Beyond internal conflict: The emergent practice of climate security
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Journal of Peace Research
2021, Vol. 58(1) 186–194
Beyond internal conflict: The emergent ª The Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
practice of climate security sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0022343320971019
journals.sagepub.com/home/jpr
Joshua W Busby
LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Austin-Texas
Abstract
The field of climate and security has matured over the past 15 years, moving from the margins of academic research
and policy discussion to become a more prominent concern for the international community. The practice of climate
and security has a broad set of concerns extending beyond climate change and armed conflict. Different national
governments, international organizations, and forums have sought to mainstream climate security concerns empha-
sizing a variety of challenges, including the risks to military bases, existential risks to low-lying island countries,
resource competition, humanitarian emergencies, shocks to food security, migration, transboundary water manage-
ment, and the risks of unintended consequences from climate policies. Despite greater awareness of these risks, the
field still lacks good insights about what to do with these concerns, particularly in ‘fragile’ states with low capacity and
exclusive political institutions.
Keywords
climate change, climate security, environmental security, human security
During a visit to the Pacific island nation of Tuvalu in security; and third, how policy can be made more effec-
2019, UN Secretary-General António Guterres wrote on tive going forward.
Twitter: ‘We must stop Tuvalu from sinking and the
world from sinking with Tuvalu’ (United Nations,
The challenges
2019). Guterres underscored the existential risks of cli-
mate change for low-lying island countries. In so doing, The emergent practice has identified a broad suite of
the Secretary-General demonstrated that practitioners climate security challenges, ranging from the operational
have a more expansive set of concerns than whether implications for specific military bases to the existential
climate change leads to violent conflict, the primary challenges for some countries and regions. The links
focus of much academic research (Gleditsch, 2021). between climate change and internal conflict – both civil
Climate-related internal conflict still remains a central wars and communal conflicts – still have a central place
focus for practitioners. That said, we still know little in the conversation as evinced by several United Nations
about how to prevent climate-related conflicts from Security Council resolutions for ongoing conflicts in
starting or how to stop them once they start, though Africa. A 2015 report for the G-7 identified seven
academics have more understanding now of risk factors. sources of what they described as ‘compound climate-
Both the practice and study of climate security (or cli- fragility risks’, climate risks that when combined with
mate security, for shorthand) need to develop more les- other sources of state fragility can lead to negative con-
sons of what works to diminish conflict risks and wider sequences including local resource competition, liveli-
threats to human security. To understand where the hood insecurity and migration, extreme weather events
practice of climate security should go, this essay is and disasters, volatile food prices and provision,
divided into three parts: first, the suite of climate security
challenges policymakers have identified; second, a short Corresponding author:
overview of the emergent practice of climate and busbyj@utexas.eduBusby 187 transboundary water management, sea-level rise and dis- atolls may become uninhabitable by 2050 if saltwater placement, and unintended effects of climate policies overtops aquifers and makes it impossible to grow crops (Rüttinger et al., 2015: viii–x). or secure fresh water (Storlazzi et al., 2018). Such risks Part of this more encompassing set of climate security constitute threats to the continued existence of some concerns is a function of a greater willingness of practi- states, even leaving aside human security impacts. tioners to embrace human security and move beyond a Indeed, countries have made preliminary preparations traditional focus on state security. A focus on human for managed retreat by securing land overseas (in Fiji, security constitutes a broadening in two directions, sub- in Kiribati’s case). stantively away from conventional security threats (mov- Even if their existence is not threatened, other coun- ing beyond armed attacks to encompass environmental tries face extensive risks because of large populations and change) and whose security is of concern (moving valuable infrastructure located near coasts. Former US beyond states to the security of individuals and commu- Vice President Al Gore dramatized these risks in his nities). While the concept has been critiqued for being slideshow projections of future climate change (Gore, wooly (Paris, 2001, 2004; Busby, 2008), a human secu- 2006). Accurately estimating these risks requires projec- rity lens draws attention to how climate change can lead tions of emissions and sea-level rise, adequate representa- to negative consequences for people, even if state security tions of elevation, and good population maps and is not challenged (Adger et al., 2021). The most severe forecasts. A 2019 study corrected some standard biases threat of course is loss of life, and extreme weather events in digital elevation models to estimate the number of such as swift onset storms and even slower onset people likely living in expanded flood zones in a variety droughts can lead to large-scale fatalities. Calls to of emissions scenarios. In the high emissions scenario, broaden or redefine security date back to the 1980s (Ull- they found that some 340 million people would be living man, 1983). With other concerns like the coronavirus below annual flood levels (or below high tide) by mid- also contributing to large-scale death and economic dis- century, up from 250 million today – between 18% and ruption, policymakers have increasingly accepted that 32% in China alone (Kulp & Strauss, 2019). health and environmental threats can constitute security The risks to coastal populations extend beyond sea- concerns. There is, of course, a longstanding debate level rise. A study estimated 625 million lived in low about the merits of securitizing environmental and other elevation coastal zones in 2000 (less than 10 meters problems, because of the potential for threat inflation, above sea-level), with that number expanding to between the use of emergency procedures for security problems, 879 million and nearly 950 million by 2030 under dif- and the risks of reinforcing nationalist approaches to ferent population growth scenarios (Neumann et al., collective problem-solving (Deudney, 1990). 2015). The risks of sea-level rise are magnified by storm This recognition of the security consequences of surge and hurricanes/cyclonic activity. Large coastal climate change led the Intergovernmental Panel on populations in the United States are at grave risk of Climate Change (IPCC), in its Fifth Assessment Report, storms and hurricanes, extending from Texas along the to include a chapter on human security, defined as Gulf Coast to Florida and up the eastern seaboard to protecting the ‘vital core’ of human lives, which include New York. In 2017, three storms in succession – Har- material and non-material aspects (Adger et al., 2014). vey, Irma, and Maria – collectively caused more than The IPCC chapter included but was not limited to the $250 billion in damages and thousands of deaths, and links between climate and conflict. While the treatment required the mobilization of tens of thousands of the went further than this author would have to include military for humanitarian rescue and response (Rice, threats to cultural survival, the chapter signaled the pol- 2018). The island of Puerto Rico, a US possession, had icy community’s broader interests beyond the study of its electricity grid destroyed, with thousands of residents climate–conflict links. experiencing prolonged power outages over the next Among those security risks are the existential threats year. The densely populated areas off the Bay of Bengal to low-lying island countries from sea-level rise, saltwater bordering India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar have expe- intrusion, and coastal inundation from storms. These rienced intense cyclonic activity, with large-scale loss of risks constitute both human security concerns and life, though much less in recent decades for India and threats to state security. In traditional national security Bangladesh. Myanmar experienced catastrophic losses of parlance, states worry that armed external attacks might more than 140,000 lives when Cyclone Nargis battered lead to their countries ceasing to exist as independent the Irrawaddy Delta in 2008. The impacts of climate units. Some studies suggest a number of Pacific island change on hurricanes has been a contentious issue
188 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 58(1)
among scientists, but the linkages have become clearer and led to damages in excess of $16.5 billion (Rice,
over time (Mooney, 2007). While some of these risks 2019). Other climate risks include riverine flooding,
can be managed with early warning systems, cyclone which periodically upends the lives and livelihoods of
shelters, and other adaptive responses to climate-proof hundreds of millions around the world and is likely get-
infrastructure, the enhanced risks of cyclones, along with ting worse as a result of more variable rains leading to
sea-level rise, may exacerbate the habitability problems of larger downpours. In 2010, Pakistan, for example, expe-
some coastal locations. rienced severe flooding that led to the displacement of
These risks of habitability extend beyond islands and more than 1.5 million with disruptive effects on as many
coastal areas. Wallace-Wells surveyed a variety of exis- as 20 million people (Schaffer & Dixon, 2010). In July
tential challenges to parts of humanity in his evocative 2020, seasonal flooding in China led to the temporary
essay and later book The Uninhabitable Earth (Wallace- displacement of more than 40 million people, with con-
Wells, 2017, 2019). As he noted, some studies warn that cerns that the Three Gorges Dam might fail, potentially
rising temperatures will make regions of the world in leading to catastrophic loss of life downstream (Tan,
South Asia and the Middle East uninhabitable by stres- 2020). While the climate signal in this particular episode
sing crop production, reducing freshwater aquifers, and is unclear, flood risks are among the various large-scale
by making regions so hot that it will be difficult for threats to loss of life from climate-related hazards.
people to spend extended periods of time outdoors. One The impacts on loss of life and livelihoods from cli-
study, using a mid-range scenario for climate change mate hazards and disasters are clearly significant human
(RCP4.5), found that under a range of population and security issues, but are they national security issues? One
economic growth scenarios, between 1.62 billion and of the concerns associated with climate-related extreme
2.49 billion would face mean annual temperatures in weather events is population displacement within or
excess of 29 degrees Celsius (84 degrees Fahrenheit) by across borders. People may be forced from their homes
2070 and would be displaced from what is considered temporarily or permanently as a result of climate change.
the normal range of conditions habitable for human Whether climate migrants are likely to engage in conflict
beings. The Saharan desert, for comparison, has a mean or become targets of violence has been vigorously
annual temperature of 30 degrees Celsius (Xu et al., debated by academics (Reuveny, 2007; Raleigh, Jordan
2020). & Salehyan, 2008; Koubi et al., 2016). The large pop-
Another study on South Asia examined the intersec- ulation movements triggered by drought in Syria, and
tion of heat and humidity and suggested that the upper whether these movements contributed to the civil war,
bound for human habitability is 35 degrees Celsius with have been particularly contentious (Gleick, 2014; Kelley
even 31 degrees Celsius dangerous for human beings. A et al., 2015; Selby et al., 2017).
temperature of 34.4 degrees Celsius with 80% humidity Even if the contribution of climate migrants to con-
can feel more like nearly 54 degrees Celsius or 129 flict is unresolved, security practitioners are concerned
degrees Fahrenheit, and it can be quite dangerous if about the dislocative effects of large-scale migration,
people are unable to cool down. A 2015 heat wave in whether it be pastoralists searching for better grazing
India and Pakistan had a wet-bulb temperature of 50 land and water potentially coming into conflict with
degrees Celsius and killed 3,500 (Leahy, 2017). This settled agriculturalists or internal or cross-border move-
study suggested that, for a high-end emissions scenario ments of people seeking to escape from extreme weather
(RCP8.5), nearly 30% of the population in the agricul- events. Prior to the coronavirus, the rise of populist
turally rich Indus and Ganges river valleys would face a nationalism had created dangerous political dynamics
median temperature of 31 C by 2100 compared to only in the United States and a number of European coun-
2% in the RCP4.5 scenario (Im, Pal & Eltahir, 2017), tries. For example, climate change has been implicated
which underscores the importance of actions taken today by analysts in the migration decisions of farmers from
to limit emissions to the lower-range scenarios. Central America (Leutert, 2018), and the militarized
Climate risks that threaten human existence extend response of the Trump administration to those migrants
beyond sea-level rise and temperature increases. As the had profound implications for regional security in Cen-
United States has witnessed in recent years, the spread of tral America. Even if the reasons for migration are not
populations to forest-rich environments has put many environmental, displaced populations may be at risk of
communities at risk of wildfires, a risk accentuated by climate hazards. After 700,000 Rohingya fled Myanmar
rising temperatures and disrupted rainfall patterns. In in 2017 in response to ethnic cleansing, they found
2018, the Camp Fire in California claimed some 85 lives themselves at risk of storms and cyclones in their newBusby 189
location in Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh, raising human minerals important for clean energy systems, land use
security concerns (Grunebaum, 2019). Moreover, their issues associated with biofuels and REDDþ forest con-
presence in Bangladesh creates an ongoing source of servation initiatives, and short-run adaptive responses
interstate tension. that may exacerbate environmental damage to forests,
Even where populations do not migrate, practitioners water, and land (Dabelko et al., 2013). These potential
worry about the effects on lives and livelihoods, partic- impacts underscore the distributional impacts of deci-
ularly for agriculturally dependent communities, which sions made to address climate change, both mitigation
may face severe food security deficits from growing sea- and adaptation, which could be as, if not more, conse-
sons disrupted by climate extremes and variability. Scien- quential than the physical impacts of climate change
tists project major declines in land productivity and crop itself.
production under a range of climate scenarios, as crop-
growing becomes more difficult as growing conditions
deviate from those required by their crops (Iglesias, The practice of climate and security
Quiroga & Diz, 2011). In countries with inadequate Policy discussions about the links between climate and
famine prevention and response capability, these impacts security date back to the mid-2000s but have matured as
can be severe. In the wake of a drought that began in late different governments and international organizations
2010, Somalia experienced an estimated 260,000 excess have sought to mainstream climate security concerns.
deaths from famine (Checchi & Robinson, 2013). A community of practice has emerged among think
Somalia’s situation of course was exacerbated by the tanks, led by organizations such as the US-based Center
long-running civil war between a weak government and for Climate and Security and CNA’s Military Advisory
the al Shabaab insurgency. This example itself suggests Board, the German-based adelphi, and the Stockholm
food security is not simply one of human security but is International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).1
bound up with wider issues of state security. Indeed, one Among governments, the United States has paid sig-
of the core findings of recent climate security research is nificant attention to climate risks, particularly of its own
the risk of internal conflict in agriculturally dependent military bases but also its overseas interests. The Obama
societies (von Uexkull et al., 2016). So, even if the initial administration issued numerous reports highlighting the
effects are on human security, they may escalate to state risks for bases, missions, and training, with thematic
security threats under certain conditions. reports on the Arctic, food security, and water security,
Security risks also extend to food importers who may as well as branch-specific risks for the Navy and the
face higher global prices if climate disruptions increase Combatant Commands (Busby, 2016). Climate and
prices on key foodstuffs like wheat. The effects of security received presidential attention through executive
drought and disrupted agricultural exports on global actions, though subsequently rescinded by the Trump
food prices were implicated in the onset of the Arab administration (Scata, 2017; Calma, 2019). While atten-
Spring protest movements (Lagi, Bertrand & Bar-Yam, tion waned in the Trump era, the specific vulnerabilities
2011). Though states may insulate their populations of US military bases continued to be investigated
from these effects through social policies (Hendrix & (Department of Defense, 2018, 2019).
Haggard, 2015), academic research has found support Climate security concerns are not limited to the
for the increased risks of riots and protests if global prices United States. The United Kingdom, Germany, several
are passed on to domestic consumers (Smith, 2014). Scandinavian governments, and countries in Oceania
Beyond the social and political effects of climate have been especially worried. Among advanced indus-
impacts themselves, an emergent concern is the potential trialized countries, these concerns coalesced with the
for maladaptation and unintended negative conse- 2015 report for the G-7 mentioned above (Rüttinger
quences of responses to climate change that may lead et al., 2015).
to negative security consequences (Swatuk & Wirkus, At the Security Council, several member states have
2018; Swatuk et al., 2020). Russia for example reacted sought to create space for discussing climate and security.
to a 2010 drought by banning grain exports, which con-
tributed to the spike in global food prices that preceded 1
Other efforts include the Planetary Security Initiative, a Dutch-
the Arab Spring. The Wilson Center published a survey
government funded effort that hosted four annual conferences from
of this ‘backdraft’ potential of unintended consequences, 2015 to 2019. A wider international community of practice has been
which included discussion of land grabs, geo- developed through the Climate Security Expert Network and the
engineering, potential conflict over lithium and other International Military Council on Climate and Security.190 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 58(1)
The first such discussion, prompted by the United King- management institutions can reduce conflict risks by
dom, occurred in 2007. At the time, the connections allocating water, dealing with shocks, and resolving dis-
between climate and security were not well understood. putes (Tir & Stinnett, 2012; De Stefano et al., 2017). As
Some member states such as Russia and China resisted with the Indus River Treaty between India and Pakistan,
calls for the Security Council to broach the topic. Since such institutions can endure despite tensions on other
then, the Security Council has more frequently held matters. The policy agenda here is to build such institu-
focused discussions on climate and security, including tions in basins where they are lacking and to deepen
both formal ‘open debates’ and several ‘Arria-formula’ institutions where they exist. In the contemporary dis-
informal sessions (Climate Security Expert Network, pute over Ethiopia’s construction of the Grand Renais-
n.d.). Several ongoing UN peacebuilding and peacekeep- sance Dam, analysts recommend building a more
ing missions have in their mandate renewals been tasked inclusive institutional architecture: legacy agreements
by the Security Council to report on climate-related prioritized water access of Egypt and Sudan, leaving
security risks, including the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, other riparians such as Ethiopia with little say over water
Somalia, Mali, and Sudan (Eklöw & Krampe, 2019). access (Krampe et al., 2020).
Support from Sweden, Germany, and other states For other climate security concerns, particularly with
ultimately coalesced in the creation of the Climate Secu- respect to famines and cyclone risks, there are also well-
rity Mechanism at the United Nations in 2018, a tripar- established policies for addressing human security. These
tite arrangement of the United Nations Development include early warning systems, hazard specific interven-
Programme, the United Nations Environmental Pro- tions such as cyclone shelters, pre-placement of emer-
gramme (UNEP), and the UN’s Department of Political gency supplies, social support mechanisms such as
and Peacebuilding Affairs. In its first year plus, the CSM food-for-work schemes and cash transfers, and disaster
sought to mainstream climate security concerns in the risk reduction strategies such as better building codes
wider UN (United Nations Climate Security Mechan- (Cash et al., 2013; de Waal, 2018; United Nations
ism, 2020), building on more than a decade of UNEP’s Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2019).
work on environmental peacebuilding (Jensen, 2019). In terms of internal conflicts potentially affected by
Other international and regional organizations are also climate change, we know less about what works (Busby,
grappling with what role they should play (Dellmuth 2018). As Dellmuth et al. (2017) note, ‘[w]hile IGOs are
et al., 2017). increasingly important, little is known about the condi-
tions under which they address climate security chal-
lenges, and when they do so effectively’. While
Towards more effective policy foresight and horizon-scanning studies of vulnerability
The discussion of threats and policy initiatives begs the are useful, the question is how they should inform sub-
question of what to do. The US climate security com- sequent action (Moran et al., 2018). Another study sum-
munity has developed a community of stakeholders who marized the problem for practitioners: ‘Yes, but so what?
understand the issue and convene regularly. The chal- What is the ministry for development, or foreign affairs,
lenges of working with the Trump administration have or defence, or environment supposed to do about it?’
reinforced a tendency to frame the issue in terms of (Smith et al., 2019).
impacts on the US military, its bases, and operations Environmental peacebuilding, which overlaps with
(Climate and Security Advisory Group, 2019). This the climate security field, may be one place to learn
emphasis may sideline other instruments of national lessons. Key insights focus on reducing competition
power like development, diplomacy, and humanitarian between groups over resources, better natural resource
assistance, which may be more important levers for management, and enhanced dispute resolution (UNEP,
addressing overseas impacts, and runs the risk of reinfor- 2012). Other ideas mentioned are for climate-related
cing international cleavages between countries. That adaptation/development projects to anticipate potential
emphasis may dissipate with the change in the US distributional consequences that might lead to conflict.
administration in 2021, but the temptation to emphasize On security, the guidance has emphasized how climate
the military dimensions of this problem for political pur- impacts can upend conflict resolution if peace plans are
poses remains. premised on resource availability or livelihood possibili-
Internationally, we still know little about what works ties that may no longer be tenable. Mainstreaming a
for several climate security risks. For transboundary riv- climate security perspective in existing development and
ers, we have an appreciation for how river basin security programming can help practitioners moreBusby 191
accurately diagnose drivers of conflict such as farmer– concerns, what policymakers are supposed to do with
herder violence (van Shaik et al., 2019). Studies of envi- awareness of the risks is less clear, particularly for fragile
ronmental peacebuilding focus on trust-building and states. Addressing climate security challenges in those
elevating the cooperative possibilities of managing and places requires a theory of state development. The liter-
sharing natural resources across borders or within coun- ature on fragile states has recognized that the attributes of
tries (Swain & Öjendal, 2018: 8). Support for mediation a classic Weberian state – that has reach over its entire
and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and pro- territory, is autonomous from society, and has bureau-
moting inclusive development and sustainable liveli- cratic capacity – may be totally or partially impossible in
hoods are among recommended strategies to rebuild fragile contexts (Giraudy, 2012). Scholars such as Alex
trust (Mobjörk & van Baalen, 2016; Krampe, 2019; de Waal have begun to theorize state development in
Vivekananda et al., 2019). In seeking to foster coopera- those places as a ‘patrimonial marketplace’, temporary
tion over resources, some environmental peacebuilding elite compacts of convenience brought about by patron-
approaches emphasize narrow technical cooperation with age (de Waal, 2009: 102).
the hope these activities will foster cooperation on a Under such circumstances, as Radin (2020: 9) argues,
wider range of issues, though this apolitical approach has international actors are most likely to be successful when
its detractors (Krampe, 2017; Ide, 2020). they press for changes that do not threaten core goals of
The climate security academic community has started domestic elites. These insights on fragile states need to be
to identify known risk factors for conflict, which include brought into the practice of climate security. What
recent conflict, weak state capacity, high agriculture would a viable path forward be for a country like Somalia
dependence, and high political exclusion (Theisen, Hol- or the conflict in the Lake Chad Basin? What is the
termann & Buhaug, 2012; von Uexkull et al., 2016; sequence of reform? Must the conflict end so the envi-
Busby & von Uexkull, 2018; Mach et al., 2019). The ronmental challenges can be dealt with or is dealing with
geography of at-risk countries generally encompasses the environmental problems a route to resolving the conflict?
‘shatter belt’ of fragile states that extends from the Sahel Here, we do not have a robust evidence base to draw on
across North Africa to the MENA region through Tur- from past practice. These are important research ques-
key to the Philippines (Buhaug, Gleditsch & Theisen, tions that would be of great practical value, but for which
2008). However, as contemporary experiences in Afgha- there are not obvious answers.
nistan, Iraq, and Somalia demonstrate, the international Finally, this discussion begs the question of what to do
community’s ability to build capacity and more inclusive about the existential climate risks facing some countries
political institutions in fragile states is fraught. Some and populations. Accepting that some countries need to
countries may be ripe for change only when an emergent relocate raises thorny questions: Would relocated coun-
domestic elite is interested in inclusive development, as tries re-establish sovereignty inside the domain of another
occurred in Ethiopia in the early 1990s. country? Would they lose access to resource-rich exclusive
There is a better record of targeted international sup- economic zones if they abandon their territorial holdings?
port for state capacity for specific purposes, as Ethiopia Before we necessarily accept that some places will become
built an impressive food security system and Bangladesh unlivable without massive investment, more in-depth risk
invested in cyclone early warning systems and shelters assessments of whether and at what cost places could
(Cash et al., 2013; de Waal, 2018). Those developments remain viable are warranted. Embracing managed retreat
required local actors with vision and political space to may undermine both local and international efforts to
take advantage of international assistance, a challenging support local adaptation, which is preferable (Barnett,
situation in countries with more fragile governance such 2017). In the meantime, scholars and practitioners of
as Somalia and countries surrounding Lake Chad. climate security should create more opportunities to
exchange information and ideas, lest academic findings
become divorced from what practitioners care about and
Conclusion policymakers support actions researchers believe have little
The emergent field of climate and security has gathered chance of success (Busby, 2018).
significant interest in a little more than a decade. Think
tanks and scholars have succeeded in making policy audi-
ences aware of the potential security impacts of climate Acknowledgments
change, as the first section on challenges demonstrated. I thank the editors and three anonymous reviewers for
Despite some fledgling efforts to address climate security the helpful comments on drafts of this article.192 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 58(1)
ORCID iD Rahman & M Aminur Rahman (2013) Reducing the
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