            experiments to sites in Paki-
be used offensively.” 19            “virtually conceptualized               stan, where they would pose a
                                    itself.” 22                             grave threat to neighboring
  In this environment, the key                                              India.
event was the emergence in the        As in earlier disinformation
early 1980s of the Acquired         campaigns, the propagandists            • Citing a number of publicly
Immune Deficiency Syndrome,         sought to expose what they con-           available sources, the article
AIDS, as a national health cri-     sidered a greater truth about             recounted a series of well-
sis. Scientists had named the       the “main enemy”—i.e., that               established facts about
disease in 1982, and the follow-    the United States was an impe-            AIDS—that there was great
ing year a causative virus (HIV)    rialistic, reactionary power con-         concern about contaminated
was identified. However, the        trolled by a war-mongering                blood donations; that AIDS
origins of HIV/AIDS were still      arms industry. In their conspir-          was probably caused by a
obscure. The lack of verifiable     acy-driven world view, it was             virus; and that AIDS regis-
facts and the strong emotional      plausible to assume that AIDS

4                                                            Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)
The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth

                                           The idea for the AIDS disinformation campaign would have
 tered its first major outbreak            been approved and polished at KGB headquarters.
 in the United States.

• The author then listed ele-              charges made in 1982 in the           of Army Labs in RDA” and spe-
  ments of the US biological               Soviet media to the effect that a     cifically referred to “the U.S.
  warfare program known to                 research laboratory sponsored         Army Medical Research Insti-
  the public: government                   by the University of Maryland         tute of Infectious Diseases
  records obtained through the             in Lahore, Pakistan, was in fact      (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick,
  Freedom of Information Act               a bacteriological warfare             Md,” which had—the journal
  by the Church of Scientology,            facility. 26 AIDS itself was not of   asserted—placed particular
  which had documented biolog-             much concern to the average           emphasis “on problems associ-
  ical agent experiments in the            Indian in 1983, but any men-          ated with medical defense
  1950s; CIA-sponsored testing             tion of schemes involving             against potential biological war-
  of drugs on humans during                India’s arch-foe Pakistan could       fare agents, or naturally occur-
  the same time period; and the            be expected to draw attention         ring diseases of particular
  development of biological                on the subcontinent.                  military importance and on the
  weapons until the late 1960s                                                   highly virulent pathogenic
  at Fort Detrick.                           The 17 July letter’s extensive      microorganisms which require
                                           quoting of US sources—e.g.,           special containment facilities.” 28
• Even though President Rich-              U.S. News & World Report,
  ard Nixon had banned US                  Associated Press, and Army              Once conceived, the idea for
  offensive bacteriological weap-          Research, Development &               the AIDS disinformation cam-
  ons research by executive                Acquisition magazine—sug-             paign would have been
  order in 1969, the letter in the         gests that US-based KGB offic-        approved and polished at KGB
  Patriot stated that the Penta-           ers initiated the AIDS                headquarters (the Center) in
  gon had “never abandoned                 campaign, or at least collected       the Moscow suburb of Yasen-
  these weapons” and claimed               the material that triggered the       ovo. (See box on Soviet active
  that Fort Detrick had discov-            idea. The KGB had large resi-         measures process.) The task of
  ered AIDS by analyzing sam-              dencies in New York City and          pulling pertinent material
  ples of “highly pathogenic               Washington, DC, both of which         together and generating the let-
  viruses” collected by Ameri-             were assigned officers who            ter would have fallen to the
  can scientists in Africa and             worked solely on active               KGB’s disinformation special-
  Latin America.                           measures. 27                          ists of Service A, under Gen-
                                                                                 eral Ivan Ivanovich Agayants.
• It concluded by quoting statis-            One especially clear indicator      By 1985, the service employed
  tics and publications on the             of the US origins of the effort is    roughly 80 officers at Yasenovo
  spread and lethality of AIDS,            the Patriot letter’s reference to     and another 30 to 40 in the
  and its particular threat to             Army Research, Development &          Novosti Press offices at Push-
  developing nations. 25                   Acquisition,which was not             kin Square. 29
                                           widely available and would
                                           make unusual reading for a              Although they had no particu-
Indicators of Soviet
                                           “well-known American scien-           lar training in psychology, these
Inspiration
                                           tist” who also described himself      specialists had honed their
                                           as an “anthropologist.” The           skills over several decades and
  There can be little doubt
                                           journal would be a typical            understood the dynamics of
about the KGB’s authorship of
                                           source for a KGB officer seek-        rumor campaigns intuitively.
the letter. The letter’s argu-
                                           ing material for a disinforma-        The responsible officer(s) would
ments built on earlier disinfor-
                                           tion campaign, however. In fact,      have composed the text first in
mation campaigns involving US
                                           the magazine’s July/August            Russian and then commis-
bacteriological warfare and spe-
                                           1982 issue focused on “The Role       sioned a translation into
cifically picked up on false

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)                                                            5
The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth

As an opening salvo, the letter was a dud.
                                                                           eventually lead to the dissolu-
                                                                           tion of the USSR, but at the
English by KGB-translators.         Indian journalists and politi-         time he refrained from interfer-
Some translators were native-       cians willing to take money. 31        ing with the KGB active mea-
speakers, but most were Rus-                                               sures program and generally
sian speakers schooled in             With respect to the left-wing        supported its agenda. 34) Sec-
English for this purpose.           Patriot, the KGB had been              ond, the spread of AIDS had
                                    involved in setting it up in 1967      become a much greater global
  The use of non-native speak-      for the very purpose of circulat-      concern and made it a poten-
ers who may not have had            ing Soviet-inspired articles.          tially more powerful disinfor-
much exposure to spoken             With a circulation of about            mation weapon than two years
English, occasionally resulted      35,000, the Patriot was small by       earlier.
in stilted and syntactically        Indian standards, but it quickly
incorrect translations, as          gained a reputation in intelli-         Three events in 1985 might
appeared in the Patriot letter.     gence circles as Moscow’s              have contributed to a Soviet
The text included several gram-     mouthpiece. 32                         decision to reactivate the AIDS
matical errors, including a ref-                                           campaign.
erence to the “virus flu,” rather     As an opening salvo, the let-
than “flu virus.” Such linguistic   ter was a dud. Though care-            • A US government report
slip-ups were typical give-         fully prepared and planted, no           released in February 1985
aways of Soviet bloc disinforma-    media outlet picked it up at the         claimed that the Soviets had
tion stories. 30                    time. Even though the letter             broken the Geneva Conven-
                                    mentioned Pakistan, the Indian           tion by producing biological
                                    press probably ignored it sim-           weapons. 35
Placement                           ply because AIDS was not then
                                    an issue on the subcontinent. 33       • An article in Lyndon H.
  Composed, approved, and           That the Soviet media failed to          LaRouche Jr.’s Executive Intel-
translated, the letter needed to    follow up, on the other hand,            ligence Review accused the
be inserted covertly into the       may have been because the let-           USSR of blocking the battle
media. India, as a large, non-      ter had fallen into that second-         against AIDS. 36
aligned country with a diverse      ary category of disinformation,
English-language press, was an      a single, if clever, piece con-        • Concern about the spread of
ideal staging ground. The           ceived at the bottom of the              AIDS within the USSR may
Indian government put few           Soviet active measures’ pyra-            have prompted the leader-
restrictions on the influx of       mid and not reinforced by addi-          ship to attempt to redirect
Soviet officials, and in the        tional support measures.                 domestic concerns abroad. 37
1980s more than 150 KGB and
GRU (military intelligence)                                                  The campaign reopened with
officers served on the subconti-    Reemergence of the                     an article in the newspaper Lit-
nent. Many of them were busy        Campaign.                              eraturnaya Gazeta, the KGB’s
planting biased or false stories                                           “prime conduit in the Soviet
in Indian papers. According to        The Patriot letter lay largely       press for propaganda and
KGB archivist and defector          unnoticed for nearly three             disinformation.” 38 On
Vasili Mitrokhin, the KGB           years. By 1985, a lot had              30 October 1985, the paper pub-
planted 5,510 stories in this       changed. First, a new, dynamic         lished an article by Valentin
way in 1975 alone and con-          general secretary of the CPSU,         Zapevalov, titled “Panic in the
trolled 10 Indian newspapers        Mikhail Gorbachev, had, with           West or What Is Hiding behind
and one news agency. KGB            KGB support, taken over and            the Sensation Surrounding
officers boasted to one another     ended the USSR’s period of             AIDS.” 39
that there was no shortage of       leadership disarray. (Gor-
                                    bachev’s reform agenda would

6                                                           Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)
The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth

  Zapevalov began his lengthy              Fort Detrick. As a result of tests
piece by reminding readers that            on unsuspecting victims—peo-          East Germany’s Ministry for
                                                                                 State Security
AIDS was apparently spread-                ple from the US “satellite coun-
ing from the United States to              try” Haiti, drug addicts,             Modeled on the KGB, East Ger-
the rest of the world (in fact,            homosexuals and homeless peo-         many’s MfS was a massive secu-
                                                                                 rity and espionage agency that
most early AIDS cases were                 ple—the virus was then alleg-
                                                                                 included secret police and foreign
reported among US homosex-                 edly unleashed. Zapevalov             intelligence components. The for-
ual men). He went on to accu-              concluded by suggesting that          eign intelligence branch (HVA, or
rately describe the disease,               US military personnel were            Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung—
quoting well-known publica-                potential carriers of the virus       chief reconnaissance division) was
tions such as U.S. News &                  and expressed the hope that           headed for many years by the
World Report for statistical evi-          “one of the victims” would sue        urbane Markus Wolf. In the early
                                                                                 1960s, the HVA set up its own dis-
dence. He then veered back to              the CIA or the Pentagon to
                                                                                 information section, Department
his initial contention about the           show the world that “all vic-         X (or HVA X). By the 1980s, the
provenance of AIDS, chroni-                tims of AIDS are the result of a      department had grown to include
cling in some detail the early             monstrous experiment.”                roughly 60 officers, based at MfS
spread of the disease, and ask-                                                  headquarters in the Normannen-
ing rhetorically: “Why [did]                 The structure of the Literatur-     strasse in East Berlin.
AIDS…appear in the USA and                 naya Gazeta article bears a
                                                                                 Headed throughout its history by
start spreading above all in               striking resemblance to the           Col. Rolf Wagenbreth, HVA X
towns along the East Coast?”               Patriot letter. While both publi-     focused primarily on West Ger-
This leading question was fol-             cations claimed that AIDS was         many, but it was also active in the
lowed by a laundry list of covert          made in the USA, most of the          Third World. (By the late 1970s it
US biological warfare pro-                 information given in the text         had expanded its overseas activi-
                                           was accurate—an essential             ties to include China and the
grams of the 1950s and 1960s                                                     United States.) In the mid-1960s,
already noted in the Patriot let-          ingredient of a successful disin-
                                                                                 the KGB introduced structural
ter; CIA-authorized testing of             formation campaign. Much of           reforms in the Soviet bloc intelli-
drugs for mind-control pur-                the data was taken from pub-          gence network, permitting indi-
poses; the case of Frank Olson,            lished sources. As had the            vidual KGB departments to work
a Special Operations Division              authors of the Patriot letter,        directly with their territorial,
(SOD) bio weapons expert who               Zapevalov used verifiable facts       counterintelligence and disinfor-
                                           about early Cold War US exper-        mation counterparts in Eastern
committed suicide after he was
                                                                                 Europe. Henceforth, HVA X
administered LSD without his               iments as circumstantial evi-
                                                                                 informed the KGB directly of
knowledge; and the delivery of             dence for his claim that AIDS         active measures planned by East
a toxic substance by CIA officer           was the result of similar tests.      Berlin, and HVA and KGB held
Sidney Gottlieb to the Agency’s                                                  annual bilateral meetings, alter-
station chief in Congo for use in                                                nating between Berlin and Mos-
                                           Enter East Germany and                cow, to discuss operations against
assassinating President Patrice
                                           Dr. Jakob Segal                       the United States and other
Lumumba. 40
                                                                                 nations. 44
                                             The Soviets frequently
  In the last third of the article,
                                           involved allied intelligence ser-
the author reminded readers of
                                           vices and their disinformation       The rest of this story is largely
the biological warfare pro-
                                           departments in their disinfor-       about the role played by a dedi-
grams at Fort Detrick and
                                           mation campaigns. In this case,      cated East German scientist
stated that these experiments
                                           in turning to East Germany           known to the KGB and East
continued notwithstanding
                                           and to a particular East Ger-        Germany’s Ministry for State
President Nixon’s 1969 ban.
                                           man, the Soviets injected their      Security, the MfS (colloquially
The Patriot letter from 1983
                                           campaign with an energy even         known as the Stasi) and the
was referenced as a source for
                                           they may not have expected.          Soviet and East German prac-
the alleged creation of AIDS at

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)                                                                 7
The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth

tice of exploiting unwitting ser-
                                     The Segal Arguments in AIDS—its nature and origins
vants of seemingly good causes
for their own ends.                  Segal and his coauthors mixed truth, to establish professional credentials,
                                     and fiction—the heart of their story. At the outset, the three detailed well
  While most of the KGB’s jun-       established facts about the illness, including that it was caused by the HIV
ior partner services conducted       virus and disabled a body’s immune system.
active measures to some extent,
by the 1980s, East German            Rejecting theories about the simian origins of the virus, the three asserted
                                     that Fort Detrick was “for a long time…the central laboratory of the Pentagon
intelligence had emerged as the
                                     for the development of biological agents of war” and operated a “P-4 type” high
KGB’s most valuable partner in       security laboratory for gene manipulation in “building 550” since 1977. 49
loyalty, professionalism, and        There, voluntary human test subjects were probably infected with the AIDS
technical expertise. Having          virus, which they alleged was the product of two natural, artificially synthe-
decided to revive the AIDS cam-      sized (“recombined”) viruses, VISNA and HTLV-I. When the test subjects
paign, the KGB informed its          showed no symptoms for six to 12 months, due to AIDS’ long incubation
East German counterpart              period, the Pentagon concluded its virus was ineffective, and the infected vol-
unambiguously that Moscow            unteers were released.
expected it to participate. 41       Since the test subjects were criminals who had spent a long time in jail
                                     deprived of female companionship, the three argued, most of them had
  The East Germans were told         become homosexuals. Many of the infected volunteers headed for New York,
specifically to employ a “scien-     mixing with the local gay population, thus initiating the epidemic whose first
tific approach” 42 and produce       victims were registered among homosexuals in that city in 1979—two years
disinformation contending the        after the alleged Fort Detrick experiments. Displaying a wobbly grasp of US
AIDS virus had been developed        urban reality, they added that it “was logical for the released prisoners to seek
at Fort Detrick, from where it       out a major city close by, but not Washington, where the political climate is
                                     rather unsuitable for criminals [in fact, Washington, D.C. had one of the high-
spread to the general popula-
                                     est crime rates of the nation in the 1980s]. New York with its developed
tion through human testing.          underworld was more promising.” 50
Beyond those obligatory details,
the East Germans were given a       views who were not openly pro-             gence probably originated in
free hand in devising their own     Soviet. Bloc intelligence                  those years. After the war, Segal
strategy and spreading the          referred to them as “agents of             settled in East Berlin, where he
story. The HVA code named the       influence,” “subconscious multi-           became head of the Institute for
operation INFEKTION and             plicators,” or simply as “useful           Applied Bacteriology at East
VORWÄRTS II [Forward II]            idiots.” 45                                Berlin’s Humboldt University in
and henceforth was the KGB’s                                                   1953 46 After his retirement, he
junior partner and main ally          The agent of choice in this case         and his wife Lilli—also a scien-
regarding AIDS. 43                  was the retired East German                tist—developed an interest in
                                    biophysicist Professor Jakob               AIDS, although neither of them
  The KGB was particularly          Segal. Born in St. Petersburg in           was an expert on the subject. 47
keen on employing another of        1911, Segal grew up in interwar            Both Segals were unwavering
its standard active-measure         Germany, where he studied biol-            believers in international com-
practices, the use of unwitting     ogy, but as a Jew and commu-               munism and staunch support-
agents who were held in high        nist he was forced to flee to              ers of the GDR. As an
esteem in their home countries.     France when the Nazis assumed              established KGB contact and an
Such individuals did Moscow’s       power. According to Segal, he              MfS informer (Inoffizieller
or East Berlin’s bidding            completed his PhD at Sorbonne              Mitarbeiter, or IM), 48 Segal was
through their speeches, publica-    University in Paris, just before           a known quantity, and Soviet
tions, and personal networks.       the German invasion in 1940                bloc intelligence had enough
Often, these individuals were       and joined the French resis-               information to judge him politi-
journalists, scientists, or other   tance during the occupation. His           cally reliable.
public figures with left-wing       connection with Soviet intelli-

8                                                              Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)
The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth

                                           Segal became genuinely and passionately devoted to his
  How Segal was actually                   cause, and many people found him winsome and convincing.
brought into the process is not
known with certainty, but in all
likelihood “evidence” of the US            have met him, the theory’s           conceded that the theory was
origins of AIDS would have                 appeal [about the origins of         based on circumstantial evi-
been given to him in personal              AIDS] may lie in the man him-        dence, they concluded that the
meetings, perhaps with a pro-              self. Engaging and well-read, he     “assumption that AIDS is a
fessional colleague previously             is sympathetic to AIDS suffer-       product of the preparation of
briefed by the MfS. In this first          ers and wants to help out in the     biological warfare can there-
meeting, Segal would not have              fight against the disease.” 52       fore be quite plainly expressed.”
been told explicitly that the                                                   According to press reports,
material came from Soviet bloc                                                  Segal subsequently claimed the
                                           The Segal Contributions              project was code-named “MK-
intelligence or that it was part
of a disinformation campaign.                                                   Naomi.” 54
                                             Segal’s first major contribu-
Rather, he simply would have               tion to the AIDS disinforma-
been encouraged to look into                                                      HVA X had provided Segal
                                           tion campaign was a 47-page          with much of the material for
the matter. Given Segal’s back-            pamphlet titled AIDS—its
ground, he would have been                                                      his pamphlet, 55 which began
                                           nature and origin, co-authored       circulating in Harare, Zimba-
expected to reach the intended             by his wife Lilli and Ronald
conclusion. While Segal may                                                     bwe, on the eve of the Eighth
                                           Dehmlow, a fellow retired Hum-       Conference of NonAligned
have suspected the real source             boldt University professor. 53 In
of the AIDS material, it was                                                    Nations (1–6 September 1986).
                                           it, the authors went to great        The conference was attended by
common practice in the GDR                 lengths to refute the more and
for authorities to share “back-                                                 representatives of more than
                                           more widely accepted theory          100 Third World countries—as
ground information” quasi-con-             about the African origins of
spiratorially in one-on-one                                                     well as four HVA and 20 KGB
                                           AIDS, inter alia by pointing to      officers, who were busily dis-
conversations. Its validity was            the fact that the epidemic’s first
typically not questioned. 51                                                    tributing Segal’s paper to the
                                           cases were reported among the        press and delegates. 56 Segal’s
                                           gay populations of New York          explicit repudiation of the the-
  Segal’s selection as the cam-
                                           and San Francisco, not in            sis that AIDS originated in
paign’s frontman was a master-
                                           Africa. Like the Patriot letter      Africa was tailor-made for an
stroke. As a German, he could
                                           and Zapevalov’s article in Liter-    African audience, and his
speak unfiltered to the popula-
                                           aturnaya Gazeta, Segal’s pam-        claims subsequently appeared
tion of a major member of the
                                           phlet tediously detailed several     in the press of 25 African coun-
Western alliance, and as an
                                           well-established facts about         tries. The East German commu-
established scientist, he pos-
                                           AIDS, and he described accu-         nist party leadership was
sessed professional authority. By
                                           rately how Western scientists        delighted to see Segal’s theses
concealing their hand, the intel-
                                           had identified HIV. Having           included in the conference’s
ligence services ensured that
                                           demonstrated his professional        final report and heaped praise
Segal would speak convincingly,
                                           expertise on the subject matter,     on the HVA for the operation. 57
with the voice of a true believer
                                           Segal then detailed his theory
not that of a paid informant.
                                           about US government experi-
  In the event, Segal became               mentation, specifically among        Disappointment at the
genuinely and passionately                 homosexual prisoners who went        Politburo
devoted to his cause, and many             on to infect gay populations in
people found him winsome and               New York City and San Fran-           Meanwhile, Segal began
convincing. A Montreal Gazette             cisco. (See text box on facing       aggressively pushing his the-
reporter, who interviewed him              page: Segal Arguments.) Even         ory at home. In late summer of
in 1992, wrote: “For those who             though Segal and his coauthors       1986, he asked for a meeting

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)                                                           9
The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth

                                                                                      for having agreed that the HIV
 Segal Memorandums to the Ministry of Health                                          virus had originated in Africa.
                                                                                      After detailing what was wrong
 1. If AIDS spread at the current rate, Segal predicted, American hospitals
                                                                                      with the Soviet scientist—the
 would soon be overwhelmed, as every AIDS patient “is on average being hos-
 pitalized for 82 days until death and costs on average $49,348.” By 1990, the        USSR’s top AIDS expert had in
 cost of care for patients would “ruin the country economically.” If one could        1986 pinpointed a case of HIV
 persuade Americans that AIDS was the result of war preparations, Segal               infection in the USSR that pre-
 argued, the epidemic could become “an important political factor.” And since         ceded the virus’s supposed birth
 a majority of AIDS victims were young men eligible for military service, the         at Fort Detrick—Segal accused
 disease would lead to “a military and economic weakening…. Overall, the              him of lying.
 United States is facing a decade of gravest economic problems.” Since AIDS
 spread exponentially, countries currently less affected—such as the Warsaw             It is evident from the second
 Pact states—would be much better off for many years. “This optimistic prog-
                                                                                      memorandum that Segal was
 nosis, however, has a reverse side,” Segal cautioned. Due to the expected
 rapid spread of AIDS in the West, the Americans would lose their capability          solely interested in bringing
 to wage war against Moscow in the next 10 years. When the American pres-             political pressure to bear upon
 ident became aware of this decline, “would he not contemplate the idea of a          colleagues from bloc countries
 preemptive strike in the next years? With [President Ronald] Reagan and              with opinions that differed from
 [Vice President George H.W.] Bush, such a reaction cannot be ruled out.” 58          his own, rather than engage
 2. In the second memo, Segal took swipes at his critics. One of these, Profes-       them in a professional dia-
 sor Niels Sönnichsen, representing the GDR at an AIDS summit of the World            logue. Indeed, as a political
 Health Organization in Graz, Austria, in April 1986, had concluded his lec-          activist, Segal had reason to be
 ture by saying that AIDS originated—“as we know”—in Africa. “This state-             upset with Zhdanov. The Soviet
 ment is, as a matter of fact, false,” Segal commented and added:                     scientist’s comments threat-
 “[Sönnichsen’s] remarks can only be viewed as a formal kowtow to the US-
                                                                                      ened to pull the rug from
 supported thesis.” Then Segal took on Professor Viktor Zhdanov, director of
 the Ivanovsky Institute of Virology, the Soviet Union’s top AIDS expert, at
                                                                                      underneath Segal’s own theory.
 the second international conference on AIDS in Paris in June 1986. Zhdanov           When asked by a reporter
 had reported on the case of a 14-year-old girl who had contracted lymphade-          whether the United States had
 nopathy, an early indicator of infection with HIV. Soviet scientists had traced      developed the AIDS virus,
 the girl’s infection to a series of blood transfusions in 1974 and concluded the     Zhdanov replied bluntly: “That
 AIDS virus must already have existed at that time—a blow to Segal’s theory           is a ridiculous question. Per-
 of its 1979 origins in the United States. Segal indignantly pointed out, “One
                                                                                      haps it was the Martians.” 60
 could infer [from Zhdanov’s statement] that AIDS did not spread from New
 York to the rest of the world but was imported to America from the Soviet
                                                                                        Axen referred Segal to Karl
 Union.” He then accused Zhdanov of lying. 59
                                                                                      Seidel, head of the health
                                                                                      department of the central com-
with Hermann Axen, the East                disaster, the US political situa-          mittee of the SED (East Ger-
German Politburo member                    tion would change drastically.             many’s ruling communist
responsible for foreign affairs,           At the same time, he warned,               party), and the two met on
and offered two memorandums                the economic consequences                  17 September 1986. In this
for consideration. The first               would lead US leaders into des-            meeting, Segal reiterated his
memorandum demonstrated                    perate and warlike acts. (See              “assumption” (underlined in the
that Segal deemed AIDS to be               Segal Memorandums in text                  minutes of the meeting) that
both a medical problem and a               box.)                                      AIDS was the result of biologi-
political weapon. As a medical                                                        cal warfare experiments at Fort
problem for the United States,              In the other memorandum,                  Detrick. Segal conceded that
he predicted, AIDS would even-             Segal took on East German and              this assertion was merely “a
tually overwhelm the nation’s              Soviet scientists who contra-              hypothesis, albeit a probable
economy, and, if Americans                 dicted him. Segal charged the              one.” Since the Soviet bloc was
could be made to believe their             East German with being sub-                only minimally affected by
government had caused the                  servient to the United States              AIDS, Segal argued the GDR

10                                                                     Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)
The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth

                                           West German media reported a mysterious visit of two “US dip-
should abandon its “defensive              lomats” to Jakob and Lilli Segal in East Berlin.
publishing practice” and begin
denouncing the “true culprit” of
the AIDS epidemic, i.e., the               mentioned anti-imperialist         construed as an official
United States.                             goal.” 61                          endorsement? In fact, Hager’s
                                                                              decision to keep Segal at arm’s
  Segal solicited guidance from              Hager may not have been          length was a clever move from a
the SED central committee as               aware of the details of the        disinformation operation per-
to how he should proceed and               AIDS disinformation cam-           spective. By keeping Segal at a
expressed interest in working              paign, but he probably knew        distance, Hager maintained at
with the Ministry of Health                about it in general. 62 In any     least a semblance of scientific
AIDS task force under Profes-              event, he rejected most of         independence for the AIDS
sor Sönnichsen—even though                 Seidel’s recommendations,          campaign’s front man and
one of Segal’s memorandums                 although he authorized the         denied Western observers the
disparaged Sönnichsen. Segal               Segals’ participation in the       opportunity to quickly dismiss
also expressed disappointment              AIDS task force. Hager con-        Segal’s utterances as state-con-
that officials had not paid suffi-         cluded that the GDR should         trolled propaganda. Another
cient attention to his own work.           maintain its restrictive AIDS      reason for Hager’s reluctance to
                                           information policy, and “since     endorse Segal was probably
  Seidel briefed Kurt Hager, a             Comrade Segal himself speaks       East German leader Erich
hard-line Politburo member                 of a hypothesis, reproduction      Honecker’s angling for an offi-
and the SED’s chief ideologue,             [of his theses] in official GDR    cial state visit to Washington,
on the meeting and suggested               publications must be avoided. I    DC. The last thing Honecker
how to deal with Segal and the             do not know to what extent his     needed was to have an anti-
AIDS issue. Seidel pointed out             assumptions can be published       American active measure of his
that Segal’s theses, even if only          in relevant foreign journals. Of   own secret service blow up and
partially substantiated, would             course, he alone would be          derail his cherished project. 64
portend the “unmasking of                  answerable for them.” 63
steps for biological war prepa-
rations of US imperialism,                   For Segal, support from the      A Mysterious Visit
which is politically highly                SED leadership would have car-
explosive. Especially the well-            ried obvious advantages. His         Shortly after Segal’s corre-
founded polemics against the               AIDS hypothesis offered him        spondence with the SED leader-
long-tailed-monkey theory of               the chance of a lifetime—          ship, West German media
the origins of AIDS [in Africa],           advancing the cause of commu-      reported a mysterious visit of
should reinforce anti-imperial-            nism while increasing his own      two “US diplomats” to Jakob
ist sentiments and activities of           name recognition far beyond        and Lilli Segal in East Berlin.
numerous political forces in               the scientific community and       According to a report in the
Africa who must perceive this              East Germany. Segal doubt-         weekly Der Spiegel—appar-
theory as an insult and dispar-            lessly also realized that his      ently based on an interview
agement by the schemes of US               work would endear him to the       with Segal—the two showed up
imperialism.” He recommended               SED leadership, which would        at his doorstep in mid-October
that Segal be allowed to pursue            have supported his research        1986, flashed their credentials,
his work without restrictions              efforts and sponsored trips        politely asked for permission to
and that he and his wife                   abroad, a major perk for a GDR     enter, and began to “cross-
become consultants to the AIDS             citizen.                           examine” Segal for two hours
task force. He also suggested                                                 about his hypothesis. Segal was
that the GDR publish more                   But why did Hager turn down       “certain they were from the
material on AIDS, which “also              most of Segal’s proposals and      CIA.” 65 He later elaborated that
takes into account the above-              avoid anything that could be       the two visitors “wanted to

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)                                                      11
The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth

Heym’s words carried significant moral weight … and his enlist-
ment in the AIDS campaign was a major coup.                                operation must be rated a suc-
                                                                           cess.

know where we got our infor-        had no incentive to have him
mation. They were interested to     “cross-examined,” in Berlin or         Another Dupe
know whether the information        elsewhere.
was correct or not. They were                                                On 18 February 1987, the
merely looking for the traitor        In all likelihood Segal’s visi-      major West German daily news-
[who had revealed the secrets       tors were HVA officers intent          paper tageszeitung published a
to Segal]. In turn, they offered    on building up Segal’s resolve         lengthy interview by the
us wonderful working condi-         by posing as CIA men visiting          famous East German author
tions, which we did not accept,     in diplomatic guise and raising        Stefan Heym with Jakob Segal
though.” 66                         questions that allowed Segal to        on AIDS. 69 Segal and Heym had
                                    conclude that his theory had           much in common. Like Segal,
  Segal appears not to have         struck a nerve in Washington.          Heym was a German of Jewish
questioned the credentials of                                              descent with communist sym-
his visitors. With his conspira-      Segal was unlikely to have           pathies, and like Segal he left
torial mindset, the incident        invented the story. By this time       Germany when the Nazis came
must have confirmed his worst       he was a sincere believer in the       to power in 1933. Heym emi-
suspicions; the appearance of       veracity of his theory, and the        grated to the United States in
the two “CIA men” showed US         invention of such a fairy tale         1935, became a US citizen, and
authorities to be totally uncon-    does not correspond with his           served in a psychological war-
cerned about the consequences       missionary zeal for spreading          fare unit of the US Army in
of their “actions” and merely       the “truth.” Moreover, a yarn          World War II. In 1952, he
interested in tracking and pre-     about CIA operations in East           returned all his American mili-
sumably punishing those             Berlin, published in the West-         tary commendations in protest
responsible for leaking the         ern media, would have gotten           of the Korean War, moved to
secret.                             him into serious trouble with          Prague, and in the following
                                    the GDR security apparatus.            year to East Germany, where he
  However, the story can hardly     Yet there were no repercus-            quickly became a literary and
be taken at face value. For one     sions for Segal.                       political icon.
thing, it is virtually inconceiv-
able that CIA officers would          Only one organization in East          Heym’s words carried signifi-
have “cross-examined” a well-       Germany, the MfS, had the              cant moral weight in East Ger-
known East German scientist         authority and wherewithal to           many and beyond, and his
with connections to MfS and         carry out a deception opera-           enlistment in the AIDS cam-
KGB in one of the best moni-        tion—if that is what it was.           paign was a major coup for
tored cities of the Soviet bloc.    Günter Bohnsack, a former              Segal and the HVA. Heym
As one former CIA station chief     HVA X officer deeply involved          looked favorably on Segal’s the-
in Germany wrote, “East Ger-        in the East German AIDS dis-           ses, but like his interviewee, he
many’s ubiquitous security ser-     information campaign, has lit-         was probably unaware of HVA
vice had such an iron grip on its   tle doubt that the two visitors        involvement. The tageszeitung
people that almost no one dared     were from the HVA, and he              was an anti-status-quo, left-of-
spy for the Americans.” 67 Had      recalls “overhearing comments          center newspaper, independent
the CIA really wished to con-       from M. Wolf to the effect that        of Moscow but critical of the
tact Segal, it could have done so   the dear professor needed to be        United States. As such, it repre-
easily on one of his trips          ‘propped up.’…This ‘CIA visit’         sented the perfect vehicle for
abroad. But why would it? US        was certainly staged.” 68 Given        Segal and the HVA, and the
intelligence knew Segal’s the-      that Segal repeatedly referred         interview had the intended
ory was humbug and therefore        to the “CIA visit,” the HVA

12                                                          Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)
The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth

                                           The naive conclusion by a Western academic would have
effect. As a contemporary                  pleased intelligence headquarters in East Berlin.
reader observed:

   Consider the peculiarity                tronic surveillance) recorded a          case long-term inmates of
   of the situation: Two well-             phone conversation referencing           a prison for men!—back to
   known, respected East                   Simmel’s project and for-                their cells. 72
   Germans publish a the-
   ory propounding the                     warded a copy to Department             The book quickly became a
   notion that AIDS is                     X. The disinformation special-        bestseller and spawned a popu-
   caused by a man-made                    ists spotted an opportunity and       lar three-part TV program.
   virus produced by Ameri-                decided to anonymously send
   can biological warfare                                                        Raving about his agency’s coup,
                                           Simmel material pertaining to         Markus Wolf proudly piled 10
   researchers—but they do
   so in West Berlin. They                 Segal’s AIDS theory. 71               copies of Simmel’s novel on his
   are not permitted to pub-                                                     desk. Bohnsack and his col-
   lish their theory in                      The result was, from the East
                                                                                 leagues were both happy and
   newspapers in their own                 German perspective, phenome-
   country, which is offi-                                                       surprised that Simmel accepted
                                           nal. Released in mid-1987, Sim-
   cially anti-American and                                                      the HVA material as genuine
                                           mel’s 500-page novel, Doch mit
   especially vituperative                                                       and made such extensive use of
   about the CIA. It is impos-             den Clowns kamen die Tränen
                                                                                 it. 73
   sible to give a verifiable              [Along with the clowns came
   explanation for this reti-              the tears] revolved around a            Simmel’s uncritical accep-
   cence, but one may                      biological arms race between          tance of the HVA’s disinforma-
   surmise that in the GDR                 the United States and the
   the politics of AIDS has                                                      tion package most likely was
                                           Soviet Union. The two super-          the product of naivety, moralis-
   remained the province of
   medical personnel rather                powers were portrayed as              tic zeal, and eagerness to tell a
   than political                          equally cynical, ruthless, and        good story. Shortly after the
   propagandists. 70                       unethical in their pursuit of a       book was released, Simmel said
                                           super germ. In the foreword,          about himself more insightfully
This naive conclusion by a                 Simmel insisted that “The mon-
Western academic would have                                                      than he would have realized at
                                           strous experiments I report on        the time: “Simmel is in a fatal
pleased intelligence headquar-             have already been successfully
ters in East Berlin.                                                             way naive and starry-eyed. He
                                           conducted by some scientists.”        may come across as cunning
                                           One protagonist cites Heym’s          and clever, but he steps into
Still Another Dupe                         interview with Segal in the ta-       every trap that’s out there.” 74
                                           geszeitung as evidence for the
  The HVA’s biggest coup was               monstrosity of the superpow-
yet to come. In the mid-1980s,             ers’ goals:                           Back to the USSR
the Austrian-born best-selling
author Johannes Mario Sim-                     He [Segal] is convinced             Meanwhile, the Soviets’ own
                                               that genetic scientists at        propaganda machine went into
mel mulled over a book project                 Fort Detrick have experi-
on the perils of genetic manipu-                                                 high gear. Moscow understood
                                               mentally generated the
lation and biological warfare.                 AIDS virus HTLV III               that repetition of a particular
By that time, Simmel had                       [sic]. However, since the         theme over an extended period
already authored 20 novels,                    infection’s initial effect is     of time was key to a successful
numerous screenplays, and var-                 minor and the incubation          disinformation campaign, 75 and
                                               period lasts two to five          the Soviets promoted the AIDS
ious short stories and chil-                   years, they didn’t con-
dren’s books. His works had                    sider the virus viable in         story’s worldwide dissemina-
been translated into 25 lan-                   humans and sent the               tion through radio broadcasts,
guages and sold over 65 million                infected test persons—yes,        rumors, posters, handbills, forg-
copies. By sheer coincidence,                  yes, yes, they work with          eries, and leaflets (some of
                                               test persons there, in this       which displayed pornographic
HVA Department III (elec-

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)                                                          13
The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth

The merger of the ethnic weapons and AIDS campaigns creat-
ed a powerful narrative in Africa.                                          greater extent than the popula-
                                                                            tion of friendly forces.” 82

caricatures of US soldiers).         Turkey, the Soviets sought to            In June 1987, Novosti news
Soviet propagandists even lifted     stir concern among the local           agency editor Valentin Falin
some stories about the US gov-       population, create pressure on         told a USIA official slyly: “And
ernment’s alleged creation of        US allies to send American             given the US treatment of
AIDS verbatim from a New             troops packing, and generally          American Indians, putting
York gay magazine, the New           discourage contact with Ameri-         smallpox blankets on them, and
York Native, which in Novem-         can citizens. 80                       the placement of Japanese-
ber 1986 called for a US con-                                               Americans in detention during
gressional investigation into          The Soviets also began to            the Second World War, the
the origins of AIDS. 76              broaden the campaign’s focus,          development of an ethnic
                                     merging it with other disinfor-        weapon by the US sounds
  Soviet efforts promptly paid       mation campaigns. A particu-           pretty logical.” 83
off. Third World media reported      larly effective twist was the
the AIDS falsehood widely, and       claim that the US government
even the established British         had designed AIDS as an eth-           The Impact in Africa
newspapers Sunday Express            nic weapon against black peo-
and Daily Telegraph recounted        ple. The “ethnic weapon” theme           The merger of the ethnic
Segal’s “findings” uncritically.     had first appeared around 1980         weapons and AIDS campaigns
By late 1987, the story had cir-     in the Soviet active measures          created a powerful narrative
culated in the media of 80 coun-     repertoire. In an effort to hitch      that threatened to undermine
tries, appearing in over 200         the United States to the widely        America’s reputation in Africa.
periodicals in 25 languages. 77      detested South African apart-          Allegations that Washington
“If media replay is an indica-       heid regime, Moscow spread the         was using AIDS as a racial
tion of success,” noted a US offi-   rumor that Washington was              weapon against Africans began
cial, “then this campaign has        aiding Pretoria in the develop-        circulating across the continent
been very successful.” 78            ment of weapons to eliminate           in the wake of the nonaligned
                                     nonwhites. 81                          nations summit in Harare in
  The Soviets paid special                                                  1986, where HVA and KGB had
attention to countries with US         Since these claims were base-        promoted Segal’s paper so
military bases on their soil. In     less, the Soviets employed the         diligently. 84 On 7 June 1987,
late 1985, North Korea began         well-established technique of          the Patriot rejoined the fray
its own AIDS propaganda oper-        propping up their conspiracy           with an article accusing the US
ation, portraying US troops in       theories with circumstantial           Department of Defense of con-
South Korea as carriers of the       evidence. For example, an              ducting experiments in Africa
epidemic. Turkish broadcasts         American military manual had           to determine the “depopulating
emanating from the USSR              indeed noted in 1975 that “it is       effect” of AIDS in strategically
urged the closure of US bases        theoretically possible to develop      important areas of the conti-
because they were allegedly          so-called ‘ethnic chemical weap-       nent like Zaire.
breeding grounds for AIDS. And       ons,’ which would be designed
an English-language, Soviet-         to exploit naturally occurring           In early 1988, a Nigerian
inspired broadcast in Asia           differences in vulnerability           newspaper varied the theme
alleged that outbreaks of AIDS       among specific population              somewhat by claiming that the
“are as a rule registered in the     groups. Thus, such a weapon            spread of AIDS in central and
areas near American war              would be capable of incapacitat-       western Africa was the result of
bases.” 79 By targeting nations      ing or killing a selected enemy        rich Americans testing contami-
where American troops were           population to a significantly          nated polio vaccine on poor
based, such as South Korea and                                              blacks during the 1960s. 85 The
                                                                            tale was told and retold in a

14                                                           Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)
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