20 Korea needs a flexible, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific vision Dr Kyungjin Song
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VOL
20
Korea needs a flexible,
inclusive, and prosperous
Indo-Pacific vision
Dr Kyungjin Song
INDO-PACIFIC ANALYSIS BRIEFS 2021
INDO-PACIFIC ANALYSIS BRIEFS 2021
The Perth USAsia Centre’s Indo-Pacific Analysis Briefs seek to provide perceptive and contemporary
insights from across the region. The series features leading analysts from Asia, Australia and the
US to deliver up-to-the-minute assessments on issues of national and regional importance. This
series will shine a light on the issues that remain critically important to Australia and the Indo-
Pacific at a time when global events may otherwise dominate the news cycle.
AUTHOR Dr Kyungjin Song
Director of the Innovative Economy Forum
Dr. Kyungjin Song is Director of the Innovative Economy Forum and was President of the Institute
for Global Economics in Seoul.
She served the Government of the Republic of Korea in various capacities. From 2009-2011 she
served as special adviser to the Chairman of the Presidential Committee for the Seoul G20 Summit
in the Office of the President. She oversaw the entire production of the official White Paper of the
G20 Seoul Summit in 2010. She worked as special assistant to the Special Economic Adviser to the
President in the Office of the President 2008-2009. From 2004 to 2008, she worked in the Ministry
of Finance and Economy as foreign press spokesperson. She also served as special adviser to the
Chairman & CEO of the Korea International Trade Association from 2011-2012.
Dr. Song writes columns for Korea’s daily newspapers in Korean and English. She also writes for
international newspapers occasionally.
Dr. Song was awarded the Korean Government’s Order of Civil Service Merit for her outstanding
achievements in June 2011.
Korea needs a flexible, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific vision 3
KEY POINTS
→ The recent US-Korea 2+2 Meeting in Seoul has reignited questions over
whether Korea should adopt a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy and engage the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
4
→ Participation in an expanded Quad would assist Korea in dealing with critical
regional issues including the Korean Peninsula and economic coercion from any
regional powers including China
Korea needs a flexible, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific vision
→ Korea has been reluctant to align itself with the Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Strategy over concerns of angering China and North Korea by joining what is
perceived to be an anti-China initiative
→ Korea can enhance its strategic weight by building upon its existing New
Southern Policy to develop its own Indo-Pacific Vision
→ In order to expand, the Quad should broaden its scope and become more
accommodating to reluctant countries who are concerned over great power rivalry
The recent Republic of Korea-United States Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) has
given rise to renewed interest in Seoul as to whether or not Korea should officially endorse
the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy and engage with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
(Quad). South Korean Foreign Minister Chung Eui-young and Defense Minister Suh Wook met
with their US counterparts Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd
Austin in Seoul on 17 March 2021 to discuss the Korea-US bilateral relationship.
Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Korea’s Strategic Ambiguity
When the Trump administration revived its Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy and reengaged
with the Quad in 2017, the Korean government and the intellectual community did not pay much
attention to it. At the outset of the Moon Jae-in administration in 2017, when asked by local
press about the possibility of Korea joining the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy, the then economic
adviser to the President and head of the Presidential Committee on the New Southern Policy
(NSP) Kim Hyun-chul said Korea need not be part of it1. That answer was in line with the Korean
government’s stance of “strategic ambiguity,” reinforced further after the bitter economic
retaliation by China to Korea’s deployment of the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense)
in 2017, which has not been withdrawn yet.
The Korean government had little intention to become involved in what was considered a US-
led anti-China strategy at the expense of enormous economic gains from its trade with China,
which accounts for a quarter of its total exports.
Furthermore, a trust deficit caused by the Trump’s undermining
of the Korea-US alliance, including the exorbitant demand for
increased defense burden sharing has caused reluctance for Korea
to more closely align with the US2.
The THAAD incident and the unreasonable demand for military burden sharing are still
remembered by many Koreans as tell-all indications of the Trump administration’s disrespect
for the Korea-US alliance. Nonetheless, findings of a favourability survey conducted by theAsan Institute for Policy Studies in December 2020 demonstrate a positive attitude of Koreans
towards the new Biden administration. When asked about the preferences between the United
States and China, 73.2% of the respondents preferred to strengthen cooperation with the United
States, whereas only 10.4% did with China3.
The Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Korea-US Alliance 5
When Joe Biden was elected, most nations in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world had
a sigh of relief, hoping for a swift return to normalcy and a departure from Trump’s transaction-
based diplomacy. President Biden made it clear that while pursuing value-based diplomacy, his
Korea needs a flexible, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific vision
administration would succeed Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy in viewing China as a revisionist
power and would deal with it from a position of strength in cooperation with allies and partners.
This was well illustrated in a February speech in which Biden promised to “take on directly
the challenges posed on [US] prosperity, security, and democratic values by our most serious
competitor, China.”4
Biden also provided a new dimension to US-China relations by introducing the notion of China
as a serious competitor and a situational cooperator. The US will work with China when it is
in America’s interest, such as addressing climate issues and tackling the COVID-19 pandemic
while continuing to counter its aggressive and coercive action. A similar stance of competition
and issue-based engagement was allegedly observed on the part of China at the United States-
China Anchorage talks between Secretary Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan
and China’s most senior foreign policy official Yang Jiechi and Foreign Minister Wang Yi on
March 18-19. While fierce competition is highly likely between the two great powers, bilateral
engagement and cooperation cannot be ruled out yet.
The Biden Administration has encouraged the Korean government
to stand with the US against Chinese coercion, stressing the
importance of promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific to address
the issues critical to the Korean Peninsula, the region and across
the world.
2+2 talks also addressed the need for closer Korea-US collaboration to protect freedom,
democracy, human rights and the rule of law, as well as of strengthening the Korea-US alliance
and US-Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation. This stance has been reiterated by the US across
various levels of government, first by President Biden in a phone call with President Moon, then
by Secretary Blinken to Foreign Minister Kang, and again at the recent 2+2 meeting5.
Korea’s Dilemma with the Indo-Pacific and the Quad
With the first ever Quad Leaders Meeting6 on 12 March, there were intensifying calls in Seoul for
Korea to engage in a policy dialogue pertaining to its stance on the Indo-Pacific and the Quad.
However, these calls were often unheard or ignored until the Korea-US 2+2 Meeting was held.
With both initiatives broadly seen as US-led anti-China apparatuses, the Korean government
has kept a low profile on the matter in favour of cautious approaches towards China and North
Korea. Korea maintains that there has been no formal request from the United States to endorse
the Indo-Pacific Strategy or engage with the Quad, as evidenced by the omission of the Quad
from the Joint Statement7 of the 2+2 meeting.
A fissure between Korea and the US was manifested when Secretary Blinken responded to the
question of Quad in an interview8 with a Korean media. Unlike his Korean counterpart, Blinken
admitted that the United States is “working closely with Korea on its own strategy for the South
(New Southern Policy), toward finding ways to cooperate … with the Quad as well.” This lack of
cohesion proved an alarm bell for the urgent need to recalibrate the Korea-US alliance toward
restoring mutual trust and cooperation.Box 1 Except from Joint Statement of ROK-US Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting
Against the backdrop of increasing challenges to the regional security
environment, the shared values of the ROK-U.S. Alliance undergird the
6 two countries’ commitment to opposing all activities that undermine
and destabilize the rules-based international order. The ROK and the
United States emphasized that they remain united in their shared
Korea needs a flexible, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific vision
commitment to maintaining peace and stability, unimpeded lawful
commerce, and respect for international law. The ROK and the United
States reiterated their resolve to continue to work together to create a
free and open Indo-Pacific region through cooperation with the ROK’s
New Southern Policy. The two countries are united in their dedication
to support ASEAN centrality and other regional efforts. Both sides
acknowledged the contributions of ongoing bilateral dialogues to
expanding regional coordination with the Pacific Island countries and in
the Mekong sub-region.
Source: US State Department9
The need for Korea’s own vision for the Indo-Pacific and the Quad
With the Indo-Pacific region increasingly becoming the center of global geopolitics, geoeconomics
and geostrategy, Korea is feeling at a loss by the rapid changes in US-China relations and the
regional dynamics which will not allow it to maintain “strategic ambiguity.” There are, however,
compelling reasons10 why Korea should put its own flexible, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-
Pacific vision in place in support of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific and join the Quad in a more
proactive manner.
First, Korea’s principle-based diplomacy and the United States’ value-based diplomacy
converge. Both countries are full democracies driven by shared values such as human rights,
peace, security, prosperity and the rules-based order in the region. Korea is an authoritarian-
country-turned-a-full-democracy with economic success benefitting from the rules-based
international order that is now being challenged.
It is thus critically important for Korea to establish a set of its own
principles and terms for a flexible, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-
Pacific corresponding to the spirit of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific,
on which it will decide on joining the Indo-Pacific and the Quad, free
from coercion of any great power.
Second, there are areas of convergence between Korea’s New Southern Policy and the US-Indo-
Pacific Strategy that can be leveraged. For all intents and purposes, the NSP is a collection
of bilateral trade, economic and people-to-people cooperation arrangements between Korea,
ASEAN countries and India, whereas the Indo-Pacific strategy is a comprehensive set of policies
encompassing a wide range of realms based on shared values and interests. While the NSP
would not constitute a vision as comprehensive as the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, it would form
the basis for an economic and trade subset of Korea’s Indo-Pacific vision.Given that the NSP is under the jurisdiction of an ad-hoc presidential committee that may
be destined to vanish into thin air, its sustainability is always under question. This provides
a pressing need for Korea’s Indo-Pacific vision for the sake of keeping the NSP itself intact,
as well.
Third, an Indo-Pacific strategy will provide Korea with strategic autonomy and thus enhanced
leverage in US-China competition and cooperation, keeping it from being swung from one end 7
to the other by any great power. Also, Korea engaging with the Free and Open Indo-Pacific and
the Quad will greatly help mend deteriorating relations with Japan, an active proponent of the
Free and Open Indo-Pacific and by extension boost Korea-US-Japan trilateral cooperation.
Korea needs a flexible, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific vision
Fourth, Korea will be able to meet the expectations of the international community by
contributing more to the shared values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in
tandem with its economic weight. This would provide Korea with a seat at the table on important
regional issues, especially in the forthcoming Quad’s vaccine expert working group, critical and
emerging technology working group, and climate working group.
Conclusion: Priorities for Promoting the Indo-Pacific and the Quad
Anything perceived, even wrongly, as being “anti-China” may find hard time persuading the
current Korean government to accept it. If Washington and the Quad members are serious
about inviting Korea to the forum11, they must consider delivering the following which can and
will apply to other non-Quad countries.
• Broaden the scope of its agenda from military/security issues to include economic,
governance and universal values realms to invite greater international cooperation. This will
then help dilute the image of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific and the Quad as pure anti-
China initiatives. A good example is the thirteen meetings convened in 2020 between the
Quad members and Korea, New Zealand and Vietnam to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic. It
is a positive signal that Blinken already acknowledged that the Quad is about more than one
particular challenge.
• Encourage non-Quad members like Korea to develop and be equipped with their own vision
of the Indo-Pacific and the Quad. This will allow the concerned countries more room for
maneuver in accordance with their national interests. The leaders at the Quad summit
reaffirmed their strong support for the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific in “the spirit of
the Quad”12 that is free, open, and rules-based. That not all the Indo-Pacific strategies are
in exact sync with one another is a positive factor for non-Quad countries. For example,
India’s Indo-Pacific vision is an enabler for a common pursuit of progress and prosperity,
not directed against any country and based on principles and commitment to the rule of law.
• Ensure that the Quad is a flexible group of like-minded partners dedicated to advancing a
common vision and ensuring peace and prosperity in the region and around the globe.
The above recommendations will facilitate reluctant countries like Korea to be more proactive
on the Indo-Pacific and the Quad without compromising its core national interests. Working
towards this end will ensure that the Indo-Pacific is a truly free, open and inclusive initiative for
regional and global stability.8
Korea needs a flexible, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific vision
Endnotes
1 Yoo Ji-hye & Kang Tae-hwa (2017), ‘Korea-US Summit announcement “Indo-Pacific Line”… Blue House does not agree, JoongAng
Ilbo, 10 November, https://news.joins.com/article/22101646#none
2 Kyle Springer (2020), ‘Embracing the Indo-Pacific? South Korea’s progress towards a regional strategy’, Perth USAsia Centre, https://
perthusasia.edu.au/our-work/embracing-the-indo-pacific-south-korea%e2%80%99s-progress
3 James J Kim & Chungku Kang (2021), ‘South Korean Outlook on the United States and ROK-U.S. Relations in the Biden Era,’ The
Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 10 February, http://en.asaninst.org/contents/south-korean-outlook-on-the-united-states-and-rok-u-s-
relations-in-the-biden-era/
4 Joseph R. Biden (2021), ‘America’s Place in the World,’ The White House, 4 February, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/
5 US State Department (2021), ‘Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong Before Their
Meeting’ (2021), US State Department, 17 March, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-republic-of-korea-foreign-
minister-chung-eui-yong-before-their-meeting/
6 Joe Biden, Narendra Modi, Scott Morrison & Yoshihide Suga (2021), ‘Our four nations are committed to a free, open, secure and
prosperous Indo-Pacific region,’ The Washington Post, 14 March https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/03/13/biden-modi-
morrison-suga-quad-nations-indo-pacific/
7 US State Department, (2021) ‘Joint Statement of the 2021 Republic of Korea-United States Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting
(“2+2”)’, US State Department, 18 March, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-of-the-2021-republic-of-korea-united-states-foreign-
and-defense-ministerial-meeting-22/
8 US State Department (2021), ‘Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Yang Man-Hee of Seoul Broadcasting System’ (2021), US State
Department, 18 March, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-with-yang-man-hee-of-seoul-broadcasting-system/
9 US State Department, (2021) ‘Joint Statement of the 2021 Republic of Korea-United States Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting
(“2+2”)’, US State Department, 18 March, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-of-the-2021-republic-of-korea-united-states-foreign-
and-defense-ministerial-meeting-22/
10 Ramon Pacheco Pardo (2021), ‘South Korea would benefit from joining a Quad+,’ Center for Strategic and International Studies,
26 February, https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-korea-would-benefit-joining-quad
11 James Park (2021), ‘Biden Should Embrace South Korea’s Strategic Nondecision on the Quad,’ The Diplomat, 5 March, https://
thediplomat.com/2021/03/biden-should-embrace-south-koreas-strategic-nondecision-on-the-quad/
12 US State Department (2021), ‘Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: “The Spirit of the Quad”,’12 March, https://au.usembassy.gov/quad-
leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad/About the Perth USAsia Centre
The Perth USAsia Centre located at The University of Western Australia is a non-partisan, not-
for-profit institution strengthening relationships and strategic thinking between Australia, the
Indo-Pacific and the USA. The Centre is a leading think tank focusing on geopolitical issues,
policy development and building a strategic affairs community across government, business
and academia. Since the Centre’s inception in 2013, we have collaborated with over forty 9
partners to convene more than four hundred programs across sixteen cities in eight countries,
engaging a world-class community of over 10,000 strategic thinkers and policy leaders.
Korea needs a flexible, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific vision
For more information, contact: Dr Jeffrey Wilson, Research Director, jeffrey.wilson@perthuasia.edu.au
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