The Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis
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CLOSUP Student Working Paper Series
Number 37
April 2018
The Role of National and State Actors in the
Cape Town Water Crisis
Grant Rivas, University of Michigan
This paper is available online at http://closup.umich.edu
Papers in the CLOSUP Student Working Paper Series are written by students at the University of Michigan.
This paper was submitted as part of the Winter 2018 course PubPol 495 Energy and Environmental Policy Research,
that is part of the CLOSUP in the Classroom Initiative.
Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect
the view of the Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy or any sponsoring agency
Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy
Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy
University of MichiganThe Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis
Grant Rivas
Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy
Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy
April 25th, 2018The Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 1
Abstract:
A combination of rapid population growth, lack of proactive water management policy,
and prolonged drought have put Cape Town, South Africa on the verge of becoming the first
major, global city to effectively run out of water, a crisis projected to threaten more cities in the
future due to changing climate patterns. This paper analyzes the public statements of officials
from the African National Congress and Democratic Alliance—the two major political parties
within South Africa— to examine how conflict between government actors at both the national
and state level affected the management of the Cape Town water crisis. To study this issue, the
paper specifically examines actors’ discussion of assigning responsibility for the crisis and
identifying potential policy solutions. From this analysis, the paper finds that actors from both
parties attempted to leverage the crisis as a political tool and that their discussion has primarily
revolved around blaming political opponents rather than identifying solutions. These findings
show the importance of collaboration between both discrete branches of government and rival
political parties during crisis situations. It also emphasizes the need for world leaders to
proactively plan against future droughts and other natural disasters potentially worsened by
climate change.The Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 2
Introduction:
Sub-Saharan Africa has long struggled with water stress and scarcity due to the primarily
dry, arid regional climate. Only 22-34% of the Sub-Saharan population has access to clean
drinking water and much of the region’s supply is largely dependent on both annual weather
patterns and population growth (Tatlock, 2006). A lack of water has been detrimental to the
region’s growth from both economic and human development perspectives because water
scarcity creates public health concerns and threatens agricultural production. In addition, the
recent War in Darfur, Sudan, which has already killed over 300,000 people and displaced
another 3,000,000, was largely started as a result of limited access to clean water (Darfur
Conflict, 2014).
While this issue is already critical, the scientific community largely concurs that global
climate change will create more extreme, variable weather patterns including severe, extended
droughts and massive heat waves (Infographic: Extreme Weather, 2012). Climate change will
especially impact drought vulnerable areas like Sub-Saharan Africa and exacerbate issues which
already severely inhibit the region’s development. Indeed, the UNEP projects that over 50% of
the African continent is projected to suffer from greater water scarcity and stress by the year
2025 (Africa Water Vision 2025, 2009).
Many researchers also concur that rapid population growth within countries puts even
greater strain on water availability than climate change (Lall, 2010). Sub-Saharan Africa is
expected to have its population more than double over the next 40 years, making it even more
vulnerable to increased water scarcity (Pflanz, 2013). Organizations like the UN have already
begun to prepare for the effect of population growth on water scarcity by instituting initiatives
like the International Decade of Action: Water for Life, a project focused on increasing theThe Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 3
amount of available drinking water by addressing issues such as population growth (UNDESA,
2014).
While climate change and population growth will exacerbate the threat of water scarcity
in the coming years, some regions within Sub-Saharan Africa may already be experiencing the
adverse effects of these patterns. Cape Town, the capital and most populous city of South Africa,
is on the verge of reaching so-called “Day Zero”—the day at which the city will effectively run
out of available drinking water. Cape Town has not had historically high rates of access to water,
but severe, unprecedented drought in recent years has left the city in a state of crisis.
Additionally, the city’s population doubled over a 15-year period from 1996-2011, putting even
more pressure on water sources and infrastructure (Peterson, 2016). These factors have lowered
dam levels in Cape Town from over 70% in 2014 to just over 20% today (City of Cape Town,
2018). On Day Zero, the city will run below the requisite 13.5% capacity of supply dams and
shut off water services for almost all of the over four million residents of Cape Town.
Figure 1:
(Bohatch, 2017)
The local government has already been implementing measures to decrease water
consumption and prepare for the potential of Day Zero. For example, while the government has
long advertised voluntary limitations on water consumption, it has more recently enforced strictThe Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 4
water regulations, currently limiting individuals to 13 gallons of water per day. 1 Additionally, the
government has also begun to build water distribution centers outside most major grocery stores
and other local gathering places in preparation for the water shutoff (Winsor, 2018). As
described by the Chief of Cape Town's disaster operations center, Greg Pillay, “We’ve identified
four risks: water shortages, sanitation failures, disease outbreaks and anarchy due to competition
for scarce resources...in my 40 years in emergency services, this is the biggest crisis" (Watts,
2018).
Individuals have also taken initiative to avoid Day Zero, mobilizing their communities to
conserve water by doing things like crafting water distribution tools to help locals gather water at
natural springs across the city (McKenzie and Swails, 2018). These efforts have helped Cape
Town decrease daily water consumption by over 60% from 1.2 billion liters to now only 510
liters of water (Winsor, 2018). Although Day Zero was originally projected to occur in Spring
2018, projections now show that Cape Town may have delayed it until early 2019. Moreover, if
the drought ends sometime in the next few years, Cape Town may yet have hope to avoid
becoming the first major global city to run out of water (McKenzie and Swails, 2018).
While recent results have been promising, it is still too soon to consider Cape Town safe
from reaching Day Zero. Further policy intervention is needed to not only mitigate the continued
overconsumption of water in many wealthy neighborhoods of Cape Town but also identify new,
sustainable sources of water for the city’s future. However, infighting between national political
parties makes identifying and implementing policy solutions a challenge.
This paper attempts to study how various actors from the two major political parties
within the South African government discuss the water scarcity crisis in Cape Town. It does this
1
For reference, Americans use between 80-100 gallons of water per day on average (Winsor, 2018).The Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 5
by looking at articles in African newspapers describing the crisis and studying the language used
by actors to assign responsibility and propose future policy solutions. The deviant case of Cape
Town is worthy of academic study so as to analyze and examine the circumstances surrounding a
crisis that many other major cities—including Los Angeles, London, and San Paulo—may soon
face as a result of climate change and population growth (Frisk, 2018).
Literature Review:
The amount of literature written on policy responses to severe climate and weather is
large and continuously growing. Changing climate and weather patterns have presented new
challenges for policy makers across a number of fields including water resource management.
Articles such as Dai (2013) demonstrate that climate change has increased the number and
severity of global droughts in recent years and show that the number of severe, widespread
droughts is projected to increase over the next 30-90 years. This work emphasizes that it is
important to study current examples of extreme drought—such as Cape Town— as more cities
may face similar changes in future years.
Gerlak (2006) studies the broader history of water management policy in the United
States, specifically trying to answer how the struggle between federal oversight and local
autonomy affects water management. The author looks at five different “streams” of water
management in the United States and conducts broader case studies about how policy differed
throughout different points in history. From this analysis, Gerlak (2006) suggests that a policy of
pragmatic federalism dominates US water management policy and encourages both collaborative
partnerships between federal and local institutions as well as a problem-oriented approach. ThisThe Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 6
article highlights the importance of the relationship between national and local institutions in
water management policy and the challenges that a non-collaborative approach creates.
Other papers have begun to research the effectiveness of water management policies by
looking at individual cases like California, which recently experienced a prolonged, severe
drought. Specifically, Palazzo et al. (2017) attempts to answer why 50% of urban water districts
in California did not meet their individual conservation target, despite the overall state reducing
water usage by over 25%. The paper uses a series of regression analyses to compare water
reduction in different districts with other variables. Results from this analysis showed that a
variety of economic, environmental and institutional factors affected districts’ relative levels of
water usage reduction. Among the most prominent factors affecting water usage reduction were
median income, drought severity, and prior levels of water usage. These findings demonstrate
that it is crucial to study how individual actors and communities are affected by drought policy
as there can be great variation among groups.
Tortajada et al. (2017) also examines the California drought as a case study, using it to
examine how decision-making and resource availability affected resiliency building. The paper
defines resilience in the context of climate change as the ability of social and ecological systems
to adapt and change while still retaining the same basic structure or ways of functioning. The
authors view coping responses and resiliency building as essential for communities adapting to
climate change and looks at responses from actors—primarily in agriculture and government—
during the California drought to examine resilient behavior. The paper overlays agricultural
production and weather pattern data with policy decisions to understand the implications of
various decisions. Tortajada et al. (2017) considers California’s response to the drought to have
been relatively successful and points to decentralized decision making and shared responsibilityThe Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 7
for water management amongst multiple institutions as among the reasons for this success. It
also calls for advanced preparation for policy and institutional responses for future crises in not
just California but other regions as well, considering the changing global climate.
Like Tortajada et al. (2017), Crase and Cooper (2017) conduct a case study to better
understand the success of different water resource management policies during severe droughts.
Specifically, Crase and Cooper (2017) attempt to determine the direction of contemporary water
management interventions by studying different policies introduced by the Australian
Government during the Millennium Drought from the mid 1990s-2010.The paper primarily
studies the country’s water policies and the drought’s impact on them rather than the new
policies implemented to directly address the drought. It utilizes a framework that examines a
number of areas such as urban, agricultural, and environmental water use and ultimately argues
that increased connectivity between water users with varying levels of demand—such as farmers
and urban dwellers—has the potential to increase adaptability among consumers and reduce the
impact of water scarcity. This study again demonstrates the value of studying the relationship
between different actors and suggests that more communal solutions to crisis may help limit the
impact of droughts.
Unlike other case studies, McLeman et al. (2008) does not look to modern examples of
climate change, but past deviant climate phenomena. During the mid-1930s the state of
Oklahoma experienced a disastrous mix of harsh drought and heavy rain that caused widespread
crop failure, economic collapse, and general hardship in rural communities. By using a variety of
primary and secondary sources, McLeman et al. (2008) examines how communities responded to
extreme climate changes paying particular attention to the scale of adaption, the roles of various
actors, and limitations of adaptation. The paper’s findings suggest that rural communities mayThe Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 8
have more adaptive potential than is generally perceived and that government should play a more
active role in supporting at-risk communities both in advance of and during extreme weather
situations. Although this case may seem slightly outdated, identifying the successes and failures
of past policy makers after requisite time is given to fully understand the implications of their
decisions is valuable for approaching climate change related challenges. In the context of new
research, McLeman et al. (2008) is also valuable as a framework for examining the role of actors
and community in adapting to extreme climate.
Specifically looking at past droughts in South Africa, O’Farrell et al. (2009) uses a case
study to look at what policies the South African government and smaller institutions adopted
during previous droughts to better understand historical approaches to these crises. Considering
droughts are only expected to become more frequent in future years, this paper also asks what
past practices suggest for the future of drought management. To answer these questions, the
paper uses a framework that studies how actors evade, respond to, and endure droughts as well as
context for how broader, racial challenges in the country have contributed to these policies.
Based off its analysis, O’Farrell et al. (2009) suggests that policy makers must urgently address
drought preparedness given the state’s current inability to adequately address the issue and
global weather patterns. Among other proposals, they suggest that South Africa must build social
and institutional capacity, strive for a broader culture of sustainability, and embed drought-
coping mechanisms into land restitution policies.
The literature both emphasizes the importance of research into drought management
policy and the role of individual actors in setting the policy landscape (Crase and Cooper, 2017
and McLeman et al, 2008). In addition, it suggests that a collaborative relationship between
government bodies is essential to effective management (Gerlak, 2006 and Tortajada et al, 2017).The Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 9
This paper uses past research as a framework to build upon the existing literature and study how
the role of national and state actors affects the Cape Town water crisis. In conducting this
analysis, the paper not only furthers understanding of the role of government actors and
institutions in managing drought crisis but also applies current theories to what may become the
most severe and drastic instance of drought in modern history.
Methods:
As discussed in the introduction, the current water crisis occurring in Cape Town, South
Africa is exceptional and worthy of academic study given broader changes in the Earth’s climate
and population growth patterns in the region. This case study into the crisis attempts to answer
the following research question: how does political conflict between government actors affect
policy outcomes in crisis situations? To answer this question, I will use a framework that studies
how South African government officials from both the African National Congress (ANC) and
Democratic Alliance (DA)—the two major political parties of South Africa—have discussed and
responded to the crisis.
Similar to that described in Seawright and Gerring (2008), this paper is an example of a
deviant case study. A deviant case is one that strongly differs from normal outcomes and my
case qualifies as deviant because Cape Town may well become the first major city on the planet
to effectively run out of water. By analyzing this deviant case, I hope to draw conclusions about
how Cape Town might have avoided this outcome, what the city might do moving forward, and
what steps other major cities can take to avoid similar situations.
I look at newspaper articles to collect data and better understand how relevant actors are
talking about the crisis. I give local Cape Town newspapers priority over internationalThe Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 10
publications to give the most accurate and comprehensive view of political actors’ opinions. A
variety of major South African newspapers were sourced in this research to limit editorial bias by
authors.
South Africa is governed as a parliamentary republic, where the democratically elected
Parliament of South Africa nominate a President, who serves as both the head of state and head
of government. Additionally, the nine provinces of South Africa each have their own provincial
parliaments, led by a Premier. In terms of actors, this paper will be looking at the two major
political parties in South Africa, the African National Congress and Democratic Alliance.
Members of the ANC serve as Premier in eight of the nine South African provinces. Cyril
Ramaphosa, the new President of South Africa, is also a member of the ANC and leads their
strong majority in the National Parliament. While the DA is the minority in Parliament, they
control many senior government positions throughout the Western Cape—the provincial home of
Cape Town—including Premier.
Since universal suffrage was established in 1994, the African National Congress has been
the national ruling party of South Africa and generally held consistent control of most South
African provinces. The party of Nelson Mandela, the ANC has maintained prominence for
decades and was the leading opposition group during the apartheid era. While the party does not
have much provincial authority in the Western Cape, it still maintains control over national
resources and agencies relevant to crisis management. While there are fewer notable actors from
the ANC than the DA in relation to the crisis, Nomvula Mokonyane, the former Minister in the
Department of Water and Sanitation, and Cyril Ramaphosa, the new President of South Africa,
are amongst the most relevant leaders in the crisis.The Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 11
The Democratic Alliance has controlled the Western Cape province and Cape Town for
much of the past decade and its current leaders are largely those who have been in power since
the beginning of the crisis. The DA is considered to be the successor to the apartheid National
Party and has a substantial number of white elites among its base. The three most relevant actors
of the DA are Patricia de Lille, Mayor of Cape Town since 2011; Mmusi Maimane, the party
leader of the DA; and Helen Zille, current Premier of the Western Cape as well as former DA
leader and Mayor of Cape Town. While these three actors are the most prominent in regard to the
crisis, this paper will also examine the view of some secondary actors within the Democratic
Alliance
As described above, my framework will specifically study the opinions of these actors
across two specific elements: assigning responsibility and identifying future policy solutions. I
define assigning responsibility as who groups perceive as most liable for allowing the current
crisis to become so dire. Assigning responsibility was chosen to be one of the elements
researched because it will best demonstrate how political conflict inhibits the government’s
ability to adequately address the issue. It also provides valuable historical analysis about who
different actors perceive as responsible for the mistakes that ultimately resulted in the current
water crisis.
I define identifying policy solutions as the policies actors believe the government should
implement to ameliorate the situation. Identifying policy solutions was selected as the second
element because it will best demonstrate the opinions of party leaders about next steps and
highlight how political tension affects policymaking. I am curious how differences in opinions
about what needs to be done both between and within parties will affect the government’s ability
to respond to the crisis.The Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 12
Results:
African National Congress (ANC):
Nomvula Mokonyane:
Nomvula Mokonyane served as the Minister in the Department of Water and Sanitation
from May 2014 through January 2018 and was a prominent cabinet member in former President
Jacob Zuma's government. As Minister in the Department of Water and Sanitation, she oversaw
the agency within the national government most responsible for addressing the Cape Town crisis.
Mokonyane was the senior stakeholder within the ANC responsible for managing the Cape
Town crisis for almost four years and was one of the leading voices working to prevent Day Zero
(Cruywagen, 2018a). Mokonyane notably holds an optimistic perspective that Day Zero can be
avoided and that the city does not need to take a fatalist approach towards the crisis, instead
arguing that it can be avoided if proper action is taken (Chambers, 2018a). She has been heavily
criticized for this comment as well as for not making the issue a greater priority in her
department earlier (Deklerk, 2018).
Mokonyane places blame on Mmusi Maimane (the party leader of the DA) and Helen
Zille (current Premier of the Western Cape) claiming that they have misused appropriated funds
for desalination plants and that the crisis is largely a result of government mismanagement rather
than natural disaster. She argues that the DA-led Western Cape government is to blame and that
her national agency has taken the appropriate steps to support the province (Jordan, 2018).
Mokonyane also explicitly notes that she does not hold Cape Town mayor Patricia de Lille
exclusively responsible for the crisis and believes that DA leadership is using her as a scapegoat
for their mismanagement (Cruywagen, 2018a).The Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 13
As noted above, Mokonyane views mismanagement as the biggest cause of the crisis and
thinks that better policies directed at limiting mismanagement will be most effective in
mitigating the crisis. Prior to leaving her role as minister, her most notable decision was to
support the Berg River-Voëlvlei Augmentation scheme as outlined in the National Water Act
(Speckman, 2018). This scheme would divert some water from the Berg River to provide
drinkable water to the Western Cape (Department of Water Affairs, 2012). Additionally,
Mokonyane has approved some plans for desalination plants in the Western Cape (Deklerk,
2018). Mokonyane frequently makes broad requests of the city to limit wasteful
overconsumption and do the little things that will save water. Despite these efforts, she has been
highly criticized on many fronts for focusing too much on long term solutions and not taking
short term considerations of citizens seriously enough (Chambers, 2018b).
Cyril Ramaphosa
Cyril Ramaphosa recently assumed office as President of South Africa in the wake of
former President Jacob Zuma’s corruption scandal. Ramaphosa has been an influential member
of the ANC since the apartheid era and was notably Nelson Mandela’s choice for President in the
1990s (Parker, 2018). He most recently served as Deputy President of South Africa from 2014-
2018 until being voted in as President by the National Assembly in February 2018. Although
Ramaphosa is new to his leadership position, he has made Cape Town’s crisis one of his premier
issues (Mabuza, 2018).
Thus far, Ramaphosa has blamed climate change for the crisis, pointing out how the
sustained drought is proof for any remaining climate change deniers that they must take the issue
seriously (Cyril Reassures, 2018). His discussion of the crisis has not focused on finding blame
in past leaders but rather on uniting policymakers around shared goals. Ramaphosa has not yetThe Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 14
put forth major policy proposals to address the crisis, but has rather used vague, general language
describing how he is building working teams and prioritizing the issue with his cabinet. For
example, in an interview given on CNN shortly before he assumed the presidency, Ramaphosa
stated, “I'm going back home and I'm going to corral as many people as possible to put our heads
together and see exactly what we should be doing, not only in the immediate term, but also in the
long term” (It’s Cyril to the Rescue, 2018). Ramaphosa has also inserted new leadership to
address the crisis at the national level, appointing Gugile Nkwinti as the new Minister in the
Department of Water and Sanitation and making Nomvula Mokonyane the new Communications
Minister (News Just In, 2018).
ANC Leadership:
Having led South Africa for the vast majority of the crisis, former President Jacob Zuma
has notably said little in relationship to the crisis 2. He had frequently been asked by both
constituents and critics to declare the crisis a state of emergency but ultimately failed to act
(Laing, 2018a). Other ANC leaders, including provincial chairperson Khaya Magaxa and Former
health MEC Theuns Botha, blame the opposition DA's leadership for the crisis, specifically
criticizing Mmusi Maimane, Helen Zille, and Ian Neilson (ANC Wants Zille's Head, 2018). Des
van Rooyen, Minister of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs, revealed that the
Western Cape government spent only 24% of funds allocated towards drought relief. While he
did not assign blame to specific individuals in the party, he claimed that this underspending was
unacceptable and inhibited his ability to lobby for additional resources from the National
Treasury (Reasons given for drought relief underspend, 2018).
2
Jacob Zuma served as the fourth President of South Africa from May 9, 2009 to February 14, 2018. He resigned
from office after facing a vote of no confidence in Parliament and is currently being prosecuted for corruption
charges (York, 2018).The Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 15
The Democratic Alliance (DA):
Patricia de Lille:
Patricia de Lille is the current Mayor of Cape Town and has historically been viewed as
one of the most revered politicians in South Africa due to her investigation of a controversial
arms deal (du Plessis, 2010). However, she has drawn strong criticism for handling of the Cape
Town crisis. In an op-ed for Business Day: South Africa titled “Lack of Rain Not My Fault”, de
Lille argues that the administration should not be criticized for the crisis in Cape Town as the
administration has implemented many policies that have helped Cape Town drastically reduce
the amount of water consumed (de Lille, 2018). Ultimately, she argues that she cannot make it
rain in the city and that she is limited in her ability to fully address the crisis.
De Lille has resisted blaming any groups or constituencies for creating the crisis and has
urged the city to identify united solutions rather than focus on assigning blame. Representatives
of her administration have largely supported the mayor’s position, although some officials,
including Deputy Mayor Ian Neilson, have accused agriculture businesses, of exacerbating the
crisis (Kahn, 2018).
The Mayor has been taking steps for years to encourage conscientious use of potable
water and has increasingly placed water restrictions on citizens up to the current limit of 13
gallons per day (De Lille: Save resources, 2017). She has emphasized policies focusing on
“building resilience” and shifting away from surface water dependency to new options like water
re-use, groundwater alternatives, and desalination (Water Scarcity, 2017). However, while the
mayor has been devoting funds towards desalination, she does not believe that this is a
sustainable long-term solution for the crisis (Deklerk, 2017). De Lille has noted that recycledThe Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 16
water may be an especially important alternative for businesses that depend on water like
manufacturing and construction companies (Taking Major Steps, 2017).
Some initiatives supported by de Lille, specifically a proposed tax on wealthier
individuals with higher water usage levels, have not been implemented due to resistance from the
City Council (Phakathi, 2018a). As is further discussed in the following section, in-party fighting
has made it challenging for de Lille to act on the issue, having been removed from her role as
head of managing the water crisis (Mzantsi, 2018). Political conflict has risen to the point where
de Lille now plans to write a “tell all” book discussing political infighting within the DA in
relation to the Cape Town crisis (Nombembe, 2018).
Mmusi Maimane and Helen Zille:
As the two most prominent leaders in the DA, both Maimane and Zille frequently work in
lock step and hold similar stances on issues. Both consider the crisis to be of the utmost
importance with Zille going so far as to say it “exceeds anything a major city has had to face
anywhere in the world since the Second World War or 9/11” (Chambers, 2018a). Although both
hold substantial roles in the government, they have rarely taken responsibility for any blame,
instead primarily directing their criticism at Minister Mokonyane, Mayor de Lille, and the
broader national government led by the ANC (Jordan, 2018).
Specifically, the DA’s leaders have criticized Mokonyane and her Department of Water
and Sanitation for failing to update infrastructure and provide augmentation schemes to prevent
water shortages. In regard to Mokonyane and the broader ANC’s handling of the situation, Zille
claimed that the crisis demonstrated how out of touch the national government is with the day to
day experience of citizens and questioned what authority they had to intervene in the issue.
Mokonyane deflected these claims by arguing that Zille and Maimane were trying “to shield theThe Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 17
province and their organization from accountability on the water crisis by shifting blame on the
issue to national government” and that her main priority was preventing Day Zero (Deklerk,
2018).
They have also greatly criticized de Lille for not creating more stringent water
restrictions sooner and have removed her from her role as lead of the drought response team
because she withheld key information from both counselors and the party (Praise, criticism from
DA, 2018). After the ANC proposed a vote of no confidence in de Lille’s leadership, the DA
shockingly supported their motion (Phakathi, 2018b). However, this ultimately resulted in the
ANC withdrawing their motion, as ANC leadership did not want to allow DA leadership to
scapegoat De Lille and defer responsibility of the crisis onto a single representative.
Maimane’s role as Leader of the DA does not give him any formal government role and
he has been criticized for overstepping his bounds and interfering in the day-to-day operations of
addressing the crisis (Cruywagen, 2018b). Maimane has also been for his lack of specific,
“advanced solutions” (Maimane has ‘No Advanced Solutions’, 2018). Thus far, Maimane has
only publicly suggested that conserving water is key in preventing Day Zero (Cruywagen,
2018b).
Zille has also not strongly endorsed particular policy solutions as much as demanded
change from government actors in their approach to the crisis (Praise, criticism from DA, 2018).
For example, Zille was a noted critic of the National Treasury for only allocating roughly 500
million USD to drought relief, claiming that the funds were relatively insignificant given the
scope of the crisis (Drought Relief Allocation, 2018). Additionally, while she has not truly
offered alternative solutions, she has been highly critical of the desalination plants proposed by
Nomvula Mokonyane, impeding the development of these projects (Govender, 2018). Zille hasThe Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 18
also devoted many of her comments to discussing management plans for when the city does run
out of water instead of discussing potential strategies to avert the crisis. Some of these plans
include stationing soldiers at all water distribution points to limit disorder (Soldiers to guard,
2018). Furthermore, Zille has infrequently promoted strategies for conserving water, such as
exclusively using grey water in toilet cisterns (Cape Town Water Crisis Persists, 2018).
DA Leadership:
While Patricia de Lille, Mmusi Maimane, and Helen Zille are the three actors within the
DA most responsible for managing the crisis, other party members within the provincial and city
government are also working to address water scarcity. JP Smith, the Head of Safety and
Security in Cape Town, did not assign blame to either party, but rather noted that residents in
affluent areas have not significantly cut back on their water usage. He believes that getting
wealthy residents to stop watering their lawns among other strategies would drastically reduce
the amount of water needed in Cape Town (Laing, 2018b). City of Cape Town deputy mayor Ian
Neilson frequently notes how reduced water usage by citizens provides the best opportunity for
preventing Day Zero. Additionally, Nielson is cautiously optimistic that winter rains will
alleviate current concerns (Pather, 2018).
Analysis:
As summarized in Figure 2 below, analyzing the discussion of ANC and DA leaders
around assigning blame and identifying potential solutions demonstrates that there are divergent
opinions among senior South African political leaders. To further academic understanding of
how political conflict between government actors affects policy in crisis situations, this paper
now examines what the data specifically suggests about the effects of both partisan conflict andThe Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 19
federalism on policy outcomes. Additionally, it studies what this discussion implies about the
future of the Cape Town water crisis.
Figure 2: Summary of Opinions of ANC and DA Leadership
Actors Party Position Assigning Identifying Policy
Responsibility Solutions
Nomvula ANC Former Minister Mismanagement by Berg River-Voëlvlei
Mokonyane in the DA-led city and Augmentation scheme,
Department of Western Cape limited support for
Water and government desalination plants
Sanitation
Cyril ANC President of Climate Change and Broad solutions, ie
Ramaphosa South Africa drought building working teams
ANC ANC - Financial Better management of
Leadership mismanagement by government funds
DA Leadership
Patricia de DA Mayor of Cape Resisted blaming Conservative water
Lille Town others usage by residents
Mmusi DA Party Leader of Mismanagement by Limited policy
Maimane and the DA and ANC (Mokonyane) proposals. primarily
Helen Zille Premier of the and de Lille focus discussion around
Western Cape managing water
distribution after Day
Zero
DA DA - Overconsumption by Conservative water
Leadership wealthy residents usage by residents
Partisan Conflict and Federalism
The data clearly demonstrates that there is a strong difference in opinion between ANC
and DA leaders around who is responsible for allowing the crisis to become critical. As shown
above, Nomvula Mokonyane suggested that local government mismanagement is mostThe Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 20
responsible for causing a crisis situation. Des van Rooyen further argued that the Western Cape
government has not fully allocated funds intended to address the crisis. These comments are in
direct contradiction to those of Mmusi Maimane and Helen Zille, both of whom view
Mokonyane’s department and the broader national government as having done too little too late
to help the nearly four million Cape Town residents threatened by water scarcity.
While South Africa is far from the only country that suffers from partisan conflict, it is
important to note the contextual factors driving high levels of politicization. The Western Cape is
the only province consistently won by the DA, and the ANC views the water crisis as an
opportunity to take over a DA stronghold and further political control over South Africa. The DA
brands itself as the party of good governance and limited corruption, further explaining why the
ANC has shown willingness to attack them for their mismanagement (ANC Hatches Plan, 2018).
Conversely, in the wake of President Zuma’s scandals, the DA believes they have an opportune
window to take national power if they are able to properly frame the ANC as incompetent and
corrupt (York, 2018). These factors have created a political environment in which leadership
members from both parties devote substantially more of their public comments to blaming
political opponents rather than discussing practical policy solutions.
As discussed in several reviewed articles, many Capetonians perceive this “blame game”
between the ANC and the DA as a direct cause of the government’s inability to adequately
respond to the crisis (Deklerk, 2018 and Jordan, 2018). Despite both parties’ attempts to divert
responsibility, the perception that they are playing politics rather than solving issues has
damaged their legitimacy among voters, especially in the Western Cape (DA’s Day Zero, 2018).
Gerlak (2006) and Tortajada et al. (2017) highlight that effective collaboration between federal
and local governments is most effective in addressing drought crises, and the failure of SouthThe Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 21
Africa’s political leadership to set aside political concerns in favor of implementing effective
policy ignores lessons learned from previous droughts.
Furthermore, there is clear intra-party conflict within the DA that mitigates their ability to
effectively govern Cape Town during the crisis. Mmusi Maimane, Helen Zille, and the broader
DA leadership direct any criticism of their party’s governance toward Mayor Patricia de Lille,
who they believe has been ineffective in her management and leadership. Conflict between these
two wings of the DA forced policy makers to devote much of their time towards initiatives such
as removing de Lille from office instead of focusing all efforts on the crisis. Nomvula
Mokonyane also noted how Maimane and Zille’s willingness to scapegoat de Lille rather than
take accountability for their mismanagement creates further conflict and shows how DA
leadership has prioritized their own personal popularity over good governance. Again, Gerlak
(2006) and Tortajada et al. (2017) note how collaboration between institutions is essential in
drought management, and in-party fighting within the DA further inhibits different branches of
the South African government to jointly craft policies.
The Cape Town case also highlights the importance of clearly defined roles between
national and provincial governments in a federal model. Mmusi Maimane, Patricia de Lille, and
Nomvula Mokonyane have all simultaneously been criticized for overstepping the scope of their
positions and not doing enough to address the crisis (Praise, criticism from DA, 2018 and
Cruywagen, 2018b). This shows how the blurred line between what different institutions are
responsible for in relation to the drought has created confusion around accountability.
As shown in articles such as O’Farrell et al. (2009), South Africa has long known that it
was threatened by the potential of prolonged drought and an inability to hold specific politicians
and institutions accountable for their mismanagement inhibits Cape Town’s ability to makeThe Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 22
progress in addressing water scarcity. A lack of clearly defined roles also prevents both the
federal and provincial government from implementing practical solutions because branches are
not able to take full ownership of policy outcomes. This is best demonstrated in how
disagreement between Nomvula Mokonyane, Patricia de Lille, and Helen Zille about the
viability of desalination plants prevented South Africa from taking a clear stance on this policy
proposal (Govender, 2018). While Cape Town is less than thirty years removed from apartheid
and still an evolving democracy, more clearly defined division between the responsibilities of the
provincial government and national ministries would better enable actors to create policy
changes.
Cape Town Going Forward
In addition to the partisan and federal conflict described in the previous section, leading
actors have proposed surprisingly few policy solutions thus far. As shown in Figure 2, leaders
such as Cyril Ramaphosa have only proposed broad ideas such as building teams to address the
crisis. Other actors such as Ian Neilson and Patricia de Lille have not put forth many proposals
about how to increase water supply, but rather focused their attention on how to curb
overconsumption. Mmusi Maimane and Helen Zille most notably proposed almost no policies
intended to prevent the crisis, instead primarily discussing how best to manage water distribution
if Day Zero does arrive. Even when legitimate policy proposals are discussed, a lack of clear
direction and agreement from ANC and DA party officials prevents full implementation of
projects such as desalination plants (Govender, 2018).
It is clear from these actors’ discussion of potential policy solutions that there is not one
clear path to preventing Day Zero. However, while there may not be a singular policy that will
fix the Cape Town water crisis, there are still lessons that both current and future policymakersThe Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 23
should take away from this analysis and the literature reviewed. As noted by Deputy Mayor Ian
Neilson, affluent residents have not mitigated their water usage in light of the crisis. Palazzo et
al. (2017) discussed how there have been other past examples of wealthy communities not
limiting their water usage in drought crises and continuing water intensive practices such as
maintaining front lawns. This is problematic because less affluent communities are
disproportionately required to adjust their lifestyle during droughts. Especially when considering
South Africa’s history of apartheid and the DA’s perceived role as the party of white elites, the
South African government has an obligation to implement policies that ensure at-risk
communities are not disproportionately responsible for limiting Cape Town’s water usage.
While the data demonstrates that is there are a limited number of plausible, impactful
policy options available to current actors in South Africa, this does not mean that there are not
steps governments can take to prevent water scarcity crises in light of climate change. As argued
in O’Farrell et al. (2009), proactive drought preparedness policies are most effective in limiting
damage caused by droughts for countries in already water-scarce regions such as South Africa.
Policymakers in other countries should take note of the limited options available to Cape Town
and appropriately take steps to improve infrastructure, promote resilience building in
communities, and develop a culture of sustainability prior to the onset of droughts.
Conclusion:
By specifically examining the case of the Cape Town water crisis, this paper furthers
academic understanding of how political conflict between government actors affects policy
outcomes in crisis situations. In analyzing divergent opinions of leaders within the African
National Congress and the Democratic Alliance, it demonstrated how actors’ tendency to play
partisan politics rather than address key issues prevented the South African government fromThe Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 24
implementing effective policy solutions. However, this research was conducted as the crisis was
ongoing, creating limitations in its findings and a need for future research. The dynamism of this
case made it difficult to continuously monitor the opinions of key actors, especially when
considering that many were removed from office during the course of research. Indeed, President
Zuma’s removal from office drastically altered the South African political landscape and, at the
time of this paper’s submission, there is heavy speculation that Patricia de Lille may be forcibly
removed from office before the end of the week (Dentlinger, 2018). Additionally, over the past
two months, the date of Day Zero was pushed back at least six times.
Despite the limitations created by studying a current case, this research provides a
valuable, historical perspective of how actors and journalists perceived the crisis as it was
ongoing. Future research into the crisis should expand on this paper’s methods as new actors and
proposals enter into the policy arena. Furthermore, researchers should also study how political
conflict between actors affects water management policy in countries other than South Africa to
better understand how crises are affected by different government models. Cities ranging from
London to San Paulo are projected to face similar crises in the near future and it would be
valuable to understand how countries with differing levels of development and institutional
maturity cope with water scarcity (Frisk, 2018). Finally, it would be valuable to look back and
examine who past actors in South Africa viewed as responsible for preventing crises and what
policies they proposed to limit the threat of drought. Researching their opinions and failures
would help policymakers in similarly water threatened countries avoid the same mistakes made
by South Africa.
The scope of this paper was not intended to compare different potential policy solutions
and thus, does not make specific recommendations about what policies South Africa shouldThe Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 25 implement to address the crisis. However, it does identify clear takeaways that both current and future policymakers should recognize in regard to the policymaking process and broader water management policy. This case study clearly demonstrates the tangible, negative impact that political conflict has in relation to instituting impactful policy measures and exemplifies how damaging it is to use a crisis situation as a political tool. Partisan politics are unavoidable in most any country, but in natural disaster situations with the potential for catastrophe, policymakers would be most successful in setting political differences aside and focusing on collaborative solutions. This principle applies to both inter and intra-party conflict. Above all, this paper highlights how desperate a situation becomes when policy makers are not actively strategizing to address water scarcity in advance of a serious drought. With so many cities throughout Sub- Saharan Africa and many other regions of the world at increased risk of water scarcity due to changing climate patterns, policy makers should be proactively working to identify new sources of water and implement progressive water resource management programs before they face the same challenges as Cape Town.
The Role of National and State Actors in the Cape Town Water Crisis 26
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