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doi:10.5477/cis/reis.173.121
The Genesis of Populism in Spain between
2011 and 2013: A Demand-Side Analysis
La génesis del populismo en España entre 2011 y 2013:
un análisis desde la demanda
Arturo Rodríguez Sáez
Key words Abstract
Populist Attitudes This study analyses the genesis of populism in Spain between 2011
• Demand Side and 2013 within a context of acute economic and institutional crisis.
• Populist Moment Focusing on social demand, it enquires whether there are any populist
• Podemos attitudes, from the perspective of ideational theory and using qualitative
methodology. The study demonstrates how populist attitudes have
a latent, manifest or borderline existence, depending on complex
ideological factors. The conclusion is that prior to the appearance of
Podemos, there were explicit populist minority attitudes, many of them
located in an ambivalent border area.
Palabras clave Resumen
Actitudes populistas Este trabajo analiza la génesis del populismo en España entre los
• Demanda años 2011 y 2013 en un contexto de aguda crisis económica e
• Momento populista institucional. La perspectiva de análisis se centra en la demanda
• Podemos social, preguntándose, desde la teoría ideacional y una perspectiva
metodológica cualitativa, si existen actitudes populistas. El trabajo
demuestra cómo las actitudes populistas tienen una existencia latente,
manifiesta o en ámbitos fronterizos dependiendo de complejos factores
ideológicos. Concluye que antes de la aparición de Podemos existían
actitudes populistas explícitas minoritarias, muchas de ellas situadas en
un ámbito fronterizo de ambivalencia.
Citation
Rodríguez Sáez, Arturo (2021). “The Genesis of Populism in Spain between 2011 and 2013: A De-
mand-Side Analysis”. Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 173: 121-140. (http://dx.doi.
org/10.5477/cis/reis.173.121)
Arturo Rodríguez Sáez: Universidad Complutense de Madrid | arsaez@ucm.es
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 173, January - March 2021, pp. 121-140122 The Genesis of Populism in Spain between 2011 and 2013: A Demand-Side Analysis
Introduction1 nomenon to the characteristics of a single
promethean political actor. The uniqueness
Populism thrives where there is democratic of this study will also address this ques-
unrest (Rivero, Zarzalejos and Palacio, tion a few years before the emergence of
2017) and trust in institutions has become the political subject of populist supply (Po-
strongly eroded. It appears in defining his- demos), thus analysing the genesis of left-
torical moments, when there is a crisis of wing populism by looking at the demand di-
political legitimacy (Hawkins and Rovira, mension.
2018). One of those exceptional political The question was therefore posed as to
moments swept through Europe after the whether or not populism existed in Spain
start of the 2008 Great Recession. prior to Podemos; whether it was indeed
As in other European countries, pop- possible to speak of a latent populist de-
ulism made its appearance in Spain during mand, of widespread populist attitudes in
an economic crisis that not only caused a society; and, if this was the case, whether
deterioration in living conditions, but also this was an ideologically homogeneous de-
precipitated a political crisis that was in- mand or, on the contrary, whether demand
tensified by cases of corruption. The man- was plural and diverse. Data from 16 dis-
agement of the crisis and the loss of con- cussion groups were analysed qualitatively
fidence in the main political parties led in to answer these questions.
social unrest, which would finally explode This article consists of four sections.
and result in the 15-M movement. Podemos The first section outlines the theoretical
took advantage of this well of social discon- model applied to the research, followed by
tent and launched a political initiative that an analysis of the debate on the study of
experts have described as left-wing pop- populist demand. The second section dis-
ulism (Ivaldi, Lanzone and Woods, 2017). cusses the methodology and shows the
Despite the attention paid to Podemos, pertinence of using a qualitative approach
most of the international studies (Akkerman, to analyse populist attitudes. The third sec-
Mudde and Zaslove, 2014) have focused tion contains the results. The fourth section
on populist supply. However, very little is provides some conclusions for reflection
known about populist demand, although and discussion.
some research recently analysed the exist-
ence of populist attitudes in Spanish soci-
ety (Andreadis et al., 2018; Boscán, Llama- The study of populist attitudes
zares and Wiesehomeier, 2018).
The main contribution of this study is Populism is a widely disparaged term. It is
to fill this gap in the specialised literature. usually accompanied by a certain seman-
As highlighted by studies on populist at- tic reductionism, always riddled with cli-
titudes, the analysis of demand is impor- chés, which are condensed into the idea
tant to further understand the populist phe- of demagogy. This has made it a cursed
nomenon (Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove, ideological term (Rodríguez Sáez, 2018). In
2014; Hawkins and Rovira, 2018), in order the academic world, however, notable ad-
to avoid explanations that reduce the phe- vances have been made in how it can be
conceptualised. Although it is a disputed
concept (Moffit, 2016; Mudde and Rovira,
1 The data used in this study are part of the project
2017; Vallespín and Bascuñán, 2017), the
entitled “Stealth Democracy: entre la participación y
la profesionalización” (National R&D Plan CSO2012- literature has now overcome the recom-
38942). mendation of relinquishing the term merely
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 173, January - March 2021, pp. 121-140Arturo Rodríguez Sáez 123
because it is difficult to grasp (Roxborough, The underlying idea suggests that these
1984). Today the literature reflects different attitudes function as a symbolic condi-
approaches such as focusing on the logic tion of possibility for the populist supply to
of political action, populism as a style, and emerge. In this way, the populist phenom-
populism as an organisational strategy. enon needs a specific social context for it
Despite the multitude of approaches, it to take root (Hawkins and Rovira, 2018). A
is possible to speak of a certain consen- climate of populist attitudes is the demand
sus on the definition of populism from the on which populist seduction can be hung,
so-called ideational perspective (Akkerman, unless that we are talking about what Ortí
Mudde and Zaslove, 2014; Mudde, 2017). (1988) called “imaginary populism”: a type
Within this perspective, populism is a thin of populism without a social base. These
discourse or ideology that emphasises the political attitudes are not fully developed
fight of the general will of a morally virtuous ideologies or frameworks but are defined as
people against the elite. Therefore, pop- “a latent demand or a disposition” (Hawkins
ulism is characterised by a dichotomous and Rovira, 2018: 7). They reveal opinions
vision of political space, a polarising logic and beliefs characterised by the populist bi-
that can be called populism’s binary code. nary code, which were capable of being po-
litically activated by populist supply.
This basic definition is made up of three
elements: the people as a virtuous moral Various international studies seem to
agent, the popular will, and the elite as an have confirmed that populist attitudes are
object of rejection. The first two conditions widespread across different European coun-
operate as the positive moral pole of the bi- tries, including Spain (Andreadis et al., 2018;
nary code, while the elite occupies the nega- Boscán, Llamazares and Wiesehomeier,
tive reference based on which the people is 2018), and that they also constitute a solid
constituted (Laclau, 2016), the people as one predictor of populist vote (Akkerman, Mudde
(Torre, 2017). These features make up the and Zaslove, 2014; Elchardus and Spruyt,
lowest common denominator of populism. 2016; Andreadis et al., 2018; Boscán, Llama-
zares and Wiesehomeier, 2018). This paper
These three constituent elements always
aims to further the analysis of the demand
merge with other “thick ideologies” (Mudde,
by testing the demand hypothesis in the pe-
2004), which provide populist expressions
riod prior to the rise of left-wing populism
with their ultimate ideological character. The
(Podemos) between 2011 and 2013.
literature differentiates, at least, between
left-wing populism, which is inclusive and H.1: The emergence of a left-wing popu-
focused on redistribution, and right-wing list actor suggests that there was a prior ex-
populism, which is exclusive and oriented isting climate of populist attitudes that op-
towards cultural identity issues (Mudde and erated as a condition of possibility for its
Rovira, 2013). emergence.
The literature has focused on the study of The international literature has also be-
these three dimensions around political sup- gun to address the question of how popu-
ply, as if the existence of a properly popu- list attitudes are established, and what the
list demand were not needed to activate this possible social, political and economic de-
type of political discourse. This analysis has terminants are (Boscán, Llamazares and
been recently promoted from the ideational Wiesehomeier, 2018).
perspective, which showcased the study of One of the most popular hypotheses in
populist attitudes (Boscán, Llamazares and current studies on populism is that of the
Wiesehomeier, 2018). losers of globalisation (Kriesi et al., 2008).
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 173, January - March 2021, pp. 121-140124 The Genesis of Populism in Spain between 2011 and 2013: A Demand-Side Analysis
The thesis maintains that manual workers populism and its determining factors vary
in the productive sectors with lower educa- in time and space. At present it does not
tional levels have been the most affected by seem certain that populist attitudes can be
the processes of internationalisation of la- seen only among the most vulnerable so-
bour markets, and they constitute the pop- cial classes, the declassed workers. Perhaps
ulist social base. In this sense, different the focus should be changed to the qualified
studies have held that the voters of popu- precariat who sees their life horizon reduced
list parties share a given sociodemographic due to the effects of globalisation (Mudde,
profile: they are social groups that, in gen- 2016). Some empirical evidence already ex-
eral, have a lower educational level and in- ists that allows this type of hypothesis to be
come (Boscán, Llamazares and Wieseho- questioned There are studies that show that
meier, 2018; Rico and Anduiza, 2017). populist demand is formed by those groups
The thesis of cultural backlash (Ingle- that have a negative perception of the coun-
hart and Norris, 2016) suggests that a silent try’s situation (Elchardus and Spruyt, 2016),
counter-revolution is taking place against without reducing this to “status anxiety”
cosmopolitan values by those social sectors (Müller, 2017).
that feel that they are losing their traditional Focusing on certain social groups to de-
values. This seems to be more constrained fine populism is problematic given the so-
to the study of right-wing populism. It op- cial heterogeneity that characterises the nu-
erates against immigration, represented as merous populist social bases (Müller, 2017).
a disturbing shadow that also threatens Nor does this kind of hypothesis serve to
to undermine ethnic and cultural ways of address populism in other contexts, such
life. In this way there is a defensive back- as post-Soviet ones, whose fundamen-
lash to the community of equals; an exclu- tal problems are state weakness and/or
sion around values that are characteristic of corruption (Hawkins and Rovira, 2018). It
“national-populism” (Eatwell and Goodwin, seems that there is no single type of popu-
2018). list social base, but rather a complex mesh
Both explanations take the hypothe- of dimensions that operate historically and
sis of globalisation as the ultimate basis of contingently.
populism, be it in its economic or cultural The use of the context hypothesis seems
version. The underlying analytical premise more productive (Hawkins and Rovira,
suggests that populism is a reactive phe- 2018). The idea is that the latent climate
nomenon in the face of the processes of of populist attitudes in a society requires a
social change that crumble the existing so- certain context to be activated by the sub-
cial order and push certain social groups ject of the populist supply. In line with La-
to a new unknown and apparently painful clau (2016), it could be said that populist at-
historical threshold. Populism is therefore titudes take shape at times where there is a
made up of social classes disenfranchised crisis of representation. However, it is not
by historical evolution, whose (re)action is a possible to determine a priori what factors
symptom of a tragic, impotent awareness. trigger representation failures, as these are
Despite the salience of these explana- always contextually determined.
tions, which are strongly rooted in the theory Some hypotheses are proposed here
of modernisation (Müller, 2017), focusing the that could help illustrate the specific context
study of populism on “social content” has of Spain. I suggest that a crisis of political
methodological limitations (Laclau, 2016). representation resulted from a combination
This is mainly because the social base of of long-term structural factors, such as the
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 173, January - March 2021, pp. 121-140Arturo Rodríguez Sáez 125
cartelisation of political parties (Mair, 2005); match their political supply to existing de-
programme convergence (Crouch, 2004) mand, it is to be expected that the host ide-
and the permanent restructuring of the Wel- ology of these parties will largely match the
fare State (Rodríguez Cabrero, 2014); and characteristics of the political demand that
of conjunctural factors, such as with the they seek to mobilise.
economic management of the Great Reces- H.3: It is expected that different populist
sion (Fernández-Albertos, 2012) and po- demands modulated by the ideological vari-
litical corruption (Roberts, 2017). This trig- able will be found, so a discourse centred
gered a climate of populist attitudes. on aspects related to the defence of social
H.2: It is expected that populist political issues can be found among the left-wing
attitudes will be found in those sectors that groups with populist attitudes, whereas the
perceive that the political parties within the discourse in right-wing groups with popu-
system are not receptive, or do not have the list attitudes revolves around identity issues
capacity to respond to social demands. such as immigration or nation.
Finally, the literature contains other vari-
ables, such as ideology or political prefer-
ences, that modulate populist attitudes (An- Methodology
dreadis, et al., 2018; Boscán, Llamazares
and Wiesehomeier, 2018). The results of Based on these objectives, discussion
these studies indicate that the correlation groups were used as a technique intended
between populist attitudes and voting for to capture the representations that people
populist supply is conditioned by ideology. have of how the political system operated in
This operates as a mechanism that delim- the crisis of the 2011-2013 period.
its social groups that potentially hold popu- While the methodological objectives in
list views. the literature have been recently focused on
Based on this premise, I maintain that capturing populist attitudinal trends through
there is no single populist demand, but surveys (Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove,
that demand is plural, which conditions the 2014; Andreadis et al., 2018; Boscán,
strategy for aggregation of discontent. This Llamazares and Wiesehomeier, 2018), there
means that the ideological visions of the so- are no qualitative studies to date. This pa-
cial world held by the different social groups per aims to be an initial contribution to the
determine differentiated populist demands; qualitative study of the demand for pop-
which is especially important taking into ulism.
account that the leaders of Podemos per- The discussion group is an intensive way
ceived that the heat of the 15-M movement of producing data on a group basis (Mor-
could be a populist moment in the making, gan, 1996) that allows social discourses
a massive and inorganic demand capable to be interpreted in relation to a particular
of being articulated into a discourse based theme (Krueger, 1991; Barbour, 2013). The
on the bottom/up dichotomy (Errejón and universe of opinions, beliefs and attitudes
Mouffe, 2015). within the delimited area of interest is com-
If at the supply level, left-wing populism plexly condensed in these groups. Further-
focuses its discourse on issues related to more, compared to the precoded questions
the redistribution of wealth (March, 2011), generated through a survey, where dis-
right-wing populism is characterised by courses cannot emerge spontaneously, this
connecting with a cultural, nationalist iden- technique provides an environment for sub-
tity (Mudde, 2007). As political parties try to jects to speak relatively openly (Ortí, 1988).
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 173, January - March 2021, pp. 121-140126 The Genesis of Populism in Spain between 2011 and 2013: A Demand-Side Analysis
This technique can be used to explore study, the groups were asked to give their
the findings of surveys further and to ei- opinion on the political system, democracy,
ther confirm or question their results. It also political parties, participation, technocracy,
generates the methodological conditions of 15-M and territorial issues 5. The groups
possibility to enquire into aspects that the were held in locations that were close to
literature may have neglected. Spontane- the participants, and the sessions lasted an
ous discourses, by going beyond the stand- average of an hour and a half. The groups
ardised categories that the use of surveys were found in places associated with the
eventually imposes, provide an opportunity type of discourse that was sought, such as
to observe the possible ambivalences or supporters of the middle class of the PP in
contradictions encountered in recent stud- Alicante, left-wing working class in Getafe,
ies on populist attitudes, as well as to ex- and unemployed people in Madrid, among
plore potential blind spots. Whatever this others6.
technique loses in precision and represent- The main analytical points to interpret
ativeness is gained in meaning (Ortí, 1988). the discourses are based on the ideational
One of the main objectives of the study is definition of populism. The three elements
to verify that there is no specific populist so- constitute the theoretical conditions that
cial base. To confirm this hypothesis, a sam- discourses should fulfil in order to be in-
ple was designed that included very diverse cluded within the category of populism. The
positions in generational, economic, employ- analysis aims to see if the following condi-
ment, ideological and political terms2. How- tions are met:
ever, it was decided to incorporate new so- Condition 1. The elite as the object of mo-
cial profiles absent in the sample which were ral or political condemnation.
important from a theoretical point of view, es-
Condition 2. The people as a morally virtu-
pecially to be able to question the different
ous subject.
hypotheses of those defeated by the effects
of the crisis. A CIS survey3 was used that Condition 3. The sovereignty of the people
also used discussion groups to analyse polit- as something univocal and undivided.
ical attitudes to this end, and part of the dis- However, these conditions have been
courses were incorporated into the sample4. thought about and applied within the lit-
A total of 16 discussion groups were erature to the analysis of the discourses
carried out between 2011 and 2013 (7 in of the populist supply. Since populist atti-
2011, 7 in 2012 and 2 in 2013). The groups tudes are not ideologically articulated dis-
from 2012 replicated those of the previ- courses, they will hardly meet all analytical
ous round to see whether attitudes towards conditions. Based on this methodological
the political system varied in any way after assessment, it was decided to reduce the
the appearance of the 15-M movement. All requirements for populist attitudes to be
groups consisted of between 6 and 8 peo- identified. It was therefore decided that they
ple. Participants were contacted through would only have to comply with at least two
the researchers’ personal and academic conditions in the definition; the anti-elitist
networks. The groups were only lightly
moderated. Based on the objectives of the 5 The CIS study was included to complete some social
profiles of the sample. It addressed a similar theme and
attempted to capture people’s attitudes towards poli-
2 tics, democracy and the 15-M movement.
The composition of the groups is shown in Annex 1.
6 Given that the study was mainly limited to urban ar-
3 CIS Survey 2921 (2011).
eas, future studies will need to include rural areas in the
4 Annex 2 details the composition of the groups. sample.
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 173, January - March 2021, pp. 121-140Arturo Rodríguez Sáez 127
element (an essential condition, albeit insuf- social factors determine these attitudes,
ficient in itself). and what role ideology plays in the process.
If populism is a binary code, the cast- Starting from a question about the po-
ing of a shadow is necessary to constitute litical system, the initial discourse of all the
the people. However, this condition by itself groups included a critical narrative that re-
does not allow attitudes to be labelled as mained until the end. This narrative sug-
populist; otherwise virtually any discourse gested the existence of a shared general
that is critical of the system would be pop- discourse that would be expressed in the
ulist (Müller, 2017). For this reason, at least participants’ surfeit of, mistrust of, and disil-
one other condition of the positive moral lusionment with, the political system.
pole was required to be met, one of the two The apparent unity of that critical dis-
Siamese conditions referring to the ideal- course contained multiple aspects. It could
ised and monistic image of the people. be said that there was a common discourse
Based on this instrument, a textual anal- but it varied according to variables such as
ysis was first carried out to identify where social position and ideology. Shared criti-
populist ideas were identified. This track- cism overlapped with a discursive thickness
ing and discrimination function was ful- full of nuances and differences, where dif-
filled by marking discourses with alpha- ferent perceptions coexisted about the ori-
betic codes that indicated which analytical gin of the problems of the political system
conditions they met. For example, when and their possible solutions.
there was some content critical of the elites, Three discursive spaces could be iden-
the code that expressed an anti-elitist atti- tified based on the resulting analysis: so-
tude was applied to it. This was also done cial groups with non-populist attitudes (they
with the rest of the theoretical conditions. met only one condition or none of the three
In contrast, when discourses contravened conditions); social groups with populist at-
any condition, they were marked as such titudes (they met at least two conditions);
by adding a negative sign to the codes. De- and borderline social groups, in which both
pending on the number of analytical condi- types of attitudes were mixed (there were
tions they fulfilled, the groups were included some sectors that met the conditions and
or excluded from the populism category. others that did not). The classification was
The discourses based on the social char- the result of combining the analytical condi-
acteristics of the groups were simultane- tions with the type of ideology7.
ously analysed, by applying a “sociological
analysis” that considers that all discourse
reveals something fundamental about the Non-populist field
social conditions of the subject that issues
it (Ruiz, 2009). This category includes those groups that
did not clearly and preferentially portray
populist ideas. A total of six discussion
Results: populisms, groups were identified in this category. Two
non-populisms, of them were located ideologically on the
and borderline realities right (DGs 6 and 8), two in the centre (DGs 7
and B), and three on the left (DGs 10, 11
In this section the demand hypothesis is and 16). All these groups held that politi-
tested from the perspective of populist at-
titudes. This is done by investigating what 7 See Table 1.
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 173, January - March 2021, pp. 121-140128 The Genesis of Populism in Spain between 2011 and 2013: A Demand-Side Analysis
cians were the main cause of democracy Non-populist space in the centre
malfunctioning and the main cause of the
Pragmatic Reformism
political crisis, thus fulfilling the condition of
being critical of the elite. This was a hinge group of liberal middle-
At the same time, there was a deep class businesspeople (DG 7) positioned be-
suspicion of the abilities and skills of cit- tween the left and the right, who suffered
izens to make political decisions. This from an internal ideological division and
discourse revealed a horizontal mistrust dispute. Despite their anti-elitism, they did
among citizens. The condition of the virtu- not meet any of the other two conditions
ous people was not met. Nor was there an that would bring them closer to the popu-
idea of popular will, which was meaning- list field.
fully absent. Criticism of the political class is strong
here (“politicians base their decisions on
This general characterisation of the non-
what is best for themselves, not on the in-
populist field was expressed differentially
terest of society”). But at the same time,
when the ideological variable was consid-
they believed that the crisis of democracy
ered. Thus, three ideological spaces with
lay in external factors. A certain political im-
specific features were differentiated be-
potence ran through their discourse since
tween:
they claimed “there is no real alternative to
what is happening”. They pointed out that
Spain was subordinated to the centres of
Non-populist right-wing space,
European political and economic power
the conservative elitism
(“we are strongly subject to ... Merkel and
These were liberal and conservative groups Sarkozy, to everything they do, that is, we
from the upper-middle class (Discussion are their puppets”). The perception was that
Groups (DGs) 6 and 8). Their vision of poli- there is no external political efficacy (“politi-
tics was elitist, pro-status quo, and in sup- cal parties are simply pawns in the hands of
port of bipartisanship as the preferred the economic system”).
mechanism for parliamentary representa- The solution they proposed involved fur-
tion. Despite this, they reported a loss of ther improvement of pluralism and a more
confidence in politicians (“we have lost con- professional political class. Even for the part
fidence in politicians”), without this implying of the group that had a positive view of the
support for models of participatory democ- 15-M movement, the answer was to regen-
racy (“the masses are not qualified to make erate the existing political system, even with
decisions because they are sheep”) or par- new political parties: “I thought it gave them
tisan competition that went beyond biparti- time to create a political party”.
sanship.
The losers in the crisis
Supporters of strong governments who
were reticent to all kinds of peripheral nation- The group of unemployed appeared as the
alism, defended the recentralisation of the losers of the economic crisis (DG B). Their
State to avoid “petty fiefdoms”. Current poli- discourse was full of references to unem-
ticians’ lack of ability (“today, politicians are ployment and the climate of insecurity that
mediocre”), “excess bureaucracy” and the this causes (“I am pessimistic about my
territorial question were identified as being prospects (...), I am currently unemployed,
symptoms of the malfunctioning of democ- and I am worried about the future”). Lack of
racy. confidence in the future makes them look to
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 173, January - March 2021, pp. 121-140Arturo Rodríguez Sáez 129
Europe as a solution (“I would like to live in advantages of the majority and believed
a different European country”). they “lacked a future ... (within a) radical
In this climate of bewilderment, their ac- capitalism”; there was an awareness of po-
rimonious discourse was aimed at the “poli- litical helplessness separate from populism.
ticians, businesspeople and all that rabble”.
They did not believe in politics and even
“less in banks”. Politicians were perceived Borderline populism field
as being corrupt and “not caring about so-
ciety”. They did not feel represented and The groups that are included here are those
would like to see “other types of parties”. that fulfilled the anti-elitist condition and
Neither was anything flattering said about ambivalently met one of the other two con-
the people (“everyone was buying flats like ditions for being regarded as populist. None
crazy here”). In addition, the idealised im- of the groups thought that the people were
age of Europe was placed in contrast to a virtuous. There was therefore explicit hori-
stigmatised Spanish “mentality”. zontal mistrust among citizens. In contrast,
the results were less clear in terms of popu-
lar will. This element was detected among
Non-populist left-wing space the various groups gathered under the con-
cept of borderline groups to different de-
Left-wing disenchanted workers (DGs 10 grees.
and 11) through to the precariat (DGs 16) Populist attitudes were featured in mi-
could be found here. These groups were nor sectors of some groups. In other groups,
also anti-elitist. The most notable difference the tension between populism and pluralism
was their incessant critique of bipartisan- converged dramatically (DG 12). This was a
ship. None of the other two conditions were space inhabited by a discourse laden with
met. In fact, this group were hypercritical of ambivalence and tension. It was a borderline
the concept of a virtuous people. The cat- space where some groups leant towards the
egory of popular will was not fulfilled either, non-populist field, whereas others swung to-
although marginally unarticulated populist wards the populist zone. This contradictory
appeals emerged. space was a half-way place where it was
These groups sympathised with left-wing necessary to discern where that third condi-
parties with parliamentary representation, tion of the united people was fulfilled.
although they had grown intensely discon- Starting from the ideological demarca-
nected from them (“the left-wing voter is tion principle that was initially proposed,
much more disenchanted with political life two groups on the right (DGs 5 and 9), two
and with what political parties called left- in the centre (DGs 12 and A) and five on the
wing parties represent”). The former were left (DGs 2, 3, 4, 14 and 15) were identified.
highly critical of bipartisan politics for reduc- The borderline space included diverse so-
ing spending on public services; a criticism cial and ideological positions. Three differ-
that extended to the self-satisfied citizens ent spaces could be identified:
themselves (“In the end we are super-com-
fortable and there is no mobilisation ... indi-
vidualism I think is a general reflection of so- The right-wing borderline space
ciety”). The precariat expressed an intense (DGs 9 and 5)
anti-establishment rhetoric due to the “great
insecurity” they endured, and considered While group 9 comprised proto-populist
themselves to be excluded from the social middle-upper classes from Alicante close
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 173, January - March 2021, pp. 121-140130 The Genesis of Populism in Spain between 2011 and 2013: A Demand-Side Analysis
to the PP, group 5 revealed an involuntary The ideological centre of the border
reaction of retired working-class women to
Competitive pluralism versus utopian
the crisis, which consisted in a defensive
populism
political conscience. Although they shared
criticism of the political class, due to its The group of young middle-class university
low external political effectiveness, there students from Madrid were radically bor-
was a certain diversity of views within the derline. They were divided between being a
group: one part shared a liberal-conserv- part of the populist left that pins the hopes
ative pluralist vision of politics, while the of a political solution on charismatic lead-
other, albeit in the minority, expressed a ers that respond to popular demands (“the
forceful discourse that was clearly popu- people propose and a trained leader”) and
list. another pluralist one from the centre-right
Their common denominator was cri- that leans towards political effectiveness.
ticism of what they considered to be the Both sectors agreed that politicians do not
over-representation of peripheral nationa- fulfil their electoral promises, nor are they
lisms. They stated that: “There were given receptive to citizens’ demands (“They come
quite a lot more leeway so that they would to power and do not fulfil the commitments
support the constitution when it was first they had made to the people”).
developed, and today they are running The group encapsulated the constitutive
the show, because you either get an ab- tension between populism and pluralism. An
solute majority or you can’t be in govern- ideological conflict that expresses different
ment ...”. ways of facing the political crisis. One is ba-
This was therefore a minority sector sed on popular appeals that aspire to gather
that revealed some populist attitudes. The support based on leadership, and the other
debate on public health triggered some through effectiveness criteria (“politicians
populist tension. Support for public ser- should be efficient and consistent with their
political ideas and what they represent”).
vices was based on a discourse that exclu-
ded outsiders and included nationals. Here A discourse was recorded that blamed
the opinion that immigration was making citizens themselves for the problems of de-
the health system unsustainable prevailed: mocracy (“The problem is not the system, it
“You can’t open the door to everyone… is the people”), but where one part concei-
what we cannot do in Spain (because we ved the people as single unit: “the people
are seeing that in the end it falls apart) is always go in one direction”.
[offering] healthcare for all, free and for all,
this is impossible because it falls apart”. The blame discourse: between participation,
But healthcare only operates as an alibi technocracy, and proto populism
since, part of the group ultimately placed There was a perception of social decline
the focus of democracy’s problems on im- among unemployed or youth precariat in the
migration; clearly anti-other rhetoric defen- Castilla and León region (DG A) (“we have
ded on the basis of cultural values: “our had very good lives, but we will be living really
traditions versus theirs”. badly”). Lack of employment is the main con-
If this inflamed rhetoric of the people as cern, as well as the decline in employment
one (ethnos) was linked to the discourse rights (“you cannot complain”, or “you’re
against peripheral nationalisms, it contained sacked”). Many even think of migrating (“I’m
all the ideological elements of right-wing going to have to go abroad”). The generation
populism. factor is the core of their discourse.
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The climate of perplexity did not prevent An idea clearly emerged that new parties
them from engaging in an accusatory dis- are necessary (“it takes a third force to ba-
course concerning the political parties (“co- lance everything”). However, not everyone
rruption, lies and falsehood”). They thought shared this desire, both because of the
that politicians are not receptive (“they do difficulty in mobilising citizens and because
not listen to us”). The group was divided of scepticism that a new party would be the
between the solutions imagined by a parti- solution to the crisis.
cipatory pole on the left that was commit- Whereas a populist trend was notably
ted to revitalising political action (“coming found in the social segment described above,
together and engaging”) and another more the discourse seemed to be oriented towards
conservative group who preferred techno- an extension and deepening of democracy
cratic solutions (“they should work for the in the other groups (DGs 14 and 15). These
people, they should be better technically”). were made up of people with diverse so-
There was also a glimpse of a minority po- cial status—from unskilled manual workers
pulist drive when speaking of democracy. to liberal middle-class professions—whose
This group considered that democracy was lowest common denominator was their invol-
above all “what the people want”, a univo- vement in social activism. The so-called “par-
cal people that was based on the principle ticipatory democracy” aroused a broad con-
of the democratic will. sensus based on the idea of general will and
Especially outstanding was their criticism even the “united people” as a way addres-
of the people, whom they blame for the crisis sing the unsatisfied demands of “the com-
(“people have been living above their means mon people”. In the groups made up of acti-
for a long time”). They believed that “people vists who were members of associations, the
only think about themselves” and do not have moral condemnation of politicians called for a
“their own opinions”. In the end “this is what return to the people: “(...)politicians don’t care
we are like and politicians represent what we for the people (...). You have to live more with
are”, so “the two parties are to blame”. the people. Fight for the people”.
Left borderline space (DGs 2, 14 and 15) Populist field
An area of this social space was character-
All the groups included here, without excep-
ised by a populism mediated by the impor-
tion, met the minimum conditions laid out in
tance of generational self-awareness. Their
the theoretical proposal. It was the concept
anti-elitism, like their relative idealisation of
of the people’s will that seemed to define a
the general will, included prioritising a pro-
populist nature in their views. The groups
found change led by a new generation.
were located on the left axis (DGs 1, 3, 4,
At a time when there is a crisis of con- 13). Within this field, three specific spaces
fidence, they claimed that “a radical social could be distinguished, which had the fol-
change in the sense that we are the ones lowing socio-political features:
who fully initiate it” is necessary, coupled
with the capacity to overcome the crisis of
representation (“the current political system Anti-capitalist Left Populism
does not represent us”). This was the com-
mon denominator of a borderline group in Composed of construction workers and the
which young consensus supporters and po- service sector heavily involved in anti-cap-
pulists intermingled (DG 2). italist activism, they were hyper-critical of
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 173, January - March 2021, pp. 121-140132 The Genesis of Populism in Spain between 2011 and 2013: A Demand-Side Analysis
power structures. With a populist left rhet- they did not propose political alternatives
oric, for them the people were those who to the crisis. They glimpsed a crisis for the
were below, the most disadvantaged or the future, as the hopes of the left have been
poorest, who had been affected by proc- destroyed: “the system is dead; the socia-
esses of social erosion generated by a po- list system is dead, the capitalist system is
litical class that colluded with the economic now ready and then there is a third way”.
powers. All responsibility for the failure of demo-
This group represented the leftist politi- cracy was placed on politicians, this group
cal struggle between those from below and expressed a radical rejection of them, be-
those from above. They did not appeal to cause they believed that politicians are gui-
political reform but to systemic change (“a ded by their own interests (“politicians are
good change would be a system change”). always watching out for themselves”). A
Despite their desire for radical transforma- perception of unresponsiveness that was
tion, they opted specifically for defending aggravated by the generalised sense of po-
public services as an institutional mecha- litical corruption (“neither right nor left. Here
nism capable of containing the processes they are all the same. They are all corrupt”).
of social erosion that capitalism generates. As for political decision-making, the
The group’s perspective was that demo- group experienced contradictory tensions.
cracy is held hostage to the interests of the On the one hand, the group members ex-
market (“the government has less and less pressed a populist discourse connected
control, doesn’t it?; the market and econo- to the idea of the people’s will. This parti-
mic laws are in control...”). For them, the cipatory desire contrasted with the nega-
political efficiency problem is caused by tive vision of the people in relation to their
economic structural dynamics. competences and abilities to make political
decisions (“The people are not prepared to
However, they also held citizens ac-
make decisions ... because they lack cul-
countable for political change. They even
ture. And that is what happens”).
blamed the people for reproducing the cau-
ses of the crisis (“people are still in favour
of speculation”). An “apathy” against which
Generational populism, the
they demanded a certain degree of civic disenchantment of the young
commitment: “you can take a stand against
it, you can take it to the street”. These were groups of young middle-class
university students (DG 13) and working-
class vocational training students (DG 1)
The total scepticism of former labourers who had the perception that the future is
closed to them, which translated into a set
This social space, in constant decline for of attitudes against the political elite. Part of
the past forty years, reflected a populist the group combined the discourse against
agrarian discourse from southern Spain. the elite with that of social class. They iden-
They were working-class retirees who had tified themselves as working class. A class
lost hope and perceived the national politi- that endured hardship as a result of the cri-
cal crisis as a symptom of a profound politi- sis. This differentiation outlined a symbolic
cal crisis: the crisis of the socialist left and border between those below and those
the triumph of capitalism. above: “The rich are richer, and the poor
The perception of defeat on the left was are poorer” (DG 1). A participatory populist
bitterly present, but the difference was that part could be identified within this group,
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 173, January - March 2021, pp. 121-140Arturo Rodríguez Sáez 133
as some members wanted a political model (“the government is not close to the people”)
built from below, from the people, coexist- (DG13). The people vs. elite opposition was
ing with a populist part that supported a a structural feature of their discourse (“poli-
strong leadership. ticians have interests that the people do not
They were emotionally disconnected have” (DG1)). They intuited that bipartisans-
from the Constitution and a two-party sys- hip may create institutional endogamy: “they
tem. Their desire for change did not rely are not interested in changing the system”
on what has already been established; they (DG1). But the diagnosis of party cartelisa-
wanted an in-depth change instead. Their tion was accompanied by a sense of political
discourse was not based on the social is- impotence: “I do not know if the People have
sue, but on generational grounds. They were the power to change that...” (DG1).
positioned as representatives of a generatio- Regarding political decision-making, two
nal sentiment (“I believe that people today, different, but not contradictory views were
especially young people, are not much in fa- found. On the one hand, the participatory po-
vour of the current political system”). pulist groups believed that it was the people
The problem of unresponsiveness appea- who must directly make decisions. A view
red in practically all of the discursive state- framed within the aggregative democracy
ments recorded. This problem was always where decisions are to be made by “action
linked to the idea of the “people” as a unit of the people, by referendum” (DG13).
CHART 1. Group locations on the spectrum of ideological attitudes
Leftist Populist Field Centre Populist Field Rightist Populist Field
(DGs 1, 3, 4 and 13)
Leftist Border Field Borderline Field Core Rightist Border Field
(DGs 2, 14 and 15) (DG 12) (DGs 5 and 9)
Leftist Non-Populist Field Centre Non-Populist Field Rightist Non-Populist Field
(DGs 10, 11 and 16) (DGs 7, A and B) (DGs 6 and 8)
Source: Developed by the author based on an analysis of discussion group data.
On the other hand, the cartelisation-based Spain. It was hypothesised that the pos-
view held that there is a need for a leader who sible existence of a climate of populist at-
guides the popular masses: “there is always a titudes was the condition of possibility for
need for order, not a hierarchy, but someone populism to emerge. Based on the analysis
who guides the masses, right?” (DG1). of the groups, it was confirmed that, dur-
ing the 2011-2013 period, some attitudes
were found that this study has defined as
Conclusions populist; however, the results showed that,
in light of the available evidence, these atti-
Based on the theoretical premise that pop- tudes were still relatively diffuse and limited.
ulist attitudes are a fertile soil for populism, By applying the analytical conditions
this study has tested a series of hypothe- proposed to social discourses, it was ob-
ses. served that there were no social groups in
The main hypothesis was that prior to which the three theoretical elements oc-
the emergence of Podemos in 2014 there curred at the same time. This suggests
was a populist demand that could be acti- that it would be useful to rethink the way
vated and framed by this political actor in in which the literature addresses the na-
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 173, January - March 2021, pp. 121-140134 The Genesis of Populism in Spain between 2011 and 2013: A Demand-Side Analysis
ture of populist ideas at the social level. All decisive. The crisis of representation was
groups met the condition of being critical widespread, so it cannot be reduced to a
of the elite, albeit for different reasons. The sign of populism8. What can be affirmed is
rhetoric against politicians, sometimes with that it generated the symbolic conditions for
moral overtones, did not in itself express populism to appear. A set of heterogene-
a climate of populist attitudes, but rather a ous factors were involved in this process,
gap between political representatives and such as the perception of corruption, party
those represented. What is paradoxical is cartelisation, crisis management, the re-
that no group made laudatory speeches structuring of the Welfare State and the lack
about the people. This can be called the of power of governments in the face of the
paradox of the people: the people are sus- demands from international centres of eco-
picious of the people. This seems to be a nomic power.
blind spot in the literature that suggests a The crisis of representation that was ob-
new hypothesis that must be tested in other served indicated that there was a moment
contexts. Finally, populist ideas were found of high democratic uncertainty. I suggest
among those social groups where the elite that the crisis of representation is a demo-
were blamed for failing to enact the will of cratic symptom. Citizens protested against
the people, complying with the signalling politicians, but not against democracy. The
element of the culprit (the Other/Elite) and same is true of citizens with populist ten-
one of the Siamese conditions of the posi- dencies. The problem was related to the
tive moral pole of populism. Casting that actual functioning of democracy, not to the
shadow of the enemy was accompanied by ideal. Democracy appeared in all groups as
a monistic discourse. an insurmountable moral force. Rather than
Secondly, the study investigated the a populist moment, it could be argued that
possible social determinants of populist at- society was going through a democratic
titudes based on the hypothesis of the cri- moment. The populist binary code took root
sis of representation. This study has ques- within those consciences dissatisfied with
tioned those pieces of research that have the existing order, but all critical conscious-
focused exclusively on the globalisation hy- ness cannot be reduced to being signs of
pothesis. An initial approach showed that populism. Populist political attitudes are
the social groups where populist discourses born from the torn matrix of democracy.
were found corresponded to heterogene- Finally, the last hypothesis suggests that
ous social positions. Populist ideas did not populist demand was plural and was mod-
deterministically correlate with low levels ulated by ideology. It was found that there
of education, income, or occupation. This were notable differences based on this vari-
was evident among the precariat, the man- able. A discourse that pivoted around social
ual working classes, and the unemployed, questions seemed to prevail in the left-wing
groups that lacked populist drives. A latent populist space, while right-wing populism
populism was even detected which resided was only identified in a borderline area that
in middle-class professional sectors that indicated its then latent character. A proto
should have been sheltered from the most populism that was overdetermined by the
lacerating effects of the crisis. territorial question and immigration. Since
Regarding the expectation of finding the study was constructed on the premise
populism among those sectors that per- that the social question was a great trig-
ceived that the political system was not
sensitive, or was not capable of respond- 8 CIS Survey 2941 (2012). The political class was the
ing to their demands, the results were not third most serious problem for the respondents.
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 173, January - March 2021, pp. 121-140Arturo Rodríguez Sáez 135
ger for populism9, this information was un- Boscán, Guillermo; Llamazares, Iván and Wiese-
expected. It should not be forgotten that in homeier, Nina (2018). “Populist Attitudes, Pol-
those years the nationalist conflict did not icy Preferences, and Party Systems in Spain,
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RECEPTION: April 21, 2019
REVIEW: September 16, 2019
ACCEPTANCE: May 13, 2020
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